THE ARMYS CORE COMPETENCIES

A Monograph
by
Major Richard E. Dunning
United States Army

School of Advanced Military Studies

United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2013-01
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The Armys Core Competencies

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Dunning, Richard E.
Major, U.S. Army

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14. ABSTRACT

In October 2011, the United States Army published doctrine espousing its newest core competencies: Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM)
and Wide Area Security (WAS). The use of these terms is neither academic nor arbitrary as they are required by US Code Title 10,
Department of Defense Directives, defense acquisitions, and joint doctrine. The currently espoused Army core competencies are not based
on business theory and therefore fail to provide the same value that businesses realize. Improperly identifying core competencies places the
Army at risk of expending precious resources and time towards the wrong assets and strategies. Placing core competencies in Army
operations doctrine only exacerbates the poor adaptation of business theory. The Armys difficulty in identifying core competencies
indicates the need for developing the theory that includes definitions and methods of identification. If the Army can correctly identify its
core competencies, it can better manage capabilities in a resource constrained environment and design strategies and approaches that
capitalize on organizational strengths.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Core Competencies, Capabilities-Based Approach, Combined Arms Maneuver, Wide Area Security, Doctrine
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MONOGRAPH APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate:

Major Richard E. Dunning

Monograph Title:

The Armys Core Competencies

Approved by:

, Monograph Director
Thomas Bruscino, Ph.D.

, Seminar Leader
Michael J. Lawson, COL

, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies

Thomas C. Graves, COL

Accepted this 23rd day of May 2013 by:

, Director, Graduate Degree Programs

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any
other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ii

ABSTRACT
THE ARMYS CORE COMPETENCIES, by Major Richard E. Dunning, 53 pages.
In October 2011, the United States Army published doctrine espousing its newest core
competencies: Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM) and Wide Area Security (WAS). The Armys
use of the term core competencies introduced questions of validity since the Army failed to
provide a common understanding of the terms, methods for competency identification, or their
applicability in capability based planning or operations. The use of these terms is neither
academic nor arbitrary as they are required by US Code Title 10, Department of Defense
Directives, defense acquisitions, and joint doctrine.
Core competency theory originated when Prahalad and Hamel introduced the terms in their 1990
Harvard Business Review article in which they also outlined the roots of competitive advantage
and the linkage of core competencies, core products, and value in end products. Firms follow
methods to identify core competencies using definitions, characteristics, and properties to make
resource and strategy decisions to outperform their competition. The currently espoused Army
core competencies are not based on this business theory and therefore fail to provide the same
value that businesses realize.
Improperly identifying core competencies places the Army at risk of expending precious
resources and time towards the wrong assets and strategies. Placing core competencies in Army
operations doctrine only exacerbates the poor adaptation of business theory. The Armys
difficulty in identifying core competencies indicates the need for developing the theory that
includes definitions and methods of identification. If the Army can correctly identify its core
competencies, it can better manage capabilities in a resource constrained environment and design
strategies and approaches that capitalize on organizational strengths.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank Dr. Thomas Bruscino for his unwavering commitment, assistance,
guidance and mentorship during the entire process of researching and writing this monograph. I
learned far more than I could have imagined, and I am grateful for his attention to detail and
critical questioning approach. I would also like to thank fellow classmates Major Robert
McCarthy, Major Sean Finnerty, and Major Michael Mays for their guidance and encouragement.
Finally, and most importantly, I would like to thank my wife Marina for her support, devotion,
and encouragement. Thank you for understanding the long hours of research, the seemingly
endless nights at the computer, and the time spent under the reading light instead of enjoying the
Kansas countryside together.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................................................vi
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 1
Business ...................................................................................................................................... 2
Department of Defense Adapts ................................................................................................... 4
U.S. Army Core Competencies ................................................................................................... 6
CORE COMPETENCIES ................................................................................................................ 9
An Inside-Out Approach: Foundations of Core Competencies ................................................ 10
Competency Terms and Characteristics .................................................................................... 13
A Method to Identify Core Competencies ................................................................................ 15
Pitfalls ....................................................................................................................................... 17
Successful Business Examples.................................................................................................. 19
Toyota ................................................................................................................................... 19
Wal-Mart............................................................................................................................... 20
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 21
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ADOPTS CAPABILITIES AND COMPETENCIES ....... 23
The Shift to Capability-Based Forces ....................................................................................... 26
DoD/Joint Capabilities Management ........................................................................................ 29
DoD and Joint Capabilities-Based Approach Assessment........................................................ 31
DoD and Joint Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 32
THE UNITED STATES ARMY CORE COMPETENCIES ......................................................... 34
Previous Academic Work ......................................................................................................... 35
U.S. Army Espousing Its Core Competencies .......................................................................... 37
Validity of Army Core Competencies ...................................................................................... 39
Effects Driven Abstract Constructs ...................................................................................... 39
Organizational Level Capabilities ........................................................................................ 41
The Context of Competition ................................................................................................. 41
Validity Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 42
Historical Insight into Core Competencies in Action ............................................................... 43
Bedouins and Turks .............................................................................................................. 43
The Yom Kippur War ........................................................................................................... 45
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 49
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 51
BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................................... 54

ACRONYMS
ADP

Army Doctrine Publication

ADRP

Army Doctrine Reference Publication

CAM

Combined Arms Maneuver

CBA

Capabilities Based Assessment

CJCS

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

DoD

Department of Defense

DoDD

Department of Defense Directive

JCA

Joint Capability Area

JCIDS

Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System

QDR

Quadrennial Defense Review

TRADOC

Training and Doctrine Command

USAWC

U.S. Army War College

WAS

Wide Area Security

vi

INTRODUCTION
We also need to take advantage of business process improvements being
pioneered in the private sector. Over the past decade, the American commercial sector
has reorganized, restructured, and adopted revolutionary new business and management
practices in order to ensure its competitive edge in the rapidly changing global
marketplace. It has worked. Now the Department must adopt and adapt the lessons of the
private sector if our armed forces are to maintain their competitive edge in the rapidly
changing global security arena.
Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review 1997
In October 2011, the United States Army published doctrine espousing its newest core
competencies Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM) and Wide Area Security (WAS) in its Army
Doctrine Publications (ADP) that are fundamental to the Armys ability to maneuver and secure
land areas for the joint force. 1 The Armys intent for doctrine is that it presents overarching
doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting operations. 2 The Army considers its doctrine to
be a body of thought on how Army forces operate as an integral part of a joint force, a guide to
action, and a basis for decisions about organization, training, leader development, material,
Soldiers, and facilities. 3 Instead of providing a guide to action or an ability to support
organizational decisions, the Armys use of the term core competencies instead introduces
questions of definition, application, and validity. In its doctrinal body of thought, the Army
adopted specific terms; however, it failed to provide a common understanding of the terms,
methods for competency identification, or their applicability in capability based planning or
operations. The Armys failure to provide understanding of core competencies, their
identification, and their application inhibits the ability to realize the benefits of a useful business

U.S. Department of Army, Army Doctrine Publication No. 3-0, Unified Land
Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2011), 6.
2

Ibid., ii.

Ibid., 1.
1

theory. Without properly identifying its core competencies, the Army risks investment into the
wrong capabilities which may lead to reduced effectiveness or increased inefficiency.
Business
Businesses develop theories in order to increase their effectiveness in their markets,
reduce their costs, adjust to changing dynamics, and increase their profits. Todays rapidly
changing global marketplace is turbulent and complex, demanding effective responses, guiding
strategies, and development of necessary capabilities. In order to respond appropriately with
optimum solutions to new problems and lead the company, managers need the ability to make
these decisions with a greater level of assurance and skill. These business theories and tools have
evolved dramatically to meet the challenges of the marketplace with the concept of core
competencies taking shape in the 1990s.
Prior to competency management, businesses measured their success based on the
financial success of their portfolio using transaction cost governance, economic, and market
structure analysis methods to make business strategic decisions. 4 However, they found the
management and synchronization of these diverse entities difficult and unproductive. Within a
decade, three new theories emerged that countered the market-based structure analyses of
competitive strategy. These were resource-based view of the firm, dynamic capabilities approach,
and core competence perspective. 5 Businesses recognized that it was necessary to look at the
internal characteristics of the entire firm and how those characteristics contributed to the
products, thus leveraging the assets of the organization. Critical assets, such as technology and

Jay B. Barney and Delwyn N. Clark, Resource-Based Theory: Creating and Sustaining
Competitive Advantage (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 165.
5

YanBing Zhang, Development of a Structured Framework for Core Competence

Evaluation in the Manufacturing and Service Industries (PhD diss., Sheffield Hallam University,
1999), 3.
2

knowledge based capabilities, found within the organization proved to be the most competitive
contributors.
In addressing these critical assets, Prahalad and Hamel introduced the term core
competencies in their 1990 Harvard Business Review article in which they also outlined the roots
of competitive advantage, identification of core competencies and core products, and the linkage
of these concepts to add value to businesses. They defined core competencies as the collective
learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate
multiple streams of technologies. 6 They argued that core competencies were deep proficiencies
that enabled organizations to deliver unique values to customers.
Core competence management comprises three elements: identification, leveraging, and
building. Building and leveraging competencies are the processes by which competitive
advantage is created and sustained but the key to both of them is identificationconsidered one of
the most important contributions of a senior manager. 7 Firms identify their most valuable
capabilities through a thorough internal analysis of capabilities and a determination on their
contribution of these assets in the market environment against the competition. Taxonomy
supports the rigorous scientific process of discovery and a common language enables other
members of the firm to devise ways to use those capabilities. Without a practically useful
framework, the identification of core competencies can easily turn into a "political process. 8

C.K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel, "The Core Competence of the Corporation," Harvard
Business Review 68, no. 3 (May-June1990): 81.
7

Zhang, Development of a Structured Framework, 7.

Jeremy Klein, David Gee, and Howard Jones, "Analysing Clusters of Skills in R&D-Core Competencies, Metaphors, Visualization, and the Role of IT," R&D Management 28, no. 1
(January 1998): 38.
3

Department of Defense Adapts

The military identifies, builds, and leverages its capabilities to create conditions that
achieve strategic aims. Contextually, while environments, roles, missions, and metrics are
different for a military organization, it also has a stake in identifying and applying effective and
efficient capabilities. For the sake of efficiency, the Department of Defense (DoD) began using
elements of core competency theory in the 1990s when making decisions about downsizing and
outsourcing, and then expanded the use into acquisitions and capabilities management. The
concept of core in DoD has also been associated with legislative requirements to establish core
logistics capabilities in government-owned military maintenance depots. 9 The term core
function gained increased and more expanded use within DoD, beginning with DoDs
publication of its September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, which recommended the
identification of core and non-core functions. 10 Although the use of these terms have increased in
usage, services and agencies have had difficulty translating the corporate-based core competency
framework to a non-commercial context, especially definitions such as competitors, competitive
advantage, products, and business units. 11 Instead DoDs interpretation reflected an emphasis on
output focused capabilities as opposed to internal capabilities that leverage others.
The operational environment where the military needs to apply these capabilities is
characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and rapid change, requiring persistent engagement. 12
9

United States General Accounting Office, Defense Management: DoD Faces

Challenges Implementing Its Core Competency Approach and A-76 Competitions (Washington,
DC: United States General Accounting Office, 2003), 7.
10

U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC:

Department of Defense, 2001), 53.
11

Defense Business Board, Next Steps on DoD Core Competency Review Task Group
(Washington, DC: Defense Business Board, 2003), 3.
12

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication No. 3-0, Joint Operations
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2011), ix.
4

The complexities of the future security environment demand that the United States be prepared to
face a wide range of threats of varying levels of intensity. Success in countering these threats will
require the skillful integration of the core competencies of the services into a joint force tailored
to the specific situation and objectives. 13 In order to meet the challenges of this security
environment, the Department identifies desired capabilities based on potential missions and
threats and develops them into joint capabilities. Meeting the requirements of strategic guidance
entailed increasing funding for a few key capabilities while protecting others at existing levels or
making comparatively modest reductions. 14 Determining which capabilities are the few key
capabilities that bring the most value to the contributions of a military force is a crucial task.
To focus the department and the services, the Defense Authorization Acts of 2008
mandated that the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) focus on not only the roles, missions, and
capabilities of the Department of Defense and the services but also on the core competencies that
support the core missions and activities. 15 Core missions and activities support the wide range of
security challenges in the future security environment, including: the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, the rise of modern competitor states, violent extremism, regional instability,
transnational criminal activity, and competition for resources. Taken together, these factors give
rise to a future security environment likely to be more unpredictable, complex, and potentially
dangerous than today. 16 The Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff is responsible for the
13

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020 (Washington, DC: US
Government Printing Office, 2000), 12.
14

U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Budget Priorities and Choices (Washington, DC:
Department of Defense, 2012), 9.
15

House of Representatives, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008,
Conference Report to accompany H.R. 1585 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office,
2007), 286.
16

Martin E. Dempsey, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), 3.
5

development of military strategy that includes the necessary assessments to determine the
capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared to those of
possible adversaries. 17 For the CJCS to determine these capabilities, he must understand what
capabilities and core competences are.
The Department of Defense defines a capability as the ability to achieve a desired
effect under specified standards and conditions through combinations of means and ways to
perform a set of tasks. 18 To support its capabilities based approach, DoD organized capabilities
into aggregate Joint Capability Areas (JCA) that support joint mission areas. 19 Instead of finding
the most valuable specific capabilities, the Department labeled each broad category group as a
core competency. DoD views core competencies as aggregate capabilities of functionallyorganized capabilities associated with the performance of, or support for, a DoD core mission
area with the services performing the tasks and activities that supply these capabilities. 20
U.S. Army Core Competencies
As a service component, the Army has the responsibility of providing its assets in support
of combatant commanders. Because of the emphasis on competencies at the Department of
Defense level, the Army has incorporated the lexicon into its doctrine and associated a central
17

U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 5100.01p, Functions of

the Department of Defense and Its Major Components (Washington, DC:, Department of
Defense, 2010), 15.
18

Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-8, Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) Users Guide Version
3 (Washington, DC: Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments Directorate (JCS J-8), 2009), 6.
19

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Instruction 5120.02B, Joint Doctrine
Development System (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2009), A-8. Joint Capability
Areas are intended to provide a common capabilities language for use across many related DoD
activities and processes. According to US Code Title 10, DoD is required to show linkage of
competencies to core mission areas.
20

U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report

(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2009), 4.
6

idea focused on the seizing, retaining, and exploiting of the initiative to gain positional relative
advantage over the enemy. This is accomplished through simultaneous combination of
offensive, defensive, and stability operations that set conditions for favorable conflict resolution.
The Armys two espoused core competencies- combined arms maneuver and wide area security-provide the means for balancing the application of Army warfighting functions within the tactical
actions and tasks inherent in offensive, defensive, and stability operations. 21
These core competencies are problematic for several reasons, including: they are defined
at a broad complex organizational level; they are vague and overly abstract lacking specifics on
routines, processes, and means; and they are focused on outcome oriented functions not on the
internal strengths of the organization. The currently espoused Army core competencies are not
based on the business theorys characteristics that this monograph will outline, and they therefore
fail to provide much value to the service. The Army will benefit more by incorporating core
competency management theory to capitalize on its most valuable capabilities, know which ones
to build in its capability-based force management, and which ones, when leveraged, bring the
most value to its operations. The Army needs to understand the theorys concepts, translate the
theory, and develop methods of implementation to fully gain the benefits of core competencies.
The Army needs to understand its role as a provider of forces to the combatant commanders in an
uncertain national security environment in order to identify the valid core competencies. The
Army would benefit more by focusing at the operational level on dynamic capabilities, the
firms ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address
rapidly changing environments. 22 Failure to properly identify its core competencies places the
Army at risk of expending precious resources and time towards the wrong assets. Placing core
21

Department of the Army, Unified Land Operations, 5-6.

22

David J. Teece, Gary Pisano, and Amy Shuen, "Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic
Management," Strategic Management Journal 18, no. 7 (1997): 516.
7

competencies in Army operations doctrine only exacerbates the poor adaptation of business
theory.

CORE COMPETENCIES
During the 1970s and early 1980s, U.S. business academics turned their attention to
strategic management as the key to competitive success. Systems thinking led to the study of the
corporate environment and the external factors affecting organizational strategy and success. 23
Strategic management gurus, such as Michael Porter, focused on managing a portfolio in order to
select from options to diversify, decentralize, integrate, or merge activities. However, evaluating
the sources of competitive advantage requires a the analysis of a firm's internal strengths and
weaknesses as well. 24 The resurgence of interest in the firms resources as a foundation for
strategy reflected the dissatisfaction with static, equilibrium frameworks of industrial
organization economics. 25
Emerging as a result of the relentless competition since the 1990s, core competency
theory focuses on identifying, building, and leveraging internal capabilities that firms must
constantly adapt, renew, reconfigure and re-create internal capabilities to remain competitive. The
most valuable internal capabilities create sustained competitive advantage in the market
environment. This theory links the internal technical and intellectual know how through the
internal processes and products of the organization to its end products and services. It focuses on
how an organization creates and sustains the sources of competitive advantage. In fact, firms

23

Sylvia Horton, "Introduction - the Competency Movement: Its Origins and Impact on
the Public Sector," The International Journal of Public Sector Management 13, no. 4 (2000): 308.
24

Jay B. Barney, "Looking Inside for Competitive Advantage," The Academy of

Management Executive 9, no. 4 (1995): 49.
25

Robert M. Grant, The Resource-Based Theory of Competitive Advantage:

Implications for Strategy Formulation, California Management Review 33, no. 3 (Sprint 1991):
114.
9

which consistently built on their core skills and aggressively pursued the sources of competitive
advantage tended to be the most successful in the long term. 26
This section of the monograph provides an overview of competency management theory
to build a foundation of understanding for application in the U.S. Army. First, an expansion on
the background of competence management to give insight into the internal capabilities that
generate competitive advantages and what that means to a firm. Next, terms and descriptions
provide a common language concerning firm assets that supports the identification of core
competencies. Next, business examples provide insight into successful implementation of core
competencies, while pitfalls demonstrate potential traps and hazards. Finally, a useful framework
for identification provides a sound method to transfer to the military.
An Inside-Out Approach: Foundations of Core Competencies
Often described as an inside out approach, competence-based competition grew as a
response to the outside-in approach of Michael Porters competitive forces theory. 27 Porters
theory focused on understanding the external opportunities and threats to develop a business
strategy based on industry attractiveness, demanding that the firm obtain the requisite capabilities
and resources. 28 Several challenges to this theory emerged, including over-emphasis on structure
and market barriers, inattention to uncertainty, bias to product-market approach, and failure to
recognize special resources and intangible assets.29 Empirical evidence revealed that sustainable

26

William C. Bogner and Howard Thomas, Core Competence and Competitive

Advantage: A Model and Illustrative Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry (Faculty
Working Paper, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1992), 37.
27

Zhang, Development of a Structured Framework, 2.

28

Ibid., 2.

29

S. A. Lippman and R. P. Rumelt, "Uncertain Imitability: An Analysis of Interfirm

Differences in Efficiency under Competition," Bell Journal of Economics (1982): 438, and Jay B.
Barney, "Strategic Factor Markets: Expectations, Luck, and Business Strategy," Management
10

competitive advantage stems mainly from internal firm characteristics and the development of
plans that capitalize on these strengths. 30 The resource-based view, core competency view, and
distinctive capabilities view emerged as complimentary counterpoints to market structure
analyses of competitive strategy. 31
The resource-based view is a foundation of core competency theory by emphasizing
heterogeneously distributed firm-unique resources and capabilities as the genesis of competitive
advantage. 32 This view explicitly focuses on the strategies of implementation that create value
from its tangible and intangible resources. 33 The resource based view recognizes that unique
resources are not valuable unless they exploit opportunities and/or neutralize threats. The most
likely sources of sustained competitive advantage in the marketplace come from firm resources
and capabilities that are valuable, rare, and socially complex. 34
Examination of these individual internal intangible assets led firms to identify the
interconnectedness between skills, knowledge, and attributes among teams of employees inside
functional areas that created diversification in products. This resulted in a view where intellectual
and cultural assets were advocated as the major barrier to imitation.35 In 1990, Prahalad and

Science (1986-1998) 32, no. 10 (1986): 1240.

30

Zhang, Development of a Structured Framework, 3.

31

Richard P. Rumelt, forward to Competence-Based Competition edited by Gary Hamel

and Aime Heene (New York: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 1994): xv-xix. The theories of resourcebased view, core competencies, and dynamic capabilities emerged as complementary
counterpoints to market structure analyses of competitive strategy.
32

Catherine L Wang and Pervaiz K Ahmed, Dynamic Capabilities: A Review and

Research Agenda, The International Journal of Management Review 9, no. 1 (2007): 35.
33

Barney and Clark, Resource-Based Theory, 162.

34

Barney, Looking Inside, 52-55.

35

Hamel and Heene, Competence-Based Competition,149-169.

11

Hamel coined the term core competencies when they defined them as the collective learning in
the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple
streams of technologies. 36 They believed core competencies harmonized streams of technology,
organized work, and delivered value within global competition. 37 Other definitions and
descriptions of core competencies that emerged include cognitive traits such as organizational
routines for approaching ill-structured problems, shared values systems, and tacit understandings
of the value chain interactions. 38 Drejer describes the structural components of a competency:
hard technology, human beings, organization, and culture. 39 Not unlike an activity chain, the
capabilities of the firm add value to core products which are then incorporated by the firm into
end products.
The firm is able to focus its efforts by identifying those capabilities that add the most
value to the end products and are used across the firm in several core products. A firm is
conceived as a hierarchy of core competencies, core products, and market-focused business units
that are fit to fight. 40 Using the resource based view, managers answer the question of value to
evaluate the contribution of internal resources and capabilities. 41 As the demands of the market
environment change, the relationship of competencies to competitive advantage will not be stable
over time, requiring the firm to constantly change and improve the skills that underlie its core

36

Prahalad and Hamel, Core Competence of the Corporation, 82.

37

Ibid., 85.

38

Bogner and Thomas, Core Competence and Competitive Advantage, 2.

39

Anders Drejer, Organizational Learning and Competence Development, The

Learning Organization 7, no. 4 (2000): 209.
40

Prahalad and Hamel, Core Competence of the Corporation, 90.

41

Bogner and Thomas, Core Competence and Competitive Advantage, 3.

12

products and services. 42 In order to address the influence of market dynamism and firm evolution
over time, the dynamic capabilities view adds a focus on the dynamic capabilities to maintain the
competitive advantage of a firm. 43
Competency Terms and Characteristics
"The term competencies remains an experience-near concept which needs further
conceptual clarification if it is to serve the purpose of theory building" 44 Even in their original
definitive article, Prahalad and Hamel's descriptions of this phenomena are found to be too
general and of little use without additional details.45 Within the business community, many
practitioners and theorists have provided additional definitions, characteristics, and identification
methods related to the typology of firm assets. A firm is comprised of many tangible and
intangible assets described in various terms. Tangible assets are people, facilities, raw materials,
equipment, and such. Intangible assets are knowledge, culture, routines, and such. A combination
of tangible and intangible assets is a capability that performs a specific function with a desired
effect. Capabilities have a vertical integration where some at lower levels in the firm are simple
and those that are at an organizational level are complex. 46
Competences are a particular kind of organizational resource resulting from activities that
are performed repetitively, or quasi-repetitively. They represent distinct bundles of organizational

42

Bogner and Thomas, Core Competence and Competitive Advantage, 37.

43

Wang and Ahmed, Dynamic Capabilities, 7.

44

Georg von Krogh and Johan Roos, A Perspective on Knowledge, Competence, and
Strategy, Personnel Review 24, no. 3 (1995): 62.
45

Klein, Gee, and Jones, Analysing Clusters, 38.

46

Drejer, Organizational Learning, 207.

13

routines and problem-solving. 47 They can be defined as a set of progressive, iterative

understandings and skills held by corporate employees that collectively operate at the
organizational level. 48 Core competencies are the internal capabilities of the firm that create
competitive advantages and are flexible to be applied in a variety of core products and end
products. Competencies are not in the resource flow, they are considered a stock of the company;
they remain in the company, represented by the networks and know-how of employees and the
collective attributes which add up to organizational culture. 49
In order to help understand this phenomenon, authors expanded on definitions by
describing competency properties and cognitive traits. 50 Some authors introduce questions of
rareness, imitability, organization, and value for managers to ask when extracting meaning about
internal capabilities. 51 Prahalad and Hamel provided three tests concerning access to a wide
variety of markets, contribution to the customers perceived value, and whether it is difficult for

47

Valery S. Katkalo, Christos N. Pitelis, and David J. Teece, Introduction: On the

Nature and Scope of Dynamic Capabilities, Industrial and Corporate Change 19, no. 4 (2010):
1177.
48

William B. Edgar and Chris A. Lockwood, "Understanding, Finding, and Applying

Core Competencies: A Framework, Guide, and Description for Corporate Managers and Research
Professionals," Academy of Strategic Management Journal 10, no. 2 (2011): 28.
49

Richard Hall, A Framework Linking Intangible Resources and Capabilities to

Sustainable Competitive Advantage, Strategic Management Journal 14, no. 8 (1993): 609.
50

Jules Goddard, "The Architecture of Core Competence," Business Strategy Review 8,

no. 1 (Spring 1997): 47. Imbued with experiential or tacit knowledge, differentiating from
competition, cultural behavior, rare critical factors of success, sources of unique value to
customer, flexible across products, and uniqueness that narrows strategy., and Bogner and
Thomas, Core Competence and Competitive Advantage, 2. Recipes and organizational routines
for approaching ill-structured problems; shared value systems which direct action in unique
situations; tacit understandings of the interactions of technology, organizational dynamics and
product markets.
51

Barney, Looking Inside, 50.

14

competitors to imitate. 52 A company may have many assets and capabilities, fewer competencies,
and it will have a limited of core competencies. Across the breadth of the business literature the
following description of core competency emerges:
Core competencies are firm specific capabilities that are comprised of tangible
and intangible assets that are leveraged directly or indirectly across a wide variety of
markets to make a significant contribution to perceived customer value.
Knowledge and Culture: Core competencies are imbued with tacit or experiential
knowledge, organizational routines, cultural behavior, shared value systems, and
embedded with the synergistic effect of the combination of these intangible assets.
Technology, Skills, and Routines: Core competencies are a blend of multiple
technologies or resources, knowledge, production and functional skills within processes
along the value chain leading to the end products and services of the firm.
Competitive Advantage: Core competencies leverage firm assets to enable the
creation of customer desired characteristics in product and services that are the source of
competitive advantage.
Core competencies are valuable, rare, difficult to imitate, and non-substitutable.

A Method to Identify Core Competencies

While the literature on core competencies is extensive, and several empirical studies
support the value of leveraging core competencies, few practitioners or researchers have claimed
that they have developed and employed an effective approach of core competence
identification. 53 Although there are only a few recommended methods, rigorous critical thinking
and analytical skills are necessary and some techniques are integrated including capability
architectures, systems thinking, analytical hierarchical processes, questionnaires, and
interviewing stakeholders.
52

Prahalad and Hamel, Core Competence of the Corporation, 83.

53

Yves Doz, "Core Competency For Corporate Renewal: Towards A Managerial Theory
Of Core Competencies," in Andrew Campbell and Kathleem Sommers Luchs, eds. Core
Competency-Based Strategy (Boston: International Thomson Business Press, 1997), 53-75, and
Klein, Gee, and Jones, Analysing Clusters, 37- 42.
15

This monograph recommends a consensus process introduced by Kenneth Marino in his

article Developing Consensus on Firm Competencies and Capabilities. 54 Each step of the
process leverages other related analytical methods.
1. Prepare current product/ market environment profile
2. Identify sources of competitive advantage and disadvantage in the principal
product/market segment
3. Determine the organizational capabilities and competencies of the firm
4. Determine which competencies and capabilities are core
5. Synthesize and reach consensus on core capabilities through dialogue
6. Assess future conditions in existing served markets
7. Identify emerging markets related to the firms skills
8. Formulate development plans
Marinos consensus process is supported by constructing a common linkage that details
the linkage of capabilities, processes, and end products such as a strategic architecture
framework. 55 Systems thinking gives attention to the interdependence, synergy, or mutual
convenience between strategic assets as they interact. 56 This awareness requires understanding

54

Kenneth E. Marino, Developing Consensus on Firm Competencies and Capabilities,

The Academy of Management Executive 10, no. 3 (Aug 1996): 44. Marino recommends educating
participants with articles describing core competence and capabilities in advance, focusing on
each step at a time, encourage dialog, apply validity and objectivity tests, expect to compromise,
beware of difficulties in defining terms.
55

Architecture frameworks, such as the DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF), define

the critical linkage of actions and elements and the dependencies between them to provide simple
and strong mechanisms for tracing capabilities, strategies, and effects/impacts.
56

Rudy Martens, Ilse Bogaert, and Andre van Cauwenbergh, "Preparing for the Future as
a Situational Puzzle: The Fit of Strategic Assets," International Studies of Management &
Organization 27, no. 2 (1997): 11.
16

the nature of interactions among the parts. 57 Structure, people, processes, culture produce
combinations that can enable a firm to realize its full competitive advantage. 58 Strategic
architecture and systems thinking provide the manifest content to determine what capabilities are
doing and how the firm is organized. Interviews with corporate professionals verify the results of
the content analysis and enable a more comprehensive view of interactions. It was only the
interviews with internal professionals which consistently allowed the actual competence to
emerge. 59
Finally, an analytical hierarchical process combines the information obtained from the
architecture analysis, systems thinking, and stakeholder input to rank capabilities within the
firm. 60 The use of information technology, in the form of computer-based analysis, enables the
analysis of skills that are mutually supportive. 61 This process is not simple or quick. Companies
invest hundreds of hours and significant funds to determine how to align their assets, and since
market conditions constantly change, it is necessary to reframe the analysis as different core
competencies can be identified because assets are both situation and time bound.62
Pitfalls
Given the discrepancies of terms and the resource intensive nature of competency
identification, it is not unusual for firms to make many errors leading to pitfalls and perceived
57

Jamshid Gharajedaghi, Systems Thinking: Managing Chaos and Complexity: a

Platform for Designing Business Architecture, 3rd Ed. (Burlington, MA: Morgan Kaufmann,
2011), 23.
58

Barney, Looking Inside, 50.

59

Edgar and Lockwood, "Understanding, Finding, and Applying," 62.

60

Zhang, Development of a Structured Framework, 55.

61

Klein, Gee, and Jones, Analysing Clusters, 40.

62

Martens, Bogaert, and van Cauwenbergh, Preparing for the Future, 15.
17

failure of the theory. Many of the errors are the result of vague narratives, over-specificity, overgeneralization, problematic circular logic, overly abstract concepts, meta-competencies, or the use
of broad collections of competencies and capabilities. 63 Senior managers are often inclined to use
the term to justify the importance of specific areas or out prioritize other areas. Similar
designation of value and the meaning of core may result in poor decisions for resource
distribution. 64 In such an environment, there is a vested interest for everyone to prove what they
do is core.
The decision to invest into capabilities should consider if they fit the external situation.
Alignment from resource to competitive advantage ensures that the product/market perspective
and the resource perspective are combined.65 The market will also not remain static, making it
necessary to conduct analysis on a continuous basis in all organizations. 66 Technology-based
assets will only retain an advantage for a limited well-known life cycle. 67 These changes mean
that competencies cannot be assumed to be stable entities that can be identified and defined once
and for all. Rather, it is necessary to tend to competence development Furthermore, when
changes in environmental factors render the core firm resource itself obsolete, diversification by
63

Martens, Bogaert, and van Cauwenbergh, Preparing for the Future, 14, and Marino,
Developing Consensus, 50, and Jeremy Klein, Beyond Competitive Advantage, Strategic
Change 11, no. 6 (Sep/Oct 2002): 319.
64

Klein, Gee, and Jones, Analysing Clusters, 38. Core competencies are more than
outstanding capabilities and are part of the organization as a whole instead of a particular part of
it. In practice, the term core competence is often used to denote something that a company, or
part of a company, believes that it is good at. In effect, the term core competence has become
equivalent to center of excellence, but with greater legitimacy.
65

Martens, Bogaert, and van Cauwenbergh, Preparing for the Future, 14.

66

Drejer, Organizational Learning, 210.

67

Ibid., 207. The application of technology follows an S-curve shaped life cycle as
competitors adapt to the new technology or it reaches maturity. Firms must continuously apply
new technology to lead their markets before the technology passes maturity or the competition
adapts.
18

deploying the core resource would no longer be effective in preserving the value of the resource.
In this case, a better strategy for the firm is to develop capabilities that enable the firm to
efficiently adapt to constantly changing and fast evolving environments. 68
Successful Business Examples
The research in this field has produced several examples of firms that have demonstrated
the applicability of this theory. These firms demonstrate how core competencies were leveraged
inside the firm to blend capabilities through processes to add value to the end product or service.
Toyota
The gradual extension of lean production, that was pioneered by Toyota from 1938,
reflects Toyotas routine of self-testing and adapting. Routines created a dynamic lock-in
guiding the development of Toyota Production System in particular during the crucial 1949-1950
period. 69 These procedural and cultural innovations impacted such activities as changing a die,
which Toyota could do in one third the time as the American auto industry. Success changed the
game with the differentiating factors being flexibility and control.70
Toyotas core competencies concerning quality focused on internal organizational
processes in production. This increased communication, increase in quality, and reduction in
waste propelled it ahead of others in the auto industry. For example, quality control is a process
that can be easily adopted by firms, whereas Toyotas Total Quality Management (TQM) is not
just a process, but requires the firms capability of developing an organizational-wide vision,

68

Barney and Clark, Resource-Based Theory, 202.

69

Hugo van Driel and Wilfred Dolfsma, Path Dependence, Initial Conditions, and
Routines in Organizations: The Toyota Production System Re-examined, Journal of
Organizational Change 22, no. 1 (2009): 53-55.
70

Gharajedaghi, Systems Thinking, 7.

19

empowering employees and building a customer-orientation culture. TQM requires the firm to
not only install a quality management process, but more importantly, to tap into the tacit energy
of the firm. 71
Another aspect of Toyota competencies tapping into the energy of the firm is the use of
value-stream mapping to identify the waste as a product or service travels through the
corporation. Value-stream maps are created by cross-functional teams of people directly
involved in the process comparing the current and future states in order to continuously improve
activities. 72 Toyotas core competencies were not described as the ability to make high-quality
cars although these were the outputs of the firm. Its core competencies expanded into every end
product and processes within all functional areas.
Toyotas internal capabilities concerning reducing waste and improving quality were
sources of competitive advantage and are considered core competencies. They are comprised of
people, structure, organization, and culture. They blend tangible and intangible assets of the firm
to produce value in the end product and services. They are what Toyota does deep within its
core processes that are the source of competitive advantage as others like Nissan were unable to
adapt and change to Toyotas higher quality products.
Wal-Mart
One of Wal-Marts core competencies is its Point of Sale pull distribution system that
integrates information systems, close ties to retailers, and in-house trucking and warehousing
built since the 1980s. 73 One of the constituent capabilities is a specific technique known as
71

Wang and Ahmed, Dynamic Capabilities, 11.

72

M. L. Emiliani and D. J. Stec, Using Value-Stream Maps to Improve Leadership,

Leadership & Organizational Development Journal 25, no. 8 (2004): 623.
73

Alan S. Khade and Nathan Lovaas, Improving Supply Chain Performance: A Case of
Wal-Marts Logistics, International Journal of Business Strategy 9, no. 1 (2009): 160.
20

cross-docking that transfers and distributes goods between suppliers and its stores. Running
85% of its own goods through its own warehouses increased efficiency, minimized handling
costs, and resulted in a daily 3% cost advantage. This technique created low stable prices that
impacted the entire organization including promotions, employee benefits and loyalty, attraction
of customers, and greater sales. 74
Additional capabilities in the distribution value chain included the use of information
technology to transmit stocking information across functional areas. A well-known example is
when a particular product has been sold through check-out bar code scans, the information is used
not only to calculate how much the customer owes but is also transmitted to a companywide
database. Without increasing the workload of the checkout clerk, and without burdening other
company employees, timely and detailed sales information is collected for processing and use. 75
Wal-Marts cross-docking capability and use of information technology indirectly created value
for the customer and gave it a competitive advantage over competitors such as K-mart.
Wal-Marts blending of assets, skills, knowledge, and corporate culture resulted in a
competitive advantage in the market. It did not matter what product was in the system or what
region of the U.S. it was serving, the core competence applied. Wal-Marts core competencies
were found inside the company as sources of competitive advantage that the customer valued.
Conclusion
Like Toyota and Wal-Mart, managers must look inside their firm for valuable, rare, and
costly-to-imitate resources, and then exploit these resources through their organization to create

74

Goddard, The Architecture of Core Competence, 49.

75

Francis Fukuyama and Abram N. Shulsky, "Military Organization in the Information

Age: Lessons from the World of Business, in. Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role of
Information in Warfare, edited by Zalmay Khalilzad, John White, and Andy W. Marshall (Santa
Monica: Rand Corporation, 1999), 330.
21

sustained competitive advantage. 76 Senior management should spend a significant amount of

time developing the strategic architecture, a roadmap of the future, that identifies core
competencies and their constituent technologies. 77 A strategic architecture makes resource
allocation and priorities understandable, transparent, consistent, and adds definition to company
vision. Creating this architecture requires understanding the theory, understanding the
terminology, collecting information from various sources, incorporating systems thinking, and
applying critical analytical skills.
Uncertain market environments are very dynamic, requiring firms to constantly reassess
their core competencies. Through an interactive process of learning, firms alter their core
competencies continuously in an effort to maintain competitive advantage in a changing
environment. 78 Within this market environment, the ability of a company to identify, build,
deploy, and protect its core competencies is likely to yield differences in its performance. 79 In
conditions of uncertainty, firms have a strong incentive to retain flexibility to move as quickly as
possible to create the required resources and capabilities when uncertainty is resolved. 80 The
most important thing senior managers can do is correctly identify the core competencies to ensure
that resources are aligned to create sustained competitive advantage while avoiding pitfalls.

76

Barney, Looking Inside, 50.

77

Prahalad and Hamel, Core Competence of the Corporation, 87.

78

Bogner and Thomas, Core Competence and Competitive Advantage, 37.

79

Gary Hamel and C.K. Prahalad, The Concept of Core Competence, in Hamel and
Heene, Competence-Based Competition, 11-33.
80

Barney and Clark, Resource-Based Theory, 174.

22

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ADOPTS CAPABILITIES AND COMPETENCIES

During the 1990s, under pressure to reduce costs, DoD implemented best business
practices in multiple areas to increase efficiencies within the management of operations initially
focusing on its core functions. 81 Known as functional process improvement, business process
re-engineering, or revolution in business affairs, best practices were put into effect to streamline
the Department towards core functions while reducing costs. 82 DoDs research on competencies
in the early 1990s identified outsourcing as a strategic tool to enhance the capabilities and
effectiveness of the entire enterprise, not primarily as a means for reducing function costs. 83
Strategic management tools and techniques that emphasized effectiveness and efficiency also
emphasized placing primacy for resource allocation decisions into the hands of those responsible
for the mission. 84
The period after Goldwater-Nichols also saw a greater emphasis of ensuring those
responsible for their missions were making the decisions. An evolution of roles, missions,
functions, and responsibilities in the joint force emphasized service responsibility to provide
capabilities to the combatant commanders, who should be the principal source for identifying
gaps in capability to carry out their assigned operational missionsthe CINCs [combatant
commanders] role should include direct involvement in evaluating how well DoDs resource

81

U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Plan for Streamlining the

Bureaucracy (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1993), viii-ix. While the Gore Report of
1993 primarily focused on government waste and inefficiency, elements of the report impacted
efforts at transforming the way the government conducts the business of defending the country as
well.
82

DoD, Streamlining the Bureaucracy, 24-26, and U.S. Department of Defense, Report
of the Defense Science Board on Outsourcing and Privatization (Washington, DC: Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, 1996), 18a.
83

DoD, Outsourcing and Privatization, 18a.

84

Ibid., 51.
23

plans satisfy its needs. 85 From an outcome-based perspective, DoD began using the term core
competencies as the set of specific capabilities or activities fundamental to a service or agency
role in order to differentiate the services.86 The same emphasis on effectiveness, efficiency, and
command responsibilities shifted to force development processes supporting the capabilities and
competencies for Unified Action. The intent of capabilities-based thinking was to transition DoD
from a Cold War structure oriented around countering and maintaining superiority over specific
threats to developing a wide range of military capabilities that can be applied across a broad
spectrum of conflict. 87
The military assesses that the future security environment will be dynamic, uncertain,
fraught with opportunities and challenges, transnationally dangerous, and with varying levels of
intensity. 88 Ambiguous threats may employ traditional or non-traditional means and
technologies as they attempt to circumvent or undermine our strengths while exploiting our
vulnerabilities. 89 However, U.S. forces will be expected to deter or defeat any potential
adversary. 90 The description of this security environment is the foundation for the development of
military strategies, capabilities, and theater campaign plans. Rapid changes in the security

85

DoD, Outsourcing and Privatization, 54.

86

U.S. Department of Defense, Directions for Defense: Report of the Commission on

Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1995), 2-20.
87

Peter W. Matisoo, Enabling Joint Interdependence through Capability Portfolio

Management (Masters Thesis, Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School,
2008), pg. 34.
88

CJCS, Joint Vision 2020, 12.

89

U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington,

DC: Department of Defense, 1997), 4.
90

U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st
Century Defense (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), 4.
24

environment will require greater speed in planning, conducting, and resourcing military
operations. 91
When operations are required, the expectation is that US forces must have an overmatch
of available capabilities. 92 Identifying the right capabilities and competencies for the future
depends on speculative operating environment estimates that provide the foundation upon which
the joint staff develops more detailed concepts and architectures to guide force development. 93 In
preparing for a wide range of threats while ensuring that one type of warfare preparation did not
overshadow another, DoD implemented the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System (JCIDS) to provide an overarching evaluation mechanism that links joint concepts,
capabilities, and systems. 94
This section addresses the evolution of DoDs capabilities-based approach which has a
significant effect on the Armys ability to build and leverage its assets. Changes in the joint force
with respect to the roles, missions, functions, competencies, and capabilities established the
current relationship of the service that provides the forces and the combatant commander that
employs the forces. How JCIDS operates in determining capabilities to face the future security

91

Dempsey, CCJO Joint Force 2020, 3.

92

CJCS, Joint Vision 2020, 12.

93

U.S. Joint Forces Command, The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010 (Suffolk,
VA: Joint Forces Command, 2010), forward, and Bradford Brown, Defense Acquisition
University: Introduction to Defense Acquisition Management, 10th ed. (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense
Acquisition University Press, 2010), 35-37. The Presidents national security strategy provides
the Secretary of Defense guidance for the national defense strategy, which in turn provides the
Chairman guidance upon which to base the national military strategy. The national military
strategy articulates the Chairmans recommendations to the President and Secretary of Defense
on the employment of the military element of power in support of the Presidents national
security strategy.
94

Center for Strategic and International Studies, Americas Uncertain Approach to

Strategy and Force Planning (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies,
2006), 18, and Joint Forces Command, JOE 2010, 62.
25

environment is important for the services in their role as force providers of the joint force.
Regulatory, doctrinal, and bureaucratic requirements establish the framework in which the Army
attempts to identify its capabilities and its core competencies to create competitive advantage in
the national security environment.
The Shift to Capability-Based Forces
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 created functional and regional unified combatant
commanders responsible to the president for mission planning and execution, bypassing the
service chiefs who retained responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping the force. 95 The
services no longer fight and win the nations wars, a combatant commander with a tailored joint
force does. The focus changed to the needs of the combatant commanders, the forces that they
needed, and on DoD support activities; not on the capabilities of the individual services. This
change in the force structure necessitated a review of the roles, missions, and functions.
The 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) was the first report defining and
identifying the core competencies of the services as building blocks of their contribution to the
combatant commanders. It reaffirmed the role of the military services in developing concepts,
doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures that derive from their core competencies. 96 The
report identified Army competencies: overseas presence, mobile armored warfare, airborne
operations, light infantry operations, sustained land operations, and ground-based mediumaltitude air defense. 97 The commission identified issues with institutional practices that allowed
the services to independently develop and field new weapons which resulted in its
recommendation that capabilities and requirements be reviewed in the aggregate, thus starting
95

Matisoo, Enabling Joint Interdependence, 4.

96

DoD, Commission on Roles and Missions, 2-4.

97

Ibid., ES-5, 2-20, 2-29.

26

DoD on the path toward capabilitiesbased planning. 98 The success of the services in
organizing, training, and equipping the joint force are their unique capabilities, but the services do
not conduct combat operationsthe combatant commanders do. 99
Instead of assigned functions, increasingly service core competencies would be assessed
through what they brought to the joint fight while joint planning documents such as Joint Vision
2010 and subsequent documents focused on broad calls for force-wide capabilities rather than on
individual services. 100 The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review continued the emphasis towards
capabilities based planning, through a Revolution in Business Affairs to assure management
focus on core competencies. 101 A 2003 Senior Executive Council Task Force examined core
competencies in detail to support alternatives to outsourcing including Prahalad and Hamels core
competency framework. The SEC Task Force recommended an adapted definition of core
competencies into DoD by defining core competencies. 102 Although the term core competencies
is used during this transition to capabilities based forces, the services continued to have difficulty
understanding and applying them.

98

DoD, Commission on Roles and Missions, 4-1, and Institute for Defense Analysis,
Military Roles and Missions: Past Revisions and Future Prospects (Alexandria, VA, March
2009), ES-5.
99

John J. Hamre, Roles, Missions, and Requirements of the Department of Defense,

testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, June 19, 2007, 3.
100

CSIS, Americas Uncertain Approach, 16. Four capabilities lay at the heart of full
spectrum dominance. Dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimension protection, and
focused logistics.
101

DoD, QDR(1997), 15.

102

GAO, DoD Faces Challenges, 10. SEC recommended definition, A complex

harmonization of individual technologies and production (employment, delivery) skills that
create unique military capabilities valued by the CINC. Three themes remained common to each
competency definition: (1) the knowledge and experience acquired by people, (2) the discrete and
finite set of technologies the people employ, and (3) the business objectives to be achieved. It
stated that DoDs business objective to be achieved is warfare
27

In 2008, the adoption of the core competency term reached Title 10 responsibility as the
Defense Authorization Act of 2008 mandated that the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) focus
not only on the roles, missions, and functions of the Department and the services, but also on the
core competencies that support the core missions and activities.103 In an effort to emphasize a
capabilities focus, the act replaced the terms core competencies and capabilities for functions.
While moving towards capabilities, DoD must still assign functions to its services,
components, and departments to ensure functioning of the military. To lead joint decisions, it
delegates responsibility to the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff for the development of
military strategy that includes the necessary net assessments to determine the capabilities of the
Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared to those of possible adversaries. 104
Additionally as part of the Departments Readiness Reporting Systems, DoD mandates the
services to identify mission essential tasks that support core competencies. 105 Although core
competencies should enable an organizations end services (operational tasks), DoD made an
attempt to draw the link between mission essential tasks, core competencies, and core mission
areas. With the prolific use of core competencies in business, their adaptation into best practices,
and their insertion into capabilities and readiness, DoD needed a management system to bring this
whole structure together.

103

104

National Defense Authorization Act 2008, 286.

DoDD 5100.01, 15.

105

U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 7730.65, Department

of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April
23, 2007), 5. This construct is opposite of the business theory having competencies enabling the
task/functions of the firm.
28

DoD/Joint Capabilities Management

In 2004, the Joint Defense Capabilities Study determined that services dominate the
current requirements process and that service planning did not consider the full range of solutions
available to meet joint warfighting needs. The team recommended a capabilities-based process
for identifying needs, creating choices, developing solutions, and providing capabilitieswith the
combatant commanders having major input. 106 Requests for capabilities originate from three
different sources: the combatant commanders, the services, and from joint concepts.
The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, which provides a broad description of how
the future joint force operates, is the overarching warfighting concept that guides the development
of future joint capabilities. 107 The procedures established in JCIDS support the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council in advising the Secretary of
Defense in identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint military capabilities-based requirements
and gaps in an integrated collaborative approach. 108
To transform the military force to support the needs of the National Defense Strategy, the
Department has three decision support systems; JCIDS, the Defense Acquisition Management

106

U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Capabilities Study: Improving DoD Strategic

Planning, Resourcing and Execution to Satisfy Joint Capabilities (Washington, DC: Department
of Defense, 2004), iii-iv. Changes to current structure included: Combatant commanders having
major input to set joint needs as the foundation for defense programs, capabilities planning would
be accomplished at the DoD level, greater input by leadership in the front end of iterative
planning processes.
107

Robert Keenan, Capabilities Development and Systems Acquisition Management 2013

Executive Primer, ver. 18.0 (Fort Belvoir, VA: Army Force Management School, February 2013),
154.
108

Keenan, 2013 Executive Primer, 5-6. Joint/services concepts and integrated

architectures to identify prioritized high risk capability gaps and integrated joint DOTMLPF-P
approaches (materiel and non-materiel) Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership
and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P)
29

System, and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process. 109 While the other
systems focus on acquisition management and budgets, the primary objective of the JCIDS
process is to ensure the capabilities required by the joint warfighter to successfully execute the
missions assigned to them are identified with their associated operational performance
criteria. 110 Based on recommendations of the Capabilities Study, JCIDS incorporated Joint
Capability Areas as an organizational construct to support capability analysis, strategy
development, investment decision making, capability portfolio management, and capabilitiesbased force development and operational planning. 111
The Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) process within JCIDS identifies the
capabilities required to successfully execute missions, the shortfalls in existing weapon systems
to deliver those capabilities. 112 Defense acquisition programs must certify, among other
requirements, that the program is being executed by an entity with a relevant core competency
before they can progress beyond pre-systems acquisition into development. 113 An integrated
architecture method includes not just material solutions but also doctrine, organization, and
training needs and the relationship between tasks and activities. Using architectures, the JROC

109

Defense Business Board, Capabilities Requirements Identification and Development

Processes Review, Report to the Secretary of Defense, Report FY09-2 (Washington, DC: Defense
Business Board, 2008), 3.
110

Brown, Introduction to Defense Acquisition Management, 34.

111

Keenan, 2013 Executive Primer, 10. There are currently nine JCAs: Force Support;
Battlespace Awareness; Force Application; Logistics; Command & Control; Net-Centric;
Protection; Building Partnerships; and Corporate Management and Support.
112

Brown, Introduction to Defense Acquisition Management, 35-37.

113

Ibid., 44.
30

will be responsible for prioritization of capabilities based on their contribution to realization of

the Joint Operating Concepts. 114
DoD and Joint Capabilities-Based Approach Assessment
Since Goldwater-Nichols, DoD has progressively evolved towards a strong capabilitiesbased approach to identifying needs and developing capabilities. However, the pace of
transformation of the DoD business enterprise for providing joint warfighting capabilities has
been much slow, despite these significant reform efforts. 115 Adoption of competency terms in
law, regulations, or studies did not represent adoption of competency theory or the ability to
benefit from its application. Although US Code and DoD incorporated core competencies as a
term, taken in context, they are still differentiating the services in the same manner as designating
functions. Legislation that requires undertaking core competency, roles, and mission reviews only
reinforce the things that the services think they do well and keep the joint force from focusing on
the things that it does not do as well.116 Services still dominate the input resulting in gaps not
being identified that support joint needs. While Congress and the DoD have actively pursued
doctrinal changes that emphasize joint forces, implementing these changes has been more
problematic. 117
According to a 2008 General Accounting Office report, The JCIDS process has not yet
met its objective to identify and prioritize warfighting needs from a joint capabilities

114

U.S. Department of Defense, Transformation Planning Guidance (Washington, DC:

Department of Defense, 2003), 16.
115

Matisoo, Enabling Joint Interdependence, 3.

116

Hamre, Roles, Missions, and Requirements, 4.

117

CSIS, Americas Uncertain Approach, 15.

31

perspective. 118 The process is perceived as lengthy, service focused, and inattentive to combatant
commander input, especially concerning short-term or emerging requirements. 119 Combatant
commands lack analytic capacity and resources to become more fully engaged in JCIDS either by
developing their own capability assessments or participating in reviews and commenting on
proposals. 120 The current system, although improving, places the commander responsible for the
mission at a disadvantage in determining the capabilities and competencies of the force that is
needed for a specific environment and mission.
DoD and Joint Conclusion
Providing military capabilities that operate effectively together to meet future challenges
is the common purpose of the military departments, the Services, the defense agencies, and other
DoD elements. All must focus on DoD's real product- effective military operations. 121 The Army
operations within a joint environment to identify and develop capabilities to meet the challenges
of the security environment. Commanders need to identify and have input into the capabilities
that add value to the competitive advantage when plans become action. Based on the security
environment, the regional focus, and the needs of combatant commanders, capabilities need
tailoring for specific areas and for specific missions.
US Code, DoD, and Joint Doctrine have evolved to a capabilities-based process to
identify, build, and leverage capabilities that must be integrated across all domains and account

118

United States General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: DoDs Requirements

Determination Process Has Not Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities (Washington,
DC: United States General Accounting Office, 2008), 2.
119

Ibid., 14; DBB, Capabilities Requirements Identification, 4; Matisoo, Enabling Joint

Interdependence, 42
120

GAO, DoDs Requirements Determination Process, 16.

121

DoD, Commission on Roles and Missions, ES-1.

32

for geographic considerations and constraints. 122 What is missing from this capabilities-based
process is inclusion of competency based theory beyond the use of the term. Core competencies
enable the operational capabilities, inform strategies, and create competitive advantages across
geographic regions and the wide range of threats in the future security environment. The desire to
eliminate unnecessary duplication of operational capabilities and service functions is not a desire
that should apply to core competencies.
The Department would benefit from building a strategic architecture that links
capabilities, core competencies, operational capabilities, and functions to the core mission areas.
In fact, mapping functions to Joint Capability Areas would be an interim step at best, because
history shows that assignment of a function does not assure the availability of the requisite
capability. 123 The current joint doctrine of assigning core competencies to a categorization
framework without linking it to the core mission areas provides no understanding of the
relationships between capabilities, competencies, and the functions that forces perform. To
successfully acquire the capabilities required to form joint forces in dynamic future operating
environments, defense strategic guidance must provide a sound framework for capabilities and
investment areas. Alignment of capabilities requires a strategy that provides clear guidance for all
decision making within the Department, indicating where to focus limited resources to achieve
U.S. security objectives. 124 With the incomplete framework utilizing misunderstood terms,
services, such as the Army, are left to create their own doctrine to meet these ill-defined
procedural requirements.

122

DoD, Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report, 4.

123

IDA, Military Roles and Missions, ES-10.

124

Matisoo, Enabling Joint Interdependence, 74.

33

THE UNITED STATES ARMY CORE COMPETENCIES

The Army followed DoD and the joint staff in adopting core competency terms into its
doctrine; however, without the full theoretical background, the identification of its competencies
has been elusive. Many Army organizations identify essential tasks as core competencies and
then build a responsibility hierarchy similar to nesting mission statements.125 Branches of the
Army have used the terms to identify sub-categories of functions, individual competencies, and
leader competencies, but rarely related to an operational environment or competitive
advantage. 126 Army Posture Statements have reiterated assigned functions, valued application of
lethal force, or generally promoted excellence in unstated core competencies mostly addressing
individual or leader competencies. 127 Army oriented literature has often mixed two related but
separate concepts of workplace competencies and core competencies adding more confusion to
the use of the term. 128

125

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Regulation 10-5,

Organization and Functions: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (Fort Monroe, VA:
Training and Doctrine Command, 2009), 10, and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command,
TRADOC Regulation 10-5-6, Organization and Functions: United States Army War College
(Fort Monroe, VA: Training and Doctrine Command, 2005), 6, and U.S. Army War College,
How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook 2011-2012 (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army
War College, 2012), 449.
126

Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-09, Fires,

(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2012), chapter 1, 3-4, and Robert M. Williams,
Maintaining Armor Core Competencies, Armor 116, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 2007): 4, and Department
of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 2-0, Intelligence, (Washington, DC:
Department of the Army, 2012), chapter 2.
127

Department of the Army, The United States Army 2004 Posture Statement
(Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff U.S. Army, 2004), 4.This statement reiterates the
2001 Field Manual 1 core competencies. Department of the Army, The United States Army 2009
Posture Statement (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff U.S. Army, 2009), 11.The 2009
APS states that a core competency of land forces is to effectively, efficiently, and appropriately
apply lethal force. Department of the Army, The United States Army 2011 Posture Statement
(Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff U.S. Army, 2011), 12.
128

Aaron M. Zook, Military Competency-Based Human Capital Management: A Step

Toward the Future, (Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 4. This term
34

Nevertheless, US Code, DoD directives, and joint doctrine make the term core
competencies integral to the Armys doctrine and acquisition processes. Proper implementation
of core competency theory can support the Armys identification of the most valuable capabilities
for these processes. Competencies and capability development are elements that preserve the
Armys core capability to conduct decisive land operations, but only if done correctly. 129 So far,
attempts to identify the Armys core competencies have been made without a rigorous method,
resulting in the universal confusion. This section introduces a background of Army competency
related literature representing the development of the current espoused Army core competencies.
An evaluation of these competencies against the business theory definitions, characteristics, and
filters reveals that they are invalid. Two historical military examples provide insight into military
core competencies and how competencies are connected to competitive advantage in the
operational environment.
Previous Academic Work
Previous academic works on Army core competencies often take the term for granted as a
representation of organizational capabilities, functions, or individual skills. Referencing the 1988
Field Manual 25-100, Robert J. Botters focused on core individual competencies instead of a
post-Prahalad and Hamel definition for an organization. 130 He identified training core
competencies as equal to mission essential tasks with the need for tactical training to maintain
individual and collective core competencies in warfighting skills. Huba Wass de Czege
often refers to two related but separate concepts, core competencies of the organization and
workplace competencies of the individual.
129

Department of the Army, Headquarters, G-8, Army Equipment Modernization Strategy

(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2013), 3.
130

Robert J. Botters, Jr, The Proliferation of Peace Operations and U.S. Army Tactical
Proficiency: Will The Army Remain a Combat Ready Force? (Monograph, School of Advanced
Military Studies, 1996), 7.
35

emphasized cultural and technical aspects of warfare and the need to retain skills associated with
close combat, but did not address core competencies beyond the use of the term in his articles
title. 131
In a strategic research project, Frederick Rudesheim reviewed the concepts underpinning
core competencies established by Prahalad and Hamel along with example evaluation criteria.
Rudesheim provided a cursory background on the theory, recognized the difference between
institutional and operational forces, and properly identified that proposed core competencies were
often generalized statements describing the roles, mission, or assigned functions. However, he did
not recognize the role of value in the competitive environment, nor did he address the tangible
and intangible structure of capabilities and competencies. His research project demonstrated the
trouble separating functions and processes which dilutes a comprehensive understanding of the
value chain in creating a competitive advantage. 132
Each of these authors touched on separate but important structural components of a
wholepeople, organization, assets, and cultureand they represent the Armys difficulty in
identifying core competencies. Core competencies are an inextricable part of successful
strategies, detailing the tangible and intangible within the organization that will be leveraged to
fulfill the vision. Organizational values and beliefs drive culturethe culture that will produce
the competitive performance desired. 133 While culture is an important aspect of core
competencies, routines, people, and assets are equally important.

131

Huba Wass de Czege, Closing With the Enemy: The Core Competency of an Army,
Military Review 80, no. 3 (May-June 2000): 8-10.
132

Fredrick S. Rudesheim, Discovering the Armys Core Competencies, (Strategy

Research Project, U.S. Army War College, 2001)
133

Stephen Brent Appleton, The U.S. and Canadian Army Strategies: Failures in
Understanding. (Research Paper, Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 2003), 35.
36

U.S. Army Espousing Its Core Competencies

The 2009 Army Capstone Concept establishes the broad capabilities that the Army needs,
stating that the Army must maintain its core competency of conducting effective combined arms
operations in close combat to employ defeat and stability mechanisms against a variety of threats.
Supporting ideas to a concept of operational adaptability forecast the foundation for the narrative
of Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security. 134 The Army Capstone Concept of 2012,
refines the concept of operational adaptability emphasizing flexible organizations, support of a
wide variety of missions, regional alignment, and a focus on prevent, shape, and win.
Competencies are only mentioned for leaders or technical competencies (skills) in mission
command. CAM and WAS are mentioned but not as competencies. 135
Describing how the future Army will operate, the 2009 Army Operating Concept,
broadened the scope of traditional combined arms to include all elements of combat power with
the integration and sequencing of all actions, activities, and programs necessary to seize, retain,
and exploit the initiative in the context of full-spectrum operations. Achieving the necessary level
of operational adaptability rests on two broad responsibilities which The Army Operating Concept
introduces as CAM and WAStreating the two concepts as organizational capabilities.136
The definitive publication for CAM and WAS, Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 Unified
Land Operations, establishes the Armys operational framework which focuses on seizing and
134

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Pamphlet 525-3-0, The U.S. Army
Capstone Concept, (Fort Eustis, Training and Doctrine Command, 2009), i. The foundations for
the current competencies are seen in the six supporting ideas: develop the situation through
action, conduct combined arms operations, employ a combination of defeat and stability
mechanisms, integrate joint capabilities, cooperate with partners, and exert a psychological and
technical influence.
135

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Pamphlet 525-3-0, The U.S. Army
Capstone Concept (Fort Eustis, Training and Doctrine Command, 2012), 11-14.
136

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army
Operating Concept (Fort Eustis, Training and Doctrine Command, 2009), iii, 11, 13-14.
37

retaining initiative to gain relative positional advantage in a sustained mix of operations to

prevent, deter, prevail, or create favorable conditions. 137 The doctrine recognizes that
prefabricated solutions to tactical or operational problems do not exist because threats and
environments are unique and adaptive. Unified Land Operations explains that within the context
of offense, defense, and stability operations, CAM and WAS provide the means for balancing the
application of the elements of combat power.
Both employ non-descript elements of combat power; however, Combined Arms
Maneuver focuses on positive aims of defeating, seizing, and achieving while Wide Area Security
focuses on the negative aims of protection, denial, and retention. Unified Land Operations
recognizes that operational environments are unique and ever changing and that leaders will need
to adapt unspecified combinations of ends, ways, and means. Unified Land Operations uses CAM
and WAS as means for balancing operations, actions that commanders apply, and as descriptions
of unique capabilities that the Army provides for the joint force commander, to be employed by
the organization in the environment. 138
Army Doctrine Publication 1, The Army is the publication that provides the overarching
description of the Army, what it does, and where it is going. It also delineates mission, purpose,
and roles from US Code, DoDD 5100.01 and establishes the Armys contribution to the Joint
Force. In establishing the Armys contribution, The Army reiterates Unified Land Operations
core competencies and adds seven vital enabling competencies; some of which are designated
functions, statements of missions, or types of operations. 139 As an overarching organizational
137

Department of the Army, Unified Land Operations, 14.

138

Ibid., 6.

139

Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication No. 1, The Army (Washington,
DC: Department of the Army, 2012), 3-3. These enabling competencies include security
cooperation, tailoring forces, entry operations, flexible mission command, the support we provide
to the joint force and ourselves, domestic support, and mobilizing Reserve Components.
38

publication, the citing of core competencies along with ethics, descriptions of profession, creeds,
and mottos is expected and valid. However, its identification of enabling competencies also
raises questions about the method of competency determination. The identification of Army core
competencies through a concepts driven process, without a working core competency theory, and
without a rigorous method has led the Army to espouse poor core competencies. If concepts in in
overarching operational guidance and direction are misapplied, poorly constructed or illogically
included, their usage creates opportunities for misunderstanding, semantics, mixed concepts, and
poor application. 140
Validity of Army Core Competencies
Effects Driven Abstract Constructs
In its broadest sense a concept describes what is to be done; in its more specific sense, it
can be used to describe how something is done. 141 Definitions and descriptions of CAM and
WAS are very broad, focusing primarily on desired enemy effects and the environment. These
concepts use defeat and stability mechanisms as means and operational art as the method to
determine the ways; however, the mechanisms themselves are also descriptions of desired enemy
effects. 142 The actual means and ways employed are left undefined; therefore, they do not clearly
140

Martin Dempsey, Gen. Martin Dempsey on the Army Operating Concept

(presentation, YouTube, 9 September 2010)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MWMym8yNT9Y&list=PLc4c2AosXcga0v4j8yRKqvkLeWPZXTyZ, (accessed 12 December 2012), and Andrew B. Nocks, More
Mumbo-Jumbo: The Clutter and Confusion within the Armys Operational Concept of Unified
Land Operations. Small Wars Journal (8 June 2012), http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/moremumbo-jumbo-the-clutter-and-confusion-within-the-army%E2%80%99s-operational-concept-ofunified (accessed 12 December 2012), and J.P. Clark, The Missed Opportunity: A Critique of
ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, Military Review (July-August 2012): 52.
141

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command Concept Development Guide (Fort Eustis: Training and Doctrine Command, 2011), 5.
142

Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication No. 3-0, Unified Land
Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2012), chapter 2, 9-10.
39

establish the resources or routines required. Since competencies are based on doing capabilities
that are performed routinely and evaluated against the competition, CAM and WAS do not meet
basic definitional requirements. For example, they are so vague that the only aspect that truly
differentiates the two competencies from themselves are the described aims, essentially detailing
Clausewitzs positive and negative aims. 143
This conceptual abstractness allows for adaptation to a wide range of contextual
formulation, but this is not the same as creating access to a wide range of markets. While abstract
concepts like CAM and WAS may serve as an operational heuristic (a quick reminder of what
must be done), they provides little insight into the tangible and intangible assets required, how
technology and knowledge are blended, or the unique roles of behavior, belief systems, and
culture in creating a competitive advantage. 144 In order to know how they might create value, one
needs to look further into all aspects of core competencies. 145
An evaluation of CAM or WAS leads to questions on how they might create sustained
competitive advantage, how they are valuable, rare, difficult to imitate, or non-substitutable.
Their abstractness and valuable narrative of desired effects lends to their uncontested nature as
they easily form golden hammers that are applicable for every situation. Concreteness reduces
misunderstanding about what is meant in the concept and allows for challenging the concept for
its validity in a changing environment. Uncertain futures and uncertain threats should not drive
imprecision in developing capabilities.

143

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter
Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 42.
144

Goddard, The Architecture of Core Competence, 47.

145

Prahalad and Hamel, Core Competence of the Corporation, 81.

40

Organizational Level Capabilities

It is better to describe CAM and WAS as organizational level capabilities or metacompetencies which are aggregates of competencies and left vague for motivational narrative
purposes. 146 An example would be FEDEX saying it had a core competency in package delivery
or Wal-Mart saying it is creating satisfied customers, which is exactly what their competition
could say. With meta-competency definitions that encompass every means, every domain, and
every purpose it is not possible to discern what the terms really mean. Without more specificity it
is not possible to evaluated against competency characteristics, especially differentiating from the
competition, uniqueness, or narrowing of strategy. 147 Organizational level capabilities like CAM
and WAS sound great for information briefs, and are useful for describing the Army in broad
terms to those who are outside the force, but they add no value in developing operational
approaches. They may actually confuse operators, creating an environment where the standard
answers are to conduct CAM and/or WAS instead of thinking through the design of an
operational approach.
The Context of Competition
Within the operational framework of Unified Land Operations, CAM and WAS are
means applied within the competitive environment directly against the competition to achieve
organizational goals. They are also means for the commander to balance the application of the
elements of combat power. Most empirical studies and examples in business identify
competencies within the organization that are sources of value in the product or service as
opposed to the service itself. Perhaps when only thinking about conventional forces and against
certain adversaries that do not have combined arms this is an accurate description, but not against
146

Grant, Resource-Based Theory, 117.

147

Goddard, The Architecture of Core Competence, 46.

41

near peers who also have the capability to conduct CAM or WAS. Context plays an important
part in defining what competitive advantage means with regard to achieving operational goals or
aims. Even the asymmetric threats that the Army has faced in recent years apply elements of
combat power at their disposal for the same broad purposes and perhaps with more success. If the
Army has been more successful, it is because of deeper and more specific capabilities.
Namely, the Army must expand on the architecture or the linkage for mapping
capabilities to competitive advantages. Besides the operational forces, the Army is an institution
consisting of enterprises with the function of fielding, training, and equipping the operational
force. It regionally aligns its operational forces to focus on specific geographic combatant
commands. It codifies its practices, routines, and processes into doctrine that ranges from
individual and leader development to organizational doctrinal operations. These areas, when
properly linked, have more potential for identifying core competencies that, when properly
leveraged, create value operationally.
Validity Conclusion
Had the Army properly adopted the business theory, confirmatory evidence of espoused
core competencies would reside in doctrine and processes that personnel performed routinely and
that added value to the required functions of the Army. Instead, subsequent and subordinate
doctrine is silent of the constituent capabilities that would contribute to espoused core
competencies. Since competencies are a specific type of capability, CAM and WAS should have
well defined processes, organization, culture, and people that provide the structure of the
constituent capabilities. Further doctrinal work in operations and tactics should identify which
tasks contribute to CAM and WAS.
Within the doctrine and academic literature review, there is also no evidence that the
Army conducted a detailed rigorous method to survey capabilities within an architecture, applied
them against evaluation criteria, conducted leader evaluation surveys, or applied analytical
42

approaches to find the most value producing competencies in the force. Such a survey would
provide empirical evidence, causal relationships, and concreteness. Because they were developed
conceptually, CAM and WAS retain abstractness which does not support an understanding of
requisite tangible or intangible assets. They also lack context to understand who is the customer,
what is the basis of competition, and what it means to have competitive advantage. Because of
generalization, lack of technical or knowledge based capabilities, lack of distinction, nonrecognition of the competition, and lack of valuation, CAM and WAS are organizational concepts
that are better categorized as organizational level capabilities or meta-competencies.
It is understandable to avoid overly prescriptive operational doctrine because each
situation is unique, requiring operational art to design an appropriate approach instead of relying
on routines. However, the Army is full of areas that enhance, enable, and leverage operational
capabilities that are more stable. These may be found inside headquarters, sustainment, the
institutional Army, personnel management, or systems designed to support a learning and
adaptive organization. The Army should not limit the use of core competancy theory to
conceptual performance-based tactical capabilities when looking for the most valuable
capabilities.
Historical Insight into Core Competencies in Action
Bedouins and Turks
During the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Turkish rule 1916-18, British Army officer
T. E. Lawrence examined the strengths of the Bedouins to determine an operational approach to
defeat the Turks occupation of Arab lands. He found strength in the Arab irregulars
demonstrated competencies in nomadic desert living. This competency was a result of the
combination of tangible and intangible assets such as the people, the culture, tribal organizations,
routines, and physical assets such as small arms and camels. This competency led to the Arab

43

irregulars being used in a different role than the regulars whose role would only be to occupy
places to which the irregulars had already given access.148
Lawrence examined the tangible and intangible aspects of operational environment as
well as in his own forces: In each I found the same elements, one algebraic, one biological, a
third psychological. 149 The Arabs had no indigenous army to face the Turkish military forces;
they were organized in various non-unified tribes. Understanding the Bedouin competency in
desert living, Lawrence strategically aligned ends, ways, and means to conduct a successful
guerilla war against the Turks. Our tactics should be tip and run: not pushes but strokes. We
should never try to improve an advantage. We should use the smallest force in the quickest time
at the farthest places. 150
By using mobility the Arabs could neutralize the Turks numerical superiority by
deviating from the early twentieth century strategy of annihilation and its emphasis on the
decisive battle. Lawrence developed a strategy that leveraged the Bedouin core competency to
achieve a competitive advantage forcing the Turks to defend the railways needed for
sustainment.. 151 This Bedouin core competency compared to the Turks capabilities was valuable,
rare, difficult to imitate, non-substitutable.

148

T. E. Lawrence, Evolution of a Revolt (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute

Reprints, 1990), 13, http://server16040.contentdm.oclc.org/u?/p4013coll7,37, (accessed 1 April
2013).
149

Ibid., 8.

150

T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (New York: Anchor Books,

1991), 188-90, 196, 337.
151

Lawrence W. Moores, T. E. Lawrence: Theorist and Campaign Planner

(Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1992), 19, and Azar Gat, A History of
Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press,
2001), 669.
44

Avoidance of enemy strengths were typical of traditional tribal warfare. The Bedouins
could leverage their assiduous cultivation of desert power that allowed them to command the
desert like a navy commanding a sea 152 Culturally, they were very independent and used to the
moral strain of isolation. The nomadic tendencies of the Bedouin minimized their vulnerability
to Turkish counteraction. 153 The Bedouin example demonstrates the importance of innate
knowledge, culture, and experiential learning in developing a competency.
This core competency allowed the Bedouins to attack Aqaba from the unprotected desert
to in the East after a six hundred mile trip through the Hejaz and to use the desert for mobility.
However, core competencies lose their value when the context changes. When in Palestine, the
operational environment had changed due to the high density of Turkish troops. The Arabs could
no longer rely upon the desert to protect them and the local populace lacked the protection offered
by a nomadic life. 154 The Bedouins could still conduct raids, but without the core competency of
desert capability, they would not be effective when they entered more urban areas. The Bedouins
in the Arab Revolt examples the use of a core competency, its internal structure, its cultural path
dependence, its application in an operational approach, and competency erosion in a changing
environment.
The Yom Kippur War
The Arab Israeli War of 1973 demonstrates the risks adhering to old core competencies
that become core rigidities, the need for multiple capabilities to adapt quickly, developing a
strategy based on core competencies, and the risk of veering off that strategy. It is also a valuable
example for understanding the important role of institutional training, leader, and capability
152

Lawrence, Evolution of a Revolt, 14.

153

Moores,T.E. Lawrence, 18.

154

Ibid., 33.
45

development. These capabilities, when built into competencies and properly leveraged, created
characteristics in the fighting forces that affected the outcome of the conflict.
With his diplomatic efforts unfulfilled, Anwar Sadat turned to a military option for a
solution. A survey of Egyptian and Israeli strengths and weaknesses determined the strategy for
Egyptian forces. The Egyptians concluded that they performed poorly in mobile warfare, poorly
in maneuver battles, but were relatively successful when fighting from fixed defenses. Although
reforms integrated better officers and non-commissioned officers, cultural aspects drove the
development of highly scripted and rehearsed preparations for crossing the Suez Canal and
breaching the Bar Lev line. The key to Egypts military achievement was the excellent
preparation of the army for the war, as well as the fact that the Egyptian strategy combined
limited territorial goals with maximal employment of force. Prudent and detailed planning were
the main cause for the Egyptian success. 155
Egyptians built a competency in rehearsed clockwork combined arms operations that
outpaced the Israelis reactions and capitalizing on capabilities that Israel did not have. They were
also proficient in establishing fixed defensive positions incorporating anti-armor and anti-air
defenses. In order to counteract the Israeli Air Force, the Soviet-Arab concept employed a total
air defense system which moved with the attacking force and, at least in the early stages of the
war, succeeded in denying the battle area to the Israeli Air Force - inflicted heavy losses on the
IAF - and minimized the effectiveness of IAF close air support. 156

155

Uri Bar-Joseph, Strategic Surprise or Fundamental Flaws? The Sources of Israels

Military Defeat at the Beginning of the 1973 War, The Journal of Military History 72, no. 2
(April 2008), 513.
156

William E. DePuy, "Letter to General Creighton W. Abrams," 14 January 1974, in

Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy, compiled by Richard M. Swain (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1994), 70.
46

The Bar Lev line was undermanned by Israeli soldiers that lacked in professional training
and preparation. Egyptians used water cannons to breach berms and rubber boats to transfer
32,000 troops during the first hours of the war without any resistance. Once across, they
established intricate defensive positions supported by minefields, interlocking fire, automatic
weapons, anti-armor, mortars, and artillery. Egyptian forces success came from four factors:
surprise, Israeli lack of preparedness, Egyptian antitank and antiaircraft tactics, and the allencompassing script; however, they were unable to adapt to Israeli maneuver.
The Egyptians use of their core competencies capitalized on the situation on the Bar Lev
line. Strategic surprise rather than fundamental weaknesses was the independent variable that
doomed the outcome of the war in its initial stage. 157 However, when the Egyptian force pressed
an attack across the Sinai, out from their defensive positions and the protection of their air
defenses, without incorporating their core competency in clockwork rehearsals, they failed to
conduct proper combined arms operations.
The Israeli experience on the Sinai front demonstrates the pitfall of core rigidities.
Edward Luttwak best summed up the logic of an unsuccessful military endeavor when he said,
The reason that something might not work the next time is precisely because it worked the last
time. 158 What were the sources of competitive advantage for the Israelis during the Six Day War
in 1967 became a source of failure until they adapted to the tactics of the Egyptian forces in 1973.
Following the war of 1967, the IDF allocated most of its resources to air power and tank forces
at the expense of other elements, primarily the infantry, artillery, and combat engineering. 159 In
1973, the Israeli Army initially counterattacked relying almost exclusively on tanks and fighter
157

Bar-Joseph, Strategic Surprise, 530.

158

Edward Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, 1987), quoted in
Rudesheim, pg. 12.
159

Bar-Joseph, Strategic Surpirse, 513.

47

aircraft, with high casualties and little result. Their core competancy from 1967 failed them, and
they had to learn that armor must be integrated with infantry, artillery, and air defenses. 160 Israel
adapted quickly to the Egyptians and used combined arms to defeat the capability gap, especially
when the Egyptian forces deviated from their initially successful approach.
This conflict provided critical insight into competencies: sustainability, adaptability,
structure of competencies, and the importance of culture. This case demonstrates that core
competencies need to sustain competitive advantages across a wide range of markets (situations).
Tactical military operations change quickly and require a mix of capabilities that do not allow for
routines to establish sustainability. Success at tactics may be the result of core competencies
found in the systems and routines that are built into an organization that support tactical
operations: communications, command and control, or operationally adaptability. One of the
IDFs true core competencies may have been its institutional training programs that produced
tank crews with excellent gunnery skills.
At the time, the US Army concluded that military equipment was virtually the same for
both sides. The difference was in the training, the leadership, the motivation, the courage, and the
flexibility the skill, tactical and technical on the battlefield.161 These are the intangible
components of core competencies that are just as important, and sometimes more so, than the
tangible weapon systems. Because they were defending their homeland, Israeli forces took risks
which few other soldiers would have been prepared to face, and, although boldness did not
always pay, more often than not it did. 162

160

William E. DePuy, "Implications of the Middle East War on US Army Tactics,

Doctrine and Systems," in Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy, compiled by Richard
M. Swain (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1994), 88.
161

Ibid., 114.

162

Michael Carver, Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear Age in Peter Paret, ed.
Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
48

Conclusion
Identifying core competencies is just as critical for the military as it is for businesses;
however, the context of the competition, the environment, and other variables requires some
adaptation of the core competency theory. The Army has wrestled with properly identifying its
core competencies, often muddling them with individual competencies, unit functions, or mission
essential tasks. When Prahalad and Hamel introduced core competencies, and DoD emphasized
this in the 1990s, the lack of a thorough understanding of the theory led to misunderstanding and
misapplication in the Army. Regulatory requirements, joint doctrine, and a concepts driven
capability-based planning system for force development has driven the Army to identify
motivational narratives as core competencies.
Currently, the Army is misidentifying core competencies based on a desire to emphasize
organizational combat-related concepts. 163 CAM and WAS are not core competencies when
evaluated against the business theory, but are best described as organizational level capabilities or
meta-competencies. The Army should adopt the business theory and rigorous techniques for
competency identification to ensure it is building and leveraging the most valuable capabilities to
achieve operational and strategic objectives. Empirical evidence in business and the examples of
the Bedouins, Egyptians, and Israelis demonstrate that competencies are found deep inside
organizations where proficiency in routines creates advantages in the organizations products and
services.
CAM and WAS fulfill organizational motivational narratives that also conveniently
support an acquisition process. However, to find the actual core competencies, it is necessary to
look deeper, to ask how more often, and to relate capabilities to the specific environment. Loss

University Press, 1986):779-814, 798.

163

Grant, Resource-Based Theory, 121.

49

of a core competency or capability can render an organization dysfunctional because they permit
organizational leveraging of other capabilities across a wide range of markets. 164 Core
competencies are what organization possess, representing unique features to the organizations
services and products, but they are not what an organization does.

164

Appleton, Failures in Understanding, 21.

50

CONCLUSION
Identifying core competencies requires a thorough understanding of the business theory
that was created when businesses switched to this inside-out approach. So far, the Army has
retained an outcome-based perspective and instead adopted ill structured abstract narratives
describing the two primary aims in conflict. The Armys inability to adopt core competency
management practices resulted from a lack of theory comprehension; US Code, DoD, and joint
requirements; and its own conceptual doctrine development. The issue for the Army is how it
should, either as an institutional Army or as an operational force, proceed to identify its tangible
and intangible assets that are the sources of competitive advantage.165
Because the nation faces the challenges of uncertain security environment, and it is not
capable of funding every capability, changes to US Code, DoD, and Joint Doctrine have created a
capabilities-based process to identify, build, and leverage capabilities.166 Alignment of these
capabilities requires a strategy that provides clear guidance for all decision making within the
Department, indicating where to focus limited resources to achieve U.S. security objectives.167
However, the DoD approach instead created category groups of capability areas, failed to link
capabilities to missions, inadequately included combatant commander input, and installed
illogical requirements in readiness reporting.
Within this framework, and with little academic or empirical research, the Army
attempted to identify its capabilities that create the greatest competitive advantage in its
contributions to the joint force. Without a method for identification, the Army created the two
concepts of CAM and WAS that did not meet the definition, characteristics, or structure of core

165

Grant, Resource-Based Theory, 122.

166

DoD, QDR (2009), 4.

167

Matisoo, Enabling Joint Interdependence, 74.

51

competencies. Instead of utilizing the business theory, the Army developed buzzword metacompetencies that fit every situation. This monograph recommends translating core competency
theory, its definitions, descriptions, and its methods into Army concepts and doctrine for
organizations to understand how to apply its principles. For the identification of core
competencies in any organization or activity, this monograph recommends using the consensus
process introduced by Kenneth Marino. 168 Each of the eight steps of the process leverages other
related analytical methods such as the DoD Architecture Framework and Capability-Based
Assessments. Army organizations must make assessments of competitive advantage based on
measures of effectiveness to determine which of these are making the greatest contributions and
then leverage them to enable operational capabilities.
Applying this theory into a military service requires translating the definitions,
characteristics, and traits as well as developing a usable method for identification. DoD and the
Army have been moving towards a stronger capabilities-based system using the term core
competencies. The correct place for Army service-wide core competencies in doctrine is in ADP
1, The Army. However, creating operational core competencies and writing them into operational
doctrine is counterproductive to capability development and the design of operational approaches.
The Army core competencies of CAM and WAS do not represent the essential and enduring
capabilities that define the fundamental contributions of the Army in the national security
environment nor do they enhance the ability to develop operational approaches. These
abstractions do not share the same benefits as actual core competencies to assist the Army in
decision making or strategy development.
The Armys difficulty in identifying core competencies indicates the need for developing
the theory that includes definitions and methods. If the Army can correctly identify its core

168

Marino, Developing Consensus, 44.

52

competencies, it can better design strategies and operational approaches that capitalize on
organizational strengths, unify actions across functional areas, make better decisions on the use of
resources, integrate the use of technologies in processes, focus training and leader development,
and enhance image and vision.

53

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