Advanced Vocabulary Instruction: Insights from Wittgenstein's Philosophy

Saeed Ketabi and Mohammad Ali Ayatollahi, Iran

Saeed Ketabi is the head of English Department at the University of Isfahan, Iran. Mohammad
Ali Ayatollahi is a PhD candidate at University of Isfahan, Iran.
E-mail: ayatollahi1345@gmail.com
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Abstract
Who is Ludwig Wittgenstein?
What are the major concepts in Wittgensteins philosophy?
How can second language teaching be inspired by Wittgensteins philosophy?
What insights can language teachers get from Wittgenstein's philosophy for vocabulary
instruction?
What vocabulary instruction strategies are congruent with Wittgenstein's philosophy?
Conclusions
References
Abstract
This paper is an attempt to touch upon the major concepts in Wittgensteins philosophy of
language in order to find whether it has any relevance to the way vocabulary is taught and
practiced in EFL/ESL contexts. First, It briefly introduces the main concepts in Wittgensteins
philosophy such as meaning as use language games, rule-following, family resemblance,
private language, grammar, and forms of life. Then, it discusses the general pedagogical
implications of this philosophy. Finally, it provides some specific guidelines for vocabulary
instruction in EFL/ESL contexts.
Who is Ludwig Wittgenstein?
Born in 1889, Ludwig Josef Wittgenstein is considered to be one of the most influential
philosophers of the twentieth century. His relevance to language learning is mostly due to his
posthumously published book Philosophical Investigations, which is an attempt to describe the
nature of language and language learning from a philosophical point of view. To him language
learning and indeed the language per se can only be understood in the context of human life and
purposes it is put to rather than as a logical system.
Wittgensteins philosophy is relevant to the field of second language teaching in two ways. First,
questioning the usefulness of viewing language as a logical system, Wittgenstein provides us
with alternative view where language and language learning are viewed as the end product of
socialization, which obviously has implications for teaching methodologists as well as language
teachers. Second, as will be argued in this paper some concepts in his philosophy such as

meaning as use, family resemblance, and language games are particularly relevant to
vocabulary instruction and learning.
What are the major concepts in Wittgensteins philosophy?
The fact is that in theorizing about language most theoreticians including Wittgenstein create a
meta-language with its own unique terminology and framework. Wittgensteins meta-language
terminology includes such terms as: (1) meaning as use, (2) rule-following, (3) language games,
(4) family resemblance, (5) private language, (6) grammar, and (7) forms of life. What follows is
an introduction into each term in turn with a particular focus on aspects most relevant to the issue
of vocabulary instruction and learning.
1. Meaning as Use
In Philosophical Investigations (1953) Wittgenstein sets out to reject a common conception
about language and language learning, namely, the view that words function essentially as names
of objects or properties already given in advance of language. Such a view is referred to as
nomenclaturism (Harris: 1988, p2). Instead, he proposes the term meaning as use.
Wittgenstein starts in Philosophical Investigations (1953) by quoting a passage from St.
Augustine.
When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved toward
something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they
uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shown by their bodily
movement, as it were the natural language of all peoples: The expression of the face,
the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of voice,
which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting or avoiding
something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper place in various
sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had
trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.
(Confessions, I. 8)
So what is wrong with this straight forward and commonsensical statement? Commentators on
Wittgensteins philosophy say that this is an observation in need of explanation rather than an
explanation in its own right (Harris, 1988). The question is how we relate these words with what
they signify. Is there a mystical relationship between words and what they signify in advance and
independently of language as St. Augustine seems to be implying? If not, what principle governs
this relationship? To answer this question Wittgenstein describes a primitive language.
The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an
assistant B. A is building with building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and
beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this
purpose they use a language consisting of words block, pillar, slab, beam. A
calls them out. B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a
call. Conceive this as a complete primitive language (PI, 2).

To Wittgenstein what connects the word bloc (here the builders call bloc) to the object blocs
is a function of the communication system i.e. language game within which it occurs. There is no
connection between the words and what they signify in the absence of this communication
system. If it was possible to assume the existence of such a relationship in the absence of the
communication system, then words would have the same meaning irrespective of the context in
which they occurred. If this were the case, we would be using the same words every time we
produced them. In other words, the words pillar, slab, block, and beam would have
exactly the same meaning every time we produced them.
Wittgenstein, however, argues that even the verb of sameness itself is not the same every time we
use it: Does the word is have the same meaning in the rose is red and two and two is four?
So what counts as the same or different is in fact the use of form i.e. meaning as use.
Wittgenstein uses the metaphor ' tool box' to emphasize the unfixed nature of words.
Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screwdriver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws - the functions of words are as
diverse as the functions of these objects.
2. Language games
The metaphoric expression 'language games' introduced by Wittgenstein provides an alternative
view of language as a set of actions each with their own applications. Thus, rather than an
abstract system language consists of a large number of rule-governed, purposeful games such as
giving orders and obeying them, describing the appearance of an object; reporting an event,
speculating about an event; making up a story; guessing riddles; requesting, thanking; cursing;
greeting; and praying (PI: p23). In a broader sense language games can be equated to First,
speech acts like requesting or greeting; second, activities like play acting, singing catches or
guessing riddles; third, primitive languages like the language of builders consisting of four
words: block, pillar, slab, and beam(PI: p2) ; and fourth, there is the whole language
viewed as language and actions to which it is woven(PI: p23) (Kopytko, 2006).
3. Rule-following
Closely associated with the idea of language games is the notion of rules. After all, how can one
envisage a game without rules? Defending the notion of rules by a philosopher who has been
described as anti-formalist is a paradox in itself. It is interesting to see how Wittgenstein solves
this paradox.
First of all, it should be mentioned that Wittgenstein rejects to define the notion of rules in
analytic terms such as necessary and sufficient conditions. Instead, he views them as a family
resemblance concept with the implication that there are different types of rules with only broad
similarities. In his view the best way to conceptualize such terms is through examples. Second,
Wittgenstein does not conceptualize rules as mental operations either. Let us not forget that to
Wittgenstein understanding is not is not a mental process (PI: pp 134-184). Instead, he envisages
rules as a social phenomenon. Kopytko (2006) illustrated this point:

Following a rule is for Wittgenstein is analogous to obeying an order: it is a

skill acquired by training. Obeying a rule is not a matter of choice; we obey
rules blindly. [.] On the whole, rules obtain their identity from the very
practices in which they are embedded. Those who can successfully perform the
practices can understand them fully (cf. Johnannessen, 1981; Schatzki, 1996).
4. Family resemblance
It is here that Wittgenstein's rejection of general explanations, and definitions based on sufficient
and necessary conditions, is best pronounced. He points to family resemblance as the more
suitable analogy for the means of connecting particular uses of the same word. There is no reason
to look for an essential core in which the meaning of a word is located and which is, therefore,
common to all uses of that word. We should, instead, travel with the word's uses through "a
complicated network of similarities, overlapping and criss-crossing" (PI: p 66). Family
resemblance also serves to exhibit the lack of boundaries and the distance from exactness that
characterize different uses of the same concept.
5. Private language
For an utterance to be meaningful it must be possible in principle to subject it to public standards
and criteria of correctness. For this reason, a private- language, in which individual words ... are
to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private
sensations ... (PI: p243), is not a genuine, meaningful, rule-governed language. The signs in
language can only function when there is a possibility of judging the correctness of their use, so
the use of [a] word stands in need of a justification which everybody understands (PI: p261).
6. Grammar
In Wittgenstein's view grammar is a wide and rather elusive network of rules which determine
what linguistic move is allowed as making sense, and what isn't. This notion is in sharp contrast
with notion of grammar as a logical system. Indeed, Essence is expressed by grammar ...
Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (PI: pp371-373). The rules of grammar are not
mere technical instructions for correct usage; rather, they express the norms for meaningful
language. But as opposed to grammar-book rules, they are not idealized as an external system to
be conformed to. Moreover, they are not appealed to explicitly in any formulation, but are used
in cases of philosophical perplexity to clarify where language misleads us into false illusions.
7. Forms of life
The term language-game brings into prominence the fact that the using a language is part of an
activity or of a form of life (PI: p23). What enables language to function is precisely forms of
life. In Wittgenstein's terms, agreement is required "not only in definitions but also (queer as this
may sound) in judgments" (PI: p242), and this is not agreement in opinions but in form of life
(PI: p241). Forms of life can be understood as changing and contingent, dependent on culture,
context, history, etc; On the other hand, it is the form of life common to humankind, the

common behavior of mankind which is the system of reference by means of which we

interpret an unknown language (PI: p206).
How can second language teaching be inspired by Wittgensteins philosophy?
1. Constructivism
Wittgensteins relevance to second language teaching is established through constructivism-a
theory of leaning and instruction associated with such figures as Immanuel Kant, John Dewy,
and Jean Piaget. Constructivist scholars view cognition as a process of personal interpretation of
experience and construction of knowledge where learners should learn to discover principles,
concepts and facts for themselves. They adopt the notion of Wittgenstein that context is an
integral part of meaning. Learning is an active process in which meaning is developed on the
basis of experience (Bednar et al. 1992, 21) hence the importance of guessing work and
intuitive thinking.
2. Social constructivism
A major outgrowth of constructivism is social constructivism- a theoretical framework
associated with the Russian educator Vygotsky'. Social constructivists emphasize that social
interaction plays a fundamental role in the development of cognition. That is, learners should
learn to discover principles, concepts and facts for themselves. In fact, for social constructivists,
reality is not something that we can discover because it does not pre-exist prior to our social
invention of it. They, also, emphasize that individuals make meanings through the interactions
with each other and with the environment they live in. Knowledge is thus a product of humans
and is socially and culturally constructed.
What insights can language teachers get from Wittgenstein's philosophy for vocabulary
instruction?
With regard to vocabulary instruction Wittgenstein's philosophy has a wealth of insights to offer
the language teacher. The fact is that we as English teachers are strongly influenced by a
nomenclaturist view of meaning. Thus, we tend to rely on definitions and explanations as the
primary techniques of vocabulary instruction, not realizing that by adopting such isolationist
techniques we indeed misrepresent the meaning of words especially at advanced levels. The
following is a list of insights that English teachers can get from the discussion so far.
1. Although one cannot deny that language can be thought of as a logical system i.e. "sign
system", it, nevertheless, does not exist in vacuum. Rather, it is embedded in the behavior of
humans as social beings.
2. Meaning generation and comprehension is a much more complicated process than simply
attaching names to objects, events, etc. Rather, it is a function of "language use". Meaning is
generated through agreement in culture and forms of life.

3. Language teachers should resist the temptation to give the meaning of words through
explanations. Rather, they should provide their students with a description of the diverse uses of
words i.e. depicting them as part of an activity. They should have in mind that words often have
fluid, diverse, and unfixed meanings.
4. Language teachers should move from isolation to context and experimentation.
Traditional vocabulary instruction usually involves reading passages preceded by a glossary of
words along with their definitions to be augmented later through practice activities. A
constructivist view of learning, however, requires us to move from isolation to context and
experimentation. That is, learners should be given the opportunity to create contexts for and
experiment with words. Thus, the role of the teacher is to provide opportunities for
experimentation, and helping learners to make the most appropriate inferences.
5. Language teachers should realize that learners do not come to class empty-handed. They
are social beings with a repertoire of experience and background knowledge. There are cases
where they are already familiar with the semantic field to which the word to be learned belongs.
Such knowledge should not be underestimated. Rather, it should be invested upon. So both the
presentation and selection of words to be taught should be planned with an eye to what the
learners themselves can bring to the task of learning.
What vocabulary instruction strategies are congruent with Wittgenstein's philosophy?
Based on the discussion so far the following strategies can be suggested for the teaching of
advanced vocabulary.

Teachers need to go beyond the definition of words.

Output is as important as input.

Teachers need to provide opportunities for experimentation.

Teachers need to provide performance-based assessment.

Teachers need to go beyond the definition of words. Conventional methods of advanced

vocabulary instruction usually start with a definition followed by example sentences to show
how the word is used in context. Definitions, however, suffer from three shortcomings.
Firstly, they are crystallized in the sense that they do not allow for variation. This is in sharp
contrast to a Wittgensteinian view of word meaning as a fluid and context sensitive
phenomenon, which is a function of language games of which they are part.
Secondly, they are decontextualized in the sense that they are assumed to be applicable to any
context which fits the definition. This view, however, is far from being true. As Fillmore
(1975) points out even a simple word such as "bachelor" with the dictionary definition
-unmarried man- is not applicable in lots of contexts where it should given the straight
forward dictionary definition. Fillmore asks questions like: Is the pope a bachelor? Is a
thrice-divorced man a bachelor? Is a young man who has been in an irreversible coma since

childhood a bachelor? What about a Eunuch? An elderly senile gentleman who has never
been married?
Finally, another shortcoming of dictionary definitions is that most often they rely on
abstractions and generalizations in the sense that quite often dictionary definitions start with
a general superordinate term which is then qualified i.e. narrowed down. Naturalistic word
acquisition, however, takes the opposite path of moving from instances to generalizations.
Such shortcomings bring into the focus the necessity of going to areas beyond the mere
definition of the word. Areas beyond the definition of words includes in Willis's term (1998):

The potential different meanings and uses of words

Useful phrases and typical collocations

The structure and nature of both written and spoken discourse

The knowledge that certain language features are more typical of some kind of texts
than others

Output is as important as input. Passive learning of vocabulary is by no means congruent

with a view of language games, nor is it congruent with a constructivist theory of learning,
which maintains that humans can understand only what they have themselves constructed.
According to Joe et. al. (1996) having to produce language results in some different kinds of
learning from having to receive language.
Teachers need to provide opportunities for experimentation. An important corollary to the
importance of output and an important requisite of a constructivist view of learning is
providing an opportunity for experimentation. According to Joe et. al. (1996) and Nation and
Hamilton-Jenkins (2000) such type of classroom experimentation provides the opportunity
for language learners to seek clarification and confirmation, request repetition, and explain
the meaning or spelling. They suggest such activities as retelling from vocabulary cues, and
role play, and reporting as useful activities.
Teachers need to provide performance-based assessment. Not only vocabulary instruction but
also language assessment needs to reflect meaning-is-use view. Performance-based
assessment is closest to such a view of meaning in the sense that it reflects natural language
usage. Such assessment procedures involve the real time retrieval and use of vocabulary
items across all language skills i.e. reading, listening, speaking, and writing. They are also
focused on communicating meaning. Performance-based assessment needs to be carried out
throughout the course as part and parcel of the teaching cycle itself. According to Wiggins
(2000) a characteristic feature of this type of assessment is that authentic tasks that are useful,
engaging activities in themselves with the capability of becoming episodes of learning are
used for evaluation.
Conclusions

This paper touched upon the major concepts in Wittgenstein's philosophy with a view to get
some insights into the nature of meaning and vocabulary instruction in EFL contexts. It
concluded that as the current practices of vocabulary instruction in EFL contexts is often
influenced by an essentialist view of meaning, Wittgenstein's view of meaning as use and
other related concepts in his philosophy can be informative to language teachers. It further
enumerated vocabulary instruction strategies and techniques which are in line with such a
view to meaning and language learning.
References
Bednar, A. D. Cunningham, T. Duffy, M. and Perry, J. D. (1992) Theory into practice: How do we link?
In Duffy and Jonassen 1992. Constructivism and the technology of instruction: A conversation,
New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
Johnannessen, K. (1981). "The concept of practice in Wittgensteins philosophy". Inquiry 31, 357-369.
Joe, A., Nation, P. and Newton, J. (1996). "Speaking activities and vocabulary learning". English
Teaching Forum. 34 (1):2-7
Harris, R. (1988). Language, Saussure and Wittgenstein: How to play games with words. London.
Routlage.
Kopytko, R. (2006). "Philosophy and pragmatics: A language-game with Ludwig Wittgenstein". Journal
of Pragmatics. Retrieved from www.elsevier.com/locate/pragmatics
Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, fire and dangerous things: What they reveal about the mind, Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press.
Nation, P, and Hamilton -Jenkings, A. (2000). "Using communicative tasks to teach vocabulary".
Guidelines22 (2):15-19.
Schatzki, T. (1996). Social practice: A Wittgenstein approach to the human activity and the society.
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
Willis, Jane (1998) Concordances in the classroom without a computer, In Brian Tomlinson (Ed.)
Materials development in language teaching. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

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