OPEC Oil Outlook 2030
OPEC Oil Outlook 2030
OPEC Oil Outlook 2030
Table of contents
Executive summary
1.
Introduction
2.
3.
2
2
6
6
7
4.
Investment challenges
4.1
Reference Case investment requirements
4.2
Implications of a protracted recession
4.3
Uncertainty: a broader picture
4.4
Cost and human resources
4.5
Sustainable development
9
9
10
11
12
12
5.
Concluding remarks
13
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since the 11th International Energy Forum (IEF) in April 2008, there has
been unprecedented turbulence in energy markets in general, and oil markets in
particular. Oil prices have roller-coastered: starting 2008 at US$92/b, the OPEC
Reference Basket rose to a record $141/b in early July before falling to $33/b by the
end of the year, the lowest level since summer 2004. In 2009, the price recovered
from this low, reaching $77/b by the end of the year. The price swings of recent years
have led to more scrutiny from governments into the functioning of markets. It is
important to recognize the role played by futures markets and unregulated exchanges
in driving the crude oil price, in particular through increased speculative activity.
Non-commercial investor activity in oil futures does provide liquidity to markets, a
healthy feature for price discovery and risk transfer functions; however, when left
unchecked and with no position limits, it is likely to exacerbate price movements and
weakens their correlation with fundamentals.
The central element linked to the price volatility has been the global financial
crisis, the ensuing deep and widespread recession in OECD countries and the sharp
slowdown of economic activity in developing countries. The implications of this have
stretched far and wide and have been felt on every front globally, with a contraction
in economic activity, a decline in world trade and an erosion of wealth. This includes
choking oil demand.
Against this backdrop of extreme oil price volatility, the global financial crisis
and an economic crisis unseen since the Great Depression, a host of new challenges
have arisen in preparing an outlook for oil. One of these challenges relates to
assumptions for future price developments. For OPECs Reference Case, the key to
the oil price assumption is the perception of the behaviour of marginal supply costs
in the medium- to long-run. For the next decade, nominal prices are assumed to stay
in the $7080/b range, while longer term they are assumed to remain in the $70
100/b range. This assumption reflects the current broadly accepted view that prices
that are too low are not sustainable as they limit the flow of upstream investment,
while prices that are too high could hamper the global economic recovery and
medium- to long-term growth prospects. However, these assumptions do not reflect
or imply any projection of whether such a price path is likely or desirable.
Although growth has returned in 2010, there is a growing perception that the
economic slowdown will be U-shaped and the recovery will gather momentum only
gradually. For the Reference Case, it is assumed that by 2012, economic growth is
back to trend values. The strongest growth is expected in developing countries and
regions, in particular, China and South Asia, which expand at an average rate of 6.3%
per annum (p.a.) and 4.7% p.a., respectively, over the period 20092030. The average
global growth rate is 3% p.a.
Another major issue to address is the extent to which energy policies are
introduced into projections. In the Reference Case, two sets of policy initiatives have
been incorporated: the United States (US) Energy Independence and Security Act
(EISA), which has been passed into law, and the European Unions (EU) climate and
energy legislative package.
In the Reference Case, energy use increases by 42% from 20072030.
Realistically, fossil fuels will continue to satisfy most of the worlds energy needs,
contributing more than 80% to the global energy mix over this period. And oil will
continue to play the leading role to 2030.
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- iii -
1.
INTRODUCTION
As with previous Ministerial meetings of the IEF, the OPEC Secretariat has
prepared a background paper that looks at the outlook for oil demand and supply,
and the associated current and future challenges and their impacts. Todays context
throws several of these challenges into sharp focus, especially the recent history of
extreme price volatility, and the uncertainties that continue to emerge from the
aftermath of the global financial crisis.
The paper is organized into four sections. The first section focuses on recent
developments, in particular, related to oil market behaviour. The second develops a
Reference Case outlook for oil supply and demand to the year 2030.1 The third then
addresses some of the challenges ahead, covering, in particular, investment needs and
the type and scale of uncertainties. A fourth section offers some conclusions.
2.
Since the 11th IEF held in Rome in April 2008, there has been unprecedented
turbulence in oil markets. Oil prices have roller-coastered: starting 2008 at US$92/b,
the OPEC Reference Basket rose to a record $141/b in early July before falling to
$33/b by the end of the year, the lowest level since summer 2004. In 2009, the price
recovered from this low, reaching $77/b by the end of the year.
The central element linked to the collapse in oil prices was the global financial
crisis, the ensuing deep and widespread recession in OECD countries and the sharp
slowdown of economic activity in developing countries. In turn, this choked demand
for oil.
Of course, such large price swings are not in the interests of either producers
or consumers. Accordingly, two ad-hoc Ministerial Meetings focused on this issue
were held in Jeddah (June 2008) and London (December 2008). Indeed, commodity
market behaviour, particularly that relating to oil price volatility, has led to more
scrutiny from governments into the functioning of these markets. Some regulatory
institutions are currently discussing ways and means to better regulate commodity
derivatives markets, aimed at improving transparency and tightening oversight.
It is now widely recognized that unsustainably high price levels observed in
mid-2008 were to a large extent due to significant speculative investment inflows in
oil and products futures and over-the-counter (OTC) markets. It is important,
therefore, to identify and understand the role played by regulated futures markets and
unregulated OTC exchanges in exacerbating crude oil price movements, both
upwards and downwards, in particular through increased though difficult to
monitor speculative activity. The likelihood is high that the emergence of oil as an
asset class has contributed significantly to the price volatility seen in the recent past.
In addition, the recent financial turmoil has provided more broad-based evidence of
the possible adverse impacts of loosely regulated financial markets.
Non-commercial investor activity in oil futures does play a positive role in
providing liquidity, as well as facilitating price discovery and risk hedging functions.
However, when left unchecked and with no position limits, their activity tends to
1
Based upon the OPEC World Oil Outlook 2009, published in July 2009 and available at
http://www.opec.org/library/World%20Oil%20Outlook/pdf/WOO%202009.pdf
Against the backdrop of extreme oil price volatility, the global financial crisis
and an economic crisis unseen since the Great Depression, a host of new challenges
have arisen in preparing an oil outlook to 2030. One of these challenges relates to
assumptions for future price developments. For the Reference Case, the key to the oil
price assumption is the perception of the behaviour of supply costs in general, and
the medium- to long-run cost of the marginal barrel in particular. High costs have
peaked and will continue to decline as cyclical elements separate from structural ones.
Nevertheless, costs are expected to remain higher than in the past in developing the
marginal barrel, and it is likely that in the longer term some environmental
externalities will be internalized. For the next decade, nominal prices are assumed to
stay in the range $7080/b, while longer term they remain in the range $70100/b.
However, it is important to note that this is an assumption, and does not reflect or
imply any projection of whether such a price path is likely or desirable. This price
assumption reflects the broadly accepted view that prices that are too low are not
sustainable as they will limit the flow of upstream investment, while prices that are
too high could hamper the recovery of the global economy and medium- to longterm growth prospects.
The medium- and long-term assumptions for economic growth consider the
potential depth and length of the global economic contraction. This includes the
possible implications of the responses by governments and monetary institutions
around the world, in particular, expansionary policies and monetary easing. Although
the strength of the recovery remains uncertain, for the Reference Case it is assumed
that 2009 represented the bottom of the cycle. In 2010, recovery is well underway,
but not complete. Indeed, as noted by the IMF in its January 2010 revision to its
World Economic Outlook, the global recovery has begun more strongly than had
previously been anticipated.
Long-term world economic growth assumptions in the Reference Case are
based on demographic trends and productivity growth assessments. The strongest
growth is expected in developing countries and regions, particularly, China and South
Asia, which expand at an average rate of 6.3% p.a. and 4.7% p.a., respectively, over
the period 20092030. The average global growth rate is 3% p.a. over the same
timeframe. This is lower than the figure appearing in the OPEC background paper
for the 11th IEF Meeting, partly due to the considerable downward revisions to
economic growth prospects as the global financial crisis evolved, but also because of
the use of updated purchasing power parity factors, which means that the weight is
reduced for some of the fast-growing developing countries, such as India and China.
Another major issue to address in developing the Reference Case is the extent
to which energy policies are introduced into the projections. In the Reference Case,
two sets of policy initiatives have been incorporated: the US EISA, which has been
passed into law, and the EUs climate and energy legislative package, for which
related directives have now been adopted by both the EU Council and the European
Parliament.
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3.1
Oil demand
18,000
History
16,000
14,000
Projection
Gas
12,000
10,000
Oil
8,000
6,000
Coal
4,000
2,000
Nuclear/Hydro/Biomass/Other renewables
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
-3-
Table1
WorldoildemandoutlookintheReferenceCase
(mb/d)
2008
2015
2020
2025
NorthAmerica
24.3
23.6
23.4
23.1
WesternEurope
15.2
14.5
14.3
14.1
OECDPacific
8.0
7.4
7.2
7.0
OECD
47.5
45.5
45.0
44.3
LatinAmerica
4.8
5.2
5.6
5.9
MiddleEast&Africa
3.2
3.7
4.2
4.7
SouthAsia
3.5
4.4
5.5
6.7
SoutheastAsia
5.8
6.6
7.4
8.2
China
8.0
10.4
12.3
14.1
OPEC
7.7
9.0
9.8
10.6
Developingcountries
33.0
39.3
44.8
50.2
Russia
3.1
3.3
3.5
3.6
Othertransition
economies
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
Transitioneconomies
5.1
5.4
5.7
5.9
World
85.6
90.2
95.4
100.4
Figure2
Growthinoildemand20082030
2030
22.8
13.8
6.8
43.4
6.2
5.2
8.2
9.0
15.9
11.5
56.1
3.7
2.4
6.1
105.6
mb/d
25
OPEC
20
China
15
10
OECDoildemand
peakedin2005
79%ofthenet
growthinoil
demandisin
developingAsia
SouthAsia
5
0
SoutheastAsia
MiddleEast&Africa
LatinAmerica
NorthAmerica
WesternEurope
OECDPacific
5
OECDandtransitioneconomies
Developing countries
Developing countries are set to account for most of the long-term rise, with
consumption rising 23 mb/d over the period 20082030 to reach 56 mb/d. Almost
80% of the net growth in oil demand from 20082030 is in developing Asia
(Figure 2). Nevertheless, per capita oil use in developing countries will remain far
below that of the developed world. For example, by 2030 oil use per person in North
-4-
America will still be more than ten times that of South Asia. OECD oil demand falls
over the entire projection period, having peaked in 2005.
The transportation sector is the main source of future oil demand growth,
accounting for 60% of the total increase to 2030, although this is also lower than the
previous assessment. Once again this is due to the current global economic
slowdown, as well as the assumed greater efficiency improvements. The total stock of
cars rises from just over 800 million in 2007 to well over 1.3 billion by 2030, with
three-quarters of this increase coming from developing countries. Car ownership per
capita in developing countries rises rapidly from a low base of just 31 cars per 1,000
people in 2007 to 87 per 1,000 by 2030. This remains well below OECD levels,
however, which average 530 per 1,000 by 2030. The expansion in commercial
vehicles in developing countries is also stronger than elsewhere, accounting for over
80% of the increase.
Oil use is at the heart of much industrial activity. In addition to the
petrochemicals industry, diesel and heavy fuel oil, in particular, are needed in
construction and other major industries such as energy, iron and steel, machinery and
paper. The strongest increase in the industry sector comes from developing Asia and
OPEC Member Countries, particularly due to the fast growing oil demand in the
petrochemicals industry.
On the products side, the continuing shift to middle distillates and light
products over the entire period remains a dominant feature of the future demand
slate. This is clearly reflected in the fact that out of 20 mb/d of additional demand by
2030, compared to 2008, almost 60% is for middle distillates and another 30% is for
gasoline and naphtha (Figure 3).
Figure3
Globalproductdemandbyproduct,2008and2030
mb/d
40
2008
35
2030
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Ethane/LPG
Naphtha
Gasoline
Jet/Kero
Diesel/
Gasoil
*Includesrefineryfueloil.
**Includesbitumen, lubricants, waxes,stillgas,coke,sulphur, directuseofcrudeoiletc.
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Residual
Other
fuel*
products**
3.2
Oil supply
3.2.1 Upstream
Total non-OPEC oil supply is expected to continue to rise slightly over the
medium-term, increasing by just over 1 mb/d for the years 20082013. This increase
comes mainly from non-conventional oil. Non-OPEC crude oil plus NGLs are
expected to stay flat over this period. This is lower than the medium-term
expectations at the time of the preparation of the previous IEF background paper.
This is largely the result of the low oil prices that emerged at the end of 2008 that led
to cancellations and delays, with debt financing becoming more difficult and lower
earnings limiting equity finance. Non-conventional oil supply, mainly Canadian oil
sands, is expected to continue growing in the medium-term, but the low oil price
environment has again dampened growth prospects compared to the previous
outlook.
Table2
WorldoilsupplyoutlookintheReferenceCase
(mb/d)
LatinAmerica
4.1
4.9
5.6
6.0
MiddleEast&Africa
4.4
4.2
4.1
4.0
Asia
3.8
4.2
4.3
4.2
China
3.8
4.0
4.0
4.2
DCS,excl.OPEC
16.1
17.3
18.0
18.3
Russia
9.8
10.2
10.5
10.6
Othertransitioneconomies
2.9
4.0
4.4
4.7
Transitioneconomies
12.7
14.2
14.9
15.4
NonOPEC
50.3
52.4
54.3
55.4
ofwhich:nonconventional
3.1
5.0
6.8
8.6
NGLs
5.5
6.2
6.8
7.0
OPEC(incl.NGLs)
35.5
38.1
41.4
45.3
OPECNGLs
4.3
5.8
6.7
7.4
OPECGTLs
0.0
0.3
0.4
0.4
OPECcrude
31.2
32.0
34.3
37.4
Worldsupply
85.8
90.5
95.7 100.7
2030
13.1
2.3
3.6
0.7
19.6
6.2
3.8
3.8
4.4
18.3
10.6
5.1
15.7
56.3
10.7
7.2
49.6
8.0
0.5
41.1
105.9
The Reference Case thereby points to demand for OPEC oil, having fallen in
2009 in the face of the global economic contraction, rising slowly over the mediumterm and returning back to 2008 levels by around 2013. Large investments are
currently underway in OPEC Member Countries to expand upstream capacity.
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Although the low price environment at the end of 2008 and the early part of 2009 led
to the delay or even postponement of projects, several of these projects have now
been reactivated following the revival of oil prices. However, there is ample OPEC
crude oil spare capacity today and it is expected that even with the delays, this spare
capacity is set to remain at comfortable levels.
In the long-term, total non-OPEC oil supply continues to rise as the increase
in non-crude sources is stronger than the slight decline in total non-OPEC crude
supply. Up to 2020, crude production increases in Russia, the Caspian and Brazil
largely compensate for declines in the OECD. Non-conventional oil supply
(excluding biofuels), chiefly from Canadian oil sands, rises in the Reference Case by 4
mb/d from 20082030. The Reference Case also sees strong biofuels growth. On top
of this, OPEC and non-OPEC NGLs are expected to grow. As a result of these
developments, the amount of OPEC crude that will be needed continues to rise,
reaching just over 41 mb/d by 2030 (Table 2).
The expansion in Reference Case demand is largely met with non-crude
supply from both OPEC and non-OPEC sources, leaving the contribution of crude
only modest. Indeed, while global crude oil supply in 2015 is 71 mb/d, the same as
2008, by 2030 there is only a need for 77 mb/d (Figure 4). The resource base of
conventional crude, together with non-conventional oil, is more than sufficient to
meet future demand. Therefore, the key issue is not related to availability, but to
deliverability and sustainability, as well as the uncertainties surrounding the extent to
which increases in demand for crude will actually materialize.
Figure4
Worldoilsupply19702030:crudeandothersourcesofoil
mb/d
100
othersources
80
60
40
conventionalcrudeoil
20
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
3.2.2 Downstream
The recent extreme oil price volatility, the global financial crisis, and many of
the uncertainties that complicate upstream investment decisions and implementation
are also relevant to the downstream. Rising oil prices from 20032008, together with
refining tightness and high margins, have in recent years brought forward an
increasing number of projects. However, several factors are now acting to delay,
-7-
postpone or even cancel some projects. These include, among other things, the
prospect of sharply reduced oil demand across almost all world regions, difficulties in
arranging debt and equity financing and the expectation of further falls in
construction costs.
Over the base of 2008, it is estimated that around 6 mb/d of new crude
distillation capacity will be added to the global refining system from existing projects
by 2015. Almost 50% of this new capacity is located in Asia, mainly China and India
(Figure 5). In addition to distillation capacity, 5 mb/d of associated new conversion
capacity and over 6 mb/d of desulphurization capacity is expected to be constructed
worldwide by 2015.
The implication of these capacity additions, in combination with demand
projections and increases in non-crude supply, is for a sustained period of low
refinery utilizations and hence, poor refining economics. In the Reference Case, the
continuing increases in refineries potential to run crude, and the slow return to
positive additional required crude runs, result in the distillation capacity surplus
widening to over 4 mb/d by 2010, and around 5 mb/d by 2012, where it is expected
to remain for some years. If the current recession extends further than the Reference
Case assumes, this surplus will evidently be even greater. The Reference Case already
envisages that the refining industry will face some rationalization and restructuring in
order to maintain its viability.
Figure5
Distillationcapacityadditionsfromexistingprojects
2009 2015
mb/d
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
US&
Canada
Latin
America
Africa
Europe
FSU
MiddleEast AsiaPacific
The implications are not, however, regionally uniform. The refining sector in
the US & Canada is projected to be most impacted by a combination of an ethanol
supply surge and a decline in gasoline demand, as well as the continuing effects of
dieselization in Europe that generates low-cost gasoline for US export. Based on the
outlook, crude throughputs in the US & Canada steadily decline throughout the
period to 2030. Other OECD regions will also suffer a seriously depressed period for
refineries, especially those focused on gasoline rather than distillates. This indicates a
-8-
need for widespread consolidation and closure to bring back operating rates and
refinery viability.
The outlook in the OECD stands in stark contrast to that for developing
regions, especially the Asia-Pacific. The vast majority of the refining capacity
expansions to 2030 are projected to be in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East, at
around 10 mb/d and 3 mb/d, respectively, out of a global total of 18 mb/d.
Expansions in the Asia-Pacific are dominated by China with more than 5 mb/d of
required additional distillation capacity by 2030.
In addition, projections highlight a sustained need for conversion capacity,
with incremental hydrocracking, above existing projects, accounting for 4.3 mb/d of
the 5.4 mb/d of global conversion capacity requirements to 2030 (Figure 6).
Substantial desulphurization capacity additions will also be necessary to meet sulphur
content specifications, with some 14.5 mb/d required to 2030, which is over and
above existing projects of 6.4 mb/d.
mb/d
Figure6
Globalcapacityrequirementsbyprocesstype
2008 2030
25
additionalrequirements2016 2030
additionalrequirementsto2015
projectsto2015
20
15
10
0
Crudedistillation
4.
Conversion
Octaneunits
Desulphurization
INVESTMENT CHALLENGES
4.1
-9-
4.2
- 10 -
Figure7
OPECsparecapacityintheProtractedRecessionscenario
mb/d
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
2008
2009
2010
4.3
2011
2012
2013
- 11 -
Figure8
$(2008)billion
CumulativeOPECinvestmentrequirements:
howmuchisneeded?
$180430billion
500
400
Highergrowth
Reference
case
300
200
Lowergrowth
100
$100240billion
$70170billion
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
4.4
Sustainable development
Rising to environmental challenges has always been important to the oil
industry, which has a good track record in reducing its environmental and emissions
footprints. And with the world expected to rely heavily on fossil fuels for many
decades to come, it is vital to ensure the early and swift development, deployment,
diffusion and transfer of cleaner fossil-fuels technologies. This is true for both local
and global environmental protection. The need to adapt to a carbon-constrained
- 12 -
environment will make the use of these cleaner technologies all the more pressing. Of
particular note is the proven technology of carbon capture and storage (CCS), which
can be cost effective and has a high mitigation potential.
Developed countries, having the financial and technological capabilities, and
bearing the historical responsibility for the state of the Earths atmosphere, should
take the lead in mitigation and adaptation efforts, as well as in providing adequate and
predictable financial resources and transfer of technology, as enshrined in the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto
Protocol.
Despite the fact that the COP-15 Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen
in December 2009 led to more questions than answers, it is clear that OPEC Member
Countries, heavily dependent upon oil exports, will be significantly affected, not only
by climate change, but also by the adverse impacts of response measures.
A broader set of challenges concerns the issue of sustainable development
and its corollary, fighting energy poverty. It is important to remember that poverty
eradication is the very first UN Millennium Development Goal. And a major part, as
well as a catalyst in helping alleviate poverty, is making sure that every person has
access to modern energy services. It is critical that the world community makes sure
access to reliable, affordable, economically viable, socially acceptable and
environmentally sound energy services is available to all.
5.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The past 18 months have seen much upheaval as the world has faced up to a
massive financial crisis and an ensuing deep economic contraction, one not witnessed
since the 1930s. The implications have stretched far and wide, with its ripple effects
carrying it far beyond the country where the crisis originated. It has ushered in some
extraordinary changes in such a short period of time.
Of course, for the oil market in general, and OPEC in particular, the adverse
impacts were dramatic too. This is especially evident when looking at oil price
movements over that period, with the OPEC Reference Basket price hitting highs of
over $140/b in July 2008, before falling by more than $100 to below $40 only six
months later.
Few could have predicted the rapid and widespread adverse impacts that
resulted from the US sub-prime mortgage crisis. Over-leverage, poor risk
management and speculation drove the financial system to the edge of a total
meltdown when Lehman Brothers collapsed in September 2008. While it is apparent
that the world has now stepped back from the abyss, the lessons need to be taken on
board.
From an oil market perspective, OPEC and many others have clearly stated
that the high oil prices in the middle of 2008 were not justified by physical supply and
demand fundamentals. Price movements were exacerbated by massive direct and
indirect investment inflows by non-commercial players looking to gain exposure to
commodity markets. This was facilitated, among other things, by the possibility of
high leverage and the absence of position limits. Indeed, OPEC has repeatedly called
for better regulation and increased transparency in these markets, for the benefit of
both producers and consumers alike. And it is a positive development that, further to
the Jeddah and London ad-hoc energy meetings in 2008, a high level steering group
has identified a set of related recommendations to be considered at the 12th IEF.
- 13 -
- 14 -