103 BibliothecaIndo-BuddhicaSeries-No'

BUDDHA NATURE

Sallie B. Kin$

SRI SATGURU PUBLICATIONS of A Diaision INDIAN BOOKS CENTRE DELHI-INDIA

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of of The Publication this Book in Indiais madeby pemrission New York Press. of University State First Indian Edition : Delhi 1992

ISBN 8r-7030-308-9 No part of this book may be usedor reproducedin any mautrer exceptin the caseof brief without written pemrission whatsoever quotations embodiedin critical articlesandreviews.

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For mY Parents, JamesForrest Kin$, Sr. and Carolyn Prout Kin$

CONTENTS

Preface Ahlrreviations Chapter One: A. B. C. D. E. Introduction

lx

xi 1 1
J 5

The Role of the Buddha Nature Concept Terms History The Text of the Buddhct Nature Treq'tise The Buddhct Nature Treatise and Chinese Buddhist Thou$ht The Concept of Buddha Nature

23
.t'7

Chapter Two:

A. Takin$ the Semantic Ascent B. Refutatittn of Other Views C. The Essenceof Buddha Nature 1. The Buddha Nature as Three Causes 2. The Three Natures (Tristsabhdva) 3. Tathd,gataParbha Chapter Three: Soteriolo$y: Buddha Nature as the Practice of Buddhism

29 29 30 40 40 42 48 57 58 65 72 80

A,. A9rayapardrsTtti B. Dharmakdrya and Nirtsd1trt' C. Trikd,ya: Sambhogakd.ya and Nirma4akdrya D. The Relationship Between Person and Buddha

vll

NATURE BUDDHA Chapter Four: A. B. C. D. E. F. Dereification of Self and Mind

83 E3 86 92
C)J

The "Own-Nature" of Buddha Nature Atmaparamita Self Pure trlind Dhqrmakaya and "Self' Mind

9.1 95 99 103 10.1 107 111 112 1t7 1J7 139 144 150 153 153 156 169 t73 185 201.

Chapter Five: Ontology: N{onism vs. Nondualism A. B. C. D. E. All Sentient Beings Possess the Buddha Nature The Paramirti Sanya-Alunya Buddha Nature Exists Aboriginally Unborn and Unchanging Engagingin Spiritual Cultivation

Chapter Sk:

Chapter Seven: Buddha Nature and the Concept of Person A. The Ontological-Metaphysical Dimension B. The Existential Dimension C. A Final Question Chapter Eight: Retrospective and Prospective

A. Retrospective: Summary of the Text B. The Buddha N&ture Treqtise and Chinese Buddhist Thought C. Buddha Nature ThouAht and \\'estern Buddhism Notes Glossary Index

vlll

Preface

It is a pleasure to express my gratitude for the help of the many persons and institutions who supported my work. The National Endoq'ment t'or the Humanities funded this project in 1985 with a Summer Stipend that supported the early stagesof the book. Portions of this book appeareclin journal articles as Sallie B. Kin$' "Buddha Nature and the Concept of Person," Philosophy East and West 39, no. 2 (19S9), published by the University of HarvaiiPress;and Sallie Behn King, "The Buddha Nature: True Self as Action," Religious Studies 2O (198,1), published by Cambrid$e University Press. My appreciation Aoesto thesejournals and pressesfor theirpermission to publish this material. I especially thank Professor Leon Hurvitz tbr checkin$ many of rn1'Chinese translations against the ori$inal. Thanks also to Professor tr'linoru Kiyota tbr introducin$ me to Buddha nature thou$ht and raisin$ the issue of monism for me, to Professor Thomas Dean for thinking through philosophical issues with me' and to Professor John Keenan for reading the manuscript and makin$ helpful su6!$estions, especially on Yogacara matters (this despite the fact that he disa$rees with rny major thesis). My thanks to the Series Editor, Kenneth Inada, for recommending additions to the book that have considerably strengthened it. \\rhatever shortcomin$s remain in this work are clearly my responsibility alone. Finally, thanks to mv husband for his constant practical and moral support. The romanization system used in this *'ork is the Pinyin system' For the convenience of those more familiar with the Wade-Giles I s-v-stem, have zrdded\\'ade-Giles -romanizations in parentheses after the Pinvin romarrization the first time I introduce a f.amlliar term or

lx

PREFACE name. A glossary of chinese characters can be found at the back of the book. I have conceive<lof this book not only as a discr"rssion Buddha of nature thought, but also as an introduction to some important themes in chinese Buddhist thought. Th.ugh I require mosi of the book to develop these themes, I have listed them at the end of the Introduction so that the reader who is especially interested in this facet of the book may bear these themes in mind as she or he reads. In tbe final chapter i focus on rhese themes directlv.

Abbrewiations

Bl,{T IBK Ratna!,otra Taish6

Buddha No,ture Trestise (Fo Xing Lun) Indogaku Bukkydyaku Kenk5ra Ratnap,otravibhdga Taish6 Shinsh[ Daizdkyd

xl

CTHPTER ONE
Introduction

A. The Role of the Buddha Nature Concept

fT\h" concept of Buddha nature, though little discussed in Western |. surveys of Buddhism, is one of the most important ideas in East Asian Buddhisrn. In its simplest form, the Buddha nature concept provides the answer to a question with which the ancient Chinese were very much concerned: Are all beings capable of attainin$ Buddhahood, or are there some who will never be free of the sufferings of. sarysdraP Buddha nature theory answers rvithout equivocation: "All sentient beings possess the Buddha nature" and thus are guaranteed the realization of Buddhahood. Not only human beings, but all beings born and reborn in the six destinies-hell beings, hungry ghosts, animals, fighting demons, human bein$s, and gods-are promised that Buddhahood awaits them. The belief in the icctrflntika, the one forever incapable of attaining Buddhahood, is expressly rejected. At its basis, then, the Buddha nature concept is an optimistic and encouraging doctrine. When we look further into this notion, its optimism increases, as do the philosophical problems attachqd to it. When one asks how the promise of future Buddhahood is realized, what the present mechanism for this future achievement is, the answer is that insofar

NATURE BUDDFIA

'(possess"the Buddha nature, we already are Buddhalike, we as we already possessthe attributes of a Buddha-wisdom and compassion. This introduces the second level of the Buddha nature concept: Not only will we be Buddhas in the future, we already are Buddhas now. Buddha nature, then, is both the potential tQ realize Buddhahood that is possessed by all and the already complete Buddhahood that is ours in the present. Obviously, we do not experience ourselves as Buddhas-perfectly wise and compassionate bein$s-in our present condition of delusion. Insofar as our Buddha nature is not experientially realized-insofar, that is, as we experience ourselves as deluded bein$s-we ore deluded beings and not, experientially, Buddhas. In such a case' our Buddha nature is covered up or concealed from us by "adventitious defilements," such as i$norance, hatred, fear, desire-all the Buddhist vices' These defilements constitute our "ordinary" experience in surysara. Buddha nature theory holds that these defilements are adventitious or accidental; in other words, they are not necessary,not essential to the human condition, but simply the products of past karma. It is possible, however, to free oneself of that past karma and thus of the power that the defilements have to construct our reality. Once we are free of the defilements, our Buddha natur will become experientially available to us. It, unlike the defilements, is essential to the human condition; it is there for us always, whether or not we are experientially in touch with it. The defilements are able to conceal the Buddha nature from us only to the extent that we allow our past karma to determine our lives. With meditation and meritorious deeds we can free ourselves of our karma and realize our Buddhahood. Our Buddha nature, then, is our true and essential nature and identity. Buddha nature theory affirms that each of us is fully capable of realizing-making experientially present to ourselves-this enli$htened nature that is our birthright as sentient bein$s. This optimistic view of both human nature and of our ultimate spiritual destiny was attractive to the Chinese. Indeed, the acceptance of Buddha nature became normative for Chinese Buddhism as a whole. The Fa-xian$ school (Fa-hsian$; Chinese Yogvcdra) of Xuan-zang (Hsiian-tsan$) was rele$ated to a relatively low status in the hierarchical rankin$s of Buddhist doctrine constructed by leadin$ Chinese thinkbrs due to its affirmation of the i.cchantika doctrine and rejeotion of universal Buddhahood. 2

INTRODUCTION

This acceptance of Buddha nature entered into the foundations of the indigenous Chinese Buddhist schools, especially Tian-rai (T'ient'ai), Hua-yan (Hua-yen) and Chan (Ch'an), in all of which it played a major role. The influence of Buddha narure thought on the pure Land school, with its emphasis on faith in Amida, is somewhat less straightforward. Several texts of the tathiigatagar b ha-Buddha narure tradition,l such as the Snmatada:I Sirqthanarilct Sitra and the Wu Shang Yi Jing, make much of the fact that Buddha nature, as such, is inconceivable, and on this basis they recommend iaith in the Buddha who teaches this doctrine as the appropriate religious pracrice. Moreover, the t&thdgqng&rbhs.-Buddha nature doctrine of the four "perfections" possessedby the Buddha's dharntakur^a and the very positive language with which the Buddha, dhartnakaya, ninsanw, and the like are lauded in texts of this tradition open the door to devotional practices in Buddhism. Takasaki Jikidd goes so far as to say that ,,the core of the tathdgatagarbha theory is in : . . the 'pure' t'aith in the Buddha" and asserts that there is an "essential interrelation" amon$ tathdgqtagqrbha theory, laudation of the Buddha, and stupa worship.2 This claim of an essential interrelationship, however, applies only to one part ofthetathngatagarbha-tsuddha nature textual corpus, not, in fact, to the text that is the subject of this study. It is true, though, that texts of the devotional tqthag&ngc(rbha-Buddha nature tradition probably contributed in a $eneral way to the developmenr of the clevotional Pure Land tradition. A direct link can be seen in Japan, where shinran stated that the actualization of fairh (the faith upon which all else hinges in his Jddo Shinshn secr) is accomplished in the individual by the action of the Buddha nature.l As appropriated and developedby the t'our major indigenous schools of chinese tsuddhism, the Buddha nature concept traveled to the other East Asian Buddhist countries, where it played a vital role. In short, the Buddha nature concept is pivoral for all of East Asian Buddhism. It stands at the foundarion of East Asian Buddhist concepts of human being and spirituaiity and infbrms their understanding of the possibilities and ends of human life. It is an essentialpiece to the puzzle of East Asian Buddhist thought and pracrice.

B. Terms
Any discussion of the term Buddhcr n&ture must beg,in with consideration of the term tuthdganEqrbha, to which it is closely
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rl ,l

NATURE BUDDHA

linked. The Sanskrit work tath&Ecttug(trbhq,is a compound of two terms, tathqg,atq and garbha. Ta,thd.gata is itself understood as a compound word that can be interpreted in two ways: as tatha + agaia, "thus come"; or tatha + gcltct,"[hus gone." It is an epithet for a Buddha, who is "thus $one" in realization from sqmscr'rq' to ,,thus come" fuom nirzoa4a to sarysara to work for the ninsar.ta, and salvation of all. The term P,arbha also has two meanin$,s,embryo and womb. Thus, the term tathegatagarbha may mean either "embryonic Tathagata" (i.e., the incipient Buddha) or "womb of the Tathegata," understood as that which possessesthe essential attributes of the Tathdgata in their fully developed form. The first meanin$ often is <liscussedas the "cause" of the Tathagata, and the latter meanin$ as the "fruit" of Tathagata. As "fruit," it represents the fulfillment of the Buddha Path and is linked with such terms as dharrnakd'ya, nircdrya, perfect wisdom, and realizatlon. The Chinese decided $enerally to translate the term nthdgatugarbha in the latter sense as womb of the Tathagata. In Chinese, the term is rendered nt-lai'xtn$ (Japanesenyoraizd)' The term nt-lai exactly renders t&thdgqn as "thus come," and a xan$' is a storehouse. Thus the Chinese translation shows a preference for conceiving the tathdgrttagarblw as the container of the Tathegata (i.e., the womb) rather than that which is contained (the embryo)' The Budd.ha I'{ature Treatise (hereafter BN?),4 the focal text of this study, uses a distinctive device to maintain the double meaning of the Sanskrit tq,thd*qtasarbha in Chinese. The author of our text glossesru,-lai-zanf, as (1) the contained, that which is held within the storehou.e, and (2) the storehouse as the container (BN? 795c796a). The first meanin$ represents the understandin$ ol garbha as embryo; the BNT specifies that that which is contained in the storehouse, the embryo, is ordinary sentient bein$s' The second meaning represents $arbha understood as womb qua the fruit of the Buddhist path. This text likens the tathdgatagarbha in this respect to jewels, which represent the Buddha's merits. These two readings thus retain the bivalent sense of the Sanskrit P,arbha. The term Bud'dhq nlanffe (Chinese/o xin!,, Japanesebusshd) is closely related in meanin$ 6 tathdgqtagarbhct' Horvever, it is not the chinese translation of the latter; in fact,/o xins, is a chinese term for which the sanskrit equivalent is not rdadily apparent. This missin$ Sanskrit equivalent has been the topic of considerable discussion among 4

INTRODUCTION

Buddhist scholars.s Scholars now $enerally a$ree that the Sanskrit equivalenr isbuddhsdhdtu. Takasaki Jikidb explains buddhadhdtu as signifying: (1) the nature (dhatu : dharmata) of the Buddha, thus equivalent to the term dharmakaya, and (2) the cause (dhatu : hetu'1oI the Buddha. lvloreover, he says, "the link between the cause and the result is the nature @hAru) comrnon to both, which is nothin$ but the dharm&dhd,trtr."6lt should be noted that this understandin$ claims for the Sanskrit buddhqdhafu the bivalence of the Chinese/b x:in(,, embracing as it does the sense ol buddhadhdtu as cause of Brrddhahood and as Buddhahood in fruition. In passing we may also mention \\tralen Lai's observation that the Chinese had a predilection for the use of the term xin!' due to the use of the term xin$ (nature, or human nature) in the Confucian tradition, where it represented the essence or core of human personhood.T The Confucian tradition assumed that the essence of a human being was a moral nature and debated the loftiness or depravity of that moral nature. The tsuddhist use of the term xing in Jo xing, unlike the Confucian use, is not concerned primarily with the moral nature of the human bein$, although ethical implications are imbedded in the notion. Like the Confucian use, however, the term/o xrnf refers to what, in the Buddhist view, is essential in the human being. Given the history of the term xin{, in China, it was a natural choice for the translators of Buddhist texts. As the indi$enous Chinese Buddhist tradition developed, the term nt-lai-zan!, rapidly faded in prominence, whereas the term Jo xinS $rew to become central for the entire tradition.

C. History
Buddha nature thought is rooted in the Indian Mahiydna doctrinal tradition. It will be helpful for a proper understandin$ of the Buddhn Nature Trestise to place it historically in the context of the history of Yo$flciira, praifid,paramitd., Mddhyamika, and tat@atogarbha thought. The Yogdcira School An intellectual history of the Yo$icdra school cannot be $iven with any confidence at present. Not only are the authorship and dates of a number of the major Yo$4ciira works subject to debate and the

BUDDHT\ NATURE

lineaS,e of ideas \vithin the school undetermined, the very ideas themselves are subject to a great breadth of interpretation. For this reason, our understandin$ of even the most basic history and principles of this school is constantly subject to revision. The Yogdcdra school is based upon the works of trvo brothers, Asanga and \rasubandhu, fourth-century C.8., and a third figure, Maitreya (or Maitreya-ndtha), the histcrical status of whorn is subject to debate but who is regarded as the teacher of Asanga.s Tibetan tradition ascribes to Maitreya the authorship of five books: the DhqrmqdhqrmaMahayanasutralarikara, Madhydntatsibhdga, tdvibhdga, Abhisamayd,lahkara, and Ratnogotratsibhdga (Uttaratantra). The first three of these are foundational to YogdcZrathought and represent pre-AsanganY ogdcdrathought. The Abhisamuydlahk ara, on the other hand, is concerned with prajfidparamitq ideas; and the Ratnagotransibhagct belongs to the tathdgatagxrbha line. Asanga wrote a number of inrporrant Yoglcdra works, including the Abhidhqrmclsumuccctyq,, Mahayanasarytp,raha, ancl Vajracchedikd,prujiidparamit{t-sutra-Sqstrq-kdrika. In addition to his literary works, Asan$a is famous for convertin$ his youn$er brother, Vasubandhu, to Mahdydna and Yogdcdra. Following his conversion, Vasubandhu is said to have pored over the Mahdy6na literature, especially the prajfrdpdr&mita siitru literature and to have counted sutr@s in this categ,oryamong his I'avorites.eThereatler, the brothers Asanga and Vasubandhu, together with the historical or nonhistorical Maitreya, were regarded as the lbunders of the Yogdcara school. \tasubandhu's intellectual career had two major chapters. He early composed a commentary on San'dstivada teachin$s, his famous AbhidhqrmakoSa-bhd,s3a. After his conversion to Mahayana, \hsubandhu wrote voluminously, including Vim$qtikd-kdrikd, TrirnSikd-kdrika, Madl4tanta.vibhd,ga-bhasga, Mahdyd.nasutctlqir.karabhasSa, and Trisrsabhdva-mirde(a, as well as commentaries on many Mahaydna s{Ltrqs, including the Lotus (Sadtlharma-punQarika), M a hapari n insana and Da1abh um i ka. t' Until recently, rnodern scholars have thought of the two great Indian Mahayana schools, Madhyamika and Yogdc-ara,as inherentiy opposed to each other. Mddhyamika has been conceived as the Sunya school, the school characterized by the relentless critical dialectic of Ndgdrjuna that demolishes ali metaphysical views. Without substitutin$ a "view" of his own, Nagarjuna demonstrates that due to the 6

INTRODUCTION

interdependence and hence mutual relativity of all things (as taught in the early Buddhist prcltitycrsantutpada), all erttities are empty (Snrrya) of own-being (sr>abhdva)-the ability to "own" their own being, the ability to be themselves by themselves-and hence are lacking in all independent identity and characteristics. As part of his avoidance of estabiishing any constructive view of his own, Ndgdrjuna emphasizeci that 9ilnyatd, (emptiness) is not to be reg,arded as the Truth, but merely as a tool (upd.ya) to be used for soteriological purposes; that is, the purposes of the Buddhist practitiorrer striving for liberation. Silnyatd, itself is empty and surely not any kind of ultimate. The teaching of emptiness, however, is not nihilistic, because as a teaching it promotes liberation and, moreover, is identical with the principle of. pratttyasamutpd.da or the dependent coarising of all things. Nevertheless, these balancing points did not prevent the Madhyamika school's standpoint from being viewed as negative. Given the school's emphasis on destructive criticism, its refusai to advocate any "view," and its espousal of the term $ilnya,td, this response was inevitable. In contrast, the Yo$dcdra school, until recently, has been viewed by modern scholars as espousing a metaphysical view; namely, Idealism. Yotacdra was regarded as teaching that external objects are not real as such, that the category of "objects" is empty, and thac what we take to be objects simply are constructions of the mind. In this understanding of Yogdcara,the Mind itself is real; in fact, the only reality. The apparent facr that.the advocacy of this view by the Yogacdrins could follow on the heels of Nagirjuna's destruction of the very possibility of holding metaphysical views at all has puzzled a:nd dismayed many a Buddhist scholar. Recently the scholarly community, however, has determined that this picture of two antithetical Mahdydna schools has been overstated, that MZdhyamika and Yo{acdra, at least irr their classical forms, are not in fact mutually incompatible in a philosophical sense. First, as we have seen, Mddhyamika is not nihilistic and is negative only in the form of its languaSe and dialectic; strictly speaking, its philosophical standpoint is not negative, because negativity is dualistic and 9unyata is the emptyinS of all dualisms. Thus, regardlessof the philosophical status of Yogdcara,Mddhyanrika itself cannot occupy a negative pole ih any typology of philosophical positions.

NATURE BUDDTIT\

Secorrd,most scholars now believe that Yogacdraanci lvlddhyamika should be seen as differing in emphasis, though not disagreeinS,on major points. Nagao Gadjin, fbr example, has long held that classical I'{ddhyamika and Yogacdra should be seen as complementary rather than antagonistic: the forrner stressing lo$ic and the dialectic of 6unyata, the latter stressing meditation and the understandin$ of consciousness. Of course, later Yogacara and Nladhyamika thinkers did come to argue as adversaries,but such was not the attitude of the founders of the schools. Nagao summarizes the situation in the East Asian context as lbllows: and Yo$acaraBuddhisttradition, the Madhyamika In the Sino-Japanese andopposite to to tenetshavebeenunderstood be both parallel \rijfldnavada was versionof the Madhyamika, the eachother.The San-lun-tsun, Chinese the and the Fa-hsian$-tsun, School, regarded nihilistic,oran Emptiness as School.. . These as was re$arded realisticor arr Existence Vijidnavdda, vieu'shave now been revisedby ntost modern traditionalbut erroneous philosophy . . is believed be wholly . to scholars. Presently, Madhyamika the Asan$a, and other Yo$icaras. The inherited by Nlaitreya-niitha,
stltras are equally revered as authentic by both schools, Prajfiaparamitd and further, the doctrine of emptiness occupies an important position even in the Yogdcara school.rl

Third, as Na$ao mentions, it is important to bear in mind that the school, in its classical form, does rtot reject the emptiness YoSdc-ara teaching of the Madhyamika school, but on the contrary integrates it in an essential way into its own philosophy. As Na$ao stated, the works of Maitreya, Aspnga, and Vasubandhu, in their ori$inal form, have "wholly inherited" the emptiness teachings of the Madhyamika. Thus the founders of Yogacara are not the opponents of MZdhyamika, but their successors.We have seen that both Asairgaand Vasubandhu commented upon prajfrd texts and that Vasubandhu was so taken by the prajftdp&rclmita literature that comin$ to terms with it formed one of the pillars of his lvlahaydna cont'ersion. Their work, and the works attributed to Maitreya, reflect an acceptance of (Snyata as foundational, but with an interpretation and extension of that thought in a fresh direction. With Sdnyard at its roots, what are we to make of the vierv that Yo!6cdra teaches an Idealism that repards objects as false and the mind as real? In brief, we must reco$nize the existence of more than I

INTRODUCTION

one view within Yogacara. Minimally, we must distinguish betrveen three chapters of YoSdcdra thought: (1) the original teachings ot' l\{aitreya, Asanga, and Vasubandhu; and the interpretations of the original teachings made by (2) Dharmapdla and Xuan-zang and (3) Paramirtha. Dharmapdla and Xuan-zang's work ma)r properly be called Idealism. The importance of Xuan-zang in the East Asian tradition is one reason why the labei of ldealism has been attached to the Yotd,cdra school as a whole. However, the idea that the yogdc4ra school as a rvhole may sirnply be labeled Idealist is mistaken or misleadingin two senses.First, it is a moot point whether Idealism is present in the texts of Maitreya, Asan!,a, and Vasubandhu in their original form. Contemporary scholars line up on both sides of this issue. Second, it is definitell' not the case thar the yogdcdra of ParamArtha (Zhen-di, the translator of the present Buddhq, Nature Treatise) is ldealism. Those scholars who ar$ue that Vasubandhu's views are not Idealist generally agree on an alternative vierv as to what is his philosophy of mind. Ueda summarizes his rrnderstandinA follou,s: as Vikalpu or vi.ifinnapctrinamorefers to the consciousness an ordinary of
man, i.e., a man who is noi -vetenlightened. The object rvhich is kno*,n through this vijfi.anaparinama is not a thing as it really is, but rather a conceptualizedthing. In other words, this mind does not grasp the obiect as it really is, but raiher as a_ concept or namc. In truth, he does not take real existenceitself as the object, but instead takes the concept as the obiect and thinks that he is taking real exisrenceas the object, not realizing$,hat he has done. . . . In cortrast to this, the mind of the Yogacaraphilosopher is callcd prct'jfii or nir-oikalpa jfianra (rvisdom "apart" or dift'erent in its nature from dkalpa or vijiiamt). This mind does not kno*' an object throuSh conception, but rather it knows directlv the obiect as it reallv exists (yqthabhiltartha).12

Janice Willis agrees with Vasubandhu and Asan{,a:

this assessment as applying to both

[Tlhe I'imiarika lot Vasubandhul illuminates the ordinary being's chief delusion, namely,' his mistaking the commonly perceived universe of appearance to exist as perceit:ed rarher than as a universe distorted b-v conceptualization of all sorts. Indeed, this overla-v of constructive imaSinations (kalpand, vijnapti, vikalpa\ is all that we commonlv contact

BUDDHA NATURE

and cog,nize. We do not see the thing as it really is; we see only a conceptualized thing. And this is precisely Vasubandhu's point (as it had been Asand,a'salso). All that we commonly perceive is vijfiaptintdtra. It is only "representation" or "just conceptualization."And becauseof this, it is not ultimate realiw.I3

Whether this assessment fairly represents Vasubandhu's corpus as a whole will continue to be debated by the scholarly community. I am confident, however, that this summary does represent the Vasubandhu that Paramdrtha understands himself to be transmitting to China. In other words, what "consciousness-only" means in Vasubandhu, as understood by Paramartha, is a strong version of somethin$ we realize in a weak way in contemporary Western psychology and philosophy: Ordinary human consciousness does not have access to a purely "objective" reality. Our experiential world, the world we perceive and in which we live, is shaped in all moments of ordinary consciousnessby what we project-our expectations, fears, memories, confusions, suspicions, beliefs, and so forth-onto what is given to us. We do not experience reality; we experience our personally shaped (and consequently distorted) perceptions of reality. IJnlike Western thought, however, the raison-d'6tre of the Yogilc-ara school is the belief that it is possible, and ultimately necessary, by means of meditation to effect a revolution in the manner of one's being conscious such that one no longer lives in a distorted perception of reality but can actually perceive reality As It Is. This is the aim of Yotdcdra practice; it is toward this that Vasubandhu's writings, as understood by Paramdrtha, point. This also is a prominent theme of the BN?. The main points here, moreover, are in harmony with the emptiness teachings of Madhyamika. As part of the realization of reality As It Is, this understanding of Yogdcdra includes a realization of the falseness of the dualistic split between subject and object that ordinary consciousness believes is real. We have seen earlier that "subjectivity" participates in what we ordinarily take to be the "objective" and from this follows the emptiness of the "objective"; that is, the deep dependence of the "objective" upon the "subjective." The same applies, in reverse, to the status of the "subjective." When one realizes the emptiness of the""objective," realization of the emptiness of the "subjective" follows in its wake. If there is no "object" to perceive, there can be no "subject" perceivin$. Hence the l0

INTRODLTCTION

categories subject and object are mutually dependent and as such demonstrate each other's emptiness.A$ain, Janice Willis summarizes: "far from advocatin$,the superiority of thought over objects, Asanga's explication of Sunyata and tlre N{iddle Path involves the cessation of and object, both apprehenderand thing apprehended."la both sub.ject We shall meet this idea again in the BN?. The dualistic distinction between "subject" and "object" itself is false; freedom frorn experience in the form of this distinction constittltes access to experieneeof reality As It Is. This is subject-objectnondualism. So t'ar I have emphasized the common ground shared b1' N'{ddhyamika and Yogacara, their shared foundation in iunyct thought, but it is obvious that the two schools also differ on this very subject. This difference can be summarized in t$'o points. First, for pedagogical reasons, Yoghcara authors did not like the negative form of Nlddhyamika. In their experience this nefl,ativity frightened or it demoralized people. Since all Buddhist forms are upa5,ctanyr.r'ay, made no sense to espouse a form that drove people from the Dharma vvhen a more appealinS,form easily could be used. This sentiment is abundantly clear in man-v Yo$acara texts. Second, and more substantively, Yogacara authors believed that the llladhl'amika version of \{aha1'ana did not say er.erything it could say; it was incomplete. Even today one can read Na$arjuna's Mulctmndhyamaka-kfirika and debate forever about rvhether, for Nagarjuna, Buddhist practice gives access ,to reality As It Is. The Kdriket themselvesgive us no basis tor deciding yes or no. This is a mark of the perfection of the Karik{l. A literary or logical perfection, however, is not sufficienr for most religious practitioners. Yogacdra authors felt it important to affirm the existential end spiritual benefits that resulted from the practice of their disciplines. For these reasons, they took up the language of Thusness (tathata) and reality As It Is $tathabhutct), being careful to note that these pointed in the direction of the experiential fulfillment of emptiness,not its negation. Tathigatagarbha Lit er ary H istory literaThe tathhgataga.rbha literature, like the prajftdpdramita ture, is not the property of an-v identifiable school in Indian Buddhism. In the former we have a body of texts introducing and expanding upon a similar theme, the idea that "all sentient beings 1l

NATLIRE BLTDDHT\

posses the tclthdgataq,arbha." Although this theme and the set of concerns associated rvith it are readily identifiable in the texts, we cannot identify the authors of the texts nor even, with any specificity, the group a.mong whom the texts circulated at the time of their cornposition. The four most important early tqthdgqtagctrbha sutrqs are the Tathdgatagarbha sutrct, Srtmalade"ot-simhanddq-sutra, Anunntrsdpurqa,tv-a-nirde6a, and Mahd.parinin)ctnq-sutrct ls These texts were composed in India between approximately 200 and 350 C.8.16 That puts them before the time of Asanga and lhsubandhu. The Tathagatagarbh{bsfutra may have been the first of the tuthAg,etag(trbha texts; it introduces the idea that "all sentient beings possess the tathdgatagarbha" in a metaphorical and philosophically unsophisticated manner. The text consists of nine examples that represent the relationship between the tathdgatugarbha and the adventitiorrs defilements that conceal it. Thus the tathd,gata!,arbha is compared to $rain covered by the husk, a treasure buried under the ground, a Buddha statue wrapped in a ra!, and so on; where the defiiements are the husk, the ground, the rag-whatever covers or conceals that which is precious. Although these images are not philosophically developed, as images they are appealing to the imagination and convey the basic idea of the universal immanence of Buddhahood that nonetheless is experientially unavailable to ordinary persons. Other texts built on this basic idea, and sometimes on the images themselves, in a much more sophisticated manner. The Srimdlddezsi-siryhandd&-s'ntre, in which Queen Srimala instructs the assembly, speaks in both a devotional and a philosophicall.vastute manner oI a tathagatapprbha conceived in terms of positive attributes. It is critical of a purely negative understandinSof 1unyatd and teaches that the tclthagcLtclEctrbha isboth 9ilnya (rvith respect to all defilements) and asunya, "not-empty" (with respect to the perfection of the buddhadhq,rmas). The garbha possessesthe four Sur.taparamitct, or perfections, of permanence, bliss, self, and purity. It is the intrinsically pure mind that is concealed by defilement. This relationship betl'een the intrinsically pure mind and the defilement that conceals it is incomprehensible, understood only by a Buddha. Llltimately, the farbha is identified vrith the dharmakdyo of the TathaSata; thus only a Buddha attains nirxiirya. This kind of elevation and laudation of the Buddha and his attributes is a popular theme in t2

INTRODLICTION

as an much of the tathdgutc@arbha literature and often is seen important foundation of lr'lahdydnadevotionalism' is a short text with a simply Ttre Anuncltvclpurnlttq-nirdeict nf statecl bitt paradoxical theme: the absolute identification all sentient bein$,s in t(fihcrlatugarbha, sattvadhatu (the totality of The text their essential nature), and dharmakdrya or dhqrntadhdfu' one thing emphasizes that in order to become free of rvron$ views' is must be known; namely, the sin$le dhqrmadhatu' The latter This identified with the tathAgatug&rbha and the dhs'rmakdya' rvaves of dharmakd;to, when bounJ by defilements. "drifting on the beings. This same dharmakaya' when sarysd,ra," is called sentient putting aside filled with repugnance for the sufferin$ oL sarysd'ra, in pAramitd, embracin$ the 84'000 all desires, practicin$ the ten is called Dharma $ates, and cultivatin! bodhisattva practices, when free from all brsdhiscttrca.s.A$ain, this same dhannakaya, tbe defilements and utterly pure' is called Tath'dgata' Thus the realm of dharmakdyo is the realm of sentient bein$s, and with one sentieni bein$s is the dhsrmakdya' These are two names the meanin$.l7 llence, whereas the Srimfrla-sd'trcl emphasizes text this trurrr"*nd"nce of the t&thcigangarbha in the Buddha' immanence of tathdeat&garbha' in ordinary sentient emphasizes the positions but beings. These, of course, are not contradictory the basic t&thcig&tu9p'rbhodoctrine l"-"rltary emphases, f,iven joined with "ornf, of concealed immanence; that is, ontolo$ical immanence eXistentialtranscendence' the The Ma'hdparinirnana-sutro is a Mahayana alternative to The former text's Mahd.oarinibbclncr'suttanta ol early Buddhism'r8 on the on teachingls the Buddha nature exerted enormous'influence the question of history of g,raahu nature thou$ht in China, especially the the universality of future Buddhahood. The Chinese debate on quesrion was framed by the fifth century translations of the Ma'hd'pafirst rinirrcan}a-suta by Dharmakgema and Fa-xian (Fa-hsien)' The not translation. that of Fa-xian, indicated that the icchantika, would attain Buddhahood. Despite the authority of this scripture, the $reat Budmonk Dao-sheng (Tao-shen$) do$$edly insisted upon universal was ostracized from the San$ha' He later dhahood and consequently was vindicated and elevated to prominence when the much lon$'er translation by Dharmakgema was seen to include passa$essupporting universal Buddhahood, even for theicchantiko.le with this resolved,

13

BUDDHA NATURE

chinese scholars settled into careful and extensive study of the text's teachings about what Buddha nature is. Despite this important historical role, the Mahdparinirwa4asutro does not present any important innovation in t&thdgqtaga,rbha theory comparable to the three texts already discussed. As rve ha'e seen, it tends to be rather unsystematic and seems to speak with many voices. This very irnprecision, however, made the text a fruitful one for later students and commentators, who were obliged to create their own order and bring it to the text. substantively, the text emphasizes the eternity of the Buddha, implicitly criticizing the idea that ninsdqa means extinction, and linking this belief with the idea of the tathdgatagarbha.2o Within this framework, however, the text speaks of Buddha nature in so many different ways that chinese scholars created a variety of lists of types of Buddha nature that they discerned in the course of their studies of the text.2l The most important innovation of the text in the context of the development" ol ta,thd,gatasarbha-Buddha nature thought is its linking of the term buddhqdhd"tu or tathdeatadhatu, which appears to be used for the first time in this text, with the tathagatap,arbha.22 we saw earlier that the chinese term fo rin6f best translates the sanskrit buddlwdhdtu or tathd,gatadhdtu, so this is a crucial point for Chinese Buddha nature thought. These are the four most important tctthagatugarbha sutros of the early period. This early tradition is summarized by an inportant ddsrrcr, the Ratnagotrursibhdga, also know as the Mahayan6ttarcttantresd,s tr& ar simply [Jttqrq,tantrq. In the west this text is perhaps the best known of the early tctthdgatugarbhq, texts (with the arguable exception of the Srtmalada,sr-siltra, which has received recent attention). having been translated into English and studied by both obermiller and rakasaki.23 Modern scholarship has revised our beliefs about the text of the Ratna,gotr(1. As we have seen, Tibetan tradition attributes the Ratnapotrq to Maitreya, as one of the Five Books of the latter. on the basis of his studies, Takasaki leaves the attribution of the Rqurc,eotr@'sverses to Maitreya intact (thou$h unsure) but names sdramati as the author of the prose commentary of the text.2a He dates the text as we have it tc-rthe early fifth-century c.E. and places the verses sometime between Ndgdrjuna and Asanga.2sSanskrit, Tibetan, and chinese versions of the text all exist, thoug$r the sanskrit text was discovered only recently, with the edited version published in 1950.26 T4

INTRODUCTION

Although the basic verses are from Maitreya, the Ra'tna'$otra lacks characteristic Yo$dcara teachin$s and is a text of the tutha,gatqearbha stoup. The Ratrut$otre quotes extensively from the first three tqthargetagctrbha sutras listed earlier and less extensively It does quote two Yo$6cara texts, from the Mahdparinitpa4&'sutrQ" sutra and Mahdydna,siltrdlcdtkd'ra, but withMatfiyanabhid.harmqout referring to their specificaily Yo$dcdrateachin$s.27In $eneral it is a summary and systematization of then-extant tathatgdtagarbha thou$ht. The Ratnagotra is noted for its discussion of the Three Jewels-Buddha, Dharma, and San$ha-and clear elevation of the Buddha as the Supreme Refu$e as compared to the Dharma and Sangha. Like the Snmaladerst'sutra this manifests the tendency of some tdthAeatug&rbha literature to provide a foundation for Mahaydna devotionalism. There is a $lorification of the Buddha followed by a discussion of the importance of faith at the end of the text. The Ratnagotra also is important for its systematization of discourse around ten characteristics in terms of tat@angarbho which the tathdga,tdgarbha is discussed. These ten characteristics reappear in the BNT together with considerable additions.2sAs found in the Ratnagotra, thev are: o\f,'n-nature (essential nature of the tutha4atagerbha) i tathn gq,uTgctrbhaas cause (of purification, i. e., realization); tqthA*qtegarbha as result (of purification, i'e., the four Sur.wpd,ramitcl); function oI tathdgata'larbha (i.e., the ur$e towards realization); yoga or union (with the Buddha's qualities of purity, wisdom, and compassion); manifestation (of the tathdg&tagQ'rbha in various classes of bein$s); states of manifestation (of the amon$ ordinary persons, bodhisattoas, and the tat@ata*qrbha Tathagata); all-pervadingness (of the tathd'gata,Parbha in these three states); unchan$eability (of the tathfr,$ata$arbha in these three and ("f the tathdEata$orblw states); and nondifferentiation T athegpta, ninsdq'a).ze dharmakd,ya, These are the early, important texts of tq,th&,gatagarbha thought. We neecl now to consider the relationship of these ideas to the idea of enptiness as found in tllre proiftdpdramitd literature' as we did with the Yogdcira tradition. As with. the Yo$6cdra, we will see that tuthagetuSarbha thoustt, at least as it is found in the Rafiw$otra and closely related texts, is a successor to {finrya thou$,ht, a t5

BUDDIIANATURE

development frcm within this tradition, r-ather than an antagonistic opponent standin$ without. in his E'cnnyct Shislshi (History oJ Prqiiid Thought\, Yamaguchi Susumu traces the development of Buddhist thqught from pratigtasamutpctd& and Sunyata to the tMhdgqngerbha thought of the Ratnap,otra.3oHe argues for a single traditiori in which the Buddha speaks of. pratl,tya-samutpada; Ndgdrjuna extends this idea to 6inyutd; and the Rcttnctg()tra extends the same idea to nthAgcrtuE&rbhn. The Ratrwgotro itself invites us to see this continuity. The text first quotes the Sfimdld-sdtra to the effect.that tathdgangdrbhe is not accessible to those outside of *finya realization and then proceeds to claim its tathd,gete$arbha teachings to be a corrective to the errors of those fledgling bodhisattsa^s who have misunderstood 6inya teachings in a nihilistic or absolutistic manner.31 This means that realization of emptiness is a necessary precondition to realization ol tctthdgatasarbha. However, a onesidedly negative perspective betrays an incorrect apprehension of emptiness that can be corrected by realization ol tathdgatagarbha. The role assigned Sunyata here is much like that assigned it in the Yo{A.cAra evaluation: Sunyctta is essential, but must not be understood in a negative sense (and we may safely conclude on the basis of all this concern that it frequently was so understood). Like the Yogacara authors. the author of the Ratnag,otra ieels even this is not enough; there is something positive to be realized wherr one's vision has been cleared by {ilnyatd; namely, the tathdgata4arbha-dhqrmaka.va, resplendent with the f.our pu4apd,ramita ol eterniq/, bliss, self, and purity, identical to nirvd4a and realization of the Supreme Truth. Thus the 6Enya teachings as they stand irr the prajfidpAremita teachings are true but incomplete. They require further elucidatiorl, which the Ratnnpctfro provides. This is reflected in the alternative name of the R&tnagotra, namely Littqratqntra. The Ratnagotra assumes the pr&jfifr.paramitd, teachinf,,sas the punsa or prior teachings; it itself is uttqr&, in the sense of both snbsequent and superior.32 Thus the Ratnagotra's tath.dgatafarblw teaching does not negate but extends prajfrn teachings. It both corrects the misunderstanding of 6dnya as nihilistic and completes the message that 1furryata. merely begins by naming the superlatives that *unyato prepares the mind to perceive. Yamaguchi's analysis of the relationship between prajfid, thought 16

BLTDDFIA NATURD

identities of the authors and eadiest enthusiasts for tathagatafarbha thou$ht are unknown, it was a portion of the Yo$acara community who subsequently took up the tathagutagarbha texts, studied them, and ultimately combined tathAgatagarbha ideas with their orvn Yogdcara philosophy. Thus, some time atter the composition of the exclusively tq,thdEatqgerbho texts discussed earlier, a number of syncretic Yo$acdra-tathdeatq*&rbho texts were written. ra prom i ne n t examples of such texts include the LahkdcJ&tdro"-sutra,rs the Awakenin! of Faith in Mahdyana (Da Sheng ei Xin Lun), and the present Buddhct l,{q,ture Treqtise. This is not to say that all later Yog6c6rins embraced tq,thdEutqgqrbha thought. The school of Dharmapdla and Xuan-zang tended to keep its distance lrom tathd,gatagarbha ideas. This school maintained the Eotr& theory, according to which dift'erent beings had differing potentials for spiritual attainment, depending upon the nature of the "seeds" or bija stored in the dtaya-tsijfid.na and responsible for shaping the nature of ttreir subsequent births. In this view each being belonged to one of the five gotre,, fixing his or her spiritual destination as Tathagata, prqtyekcrbuddhct, arhat, worldly rebirth (icchantika or atyctntika), or indeterminate. The latter potra, "was undoubtedly created to fit the ekaydna [One Ve]riclel teaching of the buddhadhdtu fBuddha naturel into the triydna [Three Vehiclesl model, for ir was maintained that the teaching of the Buddha that all beings possessthe buddhedhdtu was intencredfor rhe edification of those who belonged to this indeterminate gotr61.,,to Thus, though this teaching incorporates tq,thd*atagarbha doctrine in a minor way, it is an obvious patchwork of inherently contradictory ideas. Another area of incompatibility can be found in this school's emphasis upon the idea of an impure mind infected with unwholesome seeds that must be uprooted one by one through an indefinitely long period of yoga practice. This view is entirely alien to the tathdgatagarbha-Buddha nature emphasis upon an innately pure mind that needs only to manifest itself.37 Outside of this stream represented by Dharmapila were other Yogicirins whose views put them in a position to welcome consideration oi tathAgatasarbha thought. Who we^ : the authors of the most important Yogdcdra-tathete&tqgarbha texts is difficult to say, but we do know the identities of d number of individuals who translated into Chinese some combination of yoS6,cara, 18

F I I
I

INTRODTICTION

tathctgatagarbha,, or Yopacara-tathdgata$arbha texts. These men, Ratnamati (fifth-sixrh-centuries), Gunabhadra (394-468). Bodhiruci .(sixth-century), and Paramartha (499-569), demonstrared in their life's work that they highlv valued this double srream..r8 Grosnick isolates three factors in non-Dharmapdla yogdcara that rvere strfficiently compatible with t&thag&t&Earbha ideas to pave the way fbr syncretism.se All three are central features of yogacara thought, and all are prominent in the Bi{?. The first is the belief that Stanyateachings leave themselves open to a nihiiistic misunderstandiqg and are incomplete as found in prajfid and N{ddhyamika rexts. As discussed earlier, Yogacdra and ta,thdgatagarbhe, thinking on this point is remarkably close: They agree that it is vital ro convey that Buddhist practice not onl)'frees one from delusion but also frees one to realize Truth, Truth that is not nihilistic but atTirmative of that which one will discover. The second feature of Yogdcdra that Grosnick cites as opening it to tqthdgata4&rbhcl thought is subject-object nondualism. In Yo$acara, subject-object nondualism is a feature of Thusness (tcnhatd). and Thusness is an expression for what one realizes at the end of the Path. It is in this affirmative function that both subject-object nondualism and Thusness are identified with Buddha nature in the Bi[?. Finally, the Yogdcdra doctrine of trisv&bhanrc, the three natures, also appears prominently in a number of syncretic texts, including the BN?. Ttris docrrine in its Yogacira contexr explains the relationship between delusion and enlightenment. parikatpitast:ab hcns is delusion experi en ce, parini gpanna- srsab a hctvct is enli$htenment experience, or seein$ thin$s as they are. Pqratqntrasvabhava, the dependent nature, is the $iven: When seen throu$h delusion, it is purikalpita; when seen without delusion, it is parhiqpanna. Because the relationship between delusion and enlightenmenr is a weak point ol tathdgatagarbhct rhought (the Snmata-sntro is typical of nthagatagarbha literarure in avoicling this issue by stating "only a Buddha undersarrds this"). the trisvabhdqrq, doctrine strengthened tathAgatagarbho thought by supplementing its account of delusion and enlightenment. Moreover, used in this way, the trisrsobhdpo doctrine integrates perfectly rvith the dual Yogacdra-tathdgatagurbha insistence upon confirming the positive nature of what one attains through Buddhist practice: One

T9

NATURE BUDDI-IA

attains Thusness (tathatd), or in other words, parinispanna' svqbh.dvct. These three poirtts are prominent in the B,\t?. However, the most familiar syncretic texts, the Lahkavatara-sutra and the Awakening of Faith, are better known for amaigarnating the Yogacara concept of d,laya-tsijftdna, the "storehouse consciousness," and the tatlfiEategarbha. This association, however, is not a straightforward matter. In the Awakening, the t&thcigetegqrbhe, is $iven at least two roles. First, d,laya-vijfidut and the tathAgst&gqrbhe are spoken of "On the side by side in connection with the production of sclmsctrct: basis of the tathdgatsga,rbhfi, there is the mind of production and destruction. Ala,ya-vijfrnna is the name fbr the harmonious joining oi 'nonproduction-and-nondestruction' with'production-and-destruction'such that they are neither one nor different."'to Later in the text, after listing the superlative attributes of Thusness (tathatrT), we are these attributes, it is identified told that, because the latter possesses with both tathd,Eeteea.rbha and d,hannakdya.{1 It seems, then, that in this text when tathdea,tegarbha is identified with tothatd its innately pure nature that is full of superlative attributes is connoted, whereas when it is identified with dlaya-vijftdrw its immanence and participation in the world of sarysara and delusion is indicated. The Awakening is so terse, however, as to leave the exact relationship in need of among d.laya-z:ijfi,ana, t&tha,td, and tathdgangarbha further interpretation by the commentators. Although the Lahkdvcttd,r&-sutrcl is encyclopedic rather than terse, its account of the relationship between tathag&tugctrbhct and dlaya-wijfidna also is ambivalent. In some passages it teaches a strai;lrtforward identification of tethdgatugarbhn and dla5ra-,o7ifiAru\ as follows: holds within it the causefor both goodand Mahdmati, Tathagata-garbha the . evil,andby it all the formsof existence produced. . . [Wlhena revulsion are known under the [or turning-backlhas not taken place in the Alayavijflnna there is no cessationof the seven evoh.in name of Tathagaa-garbha, . Mahimati,let thoseBodhisattva-Nlahhsattvas VijfrEnas.. . For this reason, who are seekingafter the exalted truth effect the purification of the Tathagata-garbha which is knownas Alayavijiana.{l Such a passage as this, in which tclthdgdtagarbha and d.Iaya-z;iifidna are identified, seems to effect this identification b1'canceling out the 20

INTRODUCTION

nthAger&Earbhct's orvn qualities of innate purity, rvisdom, and so on as discussed in the tathagatagqrbhq, texts.4r Here, the nanle tuth&gqtcrgarbha merely is appended to the alaya's attributes. Elsewhere in the text, however, the tathdgatctgarbha is spoken of with no connection to dlaya-vijftana, and here it retains its expected character: "Bv tranquillitv is meant oneness (ekdgru), and oneness gives birth to the highest Samddhi, rvhich is gained by entering into the womb of Tathdgatahood ltathdgatagctrbhal, rvhich is the realm of noble wisdom realized in one's inmost self."aa We may'conclude that rvhile the Lqhkctrsqtqrct embracres both t&thdEat&gqrbh& and alaya-vijiitTna, it has not given us a complegely worked through philosophy in which all the terms of its system are clearly understood in their mutual relations. Though the alaya-vijftd,na is mentioned in a minor way in the BAr?, this is an insignificant feature of out text. The BNT does, though, manifest profourrd influence from Yogacara thought, especially fiom theYogdcdrabhnmi (attributed to Asanga) and, to a lesser degree, from the M ahdydnasannpraha, the Mahayanasutralaitkara, and other texts. In addition to the three points discussedearlier (a positive interpretation of emptiness, subject-object nondualism, and tris,sqbhcta), the BN? very heavily emphasizes the Yogdcdra ideas of Thusness (tathata) and of a1rayapardrrfffi (transformation of the basis), though the latter is interpreted in a way different t'rom the standard Yogicdra understanding. Paramrtrtha Of the many translators of Buddhist scriptures that China sarv, Paramd,rtha (Zhen-di) (499-569) is considered to have been the greatest of his time and ranks with Kumdrajrya and Xuan-zang as one of the greatest ever.as He was born into a Brahman family in Ujjain (Ujjayini) in western India. After becoming a Buddhist monk and completing his studies,he traveled to Funan. There he was invited by emissaries of Emperor Wu of Liang to come to China to transmit the Dharrna. This he did, arriving in China in 546. Soon after his arrival, a rebellion displaced Paramdrtha's patron, Dmperor Wu, leavin$ Paramhrtha in a perilous and rootless position. Paramartha was forced to seek out a more peacet'ulplace'rvhere he could proceed with his translations. Unfortunately, in neither the Lianfl nor the

21

BUDDFL\ NATURE

succeedingChen (Ch'en) dvnasty'did political conditions stabilize in South China, and Paramartha was frequentl-v obliged to interrupr his u,ork to move to a safe location. As a result, he "spent a rvretched life translating s[tras Iand (astras] while rvanderingfrom place to place, accompanied bv a small band of disciples."46 tq'ice tried to leave He China but the first time was dissuaded b.v his disciples. and the second time, thou5ihhe set sail, was returned by strong u'inds and his "fate."47 Toward the end of his life he attempted suicide but was restrained by the combined et'forts of monks and $overnment officials. Though he acquired tame tbr his rvork and monks traveled S,reatdistances to learn from him, he faced the opposition of powerful monks at court and was blocked from rnoving to the capital. He died at the age of 70, with his disciples determined to transmit his work. \\'hen one considers the kind of life Paramdrtha lived. it is difficult to imagine how he managed to produce the number and qualitl' of works that he did, works whose message and intellectual power were to influence the development of Chinese Buddhism for centuries to come. Clearly, Paramartha was not only a brilliant scholar but, despite periodic struftlles with depression. dedicated u'ith a religious devotion to his lifework. It also is remarkable that he cared to transmit such an optimistic line of thought as that of the Yogacara and Yogdcara-tclth&g&tagarbhq, line, given the conditions in South China and the human behavior to which he was n'itness, which made the practical circumstances of his own life so difficult. He had precious little reinforcement from the "real" world of the pure mind or the innate and universal Buddhahood extolled in the w.orks -he transmitted. Paramdrtha is one of the major translators who rendered into Chinese both Yogdcdra texts and Yogdcdru-tathd.g,cltaearbhq, texts. There is no doubt that a major component of his missionary's zeal was his commitment to the transmission of these lines of Buddhist thought. His syncretic translations include, in addition to the Buddha Nsture Treq,tise: Wu Shan! Yi Jinp, a text not extant in any form other than the "translation" of which he may have been the author, and the Atc'okening of Faith in Mahdydna (Da Sheng Qi Xin Lun) of which, again, he may have been the author. His Yogdcdra translations include MadhyCtntavibhdgq-bhdsyq by Vasubandhu; the Mahdydnasamgraha of Asanga, and Mahayanasam$raha-bhas3a, Yasubandhu's commentary on Asanga's work; Jue Dinp, Zan!, Lun, 22

INTRODUCTION

part of Asanga's Yogdcdrabhami; and Vasubandhu's VimSatikci and Trirryiikct. As part of his evident devotion to Vasubandhu, lte and translated the latter's non-Yo$dcdr an Abhidhorrnako$s-bhdsga wrote a highly esteemed biography of Vasubandhu. He also translated prajfid. and lt{ddhyamika works, includin$ the Dinmond Silta (llajracchedikd-prajfid,paramita-sfitra) and the Ratndra,li of he probably would not have Nigdrjuna, works that, as we have seen, regarded as competin$ with the Yo$dcdra and Yo$dcdratuthd,gatagqrbhq. texts. Paramartha translated many other workswe have over thirty translations from his turbulent twenty-three years in China, and many others of his works were lost-but his $reatness and importance lies for the most part in his transmission of Yo$acdra and Yogdcdra-t&tlfi,Eangqrbhq, texts.as Paramartha's translations constituted crucial contributions to the Chinese Buddhist intellectual world. Paramartha's translation of Vasubandh u' s M ahdy arwsarygraha- bhds.ya stimulated the establishment of the SheJun school, an important sixth-century school that, together with the Di-lun (Ti-lun) school, focused the discussion of Yo{ac:ara and Yogdcdra-tathaga,tugqrbha ideas. This discussion contributed heavily to the development of the indigenous Chinese Buddhist schools that developed durin$ the Sui and Tan$ dlrrasties. Chih-yi andFa-zang, for example, were very familiar with Paramirtha's work; Fa-zang's commentary on the Awqkenin! of Faith is re$arded as the most authoritative of the many commentaries on that important text. Without Paramdrtha's work, the evolution of Chinese Buddhist thought would have been significantly altered.

D. The Text of the Buddha Nqh.re Treutise

The authorship of the Buddha Nq.ttffe Treatiseae is attributed to Vasubandhu, and the Chinese translation is attributed to Paramdrtha. Only the Chinese translation is extant; neither a Tibetan translation nor a Sanskrit original survives. There is no reason to suspect that the text might be a purely Chinese ori$inal, as it contains an extensive refutation of several non-Buddhist Indian philosophical schools, which would not be expected in a Chinese ori$inal. There is a considerable degree of doubt, however, as to whether Vasubandhu actually wrote the text. Takasaki and Hattori, for example, are convinced that the text was not translated but actually written by

23

BTIDDTTA NATURE

Paramartha,on the basis of his knowledge oi the Rarncgotrcrcibhctga.so It is true that there is an unmistakable overlap berween the BN? and the Ratrwgotraz:ibhaga. The two texts have a f,ood deal of rnaterial in common, and it is quite evident that the former was partialll' based on the latter. Takemura, though, finds insufficient reason to overturn the authority of the staternent recorded on the text that the authorship is \hsubandhu's and the translation Paramartha's.slIt is difficult not to be suspicious of Paramartha, however, inasmuch as he is S,ivenas the translator of both the B,\? and the Wtt Shan! Yi Jiri!, neither of which is extant in other than its Chinese (Param6rtha) version and both of which contain extensive similarities u'ith the Ratnagotravibhaga. This is not the only difficulty rvith the texr of the tstr{?. The circumstances of the text's composition, translation (if it rvas translated), and transmission are all very little known. There is no record of the date or place of translation on the manuscript. Ui puts the translation of the text between 557 and 569.sr Takemura puts it at approximately 558.s-l One particularly troublesome aspect of the text is the existence of preceded by the term comme?il. It is uncertain what several passa$es person or persons may have added these comments. Takasaki believes that fragments of a lost commenrary on the BNT bv Paramartha have been preserved here.sa Takemura makes a considered attempt to determine whether Vasubandtru, Paramartha. or someone else may have added these commentary like passa$es. He believes each case has to be treated individuallv and that it is ven, difficult to be sure in one's judgment. It is not my intention to further research the problem oi the authorship of the BNT. The scholars mentioned here rvho argue for the authorship of Paramartha are persuasive, as is the connection between Paramartha, the BN?, the Ratnagotravibhaga, and the l4zu Shang Yi Jing. It does seem likely that Paramartha was the author of the BN?, though this cannot be regarded as conclusively settied. Although it is impossible to identify the author of the rext with absolute confidence, there is no doubt that the work was in scme way in the hands of Paramirtha, either as author of the text as a whole. as author of the inserted comments, as translator, or in a combination of these roles. In this limited .ensb, we can identify the text as belonging to Paramdrtha. fu such, it bears his stamD and is 24

INTRODLTCTION

representativeof the Viewsthat he bequeathedto later $enerationsot East Asian Buddhists. The Bt{? is just one of many cases demonstrating the g,reat difficult-"- of deterrninin$ to what extent Paranrartha was the transmitter of the ideas of others, such as Vasubandhu, and to rvhat extent he rvas the ori$inator of some of these ideas. Paramartha is knorvn to have interpolated passagesdealing with tathaga,taparbhct into Yo$acara texts he u'as translatin$ into Chinese without even alertin$ the reader that he had done so. For example, a comparison of Paramartha's translation of Vasubandhu's Maha5,6nqsam$rahabhasja, u'ith the Tibetan and Xuan-zan$ r'ersions of the text, reveals inscrtions of tathcigatagarbhaideas in Paramartha'srranslation that are entirely lacking in the Tibetan and the Xuan-zangversions.ss The same kind of thing may be at work in the Buddha Nature Treatise. Chapter Four of the B.\?, "Analysis of the Characteristics," rvhich analyzesBuddha nature in terms of ten characteristics,is very close to that part of Chapter One of the Ramngotra, which analyzes the tathagcttag,urbha in terms of virtually the same ten characteristics. The author of the Bi{?, however, has greatly expanded the text by adding Yogachra concepts, discussed at considerable length, to the tqth&gatagdrbhq discourse of the Ratnagotra. Assuming that Paramartha is the author of the Bi{?, we can see that he rvas responsible rrot onl1, for transmitting Yogacera-tathagatagarbhcl texts, but also for effecting some of the synthesis himself-and in both directions (adding tqthAgqng&rbha passates to Yogacara texrs and Yogdcarapassagesto tathclg,at&gqrbho. texts). The Awqkening of Faith in the Mahaydna is another text "translated" bv Paramdrtha, attributed to another (A6vaghosa), in which the attribution is widely doubted, if not discredited outright. N{any scholars believe this text was a Chinese original. William Grosnick, however, argues that Paramartha is the likely author of this text.s6 fi as is quite possible but unproven, Param6rtha was the author of the BNT as rvell as the Wu Shan! Yi Jing and the Awakening oJ Faith in the Mahayana, he would deserve a large share of the credit for the articulation of the Yogdcdra-tathctgcrtqgqrbha ideas that so heavily influenced the development of Chinese Buddhist thought^ But even thou$h we cannot be sure whether he authored these texts, rve do know that he chose to transmit them, that YogacAra and Yogacar^-tqthalgcttclgarbhe teachings were focal con-

25

BUDDHA NATIIRE

cerns of his. that his choice of words as a translator determined in larf,e measure the language in which these ideas were subsequently considered (until the time of Xuan-zan|), and that he had a tendency to "supplement" the texts he translated rvith his own thoughts. To this extent at least his role in this historv must be credited. and a si6inificantrole it is. Within the corpus of Paramartha's works, the BN? stands out for its importance for understanding Buddha nature thought. The BN? held a position of considerable influence in the body of t&thc1gqrcrgclrbha-Buddha nature texts transmitted to China. In Sino-Japanese Buddhism there was a significant and sustained controversy concernin$ the "existence" of Buddha nature; that is, the issue of rvhether all bein$s or only some possess the Buddha nature and therehy are assured the attainment of Buddhahood. In this context. the BN? rvas well knorvn and seriously studied in China and Japan because of its thorough elucidation of the Buddha nature concept and its persuasive defense of the reality of Buddha nature. Ling-run (Ling-jun), for example, who was one of the early advocates of the universal Buddha nature theory, quoted the BN? in his attempt to refute the view that some do not possess the Buddha nature.sT It{any commentaries, both Chinese and Japanese,were written on the BII?, thou$h onlv one Japanese commentary suryives.ss As Takemura points out, however, the very existence of such a "Buddha nature controversy" is based on an understandin$ of the Buddha nature quite antithetical to that concept as presented in the Bitr?.seThe controversy, that is, is formulated on an understandin$ of the Buddha nature as some kind of original principle or metaphysical entity that 6an either exist or not exist. The essentialtheme that we shall see in the BN?, however, is that the Buddha nature is not a metaphysical thing or entity of any kind. It is thus, strictly speaking, improper to say either that it exists or does not exist, thouSh the author of the Bii? does assert, for soteriolo$ical reasons, that the Buddha nature can be said to exist in a sense that he specifies.This clear affirmation of the Buddha nature, and the philosophically and doctrinally sophisticated manner in which it is expressed,enabled the Bl{? to play the important role'it played in the Buddha nature controversy. 26

INTRODUCTION

E. The Buddha i{ature Treatise and Chinese Buddhist Thought

The importance of the BN? for Chinese Buddhist philosophy is not limited to its philosophy of Buddha nature, narrowly conceived. The text is remarkably useful todav as an introduction to the Yogacara-related foundations of Chinese Buddhist philosophy. Many of the views articulated in the text, and especially the overall standpoint from which the author speaks, are very much in harmony with widespread ideas in Chinese Buddhist thou$ht as they are expressed in the various indigenous Chinese Buddhist schools. This is especially true of Chan, but it also is true to a lesser de$ree of Tian-tai and Hua-yan. Some of the themes that will emer$e in this book as the philosophy of the BN? and that are important components of the foundation of Chinese Buddhist thought are as follows: 1. An emphasis on the positive nature of realization; a view of enlightenment as an experiential reality that goes beyond emptiness. 2. An optimistic concept of human nature based on the idea of a universal, active Buddha nature. 3. An ontology based upon nondualism, as opposed to monism, and expressed in the language of Thusness. 4. Subject-object nondualism, the idea that mind and world arise together in mutual creation, whether in a deluded or an enlightened manner. 5. A positive view of phenomenal reality, based upon the views given in points 1 and 3. 6. The concept of a pivotal conversion experience from delusion to enlightenment or from impurity to purity. 7. The equation of Buddha nature and Buddhist practice (a view that ultimately becornes more representative cf Japanese Buddhism, in Dogen, than of Chinese).60 The clear and systematic expression of these themes in the BN? provides an accessible door into some of the most important, but often puzzling, tenets of Chinese Buddhist thought. In this sense,'one can think of this book as an introduction to themes that subsequently would become core Chinese Buddhist ideas. We are introduced to

27

BLIDDI{A NATURE

them in the Bi[T at the point of their importation from India to China (via Paramartha), prior to their appropriation by Chinese Buddhist thinkers. Becausethese ideas were established at the ground of the then-emerging indigenous Chinese Buddhist schools and u'ere nor the exclusive property of any one of these schools, the importance ot' these ideas for Chinese Buddhism is unusually broad. The elucidation of these thernes is one purpose of this book. A second purpose of this book is to grapple u'ith the cornrnorl charge that the notion of Buddha nature (or tathagatugarbhal introduces into Buddhism the non-Buddhist, crypto-Hindu elemenr ot atnntsctda (a vierv of an entitative, metaphysical self or soul) or idealistic monism. I will explore the extent to which it is possible to defend the Buddha nature concept from a purell' Buddhist perspective, in terms of purely Buddhist philosophical principles. I believe this reflects the author's orvn understandinA of the Buddha nature. I begin this project by discussing the Buddha nature concept in the jarSon of the text itself. I hope to show in this u'a;- that the author simply does not think in either entitative or monistic terms, but bases his philosophy from the ground up on entirel-v other principles. .\s m1' "Buddhistic" defenseof Buddha nature relies upon my explanation of the latter in terms of action and practice, I also consider rvhat kinds of action and practice are considered especiallydisclosive of Buddha nature. A final goal of the book is to engage the BN? in dialogue rvith current Western thinkinS on the concept of human personhood. The concept of Buddha nature is probably the sing,le mosr importanr component of East Asian Buddhist concepts of human personhood. As such, to the extent that it is possible to overcome the cultural $ap between us, we could profit by hearing tliis Buddhisr response to the perennial and universal question of human being, In Chapter 7 I rvill engage in cross-cultural philosophy by addressing Western philosophical questions about human personhood to the BNT's Buddha nature concept.

28

CHAPTERTWO
The Conceptof BuddhaNature

A.

Taking

the Semantie Ascent

did the Buddha speak of Buddha nature?" (787a). In YV mid-sixth century China, the question of the status of Buddha nature is phrased in this way, and with these words the Buddha liature Treatise be$ins. The author does not open' as we might expect, with the more strai$htforward but naive question, What is Buddha nature? Instead, he takes the "semantic ascent"l -he directs the focus of the inquiry to the lan!,ua$e with which the tradition speaks of Buddha nature and away from the Buddha nature itself. Had the author be$un by askin$, What is Buddha nature? he would have begied the very questions in which he was most interested. This form of the question presupposes a Buddha nature that "is" "sbmethin$." But the ontolo$ical and metaphysical status of the Buddha nature are two of the issues that the BiV?'s author feels are most misunderstood by others and on which he focuses from the beginning of the text. By takin$ the semantic ascent, he structures the question in such a way that no such questions are be$$ed' Why, th'en, did the Buddha speak of Buddha nature? The Buddha, says the author, spoke of Buddha nature to help people overcome five shortcomings (inferior mind, arro$,ance, delusion, slanderin$ the 55IIfhy

29

t]T'DDII.\ NATI'RE

truth, and attachmenr to self) and to produce in them five 'irtues (diligent mind, re'erence, rvisdom [prcfiflal, knou,ledge lifir1nal, and compassion) (787a). In short, the Buddha spoke of Buddha nature ro help humanir)' put an end to ignorance and attain enlightenment. This is an important point: The teaching of Buddha nature does not essentiall;- indicate the existence and describe the nature of "somethin$" that "is." Ne'ertheless, it r'as important tbr the Buddha to speak of Buddha nature tbr the same purpose that all the Buddha's teachings sen'e; namely, aiding sentient beings in their quest for enlightenment. The author of the BN?, like the Buddha (he claims), \\'ants to speak positi'ely of Buddha nature, but without leading the reader to concei'e of the Buddha nature as "something" that "is." Horv he resolves this difficult- is the subject of this chapter.

B. Refutation of Other \riews

The author of the BN? is concerned that his readers' minds mav be tull of notions ol atman and ancttmctn, misconceptions of Buddha nature, and so on and that these ideas n'ill interfere with the correcr understanding of Buddha nature he rvants to preserlt. Thus he begins by contrasting Buddha nature with such competing conceptions and criticizing rhe latter, thereby clarili'ing what Buddha nature is not. only on this basis,he feels, can he go on to discuss in a constructi'e manner horv the term Buddhq nature actually does function. Thus we begin with a discussion of u'hat Buddha nature is not, argued in the context of a refutation of competin$ views. The author's first mo'e is to refute both the vierv that the Buddha nature exists and the vieu'that it does not exist. The way in which this is done is epical of the logic of the BN?. \vith respect to Buddha nature, sa1's the author, if you say either that it exists fu,,ou) that it or does not exist (tcru) you go astray. Let us consider these imporiant terms. You and wu are two of the most thoroughlv studied u.ords in the classical chinese language, especiallf in their philosophical meanin$s. Basically,you means "ha'e" or ,,there is.,' Wu is the opposrte, meanin$ "lack" or "there is not." Thus the terms indicate the presenceor absenceof a thing or things. philosophicalll" 1'ou and te,u early took on the extended, abstracr" senses of existence and nonexistence, something and nothin$. These are used, tor example, 30

NATI.,RE OF THE CONCEPT BLIDDTL{

in the Daoist (Taoist) philosophy oI Laozi (Lao-tzt) and Zhuan{zi (Chuang-tzu). However, 1'ou is used primarill- with re$ard to concrete things; the Dao (Tao),li (principle), and other such abstractionsonly occasionally are covered by you, but usually are lpu or neither you 'Nothing' implies the absence o{ any nor vru.2 "The English word 'entit)',' the Chinese uru only the absence of concrete things. . . . But if the Tao is Nothing, then Nothin$ is a positive complement of Somethin$, not its mere absence."3 Yolt', unlike other verbs and adjectives, is not negated by the term bu, "not," but forms a pair with its contrary, rrtu, "similar to such pairs as long and short, left and right, Yin and Yang."+ Thus, especially in Daoist philosophy, wu may have a positive, constructive content, unlike the En$ish nothin{, or nonexistence. That this is so is illustrated by the Daoist teachin$ that it is in being a combination of somethin g Oou) and nothin$ (tou) that such things as doors and windows are useful.s In fact, tou has such a positive nature that in Daoism it is considered the source or ben of all manifested things. We shall shortly speak again of this concept, ben. The author's most fundamental concerns in the B|'{T are, soteriolog,ically, to promote practice and chan$e, and, philosophicallv, to explain realit-v, human bein$, and human transformation in dynamic, process-oriented terms that ultimately derive from the experience of practicing Buddhism. On the basis of this agenda, he argues that neither the concept of existence Oou) nor of nonexistence (tllu) can account for the point of his interest; namely, that some here and now are realizins their Buddha nature and some are not. Insofar as he wants to encourage the practice of Buddhism, he must criticize the view that there is no (tpu) Buddha nature, a view that naturally tends to discoura$e efforts to attain what might be unattainable. Insofar as he is a Buddhist, he seeschange as the basic "given" from which philosophy must begin. He therefore must criticize the view that all "have" Cvou) Buddha nature in a substantialist sense. The concerns for practice and for the imperative of basin$ philosophy on the givenness of change are mutually related concerns. If, he ar$ues, one says there is no Buddha nature, then one will never be able to attain Buddhahood, as this would mean that there was an unbridgeable gulf between the ordinary being and Buddha, each lrozen into its own nature. The corollary to this is that if one says there is Buddha nature, then the idea of the chan$e or transformation

31

'DDIIA BI N.\TURE

inherent in practice *'ill be lost. \\4r-vpractice the Buddha way it' o'e already is Buddha? Thus. the ideas of both there being and not being a Buddha nature rnust be rejected, as either equalll, rvould lreeze realitl" into a static state of being. Bein and nonbeing are seen as static categories in Buddhist thought' As such thev are unacceptable terms tbr explaining reality becausethev do not allorv for the self-transformation,hut "nirtir,rt". the Buddha Wav. As our author puts it, neither existence (!ou) nor nonexistence (.o'u) can be "transformed." "\\'hat is cannot be destrol'ed, *'hat is not cannot be produced" (7BBc). This, of course. applies to Buddha nature as rvell. Thus, the author sa},s, Buddha nature is nothin6i "fixed" (dinE). Reality, and that rvhich constirures reality, is ot' a dynamic, everchan6lingnature. To think of rt as "fixed"-u'hether as bein$ or as nonbeing-is a basic mistake. Ontology takes second place to practical necessity; primary importance is given to rvhat is soteriological,the self-transtbrmation of liberation. ontological notions sen,e primarily to provide a theoretical explanation as to horv self-transformation or chan$e is possible.In the B-\?, the basis of this explanation is establishecl with the rejection of the static notions of being and nonbeing. so far this t.vpe of logic souncls like l{iddle path logic-the two extremes of being and n,nbein$, eternalism and annihilationism. are denied. Horve'er, rvhereas in sinyuvurla thought the rrroblem of beirrg a.nd nonbeing is resol'ed in tire dialectics of itny'ta or emptiness, here in tathagatagarbha_Buddha nature thought, the case is rather different. The issue of the being or nonbeing of tsuddha nature is concluded in the BN? as follows: "ln accordance with principle (Dao li), all sentienr beings universally and aboriginally possess the pure Buddha nature. That there should be one who eternalll' failed to obtain parinit-oana is not the case. This is why Buddha nature most assuredly aboriSinally exists (ben you); the reason being, that is, that it has nothing to do with either being or n o n b e i n g "( 7 8 8 c ) . The author begins this passage by appealing to ,,principle," literallr' "wa1'-principle." Thus, thou$h the statement does, as the author notes, refer to scripture (Tathagatagarbha Sutrq,.\,the author also u'ants to ground his teachings in what he feels simply is true, the rval'things are. n4rether or not a Buddhd had come into the worid to point it out to us. This is ti?ical of tq,tha^ataAarbha literature.6 32

NATLIRN OF TTIECONCEPT BLIDDFLA'

The author also rvants to indicate with this that rvhat he is sayin$ is an actively affirmative truth; that is, a positive qualitl' of reaiity, which may be spoken of in affirmative lan$ua$e' hon'ever obliquely' He is sayin$,in effect: The world is not chaotic, rve need not be lost in , i t . T h e r e i s a p r i n c i p l e . d i s c o v e r a b l eb v h u m a r t s . m a n i i e s t i n B t h e llv realizinp this principle (rnore closelv, b;order of the universe. bringin$ ourselves into accordance rvith this principie) rve ma1' which also is the truth of our on'n discover this truth of the ur.riverse, nature. This is a reason for rejoicin$, and the author of the BArTfelt it imperative that this be made clear. What is the meanin$ ot the statement that tsuddha nature "most assuredly abori$inally exists"? The abori$inal existetrce, berr 1'otr, spoken of here, is altogether different trom ordinary existence. Literally, ben - "root, source,ori$in" - plus -l'ou- "existence,bein$" the term conrrasts rvith you in the sense ot' finite existellce; that is, the processof cornin$ into bein$ and perishinp,in time. Ben ltru thus contrasts with both existence' or bein$ Ll'orr)' artd nonexistence' or parallel carr be nonbeing (tou), both in the finite sense.An ir.lteresting to'u. Daoist rhirrkers distin$uished nvo found in the Daoist concept of senses of the term vru.. (1) "that primal uldift'erentiated state that preceded the later state of manifested thin$s (r'u)[r'ou]" and (2) "the perpetual alternation of the absence of somethip$ (tc'u) as coltrasted a to the presence of something t)tu) [r'oul'" The former "tt'as not ,nothing' for it contained all future possibilities for $'orld mere manifestation."T This sense of tctu also rvas called ben w'u, "ori$inal or root nonexistence" to distin$uish it from the second sense of merell' contin$ent nonexistence. The term ben you used in the BN? may have been int'luenced by the Daoist ben wu. In both, the term tren is attached to the verb to distinguish the existence or nonexistence in question from the merely contingent variefy. Both ben you andben tou (independently) stand opposed to the existence-nonexistence pair. Benyou, however, does not carry the connotation carried by ben to'u in the Daoist usage; in namely, the sense of referrin$ to that out of which all else emer$,eci a temporal sense. Ben you, moreover, plays a role in tctthdg&tqgqrbhq-Btddha nature thou$ht similar in an imporlant way to that which 9ilnyatd' plays in Sfirrya thou$ht. In both cases, the two extremes of bein$ and nonbeing are rejected, and we are lgft with a term that indicates the

33

BUDDHA NATURE

conceptual insufficiency of those extremes. Yet how different are the "flavors" of the two terms! The authors of the tqtha.gata1arbha Iiterature were intent on putting into some kind of positive language what they took to be the ultimate rruths of Buddhism. They clearly felt that the 6hnya language was negative, or that it would inevitably be perceived as such. In short, we have two linguistic paths, both of which proceed through negation of conceptual extremes. but one of which ends with the term 9ilnya and the other with a "Buddha nature" that "aboriginally exists." This, then, is 6unya dialectics with a difference. According to the BN?, both the view that Buddha nature exists and the view that it does not exist are to be rejected because both imply that Buddha nature is something capable of existing as other things exist. To borrow Gilbert Ryle's terminology,s to so conceive Buddha nature is to make a category mistake; that is, to conjoin the kind of existence proper to things such as trees and stones with the very different kind of existence pertaining to Buddha nature. One thereby confuses the ontological status of Buddha nature with that of trees and stones. Buddha nature, unlike the latter, is not a thing in the world. Rather, as a term, it serves to affirm the potential of all sentient beings to realize Buddhahood. Thus to say "Buddha nature exists" is very unlike saying "stones exist." To indicate this difference between the two uses of the term exist, the author refers to the existence of Buddha nature as aboriginal existence, emphasizing that it has no relation to the ordinary concept of existence or its negation. The author's next step in clarifying the nature of being of the Buddha nature is to refute the idea that Buddha nature is a kind of own-nature (svabhd,va, zi xirg). The author does this by arguing against the existence of any own-natures at all, as follows. For example,what formerly is a seedsubsequently producesa $rain plant. The "former" and "subsequent" st4lesof this Sgain neither one nor two, are neither exist (you) nor do not exist (unr). If they were one [i.e., the samel, then there would be no "former" and "subsequent." they were different, If then whet wasori$nally lrain could subsequently a bean.Therefore, be they are neither the same nor different. Due to . [the confluence of] the destructionof the causeand the productionof the effect,own-nature neither existsnor doesnot exist. [That is,l because causeperishes, the own-natute does not exist, but becausethe effect is produced,it does not not exist. Because the time of thecause there is not yet an effect,you cannot say et own-natureexists.Because production of the effect is certainly due to the 34

THE CONCEPT OF BLIDDIL\ N.\TL'ITE

the cause, you cannot sa-v it does not exist. In this .sense culrse and eftcct. , reflection and understandin$ reach completion toAether. ancl therefore *-e say there is no o\4'n-nature. (793a)

The idea of own-nature is refuted because it does not alloli, tbr the process of chan$e as seen in the $rowth ot' a plant or in an), process havin$ a former and a subsequent stage. The author, as a Buddhrst, conceives of an own-nature as bein$ eternal precisely in the sensc ot unchan$in$.Therelbre any phe:romenon or event that in an1,\\.avrs dynamic or in process is judged to be empty' of an own-nature. Because,according to Buddhism, all is in f'lux, nou,here rvill one find an own-nature. Buddha nature is no exception to this allencompassin$rule. The author offers us here no new ideas or perspectives. \Vhat he gives us is straight Middle Path logic emphasizing the process of tlux and the interdependence of cause and eft'ect, of former and subsequent stages.He concludes the section by affirming in the most orthodox manner, "Know, therefore, that all thin$s are Thus trul5, without own-nature. only true emptiness is their essential nature" (793c). In this way the author affirms that his forthcoming teachings concerning the Buddha nature do not trespass on the inviolable teaching that there is no own-nature. He anticipates that his teachin$s may resemble an own-nature view. Hence, early in the treatise he discredits this view in order that such a misunderstandina not develop. The auth6r next prepares the reader to understand the status of his Buddha nature teachings in the context of the Mahayana emptiness doctrine, specifically, the emptiness doctrine of the Nlddhyamika two truths (satyadvaya) theory. To do so, he must first discredit a certain misunderstanding of the two truths doctrine and then offer his own interpretation of that doctrine. His interpretation is presented in the form of a synthesis of Madhyamika two truths theory and Yogdcdra three natures (trisrsabhdva) theory. The Madhyamika two truths theory teaches that all of reality is encompassed by two levels: the relative or worldly (samvrti) and the ultimate or supreme (pa,ramdrtho). Though ordinarily translated as "truth," the sagta of sa,tyadzsayaembraces both epistemolo$ical and ontological qualities; it is the key rerm in a theory of experiential reality. Saryooqti-saiyo is said to be whatever is enveloped and
.)J

BUDD}IANATURE

obscured; i$norance; existence, understood in terms of the kle*adesire, hatred and delusion; conditioned co-origination (pratttyasamutpdda); and the realm of what is empty (6ilnya). Parmctrthasatya is said to be the cessation of the modes of "1" and "mine" and of belief in person; tranquility, understood as"the cessation of the personal world; what does not arise or cease and is not dependent; known by wise saints in and through itself; the reality of. sarytsTti as its emptiness; the Middle Path; lib<lration.e Like the Mddhyamika theory, the trisrsabhdva theory is concerned with experiential reality and thus is simultaneously epistemological and ontological. The parikalpita nature is both the commonsense view of the world constructed by the deluded mind and that deluded mind itself; it is the interpretation of experience in terms of the wholly imaginary categories of subject and object, names and concepts. The paratantra nature is both the fact of conditioned coorigination (prqtityasamutpdda) and the recognition of that fact. Finally, the pariniqpanna nature is the Thusness of reality and the cognition of Thusness and therefore is perfect and absolutely true. The author begins this section by announcing that he wishes to "refute the biased views [errors] of be$nners on the Maheyenapath" (793c). The misunderstanding at issue is the vierv that "according to worldly truth (sar?o.rtisatya) all thin$s exist $rt^r); according to supreme truth (paramdrthasatya) all thing do not exist (rou)" (793c). The rnisunderstanding of supreme truth (peremd,rtfutsatya), or emptiness, in a nihilistic manner is especially troublesome to the author here. This t'irst level of misunderstanding is rejected in f'avor of the tbllowing sugllested correct understanding of the rwo truths. "That all dhqrmas lack own-nature is suprenie truth. To speak of the existence of own-nature within [the actuality of] the absence of own-nature is called worldly truth" (79Qc). The difference between the two truths, then, is not a difference between things existing or not existing, nor is it simply the difference between the existence or nonexistence of an own-nature. Rather, it is emphasized that worldly truth is constituted by falsely speaking of an own-nature as existing when in fact it does not. No sooner is this second-level understanding of the two truths proffered, however, than it, too, is called into question, especially the understanding of supreme truth given therein. Is it sufficient, the author asks, to speak thus of supreme truth as no more than the absence of own-nature? It is not, for in recognizin$ supreme truth as 36

NATURE OF THE CONCEPT BUDDHA

the a,bsenceof own nature, we are still speaking and thinkin$ on the level of worldly truth, on the level of the duality of the presence and absence of thin$s, includin$ own-nature. Given that the lan$ua$e and concepts of worldly truth are inherently deficient, they rnust represent a deficient perspective frorn which to speak of supreme rruth. Therefore, this second-level understanding of the two truths also must be transcended. We thus are brought to the third and final position, representing rhe author's o*'n understandin$ of the two truths. Especially important is his understanding of supreme truth. In expressing this understanding he rejects the dualistic lan$ua$eof bein$ and nonbein$ characteristic of the position of worldly truth in favor of his own characteristic formulation: Neither bein$ nor nonbein$ is the case. The two truths theorycannotbe called[a theoryofl bein$(j"ou),nor can it nor is neitherbein$, nonbein!, (uu), because be called[a theoryofl nonbein$ truth can be called why the supreme The reason the case(feiyoufei tnru). (taru) it is neither [a theoryofl bein$nor of nonbeing that becauce ne$ates it and thin$ it cannotbe called[a theoryofl bein$,andbecause both person and thingl it cannotbe (rian) the two formsof emptiness person reveals [of is cailed [a theory ofl nonbein$[insofaras emptiness not the sarneas of The sameis true of worldlytruth. Because the discriminatin$ nonbeingl. of nature(parikalpita) it cannot be called [a theory of] bein$,and because the relative natvre(para,tantra)it cannot be called [a theory ofl nonbein$' neither bein$ nor nonbeingwith supremetruth establishes Furthermore, are and nonbein$l neitherone nor two and respect persons thinSs. to [Bein$ [bothl is and is not. The [i.e., neither the samenor differeptl.Emptiness nonbein$, establish sameis true of worldly truth. One cannot definitively nature.Nor can one definitively [simplylon the basisof the discriminating being, establish [simply]on the basisof the relativenature.(793c-794a) The most important point here is that the tou or negation intrinsic to the previous two attempts at discussing supreme truth is now eschewed in favor of an approach which rejects the dualistic being vs. nonbeing approach. To establish this point, the author combines the three natures and two truths theories, as fbllows: Three Nq.tures discriminating@arikulpital I J relative (par&tantra) (pariniqpanna) - not named I [true

Two Truths wo.rdly(saryt:rti) supreme (parctmdrtha) 37

BUDDTL\ NATLIRE

However, rather than demonstratin$ the superiorin, of supreme truth (and, by implicarion, the parinispqnn& nal','e) o'er u,orldly truth, as usually is the case, he places both truths at the same level: Neither truth "can be called" a theory of either bein$ or nonbei'f,. In the case of worldly truth, this is becausethe recognition of the discriminating nature implies an affirmarion of nonbeing since the discriminating nature is totally false, whereas the reco$nition of the relative narure implies an at least partial affirmation of being since the relative nature is partially true-things are interdependent. Thus, since both being and nonbeing are affirmed in worldly truth, rhe tu,o negate each other, and neither can stand. In the case of supreme truth, bein$ cannot stand becausepersons and things are negated (tc'u); that is, neither is said to be ultimatelv real. I'et nonbein$ also cannot stand, becatrse the dual emptiness of person and thing after all, is, revealed (xian). This indicates for the BAr?'s author that not only is emptiness or the supreme truth nr.rt a matter of pure ne$ation or nihilism, but to the contrary, it can, and for soteriological purposes should, be described in the most positive, affirmative terms possible. He wants to clemonsrrate that supreme truth is not just a negation of worldly truth (the ideas of person and thing); it also functions positively to reveal something. His particular concern is to emphasize the positive qualiqv of this function. The author concludes by stating that t'rom rhe perspective of supreme truth, not only do being and nonbeingi not apply to the . phenomena of experience, they also are neither rhe same nor ' different; that is, they are nondual. .This may be explained as follows. Because being and nonbeing are denied on the grounds of their being both aflirmed and denied (e.g., in the case of supreme truth, nonbeing is affirmed with respect to persons ancl things, but denied with respect to emptiness), clearly their identities, which should be based on mutual exclusion, are jeopardized,, and it is no longer possible to see one as rhe negation of the other. That is, ordinarily, to affirm nonbeing is to negare being, but here one simultaneously affirms nonbeing (thereby implicitly negating being) and denies nonbeing (thereby implicitly affirming being). Thus, from the perspective of supreme truth, nonbeing is at once both afTirmed and denied, hence it is at once both being and nonbeing. The same applies to being. Moreover, says the author, emptiness ,,both is and is not, (konp 3B

THE CONCEPT BLTDDHA OF NATURT)

you bu you). This is the final salvo against an1'who might mistake emptiness for nonbeing. The treatment of emptiness in this text both argues against this particular mistake and opens the way for a discussion of emptiness in positive terms. For the BN?,s author, emptiness, or supreme truth, has a positive, "being,ful" quality to it. It is not just the negation of worldly truth; it also functions positively to "reveal" somethin$. In sum, three points have been established in this section. 1. It is incorrect to say either that Buddha nature exists or does not exist, though it is correct to say Buddha narure aboriginally exists, as long as this is undersrood as an affirmation of each person's potential to realize Buddhahood and not as a kind of existence that can stand in contrast to nonexistence. 2. Buddha nature is not an owrr-nature; an own-narure cannot be found where a phenomenon, such as a person, is in process. The idea of an own-nature therefore is to be discredited and thoroughly distinguished from the notion of Buddha nature. 3. Emptiness is not merely a matter of negation; supreme rruth does not merely negate worldly truth. The contents of emptiness or supreme truth cannot be so limited as to be exhausted by functioning in a destructive manner; there also must be a positive revelation in emptiness. Therefore, (implicitly) because emptiness is not exclusively negative, it need not conflict with a Buddha nature that, though not an own-nature, is affirmed as existing aboriginally. The import of these three points is this: Though Buddha nature cannot be said to exist or not to exist, it is in accordance with principle to realize that all possess it and hence to affirm it. Note here the key role played by the author's understanding and manipulation of language. when the two extremes of existence and nonexistence (or being and nonbeing) are negated, and as a result the principles of identity (A is A), noncontradicrion (nothing can be both A and not A) and excluded middle (everything is either A or not A) no longer are ro be relied upon, the laws of language based on those principles likewise are no longer to be assumed..At such a point, we are wide open to a new use of language. Ndgdrjuna stepped into this language void and filled it with 6&nya language. The BNT's author stepped into

39

BUDDFL{ NATLIRE

the same void and filled it with a very different kind of language, a language that could speak positively of such things as Buddha narure and tathdgatafprbha. The author makes his point clearly and succinctly in this key passa$e:"Attachments are not real, therefore they are called vacuous. If one $ives rise to these attachments, true wisdom will not arise. When one does away with these attachments, then we speak of Buddha nature. Buddha nature is the Thusness (zhen ru) revealed (xian) bv the dual emptiness of person and things. . . . If one does not speak of Buddha nature, then one does not understand emptiness" (787b). The author is uncompromising on this point. Emptiness is not limited to a negative function. it clears the way only so that something positive, Buddha nature, may be revealed. One who does not affirm Buddha nature simply has not sufficiently penet4ated emptiness.

C. The Essenceof Buddha Nature

We now turn to an account of the Buddha nature per se, which the author discusses in terms of three concepts: three causes, trisvctbhava (three natures), and tctthagat&gerbha. We will examine each of these in turn. The Buddha Nqture as Three Causes The three "causes" are three aspects of Buddha nature in its function as cause of the attainment of Buddhahood. The three are $iven as the cause of attainability, the prcryog& cause, and the complete fulfillment cause. They are discussed as follows.
The cause of attainability is the Thusness revealed by the dual emptiness [of persons and thin$sl. Because of this emptiness, one "can att^in" bodhicitta, prayopa, and so forth, up to the dhannakdya at the end of the Path. That is wh-vthis cause is calledcan uttain. The prayopa cause is called bodhiciro. With this mind, one can atrain the thirtv-seven limbs df enlightenmenr,lothe ten srages(dasabhirni) of.rhe bodhisattva,the ten perfections (paramita), the auxiliary aids to practice,lr and, at the end of the Path, the dharrnukrtya. This is called the prayopa cause. The complete fulfillment cause is "prayoga. With rhis prayog(4 one attains complete fulfillment of both the cause and the fruit [of Buddha naturel. By fulfillment of the cause is meant virtuous and wise action.

40

THE CONCDPTOF BUDDHA NATURE

Fulfillment of the fruit is constituted by the three virtues of wisdom, the cutting-off of delusion, and loving-kindness. Of these three causes.the essentialnature of the first is unconditioned Thusness. The essential nature of the latter two causes is conditioned resolution and action Within the causeof attainability are three kinds of [Buddhal nature: the nature which dwells in itself, the emergent nature, and the attaining nature. The record says,the nature which dwells in itself is [Buddha naturej in the stageof the ordinary person who has not -vetbegun Buddhist practice; the emergentnature is [Buddha nature] in the stageof the Buddhist practitioner from the first awakening of mind up to the completion of the Path; the attaining nature is [Buddha nature] in the stage of the person who has completed the Buddhist Path. (794a) According to this passage, Buddha nature should be understood as three kinds of cause. These three, however, all stem from the first cause, the cause whose nature is Buddha potentiality as such and whose essential character is unconditioned Thusness. This constitutes the text's first fully developed direct statement as to what the Buddha nature is: Thusness making possible Buddhahood. As the description of the three causes proceeds, we can see that this initial urge toward the self-realization of the Buddha nature is the basis that progressively develops into bodhtcitta, prayog&, and fulfillment, in

turn. The latter two causes, which are based on the first, simply are constituted by various aspects of Buddhist practice, or "conditioned resolution and action."r2 Bodhicitta, although not explained in this text, generally is understood as the mind that has awakened to a knowledge of the reality and loftiness of Buddhahood and that aspires to the attainment of that Buddhahood which it $impses. As such, it represents the beginning of the bodhisatnsa's career. Prayopa has a narrow and a more $eneral meanin$, both of which we see reflected here. In the narrow sense, prayo$a refers to preliminary or preparatory practices on the Buddhist path, such thin$s as the thirty-seven conditions and the auxiliary aids. In a broader sense, prqryogct means progress based on endeavor, that is, Buddhist practice as such. This latter sense is reflected in the preceding text in describing prayoga as including the ten stages, the ten perfections, and the eventual realization of dharrltakd,ya. The Chinese rendering of praryoga is jia-xin!: xingz, the active practice or cultivation of the Buddha Way that is.Jia, progressive or additive. It is noteworthy that 41

BIJDDTIA NATURE

the author of this text equates bodhicitta andprayopa. Bodhicitta, or mind of wisdom, is a term that may appear at first to refer to a mental entity of some kind. However, it is equated with prawga, a term that clearly refers to action, practice, and doing. The complete fulfillment of the potential of Buddha nature, moreouer, is accomplished by prqyo$a, or Buddhist practice and is manifested in virtuous and wise actions. Three kinds of Buddha nature are thqn listed (in the last para{raph of the quotation) and correlated with three stages of development on the path of Buddhist pracrice. A Buddha nature that "dwells in itself is the kind of Buddha nature found in those who have not yet taken up Buddhist practice; thic Buddha nature "dwells in itself in the sense that it is latent and not yet manifest. A second kind of Buddha nature, the "emer$ent nature," is found in all practitioners of Buddhism, from the newest beginner to the bodhisutttso on the brink of Buddhahood, whereas a third kind, the "attaining nature," represents the sta{le of the final completion of the Path. Insofar as all of these stages develop from the first cause of Buddha nature, they all are grounded in unconditioned Thusness. Tlw Three ltIo&res (Irisvabhiiva) The second category given as revelatory of the essence of Buddha nature is the three natures. In this text, two sets of three natures are discussed, the three natures or triscJabhaoa (son xing), and the three no-natures (san wu eing), both classic Yosdcdra ideas. The latter are discussed first. The three no-natures are: the no-marknature,the no-birth nature.and the no-realitynature. Thesethree naturestogetherexhaustthe Tathagata neture. In what sense? To$etherthey constituteits essence. what is meant by tlie no-mark nature is the fact that all dharmasare just namesand words;their own-nature lacksmarksand form. The no.birth nature means that all dharmas are brought irito being by causesand conditions; they cannot produce themselves. since neither self nor other completes [productionl, it is called the no-birth nature. The no-reality nature meansthat because things lack the mark of reality, tlere is no all other possessor reality from which [realityl can be attained. e9aa4) of In the present context, the function of'these three no-natures is to identify the essential nature of the Tathasata, or Buddha, nature with 42

NATURE OF THE CONCEPT BUDDTTA

emptiness in order to legitimize it in terms of orthodox theories of the emptiness of all thin$s and to turn aside potential objections that the Buddha nature is a crypto-Hindu entitative mind or soul. We have seen this approach in the text already: Before the author says what Buddha nature is, he is caret'ul to say what it is-not. It is quite evident that he is arguing, at least in his own mind but probably also in reality, with more 1unya-oriented opponents who would accuse him of un-Buddhist activity. After these preparatory comments, the author moves on to a discussion of the three natures as such; that is, the trisrsabhfiva of Yogac-aratheory: the discriminating nature, pa'rikalpita stsabhfuvq xsabhansa @the relapive nature, psrd'tantrq (fen-bie-xing)i pariniqpanna scrsbhtusa (xhenta-xing); and the true \ature, shi-xing).I{e first defines the $eneral meanin$ of each term. on The discriminatingnature is established the basisof the use of the languageof provisional speech.If there were no such terms, then the discriminating nature would not come into bein$. Thereforeyou should in know that this natureis merelya matter of verbalexpression, reality it has and no properties.This is what is called the discriminatin!, essenoe no nature. The relative nature is the principle (Drc-li) that manifests as the Because twelvefoldchain of conditionedorigination (pratitya-sa'mutpdda). as as it serves a basis bti-zhi) for the discriminatingnature,it is established the relative(1,t-ta)nature. The true nature is the Thusness(zhen-nt) of all thin$s. It is the wisdom realm of the wise. For the sake of purifyin$ the nondiscriminatin$, two natures, realizin! the third [i.e., liberation], and cultivating all [firstl (794b) virtues.the true nature is established. The three natures theory is important for the understandin$ of the subject-object relationship it provides. This, of course' is standard Mahayana Buddhist material, but it may fairly be said that the three natures theory manifests the Buddhist position on this issue rather clearly. For what exactly is a nature (ccine\, and in what way can there be said to be three of them that somehow Qonstitute reality? Do these natures constitute states of mind or thin$s? The beginning of an answer to this question may be sought in the following quotation. In answer to the question, "what would be lackin$ if there were no true nature?" the reply is $iven, "If there were no tnre nature, then all the various kinds of pure realms (ii"g1 would

43

BUDDH,A NATURE

not be attained (de chen!)." (795b). In other words, it is the true nature that makes realization possible. . There are three main elements in this sentence: the true nature, the pure realms, and the attaining. ordinarily, one might assume that the nature in question is constitutive of personhood or subjectivity inasmuch as we know it is fundamentally linked with Buddha nature. If this were assumed, then we would tend to think that the "realms" were sombthing like subjective states of being, attainable only beca1rseof the potential repr-esented the true nature. However, the term used for "realms," by ji^gz, ordinarily means the objective realm, one's environment, the objects of one's senses and co$nition, precisely in contrast to the subjective realm, which is rendered with the term zhi. Therefore, the simple attribution of subjective qualities to the true nature becomes somewhat problematic. Is this true nature then, some kind of quality in the world, objective to persons, that one may or may not discover? The terms for "attainin$" also contribute to one's indecision, as they literally mean "obtain" plus "complete, fulfill." Thus we have two possible interpretations for this sentence: (1) If there wr rlrr (subjective) true nature, one would never experience certain states of purity; or (2) if there were no (objective) true nature, the ,,pure" quality of the world would not exist. In fact, both meanings are intended simultaneously. This passage is an excellent example of the perspective of Mahdydna Buddhist thought insofar as neither objective reality nor purely subjective states are being referred to as such. Rather. the subject of the sentence cuts across this distinction. it concerns lived reality, or experience, with experience understood as "experience of' something, as immediately and simultaneo,usly subjective-objective: our experience is subjective in the sense that an element of awareness is present, and it is objective in the sense that there is.a "content" in that awareness, we are aware ,,of somethind,." In this passage,the author is indicating a certain quality that life may have. Life is able to have this qualiry borh because the world (objective reality) is the way it is (Thus) o,ndbecause we are the waywe are. If either of these qualities were missing, life would not have this quality. Although this may sound to the reader like a complex way of talking about the same subjective states that were earlier reiected. closer examination shows this not to be thl case,for this wouli be to render the sentence according to (1) and to ignore (2). such a reading would 44

THE CONCEPT BUDDHA OF NATURE

do justice neither to the inescapably objective quality of itngz nor to the importance of the Thusness of all phenomena or things. Therefore, what the passageis intended to express is the immediately given, lived reality that includes both objective and subjective elements. The author's perspective is one in which the two are immediately and inseparably present. In short, all three natures indicate ways in which (1) reality presents itself to persons, and (2) persons experience reality. The two elements are inherent in each nature; each has both subjective and objective qualities. The discriminating nature, then, indicates both a deluded person and a fragmented reality, with delusion defined as the experiential reality based on language.The relative nature indicates a person with partial understanding of the way things are and a reality in which all things are interdependent and relative. The true nature indicates both the way things are (Thus) and the undeluded beholding of the way things are. The author of the BNT, I submit, describes each of these natures as somethin$ "primitive," in the sense that each is $iven to human experience as a whole, as a unit, and only with reflection upon our experience do we realize that what is given as a primitive whole may be described with terms of subjectivity and otrjectivity.l3 The union of the two in experience is prior to the separation of the two in analysis. The three natures represent both a person's nature and reality's nature, as an inseparable, primitive unity, in the sense that they are bound together in rvhat is phenomenologically given. Our world is the way it is because of the way we are; we are the way we are because of the way our world is. The two arise together and are mutually creative. However, it is stressed that this interplay may be broken by transforming oneself and the way one perceives the world, something over which one has total control and for which one's responsibility also is total. Thus, by changing the way one thinks-perceivesexperiences, one simultaneously transforms not only the way one is (one's "being," in an active sense), but the way the world is as well (the way it presents it.selfto one). There is no sense that the world is "out there," objective to and separate from me. I create it, and it conditions me: The interplay creates a complex mesh that is not to be broken. This being said, one still would like further clarification of the ontological status of each of these three natures. The author provides

45

I]UDDFIA NATURE

us with such a clarification when he discusses the three natures in terms of the relative "realiqy" (sht1) of each nature. Eachof the three naturesis real (shi1)in somesense. How so? 1. The essenceof the discriminatin$nature has eternally been (wu suoyou) and yet it is not the casethat it nonexistent [totallyl lacks realir,v. Why? The names and words [that constitute this naturel stand. 2. The essence the relative of natureexistsand yet is not real.lt exlsts consciousness, or$an,and its field, $tou) on the basisof deluded its but insofaras it is not Thusness. is not real (s/ril). Why?Because it the idea of conditionedori$inationstands,in comparison the to discriminating natureit is calledexistent. But in comparison the to rrue nature it does not "really" exist (/ef shi you). This is called existingbur not being truly real $tou bu zhen shi). 3. The essence the true natureis the essence Thusness of of (ru-nr), in which bein$and nonbeing real (zhen)because are neitherbeinA nor nonbeinS rhe case(fei you;fei wu). (794c) is Each of the three natures participates in reality to some extent. Given the above analysis of the subjective-objective character that they possess. this perspective was inevitable: All are experiential reality, however deiusory. Thus the discriminating nature possesses some degree of reality to the extent that the words which constitute it stand (literally, "are not upside down") as names and words. That is to say, though this experiential reality is fundamentall_vout of touch with reality as it is (Thus), still one can create a false experiential reality on the basis of verbal cognition-experience. Because a person actually lives and experiences that way, we must admit that it possessesreality to that extent. In the case of the relative nature, deluded consciousness and conditioned oripination are what stand; that is, are experiential reality. This reality is a purely relative reality: more real than the discriminating nature, less than the true nature. This relative reality applies in both an ontological and an 6pistemological sense: It is relatively more true to see reality in terms of the processes of conditioned origination than in the terms of entitatively oriented verbal cognition-realiry- is more like that and therefore one's experience is more real. However, this is still delusion and unrealitv when compared with the true nature. Another perspective on the relative nature is offered elsewhere in 46

NATURE THE CONCEPT BUDDHA OF

the text: "The relative nature is of two kinds: pure and impure. The impure relative nature comes into bein$ on the basis of discrimination. The pure relative nature comes into being on the basis of Thusness" Qgac). We have here a rather different perspective from that just discussed. The first analysis establishes a pt'ogression: The relative nature is relatively more real than the discriminating nature and relatively less real than the true nature. According to the present analysis, however, the relative nature, or conditioned ori$ination, actrrally is the only realiqv. Insofar as one experiences it in the mode of discrimination, the discriminating nature is operative; insofar as one experiences Thusness, the true nature is operative. In other words, the relative nature, which is the only possible given, is purified by Thusness and sullied by discrimination. These two perspectives seem somewhat irreconcilable. The author's intention, however, may be within the reach of speculation.la The first analysis clearly shows the author's interest to establish the true nature as supreme, to portray the enli$htenment it represents as superior to the other two natures. The second analysis returns us to a basic Mahayana tenet: There is only one world, the world of interdependent phenornena, which can be experienced in an entirely delusory, part.ially delusory, or enlightened fashion. The ordinary world is not to be left behind; there is no superior, hidden world of purity to be attained. If the author's concern is to maintain both of these positions, then this awkward double analysis of the relative nature becomes comprehensible. Such reconciliation as there is in the text for these two analysesis.found in the statement that the pure aspect of the relative nature is equivalent to Thusness, or the true nature. In this way the relative natlrre may remain the only reality, rvhereas in its pure aspect (as supreme Thusness) it in effect transcends itself in its impure aspect. Finall-v,the true nature is the "Thusness in which being and nonbein$ are real," due to the very fact that "neither bein$ nor nonbeing is the case." The dualistic categoriesof being and nonbeing as both are neS,ated a preliminary step, but in the end they are reaft'irmedvia the Thusnessintrinsic to them both. That is, being and nonbeinp are emptied of any intrinsic reality. What one can see when those cate$ories are out of the way is the Thusness of what is or, in other words, the Thusness of the reality flux. In this way, the discussion of the true nature itself noints back to the fundamental 47

BLTDDHA NATURE

reality of the relative nature: Thusness is not transcendent of bein$ and nonbein$, it is their true nature. How does all of this apply to the concept of Buddha nature? It is important to remember that all three natures are constitutive of the Buddha nature; this is easier to see insofar as ihere ultimately is one nature, the relative, in pure (the true nature) and impure (the discriminating, nature) aspects. The very sli$ht reality accorded the discriminating nature reinforces the si$nal emphasis $iven to the omnipresence of Buddha nature. In fine, thou$h, the pure relative nature : true nature gives us our clearest ima$e of the Buddha nature as manifest in a nondistorted fashion. The true nature, like Buddha nature, is fully real yet uncharacterizable by either existence or nonexistence. Its reality is known by its functions: purification of the first nature, liberation. and the cultivation of all virtues. Finally, its nature is equated with Thusness: the realty of thin$s as they are and knowledge of that reality. Tuthfrgatagarbha The final constituent of the essentials of Buddha nature is the tuthfug,&tagarbhct. Because the latter is itself a close synonym of Buddha nature, this is a crucial component for our understandin$ of the Buddha nature. For this reason, the entire text on the subject will be presented. interspersed with interpretation. The text reads: which should be known: There are three aspectsof tathdgata'garbha the contained (suo she zdng), hiddenness,and the container (twr4 she zang). 1. Garbha as that which is contained. The Buddha calls this the are Thusness that dwells in itself (zhu zi xing ru'-nt). All sentient bein$,s ol (ru-lai-zan'p).There are two meanin$s Thtts (shr;2) tathd.gatu,garbha the of The first is the knorvledge Thusness Qu-ru'zhi) and 1ru.in ru.-lai-zangll. the second is the realln of Thusness(tu-ru'iinf). Since the two stand together. we speak of the Thusnessof Thusness(ru-ru). Comc ll'ai in nt-lni-zanpl meanscominSfrom itself,in comin$to arrive,and in arrivin$to (ru'-lai). Hence,although attain. This is what is calledThusCome,Tarbdgata the Tathagatanatve Qu-lai mn) is a causalname, it should [alsol be a nameof fruition. (795c) Tathd,gatagarbho has three aspepts, which can be examined one at a time. We begin with the assertion that the term storehouse (zong can be interpreted as meaning "the contained"; that tnnt-lai-zan!) 48

T
NATURE THE CONCEPT BUDDTIA OF

i
i

is, that which is contained rvithin the storehouse. This, in turn, is specified as the "Thusness which dwells in itself." This echoes the passa$ein the section on Buddha naiure as the three causes in which the fundamental cause of attaining Buddhahood rs given as Thusness. As in that passage,where Buddha nature as Thusness embraces all sentient bein$s, here also, as the next line of the text tells us, all sentient bein$s are the tctthagatagarbha. In other words, the essential nature of every person is Thusness and as such all constitute the tathtigcttqEqrbha. Thusness, then, is the fundamental basis of the tathagata4,arbha. The author expands on the rneaning of this Thusness by identifyin$ it as the sum of two elements: the knowledge of Thusness and the realm of Thusness. The term trarrslated here as "knowledge" (zhi) is, as mentioned earlier, a standard term for the subjective, whereas "realm" Amgl is a standard term for the objective. Ordinarily the zhi is the coSnizer anci the jingz the co{nized. In the case of the knowledge of Thusness (nt-rtt-zhi) and the realm of Thusness (ru-ru,-jinS), the former is the knnwing that accords with the principle of Thusness, and the latter is the known that accords with that principle. Because, the author says, the two "stand to$ether," the term Thusness as nt-nt, is coined to embrace them simultaneously. As such it represents thc unity of their mutualiry. All of this-the ru-rrr Thusness with both its subjective and objective constituentsis given in explanation of the single "Thus" of tathagat&gq,rbha (the nt ol ru-lai-z&ng). The discussion of Come (lai in nt-la,i-zang,) brings up the issue of the extent to which tathaqatueqrbha (and Buddha nature) should be understood as the cause of Buddhahood or as the fruit, Buddhahood itself. The author picks up the thread of standard t&thdgcttugarbhct thought, where it often is said (following Sanskrit etymology) that the larbha ol tathagatagarbha can mean, on the one hand, seed or embryo (i.e., cause of attaining Buddhahood) or, on the other hand, womb or matrix (containing the various Buddha virtues; i.e., fruit or effect). The author believes the term Tathagata Mtnffe (or Buddha nature) generally is taken to connote causation and now aims to show that the term equally connotes fruition. He does this by means of an analysis of the word come. The author represents come as meaning coming from itself (which the context'indicates means from Thusness) and simulta49

BUDDHA NATURE

neously arriving and attaining the fruit of liberation. He argues that comin$ already entails arrivin$ (because one has not come anlrvhere unless one has arrived somewhere) and arrivin$ already entails attaining (because when one arrives at a place one has attained that new situation). there is cause Thus where there is coming there is attaining-where there is effect. T&th&gqrag&rbhq, therefore, is the cause and the fruition of Buddhahood. This the

simultaneously justifies the earlier statement that all sentient being,s, including unenlightened, are tclthdgatagerbhe,.

What one artains is essentially not rwo, it is only differentiated accordin$ to puritv and impurity. In the causal stage,becauseone abandons the two kinds of emptiness,one gives rise to ignorance.Becauseit is mingled with the kle6a, it lrhe tathagatagarbhal is called polluted. Although ir is not immediately manifest, it certainly is due to become manifest, and therefore it is called attainable. At the fruirion srage,by uniring with the two kinds of emptiness,there is no further delusion, the kle*a no longer pollute, and one cafls it pure. When the fruit is manifest, we call it att(Lined. . We can compare it to the nature of water. Water, in its essence, is neither pure nor impure. We only use the words pure and impure in rhe presence or absence of dirt. When mud and sediment are stirred up the water is not clear. Although it is not clear, the water's pure nature has not been lost. When, by some means, it is settled, then purity is attained. Therefore know that the words pure and impure refer only to the presence or absence of dlrt. It has nothing to do with the nature of the water itself being pure or dirtv. One should understand this. The two kinds of Buddha nature are also like this. Both are the same Thusness.There is no difference in their essence..It is just that when one abandons the principle of emptiness, one arouses doubt and attachment. Becauseof impuriqv and confusion due to the kle6a, it [Buddha nature] is called polluted. When one does not abandon the two kinds of emptiness and the single mark of Thusness,then one does not give rise to ignoranceand the kle6a do not pollute; therefore one provisionally designates it as Wre. (795c-796a) The Buddha nature is always nondual and unchanging: The causal and the fruition stages are not different in any essential aspect. One gains nothing new at the fruition stage; one simply stops alienating oneself from one's true nature. BUddha nature in purity (attainment) does not differ from Buddha nature in impuriry (delusion). As for the term garbha (zang), a"ll sentient beings universally exist within the Tathdgata's wisdom (za,i nt-lai zhi nei) and therefore it is called

50

THE CONCEPT BUDDHA OF NATURE

the womb (zang). Because the knowledge of Thusness (nt-nt zhi) corresponds the realm of Thusness(r.u-rtt jing2), there is certainly no to sentient being,who is excluded(chur). The realm of Thusness also is (suo she chi) by the Tarhagara, thereforeit is called the encompassed and contained [i.e., "embryo," suo zan!]. Senrient beirrgsare (tcei) the tuthagangarbha, Furthermore, larbha has three meanin$s. The first shows the jing), because incomparability the true realm (zheng of apart tiom this ream of Thusness(nt-nt jin$ there is no other realm that surpasses The it. secondshowsthe incomparability the true practice(z,hen!xing), because of there is no other superiorwisdomthat may surpass this wisdom(zhi). The third makesmanifestthe incomparabiliry the true fruit [of practicel, of becausethere is no fruit that surpasses this one. This is why we speakof incomparabililv.Because fruit encompasses this (nenp shezan!) all serrtienr beings, saythat sentientbeings (toei)the tathAg&ngarbha. we (796a)rs are Beginning with the second paragraph, we find a list of three categories that the storehouse encompasses: the realm of Thusness, Buddhist practice, and the fruit of practice or attainmenr of Buddhahood. We should note that this list seems to indicate that the items encompassed by the storehouse constitute the so-called storehouse itself. After all, how could any kind of entity hold or contain the realm of Thusness? Therefore, the storehouse is not a kind of shell within which various items accumulate. The storehouse is no kind of entity at all; it is simply the sum total of all those things that it encompasses. The very title of this first secrion on ffihA,ga,krEarbho glosses the term storehause rvith the phrase "that which is contained," profferin$ the latter as an alrernarive name for one aspect of the former. Thus the storehouse, in effect the tathd,gategctrbha itself, is constituted by these three categories. First is the realm of Thusness, or all of reality truly experienced. Note once again the rejection of a subject-object split here. The tathagatagarbha (and Buddha nature) cannot be purely a principle of subjectivity; it cannot be any kind of self cut off from the world, because one of its components embraces the world-or the realm of Thusness-itself. The second component is Buddhist practice, which is equated with wisdorn. Note here that because wisdom is employed as interchangeable with Buddhist practice, it cannot be interpreted as representing any kind of static or substantial basis of subjectivity (subh as a pure mind or self). The term toisdom is used to represent the kind of subjectivity in action

I
I

51

BUDDTIA NATURE

cultivated in Buddhism. In other words, practice is a kind of doin$;' and wisdom is a particular practice-acting or doin$ wisely' Finally, the third item constitutive of the storehouse's "store" is the fruit of practice; namely, realization of the Buddha nature to$ether with its virtues. This fruit encompassesall sentient bein$s; all sentient bein$s are the t&thae(ttag(trbha in the sense that they are alI bein$s whose true nature is Buddhahood. The first para$raph of the precedin$ passa$e emphasizes very heavily the "storehouse" meaning, to the extent of playin$ on the spatial metaphor by sayin$ that all sentient beings are "within" (neti) the Tathagata's wisdom. However, the very fact that the storehouse is identified with the Buddha's wisdom indicates that the spatial sense is no more than metaphor. Sentient bein$s are encompassed by the Tathagata's wisdom in the sense that all possess the tqthAgq,ta,garbho. Because the knowledge of Thusness and the realm of Thusness correspond to each other, and the realm of Thusness also is encompassed by the Tathegaa, it is not possible that any sentient being not be a part of this universal encompassment. In the two senses that sentient bein$s are encompassed within the Tathagaa's wisdom and that they are encompassed within the realm of Thusness (recall that Thusness is the essence of the tathfr$etagerbha) sentient beings sre the tathd,g,ata.g,erblw. Again, note that sentient bein$s are said to be that which is contained within the storehouse as well as the storehouse itself. Clearly, the storehouse is its contents. itself is hidden and unmanifest;that is The Tathagata 2. Hiddenness. Come (Tathagata, why it is calleda larbha [i.e., embryo]. The term Thtl"s the nt-l.ai)hastwo meaninls.The first represents ideathat Thusness [itselfl is not inverted-that is, we call falsethoughtsinverted; when there are no The secondrepresentsthe idea of false thoughts,we speakof Thusness. naturecomesfrom the [Buddhalnaturethat eternaldwelling.This Thusness dwells in itself. HavinScome it arrives,and havin$ arrived it attains. The never chan$es;in this senseit is eternal. When the of essence Thusness nature dwellsin the staf,ebeforeBuddhistpracticeis begun,it is T^thagalesentient bein$scannot see it, it is called the by concealed hle6a. Because parbha. (796a) This passage is relatively strai$htforward. The basic point is that the storehouse is hidden in the sens thet sentient beinSB who have not yet realized it have no direct, personal knowledge of it. For them 52

NATURE OF THE CONCEPT BUDDHA

it is concealed by the kle(a or defilments (delusion, an$et, $reed, and so on) symptomatic of human i$norance. This is standard tethdgetugarbha doctrine. This passage also repeats the theme discussed earlier; namely, that the Thusness nature' or Buddha nature, is the same in the causal and fruition stages.This is concealed from the ignorant by false thou$hts and kleja, but the Buddha nature itself is untouched by this condition and drvells in the fuliness of its maturity, even in the person who has not yet be$un to practice Buddhism. she) is that of for 3. The reason speakin$ th e larbha, as container(n'en$ in whend'arellin$ the time of the merits of the fruition stage, countless all rhe .,attainability"stage If [rhe causalsta$el,are completelyenclosed. we spoke only when arrivin$ at the time of iruition, that of attaining the nature is no lTathegatalnature would be noneternal.why? It is becausethere beginning of the attainment that we know that [the Tath1gatanaturel ' aboriginallyexists.That is why we call it eternal.(796a) as "the container" The third meaning of tathagata4arbha represents the fuifillment of the Tathdgata nature, the realization of Buddhahood with its infinite Buddha virtues. In fact, however, it is misleading to speak of attainin$ Buddhahood as the Buddha nature exisrs abori$inally without be$innin$. Even before the pracrice of Buddhism is begun, the Buddha nature is full and conplete with all its virtues. Let us now summarize the most important points concernin$ the is First and foremost, the tdthdgamEqrbh& tuthagdngurbha. was expressed in many ways: The first syllable of the Thusness. This word tathdgatagq,rbha (ru-tai-xang) was identified with Thusness (ru-ru); the first aspect ctf tathdgatctgarbha, the contained, was directly identified with Thusness as both the knowled$e of Thusness and the realm of Thusness; and the tathdgclt&garbha was equated with a Buddha nature that, whether polluted or pure, is ever the same Thusness. Clearly, this identification of the tqthagang,a'rbha with Thusness is a central point; what is its si$nificance? The identification of tathagangorbha and Thusness means that the tathfrgatagarblw cannot be a principie of selfhood in a seif that is absolurely distinct frorn the world. We will discuss the concept of Thusness further in Chapter Five, brlt it is clear even now that Thusness, as the knowledge of Thusness and the realm of Thusness,

53

BUDDHA NATURE

encompasses both self and world (or better, compels us to revise our notions of self and world by asserting their mutuality and inseparability). The identificatio n ol tathagatagarbha a'd Thusness also means that the essential nature of the tattrugcltcrgarbha enrails a state of experiential reality in which the world, in effect, manifests itself as ir is and is seen as it is. Thusness arrdtathagcttagarbha, then, are principles both or enlightenment and of absolute reality. A second theme is a list of three components of the tathagangarblra: Thusness, the practice of Budcihism, and the fruit of practice; that is, realization or liberation. This is highly reminiscent of the list of rhree cause of Buddha nature we looked at earlier; namely, the cause of attainability (which is Thusness). the prayogq cause (or practice), and the complete fulfillment cause (or attainment of the fruit). In both cases we see a very simple model. The essenfial narure of Buddha nature or tathdgatagarbha is Thusness. This is the ground of the possibiriry of oui (successfuily) practicing Buddhism. The ultimate outcome of Buddhist practice, of course' is realization ot'the goal of Buddhism, or the fruit of practice. Buddha nature and tathdgatagarbha, then, as Thusness are realrty and the correct apprehension of reality. As portrayed in this tripartite scheme, they are the foundation of the possibility of practice, the doing of the practice itself, and the ultimate guarantee of its successful fulfillment. A third theme of the ruthagatagarbha marcriar is the author's emphasis upon the essential identity of the nthagatagarbhct in the stages of cause and fruition. Let us recail a passagequoted earrier: The two kinds of Buddhanature are also like this. Both are the same Thusness. Thereis no difference their essence. is just that when one in It abandons principle of emptiness, the one arouses doubt and atrachmenr. Because impurity and confusion of due to the kre6a, IBuddha'at'rej is it polluted.Whenone doesnot abandonthe two kinds of emptiness called. and the sin$e markof Thusness, thenonedoesnot giveriseto ignorance the anc kle6ado not pollute;therefore provisionalry one designates aspure.(796a) i This paralleis the discussion of the pure and impure relative natur.e in the tnsvabhZoc section. There is one basic given_here, Buddha nature (or tathagaagarbha); there, the reiative nature. Xf one abandons the all-important princiRle of emptiness, one procluces delusion and thereby effectively liies in pollution. The essential 54

THE CONCEPT BTJ'DDHA OF NATURE

.character of the basic given (Buddlia nature, relative nature), however, is untouched; it remains essentially pure and unchanged. This talk of puriry, though, is ultimately unacceptable. purity is a relative term and as such has no relation to the unchan$ing Thusness of Buddha nature. The final important theme enunciated in this section is the assertion that all sentient beings "are" the tqthdEats,garbha. Three times in this part of the text we are told that sentient beings "are" the tqthdgc,tqgarbha; not once are we told that they,,possess" it. This is to be understood in the sense that sentient beings are identified with Thusness and as such are capable of being identified with the tathAgatagarbha, the storehouse or totality, in effect, of Thusness (as both wisdom and realm, subject and world). Ler us conclude this chapter with a list of five meanings ascribed the Buddha nature in the BN?, which may summarize some of the main points of our discussion. Three of the meanin!,s given here are just stated without comment, but the last two are accompanied by the interpretation of the unidentified commentator of the BN?. It reaily exists (zhen shi you). lt can be perceived upd3n. by Having beenperceived,.its meritsare inexhaustible. It is [correealed the beginnin$ess by] shell with which it is [bothl disunited and united. The commentatorsays,beginninSless means that defilements,karma and retribution are all without a start and thereforewe say they are bepinninpless. for distnited, because As these three are in oppositionto the dharmakftAa,we say they are disunited. We say they are united becausethese three arise in dependence the dharmakaya. ls f.orshell, these three coneeal on (neng zanil the dLnrmakaya and theretbre are called slwll. 5. The be!,innin$ess, excellenrnature wirh which it is associared its is Dharma.The commentatorsays,it is called beginnir4.tess because ,the naturally attained prajfid, great compassion,meditation-and dharmaknya all aboriginallyexist, The essence and the functions have never been separatb and thereforewe say they are associated. As for "the excellent nature with which it is associatedis its Dharma,"[ir is explainedthus]. By virtue ol prajftd' the own-nature oI the dharma&rlya does nor change;by virtue of meditation, the naturepossesses awesome merits; and by virtue of greatcompassion, the naturebenefits rve natureis [othersl.Therefore saythis excellent its Dharma. (8llb-c) These five meanings more or less summarize the author's view of
)5

1. 2. 3. 4.

BUDDTIA NATURE

Buddha nature. First, he begins with the straightforward statement: The Buddha nature really, truly exists. Here he does not choose to say "it both exists and does not exist," or "it neither exists nor does not exist." It really, truly exists. This, of course, is still in contrast to the status of ordinary phenomena that partake of the unreality of delusion and defilement. Yet to say plainly that the Buddha nature reaily exists is a good example of the use of language in this text. The attempr to speak positively, if not rapturously, of that which t'ulfillment of the Buddhist path reveals is certainly characteristic ol tathdgcttug,&rbha and Buddha nhture rhought and is one of the main elernents of distinction between it and Sunyazsdda thoug\rt. Thus, the Buddha nature really exists: It may function as a constant support for the often wearisome reality of daily Buddhist practice; it offers hope and the assurance that the effort of practice is not being made for "nothing." It attests to the reality of Buddhism's soteriological promise. Second, Buddha nature can be perceived by updrya. Updya is Buddhist practice. This statement affirms that practice is not the mere elimination of ignorance, but yields positive results. Third, having been perceived, the merits of the Buddha narure are inexhaustible. This statement, like the first two, is a positive declaration of the intrinsic value of the "Buddha fruit," the fulfillment of Buddhism's soteriological piomise. Fourth, Buddha nature is concealed by the beginningless shell with whieh it is both disunited and unitbd. This meaning demonstrates why practice is needed if we already possess the Buddha nature. Thus like the preceding sratemenrs, ir too jusrifies Buddhist practice. Finally, the beginningless, excellent nature with which it is associated is its Dharma. Here we find once again very positive language used in discussing the Buddha nature. The "essence" referred to is the dharmakaya or Buddha nalure. The "functions" are p'rsjfin, Ereet cornpassion.and rneditation. In saying that these two cate$ories are inseparable or associated, the author intends to convey that they are interchan$eable.16Thus the "essence" of Buddha nature is its functions; that is, the actions constitutive of great compassion, meditation, and prajfi.d are the "essence" of Buddha nature. Action, then, (or "functions") is the essence of Buddha nature, and the particular character of this action is soteriological: the salvation of oneself and others. 56

CHAPTERTHREE
Soteriology:Buddha Nature as the Practice of Buddhism

ike emptiness, the Buddha nature concept is deeply soteriolo$i' f LJcal: in other words, it fundamentally has to do with the ultimate transformation of the Buddhist practitioner.l Buddha nature in its causal aspect is that by which one attains such transformation. In this mode, as we have seen, it is essentially unconditioned Thusness as the foundation of our future Buddhahood, but it also embraces the conditioned action of bodhicitta and praryogo. In addition to its causal role, Buddha nature is simultaneously the already present fulfillment of the transformed state; this is Buddha nature in its fruition aspect. In its ultimate form it is the dhanrwkaya, perfect wisdorn, nirr.:,d,r.ta. Pr<lxirnately, then, Buddha nature is the conjunction of means and end: Buddhist practice in all its forms and stages. In Buddhist practice we have the means by which Buddha nature attains self-realization and, simultaneously, the manifestation of the Buddha nature itself in its purity. As the author of the BN? sees it, the $oal of Buddhism is to realize radical self-transformation; Buddha nature is both the means of this transformation and the manifestation of the transformed state.
J/

BUDDHA NATURE

A. ASrayapardt:qtti
The term d9r ay a7tar avqtti (xhuan -yi). literally,, transfo rmation of the basis," is a Yo$6cdra term. In that context, its meanin$ is explairied as follows. Transformati,on (zhrnn, also ,,turning," "revolution") has two meanin$s: "transformin$', in the sense of getting rid of something, and "transformation" in the sense of attaining something. Basis (p) refers to the eighth consciousness in Yogdciira theory, the d,layavijft.d,na. The latter is the ,,storehouse" consciousness that stores the karmic seeds produced by past actions, which in turn determine the future dispositions of individuals. In the "transformation" of the dlayavijfidtw, the seeds of defilements (kleia) and discriminatory knowledge are discarded, whereas the two "fruits" of bodhi (wisdom) and nirtsana are attained. Thus for the Yogdcdrin, the storehouse, or dlayavijfifilw itself is what is transformed, or in some understandin$s, destroyed. The meaning of a*ayapardrsqtti in the present text is rather ditferent. The author of the BN? introduces the d.Sra1;apard$ftti into his discussion by describing it as the supreme purity revealecrwhen all limitations on the understanding have been removed; it is the "purity of the original nature" (ben xirtg); that is, the Buddha nature. (801b) Thus what is undergoing transformarion in the understanding of the BN?'s author is not the dlayatijmana but a person's relationship to the Buddha nature. The author builds on this beginning to produee a complex account of the d9rryap&rtu)ftti notion within the context of Buddha nature thought. We begin with a discussion of four characteristics of dsrayapardvqtti. 1. The productivebasis (sllrlg yi) is the continuins basisof the Buddha's nondiscriminatory Path. If there urre no such condition Ias dSratnryr&Ittil, the nondiscriminatorypath would not be produced. Because there is relianceon this condition,we namethis aspectthe basis that producesthe Path (Dao sheng yi). 2. The destructivebasis(mie y) is the utter extinction and nonbirth of all delusionsand habits due to their lack of ba.sis[in reality]. Except by relyrng upon the dsrayaryrdoftrd's urter destruciion of delusion,ihere would be no differencb in the extinction of delusion by #dva.kas, pratyekafuddhas, and Buddhas. But b,ecause they are not the same,we know this laaragupardvrJtrl is the basis of the utter extinction of delrrsion. 58

SOTERIOLOGY: BLTDDHA NATURE AS THE PMCTICE OF BLIDDHISM

3. The fruit of well-matured contemplation. well and c.rrectly penetrating IThusnessl, showing reverence over a long period of time, and uninterruptedly and completely cultivating the Thusnessthat one knows, these are the fruits ol dirayapardv1ti. If one is on the path, d'srayapdrdvrtti is the cause. If one has completed the path, it is called fruit. If the dSrayapardvftti were not this , fruit of wel!-matured contemplation. all Buddbas, of their very. nature, would have to repeatedly marure their contemplation, repeatedly destroy [the kle6al, and repeatedlypurify [themselvesl. Becausethis is not so, we know that the dSrayepardvrtti is the fruit of weli-matured contemDlation. 4. The dhamnd.fuiru's mark of purity. Because all false thoughts are utterly extinsuished in it. this dharmrtdhaat, surpasses that which can be e-rpressed in reasoning or in speech. Therefore, we take purity to be a characteristic of the dhannadhatu. This is the extinction of the activities of the mind and the cutting off of the way of speech. It is ineffable, because it is the attainment of the unattainable principle of Thusness (z,hen-ntli). (801b)

The first characteristic illustrates that a1rayaparavfifi is the basis on which the Buddha Way is founded. Without the a{rayaparavftti there would be no Buddhist path, no practice of Buddhism. lt is the condition by which the path comes into being" The second characteristic draws on the standard tathdgatagarbln teaching that all defilements, such as ignorance, are basically unreal, havi'g no basis in realitl'. In other words, they are simply an absence of truth or reality, rather than the real presence of defilement and as such they are utterly extinct and unborn. The d*ra,yapardt1ti is credited with being the basis for this extinct, unborn status of defilement. Delusion has no real status in the "purity of the original nature" (Buddha nature) that the a1rayapctrctvftti is.

Rather cryptically, the author posits this pure d,srayapartu)ftti in which delusion is unborn ds the reason for the difference between the paths of Sravaka, pratyekabuddha, and Buddha. Based on the exposition in other parts of thetext, his reasoning seems to be that the *rdzsaka and pratyekabuddh.q, think of themselves as having actually destroyed defilements, whereas a Buddha realizes that defilements are unborn and moreover has fully realized the positive nature of the d.srayapard,vTtti; namely, the itharmakEta. In the third characteristic, d,9rayapardvqtti is portrayed as both cause and fruit of Buddhist practice, but most important as the doing

59

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of the practice itself, whether in the earlier or later smges. This characteristic, in namin$ the acts of showin$ reverence and cultivating Thusness as fruits, even implies that the ability to practice authentically is itself a fruit, thereby blurring the means-ends, or cause-fruit distinction. This naturally leads to the fourth characterisis identified with the ineffable tic, in which d9rayapardvqtti dharmadhatu and with Thusness. In short, asraryapardoftfi represents Buddhist practice. As the productive basis it is the basis of the Buddhist Path, a synonym for Buddhist practice. The term basis, (a*ra,ya) then, does not refer here to a substantive basis, but the basis or foundation of a particular form of action, Buddhist practice. A-{rayapardgrtti as the destructive basis accounts for the negative aspect of Buddhist practice, the extinction of defilement. In accordance with tathagata.garbhn thoufht, the extinction of defilements is constituted by the realization of their ultimate unreality. The third characteristic, the fruit of well-matured contemplation, represents the positive aspect of Buddhist practice: practice as the realization of Buddhist truths. Thus this characteristic, 'ivhich represents the heart of Buddhist practice as such in all of its stages,emphasizes the Path of Buddhism and Buddhist practice as inherently positive: One attains the maturity of contemplation, reverence, and knowledge. Finally, the a9rayapara,oqtti represents the culmination of Buddhist practice, the realization of Thusness, in a condition of freedom from turbulence and verbalization. In this way, the four aharacteristics represent a9ra,ya,pa,ravqtti as Buddhist practice from its beg,inningsto its mature fruition. As such, it is consistently portrayed as being of an active character. Any idea that the "transformation of the basis" refers in sorne literal sense to the transformation of a substantive thing must be rejected for this text in th.e light of its direct identification of a9rayopardtsytti with the doing of Buddhist practice. In a short passagethat strongly supports this interpretation, the author goes on to ascribe two general meanings to a1raryo,paravqtti: It stands for separation from desire and the cause of separation from desire. Separation from desire is identified with the Third Noble Truth, Cessation (of suffering, i.., ninsd4rr), and the cause of separation from desire is identified with the Fourth Noble Truth, Path (801b). Again dAra,yepa.rdpftti is identified with the Buddhist Path and the attainments made by treading that Path. 60

\=--

AS NATURE THE PMCTICE OF BUDDHISM BUDD}L{ SOTDRIOLOGY:

of seven This theme is further emphasized in a discussion dhsnnakdya' Dharmakdyu ls a "names" given the asrayapardryrtti nature in its stage of term lrsed irt this text to represent the Buddha discussed in this passa$'e, fruition. In examinin$ the seven "narnes" dharmakdya is a we will see once again that the dsrayapardwTtti in this case as the term expressive of buddhist practice, understood nature' transformation inherent in realizin$, one's Buddha perishin$ of (1) The first name is perishin6l Ghen mo); that is' the five skq,ndha $ive rise the skandhq,-attachment -skandha cycle. The rise to new skandha' to the four attachments2 and these in turn $ive This is a cycle that can continue or in other words, rebirth. neither cause nor indefinitely. However. "Within the dharmctkaya' 'perishin$' (chen mo)' Attachments fruit exists; therefore we speak of (chen)' As for the are opposed and cured and thet"fore are defunct and so we say they'are skandhct, the fruit of retribution is exhausted gone'(mor)" (802c). that is' the stillness of 6 The second name is stillness Ai iing); all actions. called All snryskr:ta dharmct [conditioned' thin$s] are they are conjoined with the four &ctians {xfngz\, because destrucstates. These four are birth, chan$e, abidin$' and to the past are tion. All saryskqtd dharma, irr relation conjoined with birth' in relation to the future are con'ioined present are with destruction, and in relation to the conjoined with chan$e and abidin$' They ate called,qctions becatlse they never rest from activity' The Tathdgata's was not dhannakdycl, thou$h' is not like this' In the past it it will not be destroyed' In the present born, in the future there is no illness and oid a$e. It eternally and tranquilly it is abides. unborn. it is called still (Jil); undestroyed, (802c) called quiet Aingt ). discardinS (3) The third name is discarding (qi she\; t.hat is' several remnants remnants. The Srdvaka and pratyeknbuddhct have specifically kle6a and karma' The Tathdgata's attached to them, over" s&n'tsdra asrayapardvqtti d'harrnakaya has alread-v "crossed and utterly extin$uished all kle$a and delu(i.e., discarded karma) tread' Thus with sion. All paths of spiritual cultivation have been putting aside (she) the Path (in the sense cast aside (qi) and sctntsctra

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of a raft,eing put aside once one has crossed the stream and its usefulness is past), *the d,harntq,kdya al,oneabides in the fulfillment of the four perfections" (of briss, self, purity and eternity) (g02c-803a). (4) The fourth name is transcend,in! (euo du); that is, transcending the two kinrls of suffering. Because in the dharmakdya there is ncrne of the gross suffering of it iraooka and. pratyekabuddha, we use the term surp&ssing (guo). " Because there is none of the subtie suffering of the bod,hisorioli.".,four kinds of rebirth), we use the term crossin! over (du\. Thus the clhartnakdya g.;r'U"r""a these two kinds of suffering. (g03a) (5) The fifth name is elimination (ba ciu); that is, the elimination of the d,tajtaz:ijfi.dna: The meanin g of alaya is [found in the combination of the conceptsJ ,,basis,,and ,,hidden.,, It is the ,o".""-fa"rrl oi so,msara because it produces the four kinds of ,r"i f_r.; The four taints are two kinds of kle6q, karma,"rra t"iriU"_ tion. The firsr of rhe two kinds of klesa is all 'is in ignorance, "i"*..lrr-origr" and the signless liberation gu," i, ii, The second is all ftle6o other "r.". than 'iews. It is originated from desire and cured by rhe rvishless fiU"r"ti""!"?".'ifr" source of karma is the nature of thr is one: AII of samsd.rct is.rerribution. lt [samsdra] ."1;;. ifr" dlayavi.ifidna fbr its source; "" because it is not separated from this vij,fi.d,rn,retribution is nor terminated. In the dhannakdS,a [horvever] the two time periods are extinguished by.means of two paths, and therefor" rv" ,O""f. of "elimination." The two paths are: (1) Nondiscrimrridrr* wisdom_thisdoes away with present delusions p"rifi", the dharrnakdya; itis called the knowledg" ,f ""a one's defilements]. (2) Subsequent ".ir#r"".i.f nondiscrimi.,utlrrj *lrdom-this prevents any future delusions from ever uiiri.rg and fulfills the.dharmakaya; it is the knowl"d;";l;;.i;_

xinp)because ofthe the nature the self view (shen jf un). The ";;HH:?.ffi:Tffil# source of retribution

purifying, the e.xtinliuishing present of delusions.,,Remov_ ing" (chuz) is the furfill**r, ,h" severingof future delusion. Hence rhe name eliminqtion (g03ai 62

filernentsl ,,plucking shallnever arisJagain. o,rr;iaoii.,ir"

SOTERIOLOGY:BUDDIIANATURDASTHEPRACTICEOFBI.IDDHISM

(6) The sixth name is relietsing Qi2); that is, relievinS, the five fears. The five fears are (a) Suilt, as when a person does somethin$ evil and is filled with dread day and night; (b) fear of the blame of others, as when a person has done something wron$, and fears that other persons or gods saw it; (c) fear of punishment; (d) fear of bein$ born into an evi! birth, on the basis of one's present evilness; (e) fear of the many r/irtuous ones-because one's own karma is impure and one's discernment is not deep, one fears those who have accumulated virtue. However, "one who has realized the dhsrm,akdya is free of the five fears; thus we say the dhannakaya is the relievin$ of the five fears" (803a-b). (7) The final name is severin$ (duan); that is, severin$ the retribution of the six destinies or $nti.3 "The term fati has many . ' (1) the place where rneanings; we will briefly speak of two: sentient beings are reborn; (2) the place where karma acts. With these two meanin$s the term pati is established. The Tathagata's d,harmakd,ya does not return to these Eclti . .. therefore we name it setsering the six 6iati. we speak of the Tatha$ata's dharmakctya when there is this condition" (803b). All of these seven names express the ne$ation of various aspects of the life of bonda$e and sufferin$. severed, undone, extin$uished, and overcome are (1) the skandha-attachment'skandha cycle, (2) determination by the condition of time, (3) karma and kle6a, (4) as suffering, (5) the d,lu;;^avi.iii.d.na, the sourae oI sarysara, (6) fear, (7) rebirth amon$ the six destinies. These acts of severin$ and and extinf,uishing constitute the d{ra5tltparavqtti' A$ain its active nature is readily apparent. In fact, all but one of the seven "nanles" is itself a verb. These seven, then, are names for actions that Buddhist practitioners undertake to achieve. The d'h,armakaya,, on the other hand, represents the sta$e in which these seven categories of suffering and fear are undone or rernoved. Horv is the clhartnakaya described herein? (1) It has no relationship to causation; (2) it has no relationship to timei (3) it is utterly free of rebirth, klcia, or delusion: (4) it is utterly free of all suffering; (5) freedom from delusion is its purification and its fulfillmejrt; (6) it relieves the five fears; and (7) it is cut off from rrbirthlAlthough all of this is expressed'ne$atively,there are also the statements that (3) the d.hqrmakaya alone abides in the fulfillment of

63

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the four perfections, and (2) it abides eternally and tranquilly. We shall returrr later to further discussion ol the dharrnctkciyo. For now, suffice it to say thatlhe dharmo,kdyo does indeed represent the stage of fruition in which the actions undertaken by the d,Srayapard,vrtti ccme tc maturify. What, in the end, is this d*rayaparawqtti? In the BN?, given as manifesting the character of Buddha a{rayapardvqtti'is nature. We have seen that it represents Brrddhist practice. Buddhist practice here does not mean any set rituals, meditations, or ethical observances, but rather the process of the self-transformation of the individual progressing from a self-centered, ignorant mode of being-behaving to the selfless, awakened, compassionate rnode of a Buddha. But what, more literally, are we to make of the term aSrayaparavqtti, "transformation of the basis"? What is this ddr<ryo or basis? To answer this question we need to look over the preceding material and ask ourselves what is undergoing transformation. The an,sweris, the person. Thorrgh the asraye, concept as used in other texts unarguably is related to the YoSacara concept of the d,layavijfrdna, the preceding discussion clearly illustrates that, according to the Bl{?, it is the person who is undergoing transformation. In fact, to transforrn the tilaycrcijfidrta, (or "do away" with its negative functions) is only one of seven "names" or functions ascribed the d,{rayapararqtti dharmakaya. It is but one way of speaking of the process of self-purification and spiritual cultivation represented by the terrrr dSrayaparaz.sytti dharmakdyu. The seven names are rnutually complementary, different forms of language emphasizing various aspects of self-transformation. Thus, to say that a9rayupardurtfd means the transforrnation of the alayavijfiana is to choose a traditional form of language, heavily laden with theoretical Buddhist concepts, to speak of the radical spiritual transformation of the person. To speak of. the asrayaparctvrtti as the utter elimination of fear, or the ending of rebirth, likewise accomplishes this end. We are offered a variety of lin6iuistic options to help clarify a process of personal transformation, the effects of which are profound and far-reaching. In this text, therr, d,9rayaparaurfff is best interpreted as (1) the radical transformation of the person. (Z; luaahist practice, and (3) the transformation of the person's relationship to the Buddha nature. 64

OF THE NATURE,{,S PRACTICE BUDDHISM BUDDFIA SOTERIOLOGY:

A,rayapartu fffi demonstrates that the affirmation of the Buddha nature is an affirmation of every person's potential to radically translbrm himself or herself.

B. Dhnrmskfrya and I'{insdc.tu

In the precedin$ section we said that dhqrmakal'o represents the culrnination of the process of oiraynparavrtti or Buddhist practice; in other words, dharnwkd.ya represenrs the realization of Buddhahood. As such, the affirmation ol dhq,nnakdyo plays the irnportant role of affirming the capability of the self-transformarion process to are reach a culmination. In what follows, dharmakaya and ni'TJar.xL' treated as synonymous terms. Each affirms the reality and the desirability of the Buddhist $oal. As such, they represent the terminus of the dsrayapararurttt: process. As we shall see, however, the dhannukdrya also stands for "the purity of the ori$inal nature" and thus represen$ the aboriSinnl existence of the Buddha nature' It manifests the eternally true natufe of things and is 1ot just the end of a process. As shall becorne evident, dha'nnakdrya and ninsd4'a manifest the preeminently positive value associated with the tsuddha nature. Thus, they justifv the process of self-transformation itself . First, let us denronstrate that the dhsrmakdya does represent the culmination of Buddhist practice rather than a metaphysical entity. The outstanding characteristic of the dharmakaya is said to be "all suffering being at rest." Its "flavor" is constituted by nonbackslidin$ and serenejoy (803b). It is clear from the text that these are qualities that apply to persons, not to any transcendentai absolute: "If there is someone who trains in the proper practice and seeks to perceive this truth (/o), when he realizes it, he obtains nonbackslidin$ and serene joy" (803b). Another approach to the nature of the dharmakaya is aftbrded us by the following challen$e to its realty. The objeccion is raised: "How do you establish these characteristics and meanin$s concernin$ the dharmaka5,cl? If it is as you say, the dha'nnakd'ya must be nonexistent (tou), since it cannot be apprehended. If a thing, is not perceived b)'the six consciousnessesathen surely it is nonexistent, like a rabbit's horns" (803c). This question erroneously assumeb that the cihannnkdya is a thing that should Lreempirically perceptible. To defend its reality, the au-

65

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thor interprets the question of the "existence" of the dha,rm,q.kd,yaas a question concerning the possibility of achieving the goal of ninsd4a. This he does by identifying the dhnrmsknyawith the "fruit" of ninsdna. "You say that the dharmakd,ya does not exist because it is not perceived by the six senses. This idea is contrary to the truth. Why? Because one can realize ninoarla by shilltul means. contemplation, invocation [of the Buddha's namei, and correct practice are called skillful means. Because of these skillful means, the dhormakdya can be known and can be perceived" (803c). Thus, throu6fi proper prac_ tices, one can realize ni'.sd,4a- that is, the dharmrtka,ya- andrhereby know its reality. This is the first reply, and a perfecily pragmatic one: you shall know the dharmakaycr by its fruit, nirttdya. ,,If. the dhnnnakaya were nonexistent (vru), then all correct practices should be in vain. Taking right views as the foremost pracrice, and including in addition such good things as morality, concentration and wisciom, the correct practices thar one cultivates are not empty (bu kong) or fruitless. Because these correct practices do yierd fruit, we know that the dharmakdya is not nonexistent" (804a) . The dlwrmakaya is not nonexistent because it is known in experiential fruit. This text's approach to nitloa4ra is similarly pragmatic. The author begins this secrion by arguing that ninsa,4a is not the end of a process of spiritual cultivation, for then it would be somethin$ produced (suo sheng). Because it is nor caused (wu qnn) it can be said that it "abides eternally" (805b). This kind of language is qypical of texts related to the tathd,lataga,rbhq traditicrn. In this tradition, speaking ot eternity is an affirmarive langua[ie manner of characterizing the unconditioned, which another tradition might prefer to call the unborn. of more interest to us is the following passagein which the author discusses the practical, functional facers of ninsctrla. Because such marksas form, etc., we lnirudqnl abideseternally,surpassing sayit is not form. Because is not separate it from the purity,etc. of the form mark, we say it is nor nor-form (fei fei se).Because is attained by great ir meritorious functioning gong yorq)sand nondiscriminati'e (da wisdom, we say it truly exists (zhen you). Because the path that is completedby of supra-mundane vi$or and because is attainedby Buddtra, know it really . it we exists(shfyou). As the strre says, "Bhikpus, this Dharmareallyexists. is lt unbcrrn and doesnot arise.It is not madeand is unconditioned, (wuvei). Thereforeknow that ninsava.reallyand.eternally abides."6 This Dharnm is the Tathagata'sd'srayapara,rtti. That is why it is named the cnd of

dhdranl;7 it is also called yoga. (B0Sc)

e /-{

6 6 R l "l . fl t f i r -{,'j
f'\t m

s(.6eL5
I tG

Ni

r F F r r qt

SOTERIOLOGY: BUDDHA NATURE THE PMCTICE oF BI'DDHISM A8

The most irnmediately obvious feature ot' this passageis its portrayal oI nirnd4a (and therefore of d,hq,rmakdya and a,rayaparavrtti) in strongly positive terms. Its erernity and reality, *o."ou"i, validate the practice of the Buddhist path of which it is the culmination. The passage begins with a somewhat Sfrnyavdcla_like portion, where it is stated that nircdrya is neither form nor not-fb.ir, This, however, is done with an interesting twist. That it is not form is clear enou$h, but that it is nor nor-form is due to its identity with puritl and the like qualities of form. such a perspective is characteristic of tathagatagarbha thoughr with its doctrine of the unreality-;ar is, the real nonexistence-of all defilements, of any'thing ,ihu, *lgt, besmirch the purity of what is. Because all impurities, all d.efilemenrc are unreal, what is-form_is simply Thus, with nothing to mar its Thusness; hence, its unity with nirtscinn, qualitativelll as well as ontolo$ically. I{ote it is 'ot that ni.a4a is emptiness and hence so is ordinary reality. Rather, nimsa1a is purity and hence so is ordinary reaiity. The affirmative stance of the Buddha nature position is all-embracing. Throughout the passage, niroana is spoken of in terms of Buddhist practice and the Bucidhist path. Again and again it is emphasized thatnit.uar- is real because it is attained, anJthat it is attained in the practice of the Buddhist path. At the end of the passage, nirndr.ta is directry identified with practice, specifically with yoga, rvith asraya,pardvTtti (which, as we sarv earlier, is the foundation of the Buddhist path, the destruction of defilements, the fruit of mature contempration and the attainment of Thusness) and with dhdrenr (recollection, meditation, and wistrorn). in this the unnamed siltra asserts that the "unborn" "on,"*, and ,,unconditioned,, ninsar'tn really exists. Its eternity, then., its unborn and unconditioned nature' points to its treedom from the conditioned world of samsaric delusion' its identity wlth nondiscriminatory wisdom and r nusness. In the end, d6rayap&rA,ortti, dharrrtakaya,, ninsaqa are all terms used to convey various aspects of the dynamics oi the s"Jah" They portray a Buddha nature that, iinally, is a rnetaphor "ui"r". for the validity of the Budclhaway and a justification fbr Buddhist p-"ti"". tt functions ihus to validate guddhlst practice not by sening as a substantial, metaphysicar ground for the.mechanics of: release'no. rv glorifying the figure of the Buddha and thus enticing those artracred 67

NATURE BUDDFI,A

to practices of worship. Rather, Buddhist practice is validated by atresting to the desirability of the goal (the role of the dlwnnskdyanin],ana. part of the Buddha nature concept) and the capability of each person to reach that $oal. In all respects, thou$h, the Buddha nature concept revolves around Buddhist practice. The latter is the final raison d'tre of the Buddha nature concept. The fundamental message of the Buddha nature concept as expressed in this text is practice, self-transformation, r ealizat\on. Several other characteristics of the dharmnkaya aflord us further insight into the soteriolo$ical character of this fruition stage of the Buddha nature. First, the dharmakii,yo is characterized as the Middle Path, which is explained as meanin$ "separation from extremes." six examples of s'r!h negating of extremes are $iven; we will here examine one. The section is introduced with the remark, "as there are six sorts of Middle Path, [the dharmawityal rernoves itself from six pairs of extremes" (809a). In other words, the dhs,rmakfryct is the Middle Path; that is, the cure for hurnanity's sufferin$, the path of self-transforming action. Our example is entitled "the extremes of 'not producin$' (wu xuo)" and is directly 'producin$' $lc,u ru,o) and concerned with the meanin$ of practicin$ the Buddha Way' ..If I wish to cultivate Producin$:Someonegets a notion and says, wisdonl(zhi hui),I must first produce(zuo) a thought,for only then will the matter be completed." Not producin$: someonegets a notion and says, "wisdom is not an activit-v(shd3)and not a skill (nen$'Why? Because discernment(iie) and delusion are contradictories;that is, when discernment arises, delusion naturally disappears' It is not the case that discernment actively removes [defilementl. Therefore, I say wisdom is neither an activity nor a skill." the In order to avoid theseextremesthere is esmbiished parableof the it oil lamp. As it saysin the sritro,s "KdSyapa, is like a burnin$ lamp: the lamplight havin$ arisen, darknessis extin$uished'And yet although that 'I tat"ptigtrt did not produce (zuo) the thought, am able to extinguishthe c,f because me,' it is certainlybecause is the darkness; darkness extin$uished althouphthe Theref<;re, was extinguished. the light arosethat the darkness lamplightdoesnot producea thought, it is not true that there is no actlvity 'I or skill. wisdom is also thus. It doesnot producethe thought, am able to extin$uish delusion,'and yet it is also true that it is becauseof wisdom know that it is not true that Thbrefore, arisingthat delusionis extin$uished. skill." wisdomis neitheractivirynor 68

NATURE THE PMCTICE OF BLTDDHISI'I AS BLTDDFIA SOTERIOLOGY:

the thought,"l am able to [ComrnentlIf one says he produces delusions," is calledincreasinf,"and is the extremistIviervl this extinguish of "producin$"(lou zuo). If one says,"rvhen rvisdomarises,ignorance and of this not self-destructs-and because rvisdom," is calleddecreasing is In the extremist[r'iervlof not producin$(rou ztu.t). order to avoid these As thoup,ht. for not of we extremes, saythat the arisin$ wisdomcioes produce of the productionand nonproduction thought,it is not the case that it Neither it the is produces thereis no increase. therefore Ithoughtl; Iwisdom] This there is no decrease. therefore casethat it doesnot produce[chan$el; is called \litidlePath. the 1xoog1 The author's intent in this example appearsto be to establishthat the dharmakaya (or Buddha nature) is active and pla-vsa part in effecring change (in not beirr$ tou zuo) but that its activity does not take place within the scope of karmic larvs of cause and effect (in not being you %uo). ln ne$atin$ the latter extrelne, the author is indicating that wisdom, though an activity, is nonphenomenal, that is, nonsamsaric, because it is that which cuts throu$h the karmic linka$e of cause and effect, rather than bein$ subsumed by it. Yet it is equally important for the author to establish that wisdom is an activitv or tirnctioning (shi3), that is, a doing, and that it does have the skill or abiliry (neng) to effect change. It is not fortuitous that rvisdom arising, defilements are extinguished; it is definitely because of l'isdom's presence that defilements are undone. Yet the author hesitates to speak of this in a directly causal fashion, as causatiorl is the law of s&msqr& and karma, whereas wisdom is preciselv the breakin$ of this bonda$e. To ne$ate the two extremes in question, the author is obliged to walk a fine line. To think in terms of "increasin$" or "producin$" is to think in karmic or samsaric terms, u'hich do not apply to wisdom, and to think in terms of "not producin$" is a "decreasin$" or nihilistic kind of thou$ht, inasmuch as the efficacy of the Buddha Way is denied-and this too is inappropriate in the context of understanding the nature of wisdom or the functioning of Buddha nature. The effective and active functioning of the tsuddha Way within, though not subject to, sarysdra is the Middle Path that the author describes. The sin$le point that steers hirn along this path is his understanding of the soteriologically active nature of. the dhnnnnkarya or Buddha nature. A second characteristic with soteriological significance ascribed the dharrnakayct is the tact of the two trdths being "neithei the same nor different."

69

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If the supreme and worldlvtruths are the same, then ordinarypersons, upon perceiving worldly rruth, shouldpenetrate the supreme truth. But if theypenetrated supreme the truth, the-v shouldbe sages of Iinstead ordinary peoplel.But as they do not perceive supreme the truth, the two truths are not one. If you say the tu'o truths are differrent, perceiving than sages, l'orldly truth, shouldnot penetratesupremetruth. But if they did not psnsg1.1. supremetruth, they would be ordinarypeople.Therefore, because sages perceive Thereiore, know u,e [bothtruths], [the trvotruthsl arenot different. [the two truthsl are neitherthe samenor different.(809a) The theme of this characteristic is the harrnony between Thusness and phenomenal reality. With respect to the variety of things, "when you consider the penetration of Thusness you cannot say they are different, but because of worldly distinctions, you cannot say they are the same" (809a). On the one hand, because Thusness and phenomenal reality are not different, they are mutuaily identifiable. Just as "form is emptiness and emptiness is form," so "Thusness is 'phenomena 'fhusness." and phenomena are On the other hand, because they are not the same, one is not reduced to the other, and each maintains its own'significance. The example of the two truths broaches the implications of this logic for practice of the Buddha Way. The two truths (or, seeing things aright and seeing things through delusion) cannor be simply idenrified or there would be no need of practice. Yet they ultimately also cannot be kept distincr, for the bodhisctttpa must act in and through the worldly reality of delusion. The fact, then, that worldiy truth and supreme truth, phenomena and Thusness are not the same means that practice and liberation are necessary; the fact that they are not differdnt means that liberation is something real and worth striving for. A third soteriological characteristic of dharrrmkdyct is called separcrtion hom banrier s. There are three kinds of barrier: (i) the kle6a [defilementlbarrier-the arhat who obtainsthe wisdomof liberationovercomes barrier;(2) the this dh5dna [rneditationl barrier-in overcoming this barrier,ttrhats andpratyekabzddhas (3) obtaincomplete liberation; the all-wisdom barrier-this is what the badhisattcra path breaksthrough.By overcoming this barrier, they realizesambodlri Buddha's wisdoml. these In threestages, Tathagata's the [the dharmakaya onlycontends with threeobstacles;is not itselfdefiled. (810a) it Here we again see the dharma,kayo discussed in terms of practice 70

SOTERIOLOGY: BLDDHANATURE THE PMCTICD OF BUDDIIISM AS

and, especially, realization. The dharmakays is constituted in the overcoming of various barriers or milestones of pro$ress in the Buddha Way. At the first stage, the dharmakdyct is constituted in overcoming defilement. At the second stage, we see a shift in the logic of the concept of borrier. The dhydna "barrier" is not something undesirable or polluting (as kle5o), but the opposite. "separating" from this barrier must be accomplished by fulfilling it; this is not so much a barrier as a milestone. The same may be said of the third "barrier," sombodhL The "breaking through" of this barrier is equivalent to the fulfillment of the Buddha path. Thus, in all instances, the dhqrmakaya is constituted by the realization inherent in progressing on the Buddha Way. Furthermore, realization is only a matter of progressing in practice and nothing more. As the dharmakdya or Buddha nature is not defiled in any of these stagesof practice, neither is it purified in any real way by realization. There is no change in nature on the Buddha path, only various stages of prOgressin comin$ to know one's nature. The fourth and final characteristic oI dhnrmakdya cited by the author is "the purity of the dharmakdyadhdtu" (the realm of rhe dhannahaya). What is this "purity" attributed here to the dhannnkayadlwu and invoked so often in thii rext in speaking of Buddha nature,dhnrmakfrya, and the like? The author here fills out the meaning of this term figuratively, using four images-gold, warer, space and bodhi (enlightenmenr), each of which is interpreted in four different ways. The explanation oI the dhanrutkdyadhdnt's purity is as follows. 1. The first four meaningsare (a) the d,harmakdyais unchangeable, like is truth is formiess, like Sold;(b) Thusness pure,like water;(c) supreme space;and (d) mahd,parinirard\ra completelymanifest,like bodhi. is 2. The secondfour meanin$s (a) the superpowerstransform,like gold; are (b) compassion nurtures,like water; (c) own-narure [Buddhanaturel, like space,doesnot reject senrientbeingp;and (d) prajfrd clarifies and purifies,like bodhi. 3. The third four meanings (a) the cause[of enlightenment] pureand are is undefiled, like gold; (b) the superiorpath is cleansing, like water; (c) liberation is freedomfrom bondage, like space;and (d) the fruit-essence [iberation] is manifest,like bodki. 4. The fourth four meaninlsare (a) the natureof blissis to benefit[othersl,

7l

BIIDDFIA NATURE

as does gold; (b) the cssence of puritf is limpiditl', like that of u"ater; (c) the virtue of eternitv is indestructibilit""", like that of space; and (d) the meaning of sef (uro) is nonattachnleni, as in bodhi. (810a-b)

First notice the string of terms subsumed within the dharmakdyadhd,tu notion : dharmakdycr, Thusness, supreme truth, ma,hapariniT-ad\w, super powers, compassion, o\.'n-nature (or Buddha nature), prajfia, the cause of enli$,htenment, the superior path, liberation, the'fruit-essence of liberation, and the lbur Bud.dha virtues or pdramita (bliss, purity, eternity, and self). \!'hat is found here is a list of the various superlatives used in this text or, othenvise put, a list of the fruits of realization. The "purity" of the dharmakayadhatu, the realm in which Buddhisnr cornes to fruition, then, consists in the absence of defilements in these fruits. I{ence, there is no change (a source of suffering), no adherence to forms (a manifestation of ignorance), no binding or attachment. Rather, there is transformative power (the ability to act on behalf of others.), the nurturance of compassion, nonrejection of the plight of sentient beings in sq.msara, and so forth. Thus, the two main characteristics of purity seem to be the absence of any defilements in one's own behavior and mental processes and action on behalf of the liberation and welfare of others. This, of course, is none other than the practice and realization of the bodhisatnsa path, as manifest in prujfid, and kantnd.

C. Trika.ya: Sambfuttakaya and l{irmfiryakfirya

According, to the BN?, the trikaya, or three Buddha bodies, are related to the Buddha nature as follows. Buddha nature is divided into two "natures": the Buddha nature that dwells in itself (zhu zi xing xin!) and the emergent Buddha nature $in chu xing). Three Budciha bodies - dha rmakaya, sambho gakaya, and nirtndnakdya - "all become complete because of these two natures" (808b;.to In other lvords, the trikdya are subsumed within the Buddha nature. Specifically, the dhsmwkaya is identilied with the Buddha nature that dwells in itself, whereas the sambhogakd,ya and nirmarlakaya are identified with the emerg,ent Buddha nature (808c). Thus the dharmakaya represents what the Buddha nature is in itself, whether reco$nized or unrecognized, and the other two kdya represent what 72

NATLIRE THE PMCTICE OF BLIDDHISM AS SOTERIOLOGI':BLTDDFL{

it is as it comes into its own. so to speak, the Buddha nature in its manifest fbrm of self-knorvledAe and action for the liberation of others. Havin,alreadl' discussedthe dhqrmakava. we will examine the sambhogakc,ycrnext.
Becauseof the breadth and greatnessof its power and functions, this krlya aboriginally possessesthree virtues: great wisdom (praifia), Sreat meditation (samadhi), and great compassion (karu4a)Jt The essential characteristic of great u'isdom is nondiscriminative knowledge$nnrw). The essentialcharacteristic of great meditation is uncreated mentation (tut nn ln); i.e., mentation that has left behind [the dualir,vofl leavin$ [the world; i.e., saving oneselfl and entering [the world; i.e., savin$ others]. The essentialcharacteristic of great compassionis the abilitv to remove Isentient beingslfrom [sufferingl and save them. For the mentation of sentient bein$s to be caused to attain perfect pleasurein the Dharma, the six super fulfillment, three thing,sare necessary: . powers (sbhi.irta),rj and the giving of aid by removin$ [sentient bein$s from their sufferinf1. Thus great compassion removes [sentient bein$sl from the three evil paths of sufferingrr and establishespeople and detsas in great peace. Great meclitation brings about the arisin$ of faithful joy by manit'estinp the six super powers.Wisdom takes pleasurein the Dharma and realizes liberation. This is what is calied the sambhofafuiyo. (810c)

a discussion This is the entirety of the text on sqmbhogpkdya, that revolves entirely around the nature of its functioning or activities and has not a single word that implies in any way that the sambho!,a.ktiyu is any kind of substantive entity. It is constituted exclusively by actions, soteriolo$ical actions. The characteristics constitutive of this kaya are introduced in terms of the greatness of their influence and activities; that is, their power and ability to effect knowledge, by nondiscriminative change. Wisdom is constituted pleasure in the Dharma, and the realization of liberation. Knowled$e, pleasure and realization are actions, not thin$s; their meanin$ perhaps would be conveyed more accurately if they were translated verbally as knowing, enjoying, and rea.lizin$. Wisdom, as described ahar^cterized by irondiscrimhere, is a manner of being-in-the-world of what is, the taking of pleasure in the inative apprehension of. realizint knowledge of what is, and the active self-transformation freedom. soteriologicai This aspect of the sambhogakdrya, functions for the practitioner. then, constitutes its

73

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Meditation is constituted by so-called uncreated mentation (tou zuo yn), which means a manner of apprehension and beingin-the-world free of the dualiry of concepts of self and other, samsdrq and nirnar.rcr,.To be free of such dualistic thinking is both a manifestation of one's freedom and one of the bases that makes possible acts for the benefit of others. It also produces the six super powers that, in turn, result in the development of faithful joy (in others). Paranormal activities, as is implied here, are not ends in themselves, but are justified insofar as they encourage others in the praetice of Buddhism. The active, soteriological character of rneditation, then, is partially directed toward the salvation of others and partially is a manifestation of the practitioner's own dynamic, liberated state. Finally, compassion, of course, removes sentient bein$s from suffering and establishes them in peace. Obviously, this element in the sarnbhoSakaya's makeup is purely constituted by action for the szllvation of others. In sum, the sambhogakd,ya is not a thing, entity, or substance of any kind. It is a particular set of actions that manifest the practitioner's own liberated state-in such actions as nondualistic cognizing and paranormal activities-and that aim to release others from bondage. The following description of the nirrna4akdya bears certain similarities to that of the sambhopakaya. "Great compassion is the lnimtfu.nkdyo'sl basis. Meditation transmutes it into manifest form. Wisdom causes it to have five kinds of abilities: (1) it causes the arising of repugnance and fear [towards sarysaral; (2) it causes [people] to enter the Noble Path; (3) it causes [people] to discard old attachments; (a) it brings about faithful joy in the great Dharma; and (5) it causes [peoplel to receive the prediction of g,reatbodhi" (810c). fu for the sambhogakd,jta, here also the'three main characteristics given for the nirmd4aku"'a are wisdom, meditation, and compassion. In this case, compassion is the raison d'6tre for the existence of this kdya, samdd"hf power enables thiskd,ya to take form (i.e,, incarnate), and wisdom provides the direction for this kEsa's actions. Again, as for the other kdya, here too this kdya is entirely constituted by soteriological functions, this time entirely for the benefit of others. And again there is no thing, entity, or substance of any kind here, only a set of actions. Following this passage on ninndr.tahdya are listed fourteen acts 74

SOTERIOLOGY: BLIDDFI-A NATURE THEPMCTICE OF BUDDHISM AS

performed for the benefit of sentient being,s.These specify the most significant events in the lif'e of the Buddha (birth, leaving home. defeat of lvlara, enlightenment, turning the wheel of the Dharma, parinim;aqq4 and so on). Sakvamuni Buddha's life as nirmanakaya is itself portrayed as a compassionate act. The section on the trikdya includes a detailed discussion of the eternity of the three Buddha bodies. I will translate this passagein full because the assertion of eternity produces the suspicion that the Buddha bodies are eternal things. This selection, hower.er, demonstrates quite clearly that although the Buddha bodies are eternal, they are not eternal things. The eternifv of the trikdya is based upon the same soteriological functioning noted earlier. Furthermore, because thesethree bodiesalwa,vs performacts of profit to the world,it is saidthat theyabideeternall-v. eternal This abidinsrestson ten kinds of cause and condition.. . . 1. They are eternal because the boundlessness causesand of of
conditions. Having for innumerable eons cast away body, life, and property, they embrace the true Dharma. The true f)harma rs boundless,inexhaustible,inextinguishable.In turn, this inexhaustible cause molds the inexhaustible fruit. The fruit is rhese same three bodies, and thus they are eternal. 2. They are eternal becauseof the boundlessness sentient beinAs.At of the time la bodhisatnsai first gives rise to the thought of enli$htelrment,he takes the four (reat vorvs,laand gives rise to the ten inexhaustiblevows,ls Isayin{l "lf sentient bein$s are inexhaustible, my vow [to save them] is inexhaustible; rvhen sentienr beings are exhausted[i.e., all savedl, onll' therr is my vo*'exhausted." Because sentient beings are inexhaustible, the nirmdnakaya is eternally within the world, endlessl-v guiding senrient being,s. 3. They are eternal becauseof the boundlessness great compassion of (mahafunuTa). If all bodhisattvas have great compassion and eternally act to save sentienr bein$s, if in their hearts there is no limit to givin$ aid and they long abide in samsdra withour entering nin:dint, how much more is the Tathagah with all his merits consummated eternally present in great compassionl Saving [all beingsl with perpetual kindness-how couid there be a limit to it? This is why we speak of eternity. 4. They are eternal because the four bases of super powejrs (addhi-pada)16are boundless. Even rhose within the world who obtain the four basesof super powers are able to live long lives of forty lesser eons. How much mofe, then, can the master of great super powers, the Tathagata,abide for a million eons, freel-vliving
/J

BUDDHA NATURE

This is why we such a lon$ life and widely deliverin$ sentient bein$s' sPeakof eternirY'' of nondiscriminative 5. They are eternai becauseof the boundlessness as two' they are wistiom. Far from $raspin$ sa'msdra arrd nircd4a tttpi"*e truth' They are both unmovin!' [a always united i., tii" sar.nsara] and characteristic oi ninsar]al and not dep{rting [from thus w know theY are eternal' Even in the 6. They are eternal b""ut"" they are always in sc;mfirlhi' are impervious to world there are those who, obtainin[ samid'hi, rnuch more water, fire, embers, drowninp,, knives' and arrows' llow of sufferin$ will the Tathd$ata,constantly in samd'dhi' be incapable harm! This is why we speak of eternity' pure' Serenity is the 7. They are eternal because they are serene and the dwelling place of Diamond Mind, able to do away with nirt:d4al' with ignorance, with the final thought [upon enterin! it and with sufferin$' Because there is no sufferin!'' impermanence fruit is completely manifested, it is is called serene. As the Buddha eternal' called pure. This path of liberation is therefore called the world' the 8. The-v are eternal because' althou$h actin$ within are not sullied' Althou$h the Buddha bodies eight essentialthin$s17 path realti of those who havel not yet completed.the return to [the are not sullied by defilements and are joined with sarysdra, they we say they dwell nor do they have false thou$hts' This is why eternallY. dew of immortality 9. They are eternal because they are the sweet of they are still, and are far distant from Mdra [the Lord lamTtal; be longJived' superhuman' beathl. The sweetdew causespeople to the final and immortal. The Diamond Minc discards ignorance, obtains the thought [before niruar't'al and delusion' and thus Buddhafruito{eternalbliss.Becausethereiseternalbliss,thereis distant from stillness; and because there is stillness' they are far abide eternally' MZra. To be far distant from tr{6ra is to nature of production 10. They are eternal because they are not of the ori$inally destruction. It is not the case that the dfumna'kA'ya and is producedl' nor did it ori$inally did not exist but now exists [i'e', it acs exist but now, does not exist [i'e'' is destrol;edl' Although o/ the three periods (/ei ("l"gtl within the three periodsls it is not it is not the san shifa).Why? The dhannakaya abori$inally exists; periods and case that it begins now to exist' It transcends the three so we call it eternal (811a-b) Forthemostpart'theten..Qausesandconditions''forthe

eternityofthethreeBuddhabodiesemphasizesoteriologjcal thd foundation of this eternity' The and action-as fu"ror*-pructice of the Buddha bodies second and third examples have the eternity 76

OF NMURE AS THE PRACTICE BUDDHISM BUDDI{A SOTERIOLOGY:

Buddhas' rest on the eternity of salvific acts performed by the bein$,s is inexhaustible' the Assumin$ that the number of sentient en$a$e in vows ancl $reat compassion of a Buddha require him to help. These acts bein$ endless aci. of teaching and other forms of a Buddha is endless, so are those Buddhas, but only in the sense that is not different an endless series of acts for the welfare of others. This over time of in the Buddhist context, from pointin$ to the continuity without an ordinary person, rvho also is constituted by his or her acts, an underlyin$ thin$ performin$ those acts' the need to assume the The fourth and sixth examples are alike in invokin$ demonstrating transcendence of physical performance of man'els of yoga to'do as proof of eternity. This assumes that the practice (to the enli$htenment which is its aim) develops as a b-v-product imperviouscertai; supernormal conditions, includin$ longevity and a poor demonstration of . ness to accidental harm. This, of course, is as it eterniqv and only tan$entially relevant to this discussion insofar conditions implies the Buddhas' freedom from the ordinary limitin$ point to the of embodiment. This freedom, however, need not be so existence of any statie, entitative thin$ and should not compatiunrJerstood. Freedom from ordinary physical limitations is understood as dynamic series of acts realized in a ble with Buddhas already nonordinary manner (which, indeed, the trikdya doctrine assumes). from The seventh and ninth examples to$ether equate freedom bodies. The seventh example delusion with the eternity of the Budclha the identifies eternity with the serenity and purity consequent upon and sufferin$' This means vanquishin$ of ignorance' impermanence, of that eternity is a synonym f.or nirwfu.tn simply as the ne$ation confirmed by samsaric delusion and sufferin$. This interpretation is of the identification of this nirvanic condition with the "path liberation" (jie tuo Doo). we rnay recall in this context the important fruit; BN? theme that States that Buddha nature is both cause and afuryclparavrttiisboththeabandonmentofdesire(theTruthof desire Cessation; i.e.,nit'octrw) and the cause of the aband<lnment of (the Truth of Path). The ninth example repeats the theme of identifying eterniqv with of the freedom from i$norance, addinS, the metaphorical element ,,sweet <lew" of immortality and the mltholo$ical figure of Mara, the Lord of Death. The "sweet dew" of immortality is the food of the $ods.
II

BIJDDHA NATURE

In Buddhism it eonnotes the sweet taste of liberation from sannsara; that is, life-anddeath. It points not to a static state of being (in distinction to dying), but to nirc;ctrlct understood as freedom from life-and-death (as opposed to extinction). The references to the sweet dew and to distancing from Mera thus reinforce the notion of the Buddha's condition of discontinuity with saqnsd,ra.The mention of eternal bliss anticipates a topic (the four pdrumitd,) to be covered in the next chapter. srrffice it to say that this eternal bliss may be understood as bliss pdramitd. which in rurn is identified with the sanfidhi that overcomes attachment to false emptiness. Attachmenr to false emptiness is a condition in which one is committed to belief in emptiness as nothingness, or a negative ultimate truth. The samddhi overcomes both the atternpt to find bliss in sarysdra and this attachment to false nothingness. As such, it is a Middre path condition beyond dualisric affirmation and negation; in transcending dualism it is blissful. Finally, the eighth example, like the second and third, refers ro the Buddha's compassionate acts for the werfare of sentient beings. Here the point is that this action proceeds without sullying the ,,eight essential things": that is, one's own ongoing religious p.u"ti"" and the clarity resulting from it. In the backgrorrnd of this idea is the basic tdthdga,tagarbha doctrine of the essential purity of the tuthngetuEarbha (here the Buddha body), unsullied by irs conracr with defilements (here its engagement in samsaric rife). This exampre very directly portrays the action in the world performed by the Buddha bodies as the source of their eternity: The Buddha (or Buddha body) is essentially pure, or fully ltself, in the midst of soteriological action. The above illustrate the most important theme of the te' ,,causes and conditions" for the eternity of the Buddha bodies; namerv, that eternity is necessitated by never ending soteriorogicar practice and action (including both one's own practice and liberation and acting for the welfare of others). There are exceptions to this general pattern. The first reason given for eternity names the eterniry-of the Dharma as the cause of the eternity of the Buddha bodies, *hi"h the fruit of this cause. The Dharrna, of course, is not a "." substantive metaphysical entity, nor simply the Truth,.but also the way things are (empty-Thus) and the path of realization. Thus rhe Dharma ls an 78

SOTERIOLOGY: BLTDDHA NATURE THE PMCTICE OF BUDDHISM A"S

epistemological, ontological, practical, and soteriological basis constitutes the foundation of the eternity attributed to the Buddha bodies. Two other "causes and conditions" of the eternity of the trikaya do not seem to speak essentially in terms of soteriological practice and action. These are the fifth, which speaks of nonduality, and the tenth, which is concerned with nontemporality. The nonduality of sarysdra and ninsdna is due to their mutual emptiness. Therefore, eternity is not grounded here in a substantive metaphysical entity but in its contrary, the absence of such an entity, the emptiness of any attribute posited for either. Nondualistic wisdom is able to realize the nondistinction between the two and hence the Buddhas, in a sense, are able to participate simultaneously in both. In this condition. we are told, lies the Buddhas' eternity. Nondualism based on emptiness, then, is the source of eternity here. , The tenth reason, concerning temporality, is much like the first and fifth. The nature of the dharmakEta is neither samsaric (conditioned, produced) nor nihilistic (not existing, destroyed), yet the author of the BNT, characteristically, wants to speak positively of it. The key phrase of the tenth reason for speaking of eternity is the statement that although the dharmakdya, "acts,' within the three time periods, it is not "of" them; that is, it is not of a temporal nature. As in the fifth reason, its acts are thernselves of a nirvanic nature, though they occur within the framework of sarysdro, here in the sense of temporality. Like the Buddha nature, the dhormnkdTn,s existence is aboriginal-real in a sense having no relationship to either being or nonbeing-and like the Buddha nature, its reality consists in its acts. In sum, althotrgh asserting the eternity of the Buddha bodies, none of the ten reasons for eternity gives evidence of a thing or entity that lasts eternally. Instead, we see the author's characteristic desire to speak positively of the "fruit" of realization; hence, a positive conception of minsdrla, as freedom from i$porance, from time, from every kind of limitation. !'ery much evident is an emphasis upon the Buddhas as bein$s who en$age in ceaselesssoteriological action, both expressing their own enlig,htenment and acting for the welfare of others. Finally, we see an emphasis on the Buddhas'nondualistic participation innhwdrlrl and sarytsdra, their Thus-Gone-Thus-come nature. None of these reasons for speaking of the Buddha bodies as eternal steps outside widely 79

BLTDDHA NATURE

accepted Mahdyana principles. None of these reasons requires us to construe the Buddha bodies as endurin entities.

D. The Relationship Between Person and Buddha

A Buddhist text's depiction of the relationship between the Buddha and the ordinary person provides significant insight into the soteriology of that text. The BN? is no exception to rhis rule. llhe relationship between the Buddha and the ordinary person as portrayed in the BN? defines the parameters of liberation in the sense that Buddha is depicted here as the supremely liberated person, no more and no less. The BN? typically distinguishes three categories of sentient beings: ordinary persons, bodhisattvcts, and Buddhas. The BN? clarifies the relationship among these three classes by discussing the nianner in which Buddha nature can be said to pervade oi be differentiated amon!, them. We begin with the "Den'asive" (tong) aspect of Buddha nature. The pervasivenessof Buddha nature is seen in the Thusness (yuqt) and the purity of all things. Each of these two qualities, in tunt, is further explained. "worldly Thusness (su n"r.)is true Th'sness (srren ru); true Thusnessis worldly Thusness.The two Thusnesses, true and worldly, are not distinguishecl as different." As for purity, ,,There are two aspects to the meaning of purity. (1) There is Thusness (ru-n ) within the cause-because the Thtrsnessthat has not yet attained the unblemished fruition stageis not itself blemished: and (2) there is the identity of the purity of cause and fruit-because within the cause there is unblemished purif.v and arriving at fruition there is unbiernished purity" (805c). What we see in both the Thusness and the purity characteristics is the nondifferentiation between ordinary or "worldly" reality (also equivalent to the "causal" stage) and "true" reality (also equivalent to the "fruition" sta$e.) In short, there is but one Thusness and it pervades all things uniformly. 'the Havirrg established this unity, author goes on to discuss the differentiation of Buddha nature arnong the three classes of sentient beings. "within this Buddha nature three kinds of sentient beings are differentiated: (1) those who do not perceive and realize the Buddha nature-these are called ordinary persons; (2) those who do perceive 80

AS BLIDDTIA N,\TTIRE TIIE PMCTICE OF BUDDHISM SOTERIOLOG\':

and realize the lluddha nature--these are called sages; (3) those rvhose realization reaches the ultimate purit-v of this principle-these are called the Thus Come (Tathaq,ata)" (805c-806a). Clearly this categorization scheme is not a gotru.r-t)rpetheory in which some persons are innately capable cf realization and others are not. It was established in the discussion of the pen'asivenessof Buddha nature that Buddha nature is omnipresent; all share in it, and all share equaliy in Thusness. The present differentiation of Buddha nature amdng classes simpl-v recognizes the realitl' of different stages of awareness amon$ humanity and explains it in terms of the de$ree to which one has reahzed one's oln Buddha nature. Elsewhere, the text speaks of three "stages" rather than three classesof sentient beings; rramely, (l) the impure (i.e., sentient beingp), (2) the pure (i.e., bodhisottvas), and (3) the supremeiy pure (Buddhas).To dernonstrarethat this does not conflict with the assertion of the universal pen'asivenessof Buddha nature, a quotationle follorvs, indicating that all three "stages" are constituted by the dharrnadhatu (the realm of Truth, equivalent to Thusness). The realm ol"serrtient beings, it states, is this dharrnadhatu when covered by defilements and suffering rebirth. The realm ol bodhiscttarcs is this sanre realm of sentient bein{,s 'rvhen they have beccme averse to the sufferings of samsaru and practice the bodhiscttt.vctpath irr reliance on the 84,000 doctrines of the Buddha and all pararnita. Finally, the third stage (that of the Buddhas) is described as tbllows:
This realnr of sentient beings, havinS cast off all kleda coverings, gone beyond all sutfering and rvashcda*'ay all defilernents,beinEinaturally and to the utmost degreeclean and pure, being that which all bein$s desire to see, having entered and dwelled in the subtle and superior ground, the ground of havin$ arrived all-knowledge,and of universal nonobstruction Ior harmon-v]., at incomparable abiliry, and having attained rhe !,reat, spontaneouspower of the Dharma King-l call [beingsrvho achicve this] ?hus Come (Tathdgata). (306b) It is notervorthy that the BII? refers only once here to the

tlhannadhatu; Thereafter, the sentient

narnely, upon introducing

the stage of sentient beings.

the remainin$ tu'o stages are introduced as variations of bein$ "realm," rather tlan as manifestations of the Dharma "realm." This emphasizes the extent to which the author is thinking of the Buddha as a sentient being. The essential nature of

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the Buddha and of the ordinary person is the same, whereas the differentiation between the two is purely a matter of practice and its fruit of realization. Both the points of identity and of differentiation, moreover, serve to encourage pracrice. The identity between person and Buddha is constituted by their shared Buddha 'ature; this identity serves to encourage practice by virtue of its optimism. The difference between person and Buddha also is constituted by Buddha nature-the degree to which each mnkes reql in pracrice his or her own Buddha nature; to overcome the difference, practice ls absolutely necessary. The rnessageis clear: you are Buddha. but 'ou are not Buddha unless you practice. This is no paradox: The Buddirist tradition has always asserred that a Buddha couid be identified by Buddhalike behavior, paradigmatically wise and cornpassionate behavior.zo

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CTLAPTDR FOUR
Dereification of Self and Mind

f n arguing for an urrderstanding of Buddha nature as active, part of Imy task must be to demonstrate that Buddha nature is nor a substantive self or mind of any kind, nor any other kind of thing or entity^ N{any passagesin the Buddhct Ne,ture Treqtise demonstrate this by using a term that sounds as if it represents an entity but then proceedin$ to dereifo the term and demonstrate an active or functional meaning tbr it.

A. The "Own-Nature" of Buddha Nature

A tirst example may be found in the BN?'s treatment of what it calls the o,@n-n&tut'e (zi xing) of Buddha nature. LanSuape of this sort cannot help but lead one to think, ar least initially, that the term is used to refer to a substantive self or mind. This text, however, makes a point of conjoining such a term with descriptions of exactly the opposite import. In the BN? the own-nature of Buddha nature is characterized bv three traits (796b-+): (1) It possessespower like that of the wish-fulfilling mani jewel, which gives one what one wants on the basis of one's wanting it. The Buddha nature, like this, is naturall/ self-fulfilling; one cultivates realization of the Buddha nature because the Buddha nature

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N,\TLIRE BUDDFTA

intrinsically moves torvard its own self-realization. \2) It is characterized b-v nondifferentiation in the sense that ordinary persons, sages, and Buddhas all are essentially alike insoiar as the nature of the mind of each is pure and replete with the Buddha virtues, differing only in stage of realization. This shared qualiry-of the minds of all is explicitly cornpared with emptiness: It is like an earthen, a siiver, and a gold vessel; althou$h they differ in form, they are essentially alike insofar as the nature of each is emptiness and empriness is not subject to differentiation. (3) It is characterized by the nurturant quality of compassion for all. In all this there is no substantive self or mind, despite the use of "own-nature" lan$ua$e. The first trait portrays one aspect oi the dynamic character of the Buddha nature: its tendency to move toward its own self-realization. This is not to be understood as a characteristic that the Buddha rlature, as entit-v-,possesses;the Buddha nature is this tendency toward self-realization,ttlis soteriological tunction. Likewise the third characteristic represents action action. that the Buddha nature is, in this case cornpassionate The second characteristic attests to the universality of the Buddha nature. This trait may appear to be more troublin$ for my thesis, insofar as it is basedupon the shared purity and intrinsic value of the minds of all ordinary persons, sages,and Buddhas, and thus may seem to imply the existenceof a substantivemind constituted by an uncharr$in$, pure essence.But as the reader wili recall from other parts of this book, purity is expiained by such a phrase as nondiscriminative wisdom (i.e., mental functioning free of discrimination: "Becauseall false thou$hts are utterly extin$uished in it, this iiharmadhd.tu surpassesthat which can be expressed in reasonin$ or in speech. Therefore, we take purity to be a characteristic of the dharmadhatu" 80lb) and the Brrddha virtues, as u'e shall see, are explained by such things as seeing realitl' aright and ceaselessl.v workin$ for the salvation of others. In both cases, substalitive sounding terms actually refer to kinds of mental tunctionin$, and rve do not find this functionin$ ultimatell' dependin$ upon any entity that can be distinguished from the functionin$ itself. N{oreover,in the passagepresently under examination, the puriti' and virtue of the human, sage,and Buddha mind is conipared to emptiness.Althou$h the author does not want to imply rvith this that the sentient mind is 84

OF DEREIFICATION SELFAND i{IND

lacking in virtue, he does mean to say that its virtue lies precisely in the freedorn constituted by its emptiness. This reading is corroborated by the following excerpi, taken from the same passage. Subsumed within the discussion of the Buddha nature's own-nature, the tathag&ta1qrbh(l is discussed as follows: "Tathdgatagarbhu: the meaning of this {arbha is own-nature. No d,hqrmas are outside the Tathagata's own-nature because its mark is arurtmun. Therefore it is said, all dharmas are the tathdgqnectrbhct" (796b). In this passa$e, far f'rom representing a substantive entity, own-nature is identified with the very contrary of substantive self-identity, not-self or Q,natm(tn It is this very lack of a substantive self that makes possible the ttniversality of the tathdqcltagctrbha. lt is implied that if the nthdgatugarbha had a nature of its own of any kind, this nature would differentiate it from other things. Thus its universal nature, paradoxically, rests upon its lack of nature or emptiness and it is this quality which represents its "own-nature." These three characteristics of the own-bein$ of Buddha nature are further S,lossedin the text as expressin$, respectively' (1) the inconceivability ot'the Buddha nature, (2) that one should realize it, and (3) the infinity ol its virtues (797a). This conveys the idea of the Buddha nature from the perspective of the ordinary person. One understands that one cannot comprehend it, and yet that it is desirable that one realize it, inasrnuch as to do so will transforrn one into an infinitely virtuous (wise and compassionate) person. We have seen the term own'nature tsed in one other place already; namely, in the analysis of the purify of the dhqrmakdyadh.dtu.l One meaning of this purity was $iven as "own-nature [which I $oss as Buddha naturel, like space,does not reject sentient bein$s (810a)." Here again we simply see own-nature identified with an essential' characteristic behavior of Buddha nature, compassionate action on behalf of sentient bein$s. In the BN?, then, no connotation of substantiveness is attached to the own-nature concept. This nonsubstantiveness is a function of understandin{ Buddha nature as Buddhist practice. The Buddha nature concept sen'es both to entice people to engage in Buddhist practice and to represent the potential, activity, and fruition of that practice itself. The "own-bein$" of Buddha nature perhaps is best understood as the distillation of that practice; in representin$ the essence of Buddha nature, it manifests the essentials of Buddhist
d5

BI:'DDH.A NATLIRD

practice. Just as the latter convey no substantiality, neither does the former. Because there is no Buddhist practice apart from persons practicing Buddhism, persons in the act of practicing, are all there is to be found here as a foundation or "basis" for the edifice of Buddhism.

B. Atmapdramitq
Some of these themes are developed in a more complete form in our second case, the discussion ol d,tmaptiramitd,, or self pa,ramitd. The self paramitd is one of four pdram,itd-purity, self, bliss, and eternity-that are understood as meritorious qualities inherent in the dharmakaya. The f,our paramit& ^re found in tc.tlfi4&n1&rbha 'literature, where they are explained as an extension of early Buddhist teachings, as follows. Theravdda Buddhisrn characterizes reality with the Three Marks of impermanence (anitya), sutfering (duhkha), and not-self (andtman). These were sometimes accornpanied by a fourth characteristic, impurity (asubha). The reaching of the Four Marks by the Theravada was the correction of four "upside-down" views held by the ignorant, who believed that permanence, bliss, self, and purity could be found in samsara. Tathagatagartrha theorists accepted this tradition as far as it went, but asserted that it was incornplete. They then extended this teaching, with a twist characteristic of their logic. The four upside-down [viewsare the followingl:Wherethere is truly nothingeternal(within form and the five skarulha),givingrise to an ternit-v view.where there is truly suffering, givingrise to a blissview.\{rherethere rs truly no self,{iving rise to a self view. \Vherethere is truly impurit-v, giving rise to a purity view.These calledthe four upside-down are [views].. . . In order to correct thesefour, the four not-upside-dorvn [viewsj are taught.What are thesefour? [1] Form and the live skandha in pasr,presnr, and futurewill certainlyperish;therefore, they are reallynot eternal.Thus one truly givesrise to the realizationof noneternify.[2j At the time of suft'ering, there is suffering. \ltren pleasure perishes, there is suffering.Thus one abandons three time periodsas suft'ering . . and in this produces the . the reaiization sufferin$.2 Noneternity cause. of is Noneternity effect. is [3] By the completion cause of and effectthe dependenr nature(paratartu-a) is maintained. Effectis not independent, neitheris cause: and whetherin pasr, presnt, future it is still not finishedwith its preceding or cause. Therelbre the dependent natureis alsonot independent. outside of causeand effect there is no remaining dharma that couldbe a self.Therefore no-self the is truth and one produces realization no-self. rhere are two aspects the of [4] 86

DEREIFICATIONOF SELF AND MIND

of impurity, in form and nonform. Impurity in form has three [manifestationsl: the be!,inning, middle, and end. In the be$innin$ when one first enters the womb, the foetus is impure. In the middle, after one has left the womb, eating and drinkin!,, to possess property, and to beai children, all are impure. At the end, after one has left the body and the substance of the body decays, it is extremely impure. As for nonform, whether joy or $,rief,whether evil or neutral, whether connected with desire, all are tied to thought and passion and are thus nonform. By virtue of this fact, they are also impure. Therefore the sagegains penetratin$ insi$.ht into the three realms [and sees] that all are impure. Thus the five sha,ndh.a are truly impure and one produces the realization of irnpurity. These four are all true. Therefore they are not-upside-down. But with respect to the four virtues (eterniry, etc.) of the Buddha nature, these four not-upside-downs must a$ain be reinverted. In order to correct the upside. down [qualiry inherent in the "no-upside-downs"J there are established the four virtues of the Tathagata's dlwrmakd.ya. These four virtues are eternity bliis paramitd, sell pdrarnitd, and purity pArdmitd. (798a-b) firamitd, The teachin$s of no eternity, no bliss, no self, and no purity,

though acknowledged as true, are too negative for the authors of tathd,gatasarbho literature to leave alone. As ahvays, tlte latter are concerned to explicitly affirrn the positive nature of Buddhist realization. The four pd,ramitd certainly fulftll this role, but they in turn run the risk of appearing too affirmative, too tan$itrle, too much like qualities that an entitative dharmakdya possesses. This issue highlights the importance of the fact that the discussion of the four pdramitd is contextualized in the BIV? (as well as the Ra,tnagotravibhfuga) in terms of Buddhist practice. We should recall here that Buddha nature is both cause and fruit of realization and hence practice is both the seeking and the expression of realization. The BN? lists four kinds of person with four kinds of wrong view (or barriers to the rcalization of the truth). These four kinds of wrong view may be cured, respectively, by four practices. These corrective practices. or "cures," in turn, are considered "causes" of four "fruits." These four fruits are the four pdratnitd, or perfections, also given as the four Buddha virtues that constitute the Buddha's'dharmaka,ya. The relationship of the f.our pd,ramitd to their respective persons, obstacles and "causes" or cures may. be presented in the form of a table.3 Of course, the elevation of the characteristics of purity, self, bliss, and eternity to the level of the highest truth by the authors of the ta,thagatagarbha literature dvasa radical departure.-at least in terms

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BUDDHANATURE

Person Type 7. Icchantikct

Obstacle Disregard and hate of Mahdydna Adherence to self view Fear oll sarysura

Cure = Cause Faith and pleasure in N{ahdydna Praiftd The samcldhi that overcomes false emptiness Compassion (.kannrd)

Fruit (Pdramitd) Purity, Subha Self, atman, Bliss, Sukhcr

2. Non-Buddhist 3. Sratsaka

4. Pratyekabuddha

Disregard for the welthreof others

Dterniq', nityu

of the language used-from the Buddhist tradition beginning with Sakyamuni and continuing through Sunyctvticlu. The irem of pi.esent concern is the perfection of self or atmaparo,mitd. As there could hardly be a doctrine more central to the Buddhr.r'steaching than andtmqn, absence of self, this neu' revelation of a perfection of seif at the end of the Buddhist parh, characreristic of the Buddha's dhannakdya itself, was, at rhe least, a darin! use of language, \ltrat was intended by it? Here is how the Bi/? explains itseli. All non-Buddhists, their various in ways, eonceive graspa self(uro) and in thosethingsthat lack selflnamelythe five skantlhas,a form, etc.yet e.6i., thesethingssuch as form ditfer from what one grasps the mark of selfl as therefore, they are eternally lackingin self.IHowe'er,lu.ith the wisdonr of Thusness, Buddhasand bodhis^ttoas all realizethe perfecrion not-self of

(antttmapdramita) of all things. Becausethis pert'ecti.n of not-ielf arrd that 'which is seen as the mark of not-self are nor ditTerent,the Tathagatasa.vs that this mark of the eternal not-seli is the true, essential nat're lzhen ti xint) of all things. Thereforeir is said thar the perfection of not-self is self.As the srtro verse says,s The dual emptiness is already pure; [In thisl is realized the not-self, rhe supreme self.

88

DEREIFICATION SELFANDNIIND OF

the Because Buddha the realizes pure nature self. Not-self turns on itself (zhuan)and becomes perceive and graspa self u'ithin the five skandha. All non-Buddhists Overturning that attachment to self as vacuous and cultivatin$ prajfiitpdrantitd,ofle realizes suprerne not-selfthat is identicalto the the perfectionof self (armaparamitd).This is the fruit [of the practice of pra.ifiaparamital knou..(798c) that you shor-rld The essential point here is that the new teachinsol dtmapdremitct teaching, but on the contrary is not in contlict with the old o,ncrlmlr,lr is the fulfillment ol it. The very andtman itself, when taken to its extrerne (i.e., when perf'ected) is the crfmapqr&mit&. This teachin$ is logically parallel to the {unyarsdda teaching that emptiness or 9ilrrya is the characteristic or the own-beinf, (x:abhdva) of all things. In S&nya dialectics this is a way of stating the apparent paradox that the own-being of all things is to lack orvn-being. ln tathAgatagarbha and Buddha nature literature this same apparent paradox is taken as revelatory of the way things are; that is, "Thus." Hence this characteristic of not-self, when seen as revelatory of Thusness, turns on itself, or perhaps better, turns full cftcle (zhua??,to turn around. to revolve) and as churq,cteristic oJ the wqy thin$s are is indicated with the positive term sefi u'hich may be taken as meaning "own-bein$"; that is, the "own-bein$ of Thusness." Though the language is new, the content of this message is not. What we have here is a variation on the theme enunciated previously, "Buddha nature is the Thusness revealed by the dual emptiness of person and things. . . . If one does not speak of Buddha nature, then one does not understand emptiness" (787b). Non-Buddhists are as wrong as ever in seeing a self in the chanf,ing,phenomena of worldly {lux. Yet the Buddhist who stops with characterizing this flux as empty does not really understand emptifress, unless he or she realizes that this emptiness is a characteristic of reality, and as such, possesses a positive nature. The perfection of the realization of elnptiness, or the lack of self in things, is to realize to the fullest extent the qualities of this positive nature. Thus, thou$h anfrtm&n and d,tmapdra,mitd are logical equivalents, what is implied by the author is the inferiority of the former as a term indicative of the vitalizing potential of spiritual realfuation. That is, there is a soteriological difference, but no logical difference, between the two terms. Thus d,tmapdramitd is no more a substantive entity than is 89

BUDDHA NATURE

ctnAtman, and the dhannakdya (or Buddha nature) represented by atmap&r(rmftti is consequently likewise free of substantiality. Perhaps even more significant is the pivotal role played in the table by the third column items, in the case of dtrna,pd,rantitfi,, wisdom. Each of these-faith, wisdorn, samfr.dh| compassion-is an action. In each case this action is identical with, or better, constitutes, the perfection. In the case of dtmnpdrarnitd, the wisdom of realizing the lack of self in all things constitutes the perfection of self. The same principle applies in the case of each of the four perfections. Consider the fourth perfection, eternity. Exactly as we saw in the discussion of the trihdrya,6 the perfection of eternity is demonstrated here to be constituted by the act of compassion. As is prevented from indicated in the table, the pratyekah.tddha for the welfare of others. becoming a Buddha by his or her disregard This obstacle is overcome by the cultivation of compassion. The suffering and delusion of sentient beings is endless, so the compassion required of a Buddha aiso must be endless. It is this limitlessness of a Buddha's compassion that constitutes the Buddha nature's perfection of eternity. It is rwthing bur infinite compassion. There is no eternal "thing," Buddha nature or other. There is simply an unrelenting series of acts. Elsewhere in the text, the author directly defends the use of the term etrlvrparqnxitA by drawing on one of the most orthodox of Mahdy6na themes. Thereare two kinds of causeand condition [due to whichl we saythat Atmapdramifi. First, becauseit is the Tathagata'sdharma.knya possesses distantly separatefrom non-Buddhistone-sidedgpspinS of a [selfl view, because it there is no attachmentto self [implicit in this concept].Second, is distantly separatefrom what the Two Vehicles [*r&.nka andpraryeha,btrddhal one-sidelygasp as not-self, there is no false graspingof not-self. both viewsare eliminated,we speakoI dtma@ranitn. (799b) Because In case there is any doubt as to the meaning of these words, the author soon cornments on this passage (along with his parallel treatment of the other three pdramild), declaring: "This is obtaining entry into the Dharma gate of nondrraliQy'' Q99e).In support, the The quotation specifically BNT quotes the SnmalAleoi.s&tra! addresses the eternity pdra,mitd,, but the author's comment applies equally to the other threepdramit6 as well. "'If you view all events as 90

OF DEREIFIC,ATION SELFAND MIND

noneternal, this is called nihilism. It is not called a correct view. If you view ninsd4a as constantly present, this is called eternalism. It is not a correct view.' This is why the Tathegata's dharrnakdrya is separate from these two views and is named the $reat eternity pdremitd,.. . . This is attainin$ entrance through the Dharma gate of nondualism, which is neither one nor two" (799c). In short, this is Middle Path thinking: One-sided negation of self misses the tr{iddle Path as much as does one-sided affirmation of self. occupies the Middle and corrects both. In this Atmapdramrtd crif.icism of do$ged adherence to a,n&unan there is an echo of the author's disquiet with those who overemphasize emptiness. He does not miss any opportunity to assert that negation cannot be the culmination of the Buddhist Path. In this context, it is useful to recall that early Buddhism also was concerned with an incorrectly one-sided understanding of the and,tman doctrine. The following is a quotation from the Sabbdsavasutta. of Majjhima-nikdya, No. 2. When he [the unwise personl reflectsunwiselyin this way, one of the six falseviewsarisesin him: 1. I havea Self:this view arisesin him as true and real. 2. I haveno Self:this view arisesin him as true and real. 3. By Self I perceiveSelf:this view arisesin him as true apd real. 4. By Self I perceivenonself:this view arisesin him as true and real. 5. By nonselfI perceiveSelf;this view arisesin him as true and real. 6. Or a wronEview arisesin him as follows:This my Self,which speaks the and feels,which experiences fruits of $oodand bad actionsnow here and now there, this Self is permanent, stable, everlastin!,, the unchangin$, remainin$, samefor ever and ever.7 The dtmapd.ra,mitd, of the BNT thus is squarely in the venerable Buddhist tradition of denying thatandtma,?r. means "there is no self' in the simple dualistic sense of a denial of the view "there is a self." Andtman can be equated with neither of the dualistic poles; it is a Middle Path doctrine that, as both the BN? and the Maiihima-nikdya quotations well show, is intended to produce freedom altogether from any kind of view whatsoever on self, whether positive or negative, to which one could become attached. In this context, the dmw,pdramitd language of the BN? should be seen'as a corrective to what was perceived as the excessively negative lan$ua$e of 6ttn'yansd'da and

91

BUDDIIANATURE

should not be seen as taking up a position on the positive side of the dualistic pole.

C. Self
A different, but also striking, use of the term sef already was seen in the discussion of the purity of the dhnrmahayadhaal3 rhere one of the meanings of ttris purity was given as ,,the meaning of sef (uo) is nonatrachmenr, as in bodhi" (810b). The thinking behind this staternent seems to be closely related to that of the d.tmapdramitd., in which "self is identified as "the perfection of not-self," via the power of prajtulpdramitA, meaning the realization of the emptiness of things. The author of the BIV'?seems to want to ,,sunyatize,'or negate the theory of and"tman just as prajfi.d,pdramitd negates any possibiiity of a self theory. In both of these explanations, the term sef is identified rvith intellectual and emotional nongrasping; that is, acts of mental freedom. one implication of this position is that grasping a doctrine oi anrttnzcrn as Truth is not representative of liberationhence the tendency in this text to play rather freely with words like Atnlan, andtman, o,ntttmaparamitd, and dtma,pd,ramita. The most important point to be made about this passagefor our purposes is that sef consists in the act of nonattachment. Though negatively stated, this is an act insofar as it is composed of the propensity fo behave in a nonattached manner. It should be recalled, rnoreorrer,that this "perfection of self" languagie used in the context is of a discussion of practice, and in fact the "perfection of self is $iven as one of the fruits of practice. Hence, the perfection of not-self that is self is the person (as series of acts) transformed by virtue of Buddhist practice culminating in realization.

D. Pure Mind
Our fourth case concerns the notion of ,,pure mind" and its substantiality or lack thereof. we may examine this notion in the context of a discussion of two practices, the cultivations of the Principle of Thusness and of the Plenary Thusness. Here we will see the interrelatedness of the teachings concerning Thusness, Buddhist practice, the true understanding of mind, and the positive vaiue readily ascribed to realiry-. 9'2

DEREI}-ICATION SELFAND MIND OF

The causeof abandoning desireobtainscompretion when conioined with two practices. These rrractices the cultivar.ion the principle two are of of Thrrsness the cultivationof plenaryThusness. the world therc are and In oniyt*'o thingsto be known:people andthings. one who is ableto penetrate these two [kinds ofl emptinesseternally realizesthe true pinnacle of Thusness. Hdnce this is called the principle of Thusness. The ultimate PlenaryThusness proi:res the scurce, attains to the [tmel nature, and penetratesthe source of the dharmadhatrr; thus it is spoken of as the ultimate. The cultivationof the principleof Thusness dcesnot misusepersons and things. \Vhy? Beeause people and thinAs are, irom the beginning, characterizecby the 'tmost wo'drousness(rniao ji) and by tranquilliry. Theyneitherincrease decrease number;thevhavenothinA Jo with nor in tn either beingor nonbeing you ti tou). The mark of tranquilliryindicates (li that the own-natu!'e pure,all delusions is being, from the beginninf,, unborn. seeing duai emptiness people the and things]is what is calledthe mark [of of tranquilliqv. inherently The puremind $,i xing qing.iin|xur) is calledthe NobleTruth of Path.The nonrasping the pure mind in which delusion of neverarises calledthe NobleTruth of Cessation. ie (802a) This passageis begun withr the virtual equation of ernptiness and Thus'ess in the Principle of Thusness. Then, in line rvith the "'fhusness is what is revealed by ernptiness" theme of this text, the author goes on to indicate that a kind of positive knowleclge follows on the heels of the realization of emptiness; namely, in the cultivation of Plenary Thusness. The latter, then, is the fulhiess of the former; the former is the gateway, the latter, the realm into which one enters through that gateway. The Thusness of people and things may be seen from rwo perspectives: (1) From the ultimate standpoint, it is simply rhe utmost *ondrousness; and (2) frorn the mundane standpoint, in which thourghtsof delusion and noncelusion arise, one describes ir as tranquil (i.e., pure), all delusions that nxight sully the purit-v being not real. These qualities are ascribed to persons and things as tl-rey are here and now, not as they rnight be. It is not that these itting, have to be "purified." Rather, if one sees correctly, one v,,ill realize that all things already are not only "tra'quil" (this is a sur-tyansdda-like insi$ht), but also the utrnost in wondrousness, marvelousness. excellence (miao). The latter insight is characteristic of Buddha nature thought and the Br\?. The cruciai point of the passagefor'our presellt concern is fo'nd in the final trvo sentenres: "The inherently pure mind is called the

93

BIIDDHANATURE

Noble Truth of Path. The nongrasping of the pure mind in which delusion never arises is called the Noble Tnrth of Cessation." Here we see one of the rare references in this text to somethin{ ealled mind (xin). However, this "mind" is immediately identified, in the first sentence, with the fourth Noble Truth, Path. As we saw in our discussion of d6rayapa,rd,vqtti,e the Truth of Path is equated with the "cause of abandoning desire"; that is, the cause of.realization (801b). Because the author links this cause of realization with the fourth Noble Truth, we may know that this "mind," as cause, is cause in the same way that bodhicitto, and pray,oga were said to be causes of Buddha nature,lo by representing effort, or the treading of the Path itself. Thus. this "mind," as cause, is the activity involved in realization. From the Buddha's day on, the Path is not a thing to be tread, but a way to-behave, a cornpendium of attitudes, endeavors, and behaviors. Hence the "mind" of this context is not a substance in any sense, but a way of bein$,, the way a person "is" who is on the Path. This reading is confirmed by the second sentence, where the third Noble Truth, Cessation (earlier identified with "abandoninf,, desire"), is identified, not with "mind" this time, but with its equivalent, a certain action or manner of mental functionin$, ne$atively stated as "nonfrasping." Thus, "cessation" is realized by the cessation of a certain behavior, $raspin$, or in other words, the attainment of mental behaviors free of grasping. In short, though the term mind is used, it is to be understood as a manner of beinS and a set of mental behaviors. rather than as a substantial entitv.

E. Dhsrmakirya and "Self'

Fifth, we may consider a passage in which the author discusses nine instances of prapafrccr. or false theorizin$, concerning tbe self (too). These are all negated by the functioning of the dharmakaya. Thus the latter, far frorn being a self, serves rather to deliver us from views of seif and represents the absence of such views. The nine false theories concerning the self are as follows (summarizing 803b--c): 1. The theory that a self pervades all five skondhas. 2. Taking one of the five ska,ndhtis as the self. 3. All nihilistic and eternalistic views. 94

MIND DEREIFICMION SELFAND OF

4. The theory that the self will not be reborn. This is a nihilistic view. 5. The theory that in the realms of desire and form the self exists as fdrm (se). This is an eternalistic view. 6. The theory that in the formless realm the self exists as either perception, mind, or Dharma. This is an eternalistic view. 7. The view that in all three realms (desire, form and the formless),with the exception of the heavensof no thought and neither thought nor nonthought, thought is the self. This is an eternalistic view. 8. The view that nonthought is self; that is, in the heaven of no and trees, and so on are self. This is an thought, the ggasses, eternalistic view. 9. Taking the AkaniSthaheaven (the last dhyana' heaven) as self. The section concludes: "Because [persons] with these variously deluded minds will not ^ttain nircdr.tn, these [viewsl are called prapafwa. When one gains insight into and realizes the d'hamuhdya, arises" (803c). no further prapa:fi.ca, Here we see the dhamwh,aya as freedom from views of self. In each of the nine cases, it is the self view that binds. The dlwrmakayg, then, is in effect the Noble Truth of Cessation with which here meansself view. respeetto any and all f.ormsof pra,pa,fico, Thus here in the BN? with its affirmation of dtma@ramitrt, as in the most orthodox Nikdya or prqifrdpdro,mitn text, it is theories of self and attachment to self that bind us. Buddha nature thouglht,like the rest of Buddhism, aims to release us from this bondage. The d,harmaknya (or Buddha nature), as the Truth of Cessation, represents the active releasing from bondage that constitutes the Buddha Way. Hence not only is Buddha nature not a substantive entity, not a self or an entitative mind, but the cessation of all self views. As such, its character is active and soteriolo$ical. F. Mind Sixth,.we need to look at the BN?'s use of the term mind (xin). This text does not often use this term and where it does, it often could substitute a term such as person without any appreciable change in meaning. For example, in the discussionof the eternity of 95

T]IIDDTIA NATLIRI]

the trikayall the phrase Diamoncl Mind u,as rrsed. Ler us look ar that passageagain. "[The trtkdyal are eternal because the-vare the srveer dew of imrnortality (am1ta); they are still, and are far distant from lvfdra.The sweet dew causes people to be long-li'ed, superliunran, and immortal. The Diamond Mind discards ipnora'ce. the final thought [before niraanal and delusion. :rnd thus obtains the Ruddha fnrit oi eternal jov" (811b). The Diamond lvlind here nientioned is evidentll- no "Nlind" srrch as is construed in an idealistic monism, but on the trasisof the textual evidence appears to represent the person of realization; that is, the person fulfilling the Buddha Path. This "mind"--or person-is sbown solely in the acts of dispelling igrrorance and sufferinS and enjoving the fruits of serenitl- and jo;* that result. Thus we are not presented here with a monistic r{ind of idealist metaphysicsnor with a dualistic mind opposed to a bodl'. \Vhat is portrayed is a,n acting person. Another exarnple aflain requires us to look at a passa$e already seen. "The own-nature, pure mind is called the Noble Truth of l,ath. The nongraspinp of the pure mind in rvhich delusion never arises rs called the Noble Truth of Cessation" (BrJ2a).In this case, though something called a pure mind is rnentioned, it is imme<liately identified with two of the Noble Truths, already indicating that it cannot be taken as a substantial thing. Rather, b). r'irtue of the two Truths that it represents,it is an expressionfor rhe seriesof acts that constitute engaginS in practice of the Buddha Way" and for the "nonact" of non{,rasping. The identification of pure mind with nongrasping is an echo of the equation of true self and nongrasping noted earlier. In both cases, a substantial sounding ternr, mfnd or .sefi is rendered nonsubstantial b-v its identification x,ith beha'iors and actions. The single instance of use of the term minc! that is the mosr difficult to explain as nonsdbstanf ial is found in a passageof the BN? borrowed from the TathagaruEarbhct s.utrct. giving nine similes for the corrdition of the t&thag&tugqrbha in the midst of defilement. The fourth of these similes likens the "mind" covered by defilement to the conditions of pure gold I'allen into filth (807c). This simile. taken from n'hat is considered the earliest text ot' t(rthegqtalarbha thought, reflects the lack of sonhisticarion of that text, the similes it emplirys bein$ somervhatclumsy attempts at conveyin{ a doctrine so difficult that the Sri.'ze,lade,urSfitru. simpil,- labels the problem ,,inconceiv96

ANDMIND OF DEREIFICATION SELF

able" and $oes on: the doctrine, that is, of the relationship between wisdom and ignorance. hr this simile, the "pure mind" does seem to bear substantial qualities, especially in its comparability to pure $old as a thing occupying space and capable of bein$ physically covered. By borrowing this simile, the BN? inherits the problems associated rvith it, including the implication that it affirms a substantive mind. However, imrnediately followin$ the statement of the sirnile, a few remarks are added that make it clear that no substantialiry should tre assumed here. After renderin$ the simile of the pure $old fallen into filth, the text continues, "The person free of desire is also like this; the defilements oh the surface of the mind (shan6i xin fun'nao) pervert the mutas. That is rvhy this simile is related" (807c). In characteristic t'ashion, the author of the BNT relates the simile of the gold co the condition of the practicinS Buddhist, explainin$ the former as a metaphor lbr the latter. It is the teachin$ about the hurnan condition that is bein$ promoted here, whereas the simitre with its apparent metaphysical implications is not to be taken as any rnore than an attelnpt to clarify the former. \\here it rnisleads (and it does mislead to the exterrt that it implies substantiality) it is not to be adhered to. As a carryover from the clumsy rnode of expression of the Tathdgatagarbha Silrra it is incorporated into the BN?. Horvever, the author of the BN? attelnpts to brin$ the simile into line with his effort to clarify the human condition and the path of Buddhahood. Thus, the example of pure gold fallen into filth likened to the "mind" amidst defilements is an apt simile insofar as it sheds light on the human existential condition. However, like all similes, its fit is not perfect, and we should not permit the simile to extend so far as to indicate any substantiality to a human "mind," a notion that runs eounter to the teaching and perspective of the BN?.

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CHAPTER FN'E
Ontology:Monism vs. Nondualism

s Buddha nature-t&thagataparbha thought a variety of monism? f rrhis quesrion has been discussed in the literature by a number of scholars in the recent past, many of whom believe that it is monistic. Obermiller, for example, stares thet the Re,tn&Eovawibhd4a, a tathagatagarbha text closely related to the Budclha Nanrre Treatise, is an "exposition of the most developed monistic and pantheistic teachings of the later Buddhists."l Nagao stares, "the tathagatagarhha seems to me to occupy a supreme position-a position akin to that of Brahman or Atman, or other Absolute Being,' in Brahmanical philosophy."2 In his introduction to the RatnagotrarsibhA4a, Takasaki asserts that "for explaining the possibiiity of anyone's acquiring . . . Buddhahood, . . . morristic philosophy was used as the bu"kgro,r-rrd."t Ogawaa and Yamaguchi,s on the other hand, view tathagitagarbha thought as an extension of the li'e of thought leadinl forrn the concept of conditioned origination (pratttyasamutpdda) to 6urrya, thought. Thus, they do not see it as monism. Finally, Rueg! stresses that tathdgatagctrbh.e thoughr is not monism because it is based upon nonduality, rather than nronism.6 First, it is necessary to specify the rneaning of the term monism as it rvill be used here. Generally speaking, there seem to be two meanings to the term, a stronger and a weaker.T According to the

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stronger meaning, all of reality can be reduced to one basic substance, in the sense of somethin$ rvith independent existerrce or a nature of its own. This form of monism includes both rnaterialism and ideaiism. The weaker sense of monism holds only that all of reality can be explained in terms of a sin$le principle or that one can rnake staternents about reality as a whoie. There otrviousiy is a gteat deal of diff'erence between these two meanin$s, artd in fact very many varieties of philosophical and religious thou$ht would have to be considered monistic accordin$ to the second definition. Even lv{adhyamika (6unya) thought itself would have to be considered monistic in rerms of the weaker definition. inasmuch as it speaks of all of realitf in terrns of the single principle, Silnyatd. Interesting,ly, when Obermiller describes tctthdg&ng&rbha thought as monistic, he in fact is linkin$ it with N{ddhyarnikathou6frt, which he explicitiy labels monistia.s Thus he is discussin$ both t&thqg(ltag&rbha and stutya thou$ht in terms of the weaker sense of monisrn. As noted earlier, howet'er, Ogawa and Yama$uchi avoid characterizi ng tothdgqtagarbhu thou$ht as monistic precisely by elucidar-ing tethagat&Ecrrbha thought in terms of Tsrati$tasamwtpad'a9arry*athought. Now if oue wanted to deny that tqthdgcttagarbha thou$ht is rnonisrn in the sense that Obermiller meant it (i.e., the weaker sense), one could not do so by means of comparin$ it or linkhr$ it with Stnya thought. Nor could one do so in terms of.prati$tasamutpdda, because this too is an attempt at explainin$ all of reality by means of a single principle. I take it, then. that the weaker sense of monism is not at issue here, and that the stron$er sense is what we are concerned with. This is the form of the issue to which Ogarva, Yarnaf,uchi, Ruegl,, and Nagao were addressin$ themselves' The question. then, is this. Does Buddha natureqothd$angarbhn thought establish arr ,\bsolute c.omparable to the role played in Brahmanical Hinduism by Atrnan-Brahman? Is the Buddha nature, in short, ciose kirr to the Atman-Brahman oi Hinduism? Do the two perforrn similar functions in the two systerns'i Is this variety of Buddhism, then, a forrn of crypto-Hindu thou$ht, reflectin$ more the influence of Hinduism on Buddhism than the internai dynamic of Buddhism's working out of its own sogrces? Without explicitly comparin$ the two sets of teachin$s, I shall argue against the view that the Buddha nature thouglht of the Buc! {ha 100

ONTOLOGY: MONISI{VS.NONDUALISM

Il{sture Treatise can be conceived as a rrarier}- of monism akin to Brahmanical absolutism. I will structure my argument around a consideration of five themes found in the Bi/?, the language of which seems to indicate that the Buddha nature is a substantive entity or absolute. Following the analysis of these themes, I will return to Gadjin Nagao's contrary view thet the tathagangarbha is a form of "Absolute Being" and dissuss his views in the light of my own understanding of the Bi{?. Some of the apparently monistic concepts and themes present in the BN? are the following: 1. The very cornmon statement, essential to all tathdgatagarbhctBuddha nature thou$ht, that sentient bein$s "possess" or "are" the tathdgcttagurbha-Buddha nature. 2. The concept of the tsuddha virtues or pdrq,mitA, !is., purity, self, bliss, and eternify, attributed to the dharrnakd,ya. 3. The concept of the pure nature and its lack of essential relationship with the dgantukakle1e,, or adventitious defilements; the latter are said tobe 6unya. in the sense of "unreal," whereas the former is said to be aSilrryq in the sense of "real." 4. Statements (related to the preceding) that tqthdgcltagarbha, Buddha nature, dhamtakdya, or dharmqdhdtu "really exists" (shi you) or "aboriginally exists" (ben you). 5. Statements that the tqthAgqnEarbha or Buddha nature is beyond cause and conditions and is'eternal, quiescent, unborn, rrnchan$in$, and so on. These indicate the locus of the issue; all five themes are to be found in the Blf?. Although initially they do seem to indicate that the Buddha nature (or its equivalent, t&thAgatagqrbha, dharmakAya, dharmndhAtu, etc.) is a substantive absolute, I will argue against this interpretation. How then are these passages correctly to be interpreted? I will sr'gest three kinds of readings appropriate to these passages:(1) Some will appear to be fundamentally soteriological in intent, and thus have nothin$ to do with either nlonism or nonmonism; in other words, some passa$esmay earry no ontological import at all, but may be of an entirely different order. (2) Other passa$es that do have ontological import may be understood as nondualistic,e rather than monistic. (3) Finally, some passagesmay be seen as diseussin$, actions, rather than substances, and thus,

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again, are not of ontological import other than negatively. \'arious combinations of these three themes will be .'rund in the five types of passageto be discussed. It will be useful to remember from the beginning a passagefrom the BN?, quoted earlier: "Buddha nature is the Thusness revealed by the dual emptiness of person and things." This passageindicates not only the difference between 9fr,nya and Buddha nature thought, but also is central to an understanding of the latter as nondualistic rather than monistic. The equivalence of the Buddha nature, tathdgangarbha, dharmndhatu, and so on with Thusness is key because Thusness is not a monistic concept. The word for Thusness 'like, as much as,' in Chinese, r1t, means "like, as." "Ju lntl, comparing qualities and actions rather than things, is related to jan [ranf ,'thus'(like this, as much as this). As a noun, one may takeju 'being as (not "whdt") it is."'1o Although it does have an [n^r] as ontological quality to it, Thusness refers to hoto somethinE, is, rather than what it is; it speaks of an adjectival quality of things rather than a nominative thingness as such. All it means is that things are "as they are." In a sense it is a pure tautolo$r, a simple "ttlus" attributed to all things. As The Av:akening oJ Faith in the Mahayanc says,ll the word Thusness is not a term that has the qualities or attributes of being "this" or "that"; it is a word by rvtrich words are undone, a word that points at our language and indicates that it will not do. Yet the term Thusrrcss does not have the negative connotations oI Sfinrya, a 'lundo" lantua$e. Hence to term that functions in a similar way to equate the Buddha nature with Thusness is to indicate that there is wants to say it is "real," it somethin$ positive about it-one "eiists"-but the use of the term Thusrwss serves to remind us that the direction in which our minds begin to move upon hearin$ the terms real and erists will not be a totally appropriate one. The main points of the Thusness concept as used in the BN? may be summarized as follows. l- Thusness is that which is revealed by emptiness. It is the true nature of reality that one is capable of seein$ once all previously existing ideas and habits of perception have beert cleared from one's mind by the discipiine of emptiness. 2. It is the conjunction of persons correctly perceivin$ the world as it is, and the world presentin$ itself to persons as it is. It is

r02

ONTOLOGY: MONISM NONDUALISM VS.

therefore nondualistic-it is prior to a division of experience into the categories of subject and object or mind and world. 3. Thusness allows positive language to be used in discourse about the nature of reality. In both a linguistic and an ontological sense it is affirrnative of phenomenal reality. Whereas 9ttrrya dialects emphasize what is not the case, positive Thusness langua$e emphasizes what is the case. Ontologically, what truly is, is affirmed in Thusness. 4. Thusness is not dualistic, because a comrnonsensical belief in separate, individual entities is negated by the emptiness throu$h which one passes on the way to Thusness. Nor is it monistic, because reality does not reduce in Thusness to any single principle; Thusness is not a thing, nor even a principle that can be conceived as an all-embracing One, as it functions solely as a pointer to the true apprehension of what it. Thusness is nondualistic, because it neEatesboth dualism and monisrn. 5. The term Thusness, as used in the Bi/?, has a soteriological function and as such epitomizes the optimism of Buddha nature thought. It represents the goal of the religious life as eminently deirabie and real, without setting the practitioner up to be attached too soon to any specific notions of what that goal is like. Let us now turn to the apparently monistic themes just enumerated and see what can be made of them.

A. AII Sentient Beings Possessthe Buddha Nature

First we need to discover what is .intended by the repeated contention that sentient bein$s "possess" or "are" the Buddha nature. As was seen earlier, this does not indicate that persons possess "somethin$" and that by virtue of that "sornething," they are able to complete the Buddha Way. In the chapter on Buddha nature, we saw that the author directly refutes the supposirion that the Buddha nature is an dfinan, making it clear that it is not something to which one can straightforwardly attribute existence, not something that simply "is." On the positive side, it is characterizedby such things as bodhicitt*ya5nga,, the true nature (pariniqpanna- wo,bltfrsa), and

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tclthdg&tagctrbha. Bodhicitict-prayoEo is Buddhist practice or progress on the Buddha Way. The true nature is identified with the Thusness of all things, incorporating both the way realiry presents itself to persons and the way persons experience reality. The term tsthdgat&E&rbha was subjected to a complex analysis through which two particularly salient ponts became apparent: (1) The statement that sentient beings are the tqthdgcttclsorbhct is Lrasedon Thusness. (2) The storehouse (the garbha or tathd.gatagarbha) is constituted soiely by that which it contains; namely, the true realm of Thusness, true practice or wisdom, and realization of Buddhahood. In sum, the Buddha nature, as an amalgam of these three constituents, is shown to be (1) identifiable u'ith Thusness, thus ontologically nonsubstantial, and (2) the active practice and realization of Buddhahood. Buddha nature, therefclre, essentially is constituted by action and hence is a kind of "doing" rather than a substantial thing; as Thusness, it is the inseparable conjuncticn of reality presenting itself to persons "Thus" and persons experiencinp reality "Thus." There is no place for a substantial absolute here. ' Remember also rhat the statement, "all beings possess (are) the Buddha natvrela,tha,gatagarbln" is interchangeable with the statement, "all beings are capable of realizing Buddhahood." As the BNf says, "ln accordance with principle, all sentient beings universally and aboriginally possess the pure Buddha nature. That there should be orre who etern4lly failed to obtain parinirrcd,r.ra is not the case" (788c). Buddha n&a)re rneans "potential Buddha"-not as a type of being, but as practice (i.e., realization) that is an action or series of actions. It is in accordance with the principle of the WayThusness-that this be so. Thusness is all embraeing, it exciudes no one. All are capable of performing this act, seeing things Thus, seeing reality present itself Thus.

B. The Pdrqmitd
The second theme concerns the Buddha virtues or pQramitd,.r2 Theseare presentedin the BID as the end-product of a soteriological process,and this is the key to their proper interpretation. They are the "inversions" of the four views to which they correspond and.are constituted by the four practices used to correct the errors. Thus, for example, purity pdramitfr is not a quality that the dlwnrnlenya 104

MONISM NONDUALISN,l VS. ONTOLOGY:

possesses per se. Rather, it is the inversion of dispara$ementof the lvlahayana and is constituted by faith in the Mahayana. Thus its meaning is entirely soteriological; it is defined entirely in terms of practice. As for the atmaparamita, the same principle holds. It is simply the result of the cultivation of prajfidpd,ramitct and the inversion of attachment to an(ftm{Ln The Bt{? portrays this in terms of three stagesof practice. The erroneous stage is that in which one sees a self in phenonrenal existence. This is overcome in the second stage, in which one realizes that there is no self to be found in phenomenal existence. The third sta$e is the perfection, or the lo$icai extreme one might say, of the second: Now one sees that this characteristic of not-self is the true, essential nature of all phenomena (this is still in thought) and as such may justifiably be called sef accord with 6rln3,'o (798c). This third stagediscussion of a "self," then, really is no more than an extension to the logical extreme of the perspective of the second stage.As such, it is seen as the culmination olprajfinpd,?'clmita practice. Moreover, although the term sef may seem to echo the perspective of the first,.erroneous stage, the content of the third stage is in fact the opposite (or the inversion) of that of the first. Another point to note concernin$ the use of the term se$ as a paramita, (as well as the tise of the terms purity, trliss, and etentity) shock value. Recall how the is its usefulness-soteriologically-for Heqrt S&trct, for example, earlier negated such things as the Four Noble Truths, wisdorn, nirttd,Tta, and so on. In the case of both Srlnya andtathdgatagarbha-Buddha natlrre thought, language is being used to "sunyatize." Boih the Heart Sfi,tra and the BN? take the terms that are used in the Buddhist community of the time (for the authors of the prajfidp&rs,mitq literature this was the Four Noble Truths, etc.; nature theorists, it rvas whereas for the tqthngangerbho-Buddha precisely the terms used in the prajfid. literature themselves), A purpose in both cases, perhaps, was to shock the tsuddhist community. For the tathagatugarbha-Buddha nature theorists, the idea was to shake anyone who had a too-secure or too-simplistic understandingof {ilnyatd4 that is, anyone who "grasped" 9inyata as the "Truth." Yet perhaps they believed that anyone who really understood Sunya thought would not be.shocked or dismayed by this rnove, insofar,as the tqthfigatuearbhs-Buddha nature theorists were simply further applying the identical principle of 6onyatd.

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On a purely linguistic level it is undeniable that there is a rather "being,ful" quality to the four paramito ascribed to dharmethdrya. However, one would be no more justified in believin$ that the four pdramita refer to the substantive characteristics of an entitative thing than one would be justified in attributin$ an "unbein$ful" nature to the meanin$ of,9firrya terms. Both suspicions are equally mistaken on a purely philosophical level; thou$h, if tathagatagarbhqBuddha nature theorists are ri$ht, there is somethin$ to these attributions on the emotional level. These differin$ emotional connotations are the effect of the kinds of lan$ua$e used by the two systems. As we have seen, the author of the BN? re$ards the positive form of language as a more effective updya. Furthermore, it is et'ident that, in addition to representin$ the end-product of a soteriolo$ical process and being a peculiar use of language. the paramitd are ontolo$rcally nondual. Let us takci the self pdramitd a$ain as an illustration. Note that the not-self is equated with the self: "this mark of the eternal not-self is the true, essential nature of all things. Therefore it is said that the perfection of not-self is self' (798c). This paradoxical lan$ua$e reveals the u'orkin$s of nondualistic thinking as follows. The perfection of self is found in overcoming the dualism of self and not-self. The self pdramitd. is the true and essential nature of all thin$s (sounds like a self) at the same time that it is the utmost ne$ation of self, ana'tma'pdramita, the perfection of not-self. This is a good example of the perspective of Thusness, the Thusness revealed by emptiness. Self is utterly ne!,ated, it is completely empgv, and yet this is how thints "are"-one ends on this positive note. This is the truth of thin$s, the essence of thin$s; yes, they are "Thus." Thusness, thou$h, always proceeds by way of emptiness. Cne must first negate the commonsensical realist perspective, emptying this perspective of its view of thin$s as discrete entitites, but then realize that not only is form emptiness (as 6dnya,sdd,a might be accused of emphasizin$), but that emptiness also is form and not apart from it. One returns very solidly to form, remembering its emptiness, but reco$nizin$ it as the totalit)' or fullness of what is. Just as the duality of self and not-self is transcended with ttre nondualistic term perfection aJ sg{f, so the duality of form and emptiness is transcended with the nondualistic term Thtrcness. Buddha nature thought as taught in the BMI is $rounded in the 106

VS. NONDUALISM MONISM ONTOLOGY:

perspective and language of Thusness: a nondualistic ontolo$y expressed in positive-sounding language. After all, one can almost imagine the Buddha nature theorists mtrsin$, once nondualism is realized, it might as well be expressed in positive-soundin$ lan$ua$e as in negative-sorrnding lan$ua$e, inasmuch as the former is a superior encouragement to practice, $ivin$ the (correct) impression that there is something u.'orth strivin$ for at the end of the path. Rueg,'s masterful study was important in pointin$ out the siSnificance of the distinction between monism and nondualism for participants in the debate concernin$ whether or nottcrthfrSa.taea,rbha.Buddha nature thought is a form of monism akin to Brahmanism.13 In monism (in the .strong sense), all phenornena in their manifold pluraligv are reduced to the transcendent One. In nondualism, phenomena are not thus reduced: Their plurality remains real. Such is the case in the Buddha nature thought of the Bl{?. There is no One to which phenomena could be reduced. Form is emptiness and emptiness is form; there is nothing else apart from the plurality of phenomena. They are empry, but they Are "Thus." The perspective of Thusness is the very opposite of monism insofar as the immediate givenness of the plenitude of phenomena is the locus of Thusness.

C. Sanya-Afunya
Our third problern area concerns the pair of terms 9fi.nya (empty, and in this context, "unreal") and a9urryta (nonempty, and here, "real"). The latter term is associated in the BN? and other nature texts with the tathd,gataEarbhs, tathdgctt&g{rbha-Buddha and the dharmakEtn, which are said to be the Buddha nature, innately "pure." In addition, to explain the condition of ordinary persons who are ignorant, confused, anci greedy, the concept of the dfantukakle1a, or foreign. adventitious defilements, is used. Although the tathdgataparbha (Buddha nature, dhannakdryo) and the agantukakleSa have existed agelessly in conjunction, they have no essential relationship with each other. Persons'delusions and hatred are said to have no basis in reality, but to be the unreal products of i$norance. Thus, a person is "really" the pure tclthdgataearbhrt or Budriha nature, but falsely ("unreally") thinks of himself or herself otherwise because of the activities of tlie unreal kle6o. Some examples of this kind of thing in the BN? follow. In the very

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beginning of the Blrr we are told, "Attachments are not real, therefore they are called vacuous. If one gives rise to these attachments, true wisdom rvill not arise. \\rhen one does away with these attachments, then we speak of Buddha nature" (7g7b). Attachments are not real (bu shi); Buddha nature is. .\iain, ,,If the dharmakdya lvere nonexistent (tou), then all correct practices should be in 'ain. Taking right views as the foremost practice, and including in addition sueh good things as morality, concentration and rvisdom, the correct practices that one cultivates are not empty (bu kong), or fruitless. Because these correct practices do yield firrit, *" know that the dha,makdya is nor nonexistent" (804a). Dlwrmakaya, the practices that lead one to it. and the fruits of those practices are neither nothing (tou) nor empty (kong). AEiain,,,training in the Way is not a vain error (bu kong fuo),, (S05c). Finally, quoting the Srtmd,Iddmt Sutrcl, the BN? asserts, ,,World Honored One, the tathdgatagarbha is not empry (bu kong) because of the wisdom that it does not abandon and from which it is inseparable, as well as the inconceivable and incalculable Buddha virtues. IThereforel we know that the tathdgatagarbha, because of the Tathagata's virtues, is not empty" (811c-812a). Here it is stated as plainly as one could wish that the tathdgatagarbha is not empty due to the reality of the Buddha virtues or paramitd (purity, self, bliss, and eternity). As seen in the discussion of the first issue, the rerm tathdgatagarbh' or Buddha narure does not ret'er to anlthing substantial, but rather indicates each person's potential to achieve Buddhahood (this being a matrer of activity) and identifies each person as Thusness (hence, as ontologically nonsubstantial and nondual). lvloreover, although the text says that the tathdgatagarbha, the dhctrmqkarya, and the Buddha virtues or pdramitd (purity, self, bliss, and eternity) are a(Enya, this does not mean that they exist in any substantial sense. Rather, the attribution of the a1unya qualifier can be seen as part of the inversion process exemplified by the four pctrctmitd. Thus, iust as purir.v is the inversion of the impurit,v perceived in phenomena, so the a'tinya nature of this purity is the inversion of the 9frnya nature of the impurity. In fact, it would have been inconsistent for the tathagatagarbha-Buddha nature theorists not to ascribe a9unyata to the dhqrtmakEta and paro,mira; As we saw in the case of the self pd,ramit&, not-self is the property that "really,' (in an a{unya manner) describes phenomena, and it is because of the 108

ONTOLOGY: MONISM NONDUALISM VS.

reqlity of this property that one may speak of the self pdramitd. ln this sense, the Sttnya-a9ilnya concept presents nothing philosophically new that w-asnot already present in the notion of the paramita. Whereas the paramitd express the contents of the culmination of practice, the a*unya notion is a linguistic tool used to further emphasize the reality of the fruits of that practice. Another way to understand the term a*ilnya is to realize that the logic of the Bt{? follows rhe patrern of Silnya thought, but adds a characteristic twist of its own. According to *tirrya thought, Silnya is empty of any own-mark; that is, {finya is empty of the mark of 1ilnya, and therefore it is not graspable as such.la Mddhyamikans use 6dnya to destroy all views; they "sunyatize" Sunyata to deconstruct the latter, to be clear that 9finyata is not Truth nor a valid view. Tathd,gatagarbha-Buddha nature theorists, in contrast, say that because Silnya is empry of the mark of *ilnya, it must be said of 9funya that its emptiness is real. This strikes one as exceedin$y Strangelogic at first. Yet the move made by these theorists parallels in form, though not in content, that of the. Madhyamika: In both, *ilnya is "sunyatized." For tatha$&t&gctrbhc-Buddha nature thought, thou$h, when one "sunyatizes" Silnya, one inevitably ends up with a*d,nya. The logic is strai$htforward: to "sunyatize" drinya is to introduce a9ttnya. In other words, it is by virtue of the very unreality of all things that one must say that their unreality is real. The two are two sides of one coin. It is by virtue of the dynamics of emptiness that we must speak of the nonempt.v; the former necessitatesthe latter. In my view, there is no distinguishing this kind of dvnamic from the Mddhyamika dynamic that equates ninldqrt and sanlsara. There too it is not a matter of substantialist monism, because emptiness is and must be form, every bit as much as the reverse is true. It is not a matter of one reducing to the other, but of each indicating the necessity of the other. The dynamics of ta,thd,gatagarbha-Buddha nature thought are virtually the same as in 6unya thought, though the particular forms these take appear at first to be diametrically opposed. As for the relationship between the "pure," not-empty Buddha nature or d,harmakaya and the empty (unreal), adventitious defilements, it may not be out of place here to comment briefly on the philosophical status of this relationship. The relationship between the pure Buddha narure or tathagatagarbha and the impure 109

BUDDH,A NATLIRE

defilements is undeniably a philosophically weak point in this theory.rs The BN?, for its part, has little to say about this relationship. other tathdgatagarbhq, texts that address the relationship directly exolain it by not explaining it; that is. by saying that the relationship is inconceivable. Ler us, however, speculate as to another possible avenue of interpretation not found in the texts themselves. We may approach the issue experimentally by considering this doctrine as an attempr [o express what is experienced in practice. If this doctrine is looked upon as a statement of an existential, rather than a purely notional, truth, it might appear to be more philosophically respectable. A possible interpretation is as follows. Defilements and ignorance are infinite; if one tries to "cure"' them on their own level, as it were, attempting onq by one to eliminate the various manifestations of this pervasive set of dispositions (a selfish act here, a hostile act there), one will never succeed in bringin$ the matter to an end. Rather, one must pluck out this set of dispositions by its roots, ,,overturnin," (as in aSrayapard,oftti) the whole person who so behaves. Thus, the gulf represented in tathdgutagarbhs theory between the ,,pure', nature and the adventitious defilements may represent the hiatus found in a person's own practice of self-transformation between deluded acts, on the one hand, and nondeluded acts. on the other: two sets of experienced reality in a single person that are so opposiie in nature that one may be unable to conceive of any real relationship, any point of contact between the two. The virtue of this kind of interpretation is that it fits many scholars' belief that Yogl,cara thought, in general, is based upon Yo{dcara meditative practice. Moreover, the implications for our present issue of monism also are significant. As I have stressed repeatedly, Buddha natrrre is not'an entify of any kind. Nor, for that matter, are klesa. Buddha nature is Thusness and certain kinds of actions. Kleset are otber kinds of actions. Insofar as neither is an entity, there is no possibilit"vof the two relating as things relate; there is no question of one entiqr displacing, coexisting, or being a manifestation of another entity. Thus there is no question of a need to find a philosophically sound way to corrceptualize the relationship between a monistic Buddha nature entity and akle1q, entity, the type of question, that is, that causes ehdless trouble for Indian philosophers in their attempts to relate the real Brahman-Atman with 110

ONTOLOGY: MONISM VS. NONDTIALISM

the world ol so,rysdra. If the relationship between Buddha nature and kle.5o is purely a matter of the relationship in practice between two sorts of behaviors, the \bgicdra experience would seem to be that the two sets of behavior do not relate; there is an unbridgeable hiatus between the two. The practitioner leaps over the gulf experientially upon realization of Buddha nature without ever "relating" deluded behavior to the enlightened. It must be admitted that the texts themselves do not put the matter this way and this interpretation is pure speculation. It is, however, consistent with the position of the BN?.

D. Buddha Nature Exists Aboriginally in Our fourthpoint is related the third.Therearepassages our to
text that describe the tathdgatugarbha, Buddha nature, or dharmakdya as really existent (shi you) or aboriginally existent (ben you). Again, do these indicate that the Buddha nature is something substantial that "exists"? The answer to this question is similar to that indicated in the a9ilnya issue. Partially, it is a matter of interpretation: To say that the tathd,$ataearbha or Buddha nature "exisrs" is to say that there is truth to the claim that all can attain Buddhahood. Partially it is a matter of the Thusness perspective and of preferred lantuaSe use: If the tathdgataearbh.e or Buddha nature, as Thusness, transcends the two poles of being and nonbeing (i.e., if it is nondual), one may as well say that it is real, it exists, as say that it does not exist, especially when cognizant of the encoura$in$ nature of the former statement for the practitioner. This position is well illustrated in the BiVT. In the section refuting Hlnayanist views, the author first refutes both the view that the Buddha nature exists lvou,l-because that might lead some to immediately identify themselves with the Buddha, without going through the effort of practicing the Buddha Way and actually becoming a Buddha-and the view that the Buddha nature does not exist (tnu)-because this rnight lead others to expect that no matter how much they practiced, they never could become a Buddha. He concludes with the following: "ln accordance with principle (Dao li), all sentient beings universally and. aboriginally possess the pure Buddha nature. Th.at there should be one who eternally failed to obtain pariniroarya is not the case. This is why Buddha nature most 111

BUDDHA NATURE

assuredly aboriginally exists (ben you); the reason being, that is, that it has nothing to do with either being or nonbeing" (78lc). The decision to say that the Buddha nature exists aboriginalry appears to be a pragmatic one; this is the statement that will mosr encourage practice. yet it is also quite clear that this does not mean that the Buddha natu!:e "exists" in the normal sense; abori$inal existence has nothing to do with either being or nonbeing. Why? Becauseit has to do with persons' actions or practice of the Buddha \\hy, rvhich is not essentially something ontological, arrd because it has to do with chan$e or transformation, rvith what appears ,,Thus,,, which is never thinglike but always in flux. fn" o"tfogy of Rrr* essentially is related to the soteriology of practice. Hence to say that the Buddha nature (abori{inally) ,'exists" is the lr*ry oppo.it" of $ivin$ it a substantial or thinE;like character. Rather it is to practice, to indicate the primacy of practice, "rr"o,r."g" and simultaneously to deny of reality that it accuratelv can be described with the terms and concepts of being and nonbeing. As u,ith persons, so with things. The 'dual_emptiness" of persons and things reveals what might be called the "dual Thusness" of persons ancl things. This very revJation of the Thusness (of both) is the Buddha natuie that '(aboriginally exists.,, Realitl' and perso.s are not ultimately separable in this kind of thought; both are part of the vision of Thusness that is always expresseclin positive terms. The languageof existence is preferred, in a conrext that emphasizes the inapplicability of dualistic existencenonexistence concepts.

E. Unborn and Unchanging

. The final fo.-expression apparently indicating that ?f-tathagatagarbha or Buddha nature in'olves a substantialist monistic theory is fournd in those passagesstating that the tott agomgorOno, dharmakaStc\ ninsaqa, or Buddhu .rut,rr" is beyond caule and conditions, is unborn, quiescent, eternal, or unchan$in$. For example, the Bi/? declares, ,,The TathaSata,s dhar*"AZyi . . . eternallv and tranquilly abides. unbcrn (tou sheng), it is called ,stiil,; undestroyed (wu mie), it is called ,quiei', (g02c). Also, "The dharmakctya is unchangeable, like gold,, (g10a). And finally, nir--a4a "eternally abides (chcid zhz),, (80!c). Do not these passagesindicate that we ha'e here a rnonistic substance, capable of t12

ONIOLOG\': MONISM VS. NONDLTALISI\,{

transcending the larv of conditioned originatio n (pratrtyctsamutp&d&)? This seems to be a negation not only of 6unya thought, but of early Buddhist thought as well. However, rather than being a negation of such trasic Buddhist thought, this sort of language is the logical extension ot it. The prajfidpdrqmitct literuture, for example, says that all dharmas, or thin$s, are "unborn." In prajfid thou$ht, all thin$s are unborn because there is no own-nature (sr:abhavo) to be born or to die. It is by virtue of the dynamics ol 1ilrrya (based on the principle of prqtityclsamutpdda) that this quaiifier "unborn" is logically necessitated. The theory oI pratlgtasamutpada indicates that ail rhings come into existence (are "born") due to causes and conditions, and yet, by virtue of that very principle, everlthing is said to be empty of own-nature (insofar as they are dependent), hence unreal (not truly existent as independent entities), hence incapable of birth and death or for that matter of not being born and not dying. Thus, the meaning of.unbor"n is "unrelated to the dualism of birth and no-birth"; it is necessitated by every step of pr&tityasamutpddct-{inyc thought. The exact same process is at work in tathuE&tclg(rrbho-Buddha nature thought, for the authors of this literature intend no dit'ference in the purely conceptual content of the terms unborn and eternal. Both mean "outside the realm of cause and condition"; tloth are based on and necessitated by prutity&s&mutpdda-$tnya thought. If one were to call the tathAgatuparbha-Buddha nature theorists' "eternal" attribute beingf'ul, one would also have to call the prajfiaparamitd,'s "unborn" attribute nihilistic. Both labels would be inappropriate, as both the "eternal" and the "unborn" attributes are intended to manifest nonduality. The difference between them is that .the prujfid.paramitct does so in apparently "ne$ative" lan$ua$e, whereas tqthagqrc.g&rbhcl-Buddha nature thought employs apparently "positive" lan,ua,e. In sum, our five problem areas are resolved as foliows. Ontoiogically, they indicate nondualism rather than monism. They are rnarked by a world-view in which reality is conceived in terms of actions rather than substances, and by frequent use of ,,positive" sounding language, the meaning of which does not differ essentially from the more "negative" sounding lan$uage of the Sunyu tradition. Often they are soteriological, rather than strictly philosophical, in intent.

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BUDDHA NATURE

One recent challenge to the preceding understanding that t&thdgangerbha-Buddha nature thought, as represented by the BN?, is not monistic should be noted. The eminent scholar Gadjin Na$ao, in his study, "What Remains,"ro hbels the tathdgqt&g&rbha as a monistic pure bein$. I{e proceeds by comparing several texts on the subject of emptiness and nonemptiness. Of these texts, one is from the Nikiya, three are from the Yo{dc6ra school (and are written by Vasubandhu and Asanga), and rhe fifth is the R&tnagotratsibhaga, a text closely related to the BN?. Nagao concludes that the latrer's concept is different from that of the other texts. It is valuable ro study his remarks, because the references he makes to the Rauwgotratsibhaga are all to themes shared by the BN?. In the former four texts, says Na$ao, "what remains" in emptiness are hindrances to realization (such as the body or discrimination), whereas "what remains" in the Ratnagotra are the "pure" Buddha qualities (virtues). In the Ratnagotra, he says, it is a matter of "arithmetic subtraction"; once you have "destroyed" the kle6a,, all that remains is "pure being."rz Thus, he sees the tqthdgatugarbha as a monistic pure being, which remains when the defilements have been "subtracted." Furthermore, he states that this position of the Ratnagotra is "fatal," because it would seem ro lay the foundation for the notion that kleSa and bodhi are identical.r8 The implication is that this notion threatens the conrinuation of practice of the Buddha

way.
Let us examine this matter more closely. Nagao speaks of "destroying" the hindrances, but in the Ratnagotra and the BN? the hindrances are unreal, they do not exist-how could they be destroyed? (The BN? itself makes this point directly.) Moreover, he speaks of the Buddha virtues as "transparent" pure bein$. Thus, he interprets the a9ilnya notion as meaning that the Buddha virtues are utterly distinct and separate from 6ilnya,. Yet we have seen that the term a9tinya is used in the BN? to represent the inversion that is the fulfillment of Sfirrya. In fact, this is the logic of the BN? throughout: Buddha nature also is revealed by way of SOnya. SAnya is the basis of everlthing in the BNf nothing is apart from it-the a*unya end of the path is the fulfillment of it. Nor can the notion ot' ,,arithmetic subtraction" stand scrutiny. One cannot subtract "nothing,' (i.e., tne nonexistent defilements) from "neither nothing nor something,' (i.e., Thusness). The logic of the BN? is based on the nondualiw of TT4

ONTOLOGY: MONISM NONDLIALISM VS.

Thusness and clearly is not a matter of eliminating an undesirable element and ending with a positive "somethin{,." Finally, Nagao's fear that the tathdgqtu{,arbha theory will lead to the identification of kleSct and bodhi (d,elusion and wisdom) and thereby eliminate the theoretical justification of pracrice is forestalled in the BN?. Of course, Nagao is right, in a sense, insofar as he has put his finger on the weakest point of tathAg&to,go;rbha-Buddha nature thought: the relationship between the "pure" tethnganEqrbhfr and the defilements that cover it (or in other words, the relationship between wisdom and delusion). However the author of the BN?, for one, is at pains to demonstrate why the Buddha nature doctrine not only is no threat to practice, but actively justifies and encourages it. This is one of the central themes of the texr. For example, the author argues that one cannot say either that the Buddha nature exists or that it does not exist precisely because of the necessity of encouraging practice and emphasizing its desirability. The larter also stands out as the formative motive behind the writrrrg of the BN?. The Buddha nature itself, especrally as d,9rayapardrsytti, is directly identified with Buddhist practice. Thus Nagao's fear, although justifiable, is not borne out in the context of the BN?, the core theme of which is the inestimable value of Buddhist practice and the very identificatron of Buddha nature with practice. I conclude that the Buddha narure thought of the BN? should not be understood as monistic.

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CTAPTERSIX
Engaging Spiritual Cultivation in

r I have emphasized throughout this book, the BN? articulates A ,( r the Buddha nature concept as a metaphor for Buddhist practice. This approach allows the author to affirm the Buddha ,rut,r." without positing the existence of a reified self akin to the Atman ot' Brahmanism. Moreover, the identification of Buddha nature and Buddhist practice, coupled with the glorification of the former, powerfully validates and encourages the undertaking of Buddhist practice. What, then, of this practice itself? How, in practical terms, does one engage in practice so as to rearize the Buddha nature that one already is? or, because cause and fruit are identified in the Buddha nature, perhaps we should ask, what actions are paradig_ matic of the self-expression of Buddha nature? Does the BNT Aive us any guidance on this subject? There is a good deal of marerial in rhe BII? on engaging in Buddhist practice, ranging from quite down-to-earth, L.r.riun" advice on the kind of friends one should seek, through a discussion of various bodhisatasct practices, up to quite abstract material on the most advanced of the bodhisattrsa bhamt. All of this material seems to fall well within the norms of well-established Mahdyana practices; indeed, some of it draws from early Buddhist traditions. Though the BN? offers this material in a disorganized fashion, scattered hele and

717

NATURE BUDDTIA

there throu$hout the rext, I propose to be$in with the advice given to the beginner and then focus on the material that seems to be the focal point of the author, the material that seems direcced to the audience of Mahayana practitioners to whom he addressed himself. I intend to select the most practically oriented rnaterial of this sometimes quite abstract discussion. To begin, the foundations of successful Buddhist practice are quite straightforward and commonsensical. There are rwo insi$hts:insi$ht into the sufferin$and faults of saqsara; and insight into the bliss and merits of ninl,dna. By a person'sfactor of attain completion'-This puriry, by his or her pure nature' these insip,hts (2) a lf""to, of purity" is [composedofl (1) a constituentof merit; of (3) a constituent penetration Thusnessl. [of of constiruent liberation; (1) Merit: Good roots from former livescan influencethis life. when all one roots are com-pleCe, can bear the Dharmavessel-l(2) Liberation:Havin$ been a virtuous disciple alreadyin the past, one can influencefuture lives and attain the fruit of liberation. (3) Penetration: one can penetrate by Thusness meansof the NoblePath. These[three] are called thefactor oJ purity. With the factor of purity as the condition and the pure [Buddhal nature as the cause,peoplecomplete theseinsi$hts.It is not done without causeand condition' (800a) Here the role of conditions as valid components of the Buddhist Path is stressed. Thou$h the unconditioned Buddha nature itself is sin$led ,'cause" of attaining insi$ht, it is clear that, in the author's out as the mind, this cause alone, exalted thou$h it may be, will not come to fruition without the active presence of the basic Buddhist necessitiesmerit, virtue, and the treading of the Noble Path-as conditioning influences. The mundane foundations of Buddhist practice are funher elucidated in the followin$ discussion of the "Lovr cakru,s" or four wheels, four commonsensical conditions for successin the practic'e of Buddhism.2 The four cakrasare (1) to dwell in a country that is in accordwith the of self-discipline Dharma;(2) to rely upon Dharmafriend(s); (3) to possess one'sown mind; (4) to haveplantedgoodroots in past lives' ' ' ' (1) To dwell in a $oodplace is [to livel in a placewhere a $oodpersbn lives, cultivating correct practice. If one lives there, constantlyseeinsthis mind' (800a) person,one will attail ^t enli$htened

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ENGACING SPIRITUAL IN CULTIVATION

(2) The second cakra is to be near a Dharma friend (kalyd1tamitra). A kalyd.namitra has seven characteristics, summarized as follows. She or he iq (1) giving, (2) honorable, (3) trustworthy, (4) able to speak effectively, (5) able to endure, (6) able to speak of the profound Principle, and (7) able to give peace to good friends and to establish them in good conditions. These seven characteristics are embraced by three more general qualities, all of which a kalydqamifra must possess: (1) sympathy, (2) intelligence, and (3) patience. Sakyamuni is the paradigm of the kalyd4amitra

(800b).
(3) [The third cakra isl to possessself-discipline of one's own mind. The correct teaching and practice is at the time of hearin$, no scattered mind; at the time of thinking, no disparaging mind; at the time of cultivating spiritual practice, no inverted mind. If one doesn't discipline one's own mind, a !,ood [dwellingf place and a kalyd4amita are of no use. (a) [The fourth cakra,l to have planted good roots [i.e., meritl in the past, is the constituent of liberation. Cultivate good roots. Good roots are faith, 6iro, hearing, giving, and wisdom. Faith is fught Mindfulness (samyaksmrti) of the Three Jewels. Stla means not to stray from the good Path. Hearing [encompasses] one's own hearin!, causin$ olhers to hear, not causing others to hear what is contrary [to the Truth], and not being an obstacle to others'hearing. Becauseof these four kinds of hearing, today the world is able to hear [the Dharma], reflect upon [the Dharma], and cultivate spiritual practice. [HearingJ can be a sufficient Dharma vessel for [these] three modes of attaining wisdom. [Next,l giving is of two kinds. Becauseone has in the past given material things to others, today one's desire is vanquished. Because one has in the past given of the Dharma to people, Therefore by this cause and today one's ignorance is destroyed. condition, one attains the fruit of liberation. [Finally,] regarding wisdom, because in former lives this person has already chosen, reflected upon, and understood the Three Jewels and the Four [Noblel Truths, in this iife she or he attains [the ten knowledges, froml worldly knowledge through erhaustive knowledge and no-birth knowledge.3 (800b)

The text goeson to say that without merit from past lives, the other three cakras are ol'no use. Moreover, if any of these four.cakras is lacking, liberation will not be attained (800c). The first two cqkras indicate the importance of having both a teacher and apracticin$ community, howeversmall, around one. One needs exposure to the Dharma from such people, instruction by example as much as by word. Although Sakyamuni is the 119

BI-IDDTIA NATURE

paradigmatic kalydr.tamitro, others may fill that role to a lesser extent. The list of characteristics of a katydryamitra gives the practitioner practical guidance in determining what is a spiritually wholesome and what an unwholesome influence, whom she or he should seek or shun. The third cakra is self-discipline of one's own mind. The first element in this cakra, "no scattered mind" at the time of hearin$, refers to a disciplined mind, a mind that has been disciplined by calm or concentration such that the practitioner is capable of listening to teaching on the Dharma with undivided attention. This, then, is advice to cultivate concentration; this is the foundation of meditation practice in early Buddhism, but here this concentration is the foundation of listening practice. The second element in the thira ::akrct is "no disparaging mind" at the time of thinking. This stops short of somerhing we will discuss later; namely, cultivation of "faithful joy" in the Mahdydna. Here the author limits his advice to an admonition that the practitioner not take liShtly or carelessly dismiss the teachings received, when he or she pauses to reflect upon them, but rather, open-mindedly and seriously consider their value. Finally in this cakra, we have "at the time of cultivating spiritual practice, no inverted mind." This means simply that when one en8a8es in spiritual practice, sincerity is essential. One's intentions, motives, values, and so on should be in harmony with one's actions. The fourth and last cakrct advises us to cultivate good roors, which are defined as faith, 6TIa, hearing, giving, and wisdom. Faith here is simply the maintenance of mindfulness of the Three Jewels. ,SZh is mentioned only in passing, apparently indicating that it is assumed and virtually $oes without saying. Hearing, in contrast, is very much stressed. This is reminiscent of Mahayana sfitra emphasis upon the importance of spreading the new (Mah6yana) word; this Mahdydna 9dstra author appears to feel the same urgency. The inclusion of giving, both material and spiritual, in this list returns us to a traditional foundation of practice. By portraying giving as a practice with both material and spiritual elements and with both practical and spiritual consequences, the author succeeds in representin$ it as a practice for everyone, in all circumstances, with any aspiration. Finally, wisdom, as disgussed here, would seem to be not so much itself a "good root," but rather the fruition in this life of L20

DNGAGING SPIRITUAL IN CULTIVATION

flfiltrtt,

the good roots of faith and practice sown in former lives. However, because the wisdom discussed is Hinayanic wisdom, the author implies that Hinaydnic wisdom ir gooa root for the cultivation of Mah6y6nic wisdom. " such are the foundations of successfur spiritual practice. I would judge that none of what we huu" so far is targeted by the author as a point that he especialry "ou"r"d wants to emphasize. This has arl been more in the way of fackgrouna il"t n" assumes already is possessedby people coming! to him for the instruction found in the BN?. It is a kind of .ummary of faith, moral discipline, mental concentration,. merit, and "r."rrti"l supporting conditions. Note that very little has been said about meaitution-ii" tndeed, o.airra.y irJ""^,"" thought in the form of reflection Buddha,s teachings has been endorsed. This indicates "po" thai the BN?,s author accepts the traditional idea that the cultivatio., or ruitt -in the sense of adegree of confidence and trust in the Buddha, his teaching, and the community he founded_and morality_in the sense of ,-"f-"orrt.of, generosity to others, and virtue of all kinds_must p*""au ,n" cultivation of meditationar practicer ;;. se. Discursive reflection upon the Dharma is one of several essential ingredients,"-*" stages of practice, helping to determin" *t "rA, effort,anddisciplinen"""u"uryto the """ ;,li'""J*a". "trr"", treading

of the\oble

We now turn to more advancedpractices that typify the form of spiritual cultivation advocated by ttre rr,rr rn" fotowing practice, the foundations of which *"." "i.,troa*"d ,r, Ct upter Four, is a four-part practice composedof the crrltiuution of faithful joy in the Mahdyena, prajfia, meditative and mahdkaruqd. Because practiceis tied to one "orr"*r.ri,on, this of tt *o.t emphasized themesof it standsout as especiallysignificant. " The basic idea is as il,!o;_lr,
There are four [classes]_of people_th e icehantika, the non_Buddhist.the srdvaka' and the nratvekabudiha-;;;-;;"re of four kinds of obstacle, do not see rhe Buajha. *,;;;.-wh;".""irr" four obstacles? (1) The icchantika's obstacle is disregard *i rr"""a .r the Mahayana. To correcr

:*'ilff#::ha

tauehttheb;dhis;;;;;;

orcurtivating raithrur in joy

(2) The non-Buddhist'sobstacle is giving

rise to a serf view with regard to a,

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the bodhisattua practice of dfutrnras. To correct this, the Butldha taught cultivating PraiiidPdrarnittl' grasp onto the thought of (3) The obstacle of the iraooka is to fixedly developl a mind that duhkhau'ith re!,ard to samsdra, such that [sraosakas oi Isarosdral' To correct this' the Buddha i. Ji.g,r*"a wiih and fearful the samfrrlhi that destroys taught the bodhisatttsa practice of cultivating on the first [bodhisattool stage and above can ii"f!"t "*p,iness. Those view' and destrol' such views as the false emptiness attain this samddhi is neither identical emptinessl When one enters tbis insi$ht, [one seesthat from bein$ and nonbein{'' To illustrate: with bein!, or nonbein{,, "J""putu'" $,orldly [Truths] at the ei$hth ir is like the insight iito bottL absolure and stage. . . . activities trenefiting ( ) The pratyekabucldLm's obstacle is disre$arding that rejects sentrent bein$s To correct ."n,i"rr, beinjs and creating a mind this,theBuddhataughtthecultivationoftheborlhistlttva,smdha'kan'uuJ. mahikant\a is to benefit others' This The aciivit-v of the bodhisattcsa's only ha-s an individual insight into cause shorvs that the prutyek(tbuddha hence no mahdkatllna' The and condition. He has no mind to save others, Srdpaka is also like this' joy and the rest as four To overcome these tour obstacles'we take faithful kindsofcause.Byhavin$allbodhisattc)(lscultivatethesecauses,theyattain These are called the causes ,i," p.r." paramiia of thJ supreme d'harmakaya' the nameBuddhn's child oith" grrddh^ nature's puriqv such personsattain (.797 c-798a) quaternity of faithful joy in The endorsement by this text of the and m&hAkanlno' the Mahdydn a, prqinct, meditative concentration' latter text' however' only The is taken from the Ratna$,otravibhaga' on them' The BN? the four practices without commenting names of these ideas' Thus devotes considerable space to the development boththeRatna$otramaterialandthecreativityoftheBN?'sauthor that we will discuss here shaped the formulation of the four practices by the Bi{?' as the practices especially emphasized Cultilsationheretranslatesxiu-xi,whichconnotesconsistent intended to nurture one's and repeated enp,a$ement in practices practice we see,reflected spirltual potential. The concepiof Buddhist approach in which one multifaceted in this scheme requires a to spiritual $rowth' This nurtures several human capacities conducive practice reflects the traditional program of Buddhist four-part nurturant practice inclusive of Buddhist idea of bhqtsqna, spiritually

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a multitude of forms.a Meditation alone is not all there is to Buddhist practice; rather. meditation is one of several kinds of practice that address the various aspects of human being, all of which are helped by guidance and nurturance. In the present case, faithful joy addresses crur emotional and volitional faculties; praififr and meditative concentration as discussed herein address primarily the nature of our consciousness, inclusive of our noetic and perceptual faculties; and mahd,karu,nd. addresses our instrumental and active faculties. Though 6ila, moral discipline, is notably absent from this list of quali."ies to be cultivated, we have seen that the basic moral disciplines already are assumed as prior practices readyin$ one for the practices specifically encouraged in this text. This reflects the traditional concept of moral discipline as the foundation of practice. Of course, an element of morality also is implicit in mnhd,kant4fi, though rhis is not morality in the sense of restraint or discipline. Ma,hd,kannla, is spontaneous engagement in the world for the sake of the salvation of others. In sum, then, in our author's rnind, the tour cqkrag inclusive of the traditional disciplines of self-restraint, giving, and so on, are the first steps in practice. Then, at the sta$e on which he focuses, come faithful joy as a kind of foundation for Mahdydna practice, specific prajfiit and meditation exercises, and finally, compassion. Let us look further at the particulars. The four practices that have been highlighted are the "causes" of rhree virtues, as follows: "The cultivation of faithful joy in the It{ahdydna is the cause of the purity of the d.ha,rmakdyo; this should be known. The crrltivation of prajfid and meditative concentiation (chan ding) bring about the virtue of a Buddha's wisdom; this should be known. The cultivation of the bodhisattva's mahdkaru,nd is the cause of the virtue of lovin,kindness; this should be known" (801a). Furthermore, is The cultivation of faithful joy in the Mahayana like a vesselin which it there is limitlessmeditationand wisdom(dinE hui). Because is completely a filledwith the GreatJewel[the Dharmal,it resembles vessel. The cultivationsof pruj'iia and mediativeconcentrationare incompresincethey are the foundationof lthe dharmakdya'sl mefits,praifla hensible; jewel. is is like a purejewel and meditativeconcentration like a wish-fulfillin$ The cultivation of the bodhisaitt;a'smah.dhanna is like pure water beeause sin$e t4stenourishesall sentientbein$sin the world. (801a) a

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Let us consider the key terms in these practices.Faithfuljoy is a compound Chinese term xin le, composed of "faith" * ,lo-v, bliss," and meaning faith and pleasure in the Dharma or the happiness inherent in Buddhist taith. The rerm is used by the pure Land and Yog6caraschools, each in its own way, but here its meaning is best understood from its use as a corrective practice for the icchantika. Icchantikqs hold an "upside-dorvn" viel: thev find jo1' and pleasure in samsarct and in the five skandhq.-whose nature is truly duhkha, the opposite of pleasurable-and for this reason turn their bacx on Buddhism. The icchantika who seeks joy in sctmsarctis destined to be disappointed and should drop the "upside-dou'n" view motivating such an attempt. The Bi{?'s author argues, though, that to see sarysaru as duhkha is onl_vhalf a correction. In the N{ahd1'ana one can find a joy that is based upon something real, namely. the Buddha nature, which is both freedom irom duhkha and the positive realization of the tbur great virtues including "bliss pnrnmita." The icch&ntike's search for joy' per se is not misguided; it is misguided only insofar as it is doomed to failure because the icchantfka rs seeking joy in salnsdra, rvhere none is to be found. Thus faith in the tr{ahdydna is jo-"'-fulor pleasurable because it gives a reliable and constant joy, rather than a doomed and constantly eroding pseudo-joy. This faith is not a creedal faith nor a faith in some transcendent Good. Faith in N{ahdydnais existential release from the sorrow of seeing one's fleeting joys forever slipping through one's fingers. This is rvhat the text means in speaking of talthful joy as "purity": letting go of the false, of the delusory and sorrow-prciducin$ dream, coupled u'ith the freedom and joy attendant to realizing the real. \\rhat is false cannot produce joy; u'hat is real, can. Hence, NIahar'Ena faith is jor'. Faithful joy is compared to "a vessel in which there is limitless rneditation and rvisdom (ding hui)" because "ir is completely filled r v i t h t h e G r e a t . l e w e l I t h e D h a r m a l . " F a i t h f u lj o v i s t h e ' e s s e l , t h e Dharma vessel;it is that rvhich makes possiblethe carrying fornard ot the Dharma. Without t'aith, one rvould not engagein meditation and consequentll'not attain rvisdom. The Dharma is embodied in all of these-faith, meditation, and wisdom-and u'ithout any one of them, the Dharma would not exist. The cultivations of prujfiaparctmitA and meditative concenrration are grouped together as the.iervellikecausesof Buddha'srvisdom. t24

ENGAGING SPIRITLIAL IN CI,ILTN'ATIO){

The cultir.'ation of pra-iiiaparamita is a tu'o-tiered practice that refers, first, to practice to engender in the non-Buddhist recognition that there is no self in samsara and, second, to the deepenin$of this insight into realization of the self pctramita nature of this universal nonexistence nf self. The third item in the set of tbur is named less definitell' than the other three. It usuallv is named as the samddhi that destroys false emptiness, but sometimes. more $enerally, as meditative concentration. The latter is chan din!,.literali1' dhyana,-samddhi. Both dhyana and ssmadhi are used in a variety of rvays bv different groups and at different times. Dhyana mav be used in a specific sense as transic absorption (in several u'ell-defined levels), or it may refer to meditation in general, mental cultivation, or the examination of the mind and mental objects, especiallyin a condition of mental stillness. Samadhi tends to refer to the cultivation of mental concentration. the stillinp of the activities of the mind, the development of one-pointedness of mind. The compound chqn dinA means the combination of these trvo. The samddhi that destroys false emptiness is a specific cultivation recommended for a specific purpose: as a cure for those rvho are attached to a one-sided, nihilistic vierv of emptiness. This sqmddhi is related by our author to the attainment of passage through the "emptiness liberation gate." The usual understanding of the latter is that it is simplv insight into the emptiness of all things on the basis of conditioned origination. Our author, however, understands it as a gate representin$ freedom from a neAative vierv of emptiness. Thereare arrogant peopleu'ho $raspemptiness a vielr'.This is the as
real emptiness true liberation gate. This emptiness liberation pate, arisin$ from graspin{ cmptiness, is [atqachment to the vieu' that] all things are nonbcin$; all is emptiness. This attachment to emptiness is contrary rr_r reali4'. Because it is contrary to realit)-, both cause and effect, that is, the tu'o Truths of Path and Principle, are lost Iin itl. Having become atrached ro this emptiness, one t'alls into false nothingness. This kind of attachment arises by means of emptiness and in this rval' produces a false vieu.. [Generalll'speaking,] all false vie$'s can be extin$uished by means of emptiness. But this'ieu'arises on the basis of emptiness and therefore cannot be correcfed. Ilecausi of such a per-son. the Buddha said, ,,Ka61..apa. if a pcrson $ives rise to zi self r.ie$'. though that vie*. is as large as NIt. Sumeru, I prornise to sanction him. \\hv? Bccause lthat viel'l czrn be destroved. But

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NATLIRE

this cmptiness view of the arro$anr person is like onc-quarter 0i tlte tip of n hair. I quickly rebuke it and certainly do not promise sanction."'r (797b)

The apparent fact that there were people who understood emptiness in a one-sided, ne$ative manner has been discussed rvith concern several times in this text. Consider the placement of this "santadhi to destroy false enrptiness" in the company of this quartet of practices. Faith is universally accepted as the starting point for a Buddhist practitioner. It is axiomatic that one must have a certain amount of confidence and trust in the Buddha's word and in the Path before one will be willing to take the first step on that Path. Prajfidpd,ramit{1, of course, is the foundation of Mahdydna thou$ht and practice. and compassion is equally universally accepted. In this company of unquestionable pillars of the Mahdydna Path is entered this particular samdd,hi. Obviously a matter of focal concern finds expression here. The sq'md'dhi that destroys false emptiness is the fulfillment of the thematic statement cited earlier: "Buddha nature is by the Thusness revea.led the dual ernptiness of person and thin$s. . . . If one does not speak of Buddha nature, then one does not understand emptinegs" (787b). W'ithout realization of Buddha nature' emptiness has not been understood. The cure for those stuck halfway is the somddhi that destroys false emptiness. This sarnddhi is called an insight Qluan). It is an insi$ht constituted by a nondualistic, hence nonne!,ative apperception of the true nature of emptiness as "neither identical with being or nonbein$' nor separate from bein$ and nonbeing." Despite its importance, this samddhi is not loftily out of reach. Those on the first bocllrisett\)& stage and above, that is, anyone who has engendered bodhicitta, the Thou$ht of Enlightenment, can attain it. Insofar as this insi$ht "is like the insi$ht into both absolute and worldly [Truths] at the ei$hth fbodhisatn:a] sta$e," its consequences, quite evidently, are found in the practitioner's freedom frorn a dualistic view of sarnsd,ra and ninsd,vn, such that he or she courses without obstruction in both. As the BNT typically puts it: "These people all travel the Path of the equality of.sarpsdra and nirtsdlta (pin7 denP zhi Dao\. They drvell in the condition of not-dwelling. Although they course in samsd'ra. they are not sullied. 'pure' [in a Although they course in niroalta,. they are also not they do not reject dualistic senseJ. But t'recauseof m'q'hdkaru4a, because of. prajfta, they do not reject nimsd4a" (797c). sctrp,san'a; 126

CULTTVATION IN ENGAGING SPIRITUAL

gate (thanks Thus when one passesthrou$h the emptiness liberation mahakant4a lies to the samaclhi that destroys false emptiness), directly ahead. to Mahdkantryo is "great compassion'" It is linked, aPProPriatelY, (en\ and is likened to Pure the Buddha's virtue of lovin$ kindness postpone further water, dtre to its ability to nourish all. I will until the rest of the textual material on discrrssion of this term mnhakctntna is introduced later' The set of four practices is further elucidated as follows:

cause' There are four aspectsto the meanin$of child of the Buddha: condition,basis,andccrmpletion.(1)Therearetwocauses[ofrealiz joy. of these as ,,childof the Buddha"l:Buddhanatureand faithful srarus joy Faithful faithfuljoy iSconditiohed. is unconditioned; nature two.Buddha it because of completion as that which attainsBuddhanatureis the cause the true cause nature [i.e., Buddha naturel' manifestsand completes it givesrise to all Faithfuijo,vas prnyo{a is the productivecausebecause (798a) practices. between Note here the sensitive and useful distinction drawn Buddha nature, and sq,ryskrte, condiasarr.tskrta, unconditioned tension two tioned faithful joy. This distinction holds in fruitful that could seem mutually aspects of Buddha nature theory nature contradictory.6 On the one hand, the identification of Buddha oL realization (of Buddha as unconditioned and as the ultimate source with the nature) is funtlamental to this text. Moreover, it is consistent cause already idea that Bucldha nature is both cause and effect and as text is perfect and complete. On the other hand, the author of this very much wants to validate Buddhist practice in the ordinary' of mundane sense,and this is nicely accomplished with the validation that conditioned faithful joy-the acknowledgement, in other words, en$a$in$ in specific acts chosen the practitioner is intentionally by because they promise to lead one to the desired $oal, acts tested to that end. This tension between tradition and found to be effective for the inherent perfection of the Buddha nature and the necessity paradox in Chan' resulting .practice becomes, of course, a major pole of the Lccasionally in a breakdown of the tension such that one As we have seen' in the paradox, the necessity of practiea is rejeated' blff guaanu nature is identified with Buddhist practice; thus neither of the inherent perfection of Buddha nature nor the necessity

t27

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practice can be foresworn without the loss of the central theme of the text. The author deftly handles this tension here by the simple device of naming both conditioned practice and unconditign"a grraah" nature as the dual causes of rearization. Note that faithful joy is the "productive cause" precisely because it produces practice. (2) The condition[of realizing one'sstatusas ,,childof the Buddha,,] is prajfifrparamird. Because is the conditionof all uncdnditio.,J-eritr, it it producesthe individual bodhiscrttvcts. (3) The basis[of rearizin!one'sstatusas ,,child of the Buddha,,] the is so'mddhi rhat destroys of [the grasping a farselemptiness. attachments The of a personwho takespleasure u"rng in because $tou) aresevered there is [in beingj no condirion for 'having'utis"s,-purity, The bodhisatnsa etc. who cufrivatesthe samddhi that destroys [the lrasping of a false] removethat grasping[to emprinessJ the powei by of tnis "_piir,"* ""n ih"t rs why the bodhisatnsa,s "amaiht. dharmakaya is firm, rather than *"uL. (ZSgri Here the $raspin$ of, or attachment to, emptiness is set up as a parallel ro the grasping of being. The act oi grasping itseri is the "destroys problem, and this is overcome by the samadii that false emptiness' This freedom from all forms of attachment makes the bodhisattvct's dharmaka3ta strong, and thus this samddhrr can serve as the foundation or basis of one's status as child of Buddha. "(4) The completion [of realizing one's status as ,,child of the _ Buddha"l is the bodhis'ttrsa's mahaklrurpa, because it profits others in endless engagements. Because Thusness is limitless and sq,ttvq,s are innumerable, the profiting activities [of mahdkant4.dl arso are limitless" (798a). This statement on mahdkant4fr follows the pattern we by now expect, so let us pass immediately on to a subseqrr"rr, purrug" i' which agreat deal more is said of mcthdkctnt4a, including some very interesting things. "The meaning of mahdkanr4a has thlee aspects: its essence, its greatness and the distinctions Ibetween ii and karu4d,l. 1. Its essence is prajfid. prajftd has two aspects: nondiscriminating, supreme wisdom and discriminating, *o.taty wisdom. We take discriminating wisdom as the essence of mahdkararya, because mahdkant4fr. is the condition of the upliftirij of sentient beings" (796c). To link prqjfid and kant4.a, o, *irdo_ and compassion, is the standard Mahdydna message. This passage, however, goes beyond this familiar slogan to examine the functional L28

ENGAGING SPIRITUAL IN CULTIVATION

implications of this linkage. Usually prajftd is considered to function in a nondiscriminating, nondualistic manner; indeed, it has been so labeled many times in this text. Here, however, prajfid, is attributed two aspects: "nondiscriminatin$, supreme wisdom and discriminating, worldly wisdom." This in itself is remarkable; we are told here in unmistakable terms thatprajfid, is inclusive of, though not limited to, discriminating, worldly wisdom.T Moreover, discriminating wisdom is re$arded as the "essence of mq,hq,karuno, because mahdkant4fr. is the condition of the uplifting of sentient beings." Thus when prujfid is labeled the essence of nzq,hokcnu,4.a, it is really discriminating, worldly prajfifr which the author has in mind. Of course, this is enlightened discrimination, but discrimination nonetheless. This makes intuitive sense. The bodhisoffea must grapple with the existential condition of sentient beings, which prominently includes discrimination, to be of any help to the latter. Moreover, the bodhisatasa's disinclination to turn his back on sarp,sa,rq,discussed earlier, naturally entails that he also not turn his back on worldly wisdom; that is, the wisdom that functions in the context of sarysd.ra. 2. There are five aspects to the meaning of the $reatness [of mahdkaruadl. . . . (1) [It is greatbecause practiceincorporatesl its givingsuppliesfor body and spirit (sarybhdra):the two practicesof sarybhara [i.e., material and spiritual giving] can produce great (2) happiness, virtue,wisdomand meditation. [It is great]because its mark is the abiliry to haveinsightinto the three f.orms duhkha\ ol and to save all sentierit beings [from sarysd,ral.(3) [It is great] because its placeof practice:it takesthe three worldsof sentient of (4) beings its place.e [It is great]because its impartiality: gives as of it rise to an impartial mind regardingthe condition of all sentient (5) beings. [It is greatl because its supremacy: of nothingsurpasses (796c) this spiritualcultivation. The first aspect of the greatness of mahdkctru4d makes clear that both spiritual and material giving are part of compassion. These two forms of giving are not even ranked, but referred to by a single, inclusive term. The "impartial'mind" mentioned in the fourth aspect refers to a mind that regards all persons as inherently equal, specifically in the sense that no person is more or less deservin$ than any other'of the bodhisattuo's compassion, of relief from suffering, of material help and of spiritual instruction. 3. Thereare eight distinctionslbetween (1) ktntnA andm^thdkant4dl.

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Distinction in inherent nature: the boundlessness of karund has nonanger as its nature; mahdkaruryd has nondelusion as its nature. (2) Distinction in mark: kantnrt has the suffering irrherent in duhklw as its mark; mahikant1rd has the three duhkhas as its mark. (3) Distinction in place of activity: kanlnfr. has the desire realm as its field; mah.dkantryd penetrates all three realms. (4) Distinction in sta{le: karund takes the fourth dhyd,rut as its stage;lo 'Iathagata mahAkantnA takes the no-outflow fruit as its stage. (5) Distinction in the sphere [in which it is expressedl: kant4n lis manifested byl ordinary persons and [those in] the Ttvo Vehicles [Srdvaka and pratyekabu.ddfuil; mahdkaru4d [is manifested] only by bodhisattvos and Buddhas. (6) Distinction in virtue: karund, takes freedom t'rom desire and from the desire realm as its vlrtue; mahnkanna takes freedom from desire and from all three realms as its virtue. (7) Distinction in [efficacy of] salvation: fum.ufi only has the heart-mind to relieve sufferin!,, it does not take action to relieve suffering; mahakaru4A has both the hean-rnind [to relieve sufferingl and the activities fto that end]. (8) Distinction in being ultimate and nonultimate: hatana can reiieve sufferin$ for a short while, but it cannot truly save; mahdkanuftd can eternally save becauseit never abandons [the sufferingl. (796c-797a) The primary objective of this list of distinctions obviously is to shorv

how and why mahdkarund is superior to karu4d^ Many of these points are self-evident, but a few require some comment. According to the first distinction, though kq,runfr, is "boundless," its inferiority as compared to m.qh.o,kq,ra4dis related to their difference in essential nature: ka,ntpo's nature is essentially nonanger, whereas that of mahdkaran.td is essentially nondelusion. The idea, evidently, is that anger may be eliminated u'hile some delusion remains, but if delusion 'Ihe is uprooted, anger has no foundation and cannot arise. idea of korund as freedom from anger is consistent with the fourth distinction, in which konqa is associated with the founh d,hydrw, which is characterized by freedom from emotion or, in other words, equanimity, and by mindfulness. The sixth distinction adds that knruna also involves freedom from desire. Thus it would seem that freedom from desire and freedom from anger go hand in hand and that the two are expressed positively in equanimity. The seventh and eight distinctions seem at first to be mutually inconsistent, but I believe the point is as follows. The seventh distinction shows that mahdkannlt $oes not separate the compassionate heart-mind from compassionate acts. In the case of kararyfr, 130

C]I'LTNATION IN ENCACING SPIRITUAL

in however, various conditions can interfere rl'ith the expression sincerely felt' There are plenq' of cases action of a compassionthat is b-v in which u p"rron ieelskantrw but does nothin$' This is explained of mahah'oruno be$an: the the point with which this discussion the ol mrthdkqru,4fr is prajfid' What could interfere with "rr"rr"" feelin$? contradictor,v expression in action of a cornpassionate perhaps the feetings, such as one of many fornrs of self-interest' or of such inability to determine a useful course of action are sources praiiiu *'ould blockage, and these are the kinds of thin$s that eliminate.Theei$hthpointtssimilar:alithecompassionintheworld worldly is no guarant"" Li effective actio'; prajfiii-d\scriminatin$' to know the ri$ht action to tahe under wisdom, that is-is necessary alon$ the Path the circumstances ar hand in order to help others toward ultimate liberation. with [iut please ncrte, though karunfr is throu$hout compared m;ohf,kanryd'tothedeirinrentoftheformer,norvhereisitsaidthat never occur kantndas such should be dismissed' Such an idea would rnay be inferior but to the au'.hor of the BN'?. To the contrary,kctrunct persons' it is still "boundless." It may be the practice of orciinary is still Srdr>akq. and praryekabuddhs, but its expression in action sarybhdra.ltmaybearelativelyearlysta$e,butitisstillpartofthe Buddhistpath;itconstitutes..$oodroots''plantednowthatwilibear trruit in one's own spiritual practice in the future' Let us leave the quaterniry of faithful jo"v, prajiia' meditative of passa$es concentration. and mahfrkaru4fr and turn to a final set the BN?'s instructions on practice. that also are characteristic of discussion of These passages are introduced in the context of a is a synonym in this text a$raryaparaiqtti, which the reader will recall practice. The for the Buddha nature understood as Buddhist by two categories; d$ra,yaparaeTtti, we are told here, is constituted to the Truth n"*"Iy, the abandonment of desire, which is equivalent is equivalent of Cessation, and the cause of abandonin!, ciesire,which is to rhe Truth of Path. This shows very clearly that d"6ro,yapard'vftti purposes' we will both cause and fruit of realization. For present aspect of dgrayapardvqtti' concentrate on the causal ,,The cause of abandonin$ desire embraces the Path of seein$ purpose Truth and the Path of spiritual cultivi'tion; these are for the (801c). This refers to a traditional of attaining the dharntakirya" 131

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scheme of stages of practice on the Buddhist path. Accordina to this scheme, there are three stages of practice. The first is the"path of seeing. This stage is initiared with the arising of the Thought of Enlightenment and corresponds to the firstbodhisattoq, bhanai. rhe second stage is the Path of spiritual cultivation, which consists of cutting, off delusion and developing further insight into the Truth; it corresponds to the second through the tenth of the bodhiscttftsq, bhnmi. The third stage is that of one who has realized the ultimate and has nothing further to rearn; it is manifesred in the Tathagata fruit. Here the BN? tells us that the "cause of abandoning desire,, embraces the entire Buddhist path, short of the final ,,"g", "u, which there is nothing further to learn. The passageconrinues by speaking of the goal of practice and that which obscures it: We speak of the nondiscriminating wisdom of this realm _ dharmakAyal as resembling the sun, in th.ee ways. Becauseof [of its no-outflow purity, it resembles disc of the sun. Because compretely the it illuminatesall realms,it resembles the sun's brilriance.Beca,.rse can lt oppose and cure all that crouds Truth, it resembres sun'srays. the the comment:"all that cloudsthe Truth" refersto thoughtin its entirety, and the adversities kle6q, karma, and retribution. ,,ThouEyht of in lts entirety" takes&le6a-seed cause,desirefor the objectsof the as f]ve senses as condition,and incorrectthoughtas simultaneous cause. Together these three are called, thoughtin its entirety. Theycloud and concealdeatity [such that onel doesnot seeit and doesnot know it. upon the arisingof ih" orr" realm of the dfuinrutkaya rhar is free from desire,you wilr seI urrJ k.,o* this. (B0tc-802a) lrltimately, then, the "cure" for delusion is the dharmakdya itself, just as we saw above that the ultimate "cause" of realizing one's status as Buddha's child is the unconditioned Buddha nature. Bur iust as we saw in that context that conditioned faithful joy also had an essential role to play, so here certain practices are recommended. How doesone see and know the Tathdgata's dharmakd3n that is free from desire?[one seesand knowsitl in the Realityof thinkini in *rri"i orr" seesneither thoughtsnor objects.objects are calledparikatfin-soaottar,n. Thou$htsare calledparatantraf-s;abhan:al.Because one seesneither the ,parikolpita- nor the ,Wratantra_s{abhdrsa, it is called prini,qparuw "" [wabhaoa,l: seeiry!and knowingthe one realm [of an^r Moreover, thoughtsare persons[as subjectsf;objects "nail. areihimws. Not to see persons and dharmag thoughts and objects, is called the noo

r32

ENGAGING SPIRITUAL IN CULTIVATION

seesand krrowsall dharmas like this because The emptinesses. Tathagata sameness he has penetrated bhiltatathataand [realizedlthe universal the of and all things].The nonincrease nondecrease subjectand object is [of obstacles This insi$hrcan overcome calledinsi|,ht into universal serneness. and of Realiry ltls (zhenshi).As inclusive the Pathof seein{, the As to seeing Path of spiritual cultivation,it is the generalcauseof the Tathegata's (802a) attainment. In other \\'ords, in this tbrmulation, insight into the emptiness of both subject and object is virtually the be all and end all of Buddhist practice. From the beginning of Buddhist meditation theory, it consistently was held that insight (rsipaSyanfr, Ch. guan) rather than concentration (6amntha) was the key to the attainment of enlightenment. Concentration was a tool for the better production of insight. This emphasis on the importance of meditative insi$ht lies behind the meditation teachings given in the BN?. In the present passa$e,"insight into universal sameness" is stressed as the key to enlightenment. In the quaterniqy of practices discussed earlier, the "samddhi that destroys emptiness" was uniquely emphasized, and this sctmddhi was specifically identified as an "insight." In this context, we should note that there aiways is a very ciose fit between the meditative insi$ht practices recommended by a text and the philosophical views expressed in that text.rl This is clearly evident in the BN?. We already have seen that the "sq,mddhi that destroys emptiness" is the practical fulfillment of the BN?'s stress upon the necessiqvof attaining positive realization by way of the ne$ations of Sttnyata. Similarly, the stress here upon "insi$ht into universal sameness" brings out the importance in the BN? of Yogdcaraphilosophy. In the latter, adherence to the belief in both the self and the objective world constitutes delusion. As the above quotation indicates, the eradication of this delusion frees one to see Reality As It Is; that is, another "positive realization." When recommendin$ the "samcrdhi that destroys emptiness," the author is particularly tar$etin$ persons with negative views of Sdnyata, a \rery troubling and prominent form of delusion from the author's point of view. The "insight into universal sameness" is more universally recommended for anyone with the cornmonsensical, "realist" view entailing an existential corrrmitmellt to a universe composed of "selves" and "thin$s." when desireattainscompletion In this sense, causeof abandonin$ the conjoinedwith two practices.Thesetwo practicesare the cultivation of the

133

NATURE BI.]DDTL\

Principle ot' Thusness and therctrltiYation of l,lena4'Thusness. In rhe $'orld, there are onll'r$.o rhinAs t() hc kno$'n: people and things. ()ne $ho is able to penetrate thcse t$rr Ikinds ot'l entptitress eternallv realizes the true pinnacle g f T h u s n e s s . l l c n c e t h i s i s c : r l l t . t l t h e P r i r r c f p / c r 2 l T h r r s r r e s . sT h e u l t i l - n a t e . Plenan' Thusness probes the s()trrce. :lttains to the ItrueI ttature. and penetrates the source ot the rlfttrrrrlrrrllttlfttr thus it is spoken of as the uitinratc. . . . The hnonlcd[c oi ['lcrrtry"l'htrsrtess: The illtinlate and exhaustive knon'ledge of all rertlnrs is crtllcd tlte krrrrt'lcri{g tt'Plcnury Thtrsnes.s. . . ,\ll Tathagata dh<rrrtttts, in this seltsc. :irt callecl Plcrrtrry Ihlr.snc.s.s. The tirst s t a g e b r . r c l h i s t r t t ' l .ar t a i n s t h c s e n v o i i r r r n r s 0 i i k n o $ i e d g e I i . e . . k n o $ ' l e d g e o f (r the Principlc of Thr'rsnessirrrd ()i [)lunan'Thtrsnessl ]Jecause shc or he r p e n e t r a t e s t h e a l l - c n c o n r p a s s i n r lr l f t r r r n r t r r l h r T t t p r i n c i p l e , b o t h s n r n s d r r r a n d nir.r'drrtrarc knrxyl. (S0la-S0lb)

kirrds ot knou'led$e, To realize cllrannakclyo, then, olre ctlltivates t\\'(.) of the Frinciple of Thusness and of Pler.ran'ThusnessKnou'ledgeof the Principle of Thusness is kno\\'ledge of Thusness as such: the positive realization of' the true nature of all thin$s, b1' u'av of negating of coltventional views. h.nou'led$e of Plenary 5r1n1'1r16's Thusness takes this fundamental realizatiorl and extends it blr probing its contents vis-d-r'isthe entire universe, the clharmctdhdtu' Thus to knos' the Principle of Thtrsnessis to hnorv the fundamental principle; knou'ledge of I'lenaq' Thusness is the application of that principle to all things. or the infinite particularization ot'the $eneral. is the are seli-realized: knou'ledge ofl Theset*'o [t'orms knosledge
irom it attained b1'oneselfhavin$ attained understanding. is not zrttained it does one attain realizaticrnt is rrot caused by another. Onll' bv oneselt' another. This is called self-realizationof knou'ledgeand correct vie*'s. lforeover, these trvo Iforms of] knou'ledge have tsrt nlarks Nonattachment is to see the inherent puritl' of the realm of sentient bein!,s. of It is the mark of the knorvledge the Principle of Thusness.Nonobstruction meanslimitlesspenetrationof all realmsand limitlessinsisht into them. It is the mark of the knowledge of Plbnary Thusness.Again, these trvo Iforms of] The knou'ledge of the Principle of knowledge have tn'o meanin$s. Thusnessis the cause; it is the cause of the production of snrnsdro and of ninsdr.w. The knowledge of Plenary Thusness is fruit insotar as in this principle js completed all-sufficient knowledge of the Tath6$ata'sultimate and n'orldly dharmas. (802b) Realization of the Principle of ihusness, pdra:mitd of purity: the world is not inherently 134 then, recalls us to the flawed, as the Sravakct

ENGAGING SPIRITUAL IN CULTTVATION

believes. With the realization of Thusness, one can see the lotus in the mud. This realization is charaeterized by nonattachment, which I interpret as meanin$ nonattachment to both nin:d,rya, and samsara, due to the realization of their intrinsic nondifference. Nonobstruction is described as the Tathagata's all.knowledge; it is knowledge of all realms and all dharmas, on both the worldly and the ultimate levels. In these two realizations, then, we see the characteristic BN? emphases on the goodness of the world, the positive nature of realization, and the harmonious mutual validity of worldly and ultimate knowledge. This double validation of the worldly and the ultimate results in practice in a person who would be nonattached and nonobstructed in both the mundane and the supreme realms. Such a person also would be adept in the practical wisdom of mshdkarund.

135

CTL{PTERSEI'EN
Buddha Nature and the Concept of Person

puddhism has a profound and thoroughll' developed set of on human being. One might rvell arg,ue that the Llteachings question of human being is the question par excellence rvith which the Buddhist tradition as a rvhole stru$lles. According to the traditional account, the point of departure for the Buddha's own search, discoveries, and teachings was the dilemma of the human condition. Nloreover,\'ast numbers of Buddhist texts speak out of or address human experience as such, consciously focusin$ upon it as source of both question and answer. Nonetheless,many questions a modern \\resterner asks as a matter of course about human bein$ are not directl.v addressed in the Buddhist texts. Of course there are important reasons for this. Our concept of and assumptions about hurnan individualit-v are profoundly different from Buddhist views of the same. Our two worlds of discourse about the value and meaning of incarnate, finite existence, the course of history, the meanin$ of suffering, and the nature of possible human greatness are set up on entirely different foundations. Thus for a contemporary Westerner to ask the question, What is a person? \\'hat is human being? of a Buddhist text is to set oneself up to receive an answer that does not satisfy the intent of the question. Yet, although Buddhist views and assumptions differ so markedly from our own, Buddhist texts reveal

137

CTHPTER SEVEN
Buddha Nature and the Concept of Person

has a profound and thoroughll' developed set of puddhism on human being. One might rvell argue that the I-lteachings question of human being is the question par excellence u'ith which the Buddhist tradition as a rvhole struglles. According to the traditional account, the point of departure for the Buddha's own search, discoveries, and teachings was the dilemma of the human condition. Nloreover,\'ast numbers of Buddhist texts speak out of or address human experience as such, consciously focusin$ upon it as source of both question and ansrver.Nonetheless,many questions a modern \Vesterner asks as a matter of course about human bein$ are not directly addressed in the Buddhist texts. Of course there are important reasons t'or this. Our concept of and assumptions about human individualir,"-are profoundly different from Buddhist views of the same. Our two worlds of discourse about the value and meaning of incarnate, finite existence, the course of history, the meanin$ of suffering, and the nature of possible human greatness are set up on entirely different foundations. Thus for a contemporary Westerner to ask the question, What is a person? \\trat is human being? of a Buddhist text is to set oneself up to receive an answer that does not satisfy the intent of the question. Yet, although Buddhist views and assumptions differ so markedly from our own, Buddhist texts reveal

137

BLIDDHT\ NATURE

in their o\{'n \\'ay a preoccupation with the human condition as lntent as that of our own hyperindi'idualistic, anthropocentric culture. with such a shared fixation, it is inevitable that persons on both sides of the cultural boundaries will attempt to gain light from the other side on this subject, despite the incommensurabiliqv of each other,s questions and answers. This chapter is such an attempt. Herein l will engage in dialogue the BN?, in an attempt to wrest from the texr an_ swers to two categories of questions: its view of the ontolo$ical nature of human being and its 'iew of the existential status of human beings. In the course of the discussion I will ask such questions as, what roles do individualiry and freedom play in the view of human being portrayed in this text? \Vtrat value, if any, does an individual human |ersonality possess?Is there anything of value in human history? clearly, the text itself does not speak in these terms; these are the questions of a twentieth-century, philosophically inclined Amerrcan. Acknowledging that the text itself neither speaks this language nor sharesmy concerns, in this chapter I will put my questions to the text and attempt to extract from the text its implications for the subiect of my concern. In other words, I cannot claim that the author ti tn" Bi/? makes the statements I will give as responses ro my questions about human being, but I do claim that these views are implicit in and follow from the statements he made about Buddha narure. Granting that human freedom requires us to expect the unexpected, I nonetheless believe that, if the author of the BNT were here today and could engage in dialogue with me, as long as my interlocutor remained consistent, something close to the views I will articulate in the course of this chapter woulcl emerge. First' let me specif"vthat I use the world person as an equivalent of "human person." Insofar as I am seekin$ to discover what the rext has to say about the nature of human being, there is, at first 1$ance,a somewhat poor fit between this intention and the concept of*g,radh" nature. The bottom-line statement in the Buddha n"t,rr" textual tradition is "all sentient beings (sattva, zhon! sheng) possess the Buddha nature." Entailed by the Buddha narure concept in particurar and the Buddhist perspective in general is the view that human beings as a class belong in the larger world of sentient existents and should not be singled out as ontologicaily discontinuous with re!,ard to other existents. This is a very important and well-known point in Buddhist thou6yht: human beings are not an ontologically separate 138

OF CONCEPT PERSON AND TTIE NATURE BUDDF{,\

class,insofar as sentient bein$s migrate amon$ the six destinies (the realms of hell bein[,s, demons, hun$ry $hosts' animals, humans, and gods) in dependenceupon their karma. The dominant Western belief that humans are a special class, distinct forever from animals belorv and God above, of course, stems from the Biblical tradition. On the other hand, Buddhism alu'ayshas reco$nizedthat there is a unique feature of the human condition that althou$h it dclesnot put us in an entirely separate class, does make the hu$an race special with respect to Buddhist soteriolo$y. This special feature is the capabllity we have to understand our condition and respond in such a way as to radically alter the parameters of our existence. This ma1' account for the fact that in the BNT, the text repeatedlv speaks in terms of the three .categories of ordinary persons (fut ,hr), bodhisattva.sor sages(pu sa or sheng ren). and buddhas Ub) (e.9., 806b). Thus in the mind of our author, too, it is necessaryto sin$le out human beings (or at least anthropotnorphic bein$s) to speak of our condition and our potential. Becausethe text repeatedll'usesthis framework for its analysis, there is no great $ap bet*'een its perspective and my question, \\hat is a (hurnan) person'/ What is a person, according to the Buddha l,lature Treatise't There are trvo dimensions to this question, an existential dimension and an ontolo$ical-metaphysicaldimension.r Tri discover rvhat a person is accordin$ to the latter dimensicin requires of us that rl'c elarify what it rneans to say that a person "exists." \\'hat is the nature of this existence? What is the meaning of the rvcird per.sr;n in the phrase persorlcil existence? To ask vvhat a person is irl an existential and senseis to ask what behaviors-in the broad senseot all ph1'sical psychological acts-are characteristic or paradif,matic for huntatr persons. Horv would we characterize the essence of human character? What possibilities belon$ intrinsically to human beinp,s, and in what way are these possibilities actualized't Of course, because the text does not pose these questions in this rvay, it also docs not answer them in an explicit manner. \\rhat follows is m1' ourt interpretation of the implications of the textual material for these questions posed from the outside, by a person who lives in a culture dominated by another world-view.

A. The Ontological-Metaphysical Dimension

There are two main points to the Bl{?'s understanding of thc 139

BUDDHA NATURE

ontological nature of a human person:-First, a person is not an entity of any kind, but consists of actions; and seconcr,a person does not exist in contradistinction to a world, but is correctly conceived as inseparable from world. We will begin with the first point. when I say that the author of the BN? speaks of the ontological nature of a human being as a series of acts, I mean that he identifies the person wiih a particular series of physical and psychological acts and indicates that this is the entirety of the person; there is no entity that performs the acts. This, of course, is the classic Buddhist position from very early times. The following examples, culled from previously discussed passages,will demonstrate the way in which the BN?'s views apply to a concept of the person. I can do no more than give a handiul of examples; if one were to read the BN? itself, one would find that this perspective of the person as a series of actions pervades virtually every line of the text. Moreover, the text does not struggle toward this position as to'vard a conclusion, but speaks out of this perspective as a starting poinr. First example, the true nature, as a term descriptive of Buddha nature and hence of human being, is exprained in terms of three kinds of action: purification (of the deluded and relative natures), litreration, and the cultivation of the Buddhist virtues. It is not a thing, but rhese acts. second example, the second component of tathagatagarbrn is given as Buddhist practice, which is equated with wisdom. Because u'isdom is employed as interchangeable with Buddhist practice, it cannot be interpreted as representing any kind of static or substantial basis of subjectivitv (such as a pure mind or self). practice is a kind of doing, and wisdom is a particular practice-acting or doing wisely. Third example, d,9rayapardvTtti is defined as Buddhisi practice. Naturally, this means it is of an active rather than an entitative nature. Because Buddhist practice here means the process of self-transformation of the individual progressing from dllusion to awakening, the transformation of the basis means the transformation of the person. The Buddha nature, then, is not that which lives the Buddhist life: it is the active, verbal doins or living of the life. tr'ourth and fi'al example, the text identifies the Buddha narure with the four fu4a,paramita, or suprelne perfections, one of which is qtmqpdremitd', perf.ection of self. Although this sort of language 740

OF AND THE CONCEPT PERSON NATURE BI.IDDIIA

makes the Buddha nature sound like an entitlr par excellence, the text removes the possibility of such an understandin$ by explaining cltmcrpclrcrmittr as the aetive realization of the emptiness of all thin$s; in other words, it simply gives the name dtmdpd'ramita to experiential praifid,pdramita. "Nl the non-Buddhists perceive and grasp a seif within the five skandhas. Overturnin$ that attachment to self as vacuous and cultivatins prajfidp&r&mitd, one realizes the supreme not-self which is identical to the self-paramitcr' (atmaporamita, wo bo-le-mi). This is the fruit [of the practice of pr aj fid.gt amitai" ( 798c ). d,r The second important theme concernin$ the ontolo$ical nature of the person is the view that a person does not exist in any way separate from a world. The perspective of the BN? is plainly opnosed to any such subject-object split. In the BN?, personal bein$ always is continuous with the bein$ of a world. The tristsabhdx:a are three ways (actually two, insot'ar as the three reduce to a pure and an impure paratantra) in which the person experiences what is $iven (the world) and what is given (the world) presents itself to the person- In fact, even this way of speakin$ fails to do justice to the continuity between person anci world. A person is a series of events that, in the lansua[e of subjectivity, are called experiences. But experience, in fact, is not a matter of pure subjectivity. Experience is always "experience of' somethin$. Dxperience ordinarily is conceived as the point of contact between a subject and an object. But in the BN? these two are portrayed as a sin$le, primitive $iven, unified in itself, and divisible only upon secondary analysis. Ontolo$ically, then, a person is this primitive $iven: an experiential world or a personal world. The inseparability of subject and world is conveyed also in the concept of Thusness. This is captured rather nicely in the following passage: "All sentient beings ^re (shiz) the teth$atclgarbhq 'Thus' (nt in nt'Iai-zan!). (nrlai-zang). There are two meanin$s of The first is the knowledge of Thusness (ru-'ru'-zhi) and the second is the realm of Thusness (n"t-ru-iinE). Because the two stand together, we speak of the Thusness of Thusness (nt-nt)" (795c). Here we see the conjunction in the sin$,le term n -nr of the knowledge of Thusness (zhi, a standard term for the subjective) and the Thusness "reafm" Qin!, a standard term for the bbjective). Althou$h ordinarily the zhi is the cognizer and the jin{, the co$nized, in the case of t4l

i}['DD}{]\N,\TLTI{E

Thusness,the trvo "stand together," and the term Thusnessas ru-ru is coined to embrace thern simultaneously. As such it graphicallv representstheir inseparabilit-v. path. Finally, in a section devoted to the elucidatiorl of the N.{iddle the author of the B-\? provides an example intended to discredit the practice of "discriminating the grasper and the grasped aird considerin$ them tr-rreally exist." In other words, the intention here is to discredit the idea of discrete subjects and objects. grasper Disc.riminating and grasped and takingthem realll,to exist:ln the .strtro, the Buddhausesa ma$ician an illustrationto drau'us away as from these two extremes.:"Ka6yapa, is like a magicianwho conjures it magicalimages.The tiSersthat he makesturn around and devour the
magician. KASyapa, when bhihsus u'hose method of contemplation is like this contemplate an object, what appears [to theml is merely emptv. Hence, there is nothing to the'real'and no reality to the false." How then can one escapethe extremes [of graspedand grasperl, and b1, rel-vingon the manot|ifiaru $,i shi)r create consciousness-only wisdom? consciousness-only *'isdom (toei shi rhi) is the u'isdom Iconstituted by the understanding that] all sense data lgurtal lack an essence. When this consciousness-onl-v u'isdom is perfected,it turns around and extinguishesits own root; namely, manot;ijfidna. Hou'is this? Becausethe sense data lack essence, manotsi.iiidrtct is not produced. With the manovijiiar?a not prcrduced.consciousness-only wisdom self-destructs.Manorsijiianta is like the ma{,ician;consciousness-o'11' wisdom is like the ma!,ical tiger. Because maruxsijfiana produces consciousness-only wisdom, *,hen the contemplation of consciousness-onlf perfected,it can turn and destroym anrn:ijiiarur,. is \\hv? Because sense data lack bein{ (tou). Thus mcnouSfrdna is not produced, just as in the example the ma$ical tiger turns and devours the magicien.As Arvadevasays in vcrsc, Throughout the three realnrs,rthe origin of manotsiiiiana Is ahval'sto be found in sensedata. \\rhen one perceivesthat sensedata have no essence Existing seedsarc naturally extin{uished_ (8{)9b--c1s example ablv demonstrates the text's assertion of the of the $rasped "object" and the $raspin$ ,,mind." The argument adheres closely to Yogacara doctrine. Yogi.cara agrees with Mddhvamika that all sense data are inherently unreal, that is, lacking in any nature of their own, and that a Buddhist should practice in order to realize this. The peculiarly Yogicara point is that sense ciata are unreal because they are produced by the mind. It is crucial to nonduality 742 This

BIIDDHA NATIIRE,\ND THECONCEPT PERSON OF

realize,thorr{,h,that the mind likewise is produced by the sensedata. If there were uo sensedata "objects," there would be no co$nizin$of sensedatzland hence, immediately, no co$nizer qua separateself. Thus rve rely on the manozsijfTdna,or ordinary consciousness, to produce so-called consciousness-only wisdom, the knowledge that sensedata or phenomena lack essence,hence ultimately lack reality. In other rvords, starting trorn the stage of ordinary consciousness at rvhich the practirioner finds himself or herself,as a skillful means one engagesin unspecified meditative practices that enable one to see the nonexistence of essencesin phenomenal reality. Once one has done that, however, this new awarenessone has en$enderedpossesses the power to turn on that which produced it, ordinary consciousness, and destr<tf it. \\'hv? Consciousness-onlywisdom sees there are no object-things "out there." It, in effect, directs manot:ijfrana to see this. With no objects from u'hich to separate itself, marrovijfiana, in turn, becomes incapable of discriminating itself as a separate thing with its own self-containedessence-identity. other words, if there In are no ob.iects,there can be no subject; the existence of each is completelr- dependent upon the existence of the other. Thus manrx;i.ifiane, as a sense of a separatelv existin$ self, is destroyed. Once this happens,though, the so-calledconsciousness-only wisdom self-destructs. \\rhy? First, it was simply a skillful nteans for the purpose crf undoing the self-delusion of manovijfiana. Second, its existence was derived lrom manorijfid,na; the latter produced it. \\rhat, then, is the nature and status of the subject in this theory? It is clear that with sense data as its cause, the manovijffano consists totall.yin cognizing activit-v.That is, no sensedata, no cognizing; no cognizing, no cof,nizer.The cognizing, then, is the cognizer; in other u'ords, there is no entity-c(tfnizer here, only acts of co$nizin$ that produce an illusory sense<lfself.As for consciousness-only wisdom, it is plain that this is far from an ultimate in this text. It is no more than a skillful means thar self-destructsonce its task is accomplished. trloreover, the very u'ords consciousness-only (which are the words the text uses) are misleading as used in the BN?. Though the phrase is appropriate inasmuch as the sense data "objects" lack an independent essenceand hence are unreal, or do not exist, the real teaching of this passage thar the cognizer and the cognized,subject is and object, are interrelared even to ihe extent of being mutually dependent. They arise and disappear together. Hence, consciousness143

BLIDDFIA NATURE

onb does not mean "consciousrless-yes, objects-no" (and certainlv not "mind-yes, matter-no") but rather, it implies ,,cof,nitiononly" or "co$nizing only," with both "consciousness"qua mind and sense data qua objects of consciousness negated. As an illustration of the ontological status of a human person, this example indicates several things. 1. It manifests the nondualiqv of cognizer and cognized, or subject and object. It does not reduce objects to an ultimate subjective base. but asserts the absolute dependence, relativity, and ultimate unreality of both. 2. It demonstrates the active nature of the person; there is no "mind" here, but certain kinds of co$nitions and wisdom. 3. The practical consequences of "consciousness-only rvisdom" consist in the elimination of delusion. Thus, as an illustration of Buddha nature. we see again in this example an emphasis on the teaching that Buddha nature means the practice (or eng,agement the activity) of becominA Buddha. This activitv. in again, is what a person is. Incidentally, as representative of the BN?'s stand on the nondualism of subject and object, this example reinforces the argument of Chapter Five that the position of this text cannot be idealistic monism. Subject and object are mutually dependent: mutually unreal in delusion, inseparably self-revelatory in Thusness. This is nondualism.

B. The Existential Dimension

Let us now take up the question of human personhood in the existential dimension. A little. reflectic'n quickly will reveal that, in the vierv of the BN?'s author, one cannot speak of the human character or of paradi$,matic human behavior as such without one preliminary point. Existentially, human beings are of two basic types: deluded and enlightened. Once one has divided humanity (in which category I include the BN?'s three divisions of ordinary beings, sages, and Buddhas) into these two camps, one then can proceed to make meaningful statements about characteristic human behaviors. As evidence of this, recall the authdr's treatment of the classic Yo$dcara concept of the tn'spabhansa,the three ',natures" that, as we 744

PDRSON ANDTHDCONCEPT.OF NATURE BLIDDFIA

have seen, represent three ways in which persons perceive worlds and worlds present thernselves to persons. In rvorkin$ throu$h these three rratures, our text stressed the readil$ according to which the rniddle nature, pcffatcrntrq, is divided into two sLrbcategories,an impure and a pure p&ratT,ntra. The fornrer is identifiable with the nuirrr" of delusion, parikalpite,, whereas the latter is identified with the pure parinigpanna. In this way the tripartite trisvabhtirsa theory becomes a theory that divides humaniry into two categories' The characteristic that assi$ns persons to one category or the other is so-called puriry and impurity, or delusion and enli$htenment. our author has in mind a model of human bein$ in which deluded beings transform themselves into enlightened bein$s upon the pivot ol asrayaparctvl:tti, which I earlier translated as "the transformation of the person" but which I can now translate as "conversion,"6 in the convefts the person from a deluded bein$ sense that a'rayaparavrtti into an awakened bein$. Thus we have two cate$ories of person, 7 before and after asrayaparavrttL 1. Before "conversion," then' we have the "impure" clr deluded existential mode of human bein$. \!'hat characterizes human bein$ in this mode? In whichever existentiai mode a person finds himself or herself, a human beirr$ alwal's is identifiable with Buddha nature' The significance of this for the deluded person is twofold. There is the universally valid promise of eventual Buddhahood. More interestin$ for present purposes are the Buddha nature doctrine's implications for a theory of human nature. Ii the Buddha na{Lrre is the essentia-l nature of a human bein$, then there is, on this level and in this context, a universal sameness shared by humanity ac the core ol our identity. \\'e are all intrinsicall-v enlightened and compassionate beings and not just in porential but ahvays and aiready in present reality, though all appearances end self-knorvled$e rnay be to the contrary while in the deluded existential mode. To the extent that this hidden reality is not yet manifest, thou$h, the sarnenessthat it implies is all the greater. We can speak of it only as wisdom and compassion and cannot specify its character l'urther; active manit'estation is required for that. on the other hand, what does distin$uish us one from another are our individu eLk:arma and klesa, the .past history and defilements that together are responsible for the creation and constitution of our bodies as well as what we in the West, from a very different

r45

BIJDDI{A NATURE

perspective, call our various personalities. To the extent that a person exists in the deluded existential mode, that person's individual character traits, beliefs, habits, tendencies, values, mannerisms, and so forth simply are kleSa. They are all based upon a fundamentally deluded or warped perspective upon oneself and reality and coulC not exist as they are without that foundation. They also, from the perspective of Buddha nature thou6fit, are unreal and ultimately nonexistent. The text tells us many times that the kfe6o have no basis in reality. We therefore have a situation in which persons in the deluded existential mode can be differentiated one from another only by virtue of the kle1a that constitute their personalities and have constructed their bodies, but the kleSo themselves are unreal and therefore cannot serye as any real basis of differentiation. The klesa, therefore, have no Value in constituting a person's identity. In the existential mode of delusion, then, a person can truthfully be identified with the universally identical Buddha nature but cannot truthfully be identified with the distinctive kle6q that constirure that person's individuality. The implications of this are as follows. Within the puwiew of Buddha nature thought, the person in the deluded existential mode is ahistorical and lacking in individuality. History and individuality are composed by the kle*a that constitute a person's personality; because these are simply negligible, so are history and individuality as pertaining to persons in the deluded existential mode. Second, autonomy and freedom are largely, though not entirely, ne$igible for the deluded person. Most of the deluded person's actions are driven by karma and as such identifiable with the realm of kteia and utterly lacking in real freedom. However, there is one important exception to this statement. The drive to spiritual freedom impelled by the Buddha nature is an act of authentic freedom. Buddha nature and Thusness, having nothing to do with the realm of karma and kle6o, can serye as the basis of acts of real freedom. Hence, to the extent that one acts in such a way as to free oneself of karma andkleiq one's acr is free. To the extent that one's actions are the product of past karma and kle6a, those actions are not free. By definition, though, the deluded person has not yet under$one "conversion.?' Such a person therefore will be defined largely by unfree acts. In sum, the person in the deluded existential mode is not a 146

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i

BIJDDTIA NATURE AND THE CONCEPT PERSON OF

person as we ordinarily use the term. There is no real historicalir-v or individuality accruing to the "person" and precious little freedom. What we consider to be the basis of individual personhood is written off as unreal. What is real is the universal samenessof Buddha narure; in this sameness, individual personhood, as we ordinarily use the term, cannot be found. Thus before "conversion" and while in the existential mode of delusion, a person is not a person. 2. \\'hat, then, of the person after "conversion," the "pure" or enlightened person? Again we must begin by stating that the person is the Buddha nature. Thus also in the existential mode of enlightenment there apparently is this degree of universal sameness. But how far, in this mode, does this samenessextend? The fact that we are all the Buddha nature means that we are all characterized by clear seeing and altruistic behavior. But persons in the enlightened existential mode, unlike persons in the deluded mode, have made this Buddha nature manifest in real acts of clarity and altruism. This manifestation in action, therefore, brings the Buddha nature into the realm of particularity and individuality. No two acrs of clarity or compassion are alike. Hence once the Buddha nature moves into the realm of manifestation it no longer is appropriate to speak of universal sameness, because the Buddha nature is no more than those particular acts of clarity and altruism and no entify of any kind. In other words, the person is the Buddha nature as manifest in particular actions and only as manifest in those actions. Thus history and individuality, which were lacking in the deluded existential mode, enter the constitution of the person now, in the enlightened existential mode. The particular behaviors, mannerisms, even the personality of the person, now possess reality and value. Moreover, the actions of the person now possess complete autonomy and freedom. What the person does (physically, psychologically) has no relation to the world of karma and kle9a but is entirely a spontaneous manifestation of the always free Buddha nature. The person, then, is really and fully a person at this sta$e, after "cirnversion" and upon entry into the enlightened existential mode. I must emphasize this remarkable point: "Conversion" and enlightened behavior not only do not rob a person of individuality, but in fact constitute its very possibility for the first time. Compare this with the classic position of the Hindu lJpaniqqds in which, upon enlightenment, the person loses whatever individuality he or she had

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by mer$in$ into the Oneness of Brahman-Atman, "as when rivers flowing towards the ocean find there fihal peace, their name and form disappear, and people speak only of the ocean."8 The position of Buddha nature thought is the precise converse of this. Buddhist pracrice constitutes the possibility for discbvering and actualizins individuality for the first time. One becomes a person upon enlightenment. One $ains freedom. The history that one constructs with one's particular actions is a real thing. This, in the end, is the result of the position epitomized in the Buddha Nantre Treqtise's line that states that Buddha nature is 'Attachments are not real, manifest in Thusness; one realizes it: therefore they are called vacuous. If one gives rise to these attachments, true wisdom will not arise. When one does away with these attachments, then we speak of Buddha nature. Buddha nature is the Thusness (zhen-ru) revealed (xian) by the dual emptiness of person and things. . . . If one does not speak of Buddha nature, then one does not understand emptiness" (787b). In the view of the BN?, Buddhist practice gains one somethin$, and that something is realiqv: One finds reality irt oneself and in one's world. And this reality possesses absolute value. Just as the lo$ic of Buddha nature thought compelled the author ultimately to speak of an etrnapdramita in which the negativiry of arwtman and *ilnyatd was simultaneously inverted and fulfilled, so here the negativity of the karma and klefu-based realm of history and individuality is invened and transformed into a realm in which history and individuality are real and valuable. Here though, unlike the andtman-cttm'apdramitd' inversion, the history and personhood that one creates are somethin$ new. Atmaparq,mitd is simply the completely adequate understanding of a,nd.tman The free acts of a real individual creatin$ himself or herself moment by moment are the construction of a historical world that never before existed, even in potential. 3. We need now to consider the existential status of the pivot between the two existential modes of delusion and enli$htenment; namely, dsrayapardvftti or conversion. The status of d*a,ya'pardeftti is not worked out as tully in the text as one would prefer, but in the end if falls into the category of the existential mode of enlightenment. A9raya,pard,vftti, it is said many times, is "pure": it is the purity of the dharmadhntu, the purity of the Buddha nature. As pure, it falls squarely on the side of enlightenment. It also, however, is identified 148

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with Buddhist practice: It is the basis of the Buddha Way; the foundation of the extinction of delusion; the fruition of practice as manifest in goodness, reverence, and knowledge; and it is the attainrnent of Thusness. In these respects, its nature mi$ht at first seem to be one transitional between delusion and purity, but that in fact is not the case. When, as the text says, one is "on the Way," asrayapa,ravftti is the cause. When one has "completed the Way," it is called Jtuft. Nonetheless, this d*ra.yapord,vqtti finally must be understood as belonging totally on the side of purity and enlightenmenr, in short, of fruition. It is cause in the same way that the Buddha nature is cause: it always is fully complete with all its virtues intact. It serves as cause of one's bein$ "on the Way" or, in clther words, as cause of the Buddha Way in the sense that, like Buddha nature, it is the purity of Thusness impellin$ one to practice Buddhism, impelling one to seek freedom and the realization of is capable of servin$ as a pivot personhood. A9rayaparavqtti between the two existential modes precisely because it is purity in the act of causing one to be on the Buddhist Path. Like bodhicitta, which also is identified with the Buddha nature, it can be a first act on the Buddhist Path. But even as a first act, it already is compieteiy pure; it is purity that moves one to perform that first act of steppin$ onto the Path, and the act itself is constituted of purity. There is in this notion thatdira,5:aparavTtti is identifiable both as purity and as Buddhist practice an anticipation of Dd$en's iater concept of Buddhist practice as rcalization. In the BNT, d9rarya' pard.vTtti is called pureboth in its role as cause and as fruit. But, as we have seen, as cause it already is in fuil possessionof its character as fruit. We have here, then, a notion in which every authentic act of Buddhist practice is itself of the nature of fruition, the nature of the end of the Path, of puriry or realization. A genuine act of Buddhist practice, whether the first awakening of the desire to practice, an advanced state of sanwdhi, or the dedication of oneself to the salvation of others in perpetuity, always is a manifestation of Buddha nature as such, which always is of the character of ftlll and complete clariry and altruism. Purity and Buddhist practice, then, are alike. Thus d,srayaparavqtti, although always of the nature of purity and fruition, nei'ertheless ca.n be identified with Buddhist practice. Now insofar as the crucial event that separates the deluded existential mode from the enlightened existential mode is the act of t49

BUDDHA NATURE

conversion, d,rayapardrrrfri, this conversion itself must be crucial to the concept of personhood embraced by the BN?. This act of conversion that engenders real personhood is in effect the foundation of personhood. If any statement can apply to both modes of the existential dimension, and thus epitomizes the existential nature of human beings as such, it is that we are bei'$,s whose nature is to transform ourselves, to undergo radical transformation at the very foundation of personhood; namely, at the foundati<-rn act-genesis. of The deluded existential mode is the drive-however convolutedtoward that event, whereas the enlightened existential mode is the dynamic manifestation of that event, the ongoing manifestation of free personhood.

C. A Final Question
A final, and important, question remains to us. When we combine our insights on the existential and ontological aspects of human personhood as suSlested by Buddha nature thought, one apparent inconsistency remains. Buddha nature thought universally affirms "all sentient beings possessthe Buddha nature." If, though, as I have argued, Buddha nature is not an entity, but rather certain kinds of acts and if in the de.luded d'xistential mode such enlightened acts by definition do not appear, what is the status of Buddha nature for the person in delusion? If, in short, Buddha nature is not an entity and if it is not manifest in acts while one is deluded, in what sense can it be said to be there at all for the deluded person? It would seem that Buddha nature could not be present under such conditions. yet the Buddha nature tradition specifically asserts that the deluded also possessBuddha nature. How can this be? The beginning of an answer to this question is the acknowledgement that in the deluded existential mode Buddha nature is really just a promise. When, from time to time, the deluded person acts freely out of Buddha nature, then in that act of ,,purity," Buddha nature is fully manifest, fully realized. outside of such moments, it is only a promise. That this must be so can be seen when one places Buddha nature thought in the larger context of Buddhist phirosophy. In Brrddhism, "reality" always means "experiential reality." To ascribe reality to anything outside experignce would certainly violate the most basic Buddhisr principles. so to the extent that, in delusion, 150

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Buddha nature is outside experiential reality (our experiential reality is the concealinskle(a), it is not in any-real way present. It is present only as promise. In this light, we can look once a$ain at the passage quoted earlier from the BN?; "Attachrnents are not real, therefore they are called vacuous. If one $ives rise to these attachments, true wisdom will not arise. When one does away with these attachments, then we speak of Buddha nature" (787b). While the attachrnents are experientially present, we do not speak of Buddha nature. Only when wisdom is experientially present do we speak of it. This view is confirmed by Sung Bae Park in his study of doctrinal and patriarchal faith, when he writes: "\\'hereas doctrinal faith is the 'l can becorne Buddha,' patriarchal faith is the commitment that affirmation that'I am already Buddha.'Therefore, patriarchal faith is 'preliminary' to enlightenment, as is doctrinal not to be re$arded as a faith, but as equivalent to enlightenment itself. To arouse patriarchal faith is to become instantly enlightened." e Thus insofar as the patriarchal faith that "I am already Buddha" is equivaient to the realization of enlightenment, one cannot authentically affirm "l am already Buddha" until one is enlightened; that is, until one experientially knows one's Buddhahood. The same is true of the affirmation, "I, a deluded person, possessthe Buddha nature." These statements take us close to the solution of our problem. While in the deluded existential mode, Buddha nature is present as promise in two senses,which must be distinguished. First, of course, is the promise of future Buddhahood affirmed for all. Second, and more important for the present question, is the promise that Buddha nature is present to the deluded person ??otein the sense that it can and will appear in its fullness and purity now if only the deluded person will open his or her eyes and see it. Thus to say that Buddha nature is present "only" as a promise while in the deluded existential mode is not to negate that it is, in fact, present and real at all times and in all conditions. But it is up to the deluded person to see that realiqv, to "realize" the reality of the Buddha nature for him or herself now, in the present moment. In this context, we should recall that in the B^V? the Buddha nature is consistently identified with Buddhist practice. Thus all appearance of contradiction or inconsistency is removed when we think of Buddha nature as equivalent tb the Buddhist praptice of. those still enmired in the existential dimension of delusion. Thus

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Buddha nature can be present now, in its fullness and purity, even though it is not an entiry of any kind and even though one is enmired in the condition of delusion insofar as it is manifest in acts of practice, or in other words, insofar as, and no farther than, one,s actions bring that Buddha nature into the world of experiential reality.

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CHAPTEREIGHT
Retrospectiveand Prospective

A r u retrospective, I will first present the BN?'s self-summary, seryes as a conclusion to the'text and brin$s closure to a fawhich number of its major themes. As a prospective (from the time of the appearance in Chinese of the Bi{?, that is) I wish to offer two thin$s: first, rny obsen'ations on the teachin$s of the BN? in relation to subsequent developments in Chinese Buddhist thou$ht; and, second, a few brief remarks on the BN? in relation to current developments in Western Buddhism.

A. Retrospective: Summary of the Text in of Theauthorgivesus a summary his teachin$ the tidy form of for of four meanings Buddhanature,which serveas the bases four
names for Buddha nature, which in turn serve as correctives or teachings appropriate to four classes of persons. The first meaning of the Buddha nature is its "inseparability from all Buddha dharmas both before and after [realizationl" (811c). The Buddha dhrmnas are numberless meritorious qualities of the Buddha nature or dfuirtnakdrya. The text states that because of the Buddha d,harmas, the tathdgatagarbha is "not empty," (bu kong) and bein$ "not empty" indicates the inherent presence of the Buddha dha,rmq,s. The second meaning of Buddha nature is, "[this nature], under all

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conditi(,ns, is Thus" (812a). This is "because all phenomena lack own-nature." l'hat is, the emptinessof all things is their Thusnessand vice versa. Btrddha nature is found in this condition. which is universirl. third, lluddha nature "has nothing to do with false thoughts or invertecl teachin$,s," and fourth, "the ori$inal nature [Buddha nature] is still" (812a). Still here is explained as meaning neither produced nor destroyed. On the basis of these meanings,or qualities, are establishedfour names for the Buddha nature. (1) By virtue of its inseparabilit-v from the Buddha dharmas, it is called the dlwrmakaya. (2) Because under all conditions the nature is Thus, it is called Tathagata (Thus Come). (3) It is called the supreme tnlth becavse it is neither false nor inverted. (1) Because it is aboriginally still, it is called parinir-oclna" (812a). Buddha nature then, is, the supreme truth, the nature ot things as they are (Thus), the freedom from all error (paririruaryr-r), and the ernbodiment of all the excellent qualities attendant crn realizatio n (dhqrme.kayq). Next is taken rrp the progressive realization of the Buddha nature b-vfour classes of persons. First, the dharmakur^a (fa shen) name of Buddha nature is explained to be the correction for ordinary persons' .,'iern's self (shen jian). The term shen has two common meanings in of Buddhism: "body," and "person" or "self." This first conjunction of a t1'pe of person (the ordinary person) with a name of the Buddha nature (dharmakd.ya) is a restatement of a point that has been made earlier. If ordinary people can rid themselves of their pen'erted views of the "me" and the "mine." they will penetrate the realm of Dharma (.dhqrmqdharu). Upon perceiving this realm the-v will have found something indestructible. Bein$ eternal, it deserves the name tnte sel,f (zhen shen) or, equivalently, dharmukayct (fa shen). Thus, what ordinary people grasp as self is not real and as a corrective the term dharmakaya is used.r The second name, Tathagatc4 is a corrective to the inverted views of the lfinayana. The Hrnayana, says the author, do not reco$nize that the Tathdgata is eternal, blissful, self, and pure. They think only of the negation of these qualities on the phenomenal level. Hence their vieu's and practice are inverted and they do not attain the fruit of the Tathdgata path. They think only in terms of the causal stage, in which the wronS views of ordinary persons (like seeing self where there is no self) have to be corrected. However, the bodhis&ttoa knows that this 154

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causal stage is not to be separated from the fruition stage, in which the virtues of self, eternity, and so on are realized. Hence, the Hrnaydna think only of leaving this world; that is, leaving (qu) and not returning (lclf). The bodhisatasa, on the other hand, knows that leaving and returning are inseparable. Hence the bodhisa.ttoa speaks of the Thus Gone (ru qu, tathd + gete; i.e., Tathdgata), and the Thus Corne (nr lqi, tathq + dgqtct; i.e., Tathigata), but the term Thus Come stands especially as a corrective to the Hlnaydna. The supreme Tntth is the corrective name for those with "scattered and turbulent minds"; that is, the early stagebodhisa,ttve. Two tlpes of confusion are exhibited by these fledgling bodhisatttsas. One thinks that emptiness is nothingness, that things only exist by virtue of discrimination, and that when the latter ceases, all things will be "empty"; that is, nonexistent. The other thinks that emptiness is something-that really exists. something that should be cultivated and attained. As a corrective to these views, the supreme truth is enunciated. This tmth is here given in verse:2 Thereis not a singlethinEto be removed And not a singlething to be added. \Vhatis shouldbe perceived it is; as Seeing real,liberationis attained. the Becarrse adventitiousdefilements empty, are They haveno connectionwith the dhannadhatu. The Supreme dharmas, not bein$ empty, Are inseparable from the dharmadhatu. (8I2b) Thus the Buddha nature, or Dharma realm, is empty of defilements but not empty of the supreme dhqrmcts (the Buddha's innumerable meritorious qualities): "Because there is not one thing that can be removed, it is empty, and because'there is not one thing that can be added, it is not empty" (812c). Thus this emptiness is a fullness and this is what the bodhisanva must learn. Nimsd.ztnis the name directed to bodhisctttncs in the tenth or final stage of their training. By definition, only a Buddha attains n,insurp. This, therefore, is the one name, or level of realization, that stands beyond the reach of the advanced bodhisa,ttuq,. Nircdna is spoken of here in distinctly positive terms as possessing all merit, infinite merit, inconceivable merit, and ultimate, pure merit. It clearly is far from the mere cessation of suffering!
t5J

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B. The Buddha lio,ture Treatise and Chinese Buddhist Thought

Buddha nature ideas are found in all the four major indigenous schools of Chinese Buddhism: Tian-tai, Hua-yan, Chan, and Pure Land. The concerns of the Pure Land school, however, diver$ed considerably from those of the former three schools, and consequently there is much less direct attention given to Buddha nature thought (as well as other important philosophical principles) in this school. In Tian-tai, Hua-yan, and Chan, thoug,h, Buddha nature thought plays a rnajor role. The first of these schools to develop as a school, the Tian-tai of the Sui dynasty, affirmed Buddha nature as one of its focal tenets. Both the school's founder, Zhi-yi (Chih-i), and his teacher, Hui-si (Hui-ssu), were very well versed in the tathdge,t&gqrbhe,and Buddha nature literature, though the fortunes of Buddha nature thought varied over the life of the school. Hui-si spoke directly and extensively of Buddha nature as such; it clearly was a major component of his world-r'ierv. Zhi-yi was less an advocate of traditional tsuddha nature language, preferring to speak of arr all-embracing l{ind in which subject and object arise together nondualistically, an idea that nonetheless clearly is rooted in the farnily of ideas found in Yogacara and Buddha nature thought. Zhan-ran (Chan-jan), the sixth Tian-tai patriarch, revived the Tian-tai school in the eighth-century, again emphasizing the idea of Buddha nature. His work was prized in Tian-tai lineages throughout East Asia. The Hua-yan school is very closely tied to t&thdgatugctrbhq* Buddha nature thought. It incorporated several streams of thought, one of which was the She-lun school, which itself had developed on the basis of Paramartha's translation of the Mahayanasa,mpraha. Moreover, its major thinker, Fa-zanS (Fa-tsang), was an expert on teth&Ecttugarbha and Buddha nature literature, and wrote what is re$arded as the most important comrnentary on the syncretic Atoakening oJ tr'aith in the Mahdydna. He frequently cited this text, along with others of.the tathagatugarbha tradition, as authorities for his own ideas. In his commentary he hierarchicallv ranked what he considered to be four schools of thought in Indian Buddhism according to his assessment of their profundity and completeness. The lowest rank was held by the Hinaydna, which was succeeded in 156

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turn by the Mddhyamika and the Yogdcdran Fa-xiang (Fa-hsiang) school oI Xuan-zang (Hsiian-tsang), whereas the highest level was occupied by the tathd,gatagarbho "school."3 The rationale for this hierarchy seems to be a desire to affirm the value of the phenomenal world. It also may reflect the understanding articulated in the Ratnagotrarsibhaga and the BN? to the effect that prajfid thought, with its ernpha-sis on ernptiness, is incomplete. because it only negates error, whereas tathd,Eang(rrbh&-Buddha nature thought is complete, insofar as it both negates error (with its incorporation of the negations of emptiness) and manifests reality (with its affirmation of Thus n ess and tathd.gataparb ha-Buddha nature ).a Fa-zang created a mind-boftlling, systernatic philosophy based on t&thLlgcrtugarbha ideas, but going beyond them. The Awakeninp of Fairlr instructs the reader in the One Mind in which pure and impure, sams&ra and Thusness intersect. Fa-zangaccepts this, interpreting it as a doctrine of the intersection of the phenomenal and the supreme principle. In his system, however, this is only a step toward the trltimate vision of a universe of dhqrmadhdtu in which all particulars within the universe not only are mutually interpenetrating, but each also cont-ainsthe whole dharmsdhatu, also known as the One Mind.s The influence of Buddha nature thought was most significant of all in the development of the Chan school. The yogdciratathdEcttagqrbha text, the Lair"kdrcat&ra Sutra, is prominently associated with the early history of Chan: Bodhidharma is supposed to have handed a copy of the text to the second patriarch, Hui-ke (Hui-k'o), commending it to him as a uniquely trustworthy guide. Thereafter, many of the early Chan monks lectured on the basis of the text and wrote comments on it. Buddha nature thought was more important in some individuals and subsects of Chan than others. It was especially prominent in the East Mountain tradition of Dao-xin (Tao-hsin) and Hong-ren (Hung-jen), Chan's fourth and fifth patriarch, respectively.6 For exampie, *'e have the following. "Hun!,-jen said to the Great Master 'What is one-practice samddhi? It is realizing that the [Tao-hsin]: Dharmakdya of the Buddhas and the nature of sentient beings are identical.' The Great Master [Tao-lhsin understood then that Hung-jen had entered directly into th'e one-practice samidhi and had perfectly reached the deep Dharmadhatu."z The connection of these words with the tathdgatagarbha

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treatise, the f{o Increase, No Decrease Sitra (Anfunntvdpilr-n{tt\)anirde(a), is apparent; the preceding messagealso was transmitted by the BA?. Such ideas as these in early Chan were passed on to later in $,enerations the important meditation manual, Zuo-chctnfi, which contains passageslike the tbllowing: "to seek the pearl, we should still the rvaves; if rve disturb the water, it will be hard to get. When the u'ater of meditation is clear, the pearl of the mind will appear of itself. Therefore, the PerJect Enlightenment Sutra says, ,unimpeded, immaculate wisdom always arises dependent on meditation.'"8 The "pearl of the mind" made inaccessible by the waves is an obvious metaphor for the concealed Buddha nature. This image combines the use of rvavesto represent delusion in the Awqkening of Faith in the Mahdyd,na and the Tathdgatagarbka Sutra's represen_ tation of the tathdgataparbha as a precious jewel. The method of practicin6i meditation follows from this theory. For the Zuo-chan yi, the "esserrtial art" of meditation is as follows: ,,Do not think of any $ood or evil whatsoever. \\rhenever a thought occurs, be aware of it . . .; as soon as vou are arvareof it, it will vanish. If you remain for a long period forgetful of objects ., you will naturally become unified."e Here, enlightenment is inherent; one need only attain freedom from thou!,ht. that is, delusion, and it will become apparent. The Platlbrm Sutra attrlbuted to the Sixth patriarch, Hui-neng, usually is said to represent a major turn in Chan thought, rvith the earlier preference tbr the Lqhhatscttctra Sutra replaced in him by a preference for the Diamond Sil.tra and the prajii.d teachings. This is confirmed by the emphasis on negation in the Platfunn Sutra in passages such as that in which Hui-neng asserts: "Good friends, in this teaching of mine, . . . all hat'e set up no-thought as the main doctrine, non-form as the substance,and non-abidin$ as the basis."ro But this pra-ifld-like series of sweeping negations does not prevent Hui-neng from affirmin{, in the following passage, some most traditional teachings from mainstream tctthapatagarbhq-Buddha nature thought. Hui-neng by no means negates the Buddha narure teachings that rvere so important in the thought of the patriarchs who preceded him. "lf someone speaks of 'r'iewing purit"v,' [then I would sa1'lthat man's nature is of itself pure, but becauseof false thoughts True Realiry is obscured. If you exclude.delusionsthen the original nature reveals its purity."tt On the basis of this kind of idea, to se the [Buddha] rianffe (Chinese jran xin!, Japanese kenshA) became a 158

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synonym for enlightenment in the Chan and Zen traditiolr to the present da,v. I hope it has been apparent throughout this book that tsuddha natLrre thought is not .iust a matter of assertin$ the existence of a Buddha nature but, especially in the s)'ncretic form in which it appears in the BNT, is a full philosophical system. inclusive of ontology, epistemology, and soteriology. In the Introduction to this book, I mentioned a number of themes found in the Buddha I'{ctture Treatise that came to have widespread si$nificance in the indi$enous schools of Chinese BudChism. I have discussedall of these themes in the course of this book. but it will be useful to return to them here to summarize those ideas found in the Bl{? that subsequently became important on so widespread a scale in the Chinese (and ultimately, the East ^Asian)Buddhist world. I do not mean to impl;- that these ideas became widespread as a consequence of their occurrence in the BNT; the Bi/? represents here many texts bearin$ these important ideas. Furthermore, though Buddha nature ideas were one major stream on which later Chinese Buddhist thought drew, the followin$ themes were not derived exclusively from Indian Buddhist sources. Chinese Buddhism is a synthesis of Indian Buddhism and native Chinese traditions; a number of the followin$ themes have their counte!'parts within the indi$enous traditions. I limit m-vself in the following discussion to merely pointin$ out parallels between the BN?'s major themes and similar themes in the indi$enous Chinese Buddhist schools, in the hope that this study can highlight the importance of these themes for Chinese Buddhism as a whole and shed some light upon them. 7. The Posr'fioe l{nhre of Realisation

The first theme in importance for the Bl{? and for Chinese Buddhism is the emphasis upon the positive nature of realization, the view of enlightenment as an experiential reality that goes beyond emptiness. In India, Ndgdrjuna \f,'asone of the $reatest ever followers of the apophatic path. the path.of the vio netativa in religious language use. With his commitment to helpin$ humanity to become free of the bondage produced by thoughts, he directed Buddhists away from any tendency to conceive of reality or liberation in any 159

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terms whatsoever, much iess in terms that carried a positive value conrrotarion. Although Ndgdrjuna was carefui to create a system in which, technically, reality and liberation were beyond either positive or negative conception, the form of his discourse was sufficiently negative to provohe a critical reaction by Indian yoSdclra and tctthalgat&$qrbha authors. These were convinced of the need to clarify the status of liberation such that it would be clear that it was a goal worth st-riving for. This view entered China in the texts transmitted by paramartha, among, others. We have Seen that it permeates the BN? from beginning to end. On the opening page of the treatise, the author states his primary theme: "Buddha nature is the Thusness revealed by the trvin emptiness of person and things. . . . If one does not speak of Buddha nature, then one does not understand emptiness" (ZB?b). At the end of the text, the author succinctly summarizes what his intentions were in writing the BN? and what he hopes he has conveyed. He wanted, he writes, "(1) To manifest the inconceivable, aboriginally existent reahn: (2) to show what can be attained by the cultivation and practice of the Way; and (3) to reveal that the attainrnent of the way results in infinite merits and ultimate perfection" (8 12c-813a). Chinese Buddhists, for their part, universally agreed in their conceptions of rhe ultimate human atr-ainment that "freedom from" suffering was not enough; all the indigenous schools articulated and/or artistically expressed visions of liberation in positive terms as "freedom to" see realityAs It Is, or "freedom to" enter the Happy Land. This was not a negation of N6g6rjuna;9ttrrya views were quite important in the foundations of Tian-rai, Hua-yan, and Chan. All of these schools. though, went beyond 9frryta language to express their supreme vision in various positive constructions, such as "three thousand worlds immanent in a moment of thought" (Tian-tai); or as the dlwnnadhAat in u'hich all phenomena freely interpenetrate (Hua-yan); or as Chan's "this mind is Buddha mind." These three schools, then, all aggeedwith the BN? that the vallue of.Sfr,r,.yatdwas to take one be.vond .ffiqyntd, to the disclosure of reality itself, seen aright. 2. Thc Optimistic Concqtion of Hwnan llature

The second important theme of the BN? is its optimistic conception of human nature based on the idea of a universal, active 160

RETROSPDCTN'EAND PROSPECTNE

I
l

now Buddha nature. In Buddha nature theory no person, no nratter be dismissed as morally, spiritually' r:r depraved in behavior, is to potentially' humanly worthless. Each person is a Buddha, not only but actuallY. Againsi the Buddha narure tradition, Xuan-zang's Fa-xiang school f'uture endor,seda plurality of ineluctable spiritual destinies, includin$ a Buddhahood for some, but prat-vekabuddhahood, arhathood, and In this hopeless destiny of endless wanderin$ in samstu'a for the res'.. of vierv, humarl nature is. varied, and consequerltly the abiliqv is education arrd discipline to mold a person's future attainments limited. Jusr as the chinese carefully wei$hed the ar$,uments of Xun-zi (Hsiirr-tzu) and lv{encius on the inherently bad or $ood morai nature of humanity, so they also carefully rveif,hed the Fa-xian$ school's theory of multiple destinies against the Buddha nature tradition's as a contrary endorsernent of universal Buddhahood' As they found' inherent human people, in favor of Mencius' optirnistic view of 'fhe acceptance of gooirr"r., so they found in favor .f Buddha nature' Itr" universality of Buddha nature by the Chinese Buddhist community as a whole contributed to a loss of status tbr Xuan-zan$'s of Fa-xiang school. Due to the latter's adherence to the theory a'd its rejection of universal Buddha *rrltiptJ spiritual clestinies by .ru,,rrl, this school was relegatecito the status of "quasi-Mahayina" he constructed his hierarchy of a thinker such as Fa-zanf when Buddhist teachin{,s. I hasten to add that neither the Confucian nor the Buddhist tradition is as naive as it mi$ht sound from this account. Althou$h each claims, respectively, that we are born morally $ood or spiritually is the Buddhas, the importance of this position for both traditions what is resulting imperative to brin$ into tan$ible manifestation of present in our conceaied "nature"; hence, the importance in each spiritual self-cultivation or education' 3. !,{ondrwlism and ?husness

upon Third, the BNT presents us with an ontolo$v based and expressed in the ian$ua$e of nondualism, u, oppor"i to monism, Thusness.Monisrnisanappropriatedesi$nationforlndianBrahmanof the BNT ism. It is completely inappropriate to apply it to the views

161

llt'[)i)ll,\ NAl'LrRl.]

arrd liken'isehas no place in an1'of the tour rnaior indigenousChinese schools.The perspectiveot'nondualism avoids both monisrn Buddl-rist and dualism. Philosophically,Thusness and nondualism begin frorn the assumption of the emptiness critique, and as a consequencerhe)' reject the dualism of ordinary belief in separateentities. Hou'ever.as the suprernelinguistic tool of }\'lddhyamika discourse,emptiness itselt' stands in danger of receiving the label monistic. Becauseemptiness is a single principle capable of explaining all of reality', some scholars see in it a rveak ibrm of monism.l2 I believe that such a readirr$ ot' emptiness is n'ron$ insofar as emptiness self-destructsupon use. But in either case, by movin$ arvayfrom emptiness as an even apparentlv ultimate philosophical principle to embrace that rvhich emptiness frees us to see-realityAs It Is-nondualism and Thusnessre.jecranr. tendency toward even this conjectured rveak tbrm of monism. Nondualism, then, explicitly rejects both dualism and monism. It is the ontological term that correlates with the experience of f'husness. This experience, as expressedin the BN?, is based on the realization that emptiness merely clears the way for a correct apprehension oi reality As It Is. Thusness,then, desi$natesthe u'a;-thin$s are seen b1' those who are capable of seeingclearll', the reality As It Is into u'hich one enters when free of delusion. Tian-tai, Hua-yan, and Chan are ali explicit about their nondualism. The classic Tian-tai position is its famous formula of the Threefold Truth: (1) all things are empr)'; (2) thev do, however. have a real temporary or phenomenal existerrce;(3) being both emptl'and temporary is the nature of all thin$s and is the N{ean.Nlcrreover,eaclr of the three truths interpenetrates the other t$'o, such that each embraces all and all are implicit in each. The Hua-yan version of nondualism is expressed in its vision ot' the dharrnctdhatu, the total universe seen aright, as shi-shi-wu-ai, the mutual nonobstrucrion of all phenomena. One reachesthis vision as the culmination of a process of progressivel)'deepening insight: One begins from the comrnonsensical perspective; this beginning view is quickly negatedat the second level, at u'hich one gains insight into emptiness; one next realizes the interpenetration of emptiness and phenomena; and finally one leaves emptiness as such behind to speak only of phenomena seen aright; that is. tree of dualism. The genius of Hua-yan is its avou'al that in the phenomena revealed in this concluding insight resides absolute value. Hua-varr 762

AND RETROSPECTN'D PROSPDCTNts

emptiness' cosmology is based upolr an appreciation of the idea that or the interrelatedness of things, inrplies an interdependent universe' of those Because the uliverse is the sum total of each and every one a interdepen<lent parts, a chan$e in any one of them would constitute of the change in the universe as a whole. In this sense, the value resides in each individual component' or in other unive-rseas a whole As a words, each component inherently possesses supreme vaiue. thinkers are in a position to $lorify result of this cosmolo$y, Hua-yan the most mundane Particular. ChanandZenmastersadoptvirtuallyallforrnsofexpression one without accepting any of them as final, emphasizin$ sometimes teachin$ purposes' aspect, sometimes another' as useful for This Sometimes, it must be admrtted, larr$ua$eof onetress appears' is reflects the fact that one crucial aspect of enlightenment that is overcoming the sense we have of bein$ selves separate from all not-self. So the contemporary Japanese SdtO Zen master Shunrlrr and you Suzuki writes: "When you are you' you see thin$s as they are, your surroundings'"r: Much more common is become one with are lan$ua$e in which oneness' emptiness, Thusness, and the like ordinary phenomena are $iven as forgotten (as in Hua-yen) and see in e*Jmpla.. of ultimate reality without further ado, as we shall embrace all these forms the fiith theme. Still, the very willingness to of discourse is evidence of the acceptance of a nondualistic of perspective. Shunryrr Suzuki has $iven a relatively direct statement qualifying his above ,hi, p"r.p""tive, which should be understood as quoted remark:

there are no speakin$' else Stricrl-v on depends somethin$ Eachexistence for Therearejust manynames oneexistence' existences. individual separate but put stress oneness' this is not our understandin$' on people Sometimes is evenonenessOneness any point in particular' We do not emphasize valuable,butvarieryisalsowonderful'I$norin$variety'peopleemph theoneabsoluteexistence,butthisisaone-sidedunderstanding and l'arielYand onenessBut oneness thereis a $apbetween understandin$ in be appreciated each variety are the same thing, so onenessshould existence.That is why we emphasizeeverydaylife rather than some particularstateof mind. We shouldfind the realiq'in eachmoment'and in
each phenomenon.ra

that The influence of Hua-yan can be ."".r h"r" in suzuki's statement 163

NATURE BUDDIL.\

"oneness should be appreciated in each existence," follou'ed bv his emphasis upon the value of everydal-life and of each phenomenon. The free play with the concepts of pluralitv and oneness evident in this quotation is a quite characteristic ChanlZen trait. Thou$h I said earlier that nondualism rejects both dualism (i.e., plurality) and monism (oneness) and that is the case, here Suzuki affirms both plurality and oneness. We already have seen in the Bli?, thoug,h, that one achievesthe same result by affirming both pluraliw and oneness as one achievesby denyin$ both. As contradictory terms. their sense depends upon their mutual negation. With either double affirmation or double negation, the two are emptied. Here Suzuki implies that variety and oneness are two aspectsof nondual Thusness seen, as it were, from two different perspectives, neither of rvhich should be construed as absolute. Finally, thou$h, Suzuki negatesthe crincept ot' either variety or oneness by identifving the trvo. 1. Subject-Object Nondualism Western understanding of Chinese Buddhism has been too long pla$ued by our misf,uided attempts to interprct it ir.t tururs of the philosophy of idealism, as rve knou' it in the Westerir tradition. It is important for a correct understandin$of Tian-tai, Hua-yan,and Chan thought that we read it not in terms of idealism, but in terms of subject-object nondualism, the vieu' that rnind and u'orld arise together in mutual creation, whether in a cleludedor an enlightcned manner. This vierv is transmitted b-vthe Bl/?. The Bi{? adopts the Yogacdra vien', according to \\.'hich correct understandin$ of experience is that it is ahvays"experience-ot"';that is, the ("subjective") arvarenessof ("objective") content of some specific kind. In delusion, n'e lo<lkback on the rnoment of experience that has .just occurred and retlectively anall'ze it into two components, the subjective and the objective. In tact, hou'ever,these two, as separatecategories,come into existence Onll'rvi1l this zrctof anall'tic bifurcation. In experience as such, that is, in the ntornent when present experience occurs, experience is the inseparahle, "primitive" unity "experience-of." One important goal of practice is to cease livin$ in the act of arrall'sisof past experience, to cease the consequent identification u'ith the "subjective" half of our experience, and to live instead in the present moment r;t' preret'lective 16.t

RETROSPECTNE PROSPECTND AND

experience in which "self' and "world" are not yet separated. This done, "self' and "world" are no lon$er experienced as separate nor as entities; in fact, the terms are rendered useless.Instead, one "is" this moment of prereflective experience, u,hich is experienced as a moment of action, of process. The content of the present moment of experience is one's identity in the present rrroment. This perspective is prominent in Chan; indeed, much of Chan languageis incomprehensible without an appreciation of this concern for a return to prereflective experience. The famous Chan master Lin-ji (Lin-chi) developed a system for instruction in Chan called the Jour processes of libercttion from subjectivity and objectiviry. These are: take away the person but not the objective situation, take away the objective situatiou but not the person, take away both the person and the objective situation, and take away neither the person nor the objective situation.ls In each c,f these, and indeed in this very approach, we see the same kind of plafulness rve saw in Suzuki's treatment of variety and oneness; by playing so freely with the categories "person" and "objective situation" in this manner, we see the nonabsoluteness of each and the incorrectness of each as conceived from the perspective of subject-object nondualism. Some illustrations of these four positions might be as follows. First, the "objective situation only" approach can be seen in "when a fro$ becomes a fro$, Zen becomes Zen."r6 In the absoluteness of a frog fu It Is one finds Zen, or enlightenment, or Thusness. Second, teaching wittr reference to person only is well-illustrated by Lin-ji's famous challen$e, "Show me the true man without rank!" Third, the use of blows and shouts to jolt the mind illustrates teaching with reference neither to person nor objective situation. Finally, the fourth approach, speaking of both person and objective situation, is demonstrated in a poem by Ddgen: Being-in-the-world: To what might it be compared? Dwellingin the dewdrop Fallenfrom a waterfowl's beak, The inraSe the moon.r1 of Here hurnan being is portrayed with the image of the moon of enlightenment present in the phenomenal dewdrop. This fourth example conveys the mutuality of subject and object, of person and

165

f IIL'l)l)l l,\ .\"'\ t'ltl-l

ob.iectir;esituation. \\'e rttal' sar'. lttttvcvcr, tltrtt ;rll four ot' these the error of are nleans of poiutirtg ut, attd trattscertclin$, apprciaches and objectivity. the ordir.rarv dualistic c()ncepti()nof sulr.lectivitv An<ltherillustratiort ot' the uoudualit;-ot' sutrjectand object in Zen is found in Zen master Do$en's ShdbOgenzOgertjdkflan: thernis delusion; beings authenticate tt-r thc Conveying selfto the m1'riad the to The m1'riacl thingsadvancin{ authenticate selfis enlightenment. To studl'the Buddha \\'af is to studythe self; To studl'the selfis to forgetthe self; b-v To lbr$etthe sclf is to lrc authenticated the myriadthin$s.r8 Llpon realization of the Buddha Way, the delusory belief in a self separate from others and separate from world is lost. One no lon$er experiences as a bein$ cut off from everythin$ else, but as an awareness in rvhich "self' and "world" arises simultaneously and in inscparable utualitl'. m

5. .{ Positdue l'iess of Phenomenal fteality The BN? expresses a positive view of phenomenal reality, as is evident in the perspectives of the first theme (a positive view of realization) and, especially, the third theme (un ontology of nondualism and Thusness). The BNT itself does not reach the culrnination of this line of thought in which a concrete particular from everyday life is given as a manifestation of the ultimate; that form of expression remains for the indigenous schools of Chinese Buddhism to develop. What the Bl/T does do is to $ive a consistent and powerful philosophical account of the more abstract point that ultimate reality is to be found in the Thusness of phenomenal reality. This positive apprehension of phenomenal reality will make possible in China Buddhist forms of expression in which ultimate realiry/ errlightenment is given as manifest in an everyday aspect of phenomenal reality. Chinese Buddhist's readiness to create a this-woddly Buddhism was no doubt influenced by the this-worldliness of the indi$enous and Daoism. It systems,Cor-rfucianism Chinese philosophico-religious lvould have been difficult to create such a Buddhism, however, had there not alread.vbeen qualities in Buddhism that pointed stronf,ly in 166

AND R.ETROSPECTNE PROSPECTNE

this direction. It remained to the Chinese to draw on these elements and creatively envision their implications. We already have seen some philosophical examples of Chinese Buddhist affirmation of phenomenal reality in the Hua-yan vision of the dhq,rrnadhatu as shi-shi-tcru'ai and the Tian-tai threefold Truth in which any one of the three, temporariness for example, can represent all. We need not repeat these exampies here. A nonphilosophical example expressive of absolute value realized in the phenomenal is the development in China and other East Asian countries ot' this-worldly Buddhist or Buddhist-inspired art in which artistic representations of phenomenal realit"v (as opposed to Buddhas, for example)le are given as expressions of enlightenment. Very famous are the Chan or Zen (and Daoist) inspired landscape and still-life paintings, poetry, $ardens, tea ceremony, and so on. Two other examples in which phenomenal reality represents enlightenment/ ultimate reality are seen in a Chan sayirr$ and a Chan anecdote. Layman Pang Yun says, "spirit-like understandin$ and divine functioning lie in carryin$ water and choppin$ wood."zo In a well-known anecdote, the Buddha $ives a lecture that consists entirely in holding up a flower. Mahdk4Syapa'ssmile in response to this act becomes the paradi$matic example of transmission of the Dharma for the Chan sect. The contemporar1 Vietnamese Zen master Thich Nhat Hanh continues this latter theme very simply in the course of discussin$ how to set up a home meditation room: "lf you want to have a statue or a painting of a Buddha, please be choosy. . . . A Buddha should be smiling, huppy, beautiful, for the sake of our children. . . . If you don't find a beautiful Buddha. wait, and have a flower instead. A flower is a Buddha. A flower has Buddha nature."21 6. Enlightenment qs a Pivotal Conpersion The BN? conceives of enlightenment in terms ot a pivotal conversion experience from delusion to enlightenment, or from impurity to purity. This is shown in the text's.use of the Yo$dc-ara trisrsabhdtsa and dsraryapardprtti teachings. The author presents trissabhdt:a as two modes in which persons perceive the world and the world presents itself to persons, the so-called pure and impure aspects of the relative nature (the impure relative nature bein$

r67

BUDDHA NATURE

delusion and the pure relative narure bein$ enli$hrenment). ASrayaparAvrtti lrc sees as the pivot on which the practicing Buddhist o'ertrrrns the most deeply establishedexistenrial habits a'd attains the abilitl'to see reality,aright. seng-zhao (seng-chao) spoke of "sucrden"enlighte'rnent before , the BN?' appeared in China. The Bi{?, lbr its parr. 'el,er speaks in terms of a "sudden" enlightenment. Nonetheless,it stiil seems t'air tcr say that the ideas found in rhe BrV? (as expressed in the -BN?.a'd elsewhere) contributed to the ongoing de'elopment oi this concepr and to its importance in later chinese Buddhist schools. l' this text, first, we have the teaching that u,e are all inhere'tly Buddhas, that perfection in its complete and marure state is present in us all. Secorrd,we have the dsravapa,rar;ytti concept ot a pi'otal con'ersion experience; and, third. the reading ol trist:ebh(tuei as indicative of crvohuman existential modes of delusion and enlightenment linked by the pi'otal asrayapararrti. Here are three of the critic-al rarv ingredients of the sudden enlightenrnent idea in the form it rvoultl take in the Chan school. 7. Buddha Nature Is Buddhist practice

The estabiishment of rhe equation of Buddira nature and Buddhist practice is one of the great achievements of the Bii?. The importance of this achievement is (minimally) twoford. First, it undercuts any possibility of of Buddha narure as an entity _concei'ing of arry kind, as a tlindu-like Atntan or even as a purely mental process. Thus it renders invalid charges that the Buddha narure teaching violates Buddhist anatm&n teachings, that it reifies process, that it sen/es as the foundation of a monistic system, or even that it supports mental-physical dualistic thinking. second, it provides a solid philosophical defense against those later chan polemicists who would destroy Chan b-_v rejecting practice on the grounds that they already were Buddha, anC so had no need of practice. Cf course, iiwas this very question-Why is there a need to pracrice Buddhism if we are all inherently Buddhas?-which vexed D6gen sufficientry to cause him for years to scour Japan and china, or *"ll as his own mind, in search <;fan answer. The answer he ultimately found taires off from the point at u,hich the BN? leaves us: the identity of Buddha nature and practice. 168

RETROSPECTNN AND PROSPECTN,ts

C. Buddha Nature Thought and Western Buddhism

\\:hen one consitlers the encounter of Buddhism vrith the \!-est, especiall.vin the context of the development of this encounter in Japnn :ind in America, two on$oing events stand out as especially import.nt: Buddhist-christian dialogue, as it is found in the Kyoto school of philosopiry,the society for Buddhist-christian studies, and elser"'here;and western Buddhism. I belie'e that, in dift'erent ways, theoreticians and practitioners in both of these contexts face in the question of human being (including the question of its transformability) rhe probable ke1' to the meeting of the trvo mutually alien worlds and to the successof their respectiveenterprises. In the question of hrrrnan bein$ n'e ha'e a matter of deep, shared concern matched with radicaliy disparate assumptions, ccncepts, and values. we alsc have the 'ery f'undation of Buddhist philosophy itself, hence, the key to the difference between the trvo world-viev,'s. This subject, althcugh theoretically thorny, is at the heart of what must be resolved to bring the two worlcis into rnutual comprehension. This no doubt rvill be a long process; indeed, thouSh the Ky'oto School to a certain extent has begun to grapple philosophically with this question, it is evident that it rvill be some time before adequate answers can be developed.zeAs, Buddha nature forms the core of the Bast Asian Bucldhist concept of human being, the role of Budclha nature thought in this investigation must be large. In this is a first point of contemporary sisnificance for the stuCy of the Buddha nature concept. Hard on the heels of the question of huma' being and, moreover, conceptually Cependent upcn it, bomes dialoSue on ethics, theoreti_ cal and applied, another area of shared existential concetrn couoled w i t l l m u t u a ! i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t yo n e r c a d i l y c a n s e e t h a t o u t s t a n d . ing among the features of ttre west to which representatives of B*ddhism, both Asian and \Vestern, will ha'e to respond is the individualistic huma'ism that permeates western philosophy and social institutions. Buddha nature thou$ht has important resources lbr meeting this challenge, and in this lies a second point of contemporary significance of Buddha nature thought. I will not specrrlate as to what Asian Buddhists will make of the challenge of western humanism, but the conjunction of western humanism with the teaching of Buddha narure rnarks a point on rvhich Buddhists in the west almost certainly rvill build. Irr the second 169

NATURE BUDDTI,A

theme. we saw that one of the implications of the Buddha nature teaching is that "each person is a Buddha, not only potentialiy, but actually." An American cannot help but note that this "actually" has not yet been realized for its humanistic potential by the Buddhist w-orld. Coming from a tradition of individualistic humanism, we read a Mahdy6na text with references to Buddha nature and the bodhisattsa ideal and see in it an imperative to social action. Asians may not have seen such an imperative, but with our traditions we can do no other. Why East Asian Buddhists have been rnoved to act as little as they have in the social arena is a vast and complex issue that cannot be treated here.23 I will mention only the sin$le point that the texts prized in the East Asian Buddhist traditions have tended to emphasize such thin$s as nondiscrimination and nonconceptual wisdom, which are difficult to reconcile with the complexities of resolving competing claims, for example, or balancin$ needs against resources, which require that one be very precise in distin$uishin$ particulars, that one make informed jud$ments, and that one re$ard such activities as important and valuable. As we have seen in the BN?, however, the old texts do occasionally refer with approval to forms of awareness that fit quite harmoniously with such practical demands. In our text, discriminatin$, worldly wisdom is the lbrm of prajfid identified as the essence of. mqhdkantnd' and mah.dkantqa itself is prized as superior to hantryi' precisely because of its practical efficacy. Such statements as these no doubt will be mined in the future, at least by Western Buddhists, as the latter strive to create a theoretical basis for the social actions in which they already are engagedand that they conceive in the li$ht of Buddhist teachin$s of compassion. There is no doubt that the very existence of such a thing as Western Buddhism will result in the further investi$ation of such teachinSs as Buddha nature and the bodhisattrsq'ideal, considerable reflection on the implications of these teachin$s for the modern worid, and the practice of these teachin$s in the realm of social action. Indeed, there already exists "Dn$a$ed Buddhism," the active engagement in society and its problems by Buddhist practitioners both as an essential element of their practice and as one of its fruits.24 It is no risk to predict that this tendency in Western Budd.hismwill continue to grow.zs 170

AND RETROSPECTN'E PROSPECTNE

One of the primary aims of interreli$ious dialo$ue is for each partner to critically assessitself in light of the challen$e posed by the other; to become clearer about itself, its stren$ths, and its lacunae; and then to move ahead, in the inspiration of its own past and the challenge of the encounter with the other, as well as the demands of the modern world. The world is shrinkin$ and we are all forced, more than ever, to take serious account of each other. The encounter of Buddhism with the West is one form of this encounter in which the taking seriously of each other is happenin$. In taki-,g each other seriously, precious new fruits are brou$ht into bein$ as individuals within each culture slowly are transformed by the process of seein$ more clearly that which another culture brin$s to one's attention and expressing in a new form the $enius of one's own culture.

AND RETROSPECTIVE PROSPECTNE

One of the primary aims of interreligious dialo$ue is for each partner to critically assessitself in light of the challen$e posed by the other; to become clearer about itself, its stren$ths, and its lacunae; and then to move ahead, in the inspiration of its own past and the challenge of the encounter with the other, as well as the demands of the modern world. The world is shrinking and we are all forced, more than ever, to take serious account of each other. The encounter of Buddhism with the West is one form of this encounter in which the taking seriously of each other is happenin$. In taki-,g each other seriously, precious new fruits are brou$ht into bein$ as individuals within each culture slowly are transformed by the process of seein$ more clearly that which another culture brin$s to one's attention and expressing in a new form the $enius of one's own culture.

NOTES

Chapter 1. Introduction
1. As discussedlater, the concept of Buddha nature is very closell- related to that of the tathdgatagarblut, with which it is almost synonymous. 2. Takasaki Jikid6. "Stnrcture of the Anuttara6rayasttra (Wu-shan$-i-ching)," Indogaku Bukky1paku Kenkyt [hereafter. IBKI B (March 1960): ,14. 3. For a discussion of thls point, see Alfred Bloom, Shinran's Gospel of Pure Grace, Association for Asian Studies: Mono!,raphs and Papers No. 20 (Tucson: IJniversiry of Arizona Press. 1965), Chapter 4, "Faith: Its Definition." 3. ! fu Xin! Lun, attributed to Vasubandhu and translated by Paramdrtha, Taishd Shinshu Daix6ky6 31. no. 1610: 787-813. 5. Formerly it was believed that the equivalent Sanskrit term for/o xin! must be buddhata or buddhatva; that iS, Buddhahood or Euddhaness.However, upon comparison of the Chirrese versions of texts containing the term /o aing witir their Sanskrit and Tibetan equivalents, it became apparent that the term/o xing did not correspond to the Sanskrit buddhata, buddhansa, or their Tibetan equivalents.Rather, what emer$ed was more complex. Ogawa lchijo ["'Bussho' to buddhatva," IBK 17 (Ilarch 1963): 544-5451 and Shinoda Masashige["Bussho to sono gengo,"lAX 11 (1963): 223-2261, for example, compare the Chinese text of the Ratrwgotatsibhdga with its Sanskrit counterpart and find thatfo xing was used to translate compounds

173

BUDDIIA NATURE

of the ternr dhatu (.nature, element, realm. principle; e.g., Btddha4hd,tu, Tarhdgata-dhatu,etc.). lotra (family,lineage), or S,arbha.Ogawa seesthese three as of equal status and synonymousmeaning and so holds that we can safely take Buddha, nature to have one meaning rather than several; namely, the term tathagdtagarbha and its equivalents. Shinoda, on the other hand, sees the dhdtu and gotro groups as the standard bases for the "Buddha nature" translation, with parbha and the remaining terms as exceptions to these standards.Nloreover,he explains the basic meaning of both dhdtu and gota as cause, as in "the dhan is the eause of the arisin{ of the three jewels-Buddha, Dharma and Sangha"and "all merits are born of this fofra" (quoted form the Ranu,gotravibh&ga). However,/o xing means not only the cause of the Buddha, but also the "essential nature" of the Buddha, enlightenment, and this the term Eotra cannot convey. Shinoda concludes th^t dhdtu, as equivalent to dh,armakdya, dharmntd and tathatd, includes the "fruition" senseof the Buddha, as well as the "causal" sense,and can be taken as the most appropriate equivalent for Buddha nature. Thus/o acrrqE would most exactly translate buddhad,hfrtu, Takasaki Jikid6, ["Dharmatd, Dharmadhatu, DharmakEya and Buddhadhatu-Structure of the tlltimate Value in Mah?iyiinaBuddhism,".IBI{ 14 (March 1966): 78-941 agrees with Shinoda's view and clarifies it. He explains dh.dtu as meaning originally "that which places or sustains something," and hence, like dharmn, it can stand for rule, principle or tnrth (ibid., p. B1). In the Abhidharma literature it was raken to mean element, essence, or essential nature. Subsequently, the terrn dharmndhatu came to. be interpreted as (1) the natwe (dhd,tu) of things (dha,rma), or the truth concerning thin6is,and (2) the totality of phenornena or things. It is also given as meaning (3) the origin or cause of the Buddha's teachinpB,the Dharma. Thus, with (1) and (2) as the fruition meaninf,,, and (3) as cause,he finds the tern dhd,ru to have the bivalence attribured to it by Shinoda.
f) '7

Takasaki, "Structure of the Ultimate Value," pp,9l-92. Whalen \Vai-lun Lai, "The Awakening of Faith in Mahdy?ina (Ta ch'enS ch'i-hsin lun): A Study of the Unfolding of Sinitic MahayanaMotifs" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1975), pp. 107-115. The debate concernin$ Maitreya is succinctly summarized by Janice Dean Willis in her On Knowint Reality: The Tatnsdrtha Chapter oJ Asairg,a's Badhisatttsabhumi (New York: Colurnbia University Press, 1969), pp. 52-53 (note 42i. Stefan Arracker, Sa;en Works oJ Va-subctndhu:The Bu.ddhist Psychalogical Doctor, R.eligions Asia SeriesNumber 4 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, of 1984), p. 19.

1 0 I have emphasized 6d,stra literatrrre in my exposition of Yogicara roots, but

of course sdtra literature also played an impoftant role. In addition to the previously mentioned Mahfrparinin'drq- s&tra and Da"6abh&mikd,sdtra, other sttros associated with the Yogaciira school include the Ssryd.hininnocarln-s6tra, the Aea,ttirnsaker,-sfitra(including the DaSablnlmikd-s{ttra and the Gan&tvyuha-silffa), and the lahkdtscttdra-srZtra. As discussed later, the pra:jfrfrparamitd sutra. literature group also plays a

t74

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

critical role in the development of Yo$6cira thought and should not be associated solely with the Midhyamika school' 11. Ga4iin M. Na$ao, "From Madhyamika to Yo{dcdra: An Analysis of.MMK' and-MV, 1.1-2," Jortrnat oJ the Internntional Association oJ xxw.rs &tdd,hist Studies,2 no. I (1979):29. 12. Yoshifurni ueda, "TVo Main Streams of Thouglrt in Yo$,iicdra.Philosophy," Philosoph.y East a:nd West 17 (1967): 162-163. 13. Willis, On f\twtoinE Reality, pp. 34-35. 14. Ibid., p.132. 15. For this historical ourline, in addition to my own readin$, of the Uthfigotagarbha texts, I have drawn mostly from Takasaki Jikid6, Nyororzd Shdsd-no rt",ito (tot yo: Shunjusha, 1974); Takasaki Jikid6, A Sn'dy on the Beitt4 a Trentise on tlw Tatlfisata4arbha Ranugotravtbt igo (Utt*ot*rtra) Theod oJ Malnyana Buddhism, Serie Orientale Roma No' 33 (Rome: Istituio lialiano per il Medio ed Estremo oriente, 1966); and william Henry ,,D6gen,s View of the Buddha-Nature" (Ph.D. dissert4tion, Grosnick, University of Wisconsin-Madison' 1979). 16. The Anena.todptmw,tt;anirde.Sa is extant only in the sixth century chinese translation of Bodhiruci; neither a sanskrit nor a Tibetan text survives. Ho*"o"r, fra{,ments of the text in sanskrit survive as quotations_in the notr,,goiro,tilftfrga and other texts, so most scholars agree that the text fo.-"ity existed in Sanskrit. The Sanskrit title is a reconstruction from the Chinese. 17. Fo Shw Bu Zet$ Bu.liatt Jin$, Taish6 16, no. 6681 467b' 18. This text is extant only in Chinese and Tibetan but Sanskrit fra$ments have been recovered. 19. The question of universal Buddhahood and the status of the iechantika in is still, for modern scholars, a moot point. It the Lfoll:d,parinhx:dq*.sttr4 may be detrated whether the siltro attains a consistent position on this issue. 20. See Grosnick, "Dogen's View," p. 32 f. 21. Ibid., pp. 128 ff. Theory in the Malti,?0,rifti'r',a, .na' 22. See Takasaki Jikido, "The Tulfilatagarbha stiaro'." IBK 19, no. 2 (March 1971): f01f1024' of tle e'reat' !^e\9lc to 23. Yevgenii Y. Obermiller, Ttrc Sublime Sry'* of Buddhist Monisn (Shan$hai: 1940); and WtinAorr, Beb{ a Monnt Takasaki,A Sadg on tlw Rana$otatsibhrt$a. 24. Takasaki, A Strtdy ort tlw Rar4ottottibhfta, 25. Ibid., pp.6142. 26. Ibid., p. 5. p9' 9 and 62'

175

BUDDHA NATURE

27. lbid., p. 33. For my summary of the Ratrurgotra, I rely most heavil), on Takasaki'sstudy in ibid. 28 The-v-also appear in altered form in the Dharmq"d.hdn;atsiseqa-6dsfra and the l|u Shanf yi Jing (Anuttard6raya_siltra). Ibid., pp. a5_53. 29. See ibid., pp. 199 and 200_267, J0. I'amag'chi Susun.r, Hannya Shisri_shi (Tok-vo:Hdzokau, 1951), Chapter 6, "N1'oraizdShiso." Jl. See Takasaki,A Study on the kttnagotarsibhfiga, pp.296 ff . 32. Yarnaguchi, Ilannya Shdsds/ri, BB. p. 33 This is rhe view of .Iohn?. Keenan,Introduction to The Realm o! Awakening: A Translation and ct! The Tenth Chapter of Asanga,s *,iu"*or*".*o, ftydy: trans. Paul J. Griffiths, p. ft""nu.,, pu,rf f,. folia\i Hakamaya, John Swanson; texts by paul J. Griffiths an, Noriaki H"k;;t;iNu*-Vo* ""a Oxford: Oxhrd Universiqvpre_ss, 1969;, pp. SO_+S. "nA 34 This is the view of G-rosnic'k, view," pp. 26 ff and,76 ff. Grosnick, -D.ogen's however,reco{nizes the ptausibiritly the crmpeting view. of He notes that the M ahdyana's{ttrciktnkara tui n. both yosacnra- and tathngatajarb ha ,,it teachings and goes o'.ro"on stare, is jusi possible *rut iti--jiorrp of practitioners who promulgated the tathagitagaibhc was u"trlotiv o"pr.t of largcr group knorvn loosely as th-e ,yogacariri..; po, p.;;.-;;;; i,5ilur," " trearises of Asangaand vasubandhu, iire history it ,"r,o"i-iii'i,-"", . -- -' r" called a school at rhat time), is difficulr to t.a"".,, "i " Ibid., p. 29. 35 The date of the I'ahkdpat(trq-sit?'a is uncertain. consequently, it may have been cornposed either- before or after tne prose portion of the Ramagotrutibhaga. SeeGrosnick, ibid., p. 27, note 43. . 1 6 .I b i d . .p . 8 1 , n o r e2 1 . 3 7 . I b i d . ,p . 8 3 . , 1 8 . I b i d . .p . 7 7 . 39. Ibid., pp. 84 ff. I follow Grosnick ^in listing the three themes he isolares; horvever, my interpretation differs from his.40. Da Sheng QiXin Lun, Taishl 32, no. 1666: SZ6b. 41. Ibid., p. 579a. 42. .ds trarrslated by DaisetzJeilaro Suzuki, Th.eLahhdvatdra pp. 19G-192.

paur, 932 reprinred Routtedge Ke{an arrd 1 ; '""il";; eo ;;;ii'ilir'.lr

glfitra (London:

gzsr,

43' It should be noted, that the $tmaradqt-siltra arso speaks of the tathtrgata,garbfta as the source of both sarps'ra ,a-nd,nbtsdr.w, though it stressestheideaoftheinnate|yp|rretathagdtagarbha. 44. Suzuki, Lahhn$atAra Siltra, p.21. My addition in brackets. 176

I_
NOT'DSTO CTTAPTER 2

life, I relied heavily on the account 45. For the following sketch of I'aram?irtha's in Diana Y. Paul, Phil'osoplryo.fMind in Sixth-Century Chirn: Param.drtha's 'Etsolution ol Consciousness' (Stanford: Stanlbrd Unrversiry Press, 1984). Chapter 1. The reader will find there a rnuch longer and more detailed account of Paramdrtha'slife. 46. Kogen Mizuno, Buddhist Sutros: (Tokyo: Kdsei,1982), p.99. 4 7 . I b i d . ,p . 3 3 . 48. Paul lists thirry*-tx'oworks attributed to Paranrartha,togethei \\'ith textual information, Philosopht-oJl,Iind, pp. 175-178. 49. Fo Xing Lun, Taish6 31, no. 1610: 787-613. 50. Takasaki Jikido, "structure of the Llltimate Value," p. .i5. His citation of Hartori. 51. Talienrura Sh6h6, Bus.shSronKenkla (Tok-vo:Hyakkaenkan, i978), p. 37. 52. Lri Hakuju, HoshoronKenk5u (Tokyo: Iwanalnishoten, 196C),p. 366. 53. Takeinura, Busshoron Kenkyu, p. 6. 5'1. Takasaki Jikido,- "Bussh6ron," in trIizuno Kdgen, Nakamura Hajime, HirakarvaAkira, and Tarnaki K6shiro, eds.,Buttenkaidaijiten,2d ed. (Tokyo: pp. 145-146. 1,977), Slrunjhsha. on 55. Grosnick, "Dogen'sVieu'," p. 78. Takasaki,A Stud-1' the Ratru4;otravibha{,a,
n .(- 2. H -

Origin,

Derelr-tpment, Trsnsrnission

56. William H. Grosnick, "'Ihe Categories of I'i, Hsiar,.f, and Yunf: Evidence that Paramirtha Composed the As'a&ening oj Fatth," Journal oJ the lnternadornlAssosiationqf Buddhist Studies 12, no. I (1989):65-92. View," p. 120. 57. Grosnick,"Dogen's 58. Takasaki, "Bussh6ron," p. 144. Extant is "Bussh6ron Setsugi" bv Kenshh. 59. Takemura, Busshdron KenkTw, pp 3-4. 60. William Grosnick gives three main themes of Buddha nature theory in China: subject-object nondualiqv; the idea that the world of phenomena is present within enli$htenment; and the coextensivenessof Buddha nature and practice. He sees these expressed most clearly in Tian-tai and Chan. Grosnick, "D6gen'sView," pp. 181-182.

Chapter 2.

'fhe

Concept of Buddha Nature

1. The shift from talk of things to talk of words, recognized as freeing a discussion from certain ontological presuppositlons. See Willard Van Orman Quine, lVord and Object (Cambridge, lr{A: lvt.l.T. Press,1960), pp.27O If. 2. A. C. Graham, "'Bein!,' in Western Philosophy Compared with Shih/Fet and Ylt/Wu in Chinese Philosophy," Asia Major 7 (December 1959): 99.

t77

BUDDTIA NATURE

Ibid., p, 100.

4 . Ibid.
Ibid., pp. r0G-101.

6 . The Tathngata.garblta s&tra, for example, states whethr or not a Buddha

comes into the world, all beings dwell in the tath.agatuEarbha. Da, Fang Deng Ru I'ai ZanE Jing, Taishi 16, no. 666: 457c.
'7

Arthur E. Link, "The Taoist Antecedents of Tao-an's prajna Ontologl," History of Religitnrs 9 (1969-70): 187-188.

8 . Gilbert Ryle, ?he Concept ol Mird (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949), pp. 22-23. 9 . Selected and condensed from the list of meanings in Mervyn Sprung, ed.,The Problem of Two Tnrths in Buddhism and, Vedanta (Dordrecht. Hbiland: D. Reidel, 1973), pp. 4344.

1 0 . The four subjects of contemplation, the four kinds of right effort, the four
steps to super powers, the five spiritual faculties and their five associated powers, the seven levels of bodhd (wisdom), and the eight constituents of the Eightfold Noble Path.

1 1 .Any supplementary aid to Buddhist practice, as opposed to a necessary

aspect of that practice.

12. Note the positive value assigned to conditioned action here. This point will
be discussed in Chapter 6.

1 3 . This use of the term prirnitive

was suggested by P. F. Strawson in Irdivi.dwls: An Essay in Descript&se Metaphysics (London: Methuen, 1959), pp. 101 ff., where he describes "person" as a "primitive concept" to which both states of consciousness and bodily characteristics are ascribed.

14. For this analysis I draw from Alan Sponberg (who applies it to the same problem in Kui-ji's writintp), "The ?rdsrcbhdoa Doctrine in India and China: A Study of Three Exe$gtical Models," Buhhyi Bru*a KenbnTjo Kdy6 2l (1982): 97-119.

1 5 . Clearly, @en

was not the first to state that sentient beinlp "are" rather than "possess" the Buddha nature.

1 6 . This is typical of tlre author's use qf the term sryratimt

to indicate dissimilarity, throughout the section from which the passageis taken.

Chapter 3. Soteriolofy: Buddha Nature as the Practice of Buddhism

l. SoterioloAf is s-onceived in this way by Frederick J. Streng in Emptitcss: A Str"tdy in Religiorn Meanh4 (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967), passim. 2. The four attachments are desire, false views, false morals. and ideas of self.

178

NOTES TO CHAPTDR 3

The six destinies are hell, and the worlds of the hun$ry $hosts, animals, n^sura (demons), humans, and dqsa (heavenly spirits). Each of the five senses has its own consciousness, plus one for the consciousness with thou$hts as its objects.

5 . Meritorious activities of body, mouth, and rnind; i.e., Buddhist practice' 6 . I have not been able to lorate the source of this quotation.
1

Dhi,rani embraces the practices of smrti (recollection)' meditation, and wisdom.

8. Referred to as Ban Dirt$,JinE bfi meanin$ Boo J i Jing. Takemura, Bnsshoron Kolhyfi, p. 157. (No 9. Compare this to the title and therne of the AnurwtvA'pinptvanirde{o Irrcriase, No Decrea,se Suta) (Fo Shtut Bu ZenP Bu Jian Jin{, Taishi 16, no. 668, pp. a66-a68).

1 0 . The sambhogahfrya is the "enjoyment" or "communai" body manifest in the

is pure Buddha lands and visible to advanced bodhisattrsas. Ni?1,rrtu.takaya ihe "transformation" body in which the Buddha appears amon(' ordinary persons.

1 1 .Or unconditioned wisdom, meditation, and compassion. t 2 . The abilities to see everlthin$, hear everlthinE, know the thou$hts of others,
know the previous lives of oneself and others, perform various wonders and know that the defilements are extinct. see Har Dayal, The Bodhisatttsa Drctrirc in Brildhist sanskrit Literature (Dethi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1932), pp. 106 ff.

13. The hells and the worlds of the hungry ghosts and animals' 14. To save all of the innumerable sentient bein$s, to eradicate all deiusions and passions, to penetrate the infinite Dharma, and to fulfill the Buddha Way' 15. As spoken by Samantabhadra in tie Hua-5mn-sfitra, they are (1) to worship all B;ddhas, (2) to praise the Tathd!,atas, (3) to perform pi.J'a worship' (4) to repent and removskarmic hindrances, (5) to make all one's talents accord wlth the joyful and mritorious, (6) to turn the wheel of the Dharma' (7) to puriiv aliBuddha lands, (8) to alwavs follow'Buddhism, (9) to always make sentilnt beinfp prosper, and (10) to return one's merits for the gpod of all' Ding Fu-Bao,-Fo Xue Da Ci Dintr (Taipei: 1946), p. 2091. Also see Dayal, D@trhe, P. 66. bdhi.sttoa 16. These are four bases of super powers, developed by unitint, intense concentration and effort with (1) desire, (2) enerA/, (3) thought' and (a) iovest{lation. See ibid., pp. 104 ff. 1?. Namely, "instruction, doctrine, knowled$e or rryisdomattained, cutting an'ay of delusion, practice of the religious lifg, progSessivestatus, [andl producintthe fruit of slintliness." William Soothill and Lewis Hodous, A Dictima,ry oJ Chircse Buddhist Terms (Taipei: Ch'en$Wen Publishin$ Co., 1970), p' 38a'

t79

BUDDTIANATURE

1 8 The three periods are past, present, and future. 1 9 Attributed in the 8N? ro the (Fo Shuo) Wu Sturng yi Jirq (Taish6, no. 669: 468477) but in fact closely paralleling a passagein the Fo Sfun Bu Zen! Bu Jian Jin! (Taish6, no. 668: 466-{68). 20. The tradition also mainrains other identifiers, such as the physical marks and the super powers.

Chapter 4. Dereification of Self and Mind

1. In Chaptel Three. 2. The text in this section on sufl'ering is corrupt and I take some small liberties in the translation. 3 9f D Sefort Ruegg, tc Thdarie du Tathrigatagarbha et du Gotra (paris: Ecole Frangaised'extr6me orient, 1969), p. 368, for a Sanskrit version ofthis chart based on the Ratnaeotravibha.ga. 4. The tive are rip,, [orm; vedantA, sensation; sarryjiifi, perception; saryskdrd, impulses (volition, dispositions, etc.); and vijfidna, consciousness. 5. Similar verses are found M ah(ry an@silt d,lahkdra. 6 In Chapter Three. ?. As ciced in Walpola Rahula, What the Buddhtt Taught, rev. ed. (New york: Grove Press[19591,1974), p . 1 0 1 . B. In Chaptet Three. 9. In Chapter Three. 10. See Chapter Two. 11. See Chaprer Three. in the Ratnagotravibhd,ga and the

Chapter 5. Ontology: Monism vs. Nondualism

tr. Yevgenii Y. Obermiller, The Subli.rne Seierrce,p. 82. 2. Gadjin tri. Nagao, " 'What Remains' in Sdnyata: A yogdcira Interpretarron of Emptiness," in Minoru Kiyota, ed., Mahayana Buddhist Meditatitvn: Theq,t antl Praetice (Honolulu: Universiry Press of Hawaii, 1978), p. 81. 3. Takasaki, A Study on, thz Raowgovavibhdga, 4. Ogawalchii6,Nwraisl pp. 341, passim. p.28.

8,sshd rw Kmhjn| (Kyoto: Nakayamashobd. 19Z6). Chapter 6.

5. Yamaguchi Susumu, HanrryaSftdsdshd (Tdkyo: Hdz6kan, l95l), 6. Ruegg,Th6otie,pp.29l and361.

180

NOTES TO CIIAPTDR 6

7. The following is derived from Roland t{all, "Monism and Pluralism," in Paul Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philsophy, Vol. 5, pp. 363-5. B. Obermiller,The Sublime Scierrce,p.81. whose work contributed to my vier'. 9. In this I agree with Rue$tr|, 10. Graham, "Being in Western Philosophy," p. 102. tt. Da Sheng Q, Xin Lun, Taishb 32, no. 1666; 576a. Cf. Yoshito S. Hakeda, trans., The Awakenin{, oJ Faith (New York: Columbia Universiry Press, 1967), p. 33. 12. Discussedin Chapter Four. 13. Rue&!, Thenrie, pp.29l and 361. analysiscontributed to my understanding here. 14. Cf. ibid., pp. 379 f. RueSl,'s 15. See Peter Gregory, "The Problem of Theodicy in the Awakening of Faith," Reli$iau.s Stu.dies22: 63-78. 16. Nagao Gadjin, "Amarerumono," In'dogakubukhryogakukenkyt 4l (1968): 2J-27. l$t En$lish version of this article is available as Na$ao, "'What Remains'in S0nyat?i,"pp. 66-82. 17. "Amarerumono," ibid., p. 26b. 18. Ibid., p. 27b.

Chapter 6. En$a$in$ in Spiritual Cultivation

1. One who can bear the Dharma vesselis one who is fit to praetice Buddhism 2. The idea of these four foundations to practice is an old Buddhist tradition, stemmin$ baok to the Ahguttara-Nikaya and other texts. Takemura, Busshlron Kenh5nr,p. 307. 3. The ten knowledgesare an outline of the Hrnayanapath and are given in the Abhidharmaho$a of Vasubandhu. The list be$ins with (1) the worldly knowledge of the ordinary person who has not yet betun the practice of Buddhism and progressup to (9) "exhaustive" knowledge,in which allklefu have been extinguished and the Four Noble Truths have been realized, and (10) no-birth knowledge, in which one realizes that one has concluded the process of knowing the Four Truths, cutting off karma and kle(a, realizin! ninsdqa, and cultivating the Path, and that there is nothing further to be done. With the tenth knowledge, one has completed the Hinayiina path' Fo hle Da Ci Diar., W.2197-219E. Paramdrtha renders the first knowledge as "worldly Right Views" (sfti zlwtt$.jialn), but in this context I believe he is referrin$ to the first of the ten knowledges. 4. On bhfioand, see Alan Sponberg, "Meditation in Fa-hsianS Buddhism," in oJ Meditation in Chinese Bu'd.dhism, Peter N. Gregory, ed., Trditiotrs Kuroda Institute Studiec in Eact Asien Buddhism No. 4 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986), p. 19.

181

BLIDDiI\ NATURE

5. The quotation is similar to orre in the Da Bao Ji Jing (Maharatnukutasutra). See iakasaki, A Srurl-rron the Ratrw!,otrat:ibhd'fa, p. 204; and Takemura, Busshdron Kenkyu, pp. 129 and 265. .'fruitful tension" from oral comments made by Robert 6. I take the idea of Gimello at a nleeting of tlte American Academy of Reiigion. inthepraiflapdramitA literatu,rewith 7. Fred Streng has pointed out a passage similar implicati,ons:"without losin$ himself in his concentration, he Ithe bodhisattrsal ries his thou$ht to an objective support (for his cornpassion) and he detirmines that he will take hold of perfect wisdom [u"hich is essentially skill-in-meansl, and he u'ill not realize [emptiness, because its realization is not the final goall. tr{eanwhile,however, the Bodhisattvadoes not lose the dharnias which act as the wings to enlightenment." Perfection oJ Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines and lts Verse Summary (Aqsaha' srika-prajfidpdramitd-raora- Eurub samcaya' Edtha), trans. Edward Conze (Berkele" Four SeasonsFoundation, 1973), p. 222. Cited in Frederick J' ,,selfhoodwirhout Seifishness: Buddhist and Christian Approachesto Streng, Autheiitic Living," in Paul D. In$ram and Frederick J. Stren$, eds', Buddhist-christian Dialogue : Muutal Renev:al and Transformation ( Honoof lulu:Universiry Hawaii Press,1986), p. 191. g. The three kinds of. duhkha are duhkhu-duhkhata (ku-ku) the sufferin$ inherent in duhkhrt: htnn-ku, sufferin$ in response to the passing of pleasure; xin},-ku, suft'erin$in response to imperrnance. The desire realm iras all three kinds of.dr^rhftha,the form realm has the latter two, and the nonforrn realm. the last. Fo Xu'e Da Ci Dian, p. 320. 9. The three realms of desire, form, and nonform. 10. The f.o:urthdhytuut stage is characterized by mindfulness and equanimity and is free of ail emotlon. See Edward Conze, Bud.d,histMeditatiott (Londc,n: Allen and Unwin, 1956; New York: Harper and Row, 1969)' p' 118' 11. Several scholars have made this point. See, for example, Peter N. Gre$ory, "lntroduction" and Alan Sponber$, "Mediation in Fa-hsian$ Buddhism," both in Gregory, Traditions of Meditatian.

Chapter 7. Buddha Nature and the Concept of Person

1. For the idea of these two dimensions I am indebted to Joaquin P6rez-Rem6n, Self and Non-SeIJ in Darly Buddhism, Reason and Reli!,ion, No' 22 (The Hague: Moutorr, 1980). 2. The author refers to the text as Baa Din! Jin$ bfi it should be Bao Ji Jin6. Takemura, Bttssh6ron KenW, P 356. 3. Manrxsijfiina is given here as the consciousness responsible for discriminating between "self' and "not-self." 4. The realms of desire, form, and the formless. 5. Ar,vadeva,Gtnng Bai Lun Ben. Takemura, Bttsshiron Kenkyt, p' 359' 6. I take this translation from Ararnaki Noritoshi's paper presented at the

182

I.] NOTESTO CFIAPTER

Buddhism, 1985. I do not intcnd trf it Lr.S.-Japan Conterenceon Japanese any Christian connotations. This division of humanity into trvo camps may seem to fit poorly u'ith the Br\?'s own division of humaniry, as mentioned, into three canrps; ordinary persons, sages,and Buddhas. Even these three, however, really break down into the same two camps, "those who do not perceiveand realize the Buddha nature" (ordinary persons) and "those who do" (sa$es and tsuddhas). Buddhas and sagesfit in a general \r'ay into the same categoryof beings rvho do perceive and realizethe Buddha nature. the only difference between them being that. in the case of Buddhas, their "realization reaches the ultimate puriqv" (805c-806a). In short, the same line of demarcation fits this set of three: purity and impurir.v,delusion and enlightenment. Juan Mascar6,trans. The Upanisha,rls(NIiddlesex,England: Penguin Books, p.74. 1965), the Pra6naUpanigad, Sung Bae Park, Buddhtst Faith and Sudden Enlightenment (Albany, \\': SLINI'Press.l98J). p. 19.

Chapter 8. Retrospective and Prospective

1. Ihis and the follorvingsections on classesof persons are summarized from BMI, p. 812a-c. 2. The following verse is found in nine N{ahhydna texts. See Takasaki,A Study on the Ratnagotravibhdga, p. 300. 3. Takasaki,Nyorsizd Shis6no Keisei,p. 3. In other listings, Fa-zangcontinues to list the tathdgangarbhn tradition as superior to Hinayana, Madhyamika, and Yogdcdra, but is irself superceded by two categories: the "Sudden Teaching" exemplified by the silence of Vimalakirti in rheVimalaklrti-siltrct and associated with the Chan school, and the "Complete" or "Perfect Teaching" of. the Hrta-yan-siltra (Atsatarysaka), with which the Hua-yan school especially is associated. Few scholars today would agree $'ith Fa-zang's characterization of the tathdgatagarbho tradition as a school comparable to Midhyamik a and Y ogd.car a. 4. See Peter Gregory, "Chinese Buddhist Hermeneutics:The Caseof Hua-yen," Journal of the American Acad.emy of Religion 51, no. 2 (June 1983): 23t-249. 5. See Francis H. Cook, Ihn-yen Budd.hism: The.Js.pel Net oJIndra (Universiry Paik and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977), especially Chapter 3, "The Indian Background of Hua-yen." 6. This point is discussed in two articles in Gregory, Traditions oJMeditation: Bernard Faur6, "The Concept oi One-PracticeSamadhi in Early Ch'an," pp. 99-128; and Carl Bielefeldt, "Ch'ang-lu Tsung-tse'sTso-ch'an I and the 'Secret' of Zen Meditation," pp. 129-161. , 7. Translated by and cited in Faur6, "Concept of One-Practice Samadhi," p. 105. His brackets and ellipsis.

183

BUDDFI,\ NATLTRE

8. Translatedand cited b-vBieleleldt,"Ch'anS-luTsung-tse's Tso-ch'an/," p. 138. e l b i d . .p p . 1 3 6 - 1 J 7 . 1t). Philip \ampolsky, The Platfurnt Sutra oJ the SLxthPatriarch (Nex'\'ork: ColurnbiaLTniversit)' Press,1967), pp. 137-138. 1 1 . I b i d . ,p . 1 J 9 . 12. See Obermiller, The Sublime Science, p. 81. 13. Shunryu Suzuki, Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind (New \brk: Weatherhill, 1970; paperback,1973), p. 83. 1 4 . I b i d . ,p . 1 1 9 . 15. See Chang Chung-Yuan, Original Teachinps of Ch'an Buddhism (New York: VintageBooks,1969), pp. 97-101. 16. Shunryrr Suzuki, Zen Mind, p. BJ. 17. As translated by T. P. Kasulis,Zen Action Zen Person (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,1981), p. 103.

t 8 As translated by Francis H. Cook, "D6gen'sView of Authentic Selfhood and

Its Socio-ethical Implications" in William R. LaFleur, ed., DOgerf Studies, Kuroda Institute: Studies in East Asian Buddhism No. 2. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,1985), p. 133. l 9 This is not to say, of course, that artistic representations of various Buddhas, .bodhisattzsas, scenes of the Pure Land, and so on did not also proliferate in China. 20 From the Transmission oJ the I'amp (8.263), as cited in Fung YuJan, A History oJ Chinese Philosophy, vol. 2, trans. Derk Bodde (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1953; paperback edition, 1983), p. a03. 2l Thich Nhat Hanh, Being Peace (Berkeley: Parallax Press,1987), p. 1}4.

22 See Hans Waldenfels, Absolute Nothingness: Foundations Jor a BuddhistChristian Dialotue, trans. J. W. Heisig (New York: Paulist Press, 1980; German edition, Breisgau: Verlag Herder Freiburg, 1976), C,hapter 7, "Emptiness and the Appreciation of World, History and Man."

23. There are prominent exceptions to this $eneralization, of course, such as

those seen in the Japanese Soka Gakkai tnday. 24. For more information on EngagedBuddhism, see Fred Eppsteiner, ed,., The Path of Compassion: Writines on Socially Enqaged Bu.ddhism, 2d ed., (Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 1988). 25. It is not only the encounter with Western expectationsthat causesBuddhism to develop in this direction. The leaders of the EngagedBuddhism movement include two Vietnamese, Thich Nhat Hanh and Cao Ngoc Phuong, and a Tibetan, the Dalai Lama. Their concerns for an EngagedBuddhism obviously do not stem from the same soufce as an American's, but from their experiencesof the plights faced by their countries in the modern world.

184

GLOSSARY

ba ba chu Bao DingJing BaoJi Jing ben ben wu

+fr,
fnffi
ffi H]F HEi ffi
*

ftr
185

BIJ'DDHANATURE

benxing benyou bu bu kong bu kongguo bu shi BusshOron Setsugi

fffi
*'

6 4*, 6*ffi 6H ffifsffiffi#

Chan(Zen) chanding chang zhu chang chen chenrno

186

ilH ilHE
ffi ffi& if itH

GLOSSARY

wei Lun ffiftrffiffi Cheng Shi chul chu2 fr ffi

Da BaoJi Jing Da FangDeng Ru-laiZangJing da gongyong

AHEiffi

^F+mxffiffi
ADSH

DaShens Xin Qi Lun t5Fru{Hffi

Dao Daoli Dao-sheng yi Daosheng Dao-xin de cheng

H HNH HE H&{fi H{H

tsffi
187

BUDDTTA NATURE

Di-lun ding dinghui DOgen du ,duan

tr*
e lts

#
H,E

tr
B
l* l*g i*F

en fa fa shen Fa-xian Fa-xiang Fa-zang fan fu

188

r*tH l*tr
Fl,*

GLOSSARY

fanfu xing fei fei se fei sanshifa fei shiyou fei youfei wu fen-bie-xing fo Fo ShuoBu Zeng BuJianJing Fo Shuo Wu Yi Shang Jing fo xing Fo XueDa Ci Dian

IL,*ffi

)F}Ftr,
/F=fr1*
'FH. 'F.'Fft ilEIlt ffi
ffiffi7lH7iffiffi ffiffiftr{fiffi ffift ffiqF-ft#n H
189

guan

BUDDHA NATURN

Bai Ben Ftrffi6 Guang Lun

suo du suo
Hong-ren Hua-yan huaiku Hui-ke Hui-neng Hui-si

ffi ffiH

9AB

+ffi
ffig ffiq

H(H)BE
ffi,8 ffi

ji 1 ji2 jing .1i

190

w
ffifi$

GLOSSARY

Jta jia xinE jianxing jie jie tuo Dao jing 1 jing2 Jue DingZangLun

/Jr Tfrt1
F,ff ffi ffiffiH ffi
f,#,

,5I

*ffiffi

Kensh0 kong kongyoubu You ku ku Kui-ji

HilII E

*a4a
## H#

191

BUDDTIA NATURA

lai Lao-zi li you li wu Lin-ji Ling-run

7ft

#+
#'ffift ffig !siH

mtao ji miao mieyi mo1 mo2

w
wtfi
ffi{* p

ner neng
192

ru
frE

GLOSSARY

nengshe neng shezang nengzang

HEffi fEtrffi HEffi

ffiffi

Yun Pang pingdengzhi Dao pu sa

+s2H
#ffi
!t

ql

qi she qu

!Fts
*

ru ru-lai

n
fr,K
193

BI.IDDHA NATURE

ru-lai xing ru-lai-zang ru qu ru-ru jing ru-ru ru-ru zhi

fr*ffi fr]Kffi

fr*,
NW

frfrffi,

frmg
=ffi =ffift B {H# l',tlFfS
f$ ffiffi

sanxrng sanwu xing

SE

Seng-zhao shang fan-nao xin she She{un

194

CLOSSARY

shen jian shen ren sheng yi sheng shi1 shi'2 shi3 shi-shi-wu-ai shiyou jian shizheng Sh0bOgenz0 Geni0k0an su ru suoshechi suo she zang

H HN gA

e{fi H
E,
EI

gsffiffi H.
ff8.F, fi,if;[EffinffiA*

6m
Ffffif+ Ffiffiffi
195

. BTIDDFIA NATURE

suosheng suozang.

ffiE ffiffi

Tian-tai tong

E
f; rEffig

wer weishizhi wo wo bo le mi
WU

wu mie Wu Shang Jing Yi

ft firfi#g ft ilftrt
ff.hffiffi

196

GLOSSARY

wusheng wusuoyou
wu wei wu yin wu zuo wu zuo yi

ft4 ffiFf

trF
ftEl ffitF

tr{fH
ffi
d.

xian xrn xin le xing 1 xing2 xingku xiu-xi

{H#
'11 '11F-

f+

WH
197

NATURE BUDDTIA

Xuan-zang Xun-zi yi yi shi yi-ta yi-ta-xing yi-zhi yinchuxing you youbu zhenshi youzuo

s#
Elf
++-

{ft Hffi

t&tu
{fi{uffi
{*It

EItrH

a
.6HH H#

zai ru-laizhi nei zang

198

EfrMgN
ffi

GLQSSARY

Zhan-ran zhen Zhen-di zhen-ru zhen-ru li zhenshen zhen shi zhen-shi-xing zhenshiyou zhenti xing zhenyou jing zheng zheng xing zhi

lEf*
R
+

Hffi HM

Hfr4B
Hg HH HHfS HH HHfE H.
IEH IE{T

g
r99

BUDDHANATURE

zhihui Zhi-yi zhong sheng zhuzi xingru-ru zhuzi xingxing zhuan zhuan-yi Zhuang-zi zi xing jing zi xingqing xin zuo yi Zuo-chan

HH Hffi

t*. ftHffifrfr
EHffiffi H ffi{ft #T Hffi HffiiFi$,L. ff SilHffi

200

INDEX

Aboriginal existence (ben you): of Buddha nature, 32-34; and nronism,111-112 Adventitious defilements: Seekle*a Alayavijmarn: and dh{tnnakaya, 62 ; and tathdg,atagarbha, 2Q Anfrtman,30,85-90; in Majjhima-nikdya,9l AnurwtcJdpilryransa,-nirde(a, 13, 158 Asanga,6,8 45ra5,1,64 A9rayapard.r;6ti (zfutan-yi) : and Buddhist practicer 59-65; and dhamwdhatu, 59-60: existential mode of. 14&-150: four characteristics of, 58-60; and humarr transformation, 64-65; and Third and Fourth Noble Truths, 601 in Yognciira, 58 A*raya:paratsqtti dhnmwkdya, 6l--64 A$trnya (not empty): Buddha dharmas as, 153, 155; Buddha

n a t u r ea s , 1 0 7 - 1 1 1 ;i n A. Dnmotdoeul-sutra.rJ Atman, 30, 100. See clso Self (ta'o) Atmaparamitd: See self parctmitd Awakeninp, of Faith in the MahaS'crwr, 158; concePt of Thusnessin, 102; and Fa-zan$, 156-l57; in Yogacdratathdgatugdrbha thought, 20 Bodhieiitg,4O42 Brahamanism, 1OLr Buddhadhatu, 5, 14 Buddha nature,,l-5; and aboriginal existence (ben you),32-34, 39; and Brahmanism, 100; and Buddhist practice, 3l-32, 4142, 57, 151-152; as causeand fruit, 57; and Chinese thought,3, 156-168; conditioned and unconditioned. 4142, 57; and defilements, 109-111; in deluded existential

207

BUDDFIA NATURE

mode, 150-152; and devotionalism, Devotionalism,3, 13, 15 Dharani,6(>67 J; essenceand functions, 55-56; Dharmakaya: as active, 691'and existence and nonexistence,30-32; dsra)&parapftti, 6l-61 ; as Buddha and faithful jo.v, 127-128; five nature that dwells in itself. 72: and meanings of, 55-56; as found in Buddhist practice, 65-72; and ordinary persons,badhisattvas. and freedom from views of self. 95: as Buddhas,80-82; and human Middle Path, 6&-69; as name of transformation, 31-32, 57; and Buddha nature, 154; and ninsd4a, monism, 99-115; and nonduality, 66; and realizaiion, 7G-71; and Two 50; and own-nature (srcbhdpa), Truths, 69-70 34-35, 39; puriry and impuriry, 50; D harmakay adhdtu, 7 | -7 2 three kinds of, 4742; and Dharmapdla,9 Thusness,102; universaliry of, 1-2 Dialogue,interreligious, 169, 17| Buddha nature thought, 27-2E, Diamond Mind, 96 156-168; and Western Buddhism, Discrirninating nature (parikalpin 169-171 s'sabhat:a),43, 46 Buddhrt Nature Treatise: author of. DdSen,149, 165-166, 168 24; an<lBuddha nature controversy, 26; and Chinese Buddhist thought, 27-28; textual problems in,23-24; Dnrptiness (6unyatd,): and abori$inal and Yogdcdra, 21 existence,34; and Buddha nature, Buddhist practice: and 35; erroneousviews of, 36-37, 155; adra.yapardtsTttf 58-60; and , and negativity,16,34,36; and Buddha nature, 151-152, 168; Yo!6cdra,7-ll conditioned, 127-l2B; and four Emptiness,fulfillment of: in Buddha classes of people, 121-122 and nature, 4O; in Ranwgotravibhiga, wisdom, 51 l1; in 16-17; in I'oghcdra, Y ogactu a-tath.dgatagarbha thought, 19 Cahras (wheels).four, 118-121 Empty, not: See a6tmya Category mistake, 34 EngagedBuddhism, 170 Chan (Ch'an): historical relation to Enlightened existential mode of Buddha nature thoug,ht,157-159; human being, 147-148 and need for Buddhist Practice, Enlightenment: and individuality, L27, 168',nondualism of, 163-164; 147-148; as pivotal conversion, positive view of phenomenal reality 167-168; positive nature of, 19, in, 167; subject-object nondualism 38-39, 159-160 in, 165-166 9-10; and Consciousness-only, Dternity of trikaya, 7 5-30 Existence $xru) and Buddha nature, subject-object nondualisrn. 142-144 30-32, 55-56 Cultivation (xiu-xi), 122-123 Dao-sheng(Tao-shent), 13 Dao-xin (Tao-hsin), 157 Deluded existential mode of human being. 145-147 Faithful joy, 121, 123-124, 127-128 Fa-xiang (Fa-hsiang), 161 Fa-zant (Fa-tsang), I 56-f 57 Fo xinS,4-5,74, 17!174, note 5

202

INDEX

Gorra theory, 18 Great compassion: See Mahdfut'runa Grosnich, William, 19, 25 Heart Sufta, l0s Hong-ren (Hung-jen), 157 Hua-yan (Hua-yen): historical relation to Buddha nature thou$ht, 156-157; nondualism of, 162-163; positive view of phenomenal reality in, 168 Hui-neng, 158 Human nature, 160-161 Icclnntika,l-21 in M ahdp arinins dTta- siltr a, 13 Idealism, 7-10, 1'64 Individualiry, 746-148 Insi$ht into universal sameness, 132-133 Kalydl.wmitra, 119 KIe6o (defilements), 2, 50, 52-53, 109-1 11 thowledge of Thusness, 48-49, 51 Lai. \\rhalen. 5 positive,3,56, 103, 106 LanSua$e, Lcthkdssatdra-siltra, 2O-21, | 57 Lin-ji (Lin-chi), 165 Lin$-run (Lin$-jun),26 Madhyamika: ne$ativity of, 7, 11; and Yogdcdra. 6-11 Maha.kanaa (great compassion), 122-t23,126. 127; and kan't4d', 129-131 ; and prajfid, 128-129 Mahaparininsdl.ta,- siltro, l3-l 4 Maitreya (Miatreya-ndtha), 6, 8 Manovijfidna, 142-144 N{arks. four. 86-87 Meditative concerrtration (chan ding), I23,724-L25 tr{iddle Path. 68-69. 91

Monism. 99-115r and Chinese Buddhist schools, 161 NagaoGadjin,8, 99, 114-115 NdgZrjuna, 6-7 Nihilism,7 Ninrn4ak@a,72, 74-75 Ninsdna,65-67, 155 No Increase, No Decrease Sutra' (Afrilnatt d,purnrTn; anir de3a), | 3, 158 Nondualism, 50, 90-92, 106-107, l6l-r64 Nonexistence (uu), 30-32, 33 Obermiller, Yevgenii,99, 100 Ogawa lchiid, 99, 100 Own-nature (x:a,bh.dtsa),34-35, 39 Own-nature of Buddha nature, 83-86 Paramdrtha (Zhen-di): lite of ,21-22; questions concernin$ his role, 25-26: translations by, 22-23; and Yogdcdra history, 9-10; as Yogacara interpreter, 17 Pdramitd,, four: and Buddhist practice, 87-90; and monism, 1O4-107; and nondualism, 106-107 Parinircdna, \54 Park, Sung Bae, 151 Person: compared to sentient being, 13&139; existential nature of' 144-150; ontolo$ical nature of, 139-144 ; and subject-object nondualism, l4l-144 Phenomenal reality, positive view of, t66-167 Plenary Thusness,93, 134-135 Prajfid, discriminatin$, 12&-129, 17O Prajfiapdramitd: l2l, 128; as Buddhist practice, 8&90, 105, t24-125 Prctti5)asanurtpdda, 7, 16, 99 Prdyoea,4042 Principle of Thusness,93, 13'1-135

203

BUDDHANATURE

Pure mind, 93-9.1, 96 Puritr': of Buddha nature, 50, 84-85; ol dharn akayadhatu, 7 1-7 2 Ra,trutgo avib haga (M ahtryan\ r tr taratantraqdstra), 14-15, 1 l4-1 I 5 RealiqvAs Is, 10-11, 133, 160 It Realm of Thusness,48-49, 5l Relative natur e (paratantra st-rnbhdt'o),43, 46. 47 Rue{$, D. Sevtbrt, 99, 107 Ryle, Gilbert, 34 So,mddhi that destroys false emptiness, 122, 725-127, 12t) Sarybhdra,729 Sambhogakdya, 72, 7 3-7 4 Self (too): as non-attachment, 72,92: nine false views of, 94-95 Self.pdramita: as fulfillment of anatman. 88-90; and monism, 105-106; and nondualism. 90-92: as non-reified, 86-92 Semantic ascent, 29-30 She-lunschool,156 Shinran,3 Soteriolo$v,57 Srtmaladet:t- simhonadrt- sitra, 3, 12: on a(inya t1thagangqrbha, 108 Subjcct-ohject nondualism:in Chinese Buddhism, 164-166; and the "insight into universal sameness,i' 132-133; and persons, l4l-144; and three narures (tristsabhdzsa),43-45; in Yrgdcara, lCLl 1; in YoSaciratuthaeatagarblra thought, 19 Sudden enlightenment, 168 SrZnyothouSht: and monism, 100 Sinyatd: See emptiness Supremetrurh,36-40, 154, 155 Suzuki, Shunryu, 163-164 TakasakiJiliid6, 14, 23-24,99 Takemura Sh6ho. 24

T athegata (ru-Iai), 48-50, 154-1Ss Tathrtgatagarbha : and dkrya*ijfirtnn, 2O; and Buddhist practice, 54; as cause and fruit, 49-50, 54-55i Chinese translation of. 4: as component of Buddha nature, 4&-55; and devotionalism.3: and emptiness, 15-17; purity and impurity, 50; Sanskrit term, 3-4; and Thusness51, 53-54; as Thusnessthat dwells in itself, 4849 Tath.d,gataga,rbha liter ature, 1 l-1 7 Tathdgata4arbha- sutra, 12, 96-97, 158 Three causesof Buddha nature, 4042 Three natures (.tristsabhdrsa):and Buddha nature, 35-39, 42-48: in Yogdcar a-tathasataqarbhn thought, t9 Three no-natures, 4243 Thusness(tathatd), 102-103; and Buddha nature, 4042, lO2,li4t and tath.dgatagarbha, SJ-54; and three natures (trisr':abhdt:a), 43, 45-58; worldly and rrue, B0; in Yogacira, ll Thusnessof Thusness, 4t]49: and subject-objectnondualism, 147-142 Tian-tai (T'ien-t'ai): historical relation to Buddha nature thought, 156; nondualism of,162; positive view of phenomenal reality in, 167 Transformation of the basis:See ASrayapardrsTtti Trikdya: and Buddha natrre,72-73; eternity of, 75-80 Trispqbhdpa: See Three natures (trisroo,bh/J)a\ True nature (parinispanrw stsabhdrsa), 4344, 46, 4748 Two Truths (satya&:aya), 35-39

Ueda Yoshifumi, 9

204

INDEX

Ui Hakuju,24 Unborn, Buddha nature as,.112-113 lJpaniqads,147:148 Vasubandhu,6,8 western Buddhism, t6g-l7r Willis, Janice, 9, 11 Wu Shant Yi Jing,3 xinEf (nature), 5 (Hsiian-tsan$),9, 17-18 Xuan-zan$,

Yama$uchiSusumu,16,99' 100 Yo$dcira, 5-11; and ldealism, 7-10; interpreters of, 9, 17; and Madhyamika, 6-1 1; srltra literature' 174-175,note 10 thou!'ht' YoflcT^'tatragatagarbha

Zhan-ran (Chan-jan)' 156 Zuo-cha:rtyi, 158