maritime piracy
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Weak coastal states often lack an adequate, sustained naval presence to monitor and police their territorial waters. Unpatrolled waters, both territorial and otherwise, may provide pirates with substantial financial opportunities that go far beyond any single country. Maritime piracy costs the global economy on average USD 24 billion per year. This research explores the impact of naval bases on acts of piracy to determine if naval presence can decrease the likelihood of piracy. To examine this important economic and national security issue, our research employs a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model. We also rely upon a newly constructed time-series dataset for the years 1992–2018. Our study shows that the presence of naval bases is essential in helping maritime forces combat piracy. Policymakers searching for options to combat piracy should find the results of this study especially useful in creating prescriptive approaches that aid in solving offshore problems.

In the late 21st century, the growth of sea ships widened the horizons for trade on a global level. However, despite slow and cumulatively significant developments in transportation technology, during the era of sail, high sea maritime instability or the threats of piracy remained a significant obstacle to trade over long distances. In addition, with limited solidarity among all essential players in the region, several Gulf of Guinea (GoG) states can diversify their national attention to handle the pandemic instead of combating illegal activities at sea. Therefore, this article talks about the different factors of maritime piracy in the GoG, Comparing the trend across the region's different states (Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Ghana), the current maritime insecurity mitigation strategies proposed, and their gaps. Besides, a discussion around a knowledge gap in terms of accurate cooperation via the various policies implemented by those institutions brings us to propose coevolution governance in the shadow of the hierarchy and to create a maritime protect area (MPA) in the GoG country who do not have it yet, especially in Togo, Ghana, and Nigeria, and surround MPA with sustainably managed fishing areas where local small-scale fishers enjoy exclusive rights. The result shows that regionally it can help Centralize and diffuse the best practices, develop greater synergy among public policies and institutions, and nationally create greater sustainability of conservation with the integration of socio-economic concern and harmonization of strategic planning, practices, and policies.

Humans rely on the sea for food and mineral resources; hence it is vital to their economic survival. Nations all throughout the world rely on the water for trade and commerce. This article looks at the present condition of marine security in the Gulf of Guinea. The Gulf of Guinea has a total shoreline of about 5,000 nautical miles and several natural harbours with dangerous weather. It has a significant crude oil reservoir, as well as fish and other natural resources. These traits provide huge prospects for marine trade and transportation, but the Gulf of Guinea is also riddled with maritime crimes of all types, including piracy and smuggling. Maritime piracy has presented a threat to coastal states’ stability and economic viability all across the world, not only in Africa. The study examines sea piracy in general, the Geographic Information System, and the impact of maritime piracy on the world socioeconomic development using secondary data. It then goes on to provide a number of recommendations aimed at addressing the problems caused by maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea in order to improve maritime security.

AbstractDespite a general agreement that piracy poses a significant threat to maritime shipping, empirical evidence regarding its economic consequences remains scarce. This paper combines firm-level Chinese customs data and ship position data with information on pirate attacks to investigate how exporting firms and cargo ships respond to maritime piracy. It finds that overall exports along affected shipping routes fall following an increase in pirate activity. In addition, piracy induces firms to switch from ocean to air shipping, while remaining ocean shipments become larger. At the ship-level, the paper provides evidence for re-routing, as container ships avoid regions prone to pirate attacks.

The acts of piracy had bedeviled mankind for many centuries though the modus operandi of this sinister act keeps changing over the years. The core concept still remains the same. It usually involves an armed attack at sea for a vessel, its cargo, crew or all of the three. The stage is set at sea, but the fall out effects are far reaching than we can imagine. There are political, economic social, security and environmental implications. All these aggregates or determinants are intertwined and have adverse consequences on all the stakeholders. Failed states political instability has become fertile grounds for pirates or sea armed robbers. Economically, the disruption of free movement of vessels, capture of crew for ransom has adversely affected the prices of goods at its final destination. This paper seeks to examine the relationships and effects these attacks have on the various facets of the marine logistic chain. The socio-economic model of Dr Kenneth McLeroy is used to explain the various linkages existing between these determinants viz economic perspective, social perspective, environmental perspective and political instability. Finally, the relevance of maritime security in the sphere of governance and the ability of institutions which would use the safety of our oceans is examined.

Abstract How do rebels choose among available tactics during civil war? How do they substitute one tactic for another? Although previous studies address these questions, they narrowly focus on the presence or absence of substitution. Differentiating the varieties of substitution, however, is critical. How rebels respond to their tactical environment—including weather conditions—depends on the type of substitution. I formally derive three types of substitution and test them by exploiting weather-induced exogenous variation in rebels' tactical costs for ground and marine violent activities. The analysis of daily panel data in 31 coastal conflict countries indicates that rebels substitute violent ground activities for maritime piracy but not vice versa. This asymmetry cannot be explained without differentiating substitution types.

This article discusses the use of PCASPs as an alternative or additional layer of protection on board ships in the fight against maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea from an international law perspective based on legal positivism. A concern is that clear-cut, international legal rules are missing on PCASPs. A particular concern is the use of force by PCASPs. The IMO, the shipping- and PMSC industry have had to resort to soft-law instruments and self-regulations. The perceived lack of legal rules concerning PCASPs and PMSCs has resulted in a lot of criticism. But does international law on maritime piracy need to develop binding international legal rules’ that are directly applicable to PCASPs? My findings are that the existing legal framework, in the Law of the Sea, SOLAS Convention, customary international law on self-defence together with the non-binding IMO guidelines and the shipping industry’s and PMSC’s self-regulations, as implemented by national laws, gives the necessary framework to adequately address the issue of PCASPs as protection against maritime piracy. The article describes maritime piracy, piracy hotspots and how interventions against piracy differ according to regions. It analyses the current legal framework on maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea in UNCLOS and the SUA Convention, flag-state jurisdiction and national laws. It defines “soft-law” and goes through regulations on PCASPs from the Montreux Document and ICoC to regulations that directly address the use of PCASPs on board ships, as the IMO Guidelines, ISO Standards, the industries standard agreements and the Guidance on the use of force.

Masha Fedorova and Piet Hein van Kempen eschew explorations of the nature of piracy to focus on whether there is some legal basis for an obligation in conventional and customary international law on states to criminalize piracy, concluding that such an obligation is absent. But the main thrust of the chapter is an historical survey which tries to decipher why this is the case.