G.R. No.

91649 May 14, 1991

The principle of Local autonomy does not make

local governments sovereign within the state; the
principle of local autonomy within the constitution
simply means decentralization. It cannot be an
Imperium in imperio it can only act intra
sovereign, or as an arm of the National
Government.

PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to

regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is
governmental, which places it in the category of an
agency or instrumentality of the Government.
Being an instrumentality of the Government,
PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from
local taxes.

The power of local government to "impose taxes

and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which
Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869
remains an "operative" law until "amended,
repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987
Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an
exception to the exercise of the power of local
governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot
therefore be violative but rather is consistent with
the principle of local autonomy.

Basco vs. PAGCOR

H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners Valmonte Law
Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners
Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR
Facts:

The Philippine Amusements and Gaming

Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of
P.D. 1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was
granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated
January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate and maintain
gambling casinos on land or water within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines."

Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to

annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter PD 1869,
because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public
policy and order

Petitioners claim that P.D. 1869 constitutes a

waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose
taxes and legal fees; that the exemption clause in
P.D. 1869 is in violation of the principle of local
autonomy.
o

Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 exempts

PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from
paying any "tax of any kind or form,
income or otherwise, as well as fees,
charges or levies of whatever nature,
whether National or Local."

Issue:

Does the local Government of Manila have the

power to impose taxes on PAGCOR?

Held

Reason:

No, the court rules that The City government of

Manila has no power to impose taxes on
PAGCOR.

Note: other issues were raised in the case, such as if

whether the petitioners have standing in filing the case, but
to make the digest fit into one page I just included the issue
which focused that was in accordance to the outline. Please
do read the case in its original when you have the time
since there are explanations to its nature which are not
included in this digest

Atienza contended that Ordinance 8027 was

superseded by the MOU, hence he cannot enforce it.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent can be compelled to
enforce
Ordinance
8027.
Whether or not the MOU superseded Ordinance
8027.

SOCIAL JUSTICE vs ATIENZA

G.R. No. 156052

March

7,

2007

Facts:
Pursuant to the police power delegated to local
government units. the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 8027. The said ordinance, in
essence, reclassified portions of Pandacan and Sta.
Ana as well as its adjoining areas from industrial to
commercial areas [reservoir of oils of big oil
companies are located in this area- this is called as
the Pandacan terminals] and owners or operators of
industries and other businesses, of the Pandacan
terminals are given a period of 6 months from the
date of effectivity of the Ordinance within which to
cease and desist from the operation of businesses
which are disallowed.
Subsequent to the approval of the ordinance,
the City of Manila and the Department of Energy
(DOE) entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in
which they agreed that the scaling down of the
Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and
practicable option and not total removal of the
Pandacan terminals as demanded by Ordinance
8027. Under the MOU, the oil companies agreed to
scale down the oils reservoir and agreed that the
joint operations of the OIL COMPANIES in the
Pandacan Terminals shall be limited to the common
and integrated areas/facilities. The said MOU was
adopted by a resolution of the Sanggunian
Panglunsod
of
Manila.
Petitioners filed a mandamus compelling
respondent in his capacity as Mayor of Manila to
enforce the said ordinance and order the immediate
removal of the terminals of the oil companies.

Ruling:
Yes, the Local Government Code imposes upon
respondent the duty, as city mayor, to 'enforce all
laws and ordinances relative to the governance of
the city.' One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the
chief executive of the city, he has the duty to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not
been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the
courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial
duty to do so. The Court ratiocinated, "these
officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the
ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute
imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It
might seriously hinder the transaction of public
business if these officers were to be permitted in all
cases to question the constitutionality of statutes
and ordinances imposing duties upon them and
which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional. Officers of the government from
the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and
are
bound
to
obey
it."
As to the second issue, assuming that the terms of
the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No.
8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it
binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full
force and effect only until April 30, 2003.Thus, at
present, there is nothing that legally hinders
respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.

For the three-term limit for elective local government

officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must
concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been
elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local
government post, and (2) that he has fully served three
(3) consecutive terms.

Here, Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to

June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as
mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire
period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the
electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him
(respondent) as mayor. Such circumstance does not
constitute an interruption in serving the full term.
RIVERA III V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 167591
May 9, 2007

Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer, he exercises

the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office
which enables him "to stay on indefinitely".

FACTS:
A petition for cancelation of the Certificate of Candidacy
of Marino Morales as mayoralty candidate in Mabalacat,
Pampanga for the May 2004 mayoralty was filed on the
ground the he already served three consecutive terms in
the office he seeks to run.

With regard to the person who will replace Morales, it is

a rule that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving
majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate
receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate
cannot be deemed elected to the office.

Morales argues that this is not so because although he

really served in 1995-1998 (1 st term) and 2004-2007 (3rd
term), he was merely a caretaker or de facto mayor in
1998-2001(2nd term) because his election was declared
void by the RTC due to an election protest.

Since his disqualification became final and executory

after the elections, the candidate having the second
highest number of votes cannot assume the position.
Hence, it is the petitioner, the elected Vice Mayor
Anthony Dee who should be declared as the mayor.

Comelec ruled that Morales already served his third term

and after an MR was filed, declared it final and executory
on May 14, 2004.

ISSUE:
WON Morales had already served his 3 consecutive
terms and if so, who should take his position.

HELD:

EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ vs. COMELEC, BIENVENIDO O.

MARQUEZ, JR.
G.R. No. 120099 July 24, 1996
Facts:

Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private

respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez Jr. (Rodriguez and
Marquez, for brevity) were protagonists for the
gubernatorial post of Quezon Province in the May
1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed
duly-elected governor.
Marquez challenged Rodriguez' victory via petition
for quo warranto before the COMELEC, alleging that
the latter has a pending case in LA, hence, a fugitive
from justice and thus disqualified for the elective
position.
Marquez Decision: "fugitive from justice" includes not
only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition
truly finds support from jurisprudence (. . .), and it
may be so conceded as expressing the general and
ordinary connotation of the term
In previous case, Whether or not Rodriguez is a
"fugitive from justice" under the definition thus given
was not passed upon by the Court. That task was to
devolve on the COMELEC upon remand of the case to
it, with the directive to proceed therewith with
dispatch conformably with the MARQUEZ Decision.
Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the
same position of governor. This time, Marquez
challenged Rodriguez' candidacy via petition for
disqualification
before
the
COMELEC,
based
principally on the same allegation that Rodriguez is a
"fugitive from justice."
The COMELEC, allegedly having kept in mind the
MARQUEZ Decision definition of "fugitive from
justice", found Rodriguez to be one.
At any rate, Rodriguez again emerge as the
victorious candidate in the May 8, 1995 election for
the position of governor.
Marquez filed urgent motions to suspend Rodriguez'
proclamation which the COMELEC granted

Issue: Whether petitioner is disqualified to the elective

position
Held: No

The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade

is the compelling factor that animates one's flight
from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there
can only be an intent to evade prosecution or
punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing
subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a
promulgated judgment of conviction.
o
There is no dispute that his arrival in the
Philippines from the US, as per certifications
issued by the Bureau of Immigrations,
preceded the filing of the felony complaint
in the Los Angeles Court

To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguez and

Marquez) and issue (whether or not Rodriguez is a
"fugitive from justice") are involved in the MARQUEZ
Decision and the instant petition. The MARQUEZ

Decision was an appeal (the Marquez' quo warranto

petition before the COMELEC). The instant petition is
also an appeal although the COMELEC resolved the
latter
jointly
(Marquez'
petition
for
the
disqualification of Rodriguez). Therefore, what was
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule in
the MARQUEZ Decision must govern the instant
petition. And we specifically refer to the concept of
"fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion
in the MARQUEZ Decision which highlights the
significance of an intent to evade but which Marquez
and the COMELEC, with their proposed expanded
definition, seem to trivialize.
To re-define "fugitive from justice" would only foment
instability in our jurisprudence when hardly has the
ink dried in the MARQUEZ Decision.
To summarize, the term "fugitive from justice" as a
ground for the disqualification or ineligibility of a
person seeking to run for any elective local petition
under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code,
should be understood according to the definition
given in the MARQUEZ Decision
o
A "fugitive from justice" includes not only
those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after
being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.
(Emphasis ours.)
Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must
therefore be established by proof that there has
already been a conviction or at least, a charge has
already been filed, at the time of flight.
o
Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this
definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the
Quezon Province gubernatorial post.

Petitioners subsequent recourse (in G.R. No.

105310) from the COMELECs May 8, 1992
resolution was dismissed without prejudice,
however, to the filing in due time of a
possible post-election quo warranto
proceeding against private respondent.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections,
petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC
for cancellation of respondents CoC on
account of the candidates disqualification
under Sec. 40 (e) of the LGC.
Private respondent was proclaimed
Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992.
Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo warranto
proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private
respondent before the COMELEC.

Marquez vs COMELEC GR 112889 (April

18, 1995)
GR No. 112889 243 SCRA 538
April 18, 1995
FACTS:
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate in
the Province of Quezon filed a petition for
certiorari praying for the reversal of the
COMELEC Resolution which dismissed his
petition for quo warranto against Eduardo
Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from
justice.
It is averred that at the time private
respondent filed his certificate of candidacy,
a criminal charge against him for ten (10)
counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of
personal property was still pending before
the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial
District, County of Los Angeles, State of
California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said
court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to
be served on private respondent on account
of his alleged flight from that country.

ISSUE:
Whether private respondent who, at the time
of the filing of his certificate of candidacy
(and to date), is said to be facing a criminal
charge before a foreign court and evading a
warrant for his arrest comes within the term
fugitive from justice contemplated by
Section 40(e) of the LGC and is, therefore,
disqualified from being a candidate for, and
thereby ineligible from holding on to, an
elective local office.
HELD:
Section 40(e) of the LGC (RA 7160) provide
that a Fugitive from justice in criminal cases
here and abroad are disqualified from
running for any elective local position.
It has been held that construction placed
upon law by the officials in charge of its
enforcement deserves great and
considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated
Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182
SCRA 166,181). However, when there clearly
is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling
law, it must merely be made to apply as it is
so written. An administrative rule or
regulation can neither expand nor constrict
the law but must remain congruent to it.
The confinement of the term fugitive from
justice in Article 73 of the Rules and

Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991

to refer only to a person who has been
convicted by final judgment is an inordinate
and undue circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make
any definite finding on whether or not private
respondent is in fact a fugitive from justice
as such term must be interpreted and
applied in the light of the Courts opinion.
The omission is understandable since the
COMELEC outrightly dismissed the petition
for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule
73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated
by the Oversight Committee. The Court, not
being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to
remand the case to the COMELEC for a
determination of this unresolved factual
matter.

In 1992, Carpo ran and elected as mayor and

in 1998 he again filed his COC for re-election
but petitioner Benjamin Borja Jr. contested it on
the ground that he had already served the
three-consecutive term allowed by law.

ISSUE:
WON Carpo has already served three
consecutive terms.

HELD:
The contention of Borja is unmeritorious.

The three term limit of local officials must be

taken to the right to be elected and the right to
serve the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms
but he must also be elected in the to the same
position in the same number of times before
the disqualification can apply.

BORJA V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 133495
September 3, 1998

FACTS:
Respondent Jose Carpo is the vice-mayor of
Pateros for a term ending June 1992. When
the mayor Cesar Borja died, Carpo became the
mayor by operation of law.

In this case, the first term of Carpo cannot be

included in the computation because he was
not elected in that instance but rather only
served the remaining term of the deceased
mayor by virtue of operation of law.

as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for three (3)

consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections.
The May 1998 elections, both Alegre and Ong ran for the
office of mayor, with Ong was proclaimed winner. Alegre
filed an election protest. In it, the RTC declared Alegre
as the duly elected mayor in that 1998 mayoralty
contest, but the decision came out only when Francis
had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and
starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect.
Acting on Alegres petition to disqualify and to cancel
Francis certificate of candidacy for the May 10, 2004
elections, the First Division of the COMELEC rendered
on March 31, 2004 a resolution5 dismissing the said
petition of Alegre.
Alegre filed a motion for reconsideration. The COMELEC
en banc issued, a resolution6 reversing the resolution of
the COMELECs First Division and thereby (a) declaring
Francis "as disqualified to run for mayor in the May 10,
2004"; (b) ordering the deletion of Francis name from
the official list of candidates; and (c) directing the
concerned board of election inspectors not to count the
votes cast in his favor.
The following day, May 8 at about 5:05 p.m. of the very same
day - which is past the deadline for filing a certificate of
candidacy, Rommel Ong filed his own certificate of candidacy
for the position of mayor, as substitute candidate for his
brother Francis. However, it is recommended that the
substitute certificate of candidacy of Rommel Ong should be
denied due course and the election officer be directed to
delete his name from the list of candidates.
ISSUE:

G.R. No. 163295

January 23, 2006

FRANCIS G. ONG, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondents.
FACTS:
Alegre and Ong were candidates who filed certificates of
candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in
the May 10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the
incumbent mayor.
On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed the petition to disqualify
Ong which was predicated on the three-consecutive
term rule. Francis ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and
May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office

a) whether or not petitioner Franciss assumption of

office for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be
considered as full service for the purpose of the threeterm limit rule.
b) whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
declaring petitioner Francis as disqualified to run
c) whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied due course to Rommels certificate
of candidacy in the same mayoralty election as substitute for
his brother Francis.
HELD:
a) Respondent COMELEC resolved the question in the
affirmative. The three-term limit rule for elective local
officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987
Constitution. For the three-term limit for elective local
government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites

must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has

been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
local government post, and (2) that he has fully served
three (3) consecutive terms.
The disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus
effectively barring petitioner Francis from running for
mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in
the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption
of office and his continuous exercise of the functions
thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be
taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the
three-term rule.
b) The ascription of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the COMELEC en banc when it disqualified Francis
from running in the May 10, 2004 elections for the
mayoralty post cannot be sustained.
c) A person without a valid certificate of candidacy
cannot be considered a candidate in much the same
way as any person who has not filed any certificate of
candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the
imagination, be a candidate at all.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED and
the assailed en banc Resolution dated May 7, 2004 of
the COMELEC, in SPA No. 04-048 AFFIRMED.

Navarro and Tamayo vs CA [GR 141307;

March 28, 2001]
(Local Government, Permanent vacancies in
the Sanggunian, Section 45 (b) of the Local
Government Code)
Facts: With the death of the Mayor Calimlim,
a vacancy was created in the Office of the
Mayor so by operation of law, he was
succeeded by Aquino the then Vice-Mayor.
Petitioner Tamayo, the highest ranking
member of the Sangguniang Bayan was

elevated to the position of the Vice Mayor

pursuant to the same law.
Since vacancy occurred in the Sangguniang
Bayan by the elevation of the petitioner,
Governor
Agbayani
appointed
herein
petitioner Navarro as Member of the
Sangguniang Bayan.
Aquino belonged to the political party Lakas
NUCD-KAMPI, while both Navarro and Tamayo
belonged to REFORMA-LM political party.
Private respondents seek to nullify the
appointment of petitioner Navarro arguing
that it was the former vice-mayor,
succeeding to the position of the mayor, who
created the permament vacancy in the
Sanggunian Bayan because under the law he
was also a member of the Sanggunian. Thus,
the appointee must come from said former
vice-mayors political party.
Petitioners, on the other hand, contended
that it was the elevation of petitioner
Tamayo, who was the highest ranking
member of the Sanggunian Bayan, to the
office of the Vice-Mayor which resulted in a
permanent vacancy. The person to be
appointed to the position vacated by him
should come from the same political party
affiliation as that of petitioner Tamayo.
However, the CA concluded that it was the
appointment of the 8th councilor, to the
number 7 position which created the last
vacancy; therefore, the person to be
appointed to the vacant position should
come from the same political party to which
the latter belonged, which was Lakas-NUCD
KAMPI.
Issue: WON the elevation of the highest
ranking member of the Sanggunian to the
position of vice-mayor created the last
vacancy in the Sanggunian Bayan.
Held: Yes. Under Sec 44 of the LGC, a
permanent vacancy arises when an elective
official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to
assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is

removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is

otherwise permanently incapacitated to
discharge the functions of his office.

Sangguniang Barangay of Don Marcos v

Punong Barangay Martinez (2008, ChicoNazario)

Sec 45 (b) of the same law provides that

only the nominee of the political party under
which the Sanggunian member concerned
has been elected and whose elevation to the
position next higher in rank created the last
vacancy in the Sanggunian shall be
appointed in the manner herein provided.
The appointee shall come from the political
party as that of the Sanggunian member who
caused the vacancy

DOCTRINE: The Sangguniang Bayan (SB) or

Sangguniang Panglungsod (SP) cannot order
the removal of an erring elective barangay
official from office, as the courts (RTC) are
exclusively vested with this under Section 60
of the LGC.
Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by
the barangay official are of a grave nature
and, if found guilty, would merit the penalty
of removal from office, the case should be
filed with the regional trial court. The most
extreme penalty that the Sanggunian may
impose is suspension.

The reason behind the right given to a

political party to nominate a replacement
where a permanent vacancy occurs in the
Sanggunian is to maintain the party
representation as willed by the people in the
election.
With the elevation of the petitioner, who
belonged to REFORMA-LM, to the position of
vice-mayor, a vacancy occurred in the
Sanggunian that whould be filled up with
someone who should belong to the political
party of petitioner Tamayo. Otherwise,
REFORMA-LMs representation would be
diminished.

FACTS:
December 2004 Severino Martinez, Punong
Barangay of Barangay Don Mariano Marcos
(Bayombong,
Nueva
Vizacaya)
was
administratively charged with Dishonesty,
Misconduct in Office and violation of the AntiGraft and Practices Act by petitioner
(Sanggunian Barangay) through the filing of
a verified complaint before the Sangguniang
Bayan.
Pursuant to Section 61 of the LGC, the SB is
the
disciplining
authority
over
elective barangay officials.
Charges, among others (6 in all) were for
failure to submit and fully remit to the
Barangay Treasurer the income of their solid
waste management project particularly the
sale of fertilizer and recyclable materials
derived from composting and garbage
collection. There was also a charge for failure
to liquidate his travelling expenses for the
2003 Lakbay-aral.
Martinez failed to file an Answer, thus was
declared by SB in default,
July 2005 - the Sangguniang Bayan rendered
its Decision which imposed the penalty of
removal from office.
August 2005 - The Decision was conveyed to
the Municipal Mayor (Severino Bagasao) for
its
implementation.
Mayor
issued
a
Memorandum, stating that SB is not
empowered to order Martinezs removal from
service. However, the Decision remains valid
until reversed and must be executed by him.
Martinez filed a Special Civil Action for
Certiorari with a prayer for TRO and
Preliminary Injunction before the trial court
against SB and Mayor.

TC - Order of SB null and void. The proper

courts,
and
not the
petitioner, are
empowered to remove an elective local
official from office, in accordance with
Section 60 of the Local Government Code.

which can, thereafter, impose a penalty of

removal from office. It further claims that the
courts are merely tasked with issuing the
order of removal, after the SP or SB finds
that a penalty of removal is warranted.

Note: Although Martinezs term as Punong

Baranggay expired in 2007 and, thus,
rendering this petition moot and academic,
the Court will nevertheless settle a legal
question that is capable of repetition yet
evading review.

This would counter the rationale for making

the removal of elective officials an exclusive
judicial
prerogative.
Pablico v. Villapando: It is beyond cavil,
therefore, that the power to remove erring
elective local officials from service is lodged
exclusively with the courts. The law on
suspension or removal of elective public
officials must be strictly construed and
applied, and the authority in whom such
power of suspension or removal is vested
must exercise it with utmost good faith, for
what is involved is not just an ordinary public
official but one chosen by the people through
the exercise of their constitutional right of
suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught
by the caprice or partisanship of the
disciplining authority.

ISSUE/HELD: WON the Sangguniang Bayan

may remove Martinez, an elective local
official, from office. NO. SC affirmed RTC.
PETITION DENIED.
Ratio: Textual
Section 60 of the Local Government Code
conferred upon the courts the power to
remove elective local officials from office:
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions.
An elective local official may be disciplined,
suspended, or removed from office on any of
the
following
grounds:

An elective local official may be removed

from office on the grounds enumerated
above by order of the proper court.
Legislative Intent Only RTC
During the deliberations of the Senate on the
LGC, the legislative intent to confine to the
courts, i.e., RTCs, the Sandiganbayan and the
appellate courts, jurisdiction over cases
involving the removal of elective local
officials was evident.
In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., the Court en
banc categorically ruled that the Office of the
President is without any power to remove
elected officials. Court invalidated Article
125, Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of
1991 (which provides that An elective local
official may be removed from office by
order of the proper court or the disciplining
authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction
to the exclusion of the other.
Ratio for making it an exclusive judicial
prerogative
The
Sanggunian
Brgy
contends
that
administrative cases involving elective
barangay officials may be filed with, heard
and decided by the SP or SB concerned,

The rule is intended as a check against any

capriciousness or partisan activity by the
disciplining authority.
It must not be tainted with partisan politics
and used to defeat the will of the voting
public. Congress itself saw it fit to vest that
power in a more impartial tribunal, the court.
Furthermore, LGUs are not deprived of the
right to discipline local elective officials;
rather, they are prevented from imposing the
extreme penalty of dismissal.
Courts not merely an implementing arm of
SB
Argument of Sanggunian is an unmistakable
breach of the doctrine on separation of
powers, thus placing the courts under the
orders of the legislative bodies of local
governments. The courts would be stripped
of their power of review, and their discretion
in imposing the extreme penalty of removal
from office is thus left to be exercised by
political factions which stand to benefit from
the removal from office of the local elective
official concerned, the very evil which
Congress sought to avoid when it enacted
Section 60 of the Local Government Code.
Congress clearly meant that the removal of
an elective local official be done only after a
trial before the appropriate court, where

court rules of procedure and evidence can

ensure impartiality and fairness and protect
against political maneuverings. Elevating the
removal of an elective local official from
office from an administrative case to a court
case may be justified by the fact that such
removal not only punishes the official
concerned but also, in effect, deprives the
electorate of the services of the official for
whom they voted.

therefore, Martinez was no longer required to

avail himself of an administrative appeal in
order to annul the said Order of the
Sangguniang Bayan. Thus, his direct
recourse to regular courts of justice was
justified.

Power of the Sanggunian

As the law stands, Section 61 of the Local
Government Code provides for the procedure
for the filing of an administrative case
against an erring elective barangay official
before the SP or SB. However, the
Sangguniang cannot order the removal of an
erring elective barangay official from office,
as the courts are exclusively vested with this
power under Section 60 of the Local
Government Code.
Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by
the barangay official are of a grave nature
and, if found guilty, would merit the penalty
of removal from office, the case should be
filed with the regional trial court. Once the
court assumes jurisdiction, it retains
jurisdiction over the case even if it would be
subsequently apparent during the trial that a
penalty less than removal from office is
appropriate. On the other hand, the most
extreme penalty that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may
impose
on
the
erring
elective barangay official is suspension; if it
deems that the removal of the official from
service is warranted, then it can resolve that
the proper charges be filed in court.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
inflexible
As a general rule, no recourse to courts can
be had until all administrative remedies have
been exhausted. However, this rule is not
applicable
where
the
challenged
administrative act is patently illegal,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction and where
the question or questions involved are
essentially judicial.
In this case, it is apparent that the SB acted
beyond its jurisdiction when it issued the
assailed Order removing Martinez from
office. Such act was patently illegal and,

DAMASEN vs TUMAMAO
Facts:A permanent vacancy occurred in the
office of the Vice Mayor of San Isidro, Isabella
when incumbent Vice-Mayor Nelia Tumamao died
on December 2, 2004. Pursuant to Sec. 44 of RA
7160, Ligaya Alonzo, the highest ranking member
of the Sangguniang Bayan was elevated to
the position.
To fill the ensuing vacancy in the Sangguinang
Bayan, Mayor Lim recommended to Governor
Padaca the appointment of Oscar Tumamao, also
a member of LDP. Tumamao was appointed, took
his oath and attended sessions.
On May 2005, Atty. Lucky Damasen, became a
member of LDP and got hold of a letter of
nomination

to

the

Sanggunian

Bayan

from

provincial chairman of LDP Balauag addressed to

Governor Padaca. He was appointed to SB and

took his oath. Damasen attended sessions but he

replacement where a permanent vacancy occurs

was not recognized.

in the Sanggunian is to maintain the party

representation as willed by the people in the

He filed a petition for quo warranto with prayer

for

writ

of

preliminary

injunction

election.

against

Tumamao with the RTC, seeking to be declared

Since the permanent vacancy in the Sanggunian

the rightful member of the SB.

occurred because of the elevation of LDP member

Alonzo to vice-mayor, it follows that the person to

As

part

Tumamao

succeed her should also belong to the LDP so as

presented Atty. Ernest Soberano who identified a

to preserve party representation. Thus, this Court

letter dated June 14, 2005, signed by LDP

cannot

Provincial Chairman Balauag, which states that

clinging to an appointment when he is in fact not

the

a bona

latter

Damasen,

of

was

his

defense,

revoking

and

that

her

she

nomination
was

of

countenance
fide member

Damasens
of

the

insistence

LDP. While

in
the

confirming

revocation of the nomination given to Damasen

Tumamaos nomination made by Mayor Lim.

came after the fact of his appointment, this Court

Later, Tumamao presented Provincial Chairman

cannot rule in his favor, because the very first

Balauag who affirmed the contents of her letter

requirement of Sec. 45 (b) is that the appointee

revoking the nomination of Damasen.

must come from the political party as that of the

Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy. To

RTC ruled in favor of Damasen.

stress, Damasen is not a bona fide member of

the LDP.

Tumamao appealed the RTC Decision to the Court

of Appeals. The CA held that Damasen was not

In addition, appointing Damasen would not serve

entitled

the will of the electorate. He himself admits that

to assume the

vacant position in

the

Sangguniang Bayan.

he was previously a member of the Lakas-CMD,

and that he ran for the position of Mayor under

Issue:
Who,

the said party on the May 2004 Elections.

between

Damasen

and

Tumamao,

is

entitled to the contested position?

Likewise, he did not resign from the said party

when he joined the LDP, and even admitted that
his joining the LDP was not because of party

Held:

Tumamao

is

entitled

to

the

contested position.

ideals, but because he just wanted to. How can

the will of the electorate be best served, given
the foregoing admissions of Damasen? If this

It

is

undisputed

that

the

law

applicable

Court

were

to

grant hereinpetition,

it

would

to herein petition is Sec. 45 (b) of RA 7160,

effectively diminish the party representation of

which provides for the rule on succession in cases

the LDP in the Sanggunian, as Damasen would

of permanent vacancies in the Sanggunian. As

still be considered a member of the Lakas-CMD,

can be gleaned from Sec. 45, the law provides for

not having resigned therefrom, a scenario that

conditions for the rule of succession to apply:

defeats

First, the appointee shall come from the same

ultimately runs contrary the ratio of Navarro.

the

purpose

of

the

law,

and

that

political party as that of the Sanggunian member

who caused the vacancy. Second, the appointee

What is damning to the cause of Damasen, is the

must have a nomination and a Certificate of

letter

Membership from the highest official of the

Secretary Counsel of the LDP, addressed to

political party concerned. The reason behind the

Governor Padaca wherein it is categorically stated

right given to a political party to nominate a

of

Demaree

J.B.

Raval,

the

Deputy

that Damasen is not a bona fide member of the

LDP.
This Court has no reason to doubt the veracity of
the letter coming from the LDP leadership. Quite
clearly, from the tenor of the letter, it appears
that the membership of Damasen still had to be
approved by the LDP National Council. Thus,
notwithstanding Damasens procurement of a
Certificate of Membership from LDP Provincial
Chairman Balauag, to this Courts mind, the same
merelystarted the process of his membership in
the

LDP,

and

it did

not

mean

automatic

membership thereto. While it may be argued that

Damasen was already a member upon receipt of
a Certificate of Membership from LDP Provincial
Chairman Balauag, this Court cannot impose such
view on the LDP. If the LDP leadership says that
the membership of Damasen still had to be
endorsed to the National Council for approval,
then this Court cannot question such requirement
in the absence of evidence to the contrary. It is
well settled that the discretion of accepting
members to a political party is a right and a
privilege, a purely internal matter, which this
Court cannot meddle in.
Lastly,

the

records

of

the

case

reveal

that Tumamao has the nomination of Senator

Edgardo J. Angara, the Party Chairman and,
therefore, the highest official of the LDP. In
addition, he is a member in good standing of the
LDP. Thus, given the foregoing, it is this Courts
view

that

Tumamao

the requirements of
February 17, 2010)

has

law. (G.R.

complied
No.

with

173165,

Sabili vs COMELEC
Facts:
1. COMELEC denied Sabilis Certificate of Candidacy
for mayor of Lipa due to failure to comply with the
one year residency requirement.
2. When petitioner filed his COC1 for mayor of Lipa
City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he
had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and
eight (8) months.
3. However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed
his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family
were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay
(Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas.
4. respondent Florencio Librea (private respondent)
filed a "Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a
Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for
Disqualification
5. Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath in
his COC that he had already been a resident of Lipa
City for two years and eight months prior to the
scheduled 10 May 2010 local elections.
6. In its Resolution dated 26 January 2010, 41 the
COMELEC Second Division granted the Petition of
private respondent, declared petitioner as disqualified

7.

8.
9.

from seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa City, and

canceled his Certificate of Candidacy for his not
being a resident of Lipa City and for his failure to
meet the statutory one-year residency requirement
under the law.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26
January 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC, during
the pendency of which the 10 May 2010 local
elections were held. The next day, he was proclaimed
the duly elected mayor of Lipa City after garnering
the highest number of votes cast for the said position.
He accordingly filed a Manifestation42with the
COMELEC en banc to reflect this fact.

6.

7.

Before us, petitioner has alleged and shown the

COMELECs use of wrong or irrelevant
considerations in deciding the issue of whether
petitioner made a material misrepresentation of his
residency qualification in his COC as to order its
cancellation.
8. Hence, in resolving the issue of whether the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling
that petitioner had not sufficiently shown that he had
resided in Lipa City for at least one year prior to the
May 2010 elections, we examine the evidence
adduced by the parties and the COMELECs
appreciation thereof.
9. Basically, the allegations of the Petitioner Sabili are
tantamount to allege that the COMELEC, in denying
his COC committed grave abuse of discretion. The
court here defined what grave abuse of discretion is;
and by that chose and ruled to review the acts of
COMELEC under its jurisdiction.
10. Eventually he was able to prove that he was a
resident of Lipa and the SC granted his petition.

In its Resolution dated 17 August 2010,43 the

COMELEC en banc denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner.
Hence, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition
(Petition for Certiorari with Extremely Urgent
Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order
and for the Conduct of a Special Raffle of this Case)
under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, seeking the annulment of the 26 January 2010
and 17 August 2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC.

Issues:
1. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding that Sabili failed to prove
compliance with the one-year residency requirement
for local elective officials.
Ruling:
1. As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily
review the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation
of evidence. However, exceptions thereto have been
established, including when the COMELEC's
appreciation and evaluation of evidence become so
grossly unreasonable as to turn into an error of
jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is
compelled by its bounden constitutional duty to
intervene and correct the COMELEC's error.
2. As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact
definition; generally, it refers to "capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction;" the abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty
3. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be
grave. We have held, too, that the use of wrong or
irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is
sufficient to taint a decision-maker's action with
grave abuse of discretion.
4. Closely related with the limited focus of the present
petition is the condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the
COMELEC, supported by substantial evidence, shall
be final and non-reviewable.
5. In light of our limited authority to review findings of
fact, we do not ordinarily review in a certiorari case
the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of
evidence. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this

regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of

jurisdiction.
In exceptional cases, however, when the
COMELEC's action on the appreciation and
evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its
discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable,
the Court is not only obliged, but has the
constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of
discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the
grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of
jurisdiction.

SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs.COMELEC

G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996

FACTS:

On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The

Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which
created the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise
created SBMA to implement the declared national policy
of converting the Subic military reservation into
alternative productive uses.

On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over

the Subic military reservation to the Philippines
government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the
implementation of its task, particularly the preservation
of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other
installations left by the American navy.

On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong,

Bataan passed PambayangKapasyahanBilang 10,
Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence,
as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic
Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office
of the President.

On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition

with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to
annulPambayangKapasyahanBlg. 10, Serye 1993.

The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify

PambayangKapasyangBlg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic
Special Economi Zone, b) to allow Morong to join provided
conditions are met.

The Sangguniang BayanngMorong acted upon the

petition by promulgating PambayangKapasyahanBlg.
18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines
so amend certain provisions of RA 7227.

Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power

initiative under the LGC of 1991.

On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local

initiative on the ground that the subject thereof was
merely a resolution and not an ordinance.

On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation

No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ
including therein the portion of the former naval base
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of
Morong.

On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued

Resolution No. 2845 and 2848, adopting a "Calendar
of Activities for local referendumand providing for "the

rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the

referendum

On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari

contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging
that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local
initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law

ISSUE:

1.

WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in

promulgating Resolution No. 2848 which governs the
conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal
PambayangKapasyahanBlg. 10

2.

WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject

within the powers of the people of Morong to enact; i.e.,
whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a
national law."

HELD:
1.

YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an

INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for a
REFERENDUM only.
In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the
footnote below, the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27
times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec
labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes
was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents
were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers,
"Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots
themselves bore the description "referendum". To repeat, not
once was the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution
No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an
INITIATIVE.
As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose
bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls
independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand,
referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt or
reject any act or measure which has been passed by a
legislative body and which in most cases would without action
on the part of electors become a law.
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises
administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its

powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making

powers belong to the people, hence the respondent
Commission cannot control or change the substance or
the content of legislation.
2.

The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the

municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage and not
yet an approved law.

The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not

yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there
would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when
the people have voted for it and it has become an approved
ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be
enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely
a proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a
mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking,
courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical
questions or cases.

In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has

authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine
the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does
not have the same authority in regard to the proposed
initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or
passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower
court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has
made no reviewable pronouncements about the issues
brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included
verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848.
Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a branch,
instrumentality or court which this Court could take
cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of
its review powers.