united states foreign policy
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Abstract This article argues that Disciplinary International Relations (DIR) does not only explain international affairs, but it also socializes and hegemonizes publics and professionals into an ideological worldview consistent with the interest of states that underwrite the world economic and security order based on hegemonic liberalism. Considerable emphasis is placed on tracing the continuities between the early theorization of IR in the United Kingdom and the United States, and the contemporary academic/foreign policy/security ‘complex’ dedicated to the maintenance of a hegemonic world order. The article demonstrates that the call for a greater theory–policy nexus in international affairs is redundant because leading American scholars double up as policy-makers, either directly or through other avenues such as consultancies. Some of the most prominent IR scholars, such as Michael Doyle, John Lewis Gaddis, Samuel Huntington, G. John Ikenberry, Stephen Krasner, Theodore H. Moran, Joseph Nye and Anne-Marie Slaughter, among others, have served in high-level positions in the United States foreign policy and security apparatus. The article also shows the ways in which in the early days of IR theorizing in the UK, scholars such as Lionel Curtis, Alfred Zimmern and Norman Angell doubled as staunch defenders of the British Empire, albeit in the language of liberal internationalism.

ABSTRACT Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the United States has become the world's undisputed economic superpower. However, the economic reforms carried out by China since the 1980s have had a big effect on its economic growth, so that it is able to rank as the second largest economy in the world after the United States. This makes America must respond to China's development by making strategic policies. State leaders have an important role in determining the direction of United States Foreign Policy. From 2009 to 2018, America underwent 2 transitions of leadership, namely from President Barack Obama to being replaced by President Donald Trump. Even though the two leadership eras are close together, the US Foreign Policy towards China is in stark contrast. This research will analyze how the differences in the US Foreign Policy against China in the Barack Obama and Donald Trump Era and the factors that cause differences in their policies by using the idiosyncratic individual factor approach. This article finds that the different backgrounds in the life of a country's leader will influence their perception in determining the direction of their foreign policy. Key words: U.S. Foreign Policy, China, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, Idiosyncratic, Psychobiography

The authors of this paper examine the possible change of course in the United States foreign policy and strategic adjustment towards Russia in international relations. Although the United States were the sole superpower in the world after the end of the Cold War, the contemporary international system is marked by growing multipolarity. This change in the international arena is caused by the rise of two revisionist great powers – China and Russia. Although China represents the US’ main geopolitical rival, Russia does not lack the ambition to influence current world affairs. Possible relative gain in Sino-American rivalry for the United States could be achieved through closer cooperation with Russia. Although this hypothetical appeasement could be beneficial for the US, the authors of this paper take the stance that rapprochement between the two countries is currently unlikely. Using neoclassical realism as a theoretical framework, the paper examines the possible US-Russian strategic cooperation, including both external and internal factors that influence state foreign policy and strategic adjustment. The paper also examines the US opening to China during the Cold War under the administration of President Richard Nixon and compares it to the contemporary state of world affairs.

<p>This thesis explores the question of whether there has been a “new” securitization of United States foreign policy in Africa since the late 1990s. It follows a stream of literature and real-world evidence suggesting that U.S. engagement with African countries has taken on a more securitized tone in the years since the end of the twentieth century. This thesis suggests that there are three key factors behind this securitization: oil, terrorism and the rise of China. I explore these factors in the context of wider U.S.-Africa engagement before examining in greater detail the case of the changing U.S. relationship with Nigeria. As one of Africa’s major oil producers as well as a site of terrorist activity and Chinese expansion, the case of Nigeria demonstrates how securitization has occurred and what effects this has had on the country and the wider African situation.</p>

<p>This thesis explores the question of whether there has been a “new” securitization of United States foreign policy in Africa since the late 1990s. It follows a stream of literature and real-world evidence suggesting that U.S. engagement with African countries has taken on a more securitized tone in the years since the end of the twentieth century. This thesis suggests that there are three key factors behind this securitization: oil, terrorism and the rise of China. I explore these factors in the context of wider U.S.-Africa engagement before examining in greater detail the case of the changing U.S. relationship with Nigeria. As one of Africa’s major oil producers as well as a site of terrorist activity and Chinese expansion, the case of Nigeria demonstrates how securitization has occurred and what effects this has had on the country and the wider African situation.</p>

This article employs surveys by Gallup, the Central Asia Barometer, and the Barometer of Eurasian Integration, as well as focus groups that were commissioned as part of this research, to argue (1) that Kazakhstani perceptions of the United States compare unfavorably to perceptions of China and especially of Russia; (2) that Russian influence is a minor or nonexistent cause of the United States’ poor image; (3) that US cultural influence has an ambiguous effect on the country’s image in Kazakhstan, due to a “clash of values” between conservative Kazakhstani society and relatively liberal US cultural exports; (4) that the United States’ foreign policy, especially its violation of other states’ sovereignty, has an unambiguously negative effect on its image among Kazakhstanis; and (5) that the resulting relatively negative image of the United States translates into reluctance to build or maintain ties with it. In conclusion, we highlight areas in which the United States–Kazakhstan cooperation is likely to receive a better reception.

Assessing the output of past foreign policy is instrumental for any country to learn policy-relevant insights, to appreciate its experience, and to improve its future conduct. To glean such insights, this article borrows Baldwin’s framework in assessing the success and failure in foreign policy. Using a case study analysis, it assesses the United States’ (U.S.) influence attempt towards Indonesia to resolve the 1999 East Timor humanitarian crisis. President Clinton’s decision to undergo an influence attempt primarily aimed to change Indonesia’s policy while gaining support from U.S. allies in the process. The article finds that Clinton’s decision was a highly successful attempt. This finding is based on several factors: (1) the attempt effectively attained the intended primary and secondary goals at a considerably high degree; (2) it was conducted at a considerably low cost for the U.S.; (3) it inflicted a high cost towards Indonesia; (4) the increase in Clinton’s stake strengthened the U.S. resolve to pursue the influence attempt; and (5) Clinton had successfully overcome the difficult undertaking as Indonesia possessed higher stake over East Timor. These findings provide some lessons for both U.S. and Indonesian foreign policymakers to chart future relations for the two nations.

Assessing United States (U.S.) past grand strategy is a useful guide to gauge foreign policy intentions enabling us to gain vital insights to discern the broad pattern of U.S. foreign policy under various administrations. Such an approach can be of benefit to the academic and policy community giving us a sense of the priorities of the foreign policy priorities of the Biden administration particularly with respect to the security of Southeast Asia. With this aim in mind, our article employs a variation of the analytical framework employed in the field of foreign policy evaluation to examine the possible options for U.S. Grand Strategy. At the risk of oversimplification, it selects and assesses four samples of U.S. Grand Strategy alternatives: isolationism, offshore balancing, selective engagement, and deep engagement. Next we focus on recent events to assess which pattern of Grand Strategy best describes the Biden administration�s foreign policy stance. Our aim is that these insights will help regional actors to anticipate and respond accordingly to the Biden administration�s foreign policy stance.

Following the principles of realist school of international relations we are analysing the shifts in Chinese military budget, military posture and overall modernization of armed forces before and after the American ?Pivot? to Asia. These results are later compared to the United States? foreign policy and military posture in East Asia that had changed in the past decade. Employing Walt?s theory of balance of threat in the following article we have analyzed the shifts in Chinese military power and how other regional actors? perceptions had changed during the last two decades of the 21st century. China that began internal balancing at the end of the twentieth century wasnot perceived as a threat to American interests in East Asia, which could potentially alter the regional status quo. The United States along other regional countries didnot perceive Chinese growing military power that was primarily land based, as a factor that should be contained. However, things started to change as Beijing assertiveness in South China Sea alerted other regional actors of Chinese growing naval power and political aspirations. As the research results show, the idea that any kind of balancing can lead to revisionism in the unipolar system is only partially correct concept which can be affected by intensity and nature of balancing politics.