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Geological Society of America Bulletin

Geological reasoning: Geology as an interpretive and historical science
Robert Frodeman
Geological Society of America Bulletin 1995;107;960-968
doi: 10.1130/0016-7606(1995)107<0960:GRGAAI>2.3.CO;2

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Geological reasoning: Geology as an interpretive and historical science

Robert Frodeman Department of Geological Sciences and Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado,
Boulder, Colorado 80301
ABSTRACT
The standard account of the reasoning
process within geology views it as lacking a
distinctive methodology of its own. Rather,
geology is described as a derivative science,
relying on the logical techniques exemplified by physics. I argue that this account is
inadequate and skews our understanding of
both geology and the scientific process in
general. Far from simply taking up and applying the logical techniques of physics, geological reasoning has developed its own distinctive set of logical procedures.
I begin with a review of contemporary
philosophy of science as it relates to geology. I then discuss the two distinctive features of geological reasoning, which are its
nature as (1) an interpretive and (2) a historical science. I conclude that geological
reasoning offers us the best model of the
type of reasoning necessary for confronting
the type of problems we are likely to face in
the 21st century.
INTRODUCTION
Contemporary philosophy has not recognized geology as a fertile ground for reflection; today, one finds no philosophy of geology as one does a philosophy of physics
and of biology. With the slight exception of
the plate tectonics revolution, the two main
schools of contemporary philosophy, Analytic and Continental, have ignored geology.
They have assumed (few thought to argue
the point) that an examination of geology
was unnecessary for understanding the nature of science.1
Nothing better exemplifies philosophys
neglect of geology than the striking lack of
attention given to the concept of geologic
time. The discovery of deep or geologic
time equals in importance the much more

1
For footnotes 126, refer to the Endnotes between the text and References Cited near the end
of this paper.

widely acknowledged Copernican Revolution in our conception of space.2 But despite

the prominence of the concept of time
within contemporary (especially Continental) philosophy, philosophers have ignored the decisive role played by Hutton
and Werner in reshaping our sense of
time.3
This neglect may be explained by the generally held assumption that geology is a derivative science.4 Geological reasoning has
been thought to consist of a few rules of
thumb (e.g., uniformity, superposition) guiding the use of mathematics and the application of the laws of chemistry and physics to
geologic phenomena. Geology was also seen
as having a host of problems that undercut
its claims to knowledge: incompleteness of
data, because of the gaps in and the poor
resolution of the stratigraphic record; the
lack of experimental control that is possible
in the laboratory-based sciences; and the
great spans of time required for geologic processes to take place, making direct observation difficult or impossible.
These factors have made geology seem to
be a less-than-ideal candidate for philosophic consideration. In fact, the philosophy
of science has traditionally viewed physics
(namely, classical mechanics) as the paradigmatic science. Physics was the first science to establish itself on a firm footing, exemplifying the true nature of science as
certain, precise, and predictive knowledge
of the world. Since the 17th century, all
other sciences (and philosophy) have been
judged in terms of how well they meet these
standards.5
Physics also fulfilled the demand that scientific knowledge be analytically derived.
This is the belief, originating with Descartes,
that objects and processes are understood
by breaking them down into their simplest
parts.6 A synthetic science such as geology
was thought to resolve itself into its constituents of physics and chemistry. Important
here too was the belief that science constituted a unified subject, distinguished by one
universally applicable methodology. By de-

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960

scribing this single logical procedure one

would have a general account that with a few
modifications would be sufficient for all the
sciences.
Most of the thinking on the nature of geological reasoning has come from within the
geologic community itself. While limited in
amount, and too often neglected, there exists an important body of work beginning
with essays dating from the classic era of geology (e.g., Gilbert 1886; Chamberlin, 1890),
when the connection between natural science and philosophy was much more explicit
in the minds of scientists. Recent work in
this area ranges from reflections on the
methodology underlying a particular field of
geology (e.g., Anderton, 1985) to more synoptic accounts of geological reasoning (Albritton, 1963; Schumm, 1991; Ager, 1993).
In their own class are the writings of Stephen Jay Gould, whose work often bridges
the gap between geology and the humanities
and who may be the only geologist widely
known outside the field.7 Finally, there are
two texts that explicitly focus on the task of
giving a full-fledged philosophy of geology:
Kitts (1977) and Von Engelhardt and Zimmerman (1988).
This work has made real and lasting contributions to our understanding of geology
and science in general. But most of this work
is characterized by two qualities. First, it
largely accepts the description of geology as
a derivative science. Second, for historical
and cultural reasons that I will discuss below, philosophically inclined geologists have
usually turned to only one of the two major
traditions of contemporary philosophy
Analytic Philosophyfor help in describing
their science.
I believe that the received view of geology
as outlined above is mistaken. My interest as
a philosopher is in challenging the assumption that geology is merely applied and imprecise physics, vainly attempting to achieve
the latters degree of resolution and predictability. Rather, I believe that the challenges
and difficulties inherent to geological reasoning have prompted geologists to develop

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GEOLOGY AS AN INTERPRETIVE AND HISTORICAL SCIENCE

a variety of reasoning techniques that are

quite similar to some of those described and
used within Continental Philosophy.
My claim, then, is that geological reasoning consists of a combination of logical procedures. Some of these it shares with the
experimental sciences, while others are
more typical of the humanities in general
and Continental Philosophy in particular.
This combination of techniques is not utterly unique to geology; in fact, I would argue that such a combination is to one degree
or another present in most types of thinking,
scientific or otherwise. But I claim that this
combination is especially characteristic of
geological reasoning. If this view is correct,
then the physics envy that geology sometimes seems to suffer from (i.e., the sense of
inferiority concerning the status of geology
as compared with other, harder sciences)
is misplaced.
The rest of this essay explains and develops these claims. I begin with a brief review
of the philosophy of science in the 20th century. This section provides the background
necessary for understanding the standard
claims concerning the nature of geological
reasoning as well as the position I will be
staking out. In the next two sections I turn to
a description of the two most distinctive features of geological reasoning: its nature as a
hermeneutic (i.e., interpretive) and a historical science. I conclude that geological reasoning does indeed embody a distinctive
methodology within the sciences, and one
which offers a better overall model than
does physics for understanding the nature of
reasoning within the sciences and within everyday life.8
This essay is a synthetic work, bringing
together ideas from a number of different
authors and traditions. Its overall goal is political, in the sense that I hope it encourages
conversation between intellectual communities who have much to say to one another,
but who too often are estranged. For much
of what follows I make no claim to originality. Rather, my claim is that the question of
how geologists (and scientists in general) actually reason is of real importance and that
it has not been given the attention it deserves. The dangers of an unrealistic understanding of the nature and limits of science
are exemplified by the putative failure of
the U.S. National Acid Precipitation
Project, which was arguably a failure of expectations rather than of science (Herrick
and Jamieson, in press).

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

IN THE 20TH CENTURY
One prominent geologist has described
the relationship between geology and philosophy as follows: . . . earth scientists do
not find philosophical discussions of their
field very interesting. In fact, many scientists
treat the philosophy of science with exasperated contempt. (Schumm, 1991, p. 5).
It is nonetheless true that self-understanding in the sciences, including geology, is derived in part from what philosophers have
told science about itself. This description
sciences own understanding of the nature of
scienceis now significantly different from
the account of science that has recently been
developed within both Analytic and Continental philosophy of science. Many scientists, busy with their own work, are only
vaguely aware that the philosophy of science
has been in turmoil since the mid-1970s. Although these changes are far from complete,
the beginnings of a new consensus are
discernible.9
To appreciate the nature of this new consensus, and what it means for our understanding of the science of geology, we must
first review the status quo to which it is a
response. During the 20th century, Western
philosophy has consisted of two main
schools of thought, Analytic and Continental. The fundamental difference between
these two approaches has turned on their
attitude toward the nature and scope of scientific knowledge. At their most basic, the
original claims of Analytic Philosophy (ca.
1940) can be reduced to two: (1) all knowledge available to humans is exclusively derived through the method employed by science, and (2) the scientific method itself
consists of an identifiable procedure of inductive and deductive logic sharply distinguished from other types of thought (i.e.,
other philosophic or literary techniques
such as traditional metaphysics, phenomenology, or literary criticism).
Early Analytic philosophers such as Russell (1914), Carnap (1937), and Reichenbach (1928, 1958) developed a powerful
characterization of the scientific method.
Their conclusions may be summarized by
the following three claims. First, the scientific method is objective. This means that the
discovery of scientific truth can and must be
separate from any personal, ethical/political,
or metaphysical commitments. This is the
basis of the celebrated fact/value distinction,
which holds that the facts discovered by the
scientist are quite distinct from whatever

values he or she might hold. Personal or cultural values must not enter into the scientific
reasoning process. A closely related point
was the insistence that one must distinguish
between the logic of discovery and the
logic of explanation. Identifying the particular social or psychological processes responsible for the scientists insights was the
job of the social scientist. The philosopher
of science was only interested in the logical
procedures that justified a scientific claim.
Second, the scientific method is empirical. Science is built upon a rigorous distinction between observations (which again
were understood, at least ideally, as being
factual and unequivocal) and theory. Facts
themselves were not theory-dependent; observation was thought to be a matter of taking a good look. The distinction between
statements that describe and statements that
evaluate was viewed as unproblematic.
Third, the scientific method constitutes an
epistemological monism. Science was thought
to consist of an single, identifiable set of logical procedures applicable to all fields of
study. This reduction of all knowledge to
one kind of knowledge proceeded in two
steps, summarized by the terms scientism
and reductionism. Scientism is the belief
that the scientific method provides us with
the only reliable way to know. Reductionism
is the further claim that it is possible to reduce all sciences to one science, physics.
It is important to note that the original
research program of Analytic Philosophy,
known as Logical Positivism, was challenged
from within Analytic Philosophy by the early
1950s. Authors such as Quine (1953), Goodman (1951), and Popper (1953) raised fundamental questions concerning many of the
points mentioned above. But for our purposes the crucial point is this: these debates
stayed in-house in the sense that the basic
orientation of Analytic Philosophy remained
intact until at least the mid-1970s. Thus,
while the exact status of scientific knowledge
became more problematic, the general assumption that science (i.e., physics) was the
model for knowing was not seriously questioned. Similarly, the degree of objectivity of
scientific knowledge may have been unclear,
but science was still thought of as essentially
value-free in comparison with ethical or political issues. Finally, while the positivist belief in the strict reducibility of all knowledge
to physics was abandoned, the belief in the
existence of one uniform method for all the
sciences was still generally held to.10
Thusand this bears emphasiswhile at
the cutting-edge of Analytic Philosophy,

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R. FRODEMAN

these assumptions were to some degree being questioned, and the received wisdom
within the philosophic community and for
others such as those within the scientific
communityretained a fundamentally positivistic orientation. Our basic story concerning the nature of science came to be questioned only with the Kuhnian revolution.11
The claims of Continental Philosophy
the other main school of contemporary philosophy concerning science can also be
summarized in two points: (1) whereas science offers us a powerful tool for the discovery of truth, science is not the only, or
even necessarily the best way that humans
come to know reality, and (2) the existence
of the scientific method (understood as
above) is a myth. Science has neither the
priority in the discovery of truth, nor the
unity and cohesiveness of one identifiable
method, nor the distance from ethical, epistemological, and metaphysical commitments that Analytic Philosophy claims it has.
Thus, Continental Philosophys basic orientation (since Hegel, ca. 1806) comes from its
attempt to define the scope and limits of
scientific knowledge as well as to identify
what other ways we have for discovering
truth. The 200 year history of Continental
Philosophy can be seen as a series of attempts to invent or define other ways of
knowing (e.g., dialectics, phenomenology,
hermeneutics, existentialism).
Initially, Analytic Philosophy and Continental Philosophy engaged in a common debate on the nature of knowledge, but by the
mid-20th century an informal division of labor had taken place. Analytic Philosophy focused on the intricacies of the philosophy of
science. It understood philosophy as being
ancillary to science, codifying and making
explicit the logic of science that scientists
already practiced, as well as deflating the
claims of other pseudo-scientific and nonscientific modes of knowing. For its part,
Continental Philosophy mostly ceded the
analysis of science to Analytic Philosophy.
Its main interest in science was not in scientific methodology per se, but in identifying what science left out in its one
dimensional (Marcuse, 1964) approach to
knowledge and experience. Continental Philosophy focused its attention on those types
of experience not amenable to the scientific
method: art, culture, subjectivity, and the
force of the irrational in our lives. Continental Philosophy insisted that these areas
were not truly understandable through the
scientific method.

962

Thus, as a first approximation, it is accurate to say that Analytic Philosophy became

that part of philosophy concerned with the
natural world, while Continental Philosophy
concerned itself with those questions relating to our cultural and personal life. One
result of this division was that Continental
Philosophy (with its pluralist attitude toward
the question of how we know) did not use its
conceptual tools to describe the nature of
reasoning in the various sciences, particularly the natural sciences. Another was that
what most scientists came to know as philosophy was the tradition and assumptions
of Analytic Philosophy, particularly in the
guise of Logical Posivitism.
This division of philosophy has begun to
change only during the past few years. The
single most important cause of its breakdown has been the influence of Thomas
Kuhn (1970).12 Trained as a physicist before
turning to the history and philosophy of science, Kuhn shook the foundations of Analytic philosophy of science. Kuhn undermined each of the assumptions described
above, arguing persuasively that the history
of science is not simply the story of unequivocal progress. Rather, conceptual revolutions in science are often the result of abandoning one set of questions or assumptions
for another.
Kuhn argued that there is often no common measure for comparing different accounts of a given set of phenomena. Each
account may be irreducible to any other, the
differences in description being the result of
the different types of questions asked, the
different types of criteria used, and the different goals of the research. This claim entailed that knowledge, rather than being
value free, cannot be separated from human
interests. What is called scientific truth now
may depend as much on our needs and desires as on any unequivocal or objective set
of criteria.13
For instance, epistemological and pragmatic values can be in competition. If our
criteria for understanding is predictive control, we may decide to tolerate theoretical
inconsistencies. If, on the other hand, our
paramount goal is rational consistency, we
may set aside the question of prediction or
pragmatic control. More overtly political decisions can also affect what seems to be an
objective process: if the energy crisis is defined as a problem of supply (we need more
oil), we will find a different set of facts and
a different range of possible solutions than if
it is defined as a problem of demand (we
need to conserve). Kuhn thus made it pos-

sible to imagine a plurality of scientific approaches to a given problem, each with its
own particular strength or virtue.
The irony is that while Kuhn undercut the
main body of assumptions of Analytic Philosophy, raising issues from a perspective
more typical of Continental Philosophy, he
has been placed traditionally (if not always
comfortably) within the framework of Analytic Philosophy. Conversely, Continental
Philosophy itself (with a few exceptions) still
has not examined scientific knowledge with
the tools at its disposal.14 My project here is
to use the approach and concepts of the
Continental tradition to describe what is distinctive about the theory and practice of
geology.
GEOLOGY AS A HERMENEUTIC
SCIENCE
The two distinctive characteristics of reasoning in the earth sciences that I will discuss in the following sections are geologys
nature as a hermeneutic (interpretive) and
as a historical science.
The term hermeneutics means theory of
interpretation; hermeneutics is the art or
science of interpreting texts. A text (by
which is meant, typically, a literary work) is
a system of signs, the meaning of which is
not apparent but must be deciphered. This
deciphering takes place through assigning
differing types or degrees of significance to
the various elements making up the text.
The status of this deciphered meaning has
been the source of some dispute; in the 19th
century it was claimed that, when properly
applied to a text, hermeneutic technique resulted in knowledge as objective as that of
the natural sciences. In the 20th century,
however, hermeneutics has claimed that the
deciphering of meaning always involves the
subtle interplay of what is objectively
there in the text with what the reader brings
to the text in terms of presuppositions and
expectations. In effect, hermeneutics rejects
the claim that facts can ever be completely
independent of theory.15
Hermeneutics originated in the early 19th
century as a means of reconciling contradictory statements in the Bible through a systematic interpretation of its various claims.
In the early 20th century hermeneutics was
applied to historical (including legal) documents to help discover the original meaning
of the author. Hermeneutics was (and still
is) used when a theologian argues which
parts of the Bible to read literally and which
metaphorically, and what weight to give to

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GEOLOGY AS AN INTERPRETIVE AND HISTORICAL SCIENCE

each part. Similarly, the literary scholar proceeds hermeneutically when she claims that
a narrators comments are to be taken seriously rather than ironically, as does the psychologist when he interprets a slip of the
tongue to be significant or not.
In the 20th century, however, hermeneutics has moved from being a rather straightforward methodology of the Geistwissenshaften (i.e., the humanities; literally, the
spiritual sciences) to a more general account of knowing. Hermeneutic philosophers such as Heidegger (1927, 1962) have
argued that all human understanding (including the natural sciences, although this
was not his main concern) is fundamentally
interpretive. Not only books, but the entire
world was a text to be read; in no field
does one find completely objective data or
information purely given. How we perceive the object is always shaped (though not
completely determined; objects assert their
own independence) by how we conceive and
act on the object with the sets of tools, concepts, expectations, and values that we bring
to the object.
When we apply this point to geology, this
becomes the claim: geologic understanding
is best understood as a hermeneutic process.
The geologist assigns different values to various aspects of the outcrop, judging which
characteristics or patterns in the rock are
significant and which are not. Examining an
outcrop is not simply a matter of taking a
good look. Rather, the geologist picks up
on the clues of past events and processes in
a way analogous to how the physician interprets the signs of illness or the detective
builds a circumstantial case against a
defendant.
Most of us are familiar with the hermeneutical aspect of understanding, the shift in
our awareness of an object when we approach it with a fresh set of concepts or expectations. This happens regularly to students when they are first introduced to a
subject. While in college I enrolled in an
introductory course in art history. Lacking
previous instruction in art, but armed with
my prejudices, I approached the course with
a sceptical attitude. Each class began with
lights dimmed, as the professor showed a
slide of a famous work of art. She then gave
us a few minutes to consider it on our own.
Typically especially at the beginning of the
semesterI saw nothing of any significance
in the slide, and I could not understand why
it was considered a great work of art. Yet it
became a truism that after a few minutes of
lecture, during which the professor intro-

duced a set of concepts for reading the

artwork, the piece would undergo the most
striking change. Aided by these concepts, I
now saw the piece as if for the first time.
Like art history, with which it shares a
strongly visual component, geology is an especially hermeneutic science: the outcrop
typically means nothing to the uninitiated
until the geologist introduces concepts for
seeing the rock.16
This shift from the belief that data are
objectively given to the scientific observer,
to the view that all human knowledge is fundamentally hermeneuticthat our perceptions are always to some degree structured
by our conceptions has portentious implications for our understanding of both the
nature of scientific knowledge and the relationship between science and society at
large. In sum, it makes the question of human interestspersonal, ethical/political,
and metaphysicalintrinsic rather than external to the work of science. The theoretic
assumptions that the scientist brings to his
or her workwhat counts as significant,
what work is worth doingstructure to one
degree or another all that is examined, seen,
and reported.
Contemporary hermeneutics claims that
this mix of percept and concept is fundamental to all human understanding. All the
world is a text; all understanding is, in the
words of Merleau-Ponty (1960; contained in
Johnson, 1993), a combination of eye and
mind. The exact degree of objectivity (to
use a word that no longer serves us well) in
our accounts of the world is open to argument; but the belief in the scientist as the
purely objective observer is no longer viable.
But this does not entail (except on the most
radical reading) that all of our accounts of
the world, scienctific or otherwise, are entirely subjective. The truths of science, as
with most things, fall somewhere in the
middle.
Philosophic hermeneutics does not purport to offer a strict methodology analogous
to how Analytic Philosophy understood the
scientific method to operate. The role of
hermeneutics is not to develop a set of rules
for proper interpretation, but to clarify the
general conditions under which understanding takes place. There are, however, three
basic concepts of hermeneutics which are
worth outlining, for they play a fundamental
role in any hermeneutic process, including
geological reasoning. These are the hermeneutic circle, the forestructures of understanding, and the historical nature of
knowledge.17

The founding concept of hermeneutics is

known as the hermeneutic circle. Heidegger
(1927, 1962) argued that understanding is
fundamentally circular; when we strive to
comprehend something, the meaning of its
parts is understood from its relationship to
the whole, while our conception of the
whole is constructed from an understanding
of its parts. So, for instance, the meaning of
this sentence is conceived in terms of the
entire paper, and vice versa. More to the
point, our understanding of an outcrop is
based on our understanding of the individual beds, which are in turn made sense of in
terms of their relationship to the entire outcrop. This back-and-forth process of reasoning operates on all levels; wholes at one level
of analysis become parts at another. Thus,
our understanding of a region is based on
our interpretation of the individual outcrops
in that region, and vice versa; and our interpretation of an individual bed within an
outcrop is based on our understanding of
the sediments and structures that make up
that bed, and vice versa. On a still more
complex level, our overall comprehension of
the CenomanianTuronian boundary event
is determined through an intricate weighing
of the various types of evidence (e.g., lithology, macro- and micropaleontology, and
geochemistry). This overall interpretation is
then used to evaluate the status of the individual pieces of evidence.
Such circular reasoning is usually viewed
as a vice, a logical fallacy to be avoided at all
cost. But Heidegger argued that this type of
circularity is not only unavoidable, it is actually, if properly handled, the means by
which understanding progresses. Understanding begins when we develop a first conception of the overall meaning of the object.
Without this initial conception we would
have no criterion for making sense of the
object. This provisional interpretation is
called into question when we are pulled up
short by details in the object (or text) that
do not jibe with our overall conception. This
forces us to revise our interpretation of the
whole as well as our interpretation of the
other particulars. Comprehension deepens
in this circular fashion, as we revise our conception of the whole by the new meaning
suggested by the parts, and our understanding of the parts by our new understanding of
the whole.
One consequence of the hermeneutic circle is that it puts to rest the claim that it is
possible to approach an object in a neutral
manner, open to all possibilities. Rather, we
always come to our object of study with a set

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R. FRODEMAN

of prejudgments: an idea of what the problem is, what type of information we are looking for, and what will count as an answer.
What keeps these prejudgments from slipping into dogmatism and prejudicethat is,
what makes science as distinguished from
ideology still possibleis the fact that they
are not blind. We remain open to correction, allowing the text or object to instruct us
and suggest new meanings and approaches.
This brings us to a second point revelant
to geological reasoning. Heidegger identified three types of prejudgments or forestructures that we bring to every situation.
First are our preconceptions, the ideas and
theories that we rely on when thinking about
an object. Concepts are not neutral tools;
rather, they allow us to get hold of an object
in a particular way, opening up certain possibilities and encouraging certain ways of
understanding while closing off others.
Thus, for instance, to approach the Western
Cordillera with concepts like ophiolite complexes and accretionary terranes will affect
what one sees in the field. These preconceptions include our initial definition of the object to be investigated as well as the criteria
used to identify which facts are significant
and which are not.
Second is our foresight, our idea of the
presumed goal of our inquiry and our sense
of what will count as an answer. Heidegger
argues that without some vague (and, one
hopes, open-minded) sense of what type of
answer we are looking for, we would not recognize it when we find it. Again, this implies
that the values of the scientistwhat he or
she hopes to find or achieveare intrinsic
rather than extrinsic to the scientific
enterprize.
Third, we always approach the object of
study with a set of practices we have in advance, what Heidegger called our fore-having. These are the culturally acquired set of
implements, skills, and institutions that one
brings to the object of study. In field geology, implements include the geologists
hammer, 0.10% HCl, a measuring tape, a
hand lens, a Jacobs staff, pencil and paper,
and a Brunton compass. At the lab there is
another set of tools: display trays, rock saws,
computers, acids, a light microscope, and a
scanning electron microscope.
As with our preconceptions, the nature of
these tools shape the type of information
collected; without a light microscope one
could not study the structure of nannoplankton; without a mass spectrometer isotopic
geochemistry would be impossible. With a
different set of tools other data would be

964

gathered that would give us a different (possibly a quite different) sense of the object.
This concept of fore-having also includes
the various skills that the geologist learns in
the field or the laboratory: map-making,
measuring strike and dip, preparing samples, cleaning and preserving specimens,
and even how to properly wield a hammer to
split a rock without destroying fossils. Included here as well are the mathematical
and statistical techniques used in research.
Just as crucial, however, and often discounted, are the social and political structures of science: professors, various graduate students, research groups, professional
associations, and other types of groups. Science is a social as well as a mental activity,
dependent on the existence of a community
of scholars. The work of science proceeds
through having colleagues to bounce ideas
off of, professional societies and journals to
define hot topics and favored lines of research, and graduate students for help with
running labs and collecting samples.18
The third basic concept of hermeneutics,
applicable to geology and indeed to all the
sciences, is the historical nature of human
understanding. Here the claim (distinct
from the argument of the next section) is
that the particular prejudgments we start
with have a lasting effect. It is often claimed
that, no matter what assumptions or goals
we begin with, the scientific method will
eventually bring us to the same final understanding of objective reality. Hermeneutics
argues otherwise: our original goals and assumptions result in certain facts being discovered rather than others, which in turn
lead to new avenues of research and sets of
facts. Any scientist can name areas of potential importance that do not get pursued
because of the lack of time and resources or
the lack of sufficient commitment on the
part of the scientific community. As these
decisions get multiplied over the decades
the body of scientific knowledge comes to
have a strongly historical component.
Heideggers claims as they relate to science and especially to geology can be summarized in two theses. First, he rejects the
view that data are purely given and that theories are totally objective constructions.
Rather, science is seen as involving various
types of values that are not only unavoidable
but also necessary and productive to the discovery of truth. Second, science is not only
something that one thinks; it is also something one does. Science is a social and historical activity structured to a significant degree by the scientists skills and equipment,

as well as by the institutional structures of

the scientific field and the culture at large.

GEOLOGY AS A HISTORICAL
SCIENCE
Hull (1976) identified four historical sciences: cosmology, geology, paleontology,
and human history. A historical science is
defined by the role that historical explanation plays in its work. While explanation
within the historical sciences uses many of
the tools common to all sciences (i.e., the
deductive-nomological model of explanation, defined below), there remains a fundamental and distinctive difference in historical explanation. This difference as it
relates to geology can be characterized in
terms of three points: the limited role or
relevance of laboratory experiments, resulting in geologys dependence on other types
of reasoning; the problem of natural kinds
(i.e., the question of defining the object of
study within historical geology); and geologys nature as a narrative science.
Insofar as their work is based on laboratory experimentation, the experimental sciences (e.g., physics and chemistry) are essentially non-historical: the particularities of
place and time play no significant role in the
reasoning process. Work takes place in the
lab, an ideal space where conditions can be
controlled. Truth claims in these disciplines
presuppose that other researchers can recreate the identical conditions of the initial
experiment within their own laboratory.
Thus, for a truth claim to count as scientific,
a scientist in Oslo must be able to reproduce
results identical to those of the original experimenter in Seattle. In this sense, time and
history have no place in the experimental
sciences.19
Of course, in another sense time and history are an inescapable part of every science;
a chemical reaction takes time to complete,
and every chemical reaction is historical in
that it has some feature, no matter how insignificant, that distinguishes it from every
other reaction. But our interest in chemical
reactions typically is not in chronicling the
specific historical conditions that affect a
given reaction, but rather in abstracting a
general or ideal truth about a given class of
chemical reactions. Even the chemicals used
are idealized, in that the supplies used by the
chemist have been assayed for purity. A particular chemical reaction thus becomes
merely an instance of a general law or
principle.

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GEOLOGY AS AN INTERPRETIVE AND HISTORICAL SCIENCE

In the historical sciences, in contrast, the

specific causal circumstances surrounding
the individual entity (what led up to it, and
what its consequences were) are the main
concern of the researcher.20 In geology, the
goal is not primarily to identify general laws,
but rather to chronicle the particular events
that occurred at a given location (at the outcrop, for the region, or for the entire planet). This means that hypotheses are not testable in the way they are in the experimental
sciences. Although the geologist may be able
to duplicate the laboratory conditions of anothers experiment (e.g., studying the nature
of deformation through experiments with
play-doh), the relationship of these experiments to the particularities of Earths history (e.g., the Idaho-Wyoming overthrust
belt) remains uncertain.
The crucial point here is that the historical sciences are distinguished by a different
set of criteria for what counts as an explanation. To borrow and adapt an example
from Hull (1976), when we ask why someone has died, we are not satisfied with the
appeal to the law of nature that all organisms die, true as that is; we are asking for
an account of the particular circumstances
surrounding that persons demise. Similarly,
in geology we are largely interested in historical individuals (this outcrop, the Western Interior Seaway, the lifespan of a species) and their specific life history. It is
possible to identify general laws in geology
that have explanatory power e.g., Walthers law but the weight of our interest
lies elsewhere. The central role played by
the question of what counts as an explanation again highlightsand this is one of the
main points of this essaythe impossibility
of separating knowledge from human
interests.21
Faced with the difficulties of modeling the
geologic past because of problems of temporal and spatial scale and the singularity
and complexity of geologic events, the geologist turns to other types of explanation,
such as reasoning by analogy, the method of
hypothesis, and eliminative induction. A
thorough analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of these and other argumentative
techniques is the subject of another paper.22
Here I limit myself to a discussion of the role
of arguments from analogy in geological
reasoning.
Arguments from analogy play a crucial
role in the historical sciences; the assumption of analogy between past and present is
what makes it possible to treat these subjects
as sciences at all, that is, as amenable to ra-

tional explanation. Just as claims within human history must assume that we can analogize from what we know of human
motivations today to make sense of past actions, reasoning in historical geology is built
upon the assumption that the present is the
key to the pastthat present-day geologic
processes operate in a manner similar to
those of the past.
Within geology the assumption of analogy
between past and present has been given explicit recognition in the principle of uniformitarianism. Recent discussions of uniformity (Rudwick, 1976a; Berggren and Van
Couvering, 1984; Gould, 1987) have described the confused way this principle has
sometimes been used. Following Rudwick,
Gould argues that geologists have at times
conflated four different types of uniformity.
The first two, the methodological claims of
uniformity of law and process, are nothing
more than geologys version of sciences
twin assumptions that nature is governed by
lawlike behavior, and that we should not invent new or unknown causes until we have
exhausted the ones we have. The second
two, uniformity of rate (gradualism) and of
state (i.e., that the Earth is in steady state,
with no periods of significantly warmer climate, higher sea level, or more volcanic activity) make substantive claims about the
Earths history that have been largely rejected by the geological community.
The overall effect of Goulds account is
deflationary; uniformitarianism becomes a
rather common-sense principle embodying
no peculiarly geological claims. By separating methodological from substantive uniformitarianism Gould empties the principle of
any specifically geological meaning. He
therefore arrives at a position identical to
Nelson Goodman (1967), who concludes
. . . the Principle of Uniformity dissolves
into a principle of simplicity that is not peculiar to geology but pervades all science.
The nature of geological reasoning is again
not different in principle from any other
science.
But this reduction of uniformitarianism to
the principle of simplicity leaves too much
unexplained. The problem is that the
present is too small a window into the past
to provide the geologist with a full set of
analogs. This is true in two senses. First, by
rejecting the claims of uniformity of state,
the geologic community is acknowledging
that some of the depositional environments
of the past (e.g., epeiric seas, Bretz floods)
do not exist today; but, one can scarcely
draw a strict analogy from a nonexistent

contemporary environment. Second, there

are inescapable disanalogies between our
human experience of time and the expanses
of geologic time. Thus, uniformity can never
tell us how to adjust modern conditions to
rocks that have been altered by diagenesis or
other time-dependent factors. By traveling
to the Caroina coast, we can see a burrower
and the trail it leaves behind, but no process
that we can observe today will tell us how
this burrow will look after 100 million yr. Of
course, we can attempt to model these differences in the lab or on a computer, but this
ultimately only recapitulates our problem,
for we cannot be certain of the parameters
we set, nor can we run our model for geologic amounts of space or time.23
Physicists may, if they like, retest the gravitational constant at the beginning of each
day; and historians of human culture have
modern examples of revolution or mass hysteria to examine for comparison with
records of the past. But geology (as well as
the other historical sciences of paleontology
and cosmology) is historical in a deeper
sense; given the complexity of geologic
events, our lack of experience of all geologic
environments and of geologic spans of time,
and our interest in the singularity of each
event, geologists cannot simply project the
present onto the past. Of course, the geologist is not entirely disarmed; the extrapolation from current rates of erosion to arguments concerning the time it takes a
mountain range to be leveled provide us
with some sense of things. This result via
analogy is then compared with the results of
other lines of reasoning, such as the method
of hypothesis, where one reasons back
from the existence of a feature to a hypothesized explanation consistent with the evidence at hand. But it is this sense of the
overall coherence of a theory, rather than a
simple correspondence between present
and the past, that defines geologic
reasoning.
There is a second aspect of the historical
sciences that merits mention. Historical entities present a unique challenge as an object
of study (cf. White, 1963; Hull, 1976, 1981).
The issue is deceptively simple: How does
one define the object of study? In other sciences, the objects of study appear as natural kinds. The nucleus of an atom consists
of neutrons and protons, the distinction between which seems written into the very
structure of the atom. But historical entities
do not spring into being fully formed, nor do
they remain unchanged to the time of their
destruction. The researcher in the historical

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R. FRODEMAN

sciences is faced with identifying the set of

characteristics that define an individual entity, and with deciding how much change can
occur before we have a new entity rather
than simply a modification of the old. Thus,
in considering the Colorado Plateau as a historical entity, we are faced with defining its
nature and extent and at what point in the
geologic past it became an identifiable and
discrete individual. Similarly, the paleontologist must decide when a fossil in an
evolving lineage constitutes a new species.
White (1963) and Hull (1976) argue that
it is the concept of a central subject that
allows the construction of a historical explanation. A central subject is the organizational identity that ties together disparate
facts and incidents. In human history a wide
variety of entities can function as the principle of organization: individuals or social
groups, corporate entities (companies, nations), even ideas (the idea of progress). In
geology there is a similar range of historical
individuals: the Laramide orogeny, the Cretaceous Western Interior seaway, the Bridge
Creek Limestone, and the species Mytiloides
mytiloides are examples of central subjects.
Central subjects provide the coherence
necessary for an intelligible narrative to be
constructed out of a seemingly disconnected
set of objects or events. But since these subjects are not natural kinds, they can be defined in different ways. This means that geologists may come to define different objects
of study and thus develop different interpretations of what at first appeared to be an
unproblematic subject of investigation. A
simple example of this is the different interpretations that can result from dividing a
stratigraphic section into different units
according to different criteria, for example,
by physical characteristics (shale, standstone, etc.) or in terms of genetically associated relationships (transgressive-regressive sequences, etc.).
Finally, the historical sciences are distinguished by the decisive role of narrative
logic in their explanations. Narrative logic is
a type of understanding where details are
made sense of in terms of the overall structure of a story. Unlike the experimental sciences, where predictions are made by combining general laws with a description of
initial conditions (the deductive-nomological model), the historical sciences are not
primarily in the business of making predictions. Historical narratives do not explain an
event by subsuming it under a generalization, but rather by integrating it into an organized whole. Thus an outcrop does not

966

make sense until it contributes to and is a

component of an overall story.24
Narrative is often dismissed as a vague
and literary form of knowledge lacking in
the logical rigor and evidential support appropriate to the hard sciences.25 But this
begs the question of whether narrative has a
logic or rigor of its own and whether scientific explanation itself is dependent on narrative logic. Continental philosophers have
argued that these two types of knowing are
integrally related to and complement one
another. In Time and Narrative, Paul
Ricoeur (1985; see also Ricoeur, 1987)
claims that narrative is our most basic way of
making sense of experience. Scientific explanation is based on narrative in the sense
that, through telling a story, we create a context that defines and gives meaning to our
research and data. Thus, the examination of
the Greenland Ice Sheet Project ice core is
explained and justified by our concern with
global climate change, and the study of black
shales is funded because of the larger story
it fits within (e.g., its relevance to hydrocarbon exploration). In historical geology, scientific reasoning is placed within the context
of a narrative of a locality or region of Earth
(or the entire Earth). It is characteristic of
their discipline that geologists tell a story
that gives a larger context and meaning to
their researcha skill that all scientists may
be called upon to master in an era when
science faces a struggle for funding.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this account of geological reasoning I
have argued that while geology depends in
part on the classic deductive-nomological
method of the experimental sciences, geology is also distinguished by a discrete set of
logical procedures. Viewing geology from
the perspective of physics skews our understanding of geological reasoning. Geology
only partially lives up to the classic model of
scientific reasoning. But rather than viewing
geology as somehow a lesser or derivative
science, I have argued that geological reasoning provides an outstanding model of another type of scientific reasoning based in
the techniques of hermeneutics and those of
the historical sciences. Geology is a preeminent example of a synthetic science, combining a variety of logical techniques in the
solution of its problems. The geologist exemplifies Levi-Strausss (1966) bricoleur, the
thinker whose intellectual toolbox contains
a variety of tools that he or she selects as
appropriate to the job at hand.

There are two important consequences of

these claims. First, scientific reasoning in
general and geological reasoning in particular are complex operations. It stands to
reason that a greater degree of self-consciousness about the nature of the reasoning
process can help the scientist in his or her
work. Second, the goal of this essay is not
only to identify the different logical procedures operating within the sciences, but also
to point the way to a more relevant and vibrant notion of reasoning within the sciences and our culture in general.
Scientific reasoning is too often caricatured as a cookbook method that provides
us with infallible answers. This misrepresentation damages both science and culture
when the inevitable disappointment sets in.
The scientific reasoning process typified by
geology offers an account of reasoning more
applicable to the uncertainties and complexities of our lives. We are seldom in possession of all the data we would like for making
a decision, and it is not always clear that the
data we possess are unbiased or objective.
We are forced to fill in the gaps in our
knowledge with interpretation and reasonable assumptions that we hope will be subsequently confirmed. Thus, the methods of a
hermeneutic and historical science better
mirror the complexities we face as historical
beings.
It is likely that this type of reasoning will
become more crucial in the next century.
Many of the issues we face (global warming,
and various types of risk and resource assessment) are by their nature both scientific
and ethical, with the scientific aspect of the
problem deeply influenced by interpretation
and uncertainty. Yucca Mountain may symbolize the type of problems we will face, as
we ask how to scientifically evaluate the viability of this proposed site for the permanent disposal of nuclear waste, while including in our decision-making the rights of
future generations to a safe environment.26
In an uncertain world, where we are constantly asked to compare incommeasurables
(present needs versus obligations to the future; quantitative and qualitative factors)
geology provides another, and I believe better, model for reasoning than has our traditional model of the sciences.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Thanks to Erle G. Kauffman, whose support has been vital; to Chris Buczinsky and
Dugald Owen, who have discussed these issues with me on many occasions; and to Ste-

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GEOLOGY AS AN INTERPRETIVE AND HISTORICAL SCIENCE

phen Jay Gould, Victor R. Baker, and an

anonymous reviewer, whose comments
saved this paper from numerous errors and
omissions.
ENDNOTES
1. Philosophic consideration of the revolution
in plate tectonics can be found in Giere (1988).
Typical conclusions by philosophers concerning
the status of geology are those of Nelson Goodman (1967, p. 99) (In conclusion, then, the Principle of Uniformity dissolves into the principle of
simplicity that is not peculiar to geology but pervades all science and even daily life.) and Richard A. Watson (1969, p. 488) (Geology is a science just like other sciences, for example physics
or chemistry.). Although not concerned with the
question of the status of geology as a science,
John Salliss Stone (1994) is a recent exception to
the general neglect of geology within philosophy.
2. For accounts of the Copernican Revolution
in our conception of space, cf. Koyre (1957) and
Kuhn (1957). The phrase deep time for geologic spans of time was coined by John McPhee
(cf. McPhee, 1981).
3. Time has been the central issue within
Continental Philosophy since Hegel, ca. 1806.
One measure of this is the importance of Heideggers Being and Time (1927, 1962), the most influental work in Continental Philosophy in the
20th century. But despite the prominence of historicist approaches to epistemology within contemporary Continental Philosophy, to my knowledge no attention has been given to the concept of
geologic time. Awareness of the cultural or philosophic implications of the revolution in geologic
time is more typical of the history of ideas than of
philosophy (cf. Gillispie, 1959; Toulmin and
Goodfield, 1965; Goldman, 1982).
4. In addition to the authors cited in Endnote
1, cf. Schumm (1991) (It is generally agreed that
geology is a derivative science.) and Bucher
(1941).
5. My account here is a gloss upon a story that
is obviously quite complex. One might well reply
that today, when the philosophy of science considers physics the paradigm science, it is physics
qua relativity theory and quantum mechanics
rather than classical mechanics that are being reflected on. My claim rests upon the distinction
between the state of knowledge within a given
field, and the representation of that field outside
the realm of specialists. Possibly the most remarkable thing about the new physics is how little impact it has had on our cultures epistemological
views, whether within the intellectual community
or with the public at large. Physics qua classical
mechanics still provides us with our basic model
for understanding the nature of knowledge. Consider, for instance, how introductory physics is
taught in U.S. colleges to this day. At my own
institution (University of Colorado), introductory
physics begins with several weeks on classical mechanics. Quantum mechanics is not taught until
the third semester of physics, long after the vast
majority of students have stopped taking physics
classes. Thus, while physicists struggle to integrate
quantum physics into an overall picture of reality,
the received wisdom has continued to be that classical mechanics still provides the model for un-

derstanding the nature of science, and indeed of

knowledge in general.
6. For the classic statement of this claim, cf.
Descartess Rules for the direction of the mind
(1964; written in 1627, first published in 1701).
7. Gould (1987, 1989) is especially relevant to
the points I will be making. Cf. Gould (1989,
p. 277291) for an argument that parallels much
of what follows.
8. In the interests of full disclosure, it should
be noted that my own limited training in geology
(I am presently completing a Masters in geology)
is in biostratigraphy. Someone with another type
of training (e.g., geochemistry) might well put
more emphasis on the causal aspect of geological
reasoning. Nevertheless, I believe it is possible to
set these differences to one side in recognition of
the fact that what is crucial about geological reasoning is (1) its historical and interpretive components, and (2) how these components tie into
the undeniably causal element of geology.
9. What follows summarizes a complex and
controversial history. The complexity in part derives from the fact that we are simultaneously considering discussions within the community of philosophers of science, as well as the impact of these
discussions on those within the scientific community. For other accounts see Hacking (1983),
Rajchman and West (1985), Rorty (1979), Giere
(1988), Rouse (1987), and Kitchner (1993). It
should be emphasized that the new view of science that I argue for in terms of Continental Philosophy, could also, with some modifications, be
made in terms of recent Analytic philosophy of
science. Much (though far from all) of the latter
(e.g., see Kitcher, 1993) is keenly aware of the
hermeneutic nature of science. Thus, my account
of Analytic philosophy of science becomes inadequate and even to some extent unfair when we
consider its work during the past decade. But
these new developments have not made much of
an impression upon the scientific communitys understanding of the nature of the scientific method.
I make these points through Continental Philosophy first because of my own greater familiarity
with this tradition. But more importantly, I believe that Continental Philosophy has greater conceptual resources for describing the nature of geology and of the sciences in general.
10. Feyerabend was an important early exception to the belief in the unity of the scientific
method. Cf. Feyerabend (1965).
11. This positivist orientation remains important within Analytic philosophy of science to this
day. Recent work in the fields of cognitive science,
artifical intelligence, and evolutionary epistemology still share these general assumptions. Cf.
Giere (1988), Kornblith (1985), Churchland
(1986), and Thagard (1992).
12. While Kuhns work was the single most
important impetus for the changes that I will discuss, he is to a certain degree a symbolic figure
representative of a larger movement within the
philosophy of science. Other important authors
include Toulmin and Goodfield (1965), Hanson
(1959), and Feyerabend (1965, 1977).
13. This is a strong interpretation of Kuhns
work (1962). Kuhn has vacillated on the degree to
which the results of science are shaped by social
values. In his later essays (cf. Kuhn, 1977) he has
retreated from some the claims made in The structure of scientific revolutions. This has not stopped
others from following the earlier, more radical

Kuhn. Rouse (1987) speaks of there being two

Kuhns, one more radical and the other more conventional in his attitude toward this question.
14. Exceptions to the general neglect of the
philosophy of science by Continental Philosophy
include the work of Heelan (1983), Kockelmans
and Kisiel (1970), and Rouse (1987).
15. For an introductory text in hermeneutics,
see Bleicher (1980). Gadamer (1975) offers a
more sophisticated historical account.
16. On the visual nature of the science of geology, see Martin J. S. Rudwick (1976b).
17. The argument that follows depends on an
entire tradition of hermeneutic philosophy, the
most important source being Heidegger (1927,
1962).
18. To adequately consider this topic would
require another paper. Since Latour and Woolgars Laboratory life: The social construction of scientific fact (1981), there has been a great deal of
work on the social and political influences on scientific research. Important sources in this area
include Pickering (1992), Traweek (1988), and
Knorr Cetina (1981).
19. Cf. Collins and Pinch (1993) for an account of the extraordinary difficulties in duplicating experiments often faced by researchers in the
experimental sciences.
20. I do not mean to deny the fact that there
is another aspect of geological research that emphasizes laws and processes (i.e., physical geology). But my focus is on what is distinctive about
geology when compared with other sciences, that
is, the perspective and interests of historical
geology.
21. The classic statement of this point is made
in Habermass Knowledge and human interests
(1971).
22. The first chapter of Rachel Laudans
From mineralogy to geology (1987) discusses 19th
century accounts of the various logical procedures
used by scientists (procedures, I would argue, that
are still constantly employed today). Stanley
Schum (1991) offers a succinct discussion of the
distinctive aspects of geological reasoning in To
interpret the Earth: Ten ways to be wrong. Schumm
groups his ten ways into three categories: problems of scale and place, of cause and process, and
of system response.
23. Derek V. Ager (1993, p. 81) makes a similar point in The nature of the stratigraphical record
when he asks, Is the present a long enough key
to penetrate the deep lock of the past?
24. Gould (1989, p. 280291) also argues for
the narrative nature of geology and the historical
sciences in general.
25. There is a wide and varied literature on
the question of narrative and the historical sciences. Cf. Carr (1986) for an excellent summary
and a set of references.
26. For further discussion of this point, see
Frodeman and Turner (1995).
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MANUSCRIPT RECEIVED BY THE SOCIETY JULY 18, 1994

REVISED MANUSCRIPT RECEIVED DECEMBER 21, 1994
MANUSCRIPT ACCEPTED DECEMBER 28, 1994

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Geological Society of America Bulletin, August 1995