G.R. No.

L-25952 June 30, 1967

MARGARITA SALVADOR, in her own behalf and as Attorney-in-fact of CANDIDA SALVADOR,

ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. JUDGE ANDRES STA. MARIA, DOMINADOR CARDENAS, REMEDIOS CABRERA,
ALBERTO M. K. JAMIR and SIMEON ENRIQUEZ, respondents.

FACTS:

7 parcels of titled land and 2 parcels of untitled land (Bigaa, Bulacan) were owned by Celestino
Salvador.
In 1941, he executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Alfonso Salvador and Anatolia Halili.
Alleging that the sale was void for lack of consideration, he filed a suit for reconveyance against
said vendees (CFI of Bulacan, Br. I).
On 4/27/1956, Celestino Salvador died, testate. As his alleged heirs, 21 persons were substituted
as plaintiffs in the action for reconveyance.
Meanwhile, a special proceeding for the probate of his will was instituted. In said proceedings,
Dominador Cardenas was appointed as special administrator (CFI of Bulacan, Br. II).
The administrator filed in Br. II an inventory of properties of the estate, covering the same parcels
of land subject matter of the reconveyance action.
Subsequently, Celestino Salvador's will was admitted to probate and Dominador Cardenas was
appointed executor of said will.
23 persons were instituted heirs in the will. Of these, 9 were not among the 21 alleged relatives
substituted in the reconveyance case and of the 21 substituted alleged heirs 7 were not instituted
in the will.
In the suit for reconveyance, the CFI ordered that the defendants (Sps. Alfonso & Anatolia), to
reconvey the parcels of land to the estate of Celestino Salvador. The defendants Appealed to CA,
but the decision was affirmed by CA, with the correction that reconveyance be in favor of the
21 heirs substituted as plaintiffs therein.
3 years later, pursuant to an order in the testacy proceedings, Lot 6 was sold so that debtors who
filed claims may be paid. The PNB bought it and the amount was then deposited in the same bank
by the administrator, subject to Court order.
The defendants in the suit for reconveyance executed a deed of reconveyance over the subject
parcels of land, in favor of Celestino Salvador's estate. Revoking the same in accordance with the
final judgment. Br. I ordered a new deed of reconveyance to be executed, in favor of the 21
persons substituted as plaintiffs in that action. Accordingly, a new deed of reconveyance was
made, in favor of said 21 persons as heirs of Celestino.
Subsequently, a new title certificate was issued in the names of the 21 persons.
Br. I (reconveyance court) ordered the PNB to release the proceeds of the sale of Lot 6, to the 21
plaintiffs in the reconveyance case. Apparently, although the passbook was given by the
administrator to said 21 persons, no release was made, as the PNB awaited Br. II's order.
On March 1, 1966, Br. II, approved claims against the estate.
On March 30, 1966, Br. II (probate court), ordered return of the passbook to the administrator and
release to the administrator by the PNB of the P41,184.00, or so much thereof is needed to pay
the afore-stated debts of the estate.
After failing to get reconsideration of said order, the 21 substituted heirs filed with the Court the
present special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction to assail the order to pay the
debts of the estate with the P41,184.00 proceeds of the sale of Lot 6; and to question Br. II's
(probate court) power to dispose of the parcels of land involved in the reconveyance suit in Br. I.

ISSUES:

(1) Are the parcels of land and the proceeds of the sale of one of them, properties of the estate or
not? YES
(2) Does final judgment in the reconveyance suit in favor of the 21 heirs who substituted Celestino
Salvador, bar the disposition of the reconveyed properties by the settlement court? NO

RULING:
The right of heirs to specific, distributive shares of inheritance does not become finally
determinable until all the debts of the estate are paid. Until then, in the face of said claims, their
rights cannot be enforced, are inchoate, and subject to the existence of a residue after payment of the
debts.

They only contend that the properties involved having been ordered by final judgment reconveyed to
them, not to the estate the same are not properties of the estate but their own, and thus, not liable for
debts of the estate.

The said contention is self-refuting. Petitioners rely for their rights on their alleged character as heirs
of Celestino; as such, they were substituted in the reconveyance case; the reconveyance to them
was reconveyance to them as heirs of Celestino Salvador. It follows that the properties they claim
are, even by their own reasoning, part of Celestino's estate. The right thereto as allegedly his heirs
would arise only if said parcels of land are part of the estate of Celestino, not otherwise. Their having
received the same in the reconveyance action was perforce in trust for the estate, subject to its
obligations. They cannot distribute said properties among themselves as substituted heirs without the
debts of the estate being first satisfied.

At any rate, the proceeds of Lot 6 alone appears more than sufficient to pay the debt and there will
remain the other parcels of land not sold. As to the question of who will receive how much as heirs,
the same is properly determinable by the settlement court, after payment of the debts.

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is denied, without costs.

PACIO
vs.
BILLON
1 SCRA 384GR No. L-15088 Jan. 31, 1961
Facts:
In 1901, Flaviano Pacio married Severa Jucutan. Herein defendants were their children. Severa died in 1930; and
thereafter Flavio married the plaintiff Toribia Fontanilla, who bore him the other four plaintiffs. The dispute between
the parties concerned two parcels of land which defendants allegedly retained without any right thereto. The litigants
later agreed to a partition of the first parcel, and the court so decreed. As to the second parcel, a hearing was
held, and it was awarded to the defendants, on the ground that it had been donated
propter nuptias
to Severa, in 1901, by Flaviano Pacio, who was then admittedly the owner. However, the plaintiffs-appellants
contend that the donation was void, because it was not made in a public instrument.
Issue:
Whether or not the donation propter nuptias was void?
Ruling:
Yes. Art. 633 of the Spanish Civil Code states that "In order that a donation of real property be valid it must be made
by public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically described and the amount of the
encumbrances to be assumed by the donee
expressed . . .." . And this Court has held that a donation propter nuptias of real property written on a private
instrument is not valid even between the parties.

BALANAY, JR. vs. MARTINEZ

64 SCRA 452
FACTS:
Leodegaria Julian died. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and six legitimate
children.

Felix Balanay, Jr. filed a petition for the probate of his mothers notarial
will, which was written in English. In thatwill, Leodegaria declared that it was her desire her properties
should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be
satisfied out of the fruits of her properties. She devised andpartitioned the conjugal lands as if they
were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one-half share of the conjugal
assets.
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will.There
after, Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument waiving and renouncing his right in Leodegarias estate
in favor
of their 6 children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on
itsallowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.
RULING:

The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its
formalvalidity had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if
on its face it appears tobe intrinsically void
.But the probate court erred in declaring that the will was void and in converting the testate
proceeding into anintestate proceeding.The will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be
given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors andimpair the legitimes. The distribution and partition
would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In themeantime, the net income should
be equitably divided among the children and the surviving spouse.(
Relate to Articles 779 and 780 : In this case, there is testamentary succession because it resulted
from the designation of heirs by the testatrix, made in a will executed in the form prescribed by law. It
can be considered as a mixed succession because there is partly by will (execution of the will and
execution of the waiver) and by operation of law (as to the share of the husband of the conjugal party
of which he eventually waived

buot buot ni na answer ha

VDA. DE VILLANUEVA vs. JUICO

4 SCRA 550
FACTS:
Don Nicolas Villaflor executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing in
favor of his wife, Dona Faustina of all his real and personal properties giving the other half to his
brother Don Fausto.
Petitioner filed an action against the administrator contending that upon the widows death, she
became vested with
the ownership of the properties bequeathed under clause 7 pursuant to its 8
th
clause of the will.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner is entitled to the ownership of the properties upon the death of Dona Faustina.
HELD:

The intention of the testator here was to merely give usufructuary right to his wife Doa Fausta
because in hiswill he provided that Doa Fausta sha
ll forfeit the properties if she fails to bear a child and because she died without
having begotten any children with the deceased then it means that Doa Fausta never acquired
ownership over the
property. Upon her death, because she never acquired ownership over the property, the said
properties are notincluded in her estate. Those properties actually belong to Villaflor. That was the
intention of the testator.
Otherwise, if the testator wanted to give the properties to Doa Fausta then he should have s
pecifically
stated in his will that ownership should belong to Doa Fausta without mentioning any
condition
G.R. No. L-10806 July 6, 1918

MONICA BONA, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
HOSPICIO BRIONES, ET AL., objectors-appellees.

Ramon Pimentel for appellant.

Ocampo and De la Rosa for appellees.

TORRES, J.:

Counsel for Monica Bona, the widow by the second marriage of the deceased Francisco Briones who
died on August 14, 1913, applied for the probate of the will which the said deceased husband on
September 16, 1911, executed during his lifetime; for the fixing of a day for the hearing and
presentation of evidence after all the interested parties had been cited; and then for the approval of
the partition had been cited; and then for the approval of the partition property made by the testator in
the said will. By an order dated January 20, 1915, Monica Bona's petition was granted and a date set
for the trial and other necessary proceedings for the probate of said will.

Counsel for Hospicio, Gregoria, and Carmen, all surnamed Briones, the legitimate children by the first
marriage of the testator, by a pleading dated March 5, 1915, opposed the probate of the will
presented by the widow of the deceased Briones, alleging that the said will was executed before two
witnesses only and under unlawful and undue pressure or influence exercised upon the person of the
testator who thus signed through fraud and deceit; and he prayed that for that reason the said will be
declared null and of no value, with costs against the petitioners.

The trial of the case opened and in the presence of counsel for both parties, Gregorio Bustilla, one of
the witnesses of the said will, was examined and he stated under oath: That he as well as Sixto
Barrameda and Domingo de la Fuente, was actually present as attesting witness when Francisco
Briones executed his will in the month of September in his (Bustilla's) house situated in the
municipality of Bao, Ambos Camarines; that Francisco Briones knowing of the presence of notary
Domingo de la Fuente in the house, he went upstairs and announced himself; that on being asked
what he wanted, Briones stated that he wanted to execute his will; that after Briones and the notary
had talked with each other, the former left and after a while returned bringing with him some paper;
that then Domingo de la Fuente, under the direction of Francisco Briones, began to draft the will,
which when finished was signed by the latter in the presence of the notary, of the declarant, and of
another witness, Sixto Barrameda; that then the three witnesses the declarant, de la Fuente, and
Barrameda signed in the presence of each other. The declarant identified the signature placed on
the will by the testator Briones and those of the other witnesses Sixto Barrameda and Domingo dela
Fuente, who all signed in the presence of the testator himself. He stated further that the testator at
that moment was in his sound judgment and not forced to execute the will. He identified the document
Exhibit A as the will executed by Francisco Briones and the signature of the latter as the one placed
by the testator. By agreement of both parties it was made to appear in the record that, if the witnesses
Sixto Barrameda and Domingo de la Fuente were called, they would have testified in the same terms
as witness Gregorio Bustilla.

In view of the above, the judge rendered judgment, dated March 27, 1915, denying probate to the will
Exhibit A as executed by Francisco Briones. From the judgment, counsel for Monica Bona appealed
and prayed to be allowed to sue further as a pauper; whereupon, by order of March 31, 1915, the
judge admitted the appeal, ordered the original records to be brought up, and reiterated his order of
December 28, 1913, declaring Bona as a pauper, for the purposes of the appeal interposed.

The whole issue discussed by the parties and submitted for the decision of this court resolves itself as
to whether or not in the execution of the will in question the solemnities prescribed by section 618 of
Act No. 190 have been observed.

But before proceeding further it is indispensable to note that the will in question was executed by
Francisco Briones on September 16, 1911, as already stated and the order denying probate was
rendered on March 27, 1915, both dated being prior to that of Act No. 2645 amending said section
618 and promulgated on February 24, 1916, which took effect only from July first of the last named
year: so that, in order to explain whether or not the above-mentioned will was executed in accordance
with the law then in force, the last named law cannot be applied and the will in question should be
examined in accordance with, and under the rules of, the law in force at the time of its execution.

The oft-repeated section 618 of Act No. 190 says:

No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or
personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by
some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed
by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. But the
absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is proven that the will
was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.

A mere reading of the last four paragraphs or parts of the will Exhibit A shows in a clear manner that
the said will in its form and contents expresses without shadow of doubt the will of the testator; and
that in its execution the solemnities prescribed by the above-mentioned section 618 of Act No. 190
have been observed.

Even though Domingo de la Fuente drafted the will and intervened in its preparation as a notary, by
the order and under the express direction of the testator, it is nevertheless true that he did it as a
witness to the execution of the said will with positive and concrete acts, while the two other witnesses
Gregorio Bustilla and Sixto Barrameda merely attested all that appeared in the second of the four
paragraphs mentioned; for in its they certify that the foregoing testament contains the last will of the
testator Francisco Briones; that the latter told them that before and at the time that he dictated his will,
there was no inducement nor threat by anybody; and that as he did not know how to write the
Spanish language, said testator requested Domingo de la Fuente to write the will, and he did it as it is
now drafted, certifying also, that the testator Briones signed his will voluntarily with his own hand, in
the presence of the declarants who, as witnesses, signed the instrument on the date expressed.
Domingo de la Fuente on his part declared that the two said witnesses formally swore before him on
the certification which precedes the said will and, according to this testimony as shown in the records
and the testimony of the above-mentioned witnesses, the said Domingo de la Fuente wrote and
drafted the said will Exhibit A by the order and under the direction of the testator Francisco Briones,
who signed in the presence of the witnesses, Bustilla and Barrameda and of Notary Domingo de la
Fuente, all of whom immediately signed also in the presence of the testator, each doing it in the
presence of each other. So that, although it is not shown expressly that Domingo de la Fuente was an
attesting witness to the will, yet it cannot be denied that it was he who wrote it by the order and under
the direction of the testator; that he was a witness to its execution from the first to its last line; and that
he was perfectly aware of the fact that all that he had written in the document Exhibit A expresses the
genuine and true will of the testator. He saw and was present when the latter signed his will, as also
when the two witnesses Bustilla and Barrameda affixed their signatures; said witnesses also saw and
were present when Domingo de la Fuente signed at the end of the said document.

The name of Domingo de la Fuente appears as that of a notary who certifies as to the certainty of the
will made by Francisco Briones and of the signatures of the testator as well as of the witnesses at its
end; and as the law does not require that one of the witnesses must necessarily be a notary, and it
cannot be denied that Domingo de la Fuente attested the execution and the signing of the will not
only by the testator but also by the attesting witnesses, it cannot but be admitted that Domingo de la
Fuente intervened, attested, and signed the testament as a witness.

This is a case in which the judicial criterion should be inspired in the sense that it is not defeated, and
if the wish of the testator is so manifest and express as in the instant case, it is not proper nor just to
invalidate the will of Francisco Briones merely because of some small defect in form which is not
essential nor of great importance, such as the failure to state therein that Domingo de la Fuente was
also a witness to the said will when he signed it twice. As a matter of act, he understood the contents
of the will better than the two other attesting witnesses, for he really was a witness and he attested
the execution of the will during its making until it was terminated and signed by the testator, by the
witnesses, and by himself, even though he did it in the capacity of a notary.

The last paragraph of section 618 of Act No. 190 supplies a legal basis to support the validity of the
will in question with the conditions for its probate because, notwithstanding the existence of such
defect merely in the form and not in the substance, the certification of authenticity and the very text of
the will show in a clear and indubitable manner that the will Exhibit A contains the last will of the
testator, and that it was signed by the latter and attested as being true and legitimate not only the two
witnesses Bustilla and Barrameda but also by the one who wrote it, Domingo de la Fuente, who was
also a truthful and reliable witness, even though he be called a notary public.

The requisites established by Act No. 2645, which amended the oft-repeated section 618 cannot be
required in the probate of the will here, inasmuch as this document was executed in September,
1911, five years before said amendatory law began to take effect (July 1, 1916), while the testator
died on August 14, 1913, two years and some months before the enforcement of the said law; and so,
the only law applicable to the present case is the provision contained in section 618 of Act No. 190,
and in accordance with the provisions of this section, the said will should be probated; for it has been
presented to the court many months before the amendatory act went into effect.

It is well-known that the principle that a new law shall not have retroactive effect only governs the
rights arising from acts done under the rule of the former law; but if the right be declared for the first
time by a subsequent law it shall take effect from that time even though it has arisen from acts subject
to the former laws, provided that it does not prejudice another acquired right of the same origin.

It is well-known that hereditary rights are not born nor does the will produce any effect until the
moment of the death of the person whose inheritance is concerned. (Decision rendered in cassation
by the supreme court of Spain on June 24, 1897.)

In view of these facts, it follows that the judgment appealed from should be reversed and it should be
declared as we hereby declare that the will Exhibit A has been executed in due form by Francisco
Briones on September 16, 1911, and that the said will contains and expresses the last will and
testamentary wishes of the deceased testator. Consequently, let the records be returned to the court
wherefrom they came with a certified copy of this resolution in order that the judge, upon petition by
the proper party, may provide for the necessary proceedings with respect to the inheritance, and the
clerk of the court may issue certified copies of the said testament; without any special ruling as to
costs. so ordered.

Icasiano v. Icasiano Digest

Icasiano vs. Icasiano
G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964

Facts:
1. Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the probate of the will of Josefa Villacorte and for his
appointment as executor thereof. It appears from the evidence that the testatrix died on September
12, 1958. She executed a will in Tagalog, and through the help of her lawyer, it was prepared in
duplicates, an original and a carbon copy.

2. On the day that it was subscribed and attested, the lawyer only brought the original copy of the will
while the carbon duplicate (unsigned) was left in Bulacan. One of the witnesses failed to sign one of
the pages in the original copy but admitted he may have lifted 2 pages simultaneously instead when
he signed the will. Nevertheless, he affirmed that the will was signed by the testator and other
witnesses in his presence.

Issue: Whether or not the failure of one of the subscribing witnesses to affix his signature to a
page is sufficient to deny probate of the will

RULING: No, the failure to sign was entirely through pure oversight or mere inadvertence. Since the
duplicated bore the required signatures, this proves that the omission was not intentional. Even if the
original is in existence, a duplicate may still be admitted to probate since the original is deemed to be
defective, then in law, there is no other will bu the duly signed carbon duplicate and the same can be
probated.

The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the
inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she has no control of. Where the purpose of the
law is to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages, and there is no intentional
or deliberate deviation existed.

Note that this ruling should not be taken as a departure from the rules that the will should be signed
by the witnesses on every page. The carbon copy duplicate was regular in all respects.

Cruz v. Villasor Digest

Cruz v. Villasor
G.R. L-32213 November 26, 1973
Ponente: Esguerra, J.:

Facts:
1. The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the late Valenti Cruz.
However, the petitioner opposed the allowance of the will alleging that it was executed through fraud,
deceit, misrepresentation, and undue influence. He further alleged that the instrument was executed
without the testator having been informed of its contents and finally, that it was not executed in
accordance with law.

2. One of the witnesses, Angel Tevel Jr. was also the notary before whom the will was acknowledged.
Despite the objection, the lower court admitted the will to probate on the ground that there is
substantial compliance with the legal requirements of having at least 3 witnesses even if the notary
public was one of them.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid in accordance with Art. 805 and 806 of the NCC

HELD: NO.
The will is not valid. The notary public cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since
he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the said will. An acknowledging officer
cannot serve as witness at the same time.

To acknowledge before means to avow, or to own as genuine, to assent, admit, and 'before' means in
front of or preceding in space or ahead of. The notary cannot split his personality into two so that one
will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation int he making of the will. To permit such
situation would be absurd.

Finally, the function of a notary among others is to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements,
a function defeated if he were to be one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. He would be
interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own
act. he would be in an inconsistent position, thwarting the very purpose of the acknowledgment,
which is to minimize fraud.

JOSE ANTONIO GABUCAN,

petitioner-appellant, vs.
HON. JUDGE LUIS D. MANTA JOSEFA G. VDA. DE YSALINA and NELDA
G. ENCLONARAQUINO,
J.:
This case is about the dismissal of a petition for the probate of a notarial will on the ground that it
does not bear a thirty-centavo documentary stamp.The Court of First Instance of Camiguin in its
"decision" of December !, #$$ in %pecial &roceeding 'o. ( for the probate of the will of
the late)ogaciano *abucan, dismissed the proceeding +erroneously characteries as an "action"The
proceeding was dismissed because the reuisite documentary stamp was not affi/ed to the
notarial ac0nowledgment in the will and, hence,according to respondent 1udge, it was not admissible
in evidence, citing section 2! of the Ta/ Code, now section 34 of the #$$ Ta/ Code,
whichreads5%6C. 2!.
Effect of failure to stamp taxable document
. 7 8n instrument, document, or paper which is reuired by law to bestamped and which has been
signed, issued, accepted, or transferred without being duly stamped, shall not be recorded,
norshall it or any copy thereof or any record of transfer of the same be admitted or used in evidence
in any
court until the reuisitestamp or stamps shall have been affi/ed thereto and cancelled.'o notary public
or other officer authoried to administer oaths shall add his 9urat or ac0nowledgment to any
document sub9ect todocumentary stamp ta/ unless the proper documentary stamps are affi/ed
thereto and cancelled.The probate court assumed that the notarial ac0nowledgment of the said will is
sub9ect to the thirty-centavo documentary stamp ta/ fi/ed in section3 of the Ta/ Code, now section 2$
of the #$$ Ta/ Code.)espondent 1udge refused to reconsider the dismissal in spite of petitioner:s
manifestation that he had already attached the documentary stamp tothe original of the will. +%ee
;ahilum vs. Court of 8ppeals, <( =. *. (4$, $ %C)8 (!, (!<.The case was brought to this Court
by means of a petition for mandamus to compel the lower court to allow petitioner:s appeal from its
decision. Inthis Court:s resolution of 1anuary , #!4 the petition for mandamus was treated in the
interest of substantial and speedy 9ustice as an appealunder )epublic 8ct 'o. 3((4 as well as a special
civil action of certiorari under )ule <3 of the )ules of Court.>e hold that the lower court manifestly erred
in declaring that, because no documentary stamp was affi/ed to the will, there was "no will
andtestament to probate" and, conseuently, the alleged "action must of necessity be
dismissed".>hat the probate court should have done was to reuire the petitioner or proponent to affi/
the reuisite thirty-centavo documentary stamp to thenotarial ac0nowledgment of the will which is the
ta/able portion of that document.That procedure may be implied from the provision of section 2! that
the non-admissibility of the document, which does not bear the reuisitedocumentary stamp, subsists
only "until the reuisite stamp or stamps shall have been affi/ed thereto and cancelled."Thus, it was
held that the documentary stamp may be affi/ed at the time the ta/able document is presented in
evidence +Del Castillo vs. ;adrilena(# &hil. $(#. If the promissory note does not bear a documentary
stamp, the court should have allowed plaintiff:s tender of a stamp to supply thedeficiency. +)odrigue
vs. ;artine, 3 &hil. <$, $. 'ote the holding in 8arraga vs. )odrigue, # &hil. <2$, that the lac0 of the
documentary stampon a document does not invalidate such document. %ee Cia. *eneral de Tabacos
vs. 1ean9auet &hil. #3, 4- and Delgado and Figueroa vs.8menabar < &hil. (42, (43-
<.>?6)6F=)6, the lower court:s dismissal of the petition for probate is reversed and set aside. It is
directed to decide the case on the merits in thelight of the parties: evidence. 'o costs.%= =)D6)6D