civilian control
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Civilian Control Over Secret Services in Poland from the Perspective of Three Decades of Their Operation The article aims to analyze the current status of civilian control over intelligence services. The years 1990-1991 marked the beginning of a comprehensive transformation of this area of state activity. The article analyses the following issues: how hev the critical problems of civilian control over intelligence services been resolved across the three decades of their operation and to what extent the political system has been transformed in this area? The article consists of four main parts. The first discusses the concept of “special services” which signify specific institutional solutions in Poland. The following parts are organized according to the basic types of civilian control, i.e., executive control, parliamentary oversight, and independent oversight. The considerations focus on the institutional dimension of security. The article is analytical. It is prepared based on the available sources and literature.

This chapter examines the origins of a distinctive system of organizing military conquest in the final quarter of the eighteenth century. It seeks to de-centre the study of politics and military contestation by looking at the war against the Marathas (1778–82) from the vantage point of the region most directly affected by it—the western peninsular territory of the Bombay presidency. The advantage in shifting the focus away from the politically dominant Bengal presidency allows identification of a critical component in the political economy of conquest—the transfer of political authority from a civilian council to the commander of a military force. This shift in political power was essential to the success of the EIC regime of conquest even as it became a perennial source of conflict within the governing structures of the Company state. The debate and dissension that accompanied the deployment of military force both enabled the success of the machine of war and characterized the creation of a distinctive early colonial ideology of rule that subverted civilian control of the military.

Building on the preceding chapter’s effort to study war and territorial conquest from the vantage point of peninsular India, this chapter focuses on the Madras presidency at war against the sultans of Mysore (1780–4). In stark contrast to the muted resistance offered by the civilian government of Bombay, when confronted with a vastly expanded military challenge, the Madras civilian power completely imploded. The belligerent Governor George Macartney struggled to wrest control against encroachments over his civilian authority from military commanders, an overweening Bengal administration and the inveterate hostility of the rulers of Mysore. These fissiparous struggles were not merely confined to the high politics of colonial administration. Ideologues like Henry Malcolm argued for the complete inversion of the ideology of civilian control of the military, especially for the local administration in Madras presidency. Taken together—the complete breakdown of civil–military relations at the highest levels of the Madras presidency and the view from the margins of local administration—the experiment of placing the military well above and beyond the civilian components of early colonial rule had taken deep roots in peninsular India.

Abstract Academic research on civil-military relations often assumes that dangers for democracy and civilian control mainly emanate from the military's predisposition of ‘pushing’ its way into politics. Yet, civilian control frequently is a precondition for governments’ moves of ‘pulling’ the military into roles that may potentially be problematic. These can include the military's involvement in political disputes or internal public security missions. Notwithstanding its empirical relevance, little academic work has been devoted to understanding how ‘pulling’ works. In this article, we aim to provide a first, exploratory framework of ‘pulling’ that captures the dynamics of the military's reactions and indirect consequences for civil-military relations. We identify three analytically distinct phases in which pulling occurs. First, politicians initiate either operational or political pulling moves. Second, we situate the military's reaction on a spectrum that ranges from refusal to non-conditional compliance. This reaction is driven by the military's role conceptions about appropriate missions and their relation to politics. In a third phase, the military may slowly start shifting its role conceptions to adapt to its new roles. We illustrate our argument with case studies of two different instances of pulling: operational pulling in the case of France (2015–19) and operational – then-turned-political – pulling in the case of Brazil (2010–20).

Abstract How do militaries push back when they oppose civilian initiatives? This article analyses the sources and character of military dissent, focusing on the United States. It details the sources of military preferences over policy and strategy outcomes, emphasising the interplay of role conceptions with other material and ideational factors. It then presents a repertoire of means – tactics of dissent – through which military leaders can exert pressure, constraining and shaping civilians’ decision-making calculus and the implementation of policy and strategy choices. Empirically, it traces military dissent in the 1990s-era humanitarian interventions; the US's ‘War on Drugs’ beginning in the 1980s; and the Afghanistan surge debate in 2009. In so doing, the article contributes to a broader research programme on military dissent across regime types. It also expands scholars’ understandings of preference formation within militaries and illuminates the various pathways through which military dissent operates and potentially undermines civilian control.

Abstract How do combat missions, defined as an armed confrontation that causes casualties, shape civil-military relations and military’s role conception? This article argues that militaries that incur combat casualties gain a stronger hand in the civil-military equilibrium. This is because casualties affect domestic political opinion and give prominence to the views expressed by military officials. Civilians are then more deferential to professional military advice. In turn, the military obtains considerable operational freedom, and can pick and choose missions which they find desirable. Second, the military’s role conception – an important determinant of military missions, is shaped most prominently by its combat experience. Militaries sustaining casualties obtain leverage vis-à-vis civilians and based on their institutional preference, they either prioritise or avoid non-traditional missions. While making these arguments, this article examines combat casualties, role conception, and civilian control in India. These concepts as a whole and, the Indian case study especially are surprisingly understudied considering it is among the few non-Western democracies with firm civilian control, a record of overseas intervention operations and a military with varying roles and missions. Analysing India’s experience therefore adds to the literature and illuminates the mechanism through which casualties affect civil-military relations.

Significance Military and civilian leaders within the current power-sharing government have since accused each other of creating the conditions that prompted the coup, in an escalating confrontation over security sector reform that risks becoming a greater threat to the transition than the coup attempt itself. Impacts The more aggressively the commission established to dismantle the former regime conducts its work, the more the risk of coups will rise. Concrete guarantees of immunity for past crimes could encourage some (but not all) military leaders to consider more serious reforms. Civilian leaders might revive discussions shelved last year about creating a new internal security organ under civilian control.

The purpose of the article is to define the concept and types of forms of democratic civilian control over the defense forces. Three aspects are identified in which the forms of democratic civilian control over the defense forces can be considered: 1) the activity aspect, according to which the form of control acts as a complex of actions of its subjects; 2) the analytical aspect, according to which the form of control has its integral element of collecting, highlighting information and data on the controlled object, comparing them with each other, de-termining the patterns and trends inherent in the functioning of the controlled object, modeling the state of the controlled object in the future, depending on the applied management decisions; 3) the organizational aspect, according to which the form of control is a way of organizing the activity of the subjects of control and the con-nections between them. Each of these aspects of the form of control is necessary for the effective implementation of control activities. The definitions of the forms of democratic civilian control over the defense forces as united by a single goal, carried out in accordance with the powers of the subjects of control defined in the acts of military legislation, are formulated for a complex of organizational and analytical measures aimed at achieving the goal of control.It was found that the forms of democratic civilian control over the defense forces should be attributed to the pub-lication of public information, the activities of temporary commissions of inquiry, internal audit, external financial control (audit), judicial control, scientific and applied (for example, sociological) research aimed at determining the actual state of control objects. The validity of classifying official investigations, inquiries and pre-trial investigations forms of democratic civil control raises doubts, taking into account the provisions of paragraph 2 of part 1 of arti-cle 1 of the Law of Ukraine “On National Security of Ukraine”, which defines an exhaustive list of types of control.An analysis of the essence and features of the forms of democratic civilian control over the defense forces allows us to make sure that these forms are inherently connected with the content of this control and are determined by the legal status of its subjects. At the same time, the forms of control can be classified by content, by subjects, by legal consequences for objects of control, as well as by timing.

This article analyzes civil–military relations and the issue of civilian control through the lens of new managerialism. It illustrates that the means and mechanisms applied by governments to govern the military actually shape its organization and affect its functions in ways not always acknowledged in the civil–military debate. We start by illustrating the gradual introduction of management reforms to the Swedish Armed Forces and the growing focus on audit and evaluation. The article thereafter analyzes the consequences of these managerialist trends for the most central installation of the armed forces–its headquarters. It further exemplifies how such trends affect the work of professionals at the military units. In conclusion, managerialist reforms have not only changed the structure of the organization and the relationship between core and support functions but have also placed limits on the influence of professional judgment.