Warlords

We analyse the influence of gun culture and exogenous political events on gun regulation in post-Soviet Georgia. While neighbouring states retain restrictive Soviet-era gun laws, in Georgia, state failure, armed conflict and proliferation of weapons during the 1990s all impelled recent governments towards moderate gun policies, including liberal rules on handgun ownership, strict rules on gun carriage and a national gun registry. We conceptualize gun policy as the product of relatively durable institutional legacies and underlying social attitudes—in this case, a distinctive post-communist ‘gunscape’—which constrain future policy development; and specific political conjunctures, which provide opportunities for limited policy experimentation. While Georgian gun owners desire weapons for self-defence, sport and the affirmation of masculinity, they do not seek to defy the state or replace its role in collective security, leading to a moderate ‘harm reduction’ approach to regulation that may be applicable in other post-conflict societies.

To date, warlordism in Africa has been viewed solely negatively. This has come about, in part, because of the analytical lenses that have been used. Typically, warlordism has been examined at the state level; and behavioural traits, rather than definitionally necessary components, have been the focus.
In effect, ‘warlord’ has been confused with other violent actors. I suggest here a reconceptualisation ‘from below’, which takes into account variation in types of warlordism, and which allows for both positive and negative effects of warlordism on society and the state.

Despite efforts to bolster failed states over the past two decades, many states in the international system still exhibit endemic weakness. External intervention often leads to political instability and in most cases fails to foster state consolidation, instead empowering and creating ties with the ones it aims to weaken. Using the case of Afghanistan, I develop a typology of political orders that explains variation in degrees of state consolidation and provides the basis for more systematic comparative analysis. I demonstrate the resilience of a political logic according to which non-state armed actors (warlords) ‘shape-shift’ and constantly reinvent themselves to adapt to changing political environments. This article, based on extensive field research in Afghanistan, shows why failed states are unlikely to consolidate and exhibit western-style state-building, as a result of intervention or otherwise.

Muitas discussões acerca da governança de recursos naturais nos Estados pós-coloniais têm ocorrido, recentemente, na literatura de Relações Internacionais. No entanto, a maior parte dessas discussões busca focar no papel do Estado. Esse paper buscará mudar esta abordagem, deslocando seu foco para a atuação dos atores não-estatais, sobretudo, warlords e grupos armados regionais. Assim, serão apontadas discussões sobre as relações existentes entre esses atores e os atores estatais, apresentando as (re)articulações existentes a partir do conceito de “global assemblage”. Analisando a atuação dos grupos armados e warlords na região leste da República Democrática do Congo (RDC), mostraremos as diferentes interações entre atores estatais e não-estatais, em relações de competição e cooperação, produzindo novas práticas, instituições e formas de governança.
Esta obra está licenciada sob uma Licença Creative Commons Atribuição 4.0 Internacional.

The composition of the Syrian People’s Council elected in April 2016 reveals how the regime attempted to renew its social base, which is assumed to have shrunk during the first years of the conflict. On the basis of data collected between November 2019 and March 2020 focused on the identity of the MPs elected in 2016, this study first demonstrates that the distribution of seats by political affiliation (Baath party, other parties from the National Progressive Front and independents) did not change fundamentally during the war. However, the study shows that the traditional categories which were usually represented in the People’s Council before the war saw a significant renewal of their representatives. Except for traditional Baathists, who still were the most numerous in 2016, the profiles of representatives of other interest groups (businessmen, Sunni clerics and tribal leaders) profoundly changed and new social categories (such as militia leaders and families of martyrs) emerged. The common characteristic of these newcomer MPs is that they had participated in war efforts alongside the regime.

The paper gives a brief overview of the last years' discussions on Feng Yuxiang, the so-called "Christian General", and his religious faith by making some notes on his figure. Feng's connection with a foreign religion is contextualized in the lively environment of Republican China and it is linked to his peculiar biography. His credo was certainly far from being dogmatic, but it hardly proved to be fully opportunistic as well. His military and political choices were often taken in connections with what Feng considered the essence of his faith. These facts reveal a new type of warlord that differed from the past ones, being concerned with the issues of his country and embracing a national-ranged perspective.

This thesis explores how three crucial variables affect stability in Afghanistan: (1) political legitimacy, (2) state-building and (3) Pakistan’s support for the Afghan Taliban. Chapter one lays the foundation for this thesis by exploring and showing the importance of the relationship between political legitimacy and stability in Afghanistan. Chapter two will build on this foundation by essentially testing this connection by examining how U.S. state-building efforts fared in addressing the issue of legitimacy as they tried to stabilize the country. Finally, chapter three looks at the relationship between Pakistan’s foreign policy, legitimacy and stability in Afghanistan, although it is more focused on explaining what drives Pakistan’s policies to influence these factors.

Afghanistan’s complex conflict shows little sign of abating.  This paper looks at the nature of the conflict and factors that might influence its post-2014 direction.  It treats Afghanistan as a qualitative intrinsic case study and positions itself in the middle of historical context, civil war theory and the post-2001 political and military situation.  Although disagreements within broader civil war theory make analysis of Afghanistan challenging (how to address complex conflicts and concepts of stalemate might benefit from further exploration), Charles Tilly’s work provides a fresh perspective and a flexible platform from which to view the conflict.  The paper identifies areas analytically “less-travelled”: the idea that a military stalemate might be a long-term result after 2014 and that other political/military factions might also get drawn in to contest control of the state.  It finds that a struggle for army loyalty is plausible and could become a further danger to the stability of the country.  The international community and the Afghan population could perhaps give thought to three issues: the implications of the term “civil war”, how to consider and address the notion of stalemate and, finally, that the Taliban might not be the only group contesting state control.