LNG Vessel Safety Zones
LNG Vessel Safety Zones
LNG Vessel Safety Zones
In Atlantic Canada
Purpose: ...............................................................................................................2
Background:..........................................................................................................3
Scope of control zones: ........................................................................................6
Exclusion zone...............................................................................................6
Application ............................................................................................................9
Justifications......................................................................................................9
Threats ............................................................................................................12
International ....................................................................................................14
Local Situation:................................................................................................17
Options ...............................................................................................................19
Option A ..........................................................................................................19
Option B ..........................................................................................................20
Option C ..........................................................................................................22
Conclusions ........................................................................................................23
Annex A:..........................................................................................................25
Halifax, N.S.
Opinions or assertions expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not
Purpose:
This paper has been prepared to discuss safety zones for LNG carriers
operating to and from the proposed Atlantic Canadian LNG receiving terminals.
The requirement for this paper evolved from the work of the TERMPOL Technical
Review Process (TRP) in order to satisfy marine safety requirements and provide
research into the activities and requirements of other ports and regions was
region.
the region. The optimum solution will provide for a reasonable, practical system
of safety zone controls for large vessels to ensure the safest possible passage of
all vessel traffic using the region’s waterways, harbours and ports.
Background:
mature industry sector worldwide with a fleet of over 1000 specialty vessels
cubic meters cargo capacity will give way in a few short years to vessels
reaching 250K cubic meters. All new terminals proposed in Canada are being
Being a new and still unfamiliar industry in Canada, LNG shipping and its
marine industry and society seeks to better understand the transportation issues
for this prized energy source. Transport Canada Marine Safety (TCMS) is
commensurate with the risks associated with the marine transportation of LNG.
analysis of environmental, operational and social risks and benefits arising from
process prior to issue of the necessary permits, the subject of safety and security
Application of safety, security or exclusion zones are found at every port and
terminal to some degree however, their rational, scope and application vary
to safe and reliable operation within a sound environment2, defines safety zones.
“…an area of sea space is established around the tanker into which no
other traffic is permitted to enter. Hence the tankers progress will never be
immediately hindered by encounters with other traffic, nor will it encounter traffic
having the potential to penetrate its hull.
1
TERMPOL Review Process 2001, Transport Canada TP743E, part 1
2
SIGTTO mission statement
3
LNG Operations in Port Areas, Best Practises for the industry, SIGTTO, Witherby’s Publishing, 2003,
p15
at the projects under review in Atlantic Canada. The proposed locations are, for
the most part, heavily industrialised with existing oil terminals, gypsum, coal,
aggregates, paper, forest products and other general cargo imported and
exported to and from the region. Shipping details and patterns have been
In support of safe navigation for all marine traffic serving the industrial
import and export activities in the region, vessel traffic control systems (VTS)
have been in place for many years. There are also established IMO adopted
proposed ports. All vessels greater than 20m LOA are required to comply with
and participate in the systems. The ports and approaches are compulsory
pilotage zones (with one exception) served by the Atlantic Pilotage Authority for
Canadian vessels over 1500 GRT and all foreign vessels however, subject to
marine traffic in the region is well monitored and controlled by Coast Guard and
The terms safety zone and exclusion zone have been liberally applied in
many arenas without a uniform appreciation of what they are or the implications
provided as they deal with routing systems. Routing systems developed under
this standard may or may not be adopted by the IMO, however, if they are IMO
adopted, they then become part of the international program of ship routing
systems. IMO adopted routing systems exist in the approaches and entrance to
the Bay of Fundy and Chedabucto Bay. While not directly applicable in the two
specific VTS systems noted the following definitions are taken from the quoted
publication for consideration when assessing the requirement and scope of any
safety zone.
Exclusion zone
An exclusion zone is an area within defined limits which is
prohibited for certain ships to keep them far enough offshore to give
sufficient time to rescue a disabled ship from going ashore and to protect
the coastline from any pollution caused by a casualty.
Security Zone
A security zone is a defined area, which for safety and
environmental purposes access is limited to persons, ships or objects
authorized by the Coast Guard. Such a zone may be stationary and
subject regional waters with the addition of Canadian modifications. All vessels
entering Canadian waters must be familiar with the requirements and carry
requirements and minimum standards for the design, installation, and safe
operation of LNG facilities” however does not address the marine shipment of
LNG. It does require that a dock used for the transfer of LNG to or from a ship
must be no less than 30 meters from any bridge crossing a navigable waterway
and the loading / unloading manifold is no less than 61 m from such a bridge.5
From the USA statutes 33CFR-165 (the regulations dealing with regulated
navigational areas), definitions provide clarification on the types of zones that are
Safety Zones
“ A safety zone is a water area, shore area, or water and shore area to
which, for safety and environmental purposes, access is limited to
authorized persons, vehicles, vessels. It may be stationary and described
by fixed limits or it may be described as a zone around a vessel in motion”
4
TCMS Publication #TP 1802, Routing Standards 1991
5
CSA Z-276, July 2003.
Security Zones
“(a) A security zone is an area of land, water or land and water which is so
designated by the captain of the port or district commander for such time
as is necessary to prevent damage or injury to any vessel or waterfront
facility, to safeguard ports, harbours and territories, or waters of the United
States or to secure the observance of the rights and obligations of the
United States.
In the above definitions please note the distinction between safety and
security although the spaces described are essentially the same. The regulations
arising from these definitions allow the USCG ‘Captain of the port’ (COTP) or
District Commander’ the authority to make rules for the application of controls or
6
USA statutes 33CFR-165
Application
The application and scope of controlled zones for LNG vessels has been
diverse in different jurisdictions depending on the calculated risk. One has only to
look at ports such as Boston, USA and Barcelona, Spain to see the range of
safety zone controls applied to LNG carriers and other traffic transiting and using
LNG facilities and adjacent waterways. For example, in brief, the port of Boston
restricts all other traffic movement in the area, closes overlying road bridges and
adjusts flight paths for aircraft approaches to and from the nearby international
airport. Additionally, the USCG provides, at cost, aerial and marine escort and
LNG carrier at the Everett terminal. On the other hand, traffic movements in the
carrier.
Justifications
The determination of need for safety zones can be broken into three
specific themes however; the application is essentially the same. Ultimately, the
safety zone for the protection of all things and people external to
tugs, service craft and any other vessels likely to pass at a close
area is also a critical factor in determining this safety zone for the
TC Security directorate.
around the vessel. The conventional approach to this solution is through the use
pilotage, escort and assist tugs and development of operational manuals with
the requirement and scope for safety zones around LNG carriers or other vessel
Threats
Two scenarios drive the threats to vessel or environment. The first deals
the area such as VLCC and ULCC traffic also using the same waterway.
accidental leak including those that may be relatively minor in nature. A leak of
LNG puts workers, crews or passing vessels at risk of exposure to the cryogenic
LNG. This event presents a serious risk of injury, death or structural failure of the
vessel due to the rapid cooling on contact and the absorption of heat away from
contacted bodies as the LNG flashes off to vapour and the likelihood of the
atmosphere. The vapour dispersion patterns and risks are thoroughly addressed
provide a buffer around the ship and facilities to protect people and assets from
Due to the existing design and equipment requirements for LNG Carriers,
and the implementation of navigation safety measures such as traffic
management schemes and safety zones, the risk of accidents is generally low.
The most significant impacts to public safety and property from an
accidental spill exist within approximately 250m of a spill, with lower impacts at
distances beyond approximately 750 m from a spill.
7
SANDIA Labs report 2004, p
malicious or terrorist act on the vessel, would only serve the perpetrators cause if
there were a significant public or economic impact resulting from their actions.
The facilities in Atlantic Canada being remotely located offer little value to this
respecting the threat of an intentional act against a ship in Atlantic Canada would
Act and regulations would confirm the nature and scope of any security threat
International
working in the industry. Several contacts have been established within the
industry that will continue to serve in supporting further dialogue, research and
analysis.
With few exceptions, the international approach to safety zones for LNG
carriers is not substantially different from other large tonnage vessels. Navigation
safety is the core issue surrounding the isolation of vessels in transit by way of a
safe zone around the vessel. Security requirements, if different, are addressed
through the ISPS Code security plan requirements for ships and ports and would
The American approach, given the high threat level exposure of their
to identify the threats and risks, and implement operational and geographic
controls that defuse the perceived threat for the particular port, approaches and
other responsible authorities) on adjacent areas that may allow access to the
target vessel such as road bridges, adjacent lands, airspace, and marine
waterways. Extensive monitoring and patrol form an integral part of that regime.
• Cook Inlet, Alaska export terminal maintains a 1000 Yard radius zone
around its terminal and berthed ships. Ships transiting to and from the
• Boston (Everett terminal) ships in transit are escorted with a safety and
security zone extending 1000 yards fore and aft and 100 yards each side;
• Cove Point, Chesapeake bay maintains a 500 yards radius zone around
presents a greater challenge. Ships less than 1600 GRT are not to
approach closer than 70 yards while larger ships must have two tug escort
and Australia have not pursued the American model for safety and security
zones in their import and export trade of LNG or other hydrocarbons. National
legislation for safety zones is dealt with as in Canada with traffic control and
separation systems. Local requirements for safety zones are dealt with by the
harbour authorities in their own port specific procedures, manuals and systems.
Each port will perform a risk analysis and develop operations rules based on the
findings of the assessment. For example, the UK port of Milford Haven maintains
a moving exclusion zone around LPG vessels over 20,000 GRT. All ships lying
alongside any hydrocarbon berth enjoys a 100 m exclusion zone. The risk
analysis conducted determined controls for ship types, size and cargo hazard
potential therefore, all ship types and cargoes are considered in the analysis.
Local Situation:
approaches are deep and wide however, as the course of the waterway leads to
the inner reaches of the harbours, the waters become relatively sheltered while
the predominant winds tend to follow the alignment of the shipping channels and
proposed wharf facilities. The sites enjoy many natural characteristics as well as
shipping. A variety of vessels including many general cargo, dry bulk, and
Existing controls effecting the safe operation and traffic flow in the region
have been determined to be adequate for the existing volume and type of
shipping. Future changes in frequency, type and size of ships and introduction of
new cargoes and their inherent characteristics are presently under review as part
of the TERMPOL review and environmental assessment process and will define
is planned and scheduled to ensure availability of pilots and the least potential for
controlled by the pilots in order to support their planned ship movements. Tug
within a port area. Additional tug capacity will be required to stand-by for
support local shipping, an extensive buoyage and beacon system has been in
place for many years. Leading lights and ranges mark the navigation channels
entering and leaving these ports. Prior to opening the LNG import terminal, a
review of terminal lighting will be required to ensure the piers are adequately
marked for navigation in the area and so that terminal lighting does not interfere
with other navigation aids, beacons etc serving the navigational channel.
for Mariners. Safety and security information including threats, traffic reports,
vessel movement controls etc. are currently distributed using these systems and
Options
The approaches to the regions proposed LNG receiving facilities already
enjoy an established network of navigational controls put in place for existing oil,
dry bulk, paper, general cargo and other import and export shipping. An analysis
LNG carriers in the region shall be in accordance with international and Canadian
legislation. In addition, local pilots serving all compulsory pilotage vessels in the
area have established protocols for the movement of vessels through the region.
The following options are presented for discussion and represent a range of
Option A
The Chedabucto Bay, Strait of Canso and Bay of Fundy VTS and traffic
serving several facilities in their areas including a variety of large and very large
requirements of the current volume and nature of traffic. As a first option for
consideration, no changes are made to the existing systems. In this option, the
increase in shipping traffic volume is absorbed into the mix of vessels with no
collision. The existing systems would apply equally to all forms of future shipping
including the passage of laden and light LNG carriers through the region.
Given the significant increase in traffic movements, the size and handling
characteristics of LNG carriers and the hazardous nature of the cargo carried,
Option B
The suggestions in this option are made to formalise and augment the
procedures for all vessels transiting and operating in the subject region. These
suggestions are provided for existing traffic in addition to the new LNG carrier
traffic in the region, as the requirement for safe vessel traffic management will
impact on all vessels equally. The following procedures could apply to all large
vessels such as, for example, those over 10,000 GRT when navigating in the
region and all vessels regardless of size operating in the vicinity of LNG carriers,
1. LNG vessels will execute a normal sea passage to Canadian waters, the
2. Pilot will embark at the outer pilot station and conduct the vessel within the
parameters of the VTS and traffic separation system to its inbound end;
harbour manoeuvres;
passage.
5. Active tug escort including tug assist with a suitable number of high
capacity tugs during inner harbour manoeuvres and to the berth (to be
analysis)
same direction;
7. Restrict all vessel movements during LNG carrier berthing, turning and
departure;
alongside the unloading terminal pier should be 250m* for any other
operation of LNG or other very large traffic in the effected waters including
*
250 m suggested based on minimum safe distance conclusion in SANDIA report.
reasonable and practical approach to safe vessel operation in the subject waters
Option C
security precautions. The purpose being to prevent access to the LNG vessel
throughout its passage and visit in Canadian waters through absolute isolation. A
high security approach to a safety zone for an LNG carrier could include
suspension of all traffic in the area during the passage of the LNG vessel to and
from the terminal. This exclusion could extend seaward to the pilot station or
beyond. Given the relatively narrow channels adjacent the proposed terminals,
the shipping channels could be closed during the presence of the LNG carrier.
The unfortunate consequence of this high level of control is its negative impact
required port and ship security plan, a lesser level of security threat during
normal operations would likely make this degree of control unnecessary and
undesirable.
Conclusions
Through the course of this paper the rationale for safety zones has been
explored as they relate to LNG carriers calling at the proposed Atlantic Canada
vessel traffic in the region has been well established for many years and will
serve as the foundation upon which any future activities or systems may be built.
Safety zones are presently exercised through compulsory pilotage, VTS, traffic
The American model is security based with active controls on all vessel,
vehicle and personnel movements. While port specific in its application, rules for
harbour safety and security zone controls emanate from national regulation.
Some facilities are located in populated areas resulting in a much higher threat
following a risk analysis of each ship type; size and cargo thus are not limited to
LNG carriers exclusively. The primary function for both safety and security zones
is to maintain a buffer zone around vessels allowing time for mitigating or evasive
measures, for LNG and other traffic in the area must consider the impact on
other port and waterway users. Thorough consultations with stakeholders will be
critical. Broad based risk analysis, modelling and development of operations and
contingency manuals are essential for developing measures for the safe
movement of marine traffic. Safety and / or security control zones should only be
applied on a case-by-case basis when a real need has been identified and they
will enhance the safety and efficiency of all operations and movements in the
area.
Annex A:
(e) any combination of tug and tow, where more than one unit is
being towed without regard to gross registered tonnage.