CHAPTER I

MARATHA INTERVENTION IN RAJASTHAN:

1730-1760 (PART I)
In order to understand the Rajput-Maratha relations in the eighteenth century, it is
pertinent that we consider the circumstances that brought the Marathas into Rajasthan.
For the sake of convenience the period from 1730 to 1794 is divided into two phases.

The first phase covers the period from 1730-1760. The second phase covers the span
from 1761-1794 and will be dealt with in the subsequent chapter. The period covering the

first phase was the span within which they made their early forays into Rajasthan via the

Mukandara Pass. The excuse for their official entry into the area was provided by the

Rajputs themselves when they were invited by the Rajput States of Jaipur, Jodhpur and
Bundi to help them in their succession disputes. Though the disputes were settled, the
Rajput Rajas found it difficult to extricate themselves from the hold that was exercised by

the Marathas in these States. The Maratha-Rajput relations need to be seen first in the
context of the Mughal-Maratha relations. It was while serving the Mughal Emperors that
Mirza Raja Jai Singh and Raja Jaswant Singh had the first contact with the Marathas.

It is clear that the Rajputs first came into contact with the Marathas while serving as the
mansabdars of the Mughal emperors. Both the Rajput Rajas, Mirza Raja Jai Singh and

Raja Jaswant Singh had tried to subdue the Marathas under the leadership of Shivaji but
were unsuccessful. This failure did not go down well with Aurangzeb and he did not hide

his displeasure. The Emperor suspected that Shivaji had fled from Agra with the

connivance of Sawai Jai Singhs son, Ram Singh. The Rajput prince was punished, first
by being forbidden the court and then by being deprived of his rank and pay.1

Establishment of the Maratha power in Malwa

The initial phase of the Maratha-Rajput relations must be seen as a part of Mughal-

Maratha conflict in Malwa. The province of Malwa was a part of the Mughal Empire.

Sawai Jai Singh, who represented the Mughal power failed to meet the Maratha
1

Jadunath Sarkar, A Short History of Aurangzib, Orient Blackswan, 2009, Delhi, p. 171.

37

challenge, and once Malwa came under Maratha domination, it was not possible for

Sawai Jai Singh to control Peshwas territorial ambitions further North. This will be
discussed in the subsequent pages but let us first take into account the rise of Maratha
power in Malwa.

The strategic importance of Malwa lay in the fact that it was the link which joined

North India with South India. All the military and trade routes passed through it.
Aurangzebs Deccan wars increased the importance of Malwa and the Emperor set the
precedent of appointing a prince of the royal blood or some most trusted officer as its

governor.On the basis of the contemporary Marathi records, Raghubir Sinh says that

during the period 1698-1707 the Marathas fought against Aurangzeb for their
existence. At this time the main purpose of the Maratha bands was to roam anywhere

and everywhere, plundering the Imperial treasury and territory and harass the enemy

in all possible ways. Initially their motive to invade Malwa was just to divert the

attention of the Emperor, but after 1707, it was the prosperity of Malwa and Gujarat
that lured them to invade these areas. The new Peshwa Baji Rao further encouraged

them to conquer new lands. He gave a systematic form and political content to the
sporadic raids by the Maratha sardars for he perceived the political, economic and
strategic value of these provinces.2 Baji Rao decided to overrun and bring under

control the rich and flourishing provinces of Malwa and Gujarat. Thus the
establishment of a Maratha domination in Malwa and Gujarat was the first step to the
establishment of a large and powerful Maratha empire.3

After securing themselves in Malwa they turned their gaze on Rajasthan. The political

situation in northern India also proved helpful to the Marathas in fulfilling their
ambition of expanding their power base.They followed the route from the Mukandara

Pass and across the Chambal from Malwa via Harauti, and from Gujarat via Idar and

Jalore. In both the cases the Maratha entry was facilitated by the internal disputes
among the Rajputs. In the case of Kota and Bundi the Marathas hovered on the
outskirts since 1725 but could make an entry only in 1732.

2
3

Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court, p. 191.

Ibid., P.192.

38

In the beginning the sporadic Maratha forays into the Mewar territory resulted in the

annoyance expressed by the Mewar Maharana in the kharitas addressed to the Maratha

king Shahu. The latter also took cognizance of the situation and rebuked his officials in
consideration of the old ties that they had with the house of Mewar. Raja Shahu exhibited

his earnestness and sincereity towards the Maharana when in 1726, he issued a permanent

ajna-patra (written order) under his own as well as the seals of the Peshwa and the
Pratinidhi, in favour of Rawat Bagh Singh Shaktawat, son of Hathi Singh Shaktawat of
Piplia, a noble of Mewar. He instructed his military commanders and all officers not to

disturb the land and the people of the Piplia village (situated within the Mewar State
territories adjoining the Malwa suba.4 During the reign of Sawai Jai Singh also the
cordiality enjoyed by the Marathas with the house of Jaipur was invoked on many

occasions. But the Maratha king could not check the ambitions of the sardars. After
establishing their power in Malwa, Gujarat and Bundelkhand, the Marathas advanced

into Rajasthan. They turned their gaze towards Rajasthan where in the words of Manucci:
The most powerful Rajahs are three in number : The first is the rajah Rana the second
is called Rathorthe third is called Chaque (? Kachhwaha)5

Objectives of the Marathas in Malwa and Rajasthan

In the 1730s, Malwa served as the frontier for the Marathas in their movement
towards the North and West of it was Rajasthan.There are various reasons ascribed to

the Maratha invasions in Malwa and the spread of their power subsequently in

Rajasthan and North India. The Marathi writers generally believe that the Peshwa
wanted to establish the ideal of Hindu-pad-Padshahi (Hindu paramountcy over the
whole of India).The Maratha advance into the province of Malwa served as a

convenient starting point for raids into Rajputana.6 In the Maratha plan of action the
policy of north-ward expansion could be materialized only when they had a strong
base in Malwa. Sir John Malcolm writes :
4
5
6

Raghubir Sinh, Studies on Maratha & Rajput History, Shri Natnagar Shodh-Sansthan, Sitamau,
Research Publishers, Jodhpur, 1989, p. 141.
Niccolao Manucci, Storia Do Mogor Or Mughal India 1653-1708, (henceforth Storio Do Mogor),
Vol. II, tr. William Irvine, Editions Indian, Calcutta, Reprinted 1966, p. 407.
Raghubir Sinh, Malwa in Transition Or A Century of Anarchy The First Phase 1698-1765, D.B.
Taraporewala, Sons & Co., Bombay, 1936, p.186.

39

Thus invited, by weakness and provoked by injury, we are not surprised to

find that the Rajput princes and chiefs of Jeypoor, Marwar, Mewar and
Malwa, so far from continuing to be that defense they had before proved
themselves of the Empire, were either secretly or openly the supporters of the
Maratha invaders, to whose first invasion of Malwa, we are told by every
Persian or Hindu writer that notices the subjects, hardly any opposition was
given; and we possess many testimonies to show that they chiefly attributed
their success on this occasion to the action of religious feelings.7
This seems to be partly true.Having gained their right to levy dues on all the area south

of the Narmada, the invasion of Malwa fitted very well in the ambitious northward

scheme of Peshwa, Baji Rao. Another cause that led the Marathas to spread their
authority all over India, was that the Peshwa was unable to check the ambition of the

Maratha sardars. The Peshwa feared them lest they disturb the peace of their native
country. Hence they were constantly employed in outward expeditions.8

Raghubir Sinh assigns economic cause as an important factor for the Maratha invasions in
Malwa and later North India. He reasons that the Peshwa and Shahu were in deep debt
and that he wanted money to pay it off. Gujarat and Malwa were the nearest to the
Deccan but Gujarat had already been under the domination of the Maratha leader

Dabhade that only left Malwa for the Peshwa.9 Even though the Peshwas were credited

with having turned the Maratha State into an Empire, the Marathi documents in the form

of correspondence and account sheets confirm that the Peshwas were heavily in debt. In a
letter to his guru Brahmendra Swami, Baji Rao described his pathetic indebtedness in the
following words:

Our sardars (Dabhade, Gaikwad, Bande and others) are masters of crores,
while I, who am devoted to you and to Chhatrapati Shahu, find it difficult to
eke out a bare maintenance. I have been suffering humiliation at the hands of
the money-lenders, and my forehead has suffered a lot by making apologies
to the men of my army [due to my inability to pay them regularly].10

7
8
9
10

John Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Including Malwa, and Adjacent Provinces, (henceforth,
A Memoir of Central India), Vol. I, Sagar Publications, New Delhi, 1970, pp. 53,54,67.
Ibid., p.75.
Raghubir Sinh, Malwa in Transition, pp. 188,189.
G.H. Khare, The Marathas as Freebooters, in Maratha History Seminar Papers, (May 28-31,
1970), ed., Dr. A.G. Pawar, Shivaji University Press, Kolhapur, 1971. pp. 213, 214.

40

The economic motive further becomes clear when after Chimnaji defeated
Girdhar Bahadur, the Peshwa ordered his brother that he should make heavy
exactions from the city of Ujjain. He further instructed that once the affairs of
the province were settled, Chimnaji should immediately hasten to a rich
country to collect money and to refurbish the army. The Peshwa aimed at
defeating the enemy in order to clear the debts.11Baji Rao wrote to his brother
that he could roam about anywhere he liked but that he should bring back
money somehow or the other.12

Rajasthan: Ecology and its Economic Resources

The nature of the present work requires that we take into account the geographical and
topographical features of Rajasthan. This will help us to understand the socio-economic

conditions of the area. It will also enable us to know the objectives of the Marathas in the

region. Rajasthan is broadly divided into two natural divisions, namely, the Northwestern and South-eastern. This division is on account of the Aravali range of hills that

run diagonally from South-west to North-east. In the North-west lie the arid plains and
shifting sand hills of Marwar, Jaisalmer, Bikaner and Shekhawati region of Jaipur,

collectively termed Marusthali. This region is characterized by low ridges and sand
dunes. South-east has low-lying plains with narrow escarpments as the land rises towards

the Harauti plateau. The Banas and the Chambal rivers irrigate this region. The well
watered alluvial low lands of the latter forming one of the more productive parts of
Rajasthan.The seasonal temperature variations of the weather of Rajasthan was recorded
by Abul Fazl

and Jahangir.14 In Marwar the climate is extremely dry. The days are

13

intensely hot in summers.15 In the North, especially on the Bikaner border there is
sometimes hard frost at night, and it is much colder than in the Southern states.16

11
12
13
14
15
16

Selections from Peshwas Daftar, (henceforth S.P.D.), ed., G.S. Sardesai, Vol. XIII, Marathyacha
Malvyant Pravesh, Government Central Press, Mumbai, 1931, No. 15.
S.P.D., Vol. XIII, No. 29.
Abul Fazl, The Ain-i-Akbari, Vol. II, tr. Col. H.S. Jarrett, Oriental Books Reprint Corporation,
New Delhi, Third edition, 1978, p. 273.
Nur-ud-din Muhammad Jahangir, The Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri or Memoirs of Jahangir, Vol. I, tr.
Alexander Rogers, ed. Henry Beveridge, Delhi, 1968, pp. 340-41.
Lt. Col. Archibald Adams, A Medico-Topographical & General Account of Marwar, Sirohi and
Jaisalmer, London, 1990, p. 351.
Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. XXI, London, 1908, p. 91.

41

The North and North-west division covers nearly three-fifth of Rajasthan and is
characterized by the presence of low ridges and sand dunes. The sandy tract extended

in the West from Runn of Kutch to the border of Sindh and formed a part of the Thar
Desert. The climate is characterized by extremes of temperatures and by a marked

degree of aridity. The soils are classified as light textured, grey-brown desert soils,
which are alkaline and saline. Rivers play only a very subordinate role in moulding

the surface features of this area. The only river of any importance is Looni or Salt
River. It flows though the Marwar desert. The region falls outside the regular course

of both South-western and North-eastern monsoons and according to T.H. Hendley

the maximum rainfall is between July and September. 17 Almost the entire region is
sandy waste, ill watered and unproductive, except in the neighbourhood of the
Aravalis. Water is brackish and found at the depth of 200 feet to 300 feet below the
surface. The oasis alone, which are highly scattered supports vegetation and human
clusters with their artificial tanks or natural hollows or pools that collect water during
the rainy season and therefore, are able to retain the same for a few months.

The South-eastern part has a very diversified character. Although this part of
Rajasthan18 is considerably smaller in extent, it consists of the higher and more fertile

land behind the Aravalis. The location of Mewar is towards the South, along the
loftiest and most clearly defined section of the Aravalis. The South-eastern region
contains extensive hill ranges and long stretches of rocky mould and woodland. Many

rivers flow in this part of Rajasthan, the primary being the Banas and the Chambal. In

many parts there are fertile table lands and stretches of excellent soils. The region is
characterized by a diverse variety of alluvial soil, varying both in texture, from clayey

loam (chikni) to sandy (bhur) and in the tints from pale brown, yellowish brown to
dark brown. Towards South and West in the Harauti region, one comes across black
soil. The region receives between 50 to 100 cms. of rainfall annually.Agriculture was

practiced in the semi-arid part of Rajasthan and in the arid parts, pastoral activities
17
18

Thomas Holbein Hendley, General Medical History of Rajputana, Calcutta: Office of the
Superintendent of Government Printing , 1900.
Satya Prakash Gupta, The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan (c. 1650-1750), Centre for
Advanced Study in History, Aligarh Muslim University, Manohar, Delhi, 1986. Guptas work is
on Eastern Rajasthan and he has mainly scrutinized the records of six contiguous parganas, which
were under the authority of the Amber/Jaipur rulers most consistently. These parganas were:
Amber (later Jaipur) Bahatri (Basawa), Chatsu, Dausa, Lalsot and Malarana.

42

dominated. Variety of crops were grown in the agriculturally conducive areas.

Though many different political and social factors have affected the development of
the regional economy over centuries, the basic facets of physical environment land,
soil, rainfall and natural vegetation, have remained the same.

The most western part broadly corresponds to Jaisalmer. The soil all along the Western

boundary is for the most part light and sandy.19 In this region, agriculture was possible
during the rainy season, as the rain would sink in and not flow off the surface. Hence,
little rainfall would suffice for the crops. Except for some places where water could be

stored, only rain crops such as bajra, jowar, moong, moth and till were grown.20 The

North-western region shelters a characterstic sub-division; the South-western region

comprising broadly of Marwar.21 It is generally a sandy tract, though the terrain gradually

changes as we move eastwards; from a mere desert in the West to comparatively fertile
lands along the eastern borders. Bikaner region formed the North-eastern section of this

broad division. It formed a plain of the lightest class of sandy soil, broken at short
intervals by ridges of almost pure sand.22 In the eastern side, the soil was sandy loam, for

the most part well adapted to the conditions of local rainfall, while in the South-east it was
less loamy, and sand hills were most frequently met with.

Though land was available in abundance, the climatic conditionss were a major
limiting factor. Even in semi-arid region, cultivation required capital investment. For

this the poorer sections solicited loans, which were required to procure means of
cultivation: seeds, manure, plough and bullocks:

in many cases the peasant indebtedness was collective and we find the
entire ryots of villages borrowing money from the bohra to purchase seeds,
manure, ploughs and bullocks so that they could cultivate the fallow lands
of the village, construct ponds and dig wells. The ryots had to pay the
debt with interest at the time of next harvest usually through their
traditional representatives, the zamindars or the patels.23
19
20
21

22
23

Muhnot Nainsi, Khyat, Vol. II, p. 31.

Lakhmi Chand, Tawarikh-i-Jaisalmer, Jodhpur, 1999, pp. 211-212.
Masanori Sato and B.L. Bhadani, Economy and Polity of Rajasthan : Study of Kota and Marwar
(17th-19th centuries), (henceforth Economy and Polity of Rajasthan) Publication Scheme, 1997.
Sato has done extensive research encompassing south-eastern Rajasthan (Kota) while Bhadani
concentrates on western Rajasthan (Marwar).
Muhnot Nainsi, Khyat, Vol. II, P. 116.
Dilbagh Singh, The Role of the Mahajans in the Rural Economy in Eastern Rajasthan during the
18th Century, Social Scientist, Vol. 2, No. 10, 1974, p. 22.

43

The physiographic features of North-western desert region did not always play a

negative role. The ground water in this region being brackish/saline, prohibited
artificial irrigation on a large scale. But the same was turned into a productive
resource. The eastern fringe of the Rajasthan desert, from Didwana through the

Sambhar Lake and the Pachbhadra salt basin to the Great Rann of Kutch, forms one of
the important salt producing zones of India. Nainsi gives us village wise details of the
salt pits.24 Salt was extracted by a particular caste known as Kharwal.25

In the South-west Marwar, the principal mineral found was salt. It was manufactured

extensively at Sambhar Lake, Didwana Lake26 and Pachbhadra Lake.27Marble was

mostly obtained from Makrana near Sambhar Lake. In terms of mineral resources, the
North-western region was not very rich. It was mainly desert. Scanty rainfalls, non-

perennial streams, low water level, that too brackish.28 These conditions posed severe

limitations on agricultural production. Agriculture could not become profitable and

dependable. However, natural vegetation was conducive for pastoralism. The hoards

of camels, cattle, sheep and goats constituted the wealth of the rural population.29
Leather industry comprised an important component of pastoral sector. In Marwar,

there is a reference of tax on the caste of bhanbhi (leather workers) in pargana Sojat.30
It must have been a tax on tanning.

It shows that cattle wealth constituted an

important aspect of the socio-economic life of the region. This is corroborated from
the nature of prevalent non-commercial taxes such as pan charai, ghas charai, korad

and jakhira (fodder tax).31 The inability of the Rajputs to pay regularly can be seen in

these environmental features. Maratha penetration was more severe in agriculturally

rich parts of Rajasthan. Sambhar salt trade was an important source of income.

24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Muhnot Nainsi, Vigat, Vol. III, is full of such references where the number of salt pits in the
villages are recorded.
Ibid., p. 130.
Muhnot Nainsi, Vigat, Vol. I, p. 43 & Vigat, Vol. II, p. 54.
Muhnot Nainsi, Vigat, Vol. II, p. 36.
Muhnot Nainsi, Vigat, Vol. I, p. 19.
There are numerous references of fight/war over cattle, camels etc. in the Nainsis Khyat.
Nainsi, Vigat Vol. I, p. 398.
G.S.L. Devra, Rajasthan ki Prashasnik Vyavastha : 1514 se 1818, Tharati Prakashan, Bikaner,
1981, pp. 178-182.

44

Strategic Importance of Rajasthan

Rajasthan fitted very well in the Maratha policy of Northward expansion. They had

already become a power to reckon with in Malwa and Gujarat. As both these areas shared
their border with Rajasthan, it served as a convenient foot-hold from where the Marathas

could strike targeted places. The State of Kota lay on the North of Malwa where the
Marathas had already obtained a firm footing. They entered Kota by the Eastern route,

and crossed the ford of the Parbati near Atru.32 Kota suffered from their incursions and
had to spend a lot of money to avoid their destructive raids. The State of Bundi could be

reached only after crossing the river Chambal, which was just below the State of Kota and
then a large portion of the Kota State. Therefore, Bundi was not directly exposed to the

Maratha raid. Jaipur could be reached only after crossing Kota and Bundi. Mewar was

exposed to the Marathas from the East and the South-east. The State of Marwar was
harassed by the Marathas from the Gujarat side.33

Therefore, they made Kota as their tributary State which easily succumbed to their

pressure. With Kota as their base, the Maratha movement in the various States of
Rajasthan became easy. Ajmer was another area coveted by the Marathas. It is

centrally located in Rajasthan. From the early times, we find that in order to establish
their hold over Rajasthan, possession of Ajmer was considered to be of strategic

importance for dynasties of the Delhi Sultanate, or the Mughals followed by the

Marathas and the British. In the context of the Marathas, the unfolding of events at

Jodhpur is self explanatory. In 1756, the war between Bijay Singh and Ram Singh
was brought to an end after an agreement was signed. According to the agreement,
Marwar was divided into two halves between Bijay Singh and Ram Singh and Ajmer

was given to the Marathas, as they had rendered help to Ram Singh. The long
campaign of the Marathas in Marwar ended by making it as their tributory. Ajmer was

given to the Marathas in moondkati (compensation for the blood ) of Jayappa. The

possession of this stronghold, perpetuated Maratha influence over Rajasthan.34

32
33
34

Beni Gupta, Maratha Penetration into Rajasthan, p. 6.

Ibid., p. 15.
Tod, Annals and Antiquities, Vol. II, p. 96.

45

However, the Rajput Rajas did not digest the loss of Ajmer. When the Marathas were
defeated in the third battle of Panipat, the Rajput Rajas took advantage of the

disturbed political situation in North India and tried to recover Ajmer from the
Marathas. With the consent of Bijay Singh, Ballu Joshi attacked Ajmer and occupied
the city. At this, the Maratha patel appointed at Ajmer asked Mahadaji Sindhia to save

Ajmer quickly, otherwise Garh Bithli would be lost to them. This would adversely

affect their prospects in the three States of Rajasthan as Mewar, Dhundhar (Jaipur)

and Marwar could be controlled from Ajmer only. If Ajmer was lost to them then
their control over the three States would also be lost :

garh vitli chhoot jasi ne tinoo hee mulak su amal uuth jasi. Mewar,
Dhundhar, Marwar ae sara hee Ajmer su dabel chhai.35
Rampura and Gagron were the other strategic areas which were under the control of
the Marathas. Both were their important outposts that lay on the bordering areas of

Malwa and Rajasthan. Rampura was a fertile plain of Mewar which had been given to
Sawai Madho Singh by the Mewar Maharana. Later, in 1752, Sawai Madho Singh

gave this stronghold to Malhar Rao Holkar. Its importance cannot be denied as the
Mewar nobles seized it from the Maratha control after the 1761 debacle. The seizure
of Rampura from the Marathas added powerful sources to the already depleted

treasury of the Jaipur State. For the Marathas it was a revolt against their domination.
Soon the Marathas recaptured Rampura after killing four hundred Chundawats.36

The geographic location of Rajasthan boosted trading activities, as it is situated on

the path of major land and sea trade routes. Undoubtedly, this trade sustained the

economy of North-western Rajasthan. Salt called Sambhar loon, or salt of Sambhar

was exported over the greater part of Hindustan from the Indus to the Ganges.37

The banjaras transported salt to different places as the factors of the banias.38

35
36
37
38

Rathora ri Khyat Vol. III, p. 572.

R.K. Saxena, Maratha Relations with the Major States of Rajputana, p. 60.
Tod, Annals and Antiquities, Vol. II, PP. 126-133.
Masanori Sato and B.L. Bhadani, Economy and Polity of Rajasthan, p. 104.

46

Rajasthan assumed importance due to the presence of the following trade routes :

The route between Agra and Ahmadabad passed through this region in two
principal branches, one of them passed through Ajmer and the other one reached
Ahmadabad via Chittor,39 Chatsu, Merta and Jalore.40

Several routes connected Agra and Delhi with lower Sindh via Ajmer and Hindaun.41

One trade route passed from Jodhpur to Peshawar.42

From Agra to Ajmer via Hindaun, Lalsot and Mauzabad.43

From Delhi to Ahmadabad through Churu, Nagore, Jodhpur, Jalore, Sirohi.44

From Rajgarh to Khairpur (Sindh) through Churu and Bikaner.45

From Agra to Khairpur through Bikaner and Jaisalmer.46

From Multan to Jaipur through Bahawalpur, Pugal, Bikaner, Churu, Sikar and

From Delhi to Khorasar via Nagaur, Jodhpur and Udaipur.

Trade route connecting Jaipur-Karauli-Gwalior.48

Jodhpur.47

These routes assumed greater importance in the eighteenth century for the Marathas.

They facilitated their movement in Rajasthan and other parts of North India. The route
generally followed by them was from the eastern side of Kota from where they moved

on to Bundi, and various territories of Jaipur like Tonk, Shahpura etc. Traders from
Gwalior and Indore who settled in Rajasthan engaged in the profession of moneylending and trade actively.49

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

H.C. Verma, Medieval Routes to India : Baghdad to Delhi, a study of trade and military routes,
(henceforth Medieval Routes to India) Naya Prakash, Calcutta, 1978, p. 113.
De J. Laet, The Empire of the Great Mughals, tr., J.S. Hoyland, Bombay, 1928, pp. 64-66.
H.C. Verma, Medieval Routes to India, 113.
Ibid.
De J. Laet, The Empire of the Great Mughals, pp. 64-66.
P.W. Powlett, Gazetteer of Bikaner, Calcutta, 1868, Appendix, p. 251.
Tod, Annals and Antiquities, Vol. II, pp. 523-525.
Ibid., pp. 603-608.
G.N. Sharma, Social Life in Medieval Rajasthan [1500-1800] : with special reference to the
impact of Mughal influence, Lakshmi Narayan Agarwal, Agra, 1968, pp. 323-325.
B.L. Gupta, Trade and Commerce in Rajasthan during the 18th Century, Jaipur Publishing House,
Jaipur, 1987, p. 135.
Ibid.

47

The Marathas procured many items from the markets of Rajasthan. The old records of
Marwar and Bikaner show that the fairs also promoted local and long distance trade.

The traders participated in the fairs either to sell their merchandise or to procure the
goods. For the royal exchequer, fairs constituted an important source of revenue. The
importance of these can be realized from the fact that the rulers considered it their

duty to organize them. The hakim of the pargana in which the fair was to be held, was
expected to personally supervise the arrangements. The safety and security of the

merchants and their merchandise also had to be ensured by him. Besides all this, the
hakim had to arrange provisions of water for the merchants and fodder for their

animals. A police station or kotwali chabutara was also established in the fairs where

armed personnel were kept ready to provide necessary protection to traders and

merchandise.50 Important cattle fairs were the Gogameri held in August-September at

Gogano, near Nohar in the East, and the other at Kolayat. Tilwara near Balotra was

the venue for the principal horse and cattle fair.51 In Marwar, the fairs were held for

the sale and purchase of cattle such as bullocks, camels, horses and other goods such
as hides, tanned leather, brass and tin utensils wearing apparels and blankets.52

Agriculture was the basic means of subsistence in many parts of Rajasthan. In the

North-western region, it was mainly dependent on rains, therefore, production was

very precarious and usually low value cereals could be cultivated. The following
description by Manucci is worth noting:

The land of the Rathor, who rules nine districts, are for the most part all
sand; they have little or no water. The cereals grown in this country
come up by help of rain only. 53
This was the reason that the State of Marwar paid the installments to the Marathas
generally in the form of miscellaneous goods.The South-eastern region had a more
diversified character and most of the region supported two crops a year. Not only the
cultivation was intensive, the area also had a variability of lucrative crops. The

Eastern and South-eastern part also had a land surplus situation, the possibilities of
50
51
52
53

Gian Chand Sharma, Administrative System of the Rajputs, Rajesh Publications, New Delhi, 1979, p. 155.
Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. XVI, London, 1908, p. 521.
Gian Chand Sharma, Administrative System of the Rajputs, pp. 155,156.
Manucci, Storia Do Mogor, Vol. II, p. 406.

48

production with the human intervention were immense. But availability of necessary
capital was a major handicap.
It has been emphasized by Dilbagh Singh that raiyatis were heavily dependent on the
superior sections of the society, i.e., the zamindars, patels, mahajan and other rich

riyayatis for resources needed for cultivation. They were frequently in debt and were

obliged to mortagage their lands to the riyayatis. Often the raiyatis collectively fell into
debt in order to purchase seed, ploughs and bullocks needed for cultivating their lands. In

the seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth century, there was an extention of

cultivation.54 Revenue collection from the crops production yielded good income to the
State.South-eastern Rajasthan enjoyed a fairly brisk agrarian commerce. Since western
Rajasthan had been agriculturally poor, and eastern Rajasthan was food surplus area it can

be safely assumed that the eastern area must have been more coveted by the Marathas. As
compared to the North-western Rajasthan, the Eastern and South-eastern Rajasthan had

an edge not only in respect of agriculture, it was also rich in mineral resources. Salt was
largely manufactured at the Sambhar lake,55 and Khetri had a copper mine. The hills of

Ajmer-Merwara were well endowed in mineral wealth. Marbles of various colours were
quarried in the vicinity of Ajmer.56 Most of the areas which were transferred to the

Marathas had intensive cultivation and supported two crops a year. Besides being rich
in agriculture, it also had an edge in the mineral resources.

Impact of Mughal Empires Decline on the States of Rajasthan

The Rajput Rajas played an important role in consolidating the Empire politically.
They served the Mughal emperors as their military and civil officers in the outlying
subas and during the campaigns on the Mughal frontier. In essence, the policy

consisted of treating the Rajput rulers as Mughal nobles at par with others, obliged to
render military services while receiving jagirs in lieu of salary. The Rajput policy of

Akbar was in fact initiated with the agreement he made with Raja Bharmal of Amber.
In the words of Abul Fazl:
54

55
56

S.P. Gupta, The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan, p. 143; Dilbagh Singh, State, Landlords
and Peasants : Rajasthan in the 18th Century, (henceforth State, Landlords and Peasants),
Manohar Publications, New Delhi, 1990, p. 23.
Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. II, London, 1908, p. 266.
Gazetteer of the Ajmer-Merwara in Rajputana, Vol. I, Calcutta, 1875, pp. 18,19.

49

Rajah Bihari Mal Kacwaha, who by the favourable grace of the Shahinshah,
became one of the officers of the Sultanate, and rose to a rank superior to that
of all the Rajahs and Raises in India, and whose sons and grandsons and
whole clan rose to high rank and great office.57
The Kachhwahas were accorded a special recognition by Jahangir, when he designated

them as Mirza Rajas.58 In Rajasthan, the Mughals were the paramount power without

annexing the territories of the Rajput kings. The Mughal supremacy and assertion of their
paramountcy over Rajput principalities was well established. The rulers of the Rajput

States were in the Imperial service and they held high mansabs. The Mughals levied no

tribute, but they expected substantial peshkash or offering at the time of a rulers
accession or at the time of grant of a jagir. The Mughals had maintained a truce in
Rajasthan, preventing the Rajputs from encroaching on areas outside Rajasthan, and also

placing a check upon the ambitions of the stronger Rajput States. Satish Chandra calls this

as the imposition of a kind of a pax Mughalica which was a precondition.59This implied

control of inter-state disputes, and also, on occasions, disputes between a ruler and his
sardars. The ruler was the final court of appeal in his State.

But in the parganas received by a ruler as tankhwah, inam or on ijara, the Emperor
was the final court of appeal. In matters of succession, the Emperor could interfere.

The tika sent by the Emperor was significant for succession.In order to maintain a
direct contact with the Mughal court, the rulers appointed their vakils there.60

If we compare the relationship of the Mughal-Rajput vis--vis the Maratha-Rajput, we

find that the former was much more stable and only occasionally disturbed by the

personal whims of the Emperor as in the case of Aurangzeb. There was an atmosphere

of peace and security, and a feeling of mutual trust. The Rajas knew that in case of
any external threat, the Imperial power was there to safeguard their interests. They did
not find the payment of the peshkash

burdensome as they were rewarded with

important assignments. It was only during the reign of Aurangzeb and his successors,
that the Rajputs relations with the Mughal Emperors became sour.
57
58
59
60

Abul Fazl, The Akbarnama, Translated, H. Beveridge, Vol. II, Bibliotheca Indica, Published by
the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Rare Books, Delhi, 1972, p. 36.
The Tuzuk, Vol. I, p. 266.
Satish Chandra, Mughal Religious Policies, the Rajputs & the Deccan, Vikas Publishing House,
New Delhi, 1993, p. 39.
V.S. Bhatnagar, Life and times of Sawai Jai Singh, pp. 279-281.

50

Sardesai opines that Shahu, while in Mughal captivity had gauged the depth of this
Rajput feeling. He had even gained the sympathies of some of them and was given a

cordial send-off on his release in Malwa. He further says that Sawai Jai Singh
continued to be friendly to the Maratha overtures even upto the time of his death in
1743. However, later events brought about a complete estrangement between the
Marathas and the Rajputs. But we must particularly bear in mind that during Shahus

life-time, there was an entire agreement and cordiality between the two sides.
Therefore, when Shahu and his first Peshwa began to shape the future destinies of the

rising Maratha power, there existed respectful amity between the Marathas and the
Rajputs.61

With the decline in Mughal power and prestige, the leading Rajput States felt free to
resume the old process of conquest and territorial expansion. Jaipur was the foremost
to acquire the position as a major State in the first half of the eighteenth century.

Sawai Jai Singh cherished the ambition of establishing a hegemony from the Sambhar
Lake in the West to Agra and Mathura in the East, and extending upto the Narmada in

the South. By grants from the Emperor and ijara he expanded considerably the

dominion inherited by him.62 As the Mughal empire weakened, the Jaipur rulers
absorbed these territories into their hereditary State.63 This should become amply

clear from the way the Kachhwaha State prospered. Initially Amber was a single

pargana state of the sarkar of Ajmer having 11,35,095 bighas of measured land and

an assessed revenue of 1,22,56,297 dams.64 By the year 1650, Mirza Raja Jai Singh
held a jagir worth 820 lakh dams in the parganas of Amber, Chatsu, Fagi, Mauzabad,

Jhag, Baharana, Pachwara, Khori, Deoli, Sanchari, Bharkol, Jalapur, Umran, Sakras,

Bawal and Jat Kalyewa.65 The area got further extended under Sawai Jai Singh. He

was able to obtain jagirs in tankha, ijara and inam. Shah Jahan gave Kama to Mirza
Raja Jai Singhs son Kirat Singh. Later, Mirza Raja Jai Singh acquired Chalkaliana
and Tonk as the reward of his subjugation of Shivaji in 1665.
61
62
63
64
65

G.S. Sardesai, Main Currents of Maratha History, p. 96.

Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics, P.186.
S.P. Gupta, The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan, p. 17.
Abul Fazl, The Ain, Vol. II, p. 278.
S.P. Gupta, The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan, p. 178.

51

Later, Shah Jahan bestowed the parganas of Toda and Tonk on Maharana Rai Singh

of Udaipur. This was given as a gesture of the acknowledgement of the help rendered

by Rai Singhs father Maharana Bhim Singh to Shah Jahan against his father,

Emperor Jahangir. But Rai Singhs successors were weak and could not retain the

parganas. Aurangzeb brought the two parganas under khalisa.66 When Sawai Madho

Singh ascended the Jaipur throne, he transferred the territories of Tonk and Rampura

to Malhar Rao Holkar in 1750. There was always a friction between Sawai Madho
Singh and Holkar regarding the possession of Tonk located hundred kilometers
South-west of Jaipur. Sawai Jai Singh extended his possessions which included the

parganas Bhangarh, Malarana and rupees 80,000 in pargana Amarsar, the areas of

Jhilai, Uniara and Barwara.67 In 1748, Sawai Jai Singhs son Ishwari Singh obtained a

farman from the Mughal Court allowing all the territories which had been in the

possession of Jaipur State to continue in his control.68

The Maharajas of Jodhpur seized several areas belonging to the Mughal province of

Gujarat, and dreamt of a hegemony from Sambhar Lake to Ahmadabad and the sea.69
In 1657, the jagirs held by Maharaja Jaswant Singh included Jodhpur, Pokaran, Merta,

Sojat, Jaitaran, Siwana, Jalore, Phalodi and Gajsinghpura.70 In 1770, there arose a

dispute between the nobles of the Mewar Maharana Ari Singh and his nephew Ratan
Singh. On this occasion, the Maharana had requested Bijay Singh for help. The

latter immediately sent his troops and settled the dispute.71 Bagh Singh, after removing

the control of Ratan Singh from Godwad, requested the Maharana that in order to have a

firm control over Godwad, it was necessary that they station their army there. If this was
not done Ratan Singh would re-establish his control over the area and this would enhance
66
67
68
69
70

71

Hanuman Singhal, Tonk ka Itiha [History of Tonk (Rajasthan)], Sahitya Kala Sangam, Jaipur, 1992, p. 9.
Jadunath Sarkar, A History of Jaipur c. 1503-1938, Revised and edited by Raghubir Sinh, Orient
Longman, Delhi, 1984, pp. 219, 220.
Satya Prakash Gupta, Expansion of the territory of the Kachhwahas in Mughal times,
Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, 27th Session, 1965, Allahabad, p. 179.
Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics, p.187.
G.D. Sharma, Rajput Polity: A Study of Politics and Administration of the State of Marwar,
(henceforth Rajput Polity), Published by Ramesh C. Jain for Manohar Book Sevice, New Delhi,
1977 , p. 50.
Vishveshwar Nath Reu, Marwar ka Itihas : Prarambh se Maharaja Bhim Singhji V.S. 1860 ( 1803 A.D.)
tak, (henceforth Marwar ka Itihas) Vol. I, Maharaja Mansingh Pustak Prakash, Jodhpur, Revised reprinted
1999, Delhi, p. 382.

52

his military might. The Maharana then conveyed to the Jodhpur Raja, Bijay Singh asking

him to maintain 3,ooo soldiers to suppress Ratan Singh. As long as the army would be
stationed there, the revenue of Godwad could be used for its expenses but the sardars of

Godwad would be under the control of the Mewar Maharana.Bijay Singh then responded

that under normal circumstances 200 cavalry and 300 infantry would be stationed there
but in case of a battle, an army of 3,000 would be made available. The day the Maharana

would send back his army, his control over the pargana of Godwad would be re-

established.72 In 1772, Maharaja Bijay Singh went to Nathdwara where he was joined by
the Bikaner ruler, Gaj Singhji and Kishangarh ruler, Bahadur Singhji. Considering it to be

a good opportunity, Maharana Ari Singh also went there and requested Bijay Singh to
return Godwad but the latter refused.73

Resurgence of Mutual Rivalries among the Rajputs

Kolff emphasizes that during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the top layer of

Rajputs tended to close ranks and articulate new norms of Rajput behavior. Earlier bards
had always encouraged their Rajput employers to assume aristocratic self-images closely

linked with myths of origin that established their status as khsatriyas and traced back their

genealogies to the great dynasties of ancient Indian history. Later the political power and

social status of the more successful lineages tended to be legitimised exclusively in the

language of descent and kinship. From the sixteenth century onwards, the political
opportunities provided by the Mughals and the importance attached to the Mughals
themselves gave a new vigour and largely pushed into the background the more ancient

character of the Rajputs as an open status group.74 Kolff suggests that since the late
sixteenth century a new Rajput Great Tradition emerged which recognized little else than
unilineal kin bodies as the elements of which genuine Rajput history ought to be made up.

By the middle of the seventeenth century, Rajasthan and particularly Mewar had become
the seat of this new Rajput genealogical orthodoxy.75

72
73
74
75

Gaurishankar Hirachand Ojha, Udaipur Rajya ka Itihas, Vol. II, Rajasthani Granthagar, Jodhpur,
Second Edition, 1999, pp. 659, 660.
Vishveshwar Nath Reu, Marwar ka Itihas, Vol. I, p. 383.
Dirk H. A. Kolff, Naukar Rajput and Sepoy: the ethnohistory of the military labour market in
Hindustan, 1450-1850, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 72.
Ibid.

53

Thus, every Rajput State was, generally speaking, one clan politically organized into one
unit under the pressure of historical circumstances and political conditions. During the

formative period, the polities of each Rajput State was largely organized around the
principle of bhai-banth, i.e., brotherhood.76As expressed in a modern work:

the ruling class belongs to one particular clan . The humblest members
of the clan considered themselves along with the ruler as the sons of the
same father enjoying their patrimony by the same right as the ruler
himself. The latter was thus nothing but primus inter pares. The State in
fact did not belong to the ruler it belonged to the clan as whole.
This identification of the clan with the State was the most characterstic feature of

medieval Rajput polity. The clan system not only affected the internal administration

of the State; it stood in the way of centralization of political power. Submission to a

common superior was basically inconsistent with the traditions of the clan

system.77The struggle between the Chundwats and Shaktawats in Mewar in the last
quarter of the eighteenth century is one of the worst examples of clan feuds which
increased the vulnerability of the Rajput States to Maratha aggressions during this

period.78The rise of Rajput States as centralized polities was possible due to a

complete subversion of the system of bhai-banth. This concept made the Rajput king

master of the clan by relegating other lineage members to the level of chakars

(servants). As an organizing principle chakri was antithetical to the idea of bhaibanth. The former emerged out of the debris of the latter. The relations between the

Narukas of Alwar and their clan-chief, the Jaipur Raja (both Kachhwahas) is a classic

example of the changing contours of chakari.79 Those traditions crystallized

themselves into clan feuds which constitute one of the most salient features of Rajput
history dicussed in our work.
76
77

78
79

G.D. Sharma, Rajput Polity, pp. 5-10 and 118.

Norman P. Ziegler, Marwari Historical Chronicles : Sources for the Social and Cultural History of
Rajasthan, Indian Economic and Social History Review, 1976, sheds light on the traditions, clan
histories and genealogies of the Rajputs, p. 219-245; A.C. Banerjee, Aspects of Rajput State and
Society, New Delhi, 1983, pp. 99-101.
A.C. Banerjee, Lectures on Rajput History, Raghunath Prasad Nopani Lectures, Farma K.L.
Mukhopadhyaya, Calcutta, 1962, p. 150.
R.P. Rana, Chakar to Raja: The Emergence of Naruka State of Alwar (c. 1660-1790), Social
Science Probings, June, 2006, p. 60.

54

Richard Fox has explained the political change among the Rajput clans on the basis of

the organizing principles of relationships between the Rajput Raja and his kinsmen.
According to Fox when the expansion of the lineage tends to slow down because of

non-availability of land in home territory, the clan comes into conflict with adjoining
groups. This leads to intensification of inter lineage and intra lineage conflict for

control over land both at home and in the neighbouring areas.80In Sarkars opinion,
war was the only occupation of the Rajputs.81

As in the case of Jodhpur, in the process of the expansion of the territory, the sons and
brothers of the ruler were allowed to occupy the various terrirories conquered by

them. These holdings were recognized as their thikanas. This practice was called
bhai-bant, because, being members of the same clan, they believed that it was their

share in a co-operative effort of the clan. Though accepting the sovereignty of the
chief of the ruling clan the sardars treated him just as primus-inter-pares. Following

bhai-bant, Rao Jodha had assigned the conquered territories to his sons and brothers.82

But the concept of bhai-bant weakened the central authority. Later rulers, therefore,
had to resort to pattadari system.

The reign of Muhammad Shah (1719-1748) witnessed a complete breakdown of

Imperial authority in Rajasthan.83 In the course of the eighteenth century the Rajput

chiefs motivated by personal ambition became aggressive against one another. All

these factors revived the pre-Mughal polity in Rajasthan. The Rajputs spent
themselves in clan rivalries and civil wars. Jadunath Sarkar observed :

The imperial Government of Delhi had held together and protected all the
feudatory States of India. But when the Emperor became lifeless shadow

confined within the harem, when the wazirs role was pursuit of pleasure
varied only by contests of his Court rivals, this unifying bond and common

controlling authority was dissolved. No superior power was left to enforce

80
81
82
83

Richard G. Fox, Kin, Clan, Raja and Rule: State Hinterland Relations in Pre-Industrial India,
University of Carlifornia Press, California, 1971.
Jadunath Sarkar, History of Aurangzib, Vol. V, Orient Longman Limited, Second Edition, 1952,
New Delhi, P. 348.
G.D. Sharma, Rajput Polity, p. 5.
Jadunath Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. I, 1739-1754, M.C. Sarkar & Sons Ltd.,
Calcutta, Second edition, 1949, p. 156.

55

lawful rights and prevent ambitious conflicts between one vassal State and
another, or between one prince and another of the same royal house. All the
pent-up personal ambitions and inter-State rivalries (hitherto checked) now
burst forth without fear or check, and Rajputana became a zoological garden
with the barrier of the cages thrown down and the keepers removed. The
fiercest animal passions raged throughout the land, redeemed only now and
then by individual instances of devotion and chivalry which had not yet
totally disappeared from the human bosom.84
Under Akbar and his successors, Rajput soldiers had carried the Mughal banner far
and wide. But Aurangzebs attempt to annex Jodhpur after Jaswant Singhs death and

his invasion of Mewar alienated the Rajputs. This was the opportunity of the
Marathas. By appealing to this feeling, Baji Rao I, easily entered Malwa and then
made his hold upon that province good.85 The last vestige of Imperial suzerainty

disappeared from Rajasthan completely when Ranthambhor was gained by the Jaipur

Raja in October 1753 and Ajmer by the Jodhpur Raja in 1752.86 Thus, it can be
concluded that the Mughal authority in Rajasthan waned on its own. The Rajput

States were left to fend for themselves. It is against this background that the Rajputs
came into direct contact with the Marathas.

The chief storm centres in Rajasthan during the second quarter of the eighteenth
century were Bundi, Jaipur and Marwar. These centres became an arena of inter and
intra clan quarrels. Sarkar has commented that:

Each of these three dynastic quarrels drew into its vortex the neighbours
of the two main contestants, and in time all three became merged into one,
with a clear cut array of allies facing opponents similarly confederated.
The Marathas were called in to decide the issue, and that by every party
and almost in every year. In the end the Rajput kingdoms were ruined,
leaving the Marathas in supreme command over a divided and
impoverished Rajasthan which was subjected to annual exactions.87

84
85
86
87

Jadunath Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. I, P.131.

William Irvine, Later Mughals, Vol. II, ed. by Jadunath Sarkar, Oriental Books reprint
Corporation, Book Publishers, New Delhi, 1971, p. 309.
Jadunath Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. I, p. 199.
Ibid., P. 134.

56

Maratha Presence in Dungarpur, Banswara, Rampura, Kota and Bundi

An amiable cord was struck between the Marathas and the House of Mewar when in
1673, at the time of Shivajis coronation it was finally asserted that the Bhonsle house

had descended from Sajjan, the son of Rana Hamir of Chittaurs uncle and
predecessor in the Sisodia House. However, the Maratha presence in Mewar can be

traced as early as 1724. On 24thNovember, 1724, Sawai Jai Singh received a kharita

from Maharana Sangram Singh in which the latter expressed his concern about the

Deccanies creating disturbances in his territory. The Maharana was of the opinion that
the Deccanies were thieves and would not give up their habits unless they were

properly chastised.88 On 14th March, 1726, another kharita was sent by the Maharana
to Sawai Jai Singh informing him about the Maratha ravages. He wrote :

Deccanies came this side and created great trouble, details of which will
be known through Maya Ram. The trouble has been particularly severe, the
account of which as sent to you in my previous letter the Maratha trouble
has been so (severe) that if they were not checked, in a year or six months,
it would spread far and wide.89
The Maharana suggested that the Rajput Rajas ought to collaborate to check the
Maratha menace.

The territories of Dungarpur and Banswara had acknowledged the suzerainty of

Mewar. In 1726, Baji Bhivrao Retrakar, a Maratha commander, visited Mewar and

realized chauth from a Mewar district. In 1728 Rawal Ram Singh of Dungarpur

received a letter of demand from Baji Rao instructing him to pay khiraj (land
revenue)to Udaji Pawar. Another letter of demand was issued on 26th May,1728 to
pay half of the khiraj to Malhar Rao Holkar and other half to Udaji Pawar. In order

to protect themselves from Maratha aggression, the Rawal of Banswara and

Dungarpur agreed to pay khiraj to the Marathas.

Despite this, the Marathas committed aggression when Raghoji Kadam Rao and

Sawai Kat Singh Kadam Rao ravaged Banswara and Dungarpur and realized rupees
88
89

K.S. Gupta, Maratha Expansion and Rajput Resistance, Proceedings of Indian History Congress,
32nd Session, Jodhpur, 1970, p. 32.
Kharita from Maharana Sangram Singh to Sawai Jai Singh, Baisakh Badi 9, V.S.1781/1724.

57

50,000 and rupees 1,13,000 from them respectively. When this was brought into the
notice of the Satara government they were rebuked for this trespass as the province

was the sphere of influence of Baji Rao. They were directed to transfer all the booty

to Baji Rao and warned them sternly against plundering the area in future. Towards

the end of 1732, Holkar and Sindhia went to Banswara and Dungarpur to settle the

payment of their dues. Maharana Sangram Singh died on 11th January, 1734. Soon
his successor was subjected to demands by the Marathas.90

The small State of Rampura was located on the North-western border of Malwa. It lay

between the States of Kota and Deolia (Partapgarh).It was ruled by the Chandawat
offshoot of Sisodia Rajputs. Prior to its being made an independent principality by

Akbar, it was a part of Mewar territory. Now it became a buffer State between Mewar

and Malwa. Gopal Singh succeeded to his ancestral domain in 1689. Late in the
seventeenth century while he was serving under Prince Bidar Bakht in the Deccan, he
sent his son, Ratan Singh, to Rampura to manage the affairs of the State. Ratan Singh

dispossessed his father Rao Gopal Singh, himself became a Muslim assuming the
name of Islam Khan. He became successful in being recognized as the new ruler. In

his despair Gopal Singh joined the Marathas in their Gujarat raids in 1705. Later

when Ratan Singh got killed in a battle in 1712, Gopal Singh reoccupied Rampura in
1714 with the help of the Maharanas forces. The latter, however, gave only a portion
of the whole district to the former and annexed the rest to Mewar. In August, 1717,
Gopal Singh and his grandson Sangram Singh entered into an agreement by which
they became tribute paying zamindars under the Maharana and renounced their
independent status till it was granted to bhanej (nephew) Madho Singh.91

In December, 1728, a son was born to Sawai Jai Singh by his Udaipuri queen and the

Maharana was induced by Jai Singh to grant Rampura to this infant, Madho Singh,

who was to remain loyal to Mewar. The Jaipur agents ousted Sangram Singh and
took charge of Rampura. When Sawai Madho Singh succeeded to the Jaipur throne in

1750, he attached Rampura to the Kachhwaha dominions. Later Rampura passed on to

90
91

Raghubir Sinh, Rajput-Maratha Relations, in Maratha History Seminar Papers, (May 28-31,
1970), ed., Dr. A.G. Pawar, Shivaji University Press, Kolhapur, 1971. p. 263.
Ram Vallabh Somani, History of Mewar [From earliest times to 1751 A.D.], C.L. Ranka &
Company, Kitab Mahal, Jaipur, 1976, pp. 327, 328.

58

Holkar in 1750. The period between 1761-82 in Mewar was marked by internal
strifes. The State of Mewar witnessed a civil war between Maharana Ari Singh and

Ratan Singh. Ratan Singh claimed to be the posthumous son of Rana Raj Singh II.
The Marathas were invited on several occasions to help the rivals. When this phase
passed, the state was destined to be governed by minor rulers that further precipitated
the conflict between the Chundawats and the Shaktawats.

In 1726, an unauthorized raid was made in Hadauti by three Maratha leaders

Krishnaji Pant, Baji Pant and Ambaji Pant. They entered the States of Kota and
Bundi with light cavalry through the Mukandara Pass with the object of plundering
the remote parts of the region, but they were not successful and returned as quickly as

they had come.92 As the Maharao had friendly relations with the Maratha chiefs they

did not think it wise to fight with the Kota forces, and left the territory as soon as the
Maharao and his ministers had received information of their operations.The Marathas

entered the territory of Kota again in 1733, under Pilaji Jadhav. This was the time
when Holkar and Sindhia marched towards Malwa.The Marathas entered Kota by the
eastern route, and crossed the ford of the river Parbati near Atru where Asuji Maratha
held a jagir.They raided and ravaged many villages and operated in the territory for

about a month. It was for the first time that the villagers suffered such extensive
devastations and ravages. To save his people from further plunder the Malhar Rao
bribed them heavily and asked to invest the fort of Nahargarh and oust its ruler,
Nahar Khan. Maharao Durjan Sal utilized Pilajis services in repressing the

recalcitrant chief Nahar Khan. The Maratha chief was to besiege Nahargarh and expel

him from there. In return he received rupees one lakh and fifty thousand.93 This was
the first monetary bribe the Marathas received from Hadauti for abstaining from
plundering a portion of it. Countless bribes like this were offered and accepted

throughout the troubled period of the eighteenth century. Kota was subjected to much
degradation at the hands of the Marathas as it lay in their march towards the North.94

92
93
94

S.P.D., Vol. XIV, Nos. 7 & 8.

Beni Gupta, Maratha Penetration into Rajasthan, p.6.
R.K. Saxena, Maratha Relations with the Major States of Rajputana, p. 23.

59

The Maharana of Udaipur was the hereditary overlord of the Hara clan of Bundi. In 1569

the chief of Bundi, Rao Surjan sapped his relations with the Maharana of Udaipur, gave
the fort of Ranthambhor to the Mughal Emperor Akbar and accepted him as the overlord.

In 1623, the Mughal Emperor Jahangir bestowed Kota on the second son of Rao Ratan.

The clan of Haras now lived divided between the two States of Kota and Bundi. In 1707,
following the death of Aurangzeb, in the war of succession to the throne, Budh Singh of

Bundi fought on the side of Bahadur Shah at the battle of Jaju. As fate would have it,

Ram Singh of Kota sided with the defeated rival Prince Azam Shah. The new Emperor

Bahadur Shah was grateful to Budh Singh and, therefore, rewarded him with the title of
Rao Raja, along with 54 forts of Harauti, including Kota, which had been confiscated due

to the treason of its ruler. But the city actually remained in the hands of Ram Singhs son
Bhim Singh. The latter secured the patronage of the Sayyid brothers. With Bhim Singh
begins the title of Maha Rao, borne by his family, as a fruit of his adhesion to the Sayyid

brothers. Bhim Singh was succeeded by his youngest son Durjan Sal in 1724 and reigned
till 1756.

Budh Singh had three queens, the chief queen being Jai Singhs step-sister, Amar

Kunwar. His second wife, a Chudawat of Begun, in Mewar, was more dear to him. In
1720, the chief queen, who was till then childless, smuggled an infant into the palace
and declared him to be her son by Budh Singh. The boy was named Bhawani Singh.

All was well till the queen expressed her desire to marry her son, Bhawani Singh to a
daughter of the Maharana. Budh Singh opposed the match on the ground that the boy

was an imposter and not his son. Sawai Jai Singh accused Budh Singh that he was

repudiating the paternity of Bhawani Singh as he wanted to keep the succession open

for a son of his favourite Chudawat queen. At this Budh Singh gave a written
undertaking that if Bhawani Singh was done away with, he would not install any of

his sons born by his other two wives. He also gave the authority to Sawai Jai Singh to
choose a successor for the Bundi throne.95 Budh Singh got the document attested by

his nobles. The matter was also brought to the notice of the Udaipur Maharana. Sawai

Jai Singh requested the Maharana to be a witness to the agreement. The Maharana put
his signature on the document signed by Budh Singh in which the latter had declared
95

V.S. Bhatnagar, Life and times of Sawai Jai Singh, pp. 213, 214.

60

Bhawani Singh to be an illegitimate child, and got it attested by his sixteen Umraos.96
On the basis of the agreement, Bhawani Singh was put to death.97

Sawai Jai Singh made the best use of this opportunity. Through his efforts,

Muhammad Shah granted the State to Dalel Singh, the second son of Salim Singh
Hada of Karwar. The strained relations between Sawai Jai Singh and Budh Singh are

also mentioned in the Khyats. After Bundi being given to Dalel Singh, Budh Singh

went and stayed at Jodhpur for sometime.98In the meantime a son was born to Budh
Singh by his Chudawat queen, the heroic Ummed Singh Hada. On the basis of Budh

Singhs written undertaking, Sawai Jai Singh demanded the surrender of this infant.

Budh Singh rolled back on his word and tried to recover Bundi. A fierce battle was
fought at Pancholas on 6th April, 1730 in which all the Jaipur nobles lost their lives.

Among those who fell on Jai Singhs side were the five great chieftains Fathmal

(of Sarsop), Kojuram (of Isarda), Shyamaldas (of Suhad), Bahadur Singh (of
Buddhani), Ghasi Ram (of Rasor), besides many others, including Khande Rao, the

regent of Narwar.99 According to the poet Suraj Mal, the Hada casualities were 1200

slain and 1000 wounded.100 The Hadas were defeated and Budh Singh took refuge in

Mewar, where he died a broken heart.

At the time of the battle being fought, Sawai Jai Singh was in Malwa. He returned

from there and halted at the border of Kota, where he was received by Maharao
Durjansal, on 11th May, 1730. Sawai Jai Singhs first task was to bring about a

reconciliation between Durjansal and Salim Singh, then took Dalel Singh to meet the
Maharao. Sawai Jai Singh then placed the document before Durjansal, containing the

terms of the agreement made by Budh Singh and testified by the Maharana. He then
asked the Maharao to put his seal also on the document, which the Kota ruler did. On

19th May, 1730, on the bank of the Kusak, Sawai Jai Singh crowned Dalel Singh, the

Kota ruler first applying the tika on Dalel Singhs brow, followed by Sawai Jai Singh,
96
97
98
99
100

Suryamal Misra, Vamsha Bhaskar (Mahachampu), ed., Chandra Prakash Dewal, Vol. VI, Sahitya
Akadami, New Delhi, 2007, P. 4605.
V.S., Bhatnagar, Life and times of Sawai Jai Singh, p. 216.
Vishveshwar Nath Reu, Marwar ka Itihas, Vol. I, p. 334.
Jadunath Sarkar, A History of Jaipur, p. 193.
Suryamal, Vamsha Bhaskar, Vol.VI, P. 4714.

61

who, waving chamvar on the head of the young Hada, proclaimed him as the new Rao
Raja of Bundi.101

The contest for the throne of Bundi invited the Marathas into the land of the Hada

Rajputs. Budh Singhs queen sent Pratap Singh Hada to seek help from Malhar Rao

Holkar. Accordingly on 22nd April, 1734, the Marathas attacked the fort of Bundi and

carried it after a severe fight. The Marathas received rupees six lakhs for their

assistance.102This was just the beginning of one of the most traumatic phases that was

to be witnessed by Rajasthan and it continued for almost a century. After the death of

Budh Singh, the struggle was carried on by his son, Ummed Singh. Towards the end

of January, 1745, Jayappa Sindhia and Ishwari Singh attacked Kota and looted it, as
Maharao Durjan Sal had been one of the chief supporters of Ummed Singh. In the
encounter, Jayappa lost one of his arms which was blown off by a cannon ball. He

imposed a heavy fine on Kota. Maharao Durjan Sal held that as Kota had been paying
tribute to Sindhia, Holkar and Panwar, they should not have attacked Kota and that
the damages for the loss of his hand should be paid either by Ishawari Singh or Dalel

Singh and not by Kota. Accordingly, Ishwari Singh asked Dalel Singh to give four

villages along with Raprane and Kesho-Rai-Patan with 42 villages to the Marathas.
Kota also promised to pay rupees four lakhs.103

In 1748, he finally succeeded to the throne with the help of Holkar. As a price for

Malhar Rao Holkars help, Ummed Singh awarded the town and district of Patan to
him. It remained under the Maratha control and continued to be so till the Hara States

came under the East India Company.104 Besides this, Ummed Singh promised to give
him ten lakh rupees. Out of this two lakhs were paid in 1749 and another three lakhs
were given by the Raja in 1751 to Malhar Rao Holkar and Jayappa Sindhia equally.

The balance of five lakhs was to be paid to the Satara treasury along with the chauth from

Bundi and Nenwa.105 Though the verdict of the battle of Bagru proved final and
101
102
103
104
105

V.S. Bhatnagar, Life and Times of Sawai Jai Singh, p. 219.

V.G. Dighe, Peshwa Baji Rao I & Maratha Expansion, Karnataka Publishing House, Bombay 2,
1944, p. 116.
R.K. Saxena, Maratha Relations with the Major States of Rajputana, p. 27.
N.L. Mishra, Geography Behind Political History, R.B.S.A. Publishers, Jaipur, 1987, p. 59.
S.P.D., Vol. XIV, No. 23.

62

irrevocable but it made Ummed Singh the feudatory of the Marathas.106 As a price for

Malhar Rao Holkars help, Ummed Singh awarded the town and district of Patan to him.
It remained under the Maratha control and continued to be so till the Hara states came
under the East India Company.The bitterness that had developed in the Jaipur-Bundi

relations persisted for a long time to come. Probably this was the reason that the Vamsha
Bhaskar which was written in 1840 by Surya Mal Mishran, the court historian of Bundi

tried to be critical of Sawai Jai Singh. Bundi was recovered by Ummed Singh, son of

Budh Singh in 1748 and he naturally had a bitter memory of Sawai Jai Singh who had
deprived him of his patrimony. It is, therefore,quite likely that Surya Mal derived some
malicious pleasure in describing that Jai Singh had died of a horrible disease.107

Sawai Jai Singh and the Marathas

Interaction between Malwa and Rajasthan began with the appointment of Sawai Jai Singh

of Amber/Jaipur as the Mughal subedar of Malwa thrice. Sawai Jai Singh has been
charged with contributing to the Maratha conquest of Malwa and indeed, of Hindustan.

Let us take into account the correspondence between Sawai Jai Singh and Baji Rao I that

according to Sir John Malcolm, commenced on a characterstic note. Baji Rao is said to
have sent a verse of the Puran to Sawai Jai Singh, which when literally translated reads:
Thou art like the cloud which drinketh the waters of the sea, and

returneth them with thunder to fertilize the earth. The mountains, in

dread of Indra, fly to thee for protection. Thou art the tree of desires. Thou
art the sea whence springeth the tree of desires, who can tell thy depth! I
have no power to describe the depth of the ocean; but in all thy actions
remember Agastya Moonee.

According to Hindu mythology, the sage Agastya muni drank up the sea. Though

flattering, Baji Rao communicated metaphorically a distinct warning of what might

happen if Sawai Jai Singh opposed the Brahmin sway. Sawai Jai Singh retorted as
mentioned under:
106
107

Beni Gupta, Maratha Penetration into Rajasthan, p. 42.

R.K. Gupta, & S.R. Bakshi ed., Studies in Indian History Rajasthan Through the Ages : Jaipur
Rulers and Administration, Vol. 4, Sarup & Sons, New Delhi 2008, p. 105.

63

If the offspring of Brahma sin with me, I forgive them. This pledge I
hold sacred. It was of no consequence that Agastya Moonee drank up the
sea; but if God should doom the walls that retain the ocean to be thrown
down, then the world would be destroyed, and what would become of
Agastya Moonee?
The Hindus believe the sea to be walled in; and the allusion to the consequences of
that element being let loose upon the earth, is considered, as addressed to one of the

sacred offspring of Brahma, whose duty it was to preserve, instead of destroying, the
general order, to be peculiarly opposite. This correspondence, however, highlights
that it was the object of the proud Rajput, while he gave encouragement and accepted

the proffered friendship, to retort the threat by warning Baji Rao of the consequences

that would ensue from breaking down long-established authority.108 This indicates
that Baji Rao had met his match in Sawai Jai Singh who refused to be cowed down.

Sawai Jai Singhs First Governorship of Malwa ( February, 1713 - November,

1717 )

As the governor of Malwa Sawai Jai Singh had won a great victory against the
Maratha invaders in 1715. He drove them across the river Narmada with heavy

losses. The impact of this crushing defeat was so strong that the Marathas did not
meddle in the affairs of Malwa for the next two years. After 1715 Sawai Jai Singh

was absent from Malwa as half of the Kachhwaha contingent was busy with the Jat
campaign. His deputy was not as vigilant and Maratha raids got revived in the

province. In November, 1717, Sawai Jai Singh was replaced by Muhammad Amin
Khan.

Here it should be remembered that the favour shown to Sawai Jai Singh by granting

the subedari of Malwa led to his disassociation from Ajit Singh. Jai Singh had
succeeded in getting the subedari on the recommendation of Khan-i-Dauran and had

direct access to the Emperor Farrukh Siyar. The growing animosity between Sawai Jai

Singh and Ajit Singh was because both of them wanted to extend their influence over
108

John Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, pp. 54, 55.

64

Rajasthan. Ajit Singh felt that he had been deprived of Sambhar and Didwana due to

Sawai Jai Singh. On the other hand, the appointment of Ajit Singh to the subedari of

Gujarat on the recommendation of the Saiyyad brothers brought him closer to them.
Besides the subedari of Gujarat, Ajit Singh also held the parganas of Sojat, Jaitaran,
Phalodi, Siwana, Merta and Gajsinghpura. He also took advantage of the situation
prevailing at the Mughal Court in expanding his territorial control around Marwar.

While proceeding to Gujarat in A.D. 1715, he occupied Bhinmal and Jalor which had

been in the Rathor domain during the time of Maharaja Jaswant Singh. After the

assassination of Farrukh Siyar, in February 1719, Ajit Singh gained the most
advantageous position. He was granted the subedari of both Ajmer and Gujarat.109

This clearly exhibits that though Sawai Jai Singh and Ajit Singh had collaborated

when their respective watan jagirs were taken away from them. Internally in order to
augment their own prospects they could leave each other in a lurch as and when the
situation demanded. The same was true in the case of their respective successors also.

Sawai Jai Singhs Second Governorship of Malwa (November 1729September 19, 1730)

Raja Sawai Jai Singhs second governorship lasted barey for ten months. Prior to the
second governorship, Sawai Jai Singh was repeatedly urged by the Emporer to go to

the aid of Raja Girdhar Bahadur, the governor of Malwa, to check the Maratha

depredations but Sawai Jai Singh did not pay any heed to this. Sarkar ascribes this

indifference to Sawai Jai Singhs disgust with court politics and Raghubir Sinh
attributes it to the Rajas collusion with the Marathas. Raghubir Sinh held the view

that religion did not play a role in guiding Sawai Jai Singhs policy of favouring the
Marathas rather he was motivated by a feeling of self-interest and personal gain. He

wanted to become the governor of Malwa and extend his dominion from the Jamuna
to the Narmada. He hoped that he could keep the Marathas out of the province by

paying them their dues regularly and in this way he would perpetuate his hold on the
province. But he could hope to become the governor of Malwa only if the Marathas
109

G. D. Sharma, Rajput Polity, pp. 233, 234.

65

made the position of every other governor untenable there.110 Satish Chandra,

however, does not accept either of the two arguments. Malcolm opines that during his
governorship, Sawai Jai Singh either conceived opposition hopeless or entertained a

secret friendship and understanding with the Marathas.111 In 1725 Sawai Jai Singh

had proposed to the Emperor that a policy of judicious compromise should be

followed with the Marathas. He suggested that Shahu and four of his principle men
should be taken into Imperial service, and Shahu be granted jagir worth ten lakhs in
each of the two provinces of Malwa and Gujarat.112

During his second governorship Sawai Jai Singh got the opportunity to follow his
policy. This is evident through a document in which he pointed out that :

The Marathas had tasted Malwa for a long time past. If this year, by
reason of our heavy concentration of troops, they were unable to enter the
suba or chastised (after they have entered) you know what heavy
expenditure would be necessary for this object every year in the future. I
therefore suggest that as Raja Shahu has been ranked as an Imperial
mansabdar since the days of Aurangzeb, your Majesty should give him a
jagir worth ten lakh of rupees in the name of his (adopted) son, Khushal
Singh, on condition that he prevented any future disturbance in Malwa and
an auxiliary contingent of his troops should attend the subedar of that
province. This will give peace to the land and save us from the expense of
campaigning (every year).113
Shahus agent, Dado Bhimsen, gave written undertakings to this effect, on behalf of

his master (26th February and 27th September, 1730).114 Sawai Jai Singhs policy was
at first approved by the Mughal Emperor Muhammad Shah and he wrote Agreed on
Jai Singhs letter. But within a short span of a few months the Emperor not only

reversed Sawai Jai Singhs policy but also charged him with slothfulness and
treachery and soon replaced him as governor with Muhammad Khan Bangash whose
utter failure in two years proved how correct Sawai Jai Singhs assessment was.
110
111
112
113
114

Raghubir Sinh, Malwa inTransition, p.194.

John Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, p. 80.
Satish Chandra, Raja Jai Singh Sawais Contribution to Imperial politics, Proceedings of History
Congrees, 11th Session, Delhi, 1948, p. 183.
Ibid., p. 184.
Jadunath Sarkar, A History of Jaipur, p.177.

66

According to Satish Chandra, Sawai Jai Singhs policy was clearly aimed at keeping

the Marathas out of Malwa. But after 1725, he considered that possible only by a
settlement with the Marathas through a judicious compromise and war should be seen

as the last resort. The policy suggested by Sawai Jai Singh had been successfully

followed by Nizam ul-Mulk. He strengthened his alliance with the Marathas. He had
also agreed for their right of levying chauth of the revenue of the Deccan. In the

words of one of Nizam-ul-Mulks biographers, Muhammad Qasim, who penned his

biography in Persian, Ahwal-i-Khawaqin,

At this time the Marathas are so strong that only a person with the luck
of Alexander can deal with them effectively. The work is not easy. All
this is due to our own folly and dissensions. It is due to this that things
have come to this pass. It is to be seen what God has in store for us.115
On being conferred the governorship for the second time Sawai Jai Singh arrived at

the provincial capital Ujjain in December. A few weeks earlier the fortress of Mandu

had been taken by the Marathas. To recover it, Sawai Jai Singh appealed to the
Maratha king Shahu in the name of the old friendship that existed between their royal

ancestors. The Maratha king relented and ordered Mandu to be restored to the
Imperialists. Early in May, Sawai Jai Singh was recalled to Jaipur by more pressing
business there.

Sawai Jai Singhs Third Governorship in Malwa ( 1732-1737 )

The Mughal Emperor made Sawai Jai Singh the subedar of Malwa for the third time
on 6th September, 1732. He was asked to maintain an army of 30,000 horse and foot

in equal numbers for which he was granted rupees 13 lakhs and 7 lakhs as loan from

the Emperor on the condition that he would raise an army and drive the Marathas out
of Malwa. Sawai Jai Singh was also assigned two-third of the total revenues of Malwa
to meet the expenses. Thus, unprecedented

resources were placed at Sawai Jai

Singhs disposal.116 In 1732, after the rainy season was over, the Marathas became
115
116

Setu Madhavrao Pagadi, Studies in Maratha History, Vol. II, Shivaji University Publication,
Kolhapur, 1971, p. 107.
Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court, p.218

67

active once again. Sawai Jai Singh reached Ujjain in December, 1732. When Sawai
Jai Singh was at Mandsaur in February, 1733, Holkar and Sindhia after leaving their

heavy baggage near the Mahi, hemmed Sawai Jai Singh round and put his troops to

great privations, by cutting off their grain and water supplies.117 Under duress Sawai
Jai Singh had to sue for peace and he offered six lakhs of rupees, Holkar expected

more.118 Though charged with playing double game,119 he had to extricate himself

from this difficult situation on his own.120

This was also the time when Sawai Jai Singh was involved in the disputed succession to the

throne of Bundi. Therefore, he tried to avoid an open conflict with the Marathas. As one of

the claimants implored the Maratha king, Shahu for help against Sawai Jai Singh, the
Marathas found this opportunity to intrude into Rajasthan. Budh Singhs wife, the
Kachhwaha queen had invited the Marathas to restore Bundi to her husband on payment of

six lakhs of rupees as their expences.121 Ranoji Sindhia and Malhar Rao Holkar were

deputed to help her. The two sardars took over Bundi in their possession on 12th April,

1734. However, Sawai Jai Singh again brought Bundi under his control.

Probably this act of the Marathas made Sawai Jai Singh realize that if not resisted, the
Marathas would thwart his own ambitions. He therefore, entreated the Emperor to
send him additional

troops with funds and supplies. Sawai Jai Singh further

strengthened his efforts by forming a strong league of the Rajput Rajas in 1734.

Hurda Conference
Sawai Jai Singh convened a conference of all the rulers of the various States of

Rajasthan in July, 1734, at Hurda to devise ways to resist the Marathas.122 Among
those who attended the conference were the Maharana of Udaipur, Jagat Singh II,
Abhay Singh of Jodhpur, Bakht Singh of Nagore, Dalel Singh of Bundi, Gopal Pal of
117
118
119
120
121
122

Holkarshahiche Itihas, Vol. I, p. 42, :Holkarankdeel maansaani Sawai Jaisinghas bahut tang
kele. Dana pani bund jhale.
Raghubir Sinh, Malwa in Transition, p. 223.
William Irvine, Later Mughals, Vol. II, p. 278.
G.S. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, Vol. II, Bombay, 1958, P.145.
Suryamal, Vamsha Bhaskar, Vol. VI, P. 4789.
Vishveshwar Nath Reu, Marwar ka Itihas, Vol. I, pp. 347,348.

68

Bikaner and the the Rajas of Kishangarh and Karauli.123 Accordingly, an agreement
with following terms was concluded among them:
1.

To remain united in all circumstances, good or bad, with a pledge to abide by

2.

No one shall countenance the traitor of another.

3.

After the rains, to re-assemble at Rampura. In his absence the head of a State

4.

In case an heir commits any error, the Rana alone shall mediate to correct it.

5.

In every enterprise all shall unite to execute the agreement.124

the terms.

shall send his heir or some person of standing.

Soon the agreement fell flat due to the non-agreement (naittifaqi) between Bikaner

and Nagore, the deception (daghabazi) of Sawai Jai Singh leading to the ruin

(tabahi) of Kota and Bundi and Maharana Jagat Singhs attempts to exhibit his own
greatness in making Madho Singh as the rightful claimant to the Jaipur throne. Each

ones eagerness to secure Maratha help further enabled the Marathas to intrude into
Rajasthan. In the end the Marathas emerged as the victors and dictated terms to the

Rajputs: jisse dakhini ghalib hokar inpar hukumat ka danka bajate the.125 Thus, the

terms of the agreement could not be executed, as they could not follow a unified
policy. Outwardly Sawai Jai Singh and Abhay Singh put up a joint front but in reality
they followed divergent paths.

With the waning authority of the Mughal emperor and the division of the Imperial
Court into two almost equally balanced groups among the nobles. One of these groups

was led by the wazir Qamar-ud-din Khan and the other by the chief bakshi, Khan-iDauran.The wazir had the ability to perceive the dangers facing the Empire better than

any of his contemporaries and was an enemy of oppression and promoted the war
party. The chief bakshi was a learned man and his character in personal life was above
reproach but he was not a strong military commander. This made him shrink from war

123
124
125

Shyamal Das, Vir Vinod Mewar ka Itihas, Vol. II, Motilal Banarasidas, Delhi, Reprinted 1986, p. 1220.
G.R. Parihar, Marwar and the Marathas, p. 50.
Shyamal Das, Vir. Vinod., Vol. II, p. 1224.

69

and therefore, he relied on diplomacy and promoted the peace party. He believed in

the balance of power and was loosely allied with Sawai Jai Singh.126Abhay Singh had

got so disgusted with the Marathas that he was not in favour of the appeasement
policy followed by Sawai Jai Singh towards them. Therefore, he joined hands with the

party led by Qamar-ud-din Khan in the Mughal Court that followed the policy of

resistance towards the Marathas. In pursuance of the hard line, Sawai Jai Singh was

also compelled to join the plan of action. Accordingly, the wazir, Abhay Singh and
Sadat Khan were to march by way of Gwalior while Sawai Jai Singh and Khan-iDauran were to be sent by way of Jaipur.

With these grand preparations, two divisions marched from Delhi in the winter of

1734-35, one under the wazir, Qamar-ud-din Khan by the eastern route into

Bundelkhand and the second under the mir bakshi, Khan-i-Dauran by the western

route into Rajasthan. The first army under the wazir totally failed against Pilaji Jadhav
and returned to Delhi in May, 1735. The second army under Khan-i-Dauran was
joined on the way to Ajmer by Sawai Jai Singh, Abhay Singh and Durjansal of Kota.

This army crossed the Mukandara pass and reached Rampura territory.The Marathas
gave a stiff fight to the the Mughal army: Mukandara utarun Rampura prante
Marathyanchya rokhane Monglache kuch jhale.127

The Imperial army was doomed to failure due to lack of direction. For eight days the

Marathas surrounded the Imperial army, absolutely immobilizing it and depriving it of

food and fodder: tyapramaane aath roj laskarche chaugird kahikabad danaghas

bund kela.128 Thus, an army of twenty thousand Marathas proved superior to the
Mughal army of two lakh.129

Having attained a lightning victory the Marathas crossed the Mukundara pass and

entered the defenceless Jaipur and Jodhpur kingdoms. Malhar Rao Holkar, who had

no more than 7,000 to 8,000 men, awaited the arrival of Pratap Singh Hada of Bundi.
126
127
128
129

Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics, pp. 209-214.

Holkarshahicha Itihas, Vol. I, p. 42.
Ibid., p. 42.
Govind Sakharam Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, Vol. II, Second Impression 1958,
Phoenix Publications, Bombay, p. 159.

70

Pratap Singh Hada had put his well-equipped army at the disposal of the Marathas.130
The Imperialists were completely outwitted by the Maratha strategy. Malhar Rao at

the head of a much smaller force was plundering areas around Ajmer. Sambhar also

suffered from his marauding.131 Malhar Rao further raided many places in both

regions. The loot of the rich city of Sambhar on 28th February, 1735, yielded him rich

dividends. The Imperial faujdar of the city was robbed of everything. By early March,
Khan-i-Dauran was at Kota and Sawai Jai Singh was near his own capital. Ranoji and

Malhar Rao were some twenty miles from Jaipur. Circumstances compelled Khan-i-

Dauran to listen to Sawai Jai Singhs advice. Accordingly, the Marathas were
persuaded to retire beyond the Narmada. On behalf of the Emperor twenty two lakhs
of rupees as

chauth from Malwa was promised. On 22nd March, 1735, this

understanding was effected at a meeting between the two sides arranged by Sawai Jai
Singh near Kota.

132

After this Sawai Jai Singh and Khan-i-Dauran returned to Delhi

only to be charged with treason.133 The war party at the Mughal court became more

vociferous, thereby ignoring Sawai Jai Singhs sober reasoning : bakshi va Jaisingh

yanjvirudh Turani pakshane Badshahkade takrar keli.134

He had suggested that the way to restore peace in Malwa was to win over the Peshwa by

friendly negotiations. The Peshwa was to be converted into an Imperial officer by

granting a jagir and inducing him to visit the Emperor. As the agreement of 22nd March,

1735 was not ratified by the Emperor, Sawai Jai Singh got enraged and he decided to

invite the Peshwa to Northern India.He called the Maratha envoy to his court and told
him : I cannot trust the Turks. If the latter triumph over the Deccani forces, they will
disregard us. Therefore in every matter I shall follow the behest of the Peshwa.135

In a letter dated August 1735, the Peshwas agent posted with Sawai Jai Singh wrote

to him the details of the negotiations which the writer was conducting with the Raja in

130
131
132
133
134
135

Irvine, Later Mughals. Vol. II, p. 283.

Ibid., p. 280.
Holkarshahicha Itihas, Vol. I, Jaisinghachya madhyasthine Holkar va Mirbaksh hanchya tarikh
22-3-1735 la bheti houun taha tharla, p. 43.
Jadunath Sarkar, A History of Jaipur, p. 181.
Holkarshahicha Itihas, Vol. I, p. 43.
Raghubir Sinh, Malwa in Transition, p. 235.

71

order to prevent the Marathas from entering Malwa.136 Accordingly, he sent a

proposal to Baji Rao to come to Jaipur at the head of only five thousand horse. Sawai
Jai Singh promised to bear his daily expenses of rupees five thousand. Another
important letter indicates Baji Raos entrance into Imperial politics at Delhi. Baji Rao

arranged terms with Sawai Jai Singh through Mahadev Bhatt Hingane, his agent at the
Mughal Court.

One, Ram Chandra Baba is mentioned as being instrumental in arranging the

accommodation. It seems that the Marathas Northward policy was arrived at by

deliberations between eminent Maratha sardars.137 In an interesting development

Baji Raos mother expressed her desire to go on a pilgrimage to North India.

Radhabais pilgrimage
When Radhabais intention of visiting the holy places of Northern India became
known, both the Rajput Rajas and the Mughal officials, requested the revered lady to

visit their States and shrines. Leaving Poona on the 14th February, 1735, Radhabai

made a successful pilgrimage through Northern India. The Emperor himself ordered
an escort of one thousand troops of his own body-guard to accompany her during the
period of her stay beyond the river Narmada. Radhabai received an honourable and

warm welcome from the Maharana of Udaipur. When she arrived near Jaipur in June
1735, Sawai Jai Singh personally came out of his capital to receive her. Arrangements

were made for her to stay in the royal palace and during the seven days of her stay at

Jaipur, Sawai Jai Singh came to see her several times and each time suitable gifts

were given to her. Radhabai also reciprocated by giving suitable presents.138 During
Radhabais stay, Sawai Jai Singh successfully sought her blessings for his daughter,

Krishna Kunwari, who was married to Rao Raja Dalel Singh of Bundi.139 There could
be a probability that since Radhabai had blessed Krishna Kunwari, Dalel Singh was

not disturbed by the Marathas till 1748. The Marathas highly appreciated the warm
136
137
138
139

S.P.D., Vol. XIV, No. 47.

S.P.D., Vol. XIV, No. 50.
V.S. Bhatnagar, Life And Times Of Sawai Jai Singh, p. 231.
Suryamal Mishra, Vamsha Bhaskar, Vol. VI, ed. Chandra Prakash Dewal, Sahitya Akadami, New
Delhi, 2007, p. 4773.

72

and respectful welcome accorded to Radhbai in Rajasthan. Her pilgrimage paved the
way for Baji Raos visit to Rajasthan.

Baji Raos visit to Rajasthan

Baji Rao agreed to the proposal out of his regard for Sawai Jai Singh and also for a

chance of winning over the Rajput princes through friendly discourses.140 He left
Puna on 9th October, 1735. To meet the Rana of Mewar, the Peshwa came via

Lunawada, Banswara and Dungarpur.141 He was given a grand reception at Udaipur

and was accommodated at the Champabagh palace in January 1734. Moreover, the
Maharana honoured him in an open darbar, where two gold embroidered seats were

arranged for the guest and the host. When Baji Rao approached the seat which the
Maharana pointed to him, he politely declined to accept the position of equality with
the Maharana, and simply occupied a seat just below. For five days dresses and
presents were offered and entertainments took place.142

Baji Rao got a written

promise of annual payment of rupees 1,60,000. The pargana of Banheda was ceded to
the Marathas to cover this amount.

After his successful visit to Udaipur, Baji Rao proceeded via the holy city of

Nathdwara towards Jaipur. Sawai Jai Singh moved South to welcome his guest and

the two met at village Bhamola, thirty miles east of Ajmer. A pavilion had been

erected at the meeting place, between the two camps, while the Rajput and Maratha
escorts stood fully armed on the two sides. After descending from their respective

elephants, both exchanged embraces and sat down on the same cushion. The visit
having lasted for several days, Sawai Jai Singh and Baji Rao discussed the peace

terms. They also had prolonged discussions regarding a lasting settlement between
the Marathas and the Mughals. The visit was marked by the usual exchange of gifts.

In May, 1736, the Emperor agreed to appoint Baji Rao the deputy governor (naib-subedar)

and de facto master of Malwa, while Sawai Jai Singh was to continue as the nominal

subedar. As all the demands of the Marathas were not accepted, Baji Rao organized the
140
141
142

G.S. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, Vol. II, p. 162.

Holkarshahicha Itihas, Vol. I, p. 44.
G.S. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, Vol. II, pp. 162, 163.

73

most spectacular campaign of his career. Leaving Poona on 12th November, 1736, he

swept through Malwa, Bundelkhand and the Gangetic doab and reached the very gates of

the Imperial capital. In 1737, Peshwa Baji Rao wrote to his brother:

Sawaiji has also sent us friendly letters requesting us to leave his territory
undisturbed we do not disturb his territory as we expect to get supplies
of grain and fodder from Sawaiji on our way.143
With the accession of Balaji Baji Rao in 1740 upto the death of Sawai Jai Singh
in1743, there was friendly interaction between the latter and the Marathas. According

to Malcolm, Sawai Jai Singhs object was to keep the dialogue between the Marathas
and the Emperor open. Clearly Sawai Jai Singh desired to combine his loyalty to the
Emperor and friendship with the Marathas.144

Jodhpur and the Marathas

The Marathas featured in Marwar politics for the first time in 1724. After the
deposition of Farrukhsiyar, Ajit Singh enjoyed an influential position at the royal

court and was appointed as governor of Gujarat as well as of Ajmer, which had
religious and strategical importance attached to it. Ajit Singh helped the Saiyyid

brothers to stabilize their position at the imperial court. This was beneficial for Ajit

Singh as his closeness to the Saiyyids helped him to safeguard his own interests. With
the fall of the Saiyyid brothers, Ajit Singh also fell into disfavour at the imperial

court. Imperial hostility drove Ajit Singh into an alliance with Churaman Jat. This
alliance was not liked by Sawai Jai Singh and he contrived to weaken Ajit Singhs

position.145 Thus, the murder of Maharaja Ajit Singh was planned and executed as a

result of an understanding between the Mughal Emperor, Sawai Jai Singh and Abhay

Singh, the son of Ajit Singh.146After the murder of Maharaja Ajit Singh by his son
Bakht Singh on 23rd June 1724, Marwar plunged into a war of succession among Ajit

Singhs sons. At the time of his fathers murder, Abhay Singh was at Delhi. The
143
144
145
146

William Irvine, Later Mughals, p. 248.

John Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, p. 88.
R.S. Sangwan, Jodhpur and the Later Mughals A.D. 1707-1752, Pragati Publications, New Delhi,
2006, pp. 86, 87.
Rathora ri Khyat, Vol. II, pp. 423, 424.

74

Mughal Emperor recognized Abhay Singh as the new ruler on 17th July, 1724 and he

was coronated there only. The Emperor presented him a khilat, bestowed the title of

Rajrajeshwar and also the area of Nagor on him147. The younger sons of Ajit Singh,
Anand Singh and Rai Singh raised the standard of revolt. A civil war had started

between the brothers. Abhay Singh was able to crush the revolt with the timely help
advanced by the strong contingents of Jaipur and Mewar.

Anand Singh and Rai Singh fled to Gujarat where they seem to have even proposed a
matrimonial alliance with the Marathas. They tried to secure the help of the Marathas

to occupy Jodhpur. The two brothers tried to gain Idar for themselves with the help of
their Maratha allies. Idar in Gujarat had been bestowed on Abhay Singh by the

Emperor. It was attacked in the middle of 1725. Though the Marathas failed to
dislodge the Rathor hold on the territory, their regular incursions ruined all sources of
revenue from that area. In March 1726, the two brothers and their Maratha allies made
preparation to march towards Jodhpur.

Meanwhile, Sawai Jai Singh made an attempt to reconcile the brothers by suggesting

that Anand Singh and Rai Singh be allotted some jagirs in Abhay Singhs territory,

but it did not succeed. Rather Abhay Singh agreed to hand over the jagir of Idar to the

Maharana of Mewar on condition that he would get Anand Singh and Rai Singh
murdered. Abhay Singh also assured the Maharana to make a common cause against
the Marathas. The Maharana was successful in establishing his hold over Idar but both

the brothers escaped and headed towards Marwar and devastated the Maharanas
territory as well. Clearly, the internal feuds and their inter-state rivalries between Ajit
Singhs sons gave an opportunity to the Marathas to gradually move towards
Rajasthan.

Marathas inroads into Marwar dates from 1728, when Kanthaji Kadam and Pilaji
Gaekwad invaded Jalore and fomented trouble at the request of Rai Singh and Anand
Singh. Abhay Singh sent Bhandari Khivsi to make peace with the Maratha leaders and
persuade them to withdraw. Bhandari Khivsi

147

Vishveshwar Nath Reu, Marwar ka Itihas, Vol. I, pp. 331,332.

75

succeeded in his mission and the Marathas withdrew. When Abhay Singh was the
subedar of Gujarat he instigated the Mughals against the Marathas. This was rankling

in the mind of Malhar Rao Holkar. Consequently in 1736, Malhar Rao Holkar
advanced from Gujarat and invaded Marwar. He plundered Jalore, Sojat, Bilara,

Merta and Jodhpur.148 Meanwhile, the long struggle with his brothers came to an end

as Abhay Singh gave Idar as a jagir to them in August 1728.149 The death of Abhay

Singh and the disputed throne of Marwar provided splendid opportunities to the
Marathas to visit the State again and again.150

The interests of the Jodhpur Raja and the Marathas clashed in Gujarat. Its
geographical location is in the South of Marwar across Palanpur and Sirohi, bordering

on Jalore, Jaswantpura and Bhinmal tehsils of Jodhpur division. The traders of

Marwar, carried their trade via the routes of Gujarat. As the State charged custom

duty from these traders, the Rathor rulers had to provide security of the trade routes
beyond their territory also. The first consideration of the Rathors in wishing for

peaceful political conditions in Gujarat was the prosperity of their own trade.
Secondly, the richness of the land was a compensation for their own territorys dry

western part.Moreover, Gujarats strategic location made them covet it as their own
territory.

As Maharaja Jaswant Singh and Ajit Singh had been given jagirs in Gujarat followed

by Abhay Singhs governorship of the same, the Rathors attempted to push Marwar
frontier towards Gujarat. On the other hand, the Marathas treated Gujarat as a source

of additional income since the days of Shivaji. The Marathas under the leadership of
Pilaji, the deputy of Khande Rao Dabhade, established their control over Baroda,

Dabhoi etc. and converted the province into a sort of marauding ground for
themselves. These were the circumstances when Abhay Singh was entrusted the task

148
149

150

Radhey Shyam, Marwar and the Marathas, in Maratha History Seminar Papers (May 28-31,
1970), ed., Dr. A.G. Pawar, Shivaji University Press, Kolhapur, 1971. pp. 249, 250.
G.R. Parihar, Marwar and the Marathas, pp. 26-32; H.C. Tikkiwal, Sawai Jai Singh and the
Marwar Affairs in the reign of Emperor Muhammad Shah, Proceedings of Indian History
Congress, 31st Session, Varanasi, 1969, p. 207.
Radhey Shyam, Marwar and the Marathas, in Maratha History Seminar Papers (May 28-31,
1970), ed., Dr. A.G. Pawar, p. 250.

76

of ridding Gujarat of the Maratha marauders.151But Baji Rao I came with an army
from the Deccan to Ahmedabad and sent a message to Abhay Singh that Khande Rao

had been taking chauth from Gujarat. Since Khande Rao was no more, therefore,
chauth should now be given to him.152

On Mah Sudi 15, V.S. 1787/1730 Baji Rao met Abhay Singh and cordialities were

exchanged. He stayed there for a month and both met for a couple of times. When the
Peshwa heard about the Nizams arrival at Narmada, he had to leave, though the

chauth was not finalized. Abhay Singh then presented a siropav to the Peshwa and

deputed bhandari Vijay Raj and Rathor Amar Singh Kushlawat with a force to safely

see off the Peshwa. They accompanied him to Baroda.153 Afterwards Abhay Singh
entered into an agreement with them, under the Ahmadabad Pact of 1731. He agreed

to pay rupees 13 lakhs as chauth of Gujarat. In return, the Peshwa promised to help in
expelling Pilaji Gaekwar and Kanthaji Bande from Gujarat. However, the pact was

soon repudiated and Abhay Singh got Pilaji murdered. Malhar Rao Holkar and
Ranoji Sindhia occupied Champaner and Pavagarh in 1733. Abhay Singh had no

choice but to agree to pay rupees 80,000 out of the revenues of Ahamdabad along
with the chauth and sardeshmukhi.

The animosity between the Kachhwahas and the Rathors stretched over generations

and the Peshwa knew about it. Hence, he took advantage of it.154 The relations

between Sawai Jai Singh and Abhay Singh were quite bitter. So much so that on the
advice of Sawai Jai Singh, Baji Rao asked Malhar Rao and Ranoji Sindhia, Kanthaji

and Anand Rao Panwar to invade Marwar and devastate it.155Abhay Singh had
antangonized Baji Rao by not paying the amount promised in 1735. Earlier Naro

Shankar had reported to the Peshwa that Abhay Singh promises to relieve the Peshwa

of his debts.156 The Peshwa dispatched a force under Shinde and Holkar towards
Marwar.157 Soon the two sardars besieged the fort of Merta. Malhar Rao Holkar and

151
152

153
154
155
156
157

Bisheshwar Nath Reu, Glories of Marwar and the Glorious Rathors, Archaeological Department,
Jodhpur Government Press, Jodhpur, 1943, p. 166.
Rathora ri Khyat, Vol. II,Mah ra maas mein Baji Rao fauj lene Dikhan su aayo ne Shri Maharaj
ne kaivayo ke Gujarat ri chauth Khande Rao laito su to ramsaran huvo su hame monu devo ne
Shri Maharaj su het iklas baandhan nu pin aayo p. 454.
Ibid.
Holkarshahicha Itihas, Vol. I, p. 44.
G.R. Parihar, Marwar and the Marathas, p.53.
Selections from Peshwas Daftar, ed., G.S. Sardesai, Vol. XXIX, Peshwa Madhavrao I Uttarhind
(1761-1772), Government Central Press, Mumbai, 1933, No. 39.
Holkarshahicha Itihas, Vol. I, Shinde Holkaranche hatakhali ek fauj Marwarant ravana keli. p. 44.

77

Ranoji Sindhia informed the Peshwa about the severe encounter at Merta.158Soon

Abhay Singhs general, bhandari Bijay Raj surrendered and agreed to pay the ransom.

Bakht Singh was also forced to pay the tribute. But as per the Merta agreement, when

Holkar and Sindhia came to collect the tribute in March, 1742, they experienced difficulty

in raising money from the people of Sojat, Raipur and Jaitaran.159 It may be noted here
that Sawai Jai Singh and Abhay Singh had divergent policies towards the Marathas.
Almost a similar situation cropped up later during the reigns of Sawai Madho Singh and
Bijay Singh. If Sawai Jai Singh had taken interest in the internal disturbance caused by

the revolt of Bakht Singh at Nagor in October, 1740, Sawai Madho Singh also supported
the cause of Ram Singh. The battle of Gangwana fought on 28th May, 1741, was the net

outcome of these hostilities. Sawai Jai Singh joined Ratan Singh in the battle but
ultimately peace was concluded. It was a decisive victory for Sawai Jai Singh as it

humbled the pride of Maharaja Abhay Singh.Soon after the battle Sawai Jai Singh

performed the Ashvamedha Yajna.160The Marathas were ever on the look out for such an
opportunity. When hostility between Abhay Singh and Bakht Singh resumed, the former
invited Malhar Rao Holkar on a daily payment of rupees 11,000. Abhay Singhs failing
health and intensification of internal conflicts within Jodhpur led him to secure the

support of the Marathas. Ironically, this was the policy that had all along been suggested
by Jai Singh. Abhay Singh exchanged turbans with Holkar at Pushkar, dined on the same
table and thus developed close relationship.

Marwar Civil War and Maratha Intervention

After the death of Abhay Singh, his son Ram Singh ascended the throne of Jodhpur on

13th July, 1749.161 Malhar Rao recognized him as the rightful claimant for the

leadership of the Rathors and sent a tika and an elephant at the time of his coronation.

The message sent was loud and clear. Earlier the change in kingship was recognized
and approved officially by the Mughal Emperors, now the same was done by the

Marathas. It was a remarkable change in political equations in the politics of

Rajasthan. As expected, Bakht Singh did not acknowledge the new Raja. The State
158
159
160
161

S.P.D., Vol. XIV, No. 14.

G.R. Parihar, Marwar and the Marathas, p. 57.
V.S. Bhargava, Rise of the Kachhawas in Dhundhar (Jaipur) : From the earliest times to the death
of Sawai Jai Singh (1743 A.D.), Shabd Sanchar, Ajmer, 1979, p. 160.
Vishveshwar Nath Reu, Marwar ka Itihas, Vol. I, p. 359.

78

was to witness a civil war and the court got divided into two armed camps. There is a

famous saying prevalent in Marwar: Rinmala thapiya teeke Raja,which means, one

who gets support of the nobles becomes the ruler of Marwar.162

If one group of nobles supported Ram Singh, the other organized itself under the banner
of his uncle Bakht Singh.Thakur Kesari Singh of Ras, Kalyan Singh of Nimaji, Prem
Singh of Pali and Devi Singh of Pokaran received jagirs from Bakht Singh as they

extended their support to him.163Ram Singh sought the political support of Kachhwaha

ruler Sawai Ishwari Singh,164 Bakht Singh secured the co-operation of Madho Singh. A

Maratha report was sent to the Peshwa informing him about the war between Ram Singh

and Sawai Ishwari Singh on the one side and Bakht Singh on the other.165 Through Sawai
Ishwari Singh, Ram Singh secured the Peshwas support who sent a force of 1,500.

Holkar also sent a force under his son. An armed conflict was imminent. The two sides
reached Pipar but the scarcity of water and the scorching heat thwarted any active action.
Ultimately a confrontation took place on 14thApril, 1750, without any conclusive results.

At last a peace unfavourable to Bakht Singh was concluded.

With the death of his ally Sawai Ishwari Singh, Ram Singh lost one of his allies. Except

the sardars of Merta, almost all the others had joined Bakht Singh. This particular

situation popularized a doha (couplet) in Marwar implying that majority of the Thakurs

were unhappy with Ram Singh and they invited his uncle, Bakht Singh to come to

Jodhpur and enthrone himself : Ramai sun raji nahin, dino uttar desh, Jodhano jhala

karai, aaw dhani Bakhtesh.166Sawai Madho Singh was now the Raja of Jaipur through

whose help, Bakht Singh prevailed upon Holkar to at least remain neutral. Holkars

neutrality sealed the fate of Ram Singh. Bakht Singh defeated Ram Singh at Merta and

occupied Jodhpur on 21st June, 1751. After loosing Jodhpur, Ram Singh went to Maroth.

He sent his agent purohit Jagan Nath to Jaipur to secure Sawai Madho Singhs aid. Since

162
163
164
165
166

R.P. Vyas, Role of Nobility in Marwar (1800-1873 A.D.), Jain Brothers Publishers, New Delhi,
1969, p. 9.
R.K. Saxena, Rajput Nobility (A Study of 18th century Rajasthan), Publication Scheme, Jaipur,
1996, p. 209.
Vishveshwar Nath Reu, Marwar ka Itihas, Vol. I, p. 360.
Selections from Peshwas Daftar, ed., G.S. Sardesai, Vol. II, Panipat Prakaran (1747-61),
Government Central Press, Mumbai, 1930, No. 16.
Vishveshwar Nath Reu, Marwar ka Itihas, Vol. I, p. 364.

79

the growing power of Bakht Singh could be a menace to Jaipur, Sawai Madho Singh
decided to support Ram Singh. When the purohit went to seek Maratha help, Jayappa
Sindhia agreed to help Ram Singh for which he was paid an advance amount of ten to

twelve thousand.167 At the end of May, 1752, he attacked and occupied Ajmer but soon

had to leave for Poona. Therefore, he deputed his general, Sahiba Patel to take care of

Ram Singhs affairs. Soon Bakht Singh attacked and defeated Ram Singh and the

Maratha force on 28th July, 1752. After this success, Bakht Singh even tried to activate an

anti-Maratha coalition of the Rajput rulers, the Jats and the Mughal wazir. However, these

efforts could not materialize due to his death on 21st, September, 1752.168 He died leaving
a disputed succession and an impending civil strife for his son, Bijay Singh.

Accession of Bijay Singh and the Battle of Merta

With the open support of Malhar Rao Holkar, Bijay Singh was coronated on 31st
January, 1753. Once again Ram Singh tried to secure Maratha help. At Raghunath
Raos instructions, Jayappa marched towards Jodhpur to reinstate Ram Singh on the

throne. He was accompanied by his son, Jankoji and brother, Dattaji along with Raja
Sawant Singhs son, Sardar Singh. They all came to Kishangarh. With 30,000 cavalry,

the city was looted by them.169 From Kishangarh, Jayappas army marched to

Pokharan and encamped there. From Pokharan they went to Alanias and looted the

place. Afterwards they reached Gangarade, near Ajmer.170The news of the Maratha
arrival led to hectic preparations by Bijay Singh. He was joined in his efforts by the

Bikaner and Kishangarh rulers, Gaj Singh and Bhadar Singh respectively.171 The
forces of the Dakhanis numbered 60,000 while Marwar forces were 40,000.

On the first day, the Rathors were victorious while the Dakhanis suffered a defeat.172

From here they marched to Merta. The next day being the shradh of Maharaja Bakht

Singh, the Rathors felt it improper to fight the Marathas. When the Jodhpur Rajas

supporters were not able to decide whether to fight or not, suddenly the Dakhanis
167
168
169
170
171
172

G.R. Parihar, Marwar and the Marathas, p. 71.

Vishveshwar Nath Reu, Marwar ka Itihas, Vol. I, p. 368.
Rathora ri Khyat, Vol. III, p. 524.
Ibid
Ibid.
Ibid.

80

attacked them with a force of 5,000. The bullocks were taken away by them and the

cannons were destroyed. Surano Devichand was killed. They started moving towards

their cannons but the Dakhanis again attacked them from behind.173 The encounter took
place on 14th September, 1754 on the plains of Merta city. The Marathas attacked from all

sides. Almost 10,000 Rathor soldiers were killed. Many of the Dakhanis also got
killed.174 The Rathor leaders could not stand the Maratha onslaught. All the three rulers of

the Rathor clan, Bijay Singh, Gaj Singh and Bhadar Singh fled leaving Jayappa and Ram

Singh to enter the city in triumph on 17th September.175When Bijay Singh reached
Nagaur the nobles persisted that if he mounted the elephant, the people would be happy to

pay their respects to him. Bijay Singh then mounted an elephant. In the meanwhile, at

Merta, Jayappa had taken possession of the cannons.176 At Nagaur, Bijay Singh asked the
hakim, Pratapmal Fatehchand about the preparations. The latter replied that he had

arranged for the supplies that would last for two years.

Maratha Attack on Nagaur and Jodhpur

Leaving their hakim at Merta, Jayappa Sindhia and Ram Singh marched to Nagaur.
After encamping at Tausar, they besieged the fort. It turned out to be a thirteen month

long siege during which Bijay Singh and his men suffered great hardships.177 On 31st
October, 1754, Thursday, purohit Jagoji and Jayappa Sindhia along with Ram Singhs

nobles, marched to Jodhpur. There they encamped at Abhay Sagar and laid siege.178

In the meanwhile, the fort of Jalore was captured by the Marathas. The fort of Phalodi

was also laid under siege. Jodhpur, Nagaur, Jalore and Didwana were under the
control of Bijay Singh while the other areas were under the hold of Ram Singh and
Jayappa Sindhia. When the siege dragged on, Bijay Singh sent Bijay Ram Bharti to

Udaipur to request the Maharana and send the Salumbar chief Rao Jait Singh to
initiate a settlement with Jayappa Sindhia.

173
174
175
176
177
178

Marwar ri Khyat, p. 32.

Ibid., p. 32.
G.R. Parihar, Marwar and the Marathas, pp. 79, 80.
Rathora ri Khyat, Vol. III, p. 532.
Ibid.
Ibid.

81

Accordingly, Raj Singh Chauhan was sent to convey to Jayappa that as he was

supporting Ram Singh, so only Ram Singh had the ability to rule. At this Jayappa
replied that he knew it that despite his efforts, it had not materialized. But as he had

given his word, if he stayed alive, then at least once he would get Ram Singh

enthroned : Vachan diyo hai, su jivto rai gayo to ekbar garh mein besan desu.179
In this way negotiations continued but without Bijay Singhs agreeing to surrender

Jodhpur, the issue could not be resolved. The siege of Nagore was further intensified.
It turned out to be a long siege.

Jayappas Murder
It was evident that Ram Singhs strength lay in the Maratha support. Seeing no respite

in sight, the Rathors decided to murder Jayappa to conquer their own land. An

important news letter was sent to report about the murder of Jayappa Sindhia.180 In
Sai Das Chauhans contingent of the silepos (a categoty of soldiers) and belonging to

his own clan, two soldiers, Khokhar Kesarkhan and Gehlot, felt that if they had to die
it was better that they die after killing Jayappa. They requested Sain Das to convey

their resolve to the Maharaja who approved of their stratagem. Saaindas then
conveyed to the Maharaja. Bijay Singh called both of them and said, if they

accomplished this task, he would give them pattas worth 10,000 each and a patta

worth 20,000 to the diwan along with the thikana of Bhakhrod to live. Both were

given money for their expenses along with a peskabaj ( a dagger worn in front) each.
Then they were made to accompany the negotiators and were facilitated to open a
shop in the army camp of the Dakhanis.181

One day when Jayappa was sitting on a bajot (stool) in his tent, his attendants were giving

him bath. They indulged in a mock fight and started moving towards Jayappa and said that

they were partners in the shop. One of them said that he gave rupees 500 to the other to go

to Merta to buy various things for the shop. But he seems to have hidden the money and is
now telling a lie that someone has snatched the money from him on the route between
179
180
181

Rathora ri Khyat, Vol. III, p. 533.

S.P.D., Vol. II, No. 48.
Rathora ri Khyat, Vol. III, the Marathas were addressed as Dikhni, by the Rajputs, p. 534.

82

Khajwada and Deswal village. Having listened to their complaint, Jayappa asked them to sit

down and wait for justice. Suddenly they held Jayappas throat and struck him with the

peskabaj. There was a great commotion in the camp. Chauhan Raj Singh and the Salumbar

chief Rao Jait Singh,182 along with some others were killed. Soon Chauhan Sain Das
secretly informed Bijay Singh that Jayappa was killed and that the atmosphere was rife with
fear : aaj Aape nu mariyo, tin ro vedo chhai.183

Taking advantage of the confusion, the Rathor army came out from the Nagore fort and

attacked the Marathas.184 The Marathas immediately took stock of the situation and

handed over the command to Jayappas son, Jankoji, while Dattaji infused vigour among
the Marathas and resolved to teach a lesson to the Rathors. As the Maratha prestige was at
stake in Marwar, Antaji Mankeshwar was called from Bundelkhand by Dattaji. Antaji
Mankeshwar wrote to his agent at Poona, that he was proceeding to Marwar to succour

Sindhias forces who had suffered from the murder of Jayappa.185 The Maratha focus had
now shifted from fighting for the cause of Ram Singh to avenging the murder of

Jayappa.This fact is corroborated by an important news-letter dated 3rd September 1755,

reporting that Bijay Singh had got Jayaji Shinde treacherously killed: Jayaji Shinde

yaans Bijay Singhani daga karun maarile hai, and that he was conspiring with Sawai

Madho Singh, the Maharana, the Jats and other Rajput Rajas.186 Another letter dated 29th

September 1755, also mentions about Bijay Singhs efforts to garner the support of the

above mentioned Rajas.187 A Maratha letter dated 5th September 1755 informs about

Sawai Madho Singh joining in this effort.188

He sent his general Anirudh Singh Khangarot along with the forces of Umed Singh of

Shahpura, Bahadur Singh of Rupnagar, Gopal Singh of Karauli and the Hadas of Bundi.
About 25,000 to 30,000 men and a strong artillery moved towards Ramgarh to join Bijay

Singh. They were joined by the Bikaner contingent under diwan Bakhtawar Mal along with

Bijay Singhs forces from Nagor. But the Marathas defeated the combined army. Jankoji
182

183
184
185
186
187
188

Shyamal Das, Vir Vinod, Vol. II, p. 853. According to the information given in Vir Vinod the
Mewar Maharana had sent Jait Singh to assist Jayappa to kill Bijay Singh. Rathora ri Khyat says
that he was invited by Bijay Singh through Bijay Ram Bharti so that he could mediate with the
Marathas for a settlement. The latter information seems to be correct.
Ibid., p. 534.
Vishveshwar Nath Reu, Marwar ka Itihas, Vol. I, p. 374.
S.P.D., Vol. II, No. 52.
Hingane Daftar, No. 163.
Ibid., 171.
Shindeshahi, Vol. I, No. 143.

83

informed Bhau Saheb about the defeat at Didwana he inflicted on Anirudh Singh, sent by

Madho Singh of Jaipur to help Bijay Singh against Jankoji.189 Dattaji Sindhia in a letter to

the Peshwa, described the details of the defeat inflicted by his forces on Bijay Singh.190 As

the prospects of success were grim, Sawai Madho Singhs general had already started
negotiations for peace. As success was eluding, Bijay Singh thought it prudent to sue for

peace. As a result, a treaty of peace was signed in February, 1756. An annual tribute of
rupees 1,50,000 was fixed on Bijay Singh.

Jankoji Sindhia Invades Jodhpur

Jankoji Sindhia brought a huge army to Jodhpur and attacked the Siwanchi Gate. But
despite great efforts loss of 500 soldiers success was not in sight. But the fact that the

fort held out against the adversaries was on account of its good defence. The fort of
Jodhpur is constructed on Jodhgiri hills. The rugged portions of the hill are scraped

and in order to strengthen it, big bastions, 12 feet to 70 feet thick were built on the
massive walls of the fort. The height of the walls of the fort range from 21-120 feet. It

is situated about 400 feet above the surrounding plains and an area of about four miles

was covered with defences when it was constructed.191 Meanwhile the nobles helped
Bijay Singh to secretly move out of the fort. He proceeded to Bikaner accompanied
by many important nobles.192

Bijay Singh and Gaj Singh meet Sawai Madho Singh

After corresponding with the Jaipur ruler, both the Rajas reached Jaipur. Sawai Madho
Singh personally received them and all the courtesies due to their stature were bestowed

on them. After the formalities were completed, Sawai Madho Singh addressed them and
said that they did not have cordial relations with Malhar Rao Holkar, while he himself

had enemity with the sons and brothers of Jayappa Sindhia. Therefore, he suggested that
they should unite. Udaipur, Jodhpur, Jaipur, Bikaner, Rupnagar, were already together.

Efforts were made to unite Kota and Bundi with them. If all of them united, the Dakhanis
189
190
191
192

S.P.D., Vol. II, No. 50.

Ibid., No. 49.
L.P. Mathur, Forts and Strongholds of Rajasthan, Inter India Publications, New Delhi, 1989, p. 73.
Rathoran ri Khyat, Vol. III, p. 535.

84

would not dare to put their foot on Rajasthan. All of them could unite and compel them to
raise their siege at Nagore. At the instance of Sawai Madho Singh, Anirudh Singh

Khangarot with an army of 60,000, was instructed to inveiglethe Dakhanis into a fight.

Anirudh Singh was joined by Udawat Dalkaran, the Thakur of Dera, Ratnot Jadho Jujhar

Singh, Thakur of Dugoli. The 7,000 contingent of Bikaner also joined the Kachhwahas.
The Dakhanis got the information about the move of the Kachhwahas and they covered

the wells with dried fog plants.When the Kachhwaha and the Bikaner army arrived, the

Dakhanis set the fog plants to fire. Their opponents could not even drink water from the

affected wells. The Dakhanis also burnt the grass and the horses of the Kachhwahas died

without fodder.193 Soon the efforts of Ram Singh and Marathas started showing results as

they captured the fort of Jalore in the beginning of 1755, where the treasures of the

Jodhpur rulers had been kept for centuries. Ajmer capitulated on 21st February, 1755
paving the way for a compromise with the Marathas.

Compromise with the Marathas

At Nagore, Singhvi Fatehchand and Devi Singh Champavat Mahasinghot negotiated
with the Marathas that they would :
1.

Surrender half of the Marwar territory.

2.

From among the 5,000 villages of Marwar, 2,500 villages were given to Ram

Singh. These included Merta, Parbatsar, Maroth, Sojat, Jalore, Bhinai, Kekri, 16

villages of Dewalia, 27 villages of Masoda. Jodhpur, Nagore, Didwana, Phalodi,

Jaitaran parganas were given to Bijay Singh.
3.

Ajmer was given to the Dakhanis.

4.

rupees 60 lakhs were to be given as cash, 32 elephants, one bhawan worth one
lakh, two lakhs worth jewellery. Some people were kept as hostages (ne baki

rupiya mein ol dini). These were Singhvi Budhmal, the brother of Fateh Chand,

Singhvi Budhmal, Vijayrajs Purohit Jeevraj, Harnaths Aasopa Sadashiv and

Jagneshwar Srimali, who later died at Ujjain.194

193
194

Rathoran ri Khyat, Vol. III, 536, 537.

Ibid., p. 539.

85

Ever since 1756, Marwar had become the hunting-ground for the family of

Sindhia.195From 1755 to 1759, Marwar faced severe famine conditions. The State was

under the obligation of paying a huge amount to the Marathas and the economic

conditions were not favourable.196 There was scarce agricultural production. It became
difficult to meet even the day to day expenses of the court. Even the lamps of the court

could not be lighted and it became very difficult to carry out the court proceedings:
Rusnai ra hi tel ra phora padai. In order to save himself from embarrassment, Bijay

Singh held the darbar only when the khansama, bhandari Narsinghdas came and saluted

him. This was a secret way of communicating to the Maharaja symbolically that oil to

light the lamps was available and hence, the Maharaja could conduct the court
proceedings. The day when Narsinghdas did not come to salute, it indicated that oil could
not be arranged. On that particular day, the court could not be held.197

However, it appears to be an exaggerated way of highlighting fiscal difficulties of the

ruler. Due to the famine conditions, Ram Singh went to Jhilai and Dattaji Sindhia went

towards the Narmada. Bijay Singhs nobles decided that as the Marathas were appointed

on their thanas, this was a good opportunity to recover their parganas. Once Ram Singh

returned and resided at Merta, then it would be very difficult to recover them. At this
Devi Singh expressed his views that it was already decided that for a year the parganas

would not be taken from Ram Singh. Hearing this, the meeting was dissolved for the time
being . But after a few days, the nobles again complained of fiscal difficulties. Anyhow,

they started from Jodhpur for Merta and soon established control over it. Jalore was
also attacked. Similarly, the Thakur of Chandawal, Prithvi Singh and Jethawat Pand

Singh, also recovered Sojat.198

Maratha Reaction
In the absence of Ram Singh and Dattaji Sindhia, when Bijay Singhs men established

their control over Merta, Jalore and Sojat, letters were sent to the Maratha
commanders. Jankoji and Dattaji Sindhia were encamping on the banks of the river
195
196
197
198

R.K. Saxena, Maratha Relations with the Major States of Rajputana, P. 22.
Marwar ri Khyat, p. xix.
Ibid., p. 41.
Rathora ri Khyat, Vol. III, pp. 541, 542.

86

Narmada. Bijay Singh was planning to capture Ajmer also. All this infuriated Jankoji

and he decided to go back to Marwar. But his men refused to go to Marwar. At this
Kanhoji Jadu offered himself to go to Marwar. Having decided thus, Kanhoji left for

Marwar with 500 horsemen while Jankoji went towards the Deccan.199Kanhoji

assembled an army of 4,000 and reached Ajmer. There he was joined by Ram Singhs
army of 3,000 and together they left for Merta. Both the sides lay opposite each other

and there was some fight. At this time Devi Singh, secretly wrote to the Dakhanis that

they should persist in their claim for the parganas as these belonged to them. He also

assured them that Bijay Singhs men would not fight. In this way, the Dakhanis lay
their claim on the Lambia and Baluda thikanas.200

Soon the Marwar nobles got divided into two groups. Kesari Singh and Jait Singh
were in favour of putting up a fight while Devi Singh and Kalyan Singh were

reluctant. The nobles then wrote to the Maharaja that only his arrival could motivate
the nobles to fight so that the Dakhanis could be thrown out of Marwar. Bijay Singh

then marched from Jodhpur. When they camped at Lambia, the supporters of Bharat

Singh Udawat fired at them from inside. The Marwar army left Lambia and stationed
their canons at Siraicha and after taking a chhadi fauj (the advanced army), they went

to Ladpura. There they fought with the Dakhanis. Kanhoji was reinforced by Ram

Singh Panwar who brought 1200 men from the Deccan. The sardars immediately left
for Ajmer to visit the camp of Bijay Singh at Pisangan. It was decided that Bijay
Singh would pay rupees 20,000 for Pisangan.201

Once again, the differences in the approach of the nobles came to the fore. Kesari
Singh suggested to recover Ajmer while Devi Singh suggested just to collect money

from the Mertias. After all these deliberations, they first moved to Alaniawas, then to

Bhairunda, Harsor and further towards Merta.202 In the meanwhile, Kanhoji decided

to enter Marwar with an army of 6,000 as suggested by Devi Singh. On the way he
halted at Naand and later at Jhadau. Immediately Bijay Singh was informed by his
199
200
201
202

Rathora ri Khyat, Vol. III, p. 542.

Ibid.
Rathora ri Khyat, Vol. III, p. 543.
Ibid.

87

messengers that Kanhoji was going to enter Marwar territory. Bijay Singh also
followed him to Jhadau. In this way wherever Kanhoji marched, Bijay Singh also

followed him on his heels. Finally Kesari Singh suggested that they should mount

their horses to fight with the Dakhanis and bring all their woes to an end.203 From
Mokaale Kahoji marched on to Merta but he could not establish his control over
Merta and Malkot. Then he moved on to Maandre and Bijay Singh camped at

Gangaarne. Here Thakur Umar Singhs men got killed and the Dakhanis lost 70

soldiers. The Marathas then looted Kuchera. Bijay Singh then camped at Harsolav and

Kanhoji conquered Kharnal. In this way, Bijay Singh continued to follow Kanhoji on

his heels. Bijay Singh realized that the sardars were not fighting whole-heartedly.

Therefore, he sent Raghunath Singh, Surtaan Singh, Karanidan Barath to Maandre

(Mandore) where Kanhoji was encamping. They offered that the land which Jankoji

and Dattaji Sindhia had acquired for Ram Singh would be returned to them. Soon the
parganas were returned. The Rathors evacuated evacuated Merta and the fort of
Jalore. The Dakhanis established their thanas over there and Kanhoji left for the
Deccan.

Rathora ri Khyat reveals that in the Jodhpur and Jaipur courts there were some

officials and nobles who had aligned themselves with the Marathas. In 1754, seeing
the adverse circumstances, Singhvi Fatehchand and Pradhan Devi Singh Champawat
decided to negotiate the terms for a settlement.204

Again we find Devi Singh showing his reluctance when the other sardars suggested

to occupy Merta in 1756, when they were facing severe famine conditions. He tried to
dissuade them saying that they had entered into an agreement with Ram Singh, and

therefore, at least for a year, they shoud not flout that agreement.205It can be easily
inferred from the sources that Devi Singh was secretely in league with the Marathas.

for he knew that as soon as they would try to recover Merta and the other parganas,

the Marathas were bound to return and disturb the peace of Marwar. The other
sardars reacted saying that Devi Singhs children were safe in the palace of Pokaran
203
204
205

Rathora ri Khyat, Vol. III, p. 544.

Ibid., p. 539.
Ibid., p. 541.

88

but their children were dependent on others.206 With reluctance, Devi Singh, along

with the other sardars left to attack Merta. But even there he was in communication
with the Dakhanis and conveyed to them that he did not want to oppose them. But

despite all his efforts, the Marwar sardars had occupied the parganas. But they should

stand firmly as he was not interested in fighting with them.207 He wrote a letter to
Kanhoji that the entire Marwar army was away and the path was open for them to

enter Marwar.208 Later, Jorawar Singh informed the Maharaja about the treachery of

Champawat Devi Singh. As a proof, he also produced the letter written by Devi Singh

to the Dakhanis and cautioned Bijay Singh that he was trusting the sardar who had

aligned himself with the Dakhanis : Aap kinre bharose barai baitha ho aap raa

umrawan ra to ai parnam chhai

Jaipur
During the lifetime of Sawai Jai Singh, the Marathas did not disturb his territories, nor

could they levy any tribute on Amber/Jaipur. Though the Marathas had become
increasingly aggressive in Rajasthan right after the acquisition of Malwa, their

presence there came to be felt only after the death of Sawai Jai Singh (1743).209 As

already mentioned, in 1708 Sawai Jai Singh had concluded a treaty (ahadnamah) with
Amar Singh II, the Maharana of Udaipur. According to this commitment, the son of

Udaipuri princess would succeed Sawai Jai Singh even if he was younger than the
sons born of wedlock with other princesses.210 The marriage treaty was especially

unfortunate, since it opened the way for perpetual quarrels over the succession and

gave the Marathas a pretext for interference.211The treaty sowed the seeds of
dissension by disregarding the law of primogeniture. Princess Chandra Kunwar, the

Udaipuri princess was first blessed with a daughter who was later married to

206
207
208
209
210
211

Rathora ri Khyat, Vol. III, p. 541.

Ibid., p. 542.
Ibid., pp. 543, 544.
Raghubir Singh, Rajput-Maratha Relations, in Maratha History Seminar Papers (May 28-31,
1970), p. 265.
Shyamal Das, Vir Vinod, Vol. II, P. 973.
Gabrielle Festng, From the Land of Princes, Smith Elder & Company, Waterloo Place, London,
1904, pp. 234, 235.

89

Maharaja Abhai Singh of Jodhpur.212 Then for many years no child was born out of
this wedlock. In December 1738, the Mewar princess was blessed with a son, named

Madho Singh. But in the intervening period, Sawai Jai Singhs other queens were
blessed with sons. His eldest son was Shiv Singh who had served as his fathers
deputy faujdar of Mathura but died suddenly in 1724. The second son Ishwari Singh
was now the eldest surviving son and after his fathers death assumed the crown. The

succession was also recognized by the Mughal Emperor, Muhammad Shah.213 But

this succession was disputed. It ultimately paved way for the Marathas to intervene in
the affairs of Jaipur.

After his accession, the new Raja went to Delhi to meet the Emperor and receive the

tika for himself. The Maharana of Udaipur supported his nephew Madho Singh. In the

eyes of the Maharana Sawai Ishwari Singhs succession to the throne was a
repudiation of the 1708 agreement concluded between Sawai Jai Singh and Maharana

Amar Singh. However, Sawai Ishwari Singh ruled for seven years. Both the brothers

were supported by different thikanedars (chiefs). Ishwari Singh was joined by Rao
Raja Sardar Singh (of Uniara), Rao Raja Shiv Singh (of Sikar), Jorawar Singh
of Kalakh), Sheodan Singh (of Ugriawas), Jorawar Singh (of Khandela), Deep Singh,

Megh Singh etc.214The thikanedars who supported Madho Singh were Mohan Singh

(of Bhadwa), Anirudh Singh of (Gadra), Anoop Singh of (Pachewar), Budh Singh (of
Bachusi) and Shyam Singh (of Sakhun). Thakur Jagat Singh , Gyan Singh (of Diggi)

and Zalim Singh (of Tordi) joined Madho Singh with a contingent of 3000 cavalry.

Besides these, Madho Singh also received the support of other chiefs including
Shyam Singh Khangarot (of Dudu), Jodh Singh (of Chomu), Ram Singh (of Samod),

Gulab Singh (of Bagru), Jaswant Singh (of Chir), Man Singh (of Bhadwa), Pem Singh
(of Godawat) and Sakat Singh.215

212
213
214
215

Shyamal Das, Vir Vinod, Vol. II, p. 973.

Jadunath Sarkar, A History of Jaipur, p. 229.
R.K. Saxena, Rajput Nobility, p. 208. The chiefs of Jaipur were known as thikanedars, not
pattayats as has been assumed by Saxena.
Ibid., p. 208.

90

The Maharana also marched in support of Madho Singh and reached Jamoli, five miles

west of Jahazpur where he halted for forty days on the banks of the river Banas.216 The

Jaipur army was facing him. As time was required for his return from Delhi, the
Kachhwaha commander Hemraj Bakshi pretended to go over to the side of Madho Singh

who paid him some money. On his return march to Jaipur from Delhi, Sawai Ishwari
Singh secured Maratha aid on the way and agreed to pay rupees 20,000 to them. Due to
the efforts of the officials on both the sides, a battle was averted. Sawai Ishwari Singh was

asked to give Madho Singh an appanage of five lakhs a year that included the parganas of

Tonk, Toda, three others,217 and included the town of Tonk where Madho Singh must
construct a home and live peacefully. This paper known as the Jamoli agreement, dated

19th December 1744, was signed by Baba Bakht Singh, Baba Nathji, Kaka Bhagat Singh

and Thakur Sardar Singh.218 Sawai Ishwari Singh paid the amount he had promised to the

Marathas but the Maharana refused pay the war indemnity to them. In early 1745, the
Maratha allies of Sawai Ishwari Singh attacked the Mewar camp at midnight and the

Mewar troops fled from the camp. Sawai Ishwari Singh repudiated the Jamoli
agreement.

The Battle of Rajmahal (March, 1747)

The repudiation of the Jamoli agreement infuriated Maharana Jagat Singh who
redoubled his efforts for his nephews rights. This time he was joined by the

dispossessed heir of Bundi, Ummed Singh and the Rao Raja of Kota, Durjan Sal.219
They met at Nathdwara to plan the future course of action. Khuman Singhji, the vakil

of the Maharana and Pem Singhji Gogawat were sent to seek the help of the

Marathas.220 They offered rupees two lakhs to Malhar Rao Holkar for pressurising
Sawai Ishwari Singh to cede four parganas to Madho Singh, restore Bundi to Ummed

Singh and allow the three parganas of Nenwa, Samidhi and Karwar to be held by Rao
Raja Durjan Sal of Kota and Pratap Singh of Karwar.
216
217
218
219
220

Shyamal Das, Vir Vinod, Vol. II, p.1231.

Hingane Daftar, No. 29.
Jadunath Sarkar, A History of Jaipur, p. 230.
Shyamal Das, Vir Vinod, Vol. II, p.1236.
Narendra Singh, Thirty decisive battles of Jaipur, J.E.P. Works, Jaipur, 1939, P. 121.

91

Malhar Rao Holkar sent his son Khande Rao ignoring the advice of his colleagues Ranoji

Sindhia and Ramchandra Baba Shenvi.Khanderao crossed the southern frontier of Jaipur
via Udaipur, and reached Rajmahal on the Banas river. The contingents of Udaipur and
Kota joined him on the way. Sawai Ishwari Singh decided to face the situation boldly and

transferred the command of his advanced division to Hargovind Natani. Sawai Ishwari

Singh himself arrived with the reserve force. A battle was fought on 1st March, 1747.

Though both the sides suffered heavily, the Jaipur army under the leadership of
Hargovind Natani carried the day. The Jaipur troops captured Madho Singhs standardbearing elephant and band, all his artillery etc. Durjan Sal fled to Kota and the Maharana,

on hearing the debacle returned to his capital. Khanderao was repulsed and forced to

retire to Bundelkhand.221 This battle proved to be very expensive for the Maharana as
Sawai Ishwari Singh got the rich trade centre at Bhilwara wherefrom a large ransom was
exacted. Besides, he also compelled the Maharana to pay a war indemnity. Thus, the
battle at Rajmahal turned out to be a clear victory for Sawai Ishwari Singh.

The Battle of Bagru (August, 1748)

The battle of Rajmahal proved that contest for the throne of Jaipur was not easy. Sawai

Madho Singh realized that he could not succeed without the support of the Marathas. For
this purpose he befriended Malhar Rao Holkar and even exchanged turbans with him and

the two became pagadi badal bhai.222 Despite the severe defeat at Rajmahal, Maharana
Jagat Singh intensified his efforts and this time sent an envoy to Puna with an offer of ten

lakhs to Raja Shahu. In return the Peshwa was to support Madho Singh and compel Sawai
Ishwari Singh to give his brother an appanage worth twenty four lakhs a year or a fourth of

the total revenue of his kingdom. Earlier the Peshwa had supported Sawai Ishwari Singh,
on account of consideration for Mirza Raja Jai Singh and Sawai Jai Singhs cordial

relations with Balaji Rao and Baji Rao himself. However, he was tempted to support
Madho Singh in order to pay for his debts. In March, 1747, he instructed Ramchandra

Baba to coerce Sawai Ishwari Singh to cede the concerned territory to Madho Singh. Sawai
Ishwari Singh found it disgraceful to part with one-fourth of his territory and wrote in reply:
221
222

Jadunath Sarkar, A History of Jaipur, p. 232.

Shyamal Das, Vir Vinod, Vol. II, p. 1239.

92

This question is one of inheritance of ancestral property. We are Rajahs

and must follow our hereditary usage. The question relates to territory;
how can I oblige the Peshwa in this matter? I had previously given Madho
what Malhar had pressed me to grant on the ground of service to the state.
He now asks for more. How can I give him that without fighting? How
can I bring down upon myself the name of a coward and an unworthy son
by dividing my entire kingdom with a younger brother?223
Next year on fourth April, 1748, Peshwa Balaji Rao held a meeting with Madho

Singh224 and entered the Kachhwaha territory, Ishwari Singh fled from the field of

Manupur. It was followed by the devastation of his territory and he was compelled to

sue for peace. The Raja sent his minister Keshavdas to resolve the matter peacefully,
but the Marathas made exhorbitant demands leading to the failure of negotiations.

Malhar Rao Holkar and Gangadhar Tatya with their army entered Jaipur territory near

Uniara in July.225 After wresting parganas Toda, Tonk and Malpura, they handed them
over to Madho Singh. In their forward journey via Piplod, Fagi and Ladana, they were

joined by many Rajput chiefs. They were joined by Durjan Sal and Ummed Singh also.
This army reached Bagru, twenty three miles east of the Sambhar town. The battle that
commenced on the first of August, continued for six days. In this battle, Sawai Ishwari

Singh received the much needed support from the Jat Raja, Suraj Mal. With the efforts of
Keshavdas, peace was concluded and the Maharanas demands were accepted. Sawai
Ishwari Singh gave five parganas to his brother, Madho Singh, and Bundi was restored to

Ummed Singh. Thus, with the help of the Marathas the Maharana was partially successful
in safeguarding the rights of his nephew.

Ishwari Singhs suicide (1750)

Sawai Ishwari Singh was a weak administrator and his loyal and able ministers either

died or were done away with. Raja Ayamal Khatri, the ablest of Jaipur diwans and

administrators, died on 9th February, 1747. He was succeeded by his son Keshavdas,

but Sawai Ishwari Singh got him poisoned on a false charge. It was due to

223
224
225

Jadunath Sarkar, A History Of Jaipur, p. 237.

Holkarshahicha Itihas, Vol. I, p. 83.
Ibid.

93

Keshavdass efforts that in the battle of Bagru peace was negotiated with the
Marathas. But soon Hargovind Natani rose in Sawai Ishwari Singhs favour who
wanted to oust Keshavdas. For this correspondence between Holkar and Keshavdas

was forged saying that it was Keshavdass connivance with Holkar that gave Bundi to
Ummed Singh and the four parganas of Tonk to Madho Singh. Thus, Keshavdas was

falsely implicated and forced to drink poison by Sawai Ishwari Singh. Keshavdas

spoke of his innocence and even said to have exclaimed that natural justice would

soon befall Jaipur.226 It is said that while dying, he uttered the following words:

Mujh bekusoor khairkhwah ko marne ka badla ishwar aapko jald hi dega. A

couplet relating this incident was composed by a poet in the Marwari language:
Mantri moto mariyo, Khatri Keshavdas, Jad hi chhodi

Isra, raj karan ri

aas.227Natani secretly corresponded with Holkar to get rid of his master, Sawai
Ishwari Singh. He kept the Maharaja in the dark about the military preparations in
defence of Jaipur.228

Vidyadhar, another elder statesman, was bedridden. Shivnath Bhaya, the old chief of

artillery was thrown into a prison with his entire family. The only people whom the

Raja trusted were people from humble origin. One of them was a barber, Shambhu

Bari and the other was an elephant-rider, Khanu mahut. Sawai Ishwari Singh had

promised to pay hefty sums to the Marathas for their support against his brother and

as war indemnity after the Battle of Bagru. The promised sum had fallen into arrears

and the Peshwa being in great need of money directed Malhar Rao Holkar to take
charge of the situation.

On hearing that Malhar Rao Holkar along with Gangadhar Tatya were heading
towards Jaipur, Sawai Ishwari Singh tried to appease them by sending his envoys with

two lakh rupees but it only infuriated Malhar Rao Holkar. But the Raja seems to have
given up. He was filled with remorse for having poisoned his faithful noble under the
influence of the self-serving Natani.229 Narendra Singh is of the opinion that Sawai
226
227
228
229

Shyamal Das, Vir Vinod Mewar Ka Itihas, Vol. II, p. 1239.

Ibid., P. 1239.
Ibid., p. 1240.
Narendra Singh, Shri Maharaj Sawai Ishwari Singhji ka Itihas, Jaipur Printing Works, Jaipur,
1933, p. 135.

94

Ishwari Singh preferred to end his own life than to stake the honour of his state to the

Marathas.230 On 12th December, 1750, Sawai Ishwari Singh committed suicide. He

got himself stung by a poisonous cobra. Three of his queens and one favourite

concubine consumed poison along with him. This is corroborated by a news-letter

addressed to Govind Pant Bundele by his accountant Baburao Visnu from the camp of

Malhar Rao Holkar and Jayappa Shinde camping near Jaipur. For eighteen hours the
corpse lay unattended and unburnt. Tod aptly describes the situation:

a dose of poison gave Madho Singh the gaddi, Holkar his bribe, and the
Mahrattas a firm hold upon Rajasthan.231

Madho Singhs Accession and the Marathas

With the accession of Sawai Madho Singh on the throne of Jaipur, the Maratha-Rajput
relations entered a new phase. The temptation for inviting the Marathas was unending.
Both, Sawai Ishwari Singh and Madho Singh had promised huge amounts to the Marathas

for their assistance. Madho Singh had sought Maratha help to oust Sawai Ishwari Singh and
ultimately emerged as a winner in the contest to the throne. The Marathas participated in

this fratricidal war due to financial reasons. After Sawai Ishwari Singh committed suicide,

at Holkars invitation, Madho Singh came from Udaipur232 and occupied the throne on 29th
December, 1750. It was decided that Sawai Madho Singh would pay rupees ten lakhs to the

Marathas. The pargana of Rampura which was given to Madho Singh by the Mewar

Maharana was now transferred by Sawai Madho Singh to Malhar Rao Hokar.233 But soon

Jayappa Sindhia arrived on 6th January, 1751, and made new exorbitant demands on Jaipur.
From this moment onwards Sawai Madho Singh stopped trusting the Marathas.

The pent-up hatred of the Rajputs due to the exhorbitant Maratha demands found
expression in the form of a sudden and violent attack on the unsuspecting Marathas when

four thousand of them entered the Jaipur city for sight seeing. Almost fifteen hundred

Marathas were slain and many were wounded. There was a heavy loss of men and
property. An important Maratha news-letter gives a vivid account of the murder of
230
231
232
233

Narendra Singh, Shri Maharaj Sawai Ishwari Singhji ka Itihas, Jaipur Printing Works, Jaipur,
1933, p.138.
Tod, Annals and Antiquities, Vol. I, p. 338.
Shyamal Das, Vir Vinod, Vol. II, P.1240.
Holkarshahicha Itihas, Vol. I, p. 83.

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Marathas insides Jaipur.234 In this letter can be traced the dormant enmity which the

Marathas and Rajputs bore towards each other.The immediate impact of this was felt in the

adjacent villages where Maratha couriers were killed and treated harshly. Sawai Madho
Singh opened negotiations after eight days and tried to convince them that the unfortunate
incident was the result of the spontaneous outburst which was not supported by him. The
Marathas on their part agreed to forgive him on the condition that besides the ten lakhs

subsidy, he would restore the looted property and pay two lakhs as compensation to the
dead and wounded. Clearly, the Marathas could barter even their anger for money.

In October, 1753, when Sawai Madho Singh made a courtesy visit to the Emperor, the
wazir, Safdar Jang was in open revolt against the young Emperor, Ahmad Shah. Sawai

Madho Singh offered to mediate.He was well placed to intervene as he had some leverage

over Suraj Mal, the Jat ruler of Bharatpur on whose forces Safdar Jang was banking.
Sawai Madho Singh was rewarded with the imperial grant of Ranthambhor for dousing

the rebellion. The fort was exceedingly strong and had plenty of water.235 A

contemporary historian Minhaz-us-`Siraz writes, The fort was famous throughout

Hindustan for its exceeding strength, soilidity and impregnability.236

Sawai Madho Singh also built Sawai Madhopur near Ranthambhor.237 Due to its strategic
location the Marathas had tried to gain control of the fort. Malhar Rao Holkar obtained

sanad from the Mughal Emperor about the occupation of the fort but the keeper of the
fort refused to hand it over to the Marathas. The fort was then besieged by the Marathas
under Gangadhar Tantia only to be fired by the defenders. They forced the Marathas to
retreat. The Marathas then shelled the defences of the fort from Shivpur. The importance

of the fort can be gauged from the fact that the Marathas continued to besiege the fort for
three years. The defenders decided to hand over the fort to Sawai Madho Singh. With the

help of the Jaipur forces, the defenders forced the Marathas to withdraw from

234
235

236
237

S.P.D., Vol. II, No. 31.

Nur-ud-din Muhammad Jahangirs, The Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri Or Memoirs of Jahangir, Vol. II, tr.
Alexander Rogers, ed., Henry Beveridge, Munshiram Manoharlal, Oriental Publishers, Delhi,
Second Edition, January, 1968.p. 58.
L.P. Mathur, Forts and Strongholds of Rajasthan, pp. 36,37.
Tod, Annals and Antiquities, Vol. II, P. 301.

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Ranthambhor. Finally in 1759, Sawai Madho Singh occupied the fort. The nearby town
of Sawai Madhopur was named after him.238

The Marathas again visited Jaipur under Raghunath Dada and Malhar Rao Holkar in
1753 to demand the tribute agreed in the past. On 30th October, 1753, they crossed the

Mukandara Pass and by way of Kota-Bundi entered the Jaipur territory. However,
direct conflict was averted. Rupees 1,25,000 were presented to Raghunath Dada and

15,25,000 were paid as outstanding tribute. Out of this sum, rupees 7,35,074 were

paid in cash and three lakhs in orders on bankers, by Jago Pandit, the Jaipur minister
to Jayappa Sindhia in April, 1755, leaving a balance of rupees 5,14,926 in arrears.239

In 1757, the Peshwas brother, Raghunath Dada again visited Jaipur and exerted

pressure on Sawai Madho Singh. This time he made exorbitant demands on the Jaipur
Raja amounting to forty or fifty lakhs in cash and large secession of territory with an
annual income of forty or fifty lakhs. Sawai Madho Singh agreed to pay the same
amount as agreed in the past. Raghunath Rao agreed to be content with eleven lakhs,

six of which were paid down and shared between him and Holkar in the proportion of

two to one. In August, 1758, Sindhia and Holkar came to an understanding to share

the Maratha acquisitions and claims in Rajasthan and Malwa. Accordingly, Jankoji

Sindhia entered the Jaipur territory. Sawai Madho Singh was coerced to pay thirty six
lakh rupees besides an additional three lakhs in the first year. Jaipur was a wealthy

Rajput State. In 1759, the Peshwa ordered Malhar Rao Holkar to claim the amount
promised by the Jaipur Raja. He was specifically ordered to recover rupees twelve
lakhs for the year 1758 and rupees nine lakhs for the year 1759. The Rajputs decided
to resist the Marathas.Forty thousand soldiers assembled for a fight. However, the
Rajputs were completely crushed at Lakheri and twenty of their leaders were slayed.

As Madho Singh was in regular communication with Ahmad Shah Durrani and Najib
ud-daula, he knew that the Durrani was expected in India in November 1759 and the

Maratha commander would have to retire immediately. Therefore, he held out

238
239

L.P. Mathur, Forts and Strongholds of Rajasthan, p. 40.

Jadunath Sarkar, A History Of Jaipur, p. 246.

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bravely.240By middle of December, Holkar laid siege to Barwara. But had to give it up

to reinforce Dattaji Sindhia at Delhi against Ahmad Shah Abdalis attack.

Jaipur was free from Maratha attacks during 1760 and for sometime after their
debacle at Panipat. Interestingly, on the eve of the battle of Panipat, the seventeen

Kachhwaha chiefs entered into an agreement with Sawai Madho Singh. They assured
the Raja that they would neither help the Muslims nor the Dakhanis. Infact, they
would have no correspondence with them. If they proved faithless to the darbar they

would be liable to social boycot.241The changing contours of the Maratha-Rajput

relations

240
241

between 1761 and 1794 will be discussed in the subsequent chapter.

Hari Ram Gupta, Marathas and Panipat, Panjab University, Chandigarh, 1961, p. 41.
Kapat-Dwara, Transcribed copy, Historical Section, available at Rajasthan State Archives,
Bikaner, Jaisath Badi 9, 1816 V.S., No. 776, the names of these sardars are as follows : Jaswant
Singh Rajawat, Jodh Singh Nathawat Chomu, Gulab Singh Chatrabhugat Bagru, Jagat Singh,
Nand Singh Rao, Bikramaditya Barwara, Dalel Singh Rajawat Dhula, Rao Sardar Singh Uniara,
Jalim Singh Nathawat, Ratan Singh Nathawat, Sultan Singh Naruka, Salim Singh, Chhaju Ram
Naruka, Chand Singh Kumbhani, Fateh Singh Kumbhani, Ajit Singh Sheobrahmpota, Dalel Singh.

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