Shapur II

Since some of the Roman emperors launched massive religious prosecutions against Christians, a large number of them entered Iran during the rule of the Parthians. Christians even enjoyed a good opportunity to hold their religious affairs during the reign of the first Sassanid kings, especially Shapur I. However, Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire in the fourth century AD, there has been, for more than a century, a prevailing hypothesis among scholars of history that Shapur II placed Christians under intense religious prosecutions in the fourth century AD. The syriac testimonies dating back to the fifth century AD which traditionally dealt with this issue are the main sources show these prosecutions. With the assumption that such events have taken place and on the basis of it, some researchers, on the other hand, have attempted to interpret the limited resources left from the fourth century AD. Various related resources, including those of the fourth century AD and the Syriac testimonies have been examined, in present study, and it has been shown that there are many contradictions and prejudices in reports of Christian resources about the religious prosecutions were enacted during the reign of Shapur II that cause serious doubts about their credibility. Finally, it has been made clear that Christian rituals did not lead to extensive prosecution in that period and the Christian community continued to grow during the rule of Sassanid Empire.

The paper analyzes material on Persians and their beliefs as presented in the 7-th century universal history “The Book of the Main Points, of The History of the Temporal World” by the East Syriac monk John bar Penkaye.
The first part deals with so-called Zurvan myth in Syriac literature: its documentation, perception, sources, interpretations, and significance for the students of the religious landscape of Sasanian Iran. When Syriac authors write about Persian beliefs, it is usually the myth of Zurvan that they retell: a story how certain Zurvan engendered two sons, Ohrmazd and Ahriman, who created the world, the former -- all that is good and beautiful, and the latter -- all that is malign. Does this story that we find in Syriac sources reflect the actual religious practices of Sasanian Iran; can it be regarded as an example of the intercommunal relationship; how is it related to Theodore of Mopsuestia's lost tractate "Contra Magos": do they share a common source, or the tractate itself is the source? These and related questions are discussed in the first part of the paper.
The second part presents excerpts from the History on Cyrus II and Shapur II.

The Roman Empire historically obtained success on the battlefield through its
strategic offense ending with a decisive open field battle where the sword was the final
arbitrator. Amongst all the wars fought by the Roman Empire against Persia, the Nisibis
War (337-363) stands out as the first instance where Rome maintained a position of
strategic defense. After a twenty-four year defensive war, a change in Emperors (from
Constantius II to Julian) resulted in transition back to the strategic offense. Instead of
expected success based on historic experience this time Rome was decisively defeated
within six months. Historians have studied and analyzed the failed offense lead by
Emperor Julian the Apostate, but have generally neglected the overall conflict. This
neglect is surprising since up to this time of the Nisibis War the strategy was unique. The
use of the strategic defense by small frontier (limitanei) armies, based in fortified cities
and fortress, supported by maneuvers and limited operational and tactical offensives by
the Field (comitatus) Army of the East allowed the Eastern Roman Empire to survive the
advancing barbarians, as well as Persian and Muslim invaders until almost the 8th
century. This thesis will focus on the importance of the Nisibis War and its resulting
impact upon the defense of Rome’s Eastern provinces.

According to Ammianus Marcellinus, the battle headgear of Šāpūr II was decorated with ram’s horns. This information corresponds to original Persian iconographic sources. Ram’s horns as sacral royal regalia first appeared in Iran after the campaign of Alexander the Great who brought syncretic Greek-Egyptian cult of the ram-headed Zeus-Ammon to the Orient. The Alexander’s practice to use ram horns as an attribute of royal power was reborn in Sasanian times, but with a new religious and ideological (viz. Zoroastrian) sense. Obviously, Sasanians ingenuously believed that by this way they restored ancient Iranian tradition, while in reality they just filled with new content the phenomenon of the Hellenistic epoch.

The present chapter traces how the rabbis in the tractate of Hagigah developed the biblical commands concerning cultic pilgrimage into laws for a bygone Jerusalem temple pilgrimage to see and be seen by God. Our investigation points to how the desire for, and loss of, the sight of God’s face punctuates and centers the Babylonian Talmud tractate of Hagigah. The biblical commandment to "see the face of God three times a year" allowed the rabbis to conjure forms and narratives of pilgrimage in an age of Greek and Roman "visual piety" but without the Jerusalem temple. The chapter shows how in varying ways earlier and later rabbis construct a pilgrimage of reciprocal vision (in which pilgrim and god mutually behold and are beheld), particularly in the Babylonian Talmud which emphasizes "homovisuality."

The article is a contribution to the more than one-hundred-year-long discussion on the date of death of Simeon bar Sabba'e, metropolitan bishop of Seleucia-Ctesiphon, and the beginning of the persecution of Christians in Persia during the reign of Shapur II. The author stresses the point that the main source on Simeon's martyrdom is a hagiographical work and, as such, it should be interpreted strictly on the basis of the principles relevant to the genre. Taking some of the hypotheses formulated to date into consideration, the author holds the view that it is not possible to determine the precise date of Simeon's death. It could only be assumed that it must have occurred somewhere between February 344 and July 345, most likely in late 344.

From the early IV century AD, the eastern regions of Sasanian Iran, commonly referred to as Bactria-Tokharistan, were invaded by various hostile peoples. For that reason, the struggle against eastern foes became one of the most important vectors of Shapur II’s (309–379) foreign policy. An analysis of the primary sources shows that Shapur’s eastern campaigns were the result not so much of his pursuit of military expansion as that of the ethnopolitical processes in Bactria-Tokharistan and adjacent regions in the IV century AD. In this regard, the wars waged by Shapur II on the Iranian eastern frontiers were defensive rather than offensive in nature and could be divided into three steps. At the first stage (late 320’s – mid-330’s AD), they were caused by the necessity to put an end to the strengthening of Kushanshahr, which has evolved from a vassal principality to an independent state, pursuing a hostile policy towards Sasanian Iran. The second eastern campaign of Shapur II (350’s AD) was triggered by the invasion of Bactria-Tokharistan by nomadic tribes known as the Chionites, who not only occupied the territory of Kushanshahr but also claimed the eastern regions of Sasanian kingdom. The final phase of Shapur II’s wars in Eastern Iran (370’s AD) represented a military conflict with the Kidarites’ who, obviously, were the dynasty of Chionite origin too, but managed to establish their own realm on the territory of former Kushanshahr and some neighbor areas. The immediate result of all these events consisted in the loss of control over Bactria-Tokharistan by the Persians. In the longer-term, the Sasanids were forced for several decades (until the reign of Yazdegerd II) to give up the attempts to return this region into the sphere of their political influence.

The eastern territories of the Roman Empire, at the beginning of the third century, witnessed to the rise of the Sassanid Empire, which succeeded the Dynasty of Parthians. Like the Parthians, the Sassanids were continuously hostile with the
Romans. For this reason long-lasting wars took place between the Romans and Sassanids throughout the centuries. In this process, a Roman Emperor, Valerianus, was killed in captivity. Although between the end of the third century and the beginning of the fourth century the balance of power changed in favor of the Romans, when Constantine the Great died in 337, superiority of Romans come to an end. After this date, Constantius II took over the administration of the eastern lands of the Roman Empire. Meanwhile Shapur II, the longest reigning monarch of the Sassanid dynasty, was ruling the Sassanid Empire. The wars between Constantius II and Shapur II gained a different dimension when Constantius II died. Ongoing battle under dominance of Iulianus, when Iovianus came to power, completely stopped and protracted war turned into peace.
The main objective of this study is to emphasis on the historical Context of the war between Constantius II and Shapur II and to examine the changing ideology of Romans and also Sasanians after the peace.

This is a brief history of the wars of Šāpur II from the middle of the fourth century to the death of that king in the year 379. These conflicts represent the military operations of the Sasanid state at its height before a gradual decline under the successor to Šāpur II. I have tried to report the facts as best I can, and I invite criticism to correct any omissions, oversights, or infelicities of style.

The so-called “Night Battle” of Singara (344 AD) still remains poorly studied historical event because of discrepancies between the sources. The outcome of the battle is described in them with considerable discrepancies too. The analysis of the sources from the point of view of the “classical theory of war” elaborated by C. Clausewitz, unambiguously demonstrates that the winning side in this battle were the Persians.

В существующей историографии Шапур II Великий (309-379) воспринимается почти исключительно как царь-завоеватель, всё правление которого прошло в войнах с соседними странами и народами. В значительной степени это так, но совершенно очевидно и то, что столь высокий уровень внешней активности Ирана в годы правления Шапура II был бы невозможен без создания стабильно функционирующей административно-политической системы внутри страны. В связи с этим в статье рассматриваются основные направления и результаты внутриполитической деятельности Шапура II. С формальной точки зрения Шапур действовал в том же русле, что и его предшественники, сохраняя сложившуюся за столетие, истекшее с момента возникновения сасанидского Ирана, систему органов власти. Однако государственная идеология и религия подверглись в данный период весьма глубоким изменениям. В результате сасанидский Иран превратился в централизованное государство с сильной царской властью, что стало ключевым условием возобновления при Шапуре Великом широкой внешней экспансии, в ходе которой сасанидский Иран окончательно закрепил за собой статус одной из ведущих мировых держав эпохи Поздней античности.
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In the existing historiography, Sasanian shahanshah Shapur II the Great (309-379) is considered almost exclusively as a conqueror, whose entire reign passed in wars with neighboring countries and peoples. To a large extent, it is true, but it is also quite obvious that such a high level of Sasanians' external activity during the reign of Shapur II would not have been possible without the establishment of a stable and effective administrative and political system within the Iran itself. In this regard, the article examines the main directions and results of the internal policy of Shapur II. From a formal point of view, Shapur acted in the same way as his predecessors, preserving the system of government that has developed over the century, which has elapsed since the emergence of Sasanian Iran. However, the state ideology and religion have undergone very profound changes during Shapur's reign. As a result, Sasanid's realm became a highly centralized empire with a strong shahanshah's power, and this circumstance was an essential condition for the renewal of wide expansion under Shapur the Great, during which Sasanian Iran finally secured the status of one of the leading powers in the world of Late Antiquity.

Along the history of Sassanid’s Empire many landmarks marked its turns. But the most important internal issues the kings Shapur I and Khosrau II had to go through were the political, military, social and administrative reforms that they had to imposse to ensure the empire and their power.

"The article deals with the problem of the date of well-known "Night battle" of Singara in Upper Mesopotamia between the Roman and Persian armies. Late Antique sources contain contradictory information about this event, especially about its date. The author picks out and analyzes two groups of sources. One of them (panegyric in honor of Constantius II written by Julian, and Libanius' panegyric in honor of Constantius II and Constant) lets us determine the date of the "Night battle" by A.D. 344, but according to the second group of sources (Jerome's "Chronicle", "Consularia Constantinopolitana" and "Chronological Canons" of James of Edessa) the Battle of Singara happened in A.D. 348.
The author puts forward and gives proof of hypothesis that not one but two "Night battles" — in A.D. 344 and in A.D. 348 — took place near Singara indeed. This conclusion may make some amendments and clarity into chronology of military-political history of Upper Mesopotamia, Roman Empire and Sasanian Iran in the middle of the IV century A.D."

An undeniable historical fact is that the governance of Shapur II didn’t spare to show a certain sympathy towards the Christian community that existed in Persian Empire around the early 4th century. Christians were the victims of perpetual persecutions carried out by pagan Roman Emperors. Thus Persia appeared as a haven of refuge. But when Constantine assumed the reins of government in Roman Empire, Christian faith took a quite obvious advantage over paganism. So Shapur became suspicious of his Christian subjects. The occasion for such a suspicion was, in any case, reinforced through prophecies by prominent Christians like the wise Aphrahat, who forecasted an obliteration of Persia as a result of a triumphal Roman victory. Moreover, Constantine sent a letter to his adolescent peer in order to express his concerns about the Christians who lived under Shapur’s reign. Some researchers though, detected in that letter a covert threat, on Constantine’s behalf, that reflected an ulterior intention for an invasion to the Persian Empire. Having, on the one hand, the article of 1985 by Timothy D. Barnes, Constantine and the Christians of Persia, and on the other hand, the article of 2001 by David Frendo, Constantine’s Letter to Shapur II, Its Authenticity, Occasion and Attendant Circumstances, as indicators, this paper disserts how defensible is the theory of Constantine planning to ivade Persia. Actually it is about a theory that has its roots in the mid-19th century and was revitalized in 1930s. Supporters of this theory were historians like O. Seeck, G. Ostrogorsky and F. Dölger, among others. According to that, the new Christian Roman Empire in Constantinople inherited the claims of the old pagan Roman Empire for a universal dominance. Using Constantine’s letter to Shapur as a “litmus test”, this paper examins how sound this theory can be. Ultimately it seems that Shapur took not so much under serious consideration Constantine’s exhortation for taking care of his Christian subjects, and so he effected a wide persecution against them which begun in 339-340 and peaked in 344-345. The paper concludes with a referation to the disputed question on the authenticity of Constantine’s epistle to Shapur.

Ammianus Marcellinus’ «Res gestae» contains important information about the use of elephants by the Sasanian Persians in the military purposes. The analysis of Ammianus Marcellinus’ data demonstrates that in the middle and second half of fourth century elephants were used by the Persians when besieging enemy (i. e. Roman) fortresses and in open-field battles. During the siege operations elephants were essentially used in place of helepolis: wooden towers (howdahs) were fixed on the backs of animals. These turrets housed Persian archers and javelin men who shot at the enemy soldiers who were located on the walls and towers of besieged fortresses.
The specific details of the use of elephants by the Persians in open-field battles are not entirely clear. Probably, P. Rance and M. Charles are partially right claiming that elephants on the battlefield were expected to provide a psychological impact on the enemy. At the same time we cannot deny that the Sasanians widely used elephants in open-field battles (as well as in sieges) not only to horrify the hostile warriors but also in order to place soldiers on animals’ backs who hit enemies with arrows, spears and other missiles. Moreover, some of Ammianus’ contemporaries (e. g. Saint Ambrose in his «Hexameron») mention exactly the same tactics of the Persian elephantry.
In open-field battles elephants were actively used in the situations when the Persians were the attacking side (as it was in the battles of Phrygia and Sumera). But if the initiative was on the side of the enemy and the Persians were the defending party, elephants were placed at reserve and their involvement into the fight, in all probability, was put off till the coming of the turning point in the battle and the enemy’s retreat. If such a moment did not come, elephantry detachments did not take part in a combat (e. g. the battles of Ctesiphon and Maranga).
The information reported by Ammianus Marcellinus does not allow us to assume automatically (as M. Charles and (in particular) P. Rance do) that the elephants which were not directly involved into the battle were in fact baggage or draft animals. Quite the contrary, Ammianus never speaks about the use of elephants in transport or any another logistic purposes, but he always refers to them specifically as battle animals which posed a «clear and present danger» to the Roman soldiers.

Studies of the Persian policy of Constantius II in the last years of his reign have looked at an interesting episode in the communications of Strategius Musonianus, Constantius’ praetorian prefect of the East, with Tamshapur, a key satrap of Shapur II. The historian Ammianus Marcellinus does not explicitly tell us that Constantius approved of Musonianus’ activities, and so some scholars have assumed that the prefect acted independently. However, a reappraisal of Ammianus’ text supports the alternative view that Musonianus actually acted with Constantius’ full knowledge and approval.