Succession Atty.

Silang-Enriquez
Batch 2020 JD-3

Succession Digests
Cases 7-28

7. Bonilla v Barcena, 71 SCRA 491

G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
Consequences of Article 777

Facts: On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and
wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet title over
certain parcels of land located in Abra.
On May 9, 1975, defendants filed a written motion to dismiss the complaint, but before the hearing of
the motion to dismiss, the counsel for the plaintiff moved to amend the complaint in order to include
certain allegations therein.
On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. Said motion to dismiss was heard
on August 14, 1975. In said hearing, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena,
and asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband, the petitioners herein; but the court
after the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real
party in interest and has no legal personality to sue.
On August 28, 1975, the court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for the plaintiff for
lack of merit. On September 1, 1975, counsel for deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation praying
that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased mother,
but the court denied the counsel's prayer for lack of merit. From the order, counsel for the deceased
plaintiff filed a second motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the complaint claiming that
the same is in violation of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court but the same was denied.
SSUE: Whether or not a court action survives, through the heirs, after the death of the plaintiff.
RULING: YES. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the
heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent,
and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The
moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance
whether such right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in
them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. When
Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No.
856, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have
thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is,
therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest for
the deceased plaintiff.

8. Salvador vs. Sta. Maria

G.R. No. 25952, June 30, 1967
Consequences of Article 777

F:
● 9 parcels of land (7 titled) in Bulacan were sold by Celestino Salvador to Sps. Alfonso and
Anatolia. However, a suit for reconveyance was later filed by Celestino before the reconveyance
court against the vendees due to lack of consideration. While the case was pending, Celestino
died on April 27, 1956 (testate) and his alleged heirs (21) substituted as plaintiffs in the
abovementioned action. Meanwhile, special proceedings for the probate of his will and for
letters testamentary was instituted wherein the same was admitted by the probate court on
Sept. 7, 1956. Nonetheless, 23 persons were instituted heirs in the will wherein 9 of them were
not among the 21 substituted plaintiffs. On the other hand, 7 out of the 21 substituted plaintiffs
were not instituted heirs (just in case super detailed na talaga).
● CFI - Reconveyance Court (1956): Ordered reconveyance of lots to the estate of Celestino
Salvador. Appealed.
● CA (1961): Affirmed CFI’s Order but judgment corrected in favor of the twenty-one (21) heirs
substituted as plaintiffs therein (no longer the estate).
Succession Atty. Silang-Enriquez
Batch 2020 JD-3

● In April 1964, pursuant to the order of the probate court (testacy proceedings), one of the lots
was sold to PNB as the proceeds (deposited in same bank by the administrator) were to be used
to settle the debts of the estate (claims were filed against the estate).
● Then in Nov. 1964, defendants in the reconveyance suit executed a deed of reconveyance of
subject lots in favor of Celestino Salvador's estate. But, in Sept. 1965, the reconveyance court
ordered a new deed of reconveyance to be executed, in favor of the 21 substituted plaintiffs.
Thus, a new reconveyance deed was made in favor of the 21 heirs to which TCTs were later
issued in their names. Consequently, the reconveyance court ordered the release of the
proceeds (PNB passbook) of the April 1964 sale to the 21 heirs but no release was made
awaiting order from probate court.
● However, in March 1996, the probate court approved the claims (taxes, 2 atty.’s fees, loan)
against the estate and ordered the return of the passbook to the administrator as the debts of
the estate should first be settled. Thus, this special civil action for certiorari with preliminary
injunction to assail the order to pay the debts of the estate with the proceeds of the sale of the
lot and to question probate court’s power to dispose of the parcels of land involved in the
reconveyance suit in reconveyance court.

I: Whether the lots and the proceeds of the sale are properties of the heirs hence cannot be used to pay
debts of estate.

R: No. It is a settled point of law that the right of heirs to specific, distributive shares of inheritance
does not become finally determinable until all the debts of the estate are paid. Until then, in the face
of said claims, their rights cannot be enforced, are inchoate, and subject to the existence of a residue
after payment of the debts. Petitioners do not question the existence of the debts abovementioned.
They only contend that the properties involved having been ordered by final judgment reconveyed to
them, not to the estate the same are not properties of the estate but their own, and thus, not liable for
debts of the estate. Said contention is self-refuting. Petitioners rely for their rights on their alleged
character as heirs of Celestino; as such, they were substituted in the reconveyance case; the
reconveyance to them was reconveyance to them as heirs of Celestino Salvador. It follows that the
properties they claim are, even by their own reasoning, part of Celestino's estate.
The right thereto as allegedly his heirs would arise only if said parcels of land are part of the
estate of Celestino, not otherwise. Their having received the same, therefore, in the reconveyance
action, was perforce in trust for the estate, subject to its obligations. They cannot distribute said
properties among themselves as substituted heirs without the debts of the estate being first satisfied.
At any rate, the proceeds of Lot 6 alone (P41,184.00) appears more than sufficient to pay the debt
(P38,872.58); and there will remain the other parcels of land not sold. As to the question of who will
receive how much as heirs, the same is properly determinable by the settlement court, after payment
of the debts.

Omar

9. Ramirez v Baltazar
24 SCRA 918, August 30,1968
Consequences of Art. 777

F:

● On 1959, Victoriana Eugaras executed a real estate mortgage as security for a loan of P2,170.00
in favor of the spouses Artemio Baltazar and Susana Flores.
● Upon the demise of Victoriana, the spouses, as creditors of the deceased, filed a petition for the
intestate proceedings of Victoriana’s estate and later filed for foreclosure against Artemio
Diawan, administrator of the estate.
● The Sheriff then sold the property at public auction to the highest bidder who happened to be
the plaintiffs themselves.
● Thereafter, the heirs named in the petition for intestate proceedings (Filemon and Monica
Ramirez) filed for the annulment of all proceedings for the foreclosure.
● Respondent spouses argued that the plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue.

I: WON the petitioners are legal heirs of Eugaras

Succession Atty. Silang-Enriquez
Batch 2020 JD-3

R: Yes. There is no question that the rights to succession are automatically transmitted to the heirs from
the moment of the death of the decedent. As a rule, the formal declaration or recognition to such
successional rights needs judicial confirmation. But although the heirs have no legal standing in court
upon the commencement of testate or intestate proceedings, this rule admits of an exception as "when
the administrator fails or refuses to act in which event the heirs may act in his place. (The administrator
in this case is being charged to have been in collusion and connivance with the mortgagees of a property
of the deceased, allowing its foreclosure without notifying the heirs, to the prejudice of the latter).

Piodena

10. Puno vs. Puno Enterprises, Inc.

G.R. No. 177066. September 11, 2009 Nachura, J.
Consequences of Art. 777

FACTS:
Petitioner Joselito Puno, claiming to be the son of Carlos L. Puno - an incorporator of respondent Puno
Enterprises who died in 1963, initiated a complaint for specific performance against respondent.
Petitioner prayed that respondent allow the petitioner to inspect its corporate book, render an
accounting of all the transactions it entered into from 1962, and give petitioner all the profits, earnings,
dividends, or income pertaining to the shares of Carlos L. Puno.
RTC rendered a decision ordering the respondents to allow the plaintiff to inspect the corporate books
and records of the company. CA reversed the decision on the ground that the petitioner was not able to
establish the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno since his birth certificate was prepared
without intervention of and the participatory acknowledgement of paternity by Carlos. Hence, he had
no right to demand that he be allowed to examine the respondent’s book.

ISSUE:
W/N petitioner should be allowed to inspect the corporate books and records of the company.

RULING:
No. Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the
corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the corporation.
The stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks
must be recorded in the books of the corporation. Sec 63 of the Corporation Code provides that no
transfer shall be valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the
corporation. During such interim period, the heirs stand as the equitable owners of the stocks, the
executor or administrator duly appointed by the court being vested with the legal title to the stock. Until
a settlement and division of the estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are held by the
administrator or executor. Consequently, during such time, it is the administrator or executor who is
entitled to exercise the rights of the deceased as stockholder. Thus, even if petitioner presents sufficient
evidence in this case to establish that he is the son of Carlos L. Puno, he would still not be allowed to
inspect respondent’s books and be entitled to receive dividends from respondent, absent any showing
in its transfer book that some of the shares owned by Carlos L. Puno were transferred to him. This would
only be possible if petitioner has been recognized as an heir and has participated in the settlement of
the estate of the deceased.
MP in bold.
Sahali, J.

11. Reyes vs RTC of Makati, Branch 142

G.R. No. 165744 August 11, 2008 Brion, J.

FACTS: Oscar and private respondent Rodrigo C. Reyes (Rodrigo) are two of the four children of the
spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes. Pedro, Anastacia, Oscar, and Rodrigo each owned shares of stock of
Zenith Insurance Corporation (Zenith), a domestic corporation established by their family. Pedro died in
1964, while Anastacia died in 1993. Although Pedro's estate was judicially partitioned among his heirs
Succession Atty. Silang-Enriquez
Batch 2020 JD-3

sometime in the 1970s, no similar settlement and partition appear to have been made with Anastacia's
estate, which included her shareholdings in Zenith.
In 2000, Zenith and Rodrigo filed a complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against
Oscar to obtain an accounting of the funds and assets of ZENITHINSURANCE CORPORATION which are
now or formerly in the control, custody, and/or possession of Oscar to determine the shares of stock of
deceased spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes. Such case was transferred to the RTC sitting as a special
commercial court. Oscar filed a Motion to Declare Complaint as Nuisance or Harassment Suit, alleging
that the case is not a bona fide derivative suit as it partakes of the nature of a petition for the settlement
of estate of the deceased Anastacia that is outside the jurisdiction of a special commercial court. The
RTC denied the motion and the CA affirmed the RTC’s order.

ISSUES: Whether the trial court, sitting as a special commercial court, has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of Rodrigo's complaint.

RULING: No. While a special commercial court has jurisdiction to try intra-corporate dispute, there is no
intra-corporate relationship between the parties that would characterize the case as an intra-
corporate dispute. While Rodrigo holds shares of stock in Zenith, he holds them in two capacities: in his
own right with respect to the 4,250 shares registered in his name, and as one of the heirs of Anastacia
Reyes with respect to the 136,598 shares registered in her name. What is material in resolving the
issues of this case under the allegations of the complaint is Rodrigo's interest as an heir since the
subject matter of the present controversy centers on the shares of stocks belonging to Anastacia, not
on Rodrigo's personally-owned shares nor on his personality as shareholder owning these shares. In
this light, all reference to shares of stocks in this case shall pertain to the shareholdings of the deceased
Anastacia and the parties' interest therein as her heirs.
Article 777 of the Civil Code declares that the successional rights are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent. Accordingly, upon Anastacia's death, her children acquired legal title to her
estate (which title includes her shareholdings in Zenith), and they are, prior to the estate's partition,
deemed co-owners thereof. This status as co-owners, however, does not immediately and necessarily
make them stockholders of the corporation. Unless and until there is compliance with Section 63 of the
Corporation Code on the manner of transferring shares, the heirs do not become registered
stockholders of the corporation.
The transfer of title by means of succession, though effective and valid between the parties involved
(i.e., between the decedent's estate and her heirs), does not bind the corporation and third parties. The
transfer must be registered in the books of the corporation to make the transferee-heir a stockholder
entitled to recognition as such both by the corporation and by third parties.
Rodrigo must, therefore, hurdle two obstacles before he can be considered a stockholder of Zenith with
respect to the shareholdings originally belonging to Anastacia. First, he must prove that there are
shareholdings that will be left to him and his co-heirs, and this can be determined only in a settlement of
the decedent's estate. No such proceeding has been commenced to date. Second, he must register the
transfer of the shares allotted to him to make it binding against the corporation. He cannot demand that
this be done unless and until he has established his specific allotment (and prima facie ownership) of the
shares. Without the settlement of Anastacia's estate, there can be no definite partition and distribution
of the estate to the heirs. Without the partition and distribution, there can be no registration of the
transfer. And without the registration, Rodrigo cannot be considered the transferee-heir a stockholder
who may invoke the existence of an intra-corporate relationship as premise for an intra-corporate
controversy within the jurisdiction of a special commercial court.
Sali

12. De Borja v vda. de Borja

46 SCRA 577

Facts:
● Francisco de Borja filed a petition for the probate of the will of her wife Josefa Tangco upon her
death (CFI Rizal). He was appointed executor and administrator while Jose de Borja (their son)
was appointed co-administrator. When Francisco died, Jose became sole administrator.
Subsequently, Francisco took upon himself, a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco (Vda. De Borja).
Even before the estate of Josefa was settled, Francisco died. Tasiana instituted testate
proceedings wherein she was appointed special Administratrix.
Succession Atty. Silang-Enriquez
Batch 2020 JD-3

● The relationship between the children of the first marriage and the second wife, Tasiana had
been plagued with numerous suits and counter-suits and in order to put an end to all these
litigation, a compromise agreement was entered into between Jose, in his personal capacity and
as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa, and by Tasiana, as the heir and surviving spouse
of Francisco. Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Jose agreed and obligated himself to pay
Tasiana the amount of Php800,000.00 as ‘”full and complete payment and settlement of her
hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa, and
to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will
and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for
consideration or otherwise.”

● When Jose submitted the compromise agreement for Court approval with the CFI of Rizal
(probate of will of fi rst wife) and the CFI of Nueva Ecija (probate of will of Francisco), Tasiana
opposed in both instances. She claims among others, that the heirs cannot enter into such kind
of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja.

Issue: Whether the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of Francisco has not yet been
probated.

Ruling: Yes. Tasiana was Francisco’s compulsory heir and her successional interest existed independent
of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist even if such will were not probated at all.
In assailing the validity of the agreement, Tasiana relies on this Court’s decision in Guevara v. Guevara
wherein the Court held the view that presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the
settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is against
the law and public policy. However, the doctrine in said case is not applicable to the case at bar. There
was here no attempt to settle or to distribute the estate of Francisco among the heirs thereto before
the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana of any
and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of Francisco and Josefa. Since a
hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the
death of such predecessor in interest, there is no legal bar to a successor disposing of her or his
hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined
until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed
limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir.

13. Jose C. Lee and Alma Aggabao vs. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City branch 85
G.R. No. 146006 February 23, 2004 Corona, J;
Consequence of Art. 777

FACTS: Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez owned ninety percent (90%) of the subscribed capital stock of Philinterlife.

When Dr. Ortaez died, he left behind a wife(Juliana), three legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and
Antonio Ortaez) and five illegitimate children (herein private respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and
her siblings).

Rafael Ortaez filed before the CFI Quezon City Branch a petition for letters of administration of
the intestate estate of Dr. Ortaez.

Judge Cruz Pao, then presiding judge of Branch 85, appointed Rafael and Jose Ortaez joint
special administrators of their father’s estate.

It appears that several years before (but already during the pendency of the intestate
proceedings), Juliana and her two children, Special Administrators Rafael and Jose Ortaez, entered into a
memorandum of agreement dated March 4, 1982 for the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr.
Ortaez, partitioning the estate (including the Philinterlife shares of stock) among themselves.
Succession Atty. Silang-Enriquez
Batch 2020 JD-3

Thereafter, Juliana and Jose Ortaez separately sold 1,014 shares and 1,011 shares respectively,
in favor of petitioner Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG), represented by its president, herein
petitioner Jose C. Lee.

On July 12, 1995, herein private respondents Enderes et al. filed a motion for appointment of
special administrator of Philinterlife shares of stock. This move was opposed by Special Administrator
Jose Ortaez.

The intestate court granted the motion of private respondents Enderes et al. and appointed
private respondent Enderes special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock.

Thereafter, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the
memorandum of agreement dated March 4, 1982. She likewise filed an urgent motion to declare void ab
initio the deeds of sale of Philinterlife shares of stock, which was again opposed by Jose Ortaez.

The intestate court issued an order granting the motion of Special Administratrix Enderes for the
annulment of the March 4, 1982 memorandum of agreement or extrajudicial partition of estate.

The intestate court declared that the ownership of FLAG over the Philinterlife shares of stock
was null and void and ordered the execution of its order declaring such nullity.

Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao, representing Philinterlife and FLAG, assail before us not
only the validity of the writ of execution issued by the intestate court nullifying the sale of the 2,029
Philinterlife shares of stock made by Juliana and Jose Ortaez, in their personal capacities and without
court approval, in favor of petitioner FLAG.

ISSUE: Whether or not Court approval was necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedent’s
estate.

RULING: The petition has no merit. It is clear that Juliana Ortaez, and her sons invalidly entered into a
memorandum of agreement extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate among themselves, despite
their knowledge that there were other heirs or claimants to the estate and before final settlement of the
estate by the intestate court. Since the appropriation of the estate properties by Juliana and her children
was invalid, the subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party (FLAG), without court
approval, was likewise void.

An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration under
Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted
to the heir without interruption from the moment of death of the decedent.

However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the
division of the estate by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors
shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares. This means that an
heir may only sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein.

Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of
stock in Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending the final
adjudication of the estate by the intestate court because of the undue prejudice it would cause the
other claimants to the estate, as what happened in the present case.

Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate, without court approval. It is
well-settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedent’s estate.

It being settled that property under administration needs the approval of the probate court
before it can be disposed of, any unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is null and void.
Succession Atty. Silang-Enriquez
Batch 2020 JD-3

As early as 1921 in the case of Godoy v. Orellano (42 Phil 347), We laid down the rule that a sale by an
administrator of property of the deceased, which is not authorized by the probate court is null and void
and title does not pass to the purchaser.

14. Heirs of Sandejas v Lina

351 SCRA 183
Opening of Succession; Consequences of Art. 777

FACTS:
February 17, 1981 - Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition praying that letters of administration
be issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate of his wife, Remedios. Letters of administration
were approved, appointing him as administrator.
April 19, 1983 - an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and petition-in-intervention was
filed by Alex A. Lina alleging, among others, that Eliodoro, in his capacity as seller, bound and obligated
himself, his heirs, administrators, and assigns, to sell forever and absolutely and in their entirety the
following parcels of land which formed part of the estate of the late Remedios. The lower court issued
an order granting the intervention.
January 7, 1985 – the counsel for Eliodoro filed a manifestation alleging among others that he
had already died in Canada. He also alleged, among others that the matter of the claim of Lina becomes
a money claim to be filed in the estate of the late Mr. Eliodoro P. Sandejas. The lower court ordered all
the heirs of Eliodoro to move for the appointment of a new administrator.
January 15, 1986 - Lina filed a Motion for his appointment as a new administrator of the
Intestate Estate of Remedios, stating that he has not received any motion from the heirs for the
appointment, his appointment would be beneficial to the heirs, and that he would be willing to give way
anytime to any administrator proposed by the heirs. The lower court granted the motion of Lina and was
appointed administrator.
August 28, 1986 – the heirs filed a MR for the appointment of another administrator Mr. Sixto
Sandejal, stating among others, that it was only lately that Mr. Sixto Sandejas, a son and heir, expressed
his willingness to act as a new administrator. Lina agreed provided that Sixto Sandejas be also appointed
as administrator of the intestate estate of his father, Eliodoro Sr. (Spec. Proc. No. 85-33707), the two (2)
cases have been consolidated.
The Intestate court (lower court) granted Lina's motion for the approval of the Receipt of
Earnest Money with Promise to sell and to Buy dated June 7, 1982.
Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA held that the contract between Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and
Lina was merely a contract to sell, not a perfected contract of sale. It ruled that the ownership of the
four lots was to remain in the intestate estate of Remedios Sandejas until the approval of the sale was
obtained from the settlement court. That approval was a positive suspensive condition, the
nonfulfillment of which was not tantamount to a breach. It was simply an event that prevented the
obligation from maturing or becoming effective. If the condition did not happen, the obligation would
not arise or come into existence.
Hence, this petition is to review under rule 45, modifying the order of the lower court. It
approved the Receipt of Earnest Money With Promise to Buy and Sell dated June 7, 1982, only to the
three-fifth (3/5) portion of the disputed lots covering the share of administrator Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. in
the property.

ISSUE: Whether there is error in the computation of the decedent’s share in the realty under
administration.

RULING:
Yes. Petitioners aver that the CA's computation of Eliodoro Sr.'s share in the disputed parcels of
land was erroneous because, as the conjugal partner of Remedios, he owned one half of these lots plus
a further one tenth of the remaining half, in his capacity as a one of her legal heirs. Hence, Eliodoro's
share should be 11/20 of the entire property. Respondent poses no objection to this computation.
On the other hand, the CA held that, at the very least, the conditional sale should cover the one
half (1/2) pro indiviso conjugal share of Eliodoro plus his one tenth (1/10) hereditary share as one of the
ten legal heirs of the decedent, or a total of three fifths (3/5) of the lots in administration.
Succession Atty. Silang-Enriquez
Batch 2020 JD-3

Petitioners are correct. The CA computed Eliodoro's share as an heir based on one tenth of the
entire disputed property. It should be based only on the remaining half, after deducting the conjugal
share.
Succession laws and jurisprudence require that when a marriage is dissolved by the death of
the husband or the wife, the decedent's entire estate - under the concept of conjugal properties of
gains -- must be divided equally, with one half going to the surviving spouse and the other half to the
heirs of the deceased. After the settlement of the debts and obligations, the remaining half of the
estate is then distributed to the legal heirs, legatees and devices. We assume, however, that this
preliminary determination of the decedent's estate has already been taken into account by the
parties, since the only issue raised in this case is whether Eliodoro's share is 11/20 or 3/5 of the
disputed lots.

15. Sps. Virgilio Santos and Esperanza Santos et.al vs. Sps. Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao
G.R. No. 1691219 March 28, 2007 Chico-Nazario,J
Consequences of Art. 777

FACTS: Petitioners in this case are legitimate and surviving spouse of the late Rita Santos who died
intestate. Rita, in her lifetime, sold to respondents Sps. Lumbao her share over in the state of her
mother a portion of 100 square meters and additional 7square meters through a document named
Bilihan ng Lupa notarized before a notary public. Several demands made by the Sps. Lumbao to Rita in
her lifetime and later to herein petitioners for the execution of necessary documents to effect issuance
of separate title however they contended that they could not deliver the title as the entire property had
not yet partitioned. Later on, Sps. Lumbao learned that petitioners executed Deed of Extrajudicial
settlement and a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of a certain Julieta Esplana involving the same
property. Hence, they filed a Complaint for a Reconveyance with Damages. Now, herein petitioner
claimed that the complaint is dismissable as it failed to comply with Katarungang Pambarangay Law;
that the document Bilihan ng Lupa is falsified; and that they are barred by Statute of Limitation since
they filed the complaint 12 years after the execution of Bilihan ng Lupa.

ISSUE: Whether the document Bilihan ng Lupa is valid and enforceable.

RULING: Yes. Bilihan ng Lupa documents were duly notarized before the notary public. It is well-settled
that a document acknowledged before a notary public is a public document that enjoys the presumption
of regularity. Thus, the heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered into by their
predecessor-in-interest because they have inherited the property that is subject to the liability affecting
their ancestor. They only succeed to what rights their mother had and what is valid and binding against
her is valid and binding against them.

Art. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.

16. Rodriguez et. al. v. Borja et. al. (Pangilinan & Jacalan)
17 SCRA 418, G.R. No. L-21993, June 21, 1966

FACTS:
A petition for a writ of certiorari and prohibition to the CFI Bulacan for its refusal to grant motion
to dismiss.

Petitioners Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio Rodriguez alleged in a motion to dismiss that
CFI Bulacan "has no jurisdiction to try the case in view of the pendency of another action for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez in CFI Rizal which was filed ahead.
Fr. Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963. For 33 years, his residence as parish priest was in Hagonoy,
Bulacan (1930-1963); but he retained with intention to return the place of his birth in Parañaque, Rizal.

They further contend that since the intestate proceedings in CFI Rizal was filed at 8 AM on
March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the CFI Bulacan at 11 AMon the same date,
the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate.
Succession Atty. Silang-Enriquez
Batch 2020 JD-3

Respondents Pangilinan and Jacalan claim that CFI Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case
upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4 and that the case in CFI Bulacan
therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12.

They further claim that as early as March 7, petitioners were aware of the existence of the
purported will of Father Rodriguez, deposited in the CFI Bulacan, since they filed a petition to examine
the same, and that petitioners filed the intestate proceedings in Rizal "for no other purpose than to
prevent CFI Bulacan from exercising jurisdiction over the probate proceedings".

Motion to dismiss was not granted. Reconsideration was denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUES:
1. W/N CFI Bulacan has jurisdiction over the case.
2. W/N the institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may proceed while the probate of the
purported will of Father Rodriguez is pending.

RULING:
1. YES. The jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the
late Father Rodriguez on March 4, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon
the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for
proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by the Rules of
Court on settlement of decedent's estates (Section 3, Rule 76).

The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan CFI ahead of any other, that court is entitled
to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue.

2. NO. Intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy
only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will (*Article 960 of the Civil Code). Only after final
decision as to the nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form
of pre-established action".

17. Nepomuceno v CA
139 SCRA 206, October 9, 1985
Disposition in favor of the mistress

F: Martin Jugo, the testator, was married to Rufina Gomez and had two (2) children (Oscar and
Carmelita), the private respondents, from that marriage. Later, he became estranged from his family
and eventually married herein petitioner, Sofia Napumuceno.

The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and
Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner. The Will explicitly states the
bigamous relationship of the testator with petitioner.

BEFORE THE CFI OF RIZAL: After the death of the testator, herein petitioner filed a petition for probate
of last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo before the CFI of Rizal. The legal wife, Rufina
Gomez, with Martin Jugo’s two children filed an opposition. Private respondents claim that the
execution of the Will was procured by undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner. That
the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the
testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus letters testamentary should not be issued to her. The CFI
denied the probate of the Will initiated by petitioner.

BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS: The petitioner appealed the decision of the CFI to the CA. The CA, in
turn, ruled that the Will is valid except that the devise, in favor of Petitioner, is null and void pursuant to
Article 739 of the Civil Code which prohibits donation between persons who were guilty of adultery or
concubinage.
Succession Atty. Silang-Enriquez
Batch 2020 JD-3

APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT: Unsatisfied with the CA’s judgment, Petitioner went to the highest
court, questioning the jurisdiction of the CA to void the devise in the Will in her favor. Petitioner
contends that the discussion about Article 739 (which refers to the intrinsic validity of a Will) is improper
in a Probate proceeding and should be lodged in another petition. Since, as alleged by petitioner,
Probate proceedings should only inquire in to the extrinsic validity of a Will.

I: 1. Whether or not the devise in favor of Sofia Naumuceno, the Petitioner, is void.
2. (Baka lang itanong) Whether or not the Probate Court is barred to judge on the intrinsic validity of the
Will.

R: YES. The prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between
persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver
cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the
legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had
been living in concubinage.

2. NO. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will. Citing Nuguid v. Nuguid “the trial court
acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been
established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. “(NOTE: The General Rule,
Probate courts will only deal with extrinsic validity of a Will)

MP: A devise given by a married man estranged from his wife for 22 years prior to his death, to a
woman with whom he has been living for said period of time is void.

PETITION DISMISSED.

Imlan

18. Seangio vs. Reyes Seangio vs. Reyes

508 SCRA 177, G.R. Nos. 140371–72 November 27, 2006, AZCUNA J;
Necessity of Conveyance of Property

F: SP. Proc. No. 98–90870 (Intestate Case) Private respondents Alfredo, Alberto, Elisa, Victor, Alfonso,
Shirley, Betty, and James, all children of Segundo, filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate
estate of Segundo, and prayed for the appointment of Elisa as special administrator and guardian ad
litem of Dy Yieng.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara, and Virginia contended that: (1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and
in full command of her faculties; (2) Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia
giving her the power to manage his business in the Philippines; (3) Virginia is the most qualified to serve
as the administrator because she is a CPA; and (4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20,
1995, disinheriting Alfredo Seangio, for cause.
Segundo’s holographic will is quoted :
“Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St.,
Ermita, Manila . . . naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama
harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe
rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa
ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.”
“Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para
makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China
Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng
malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking.”
“. . . pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga customer ng Travel Center
of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.”
Succession Atty. Silang-Enriquez
Batch 2020 JD-3

SP. Proc. No. 99–93396 (Probate Case) Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara, and Virginia filed a petition
for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo. They reiterated that the probate proceedings take
precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
Respondent Judge Reyes dismissed the petition for probate on the ground of Preterition— the
omission by a testator of one of his heirs who is entitled to a legitime.

I: Whether probate proceedings take precedence over intestate proceedings.

R: YES. Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance
instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by Article 810 . It is written,
dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly
deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the
latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. Considering
that the questioned document is Segundo’s holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over
intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with in accordance with Article 838 which
provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court. The continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will
work injustice to petitioners, and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo. The trial court
should have allowed the holographic will to be probated.
The Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will.
The holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir but simply contains a disinheritance of a
compulsory heir. Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The
mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to
institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between
Segundo and his son, Alfredo.
Under Article 783, the law specifically refers to the need to control to a certain degree the
disposition of an estate. A person writes a will because he wants to control the disposition of his estate
after his death. It is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the
form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. A
will which was executed for the sole purpose of recognizing an illegitimate child or for the sole purpose
of requiring certain funeral rites is not a will.

Jamdani

19. De Roma v. CA
G.R. No. L-46903 Date: July 23, 1987 Ponente: Cruz, J.
Topic: Rules of Interpretation (Arts. 788, 790 and 791)
FACTS:
● After the intestate death of Candelaria de Roma, petitioner BUHAY DE ROMA was appointed
administratix of the former’s estate. and in due time filed an inventory of the estate. This was
opposed by ROSALINDA BUHAY on the ground that certain properties earlier donated by
Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been included. The properties in question
consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth P10,297.50.2 There is no dispute regarding
their evaluation; what the parties cannot agree upon is whether these lands are subject to
collation. ROSALINDA argues that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code. BUHAY, for
her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has no obligation to collate because the decedent
prohibited such collation and the donation was not officious.
ISSUE:
● Whether the deed of donation expressly prohibited the collation of donated properties?
RULING:
● NO. The Supreme Court concluded that there is nothing in the above provisions expressly
prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the said court correctly observed, the
phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely described the
donation as "irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express prohibition against
collation. The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject
thereof from the collation required under Article 1061. We surmise from the use of such terms
as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed of donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and
we may also presume he understood the legal consequences of the donation being made. It is
Succession Atty. Silang-Enriquez
Batch 2020 JD-3

reasonable to suppose, given the precise language of the document, that he would have
included therein an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donor's intention.
Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Article
1062.

20. Dizon-Rivera v Dizon

G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970
Topic: Rules of Interpretation (Arts. 788, 790 and 791)

FACTS: On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died, to wit, six legitimate
children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-
appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is
the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent.
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the Pampango dialect.
Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory heirs, together with seven other
legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera,
Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon.
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties appraised at
P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture valued at
P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar Development
Company valued at P350.00) among her above-named heirs.
Testate proceedings were in due course commenced and by order dated March 13, 1961, the last will
and testament of the decedent was duly allowed and admitted to probate, and the appellee Marina
Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix of the testatrix' estate, and upon her filing her bond and oath of
office, letters testamentary were duly issued to her.
The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a total appraised
value of P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the seven compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.
In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her property be divided" in accordance with her testamentary
disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising practically the
entire bulk of her estate among her six children and eight grandchildren.
The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance adjudicating the estate
as follows:
(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina (exacultrix-appellee) and Tomas
(appellant) are admittedly considered to have received in the will more than their respective legitime,
while the rest of the appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia received less
than their respective legitime;
(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively given them in the will, plus cash
and/or properties, to complete their respective legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the other hand, Marina
and Tomas are adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less the cash and/or properties
necessary to complete the prejudiced legitime mentioned in number 2 above;
The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix' project of partition, ruling that
"(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or
prejudiced, the same shall be completed and satisfied. While it is true that this process has been
followed and adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is observed that the executrix and the
oppositors differ in respect to the source from which the portion or portions shall be taken in order to
fully restore the impaired legitime. The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result
in a distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil Code" adding that
"the testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted.

Issue: WON the last will of the deceased is to be considered controllin in this case
Ruling: Yes, Articles 788 and 791 provide that "(I)f a testamentary disposition admits of different
interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be
preferred" and "(T)he words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression
some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of
interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." In Villanueva vs. Juico6 for
violation of these rules of interpretation as well as of Rule 123, section 59 of the old Rules of Court, the
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, overturned the lower court's decision and stressed that
"the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of
Succession Atty. Silang-Enriquez
Batch 2020 JD-3

interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be
settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it
clearly appears that his intention was otherwise."
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments,
and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, when expressed clearly and
precisely in his last will amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed
and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested
parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Guided and restricted by
these fundamental premises, the Court finds for the appellee.

21. Vda. De Villaflor v. Villaflor v. Juico

G.R. No. 15737, February 28, 1962
Rules of Interpretation (Arts. 788, 790 and 791)

F:
● On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolás Villaflor, a wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a
will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Doña
Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and personal properties, giving the other half to his
brother Don Fausto Villaflor. The 12th clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and
7th thereof would be deemed annulled from the moment he bore any child with Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno.
● Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with his wife Doña
Mausta Nepomuceno. The widow instituted Special Proceeding for the settlement of her
husband’s estate then she was appointed as judicial administratrix. She submitted a project of
partition “Exhibit E”, and the probate court ordered it approved (now exhibit C). By virtue also of
the said project of partition, she received the use and possession of all the real and personal
properties. however, expressly provided that approval thereof was "sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto
en la clausula 8.0 del testamento de Nicolas Villaflor."
● On May 1, 1956, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno died without having contracted a second marriage,
and without having begotten any child with the deceased. Defendant Delfin N. Juico is
appointed as the qualified Judicial Adminstrator. The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva
is admitted to be the same Leonor Villaflor mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his will as his
"sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor".
● Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the administrator of the estate of
the widow Fausta Nepomuceno, contending that upon the widow's death, she became vested
with the ownership of the real and personal properties bequeathed by the late Nicolás Villaflor
to clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant contended that the title to
the properties became absolutely vested in the widow upon her death, on account of the fact
that she never remarried.

I: Whether title to the properties became vested to Plaintiff Villaflor

R: YES. Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is declared entitled to the ownership and fruits of the
properties described in clause 3 6 of the wi ll or ment, from the date of the death of Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno.the plain desire and intent of the testator, as manifested in clause 8 of his testament was
to invest his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the properties described in the seventh clause,
subject to the further condition (admitted by the appellee) that if the widow remarried, her rights would
thereupon cease, even during her own lifetime. That the widow was meant to have no more than a life
interest in those properties, even if she did not remarry at all, is evident from the expressions used by
the deceased uso y , posesi mientras viva" (use and possession while alive) in which the first half of the
phrase "uso y , posesión " inste of "dominio" or "propiedad") reinforces the second ("mientras viva").
The testator plainly did not give his widow the full ownership of these particular properties, but only the
right to their possession and use (or enjoyment) during her lifetime. This is in contrast with the
remainder of the estate in which she was instituted universal heir together with the testator's brother
(clause 6).
The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as reversionary legatee, could succeed to
the properties bequeathed by clause 3 6 of the testa ment in the event that the widow remarried, has
unwarrantedly discarded the expression "mientras viva," and considered the words "uso y , posesió n"
Succession Atty. Silang-Enriquez
Batch 2020 JD-3

as equival en t to " nio" (ownership). In so doing, the trial court violated Article 791 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines. Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions contained in
clause 7 of his testamente should not be allowed to obscure the clear and unambiguous meaning of
his plain words, which are over the primary source in ascertaining his intent. It is well to note that if
the testator had intended to impose as sole condition the non-remarriage of his widow, the words
"uso y posesión mientras viva" would have been unnecessary, since the widow could only remarry
during her own lifetime.

MP (BOOK, p. 34): Supreme Court has laid the doctrine in In re Estate of Calderón, 26 Phil., 233, that
the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of
interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be
settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless
it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise. The same rule is adopted by the Supreme Court of
Spain

Omar

22. Balanay, Jr. v Martinez

64 SCRA 454, June 27, 1975
Rules of Severability / Separability

FACTS:
● Leodegaria Julian was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate
children named Felix Jr., Avelina, Beatriz, Carolina, Delia, and Emilia.
● Felix Jr. filed a petition for the probate of his mother's notarial will. In the said will, Leodegaria
Julian declared, among others, that she was the owner of the "southern half of nine conjugal
lots”. She stated that after her husband's death, her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands
(which she described as "my properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner set
forth in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all
owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one-half share of the conjugal assets.
● Avelina and their counsel assailed the provision of the will praying that the probate of the
should be withdrawn and that the will be declared void for being contrary to law.

ISSUE: W/N the will should be void

RULING: No. Although the statement of the testatrix that she owned the southern half of the conjugal
lands is contrary to law because her share was inchoate and proindiviso, that illegal declaration,
however, does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.
By virtue of Art. 792 of the Civil Code, where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others
invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the
intention of the testator or interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the
beneficiaries.

Piodena

23. Bellis vs. Bellis

No. L-23678. June 6, 1967 Bengzon, J.
Governing Law of Substantive Validity of a Will
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis, was born and died a citizen of Texas, United States. By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen,
whom he divorced, and second unnamed wife, he had 7 legitimate children who survived him. And he
had 3 illegitimate children: Amos, Jr., Maria Cristina and Miriam.
In 1952, Amos executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations,
and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the
following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife; (b) P120,000.00 to his 3 illegitimate
children, or P40,000.00 each and (c) the remainder shall go to his 7 surviving children in equal shares.
Succession Atty. Silang-Enriquez
Batch 2020 JD-3

In 1958, Amos died. The executor of the will, reported the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen and
the legacies of 3 illegitimate children. In the project of partition, the executor divided the residuary
estate into 7 equal portions for the 7 legitimate children.
Thereafter, Maria and Miriam (2 of illegitimate children) filed their respective oppositions to the project
of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children. Lower
court overruled the opposition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes. MR denied. Maria and
Miriam thus appealed to this court. They argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned
in Art. 17(3) in relation to Art 16 of the NCC.
ISSUE:
Which law must be applied, Texas or Philippine law?
RULING:
Texas law. Article 16 (2), and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to: (a) the order of succession; (b) the
amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity
to succeed.
Appellants argument that Art. 17(3), of the NCC, prevails as the exception to Art. 16 (2) is not correct. It
is evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals, for it has
specifically chosen to leave the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate
and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his
Philippine estate. The Court disagrees. A provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties
shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void,
for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Art. 16 of the Civil Code states said
national law should govern.
The decedent, Amos, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas,
there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will
and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of the deceased.
Sahali, J.

24_De Guzman v Intestate Estate of Francisco Benitez,

G.R. No. 61167-68 January 20, 1989 GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.

FACTS:
● Francisco Benitez died at the age of 61 years old, without descendants, nor ascendants, nor
brothers and sisters. He left an estate consisting of fourteen parcels of coconut land in Laguna, a
residential lot, and a small savings account (P3,843.08) in the Philippine National Bank.
● Dionisia Valenzuela and her brother, Melquiades Valenzuela, first-cousins of the deceased
Francisco Benitez, filed a petition for administration of his intestate estate and for the issuance
of letters of administration to Dionisia.
● However, the petition for administration was opposed by Emiterio de Guzman on the ground
that the deceased left a will bequeathing his entire estate to him and he also filed a petition for
probate. De Guzman later died and was substituted by his heirs.
● Dionisia, et. al moved to reject the will on account of insanity. The court rendered judgment
disallowing the will and appointing Dionisia Valenzuela administratrix of the intestate estate of
the deceased.
● The evidence shows that from January 18, 1929 up to March 12, 1941 Francisco Benitez was
confined at the National Mental Hospital for varying periods of time. This leads the court to the
conclusion that at the time Francisco Benitez executed his supposed will on August 18, 1945 he
did not possess a sound and disposing mind. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision
was affirmed.

ISSUE:
Succession Atty. Silang-Enriquez
Batch 2020 JD-3

Whether the Court erred in finding the deceased Francisco Benitez not in the possession of a
sound and disposing mind when he executed his will?

RULING:
● No. Plainly, the petition raises a purely factual issue, which We are not at liberty to review
because in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth, may be raised. In any event, the decision of the Court of
Appeals reveals that the Court carefully weighed the evidence on the question of the
testamentary capacity or lack of it, of the deceased Francisco Benitez and found "no compelling
reason to disturb the lower court's findings and conclusions." The resolution of that question
hinged on the credibility of the witnesses. The cardinal rule on that point is that the trial courts,
assessment of the credibility of witnesses while testifying is generally binding on the appellate
court because of its superior advantage in observing their conduct and demeanor and its
findings, when supported by convincingly credible evidence, shall not be disturbed on appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit.

25. Baltazar vs Laxa

G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012. Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
On September 13, 1981, Paciencia, a 78 year old spinster, childless with no siblings, made her last will
and testament, with all her property in favor of her nephew Lorenzo Laxa, whom she regards as her own
son, his wife and 2 children, executed in the house of a retired judge, Limpin. There were 3 witnesses,
one being Dra. Limpin, daughter of Judge Limpin. The formalities of signing the will by the testator and
the witnesses were fulfilled. The will remained with Judge Limpin until Lorenzo, 4 years after Paciencia’s
death, filed a petition for the probate of the will and for the issuance of letters of administration in his
favor. Petitioner Baltazar filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition averring that the properties subject to
the will belongs to his predecessor in interest. The other petitioners joined in contending that
Paciencia’s will was null and void because ownership of the properties had not been transferred to
Pacienca pursuant to Art. 1049, par. 3, claiming also that the Will was not executed and attested to in
accordance with the requirements of the law; that she was mentally incapable of executing the will at
the time of its execution, and there was undue influence or duress on her by Lorenzo and other persons
or that there was forgery of her signature, or it was obtained through fraud and trickery. Petitioners
prayed that Baltazar be given the letters of administrator. RTC ruled in petitioners’ favor, ruling that
Paciencia was of unsound mind during the execution of the will (“magulyan” or “forgetful”, as per
Rosie’s testimony, a petitioner and a relative of Pacencia who helped with household chores), however,
the CA reversed such decision and granted the probate of the will of Pacencia, ruling that the state of
being 'magulyan' does not make a person mentally unsound to make Pacencia unfit for executing a Will,
and that petitioners were not able to overcome the presumption that every person is of sound mind.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but such was dismissed. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUE:

1.Whether or not the authenticity and due execution of the notarial Will was sufficiently established to
warrant its allowance for probate?
2. Whether or not petitioners failed to prove that Paciencia was not of sound mind at the time the will
was allegedly executed.

RULING:

1. Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a Will in probate
proceedings Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of
sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. These
formalities are enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code:
Succession Atty. Silang-Enriquez
Batch 2020 JD-3

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another”.

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The
notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the Office of the Clerk
of Court.
ITCAB, faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law is apparent from the face of the Will.
The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all
present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical requirement
that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed the Will in the presence of one another and
that the witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one
another. Even petitioners agreed that Pacencia’s signature may be authentic, questioning instead her
state of mind.

2.The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies
on the shoulders of the petitioners. SC agrees with the position of the CA that the state of being
forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a
Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. The above are provided in the following
provisions:

Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his
reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury
or other cause.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the
estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.

Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on
the person who opposes the probate of the will. But if the testator, one month, or less, before making
his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove
that the testator made it during a lucid interval.

ITCAB, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less before
the making of the Will. Petitioners presented no substantial evidence to prove the same, thereby
warranting the CA's finding that they failed to discharge such burden. Bare arguments, no matter how
forceful, if not based on concrete and substantial evidence cannot suffice to move the Court to uphold
said allegations. Furthermore, a scrutiny of the Will discloses that Paciencia was aware of the nature of
the document she executed. She specially requested that the customs of her faith be observed upon her
death, and was well aware of how she acquired the properties from her parents and the properties she
is bequeathing. The SC also stressed that "The very existence of [the Will] is in itself prima facie proof
that the supposed testatrix has willed that her estate be distributed in the manner therein provided, and
it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given full effect independent of the
attitude of the parties affected thereby. This, coupled with Lorenzo’s established relationship with
Paciencia, the evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, as opposed to the total lack of
evidence presented by petitioners apart from their self-serving testimonies, constrains the SC to allow
the will’s probate and favor its authenticity.

26. Suroza v Honrado

110 SCRA 388, December 19, 1981
Notarial will

Facts:
Succession Atty. Silang-Enriquez
Batch 2020 JD-3

Spouses Mauro Suroza and Marcelina Salvador, who were childless, reared a boy named Agapito.
Agapito and his wife Nenita de Vera had a daughter named Lilia. Nenita became Agapito’s guardian
when he became disabled. A certain Arsenia de la Cruz also wanted to be his guardian in another
proceeding but it was dismissed. Arsenia then delivered a child named Marilyn Sy to Marcelina who
brought her up as a supposed daughter of Agapito. Marilyn used the surname Suroza although not
legally adopted by Agapito. When Marcelina (who was an illiterate) was 73 years old, she supposedly
executed a notarial will which was in English and thumbmarked by her. In the will, she allegedly
bequeathed all her properties to Marilyn. She also named as executrix her laundrywoman, Marina Paje.
Paje filed a petition for probate of Marcelina’s will. Judge Honrado appointed Paje as administratrix and
issued orders allowing the latter to withdraw money from the savings account of Marcelina and Marilyn,
and instructing the sheriff to eject the occupants of testatrix’s house, among whom was Nenita. She and
the other occupants filed a motion to set aside the order ejecting them, alleging that Agapito was the
sole heir of the deceased, and that Marilyn was not the decedent’s granddaughter. Despite this, Judge
Honrado issued an order probating Marcelina’s will.
Nenita filed an omnibus petition to set aside proceedings, admit opposition with counter-petition for
administration and preliminary injunction, and an opposition to the probate of the will and a counter-
petition for letters of administration, which were dismissed by Judge Honrado. Instead of appealing,
Nenita filed a case to annul the probate proceedings but Judge Honrado dismissed it. The judge then
closed the testamentary proceeding after noting that the executrix had delivered the estate to Marilyn,
and that the estate tax had been paid.
Ten months later, Nenita filed a complaint before the SC, charging Judge Honrado with having probated
the fraudulent will of Marcelina. She reiterated her contention that the testatrix was illiterate as shown
by the fact that she affixed her thumbmark to the will and that she did not know English, the language in
which the will was written. She further alleged that Judge Honrado did not take into account the
consequences of the preterition of testatrix’s son, Agapito. Judge Honrado in his comment did not deal
specifically with the allegations but merely pointed to the fact that Nenita did not appeal from the
decree of probate and that in a motion, she asked for a thirty day period within which to vacate the
house of the testatrix. Nenita subsequently filed in the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition
against Judge Honrado wherein she prayed that the will, the decree of probate and all the proceedings
in the probate case be declared void. The CA dismissed the petition because Nenita’s remedy was an
appeal and her failure to do so did not entitle her to resort to the special civil action of certiorari. Relying
on that decision, Judge Honrado filed a MTD the administrative case for having allegedly become moot
and academic.

Issue:
Whether or not a will written in another language which is a translation of the language known to the
testator is void

Ruling:
YES. That could only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix
and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every
will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. Thus, a will written in English,
which was not known to the Igorot testator, is void and must be disallowed.

27. Reyes v vda. de Vidal

2 SCUD 53, April 21, 1952
Forms of Will

Facts:
On November 6, 1945, a petition for the probate of said will was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila. On December 21, 1945, Dolores Zuñiga Vda. de Vidal, sister of the
deceased, filed an opposition based on several grounds. And, after several days of trial, at
which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered its decision
disallowing the will on the ground that the signatures of the deceased appearing therein are
not genuine, that it was not proven that the deceased knew the Spanish language in which it
was written, and that even if the signatures are genuine, the same reveal that the deceased
was not of sound mind when she signed the will. From this decision petitioner appealed to this
Court.
Succession Atty. Silang-Enriquez
Batch 2020 JD-3

Issue:
1) Whether or not the signatures of the deceased appearing in the will are genuine
2) Whether or not there is evidence to show that the testatrix knew the language in which the will was
written
3) Whether or not the testatrix was of sound and disposing mind when she signed the will.

Ruling:
1. To prove that the will was signed by the testatrix in accordance with law, petitioner
presented as witnesses the three persons who attested to the execution of the will. These
witnesses are: Cornelia Gonzales de Romero, Quintin Ulpindo and Consuelo B. de Catindig.
These witnesses testified in their own simple and natural way that the deceased signed the will
seated on her bed but over a small table placed near the bed in their presence, and after she
had signed it in the places where her signatures appear, they in turn signed it in the presence
and in the presence of each other. The standards should, if possible, have been made by the
same time as the suspected document. It is preferable that the standards embraced the time of
the origin of the document, so that one part comes from the time after the origin. If possible
less than five or six signatures should always be examined and preferably double that number.

2. Another ground on which the lower court base the disallowance of the will is the failure of
the petitioner to prove that the testratrix knew and spoke the language in which the will in
question appears to have been written. According to the lower court, the law requires that the
will should be written in the dialect or language known to the testator and this fact having been
proven, the probate of the will must fail. And the will was disallowed.

3. The remaining ground which the lower court has considered in disallowing the will is the fact
that the deceased was not of sound and disposing mind when she signed the will, and it
reached this conclusion, not because of any direct evidence on the matter, but simply because
the deceased signed the will in a somewhat varied form. They do not reveal a condition of
forgery or lack of genuineness. These differences or irregularities are common in the writings of
old people and, far from showing lack of genuineness, are indicative of the age, sickness, or
weak condition of the writer. A comparison of the three disputed signatures in the will readily
give this impression.

28_Taboada v Rosal, 118 SCRA 195

FACTS:

A petition for probate was filed by Petitioner Apolonio Taboada before the Court of First Instance,
attaching therewith the last will and testament of Dorotea Perez. The will, written in Cebuano-Visayan
dialect, consisted of two (2) pages. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and is
signed at the bottom of the page by Dorotea alone, and at the left margin by three (3) witnesses. The
second page contained the attestation clause and acknowledgement is signed at the end of the
attestation by three (3) witnesses and at the left margin by Dorotea. Since no opposition was filed, the
Court allowed the presentation of evidence.

However, the Court, under Judge Ramon Pamitian, issued an order denying the probate of the will of
Dorotea and ordered the submission of names of the intestate heirs. When a new judge was assigned in
Succession Atty. Silang-Enriquez
Batch 2020 JD-3

the case, Respondent Judge Avelino Rosal, the Court again denied the motion for reconsideration filed
by Apolonio because he failed to comply with the order requiring him to submit the names of intestate
heirs. It ruled that Art. 805 of the Civil Code provides that for a notarial will to be valid, it is not enough
that only the testatrix signs at the end of the page, but also the subscribing witnesses in the same place
or at the end and of one another because attesting witnesses to a will attest not merely the will itself
but also the signature of testator.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Art. 805 of the Civil Code must be strictly construed in order for a will to be valid.

RULING:

NO, the requirement of subscription was fully satisfied. Clearly, Art. 805 of the Civil Code stated that the
will must be subscribed or signed at its end by the testator, or by testator’s name written by another
person in his presence, or by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. However, the signatures of the
witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will attested not only to the genuineness of the
signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation.

While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual forms
should be ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed. Thus, the law is to be
liberally construed in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes but with
sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent commission of fraud.