1434 2523 1 SM
1434 2523 1 SM
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Poznań 2014
Makedonka Mitrova
Abstract. Makedonka Mitrova, Ottoman Macedonia between the politics of the young Turks and the kingdom
of Serbia: expectations and negotiations.
The aim of this article is to analyze the politics of the Serbian Kingdom towards the newly created situation in
Ottoman Macedonia, caused by the Young Turks Revolution in 1908. The activities of the Serbian Chetnik or-
ganisation in Ottoman Macedonia were discontinued, and instead a Serbian political organization was estab-
lished. This organisation was mostly interested in the following agenda: regulating the status of the so called
“Serbian people” in the Ottoman Empire; regular use of the national name “Serb” instead of the general term
“Rum”; expansion of the patriarchies privileges to the “Serbs” in Ottoman Macedonia, and etc.
Keywords: Serbia, Young Turks Revolution, Serbian Political Organization, Bogdan Radenkovic, Ottoman
Macedonia
Balcanica Posnaniensia. Acta et studia, XXI, Poznań 2014, Wydawnictwo Instytutu Historii UAM, pp. 121-136,
ISBN 978-83-63047-59-7, ISSN 0239-4278. English text..
The Ottoman Empire at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the
20th century was turned into a semi-colonial state. The absolute regime of Abdul
Hamid II generated feudal social-economic relations that caused directly further leg-
ging behind of the overall development of the Empire. The initial forms of the capital-
ist production relations due to the absence of legislation were not able to spread and
to become more dynamic. Hence, also the process of creating a new layer of citizens
that would have unavoidably caused changes in the social-political system stagnat-
ed. The western states via a system of concessions, loans as well as by opening banks
managed to take over the financial developments in the Empire. The biggest imperial
Ottoman bank, serving as the state’s central bank, was under the British-French con-
trol. The Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA) also played a special role in
turning the Empire into a semi-colonial state. It was established by the western states,
after bankruptcy was declared in 1881, and the Administration had a right to take one
122 Makedonka Mitrova
third of the total income of the state. With this institution a parallel system of popula-
tion exploitation and impoverishment was established.1
Under such economic-social conditions, part of the Ottoman social structure (lead
by the Young Turk movement) strived towards unifying all different discontents in
order to overthrow the sultan’s system of Abdul Hamid II.2 The Young Turk move-
ment in Ottoman Macedonia was initially oriented towards attracting Muslim mili-
tary and civil intelligence. Thessaloniki, as the most cosmopolitan town in Ottoman
Macedonia was the centre of discontent among the young Ottoman military elite. The
officers of the III Army stationed in this city, who, due to the big debt of the state, had
not been paid and promoted to higher ranks regularly.3 This was also an attempt to get
rid of the tutorial attitude and interference of the great European powers in the inter-
nal affairs of the Ottoman Empire.
However, Ottoman Macedonia for some time was also the centre for organising
the resistance of the Macedonian population against the absolutistic regime. This was
also accompanied by the strong presence of the Balkan paramilitaries in this Ottoman
region (especially after the 1903 Ilinden Uprising was suppressed) that brought the
general situation up to a boiling point. Due to the presence and terror of the paramil-
itaries of the neighbouring states, the so-called “Macedonian question” at the begin-
ning of 1908 entered probably its most critical phase, and once again it spread abroad.
It became the reason for the great discord among the great European powers, es-
pecially after Austro-Hungary gained a permission to constructing the Thessaloniki
Railway that meant placing Ottoman Macedonia under the indirect control of Austro-
Hungary.
Having the “Macedonian question” once again in focus, the strengthening and
spreading of the Young Turk movement especially in Ottoman Macedonia, forced
Sultan Abdul Hamid II, being in need of military assistance, to offer Austro-Hungary
a military treaty. Since their economic-political interests had been threatened by the
Austro-Hungarian expansion to the Balkans, Great Britain and Russia were forced to
coordinate their actions in order to protect their interests on the Balkan Peninsula. At
the beginning of June 1908 in Reval, there was a meeting between the British King
Edward VII and the Russian Tsar Nikolas II4. At the Reval meeting they agreed on
a reforming project for Ottoman Macedonia that envisaged placing it under interna-
tional control, introduction of international military contingent and appointing an in-
ternational governor, which made the separation of Macedonia from the Ottoman state
realistically possible.5
...We would like to inform you that Macedonia is part of the Ottoman Empire from all aspects …
Macedonia has been exposed to great pressure by the authorities. We shall eliminate that pressure
without the interference of Europe. However, if Europe wants to help us and to help the humanity
then it should give up any initiatives… In order to be able to put an end to that governance, it should
impose pressure on Sultan Abdul Hamid II and the governments in Sofia, Athens and Belgrade. This
is the path that could ensure peace and safety in Macedonia … We feel free to inform you that we
have no more patience …7
Russia was the only state which did not receive the Memorandum. This was due
to the fact that according to the Young Turks it was the main culprit for the situation
in Macedonia. This Memorandum was the herald of the Young Turk Revolution that
started on 3 July 1908, soon after the Anglo-Russian agreement in Reval.8 The Young
Turk Revolution challenged the great European powers and Balkan states with com-
pletely new issues that needed resolving.9
At the time the most important reaction at the international political scene was
the declaration of independence by Bulgaria and the annexation of Bosnia and Herze
govina by Austria-Hungary, which happened in a coordinated and simultaneous man-
ner on 22 and 23 September 1908 (old style).10 On 23 September the island of Crete
6 Ю. А., Петросян, Младотурецкое движение (втораÔ половина XIX - началото XX в.)
1908, after the Resen Garrison Commander, Ahmed Niyazi Bey fled to the mountain with 160 soldiers.
Soon Niyazi Bey was joined by other officers and soldiers from the garrisons in Western Macedonia. His
small rebellion unit in the first week reached a number of 500 troops and by the end of the third week 2000.
Three days after the uprising by Niyazi Bey, Major Enver Bey, an officer in Hilmi Pasha’s Headquarters
of the Thessaloniki garrison with his unit of 800 soldiers fled and went to Tikves. - Ј. Хамза, Турско-
македонските односи..., p. 166.
9 See: L. Stavrijanos, Balkan posle 1453, Beograd 2005, p. 503.
10 С. Стефанова, Международни актове и договори, София 1958, p. 311-312. Shortly after the
victory of the revolution the Young Turks expressed their interests. Using the press and other means they
opened the issue of having also Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rumelia and Cyprus participating in the elec-
tions, and the allusions went as far as Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria. Among the other reasons this was also
124 Makedonka Mitrova
also declared its annexation to Greece.11 This is how a new diplomatic crisis, known
as the Balkan Annexation Crisis began (1908-1909). Also the issue of the mutual rela-
tions between the Serbian and the Bulgarian states became a European issue i.e. it was
incorporated into the politics of the European great powers. The Bulgarian and the
Serbian governments were no strangers to mutual alliance: for the Kingdom of Serbia,
the Serbian-Bulgarian alliance should have strengthened the position of Belgrade in
its struggle against Vienna and guaranteed Northern Macedonia as a sphere of Serbian
influence; whereas for the Bulgarian state the agreement would have been important
for its politics towards the Ottoman state i.e. to pressure Constantinople into resolv-
ing the Bulgarian-Ottoman dispute.12 The attempt for an agreement between the two
states during the Balkan Annexation Crisis (1908-1909) ended in failure. The main
reason was the inability of both governments to agree on a joint solution in regard to
Ottoman Macedonia.
The new phase in the political development of Ottoman Macedonia that happened
with the Young Turk Revolution forced also the foreign policy of the Serbian govern-
ment to take into consideration the changes in Macedonia that were underway. This
task was given to an eminent diplomat at the time, Milovan Milovanovic, who was
the Minister of Foreign Affairs. During the first days of the so called Hurriyet he gave
instructions to all the Serbian diplomatic representatives, propaganda – political ac-
tivists and supporters in the Empire, how to act in regard to the changes that had hap-
pened. The essence of the instructions is evident from the following quotation:
The unclear situation in the Ottoman state and the undetermined conduct of the other states that are
engaged in the Ottoman affairs force us not to participate in these affairs in the Empire … The for-
mula for the conduct of our compatriots towards the events would be to be as reserved as possible,
and if utterly necessary friendly neutral.13
the reason for Austria –Hungary and Bulgaria to act in a coordinated manner against the Young Turks as-
pirations for the stated territories.
11 At the same time also the Greek population of Crete made an attempt to get rid of the vassal status
and to become part of the Greek state, but there was resistance from the Ottoman state and the great pow-
ers, where the latter had openly a great control over the island. The Crete question was resolved in 1912. It
kept the Ottoman state and Greece in constant tension that had negative repercussions on the internal po-
litical life in Ottoman Macedonia. - Ј. Донев, Македонија во..., p. 153.
12 The unilateral act by the Bulgarian state declaring its independence practically meant liquida-
tion de jure of the last remaining Ottoman financial obligations. The Ottoman-Bulgarian tension that for
some months was burdening the relations between the two neighbours ended in April 1909 with the me-
diation of Russia.
13 State Archive of Macedonia (SAM), Скопје, m. 332, PE. no 3777. This instructions were send to
Following these instructions in July 1908, when the new Ottoman Constitution
was adopted, the Serbian diplomats in Macedonia kept a low profile, in a reserved and
passive manner, waiting for the further development of the situation. From this period
of the Serbian “friendly neutrality” an interesting record among the documents is the
conversation between the Skopje Vali and the Serbian Consul to Skopje. Among oth-
ers this conversation only confirms that in essence the creation of the Serbian Chetnik
Organization (SCO) in Ottoman Macedonia had no “liberation” component.14 In this
conversation the Vali pointed out to the Serbian diplomat that the failure to legiti-
mise the Serbian armed units (cheti), even after the adoption of the Constitution, had
a negative influence on the attempts to calm down the situation in the Ottoman state.
The Serbian diplomat responded that there were not too many Serbian (paramilitary)
units in Macedonia and that they would be definitely unarmed and withdrawn from
the Macedonian territory. The only condition for this was the timing - immediate-
ly after the legitimisation of, according to him, the so-called “Bulgarian units”. The
Serbian armed units on Macedonian soil, as the consul stated, “existed only because
of them”.15 In addition, the Vali continued with a series of accusations against Serbia.
He stated:
you are working on having Macedonia annexed to Serbia. The Young Turks as liberal patriots see you
as their opponents because you have been the real enemy of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.16
Furthermore, the Vali continued with his harsh and critical remarks regarding the
official policy of the Kingdom of Serbia towards the Ottoman state. He emphasised
that there was:
another reason for Young Turk’s opposing Serbia. And, official Serbia and ‘the Serbs’ (referring to
the Serbian Patriarchists in Ottoman Macedonia – M.M.) had friendly policy towards the Sultan.
Hence, the Young Turks see you, ‘the Serbs’, as a pillar of the old regime.17
These words of the Skopje Vali clearly point out to the Serbian Government that
the danger of straining the relations with the Young Turks was evident. For those rea-
sons the Serbian state had to be careful with the particular political developments in
the Ottoman Empire. Hence, the Minister M. Milovanovic approved the proposal by
his diplomats in Macedonia to legalise the Serbian armed units:
...In regard to the Chetnik activities, this issue was resolved with their discontinuation or gradual
termination … The latest movement in the Ottoman state is much stronger than the Chetnic activi-
14 The Serbian Chetnik organization was established in 1902 in Belgrade. At the end of 1903 it start-
ed working on its structure in Ottoman Macedonia. It was a paramilitary formation of the Serbian state
with a sole objective: taking over and annexing the Macedonian territory.
15 SAM, m. 332, PE. no 675, (23. VII 1908 )
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
126 Makedonka Mitrova
ty. So it is utterly natural for the units to be withdrawn spontaneously, faced with the stronger move-
ment.18
Apart from the demilitarization process of the Serbian chetas in Macedonia, there
were other manifestations that were summarised as friendly congratulations to the
Young Turks for their “successfully finalised liberation mission.”19 The Serbian con-
suls and agents in Ottoman Macedonia announced cooperation with the Young Turks
on the forthcoming parliamentary elections. After this expression of loyalty they pre-
sented the Young Turks with their demands. First and the most important was to gain
the full equality of the “Serbs” in regard to their legal (millet) position with the oth-
er ethnic groups (“narodnosti”) in the Empire. This equality was to be expressed by
official recognition of the separate “Serbian” millet in Macedonia. The Serbian part
also expected the direct support by the Young Turks in appointing a national Serbian
Bishop in the Veles-Debar Eparchy, proportional representation in the public admin-
istration and a possibility for gaining seats in the Parliament.20
After the legitimisation of the Serbian units, the Chetnik organisation “Serbian
Defence” was transformed into an Organisation for legal political activity.21 However,
the new organisation needed involvement of civil-intellectual groups, the supporters
288.
20 SAM, m. 346, PE. no 3995 (21. VII 1908); М. Пандевски, Политичките партии и организации
во Македонија (1908-1912), Скопје1965, p. 243. After the adoption of the Constitution of the Empire
there was a meeting at the Ministry of Foreign affairs of the Kingdom of Serbia attended by all the Serbian
diplomatic representatives in the Ottoman state. At the meeting they discussed about the future policy of
the Serbian government towards the Empire and about the rights and the privileges that the Serbian repre-
sentatives should fight for in the Ottoman state. Among others it was decided: a) for the Skopje, Prishtina,
Peja, Stari and Novi Pazar sanjaks as well as the Veles-Debar eparchy to be kept solely under the influ-
ence of the Kingdom of Serbia; b) The relations between the Kingdom of Serbia and the Ottoman state
had to be peaceful, as the political and economic interests of the Kingdom of Serbia imposed; c) Also
cooperation with the Bulgarian Political Clubs was envisaged. Apart from this the political programme
also encompassed other issues: schools, churches, cultural activities of the “Serbs” in Macedonia, their
economic strengthening and organizing. See: Ј. М. Јовановић, Јужна Србија од краја XVIII века до
ослобођења, p. 86-87. The main reason for the position of peaceful attitude towards the Ottoman state
was probably the fact that at the time the Kingdom of Serbia was in customs war with Austria-Hungary,
due to which the Kingdom had a great need of transit and customs exemptions through the Ottoman ter-
ritory to the Thessaloniki port. - Д. Ђорђевић, Царински рат Аустро-Угарске и Србије (1906-1911),
Београд 1962, p. 572-574.
21 See: Српски књижевни гласник, year XXI, vol. VII, no 7, Београд 1908, p. 484.
OTTOMAN MACEDONIA BETWEEN THE POLITICS 127
1. The Ottoman Serbs in the newly created circumstances shall abandon the work of the Chetnik or-
ganisation and they shall legitimise the overall activity.
2. They shall start creating a “Democratic league” that would work towards achieving ‘broad free-
dom, true equality and sincere brotherhood.’
3. The league shall recognise the territorial integrity of the Ottoman state as the bases for its future
operation.25
These premises had a purely declarative character and were more directed at the
Young Turks than at the Macedonian population. At the Conference a Temporary
Central Board of the League was elected (consisting of ten members), headed by
Bogdan Radenkovic – an ex-Chetnik from SCO.26 Two Serbian Bishops were elect-
ed honorary presidents of the Central Board. The attending delegates decided for the
headquarters of the Board and of the “Serbian League” to be in Skopje. “This city”, as
the Serbian Consul Zivoin Balugcic said:
...based on its geographical position and our national aspirations has been predetermined to serve as
the starting point for the entire awakening and organising of the Serbian doctrine (srpstvoto) in this
22 SAM, m. 333, PE. no 768, (13. VIII 1908). The organisation used different names. Firstly start-
ing from August 1908 it was called „Serbian Democratic League” or „Democratic League of the Ottoman
Serbs”, but few months later it was renamed to „Organisation of the Ottoman Serbs”. At the beginning of
1910 it started using the name „Educational-Charity Organisation of the Ottoman Serbs”. Apart from these
the following names were also used (even in the official correspondence): „Temporary Organisation of the
Serbian People in the Ottoman Empire”, „Serbian People Organisation in the Ottoman Empire”, „Serbian
Clubs” as the opposite of the “Bulgarian Clubs”, etc.
23 SAM, m. 333, PE. no 768 (13 VIII 1908).
24 М. Пандевски, Политичките партии..., 245-246.
25 Ibid, 244.
26 Историја српског народа, vol. I, Београд 1994, p. 331.
128 Makedonka Mitrova
region. Thus, the connection between Kosovo and the other parts of Old Serbia and Macedonia has
been achieved, which we really need because in this region our rights have always been contested
by the factual masters.27
The duty of the Temporary Central Board was to build an organisational network
of the newly created organisation. The adopted Rulebook was especially important
for the organisational structure and for the further development of the League. It en-
visaged the creation of vilayet (for the vilayets of Kosovo, Bitola, Thessaloniki and
Skadar), county (in Prizren, Peja, Prishtina, Novi Varosh, Plevlje and Sjenica), dis-
trict boards and municipal sub-boards of the League. 28 The county boards in Ottoman
Macedonia were planned only for Tetovo and Gostivar and they were directly subor-
dinated to the Central Board in Skopje. Apart from this in regard to the districts in the
Kosovo (Skopje) vilayet, the Central Board took over the competences also of their
county board. The tendency in the Macedonian areas was obviously to have stronger
centralisation in the management of the political activities.29
According to the instructions of the Serbian Government, the priority task of
the Conference was to get involved in the upcoming parliamentary elections in the
Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the first article from the Rulebook emphasised the task:
the population needs to be prepared for the coming elections.30 The Temporary cen-
tral board was assigned to provide its subordinate governing bodies with: translations
of the Electoral Code, printed by the Serbian Royal Printing House; various guide-
lines; to place agitators in the Macedonian population, etc. The Rulebook, special-
ly assigned the district boards of the League “to explain to their supporters the enor-
mous benefit from taking part in the elections and the necessity for all the voters to
cast their votes only for the candidates that had been previously supported by this
organisation.”31 All this allows to draw the conclusion that the Temporary Central
Board in 1908 was as a matter of fact an electoral headquarter, and the whole SPO was
turned into some kind of electoral machinery. Its greatest problem was who to address
i.e. what would be the target population for the elections? In Ottoman Macedonian
there was only the a small number of Serbian Patriarchists, and a very small percent-
age of them had their own property. The Electoral Code of the Ottoman state pro-
vided only for the citizens that owned property to have a right to vote (Article 11).
According to this Article the citizens who were not taxpayers i.e. the workers, farmers
row parliamentary framework. The first step in that direction was to announce the parliamentary elections
that were anyway a very important event after the July changes. The election campaign was postponed
for few months: from the beginning of August until December 1908. In several regions the population did
not vote due to the lack of census registers (nufuzi). In mid November only half of the MPs were elected.
The Peoples Parliament had its first session on 17 December 1908 (old style), with a significant delay. -
М. Пандевски, Политичките партии..., 249.
31 Ibid, 255.
OTTOMAN MACEDONIA BETWEEN THE POLITICS 129
and some other poor categories of people did not have a right to vote.32 The League’s
governing bodies in the course of the electoral campaign sent their agitators to the vil-
lages and towns to do a count of the adult males i.e. the potential voters and to prepare
the electorate lists. The agitation involved more frequently the teachers and the voy-
vodas, and less the clergymen.33
The Temporary Central Board started negotiations for cooperation with the Young
Turks’ party “Unity and Progress” and the leitmotif of the negotiating process was
agreeing of the Serbian seats in the Ottoman Parliament. 34 After some bargaining
during the negotiations, the Serbian political organisation in Ottoman Macedonia still
managed to achieve an agreement with the Young Turks for joint appearance at the
elections. Consequently, it joined a pre-electoral coalition thus ensuring at least some
kind of chance to enter the future parliament. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Kingdom of Serbia could not have been satisfied with this arrangement because SPO
had to accept a subordinate position in the pre-electoral coalition. On the other hand,
this was a rational decision because this Serbian political organisation did not have
enough voters in Ottoman Macedonia. This reality check also becomes evident in the
report by the consul in Skopje sent to the Ministry on 22 September 1908 (old style).35
The Serbian consul in his report concludes the following:
we cannot be fully satisfied with the results from the negotiations since we have sacrificed some of
our national interests … However, if we did not do that there would not have been an agreement and
on our own, based on our numbers and the perspectives of the electoral programme of the Young
Turks we would not have won any seats.36
Pointing at that weak Serbian status in regard to the electoral agreement with the
Young Turks, the consul at the same time suggested to his Foreign Ministry that in
his view this was another “uncertain solution”. And that was an activity where: the
Serbian Political Organisation in Macedonia should have tried to reach some agree-
ment with the “Bulgarians”. However, the Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Serbia
kept emphasising that the only option for the parliamentary elections was to reach an
agreement only with the Young Turks and they should focus primarily on the election
of the Serbian MPs in Skopje and Bitola37. Consequently agreement was concluded
only with the Young Turks.
32 Ibid, 249.
33 SAM, Скопје, F. ГОООС-Скопје, year 1908, а.е. 1.
34 The Serbian Democratic League sent to Thessaloniki Bogdan Radenkovic, Jovan Shantric and
Djordje Hadzi-Kostic to negotiate with the Central Young Turk Board. The Serbian demands were as fol-
lows: for the three non-Muslim “ethnic groups” – Serbian, Greek and Bulgarian – to get equal number of
seats in the Ottoman Parliament. But the Young Turks refused that concept and they conditioned the elec-
toral agreement with the Serbs with having an agreement on broader bases that would not have a national
background. - Историја српског народа, p. 334.
35 Г. Тодоровски, Српските конзули во Македонија за..., p. 213.
36 Ibid, p. 214.
37 Ibid.
130 Makedonka Mitrova
In addition, the international affairs the ministry of foreign affairs was in favour of
reaching an agreement with the Young Turks. During the Balkan annexationist crisis
(1908-1909), Bulgaria on 22 September 1908 (old style) declared its independence.
That influenced the changes in the position of the Young Turks towards the Bulgarian
state and towards the Bulgarian Clubs in Ottoman Macedonia. Even stronger political
blow for the Ottoman Empire came with the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
by the Austria-Hungary that happened on 23 September 1908 (old style). These two
acts, that happened successively, constituted the violation of the 1878 treaty of Berlin.
Namely, both the Ottoman state and the Kingdom of Serbia treated these successive
acts as acts of aggression on part of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria and they caused
unrest among the official authorities and among the population of both states. On the
other hand, these external events had a negative impact on the unsettled position in
the Ottoman state in regard to the strengthening of the Young Turks achievements.
Therefore, both the Kingdom of Serbia and the Ottoman Empire at the time found
themselves in the same position in regard to the unilateral political acts of Austria-
Hungary and Bulgaria.
The political tension of the situation in the Ottoman state during the Balkan an-
nexationist crisis (1908-1909) is also evident from the fact that at the meeting of
the Central Board of the Young Turk Organisation in Thessaloniki held at the begin-
ning of October 1908 the main topic of discussion was the attitude of the state au-
thorities towards these two political issues.38 The President of Serbian Party, Bogdan
Radenkovic, was sent as a representative to this meeting of the Central Board of the
Young Turk Board.39
The agreement for the pre-electoral coalition secured for the Serbian Democratic
League four seats in the Parliament from the Kosovo (Skopje) vilayet and one from
the Bitola and one from the Thessaloniki vilayets. Still after the elections the elector-
al results were such that only Savo Stojanovic from the Prishtina, Aleksandar Parlic
from the Tetovo and Janakie Dimitrievic from the Bitola vilayet got seats.40 For the
Serbian League it was also very important that the Young Turks accepted the demand
not to allow any other Serbian candidate not on the list established by the League to
run for election.41
The agitating groups from SPO were supposed to inform people in villages about
the constitutional changes and to channel their actions in the future. The orders by the
Central Board were broader: people in villages to continue maintaining the existing
organisational relations with their superiors, established before by the armed units;
to create their own courts, headed by the voyvodas; to keep their weapons clean and
well hidden, etc. This clearly shows the double game that SPO played with the Young
TurksOn one hand, SPO joined the pre-electoral coalition in order to gain seats in
the Parliament, and on the other hand, it did not give up its Chetnik judiciary and its
Chetnik weapons in an attempt to derogate the Young Turk authority. Among others,
the Serbian agitating groups advised their supporters “just like before” to remain “un-
changeable Serbs” if they wanted to get greater freedom by the Hurriyet and for the
armed units to collect the agreed membership fee, etc. All this shows that the Serbian
political-propaganda organisation in Macedonia represented an addition to or a new
copy of the same Chetnik organisation even though the Chetnik actions as an op-
tion were put aside for some time. The agitation directed especially at village pop-
ulation in the villages “not to trust any fraternising with the ‘Bulgarians’” i.e. with
the Macedonian population with Exarch church affiliation and to avoid any contacts
with it.42 However, this order whose objective was to cause further division among
the Macedonian population was difficult to realise in practice. the Macedonian peas-
antry in majority was free from the artificially implemented church-propaganda bar-
riers (which at the same time were not ethnic but only church-political markers, were
interconnected economically, through family and other traditional links and primarily
through their common vernacular language.43
One of the more important demands that the Kumanovo peasants kept posing to
the officials of SPO was the need of new schools. Many of the villages in Kumanovo,
did not have schools so in a report by a “Serbian teacher” he suggested the urgency of
this demand because in his view it was “the only way and a guarantee for the people in
the villages to vote for our candidates and stay on our side (referring to the side of the
Serbian propaganda – M.M.).”44 The issue of opening a new school was also pointed
out by the citizens of Kumanovo.
Due to this problem in the summer of 1909 there was a harsh public conflict:
the citizens of Kumanovo supporting the Serbian propaganda cut all their links with
the local Serbian club, the Serbian church-educational authorities in Kumanovo and
with the Consulate in Skopje.45 The conflict was so big that even the Metropolitan
Vinkontie was forced to urge for “reconciliation between the two sides” and the
President of SPO, B. Radenkovic came to Kumanovo and mediated in resolving the
conflict.46 In fact the citizens of Kumanovo population demanded from SPO improve-
ment of the social-economic situation i.e. satisfying the municipal needs which in the
absence of some kind of municipal elections they had to pose as a demand for the par-
liamentary elections. However, it was questionable how much the representatives of
VIII. 1908, а.е. 3; The report by a group of teachers, 28. VIII. 1908, а.е. 6.
45 Историја српског народа, p. 344.
46 М. Пандевски, Политичките партии и...p.257; SAM, Скопје, F. ГОООС - Скопје, year 1908,
а.е. 17.
132 Makedonka Mitrova
the Serbian as well as the Bulgarian propaganda (even though full of such promises)
were willing and able to realise these demands of the local population.
The February Congress of SPO in Skopje in 1909 established that the Serbian ac-
tivities in Macedonia in the eyes of the Greek Patriarchy was found as a “very serious
opponent.”47 At the same time it was pointed out that the Ottoman authorities did not
grant equal rights and privileges to the Serbian metropolitans as the ones provided to
the Greek. The SPO’s Main Board formed at the Congress tasked its MPs to put for-
ward at the Ottoman Parliament the issue of the use of all the Patriarchist privileges
for the Serbian supporters in Ottoman Macedonia.48
The main goal for the general politics of the SPO in Ottoman Macedonia was
the formation of a separate - Serbian millet within the Ottoman Empire. With this
achievement in the time of the constitutional changes of the Empire, the Serbian na-
tional name could be recognised and officially used. This was of enormous importance
for the activities of the Serbian propaganda in Ottoman Macedonia. The Ottoman
authorities continuing the state tradition regardless of the positive provisions in the
Constitution continued using the collective religious-church name of Rum millet for
all the Serbian supporters in Macedonia and for the Serbian orthodox population in
“Old Serbia”.49 Hence, the abovementioned population was placed in the same cate-
gory with the Greek, and with the Macedonian, Vlach and Albanian Patriarchists. The
Main Board demanded for the authorities to replace this archaic denomination with
the national name “Serbs”, “the Serbian people”, etc., and it instructed all the SPO’s
boards to act in that direction.50 The Serbs did not succeed in this during the Ottoman
rule in Macedonia.
The Serbian Political Organisation in Macedonia was especially active in regard
to the appointing of a Serbian Bishop to the Veles-Debar Patriarch Eparchy. This po-
sition was presented to the Greek Parteniy. The “Serbian” priests and teachers public-
ly and ostentatiously refused to recognize this Bishop as their religious leader. Finally,
in the spring of 1910, after the state visit of the Serbian King to Constantinople, the
Patriarchy appointed to this position the Serbian monk Varnava Rosic.51 The next
task for the Serbian political-propaganda action in Ottoman Macedonia in this sense
was to also get the bishop’s position at the Ohrid Patriarch Eparchy. This act they be-
47 М. Пандевски, Политичките партии и...,p. 256. 78 delegates attended the Congress and it
was opened by the Skopje Bishop Vikentie. They adopted a Constitution renaming the SPO into an
«Organisation of the Serbian People in the Ottoman Empire». The constitutional provisions defined the
Organisation as distinctly nationalistic and bureaucratic-centrist one. The Congress as the most senior
governing body elected the Main Board consisting of twelve members. Bogdan Radenkovic was re-elect-
ed as the President of SPO and of the Main Board.
48 SAM, Скопје, m. 333, PE. no 3995.
49 SAM, Скопје, m. 360, PE. no 1641. - On May 27th 1909 (old style) Stojan Zafirovic gave the fol-
lowing statement: “From the Report of the Central Board we can see that the Ottoman authorities have
not recognised the name ‘Serb’, yet. Imagine, the official documents still use Rum or a Christian instead
of Serb”.
50 М. Пандевски, Политичките партии и..., p. 258.
51 Историја српског народа, p. 345.
OTTOMAN MACEDONIA BETWEEN THE POLITICS 133
lieved would have meant final separation of the area of the Serbian aspirations from
the Greek ones in Macedonia.52 This action of SPO clearly shows the political inten-
tion in regard to the church-administrative borders established with the millet system
in Ottoman Macedonia to be redefined in the future as state (ethnic) borders.
In its activities in Macedonia the Serbian Political Organisation directed its efforts
towards dealing with the church-school status quo introduced by Hilmi Pasha after
the 1903 Ilinden Uprising. Within this context were also the guidelines of the Skopje
consul Z. Balugdzic sent to all the Serbian consuls in Macedonia on 31 March 1909
(old style). He stated: “We should demand for the 1903 decision for a status quo to be
revoked.”53 The provisions of the Hilmi Pasha status quo interfered with the attempts
of the Serbian activists to take over (from the Bulgarian or the Greek propaganda) or
to open new churches and schools especially in those Macedonian areas that were of
interest to the Serbian state.54
All these issues were discussed at the February 1909 Congress of the Party, at
which a specific political decision was made. This resolutions demanded the revision
of the Empire’s Constitution in order to regulate the final status of the “Serbian peo-
ple” in the Ottoman state and to resolve its national issue; regular use of the nation-
al name of “Serb” instead of “Rum”; a decision by the Parliament for broadening the
Patriarchists privileges without any limitations also to the Serbian Bishops; getting the
Veles-Debar Metropolitan Diocese; revoking of the church-school status quo, etc.55 In
order to achieve these demands the Serbian activists acted via the Sublime Porte, the
Parliament and the Patriarchy in Constantinople. However, they were also active in
Ottoman Macedonia gradually winning new positions or defending the ones they al-
ready had. So at the same time together with other agitating groups, even the Bishop
Vikentie took a tour round the Kumanovo villages in August 1908. His mission was to
open the churches that the Ottoman authorities had closed. During the tour he urged
the peasants not to be afraid any more but to oppose those measures of the authorities.
During the agitations the Serbian activists clashed with the Bulgarian Clubs leaders.
There were especially harsh conflicts in the areas near the border region of their prior-
ity influence sphere of priority influence: south-west of Kumanovo up to Shtip, Veles,
Prilep, Ohrid and Struga regions.56 The demarcation of the conflict zone between the
those two propagandas emphasised their very essence i.e. the conflict (?) was aimed
at moving this zone to the detriment of the opponent.57 In contrast to these actions
Europe, published in the United States of America, Rowan&Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2000, p. 226-228;
M. Mitrova, “The Balkan Wars and Ottoman Macedonia:The Spatial Context of the National Programmes
of Serbia,Greece and Bulgaria”, Prac Komisji Środkowoeuropejskiej PAU, tomieXXII, Krakow, 2014,
45-57.
55 М. Пандевски, Политичките партии и..., p. 259.
56 SAM, Скопје, m. 352, PE. no 188.
57 М. Пандевски, Политичките партии и..., p. 260.
134 Makedonka Mitrova
SPO in the Kichevo region acted mainly against the Greek Veles-Debar Bishop in the
course of 1910. In the Palanka, Veles and Prilep districts the Bulgarian-Serbian con-
flict turned into mutual lurking, frequent clashes and common insinuations with the
Ottoman authorities.58 As a matter of fact even the declaration of the constitutional or-
der of the Ottoman state did not help preventing the church-political struggles because
the “proclaimed citizens” continued acting as the believers and subjects of the propa-
ganda organ-isations in Ottoman Macedonia.
SPO also took part in the organised action of the Young Turks in Skopje boycott-
ing the goods from Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, persuading their supporters to par-
ticipate in that. In these actions, even though for different reasons, SPO found itself
in line with the Young Turk Party. But still the Serbian-Ottoman solidarity in crisis
was of short duration. The Serbian Political Organisation in the direct contacts with
“Unity and Progress” as well as via its representatives at the Parliament exerted pres-
sure on the Sublime Porte for revoking the direct agreement with Austro-Hungary,
and the dispute about Bosnia and Herzegovina was (?) taken to an international con-
ference. This Serbian proposal was rejected by the Young Turk government. In the
spring of 1909 when the Ottoman state finally recognised the annexation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary and the collaboration between the Young Turks
and SPO on this issue ended.
The Macedonian historian Manol Pandevski insightfully concludes the follow-
ing:
Even though the SPO leaders dedicated the least attention to the economic demands it was impossi-
ble to completely avoid them. In the report from the Congress in regard to the economic conditions
as well as in the adopted Resolution that dealt with these issues the following demands were posed:
dealing with and alleviating the ten percent tax system; return of the land taken from the Macedonian
peasants by force; buying out the big chiftlik properties in order to establish independent peasantry;
legal regulation of the rights and the duties between the chiftlik peasants and the beys; making the
loans more accessible to agriculture, trade, etc.59
The agrarian demands were stated in such an absolutely partial way, especially
when one takes into consideration the Ottoman categorical firmness to them, that one
could come to the conclusion that they were discussed solely for demagogic reasons.
This conclusion can be also drawn from the fact that SPO did not carry out any action
against the Ottoman beys for the purpose of resolving these problems.
In 1909 there were big changes for this political organization to function due to
the new Young Turks’ August Law on Associations, which prevented the existence of
such a political organisation.60 Hiding behind this young Turk law, the Serbian con-
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid. p.262.
60 The Law on Associations was adopted on 3 August 1909 (old stile).by the Young Turks parliamen-
tary majority. The provisions from this Law were of utter importance for the political life in Macedonia.
According to Article 4: “it was forbidden to found political associations based on national or race differ-
ences or names.” All the existing political organisations that had national trait had to be reformed or dis-
OTTOMAN MACEDONIA BETWEEN THE POLITICS 135
suls in the Ottoman Empire , which ruled with SPO, started working on its systemat-
ic disbanding. At one of the meetings it was decided for SPO, in compliance with the
law, not to announce its disbanding but to be transformed into an “Educational Charity
Association”. This decision was made on the basis of the suggestion by the Ottoman
authorities, who proposed that political clubs should be transformed into a kind of ed-
ucational boards. However, SPO even in such a form did not manage to survive much
longer. The Serbian government also played a huge role in their dissolution because it
stopped providing them with any assistance or financing. The Serbian political propa-
ganda in Ottoman Macedonia continued to exist and operate using the methods from
the time before the Hurriyet. Up until the Balkan wars (1912-1913) the Serbian prop-
aganda continued to reinforce its church-educational structure, its economic penetra-
tion and functioning of the renewed Chetnik paramilitary actions.
banded. An article in the Law authorised only the State Council: to recognise the associations’ usefulness
which practically meant that the political associations could have existed but only under the Ottoman na-
tional name and to deal only with educational, cultural and economic issues and not political ones. This
Law went into effect in November 1909.- М. Пандевски, Политичките партии..., p. 250.