DOF Vs Dela Cruz PDF

G.R. No. 209331. August 24, 2015.
*

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, represented by HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA in his official
capacity as SECRETARY, and the BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, represented by HON. ROZZANO
RUFINO B. BIAZON, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Customs, petitioners, vs.HON.
MARINO M. DELA CRUZ, JR., in his capacity as Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Manila,
HON. FELICITAS O. LARON-CACANINDIN, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Manila, Branch 17, RONNIE C. SILVESTRE, EDWARD P. DELA CUESTA, ROGEL C.
GATCHALIAN, IMELDA D. CRUZ, LILIBETH S. SANDAG, RAYMOND P. VENTURA, MA.
LIZA S. TORRES, ARNEL C. ALCARAZ, MA. LOURDES V. MANGAOANG, FRANCIS
AGUSTIN Y. ERPE, CARLOS T. SO, MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, CARMELITA M.
TALUSAN,1 AREFILES H. CARREON,2 and ROMALINO G. VALDEZ, respondents.
Administrative Agencies; Civil Service Commission; Jurisdiction; The Civil Service

Commission (CSC) has jurisdiction over all employees of government branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies, including government-owned or -controlled corporations with
original charters.—The CSC has jurisdiction over all employees of government branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters. The CSC is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the
civil service. The rule is that disciplinary cases and cases involving personnel actions, including
“appointment through certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail, re-
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
1 Carmelita M. Talusan withdrew as petitioner in Civil Case No. 13-130820, noted by the trial court in its Order dated
4 October 2013. Rollo, p. 58.
2 Arefiles H. Carreon manifested his intent to withdraw as petitioner in Civil Case No. 13-130820 per letter to counsel
dated 16 October 2013. Id., at p. 119.

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Department of Finance
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
assignment, demotion, and separation,” are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CSC. This rule is
embodied in Section 1, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and
Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws (Omnibus Rules) which states: SECTION 1. x x x. As used in these
Rules, any action denoting movement or progress of personnel in the civil service shall be known as
personnel action. Such action shall include promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail,
secondment, reassignment, demotion and separation.
Detail; Words and Phrases; Under Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules, “[a] detail is the movement
of an employee from one department or agency which is temporary in nature, which does not involve a
reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the issuance of another appointment.”—Under
Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules, “[a] detail is the movement of an employee from one department
or agency which is temporary in nature, which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and
does not require the issuance of another appointment.” CPO 189-2013 is an order detailing personnel from
the BOC to CPRO under the DOF.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies allows administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence.—The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies allows administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The doctrine entails lesser
expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Therefore, direct recourse to the trial
court, when administrative remedies are available, is a ground for dismissal of the action. The doctrine,
however, is not without exceptions. Among the exceptions are: (1) where there is estoppel on the part of the
party invoking the doctrine; (2) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to
lack of jurisdiction; (3) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice
the complainant; (4) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and
oppressive; (5) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the
courts of justice; (6) where judicial intervention is urgent; (7) where the application of

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the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (8) where the controverted acts violate due
process; (9) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies had been rendered moot; (10)
where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (11) where strong public interest is involved;
and (12) in quo warranto proceedings.
Executive Order No. 140; Section 9 of Executive Order (EO) No. 140 provides that the “order shall take
effect immediately upon publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.” EO No. 140 was published
in Manila Bulletin and Philippine Star on 17 September 2013. As such, EO No. 140 took effect on 17
September 2013.—Respondents allege that EO No. 140 took effect only on 2 October 2013, fifteen days after
its publication in two newspapers of general circulation. Hence, respondents argue that when CPO 189-2013
was issued, EO No. 140 was not yet effective. Article 2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended by
Executive Order No. 200, is clear on this issue. It states: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. The proviso“unless it is otherwise provided”
refers to an effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the completion of the law’s publication.
Thus, it is within the discretion of the legislature, or the Executive Department in this case, whether to
shorten or extend the fifteen-day period as long as there is compliance with the requirement of publication.
Here, Section 9 of EO No. 140 provides that the “order shall take effect immediately upon publication in two
(2) newspapers of general circulation.” EO No. 140 was published in Manila Bulletinand Philippine Star on
17 September 2013. As such, EO No. 140 took effect on 17 September 2013.
Detail; Under Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules, a detail is temporary in nature. In fact, detail of
employees is only allowed for a maximum period for those occupying professional, technical, and scientific
positions.—Under Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules, a detail is temporary in nature. In fact, detail
of employees is only allowed for a maximum period for those occupying professional, technical, and scientific
positions.

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ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
Same; Section 2 of Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 021181, dated 13 September
2002, clarified the maximum period of detail of employees; The detail shall be allowed only for a maximum
period of one (1) year. Details beyond one (1) year may be allowed provided it is with the consent of the
detailed employee.—Section 2 of CSC Resolution No. 021181, dated 13 September 2002, clarified the
maximum period of detail of employees. It states: Section 2. Duration of the detail.—The detail shall be
allowed only for a maximum period of one year. Details beyond one year may be allowed provided it is with
the consent of the detailed employee. The extension or renewal of the period of the detail shall be within the
authority of the mother agency. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the detail, he/she
may appeal his/her case to the proper Civil Service Commission Regional Office. Pending appeal, the detail
shall be executory unless otherwise ordered by said regional office. Decision of said regional office may be
further appealed to the Commission En Banc. In this case, CPO 189-2013 did not provide for the period of
respondents’ detail. It only provided that the order “shall be effective immediately and valid until sooner
revoked,” making the detail of respondents indefinite. There was nothing to show that respondents were
occupying professional, technical, and scientific positions that would have allowed their detail for the
maximum period provided under Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules. Further, CSC Resolution No.
021181 did not distinguish between an ordinary employee and an employee occupying professional,
technical, and scientific position. Hence, it should have been specified that the maximum period of
respondents’ detail should not exceed one year.

LEONEN, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Administrative Agencies; Civil Service Commission; Jurisdiction; View that the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) has exclusive jurisdiction over questions regarding personnel actions affecting civil service
employees.—The Civil Service Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over questions regarding personnel
actions affecting civil service employees. It is the sole arbiter that decides controversies regarding the civil
service at first instance. Courts should not directly assume jurisdiction based on allegations of
unconstitutionality and invalidity of government regulations when the question, in essence, involves a
personnel action.

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Administrative Law; Civil Service Commission; Jurisdiction; View that the Constitution confers
jurisdiction over the Civil Service Commission (CSC) for cases involving the civil service.—The Constitution
confers jurisdiction over the Civil Service Commission for cases involving the civil service. Article IX(B),
Section 1(1) of the Constitution provides: SECTION 1. (1) The Civil Service shall be administered by the
Civil Service Commission composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, with
proven capacity for public administration, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
elections immediately preceding their appointment.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Constitution gives the Civil Service Commission (CSC) quasi-judicial
powers through Article IX(A), Sections 6 and 7.—The Constitution gives the Civil Service Commission quasi-
judicial powers through Article IX(A), Sections 6 and 7, which provide: SECTION 6. Each Commission En
Banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices.
Such rules, however, shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. SECTION 7. Each
Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within
sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted
for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of
the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorariby the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
Same; Same; Same; View that as the “central personnel agency of the Government” with quasi-judicial
powers and as the body tasked to administer the civil service, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) is the “sole
arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service.”—As the “central personnel agency of the Government”
with quasi-judicial powers and as the body tasked to administer the civil service, the Civil Service
Commission is the “sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service[,]” including personnel actions,
as this court has ruled.

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ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
Same; Same; Same; View that cases involving personnel actions are within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and not within the trial courts’ jurisdiction.—Cases involving personnel
actions are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission and not within the trial courts’
jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Primary Administrative Jurisdiction; View that the doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction precludes trial courts from resolving a controversy involving a question that is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal.—The doctrine of primary administrative
jurisdiction precludes trial courts from resolving a controversy involving a question that is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal. The doctrine disallows courts “to arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body
of special competence.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that considering the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) to hear and decide administrative cases, including those involving personnel actions, as
granted by the Constitution, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) cannot assume jurisdiction based on the doctrine
of primary administrative jurisdiction.—Considering the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission to hear and decide administrative cases, including those involving personnel actions, as granted
by the Constitution, the Regional Trial Court cannot assume jurisdiction based on the doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction presupposes
that the administrative agency has jurisdiction over the subject matter while the court does not.—The
doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction is different from the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, when an administrative agency is
granted primary jurisdiction over the subject matter, the courts “cannot or will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal prior to the decision of
that question by the administrative tribunal[.]” The doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction
presupposes that the administrative agency has jurisdiction over the subject matter while the court does
not. The Complaint or Petition,

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therefore, cannot be filed before the court. As the issue is jurisdictional, there should be no exception to
the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction. When the complaint or petition is filed before a court
with no subject matter jurisdiction, the court has no other option but to dismiss the case.
Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Under the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party may seek intervention from the court, he or she should
have already exhausted all the remedies in the administrative level; The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies presupposes that both the courts and the administrative agency have concurrent
jurisdiction.—Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party may seek
intervention from the court, he or she should have already exhausted all the remedies in the administrative
level. If there is still a remedy available within the administrative machinery, “then such remedy should be
exhausted first before [the] court’s judicial power can be sought.” The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies presupposes that boththe courts and the administrative agency have concurrent
jurisdiction. This is because nonobservance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
affect the court’s jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that while both the court and the administrative agency have
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the general rule is that the courts, because of comity, practicality, and
convenience, will not interfere with the administrative process until the process comes to an end.—The
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies presupposes that the court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint or petition. Otherwise, it can never have the power to take cognizance of the
case as contemplated by Soto. While both the court and the administrative agency have jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the general rule is that the courts, because of comity, practicality, and convenience, will not
interfere with the administrative process until the process comes to an end. This is because availing
administrative remedies entails lesser expenses and results in a speedier resolution of controversies. On the
other hand, since the court and the administrative agency have concurrent jurisdiction, exceptions may be
warranted by the circumstances, and the court may choose to assume jurisdiction over the controversy.

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ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Primary Administrative Jurisdiction; View that considering that the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) is granted exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving personnel actions, the
doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
applies.—When jurisdiction is exclusively granted to an administrative agency, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply. Here, considering that the Civil Service Commission is granted
exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving personnel actions, the doctrine of primary administrative
jurisdiction, not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, applies.
Same; Same; Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; View that the exceptions to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies likewise do not apply because the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has no
jurisdiction to resolve the dispute in the first place. In order for the exceptions to apply, the court to which the
petition was prematurely filed should have jurisdiction; otherwise, the orders of the court would be null and
void for lack of jurisdiction.—The exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
likewise do not apply because the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to resolve the dispute in the first
place. In order for the exceptions to apply, the court to which the petition was prematurely filed should have
jurisdiction; otherwise, the orders of the court would be null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Decisions or
orders rendered by tribunals and agencies that do not have subject matter jurisdiction are null and void.
Hence, the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies should not be applicable
since the Regional Trial Court, the court to which the Petition for declaratory relief was filed, lacks subject
matter jurisdiction, and any order or decision rendered by it would be null and void.
Detail; Security of Tenure; View that detail of government personnel to other offices does not involve and
violate the employees’ security of tenure in the absence of any grave abuse of discretion or improper motive or
purpose.—In any case, detail of government personnel to other offices does not involve and violate the
employees’ security of tenure in the absence of any grave abuse of discretion or improper motive or purpose.

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Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Declaratory Relief; View that a petition for declaratory relief may
prosper only if there is no breach or violation yet of the assailed government regulation, and adequate relief is
not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.—A petition for declaratory relief
may prosper only if there is no breach or violation yet of the assailed government regulation, and adequate
relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding. Rule 63, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court provides: SECTION 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in
the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
Same; Same; Same; View that for a petition for declaratory relief to prosper, there should be no other
adequate relief available to petitioners.—For a Petition for declaratory relief to prosper, there should be no
other adequate relief available to petitioners. “If adequate relief is available through another form of action
or proceeding, the other action must be preferred over an action for declaratory relief.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of the order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 17.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.
Esguerra and Blanco for private respondents.
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Petitioners assail the Order dated 4 October 20133issued by Judge Felicitas O. Laron-Caca-
_______________
3 Id., at pp. 57-63.

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vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
nindin (Judge Laron-Cacanindin) of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 17 (RTC Branch
17), in Civil Case No. 13-130820. The Order extended the 72-hour Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) issued by Executive Judge Marino M. Dela Cruz, Jr. (Executive Judge Dela Cruz) in favor
of respondents Silvestre, et al.4to 20 days or until 21 October 2013 without need of posting bond.

The Antecedent Facts

The case stemmed from the issuance of Executive Order No. 140 (EO 140) on 2 September
2013, which created the Customs Policy Research Office (CPRO) in the Department of Finance
(DOF). EO 140 states that the CPRO “shall be responsible for reviewing the customs
administration policies, rules and procedures, and thereafter providing sound recommendations
for the improvement of the same.” Section 3 of EO 140 provides that “CPRO shall be composed of
its organic personnel, as approved by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) upon
recommendation of the DOF Secretary, augmented and reinforced by DOF and BOC personnel as
well as those detailed or seconded from other agencies, whether attached to the DOF or not.
x x x.” Section 9 of EO 140 states that it shall “take effect immediately upon publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.” EO 140 was published in Manila Bulletinand Philippine
Star on 17 September 2013.
On the same day of the publication of EO 140, Bureau of Customs (BOC) Commissioner
Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon (Commissioner Biazon) issued Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-
2013 (CPO 189-2013) detailing 27 BOC personnel holding the positions of Collector of Customs V
and VI, including

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respondents in this case, to CPRO “effective immediately and valid until sooner revoked.” CPO
189-2013 was approved by DOF Secretary Cesar V. Purisima (Secretary Purisima).
On 30 September 2013, respondents filed an action for Declaratory Relief with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila. On 1 October 2013, Executive Judge Dela Cruz issued a TRO for a period
of 72 hours enjoining petitioners or any person acting for and in their behalf from implementing
CPO 189-2013. Thereafter, the case was raffled to the salaof Judge Laron-Cacanindin.
In the assailed Order of 4 October 2013, Judge Laron-Cacanindin extended Executive Judge
Dela Cruz’s 72-hour TRO for 20 days or until 21 October 2013. She then set the hearing for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction on 18 October 2013.
On 21 October 2013, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before this
Court, with prayer for the issuance of a TRO or a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
Petitioners alleged that the case involves personnel action affecting public officers which is under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Petitioners also alleged that
respondents failed to exhaust all administrative remedies available to them before filing the
petition before the RTC. Petitioners also alleged that CPO 189-2013 is an internal personnel
order with application that is limited to and only within BOC and as such, it cannot be the
subject of an action for declaratory relief.
In their Comment, respondents alleged that the case involves the validity and constitutionality
of CPO 189-2013, and thus, it is beyond the jurisdiction of the CSC. Respondents further alleged
that EO 140 violated Article 2 of the Civil Code when it became effective immediately after its
publication.

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In their Reply, petitioners alleged that respondents only assailed the validity of EO 140 to
justify their filing of an action for declaratory relief. As regards its effectivity, petitioners alleged
that EO 140 states that it shall “take effect immediately upon publication in two (2) newspapers
of general circulation.”
In an Order dated 21 October 2013, Judge Laron-Cacanindin denied respondents’ application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
In an Order dated 5 November 2013, Judge Laron-Cacanindin inhibited herself from further
hearing the case.

The Issues

The issues for determination by this Court are the following:
1. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief filed by
respondents;
2. Whether respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies in filing the action
before the RTC;
3. Whether EO 140 violated Article 2 of the Civil Code when it became effective
immediately after its publication; and
4. Whether CPO 189-2013 was validly issued.

The Ruling of this Court

Jurisdiction over the Petition

The CSC has jurisdiction over all employees of government branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies, including government-owned or -controlled corporations with
original charters.5 The CSC is the sole arbiter of controversies
_______________
5 Corsiga v. Defensor, 439 Phil. 875; 391 SCRA 267 (2002).

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relating to the civil service.6The rule is that disciplinary cases and cases involving personnel
actions, including “appointment through certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement,
reemployment, detail, reassignment, demotion, and separation,” are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the CSC.7 This rule is embodied in Section 1, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws
(Omnibus Rules) which states:
SECTION 1. x x x.
As used in these Rules, any action denoting movement or progress of personnel in the civil service shall
be known as personnel action. Such action shall include promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment,
detail, secondment, reassignment, demotion and separation. x x x.

Under Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules, “[a] detail is the movement of an employee
from one department or agency which is temporary in nature, which does not involve a reduction
in rank, status or salary and does not require the issuance of another appointment.” CPO 189-
2013 is an order detailing personnel from the BOC to CPRO under the DOF.
A reading of the petition filed before the RTC shows that respondents were questioning their
mass detail and reassignment to CPRO. According to respondents, their detail was carried out in
bad faith and was meant to remove them from their permanent positions in the BOC. The action
appears to be a personnel action under the jurisdiction of the CSC.
However, the petition went beyond questioning the detail of respondents. Respondents further
assailed the validity and constitutionality of CPO 189-2013. Respondents alleged that CPO 189-
2013 was issued even before EO 140, pursuant to
_______________
6 Id.
7 Olanda v. Bugayong, 459 Phil. 626; 413 SCRA 255 (2003).

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which CPO 189-2013 was issued, became effective. Respondents alleged that CPO 189-2013 was
issued to beat the deadline of the Commission on Elections’ ban on personnel movement from 28
September 2013 to 20 October 2013 due to the scheduled barangayelections. When respondents
raised the issue of validity and constitutionality of CPO 189-2013, the issue took the case beyond
the scope of the CSC’s jurisdiction because the matter is no longer limited to personnel action.
Thus, the RTC did not abuse its discretion in taking cognizance of the action.

Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Petitioners allege that respondents failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before
filing the case with the RTC.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies allows administrative agencies to carry
out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their
respective competence.8 The doctrine entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier
resolution of controversies.9 Therefore, direct recourse to the trial court, when administrative
remedies are available, is a ground for dismissal of the action.
The doctrine, however, is not without exceptions. Among the exceptions are: (1) where there is
estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (2) where the challenged administrative
act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (3) where there is unreasonable delay or
official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (4) where the amount involved
is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (5) where the question
involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided
_______________
8 Addition Hills Mandaluyong Civic & Social Organization, Inc. v. Megaworld Properties & Holdings,Inc., G.R. No.
175039, 18 April 2012, 670 SCRA 83.
9 Id.

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by the courts of justice; (6) where judicial intervention is urgent; (7) where the application of the
doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (8) where the controverted acts violate due
process; (9) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies had been rendered
moot; (10) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (11) where strong public
interest is involved; and (12) in quo warranto proceedings.10
In this case, respondents allege that CPO 189-2013 is contrary to law and unconstitutional.
Respondents assail CPO 189-2013 as patently illegal, arbitrary, and oppressive. This case clearly
falls within the exceptions where exhaustion of administrative remedies need not be resorted to
by respondents.

Effectivity of EO 140

Respondents allege that EO 140 took effect only on 2 October 2013, fifteen days after its
publication in two newspapers of general circulation. Hence, respondents argue that when CPO
189-2013 was issued, EO 140 was not yet effective.
Article 2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended by Executive Order No. 200,11 is
clear on this issue. It states:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in
the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise
provided.

The proviso “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to an effectivity date other than after
fifteen days following the com-
_______________
10 Vigilar v. Aquino, 654 Phil. 755; 639 SCRA 772 (2011).

11 Providing for the Publication of Laws Either in the Official Gazette or in a Newspaper of General Circulation in the
Philippines as a Requirement for their Effectivity.

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pletion of the law’s publication.12 Thus, it is within the discretion of the legislature, or the
Executive Department in this case, whether to shorten or extend the fifteen-day period13 as long
as there is compliance with the requirement of publication.
Here, Section 9 of EO 140 provides that the “order shall take effect immediately upon
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.” EO 140 was published in Manila
Bulletinand Philippine Star on 17 September 2013. As such, EO 140 took effect on 17 September
2013.
In addition, the Court already ruled that “[i]nterpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public, need not be published.”14 EO 140 is an internal regulation that affects primarily the
personnel of the DOF and the BOC. It remains valid even without publication.
Validity of CPO 189-2013

Respondents assail the validity of CPO 189-2013. Respondents allege that under EO 140,
CPRO shall be composed of its organic personnel, as approved by the DBM upon recommendation
of the DOF Secretary. The organic personnel was supposed to be augmented and reinforced by
DOF and BOC personnel. Respondents allege that they were detailed to CPRO even before its
organic personnel could be constituted.
We rule for respondents.
Section 3 of EO 140 provides:
_______________
12 Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. v. Military Shrine Services-Philippine Veteran Affairs Office,
Department of National Defense, G.R. No. 187587, 5 June 2013, 697 SCRA 359.
13 Tañada v. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528; 146 SCRA 446 (1986), Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration.
14 Id.

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SECTION 3. Personnel and Staffing Complement.—The CPRO shall be composed of its organic
personnel, as approved by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) upon recommendation
of the DOF Secretary, augmented and reinforced by DOF and BOC personnel as well as those detailed
or seconded from other agencies, whether attached to the DOF or not. In addition, the CPRO, upon
approval of the DOF Secretary, may hire or engage technical consultants to provide necessary support
in the performance of its mandate.

Respondents were supposed to augment and reinforce the existing organic personnel of CPRO.
Yet, at the time of respondents’ detail, CPRO had not been formally organized. CPRO had no
organic personnel that had been approved by the DBM upon recommendation of the DOF
Secretary. The DOF Secretary had yet to promulgate rules and regulations and to prescribe
procedures and processes to enable CPRO to effectively exercise its powers and duties, as
required by Section 4 of EO 140.
In addition, under Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules, a detail is temporary in nature.
In fact, detail of employees is only allowed for a maximum period for those occupying
professional, technical, and scientific positions.15 Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules
provides:
SEC. 8. A detail is the movement of an employee from one department or agency to another
which is temporary in nature, which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does
not require the issuance of another appointment.
The employee detailed receives his salary only from his mother unit/agency.
_______________
15 Section 26(6), Chapter V, Book V, Title I of Executive Order No. 292 provides that the detail shall be allowed “only
for a limited period in the case of employees occupying professional, technical and scientific positions.”

90
90 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
Detail shall be allowed only for a maximum period in the case of employees occupying professional,
technical and scientific position. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the detail, he
may appeal his case to the Commission. Pending appeal, the decision to detail the employee shall be
executory unless otherwise ordered by the Commission.
Section 2 of CSC Resolution No. 021181, dated 13 September 2002,16clarified the maximum
period of detail of employees. It states:
Section 2. Duration of the detail.—The detail shall be allowed only for a maximum period of one
year. Details beyond one year may be allowed provided it is with the consent of the detailed employee.
The extension or renewal of the period of the detail shall be within the authority of the mother agency.
If the employee believes that there is no justification for the detail, he/she may appeal his/her case
to the proper Civil Service Commission Regional Office. Pending appeal, the detail shall be executory
unless otherwise ordered by said regional office. Decision of said regional office may be further
appealed to the Commission En Banc.

In this case, CPO 189-2013 did not provide for the period of respondents’ detail. It only
provided that the order “shall be effective immediately and valid until sooner revoked,” making
the detail of respondents indefinite. There was nothing to show that respondents were occupying
professional, technical, and scientific positions that would have allowed their detail for the
maximum period provided under Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules. Further, CSC
Resolution No. 021181 did not distinguish between an ordinary employee and an employee
occupying professional, technical, and scientific posi-
_______________
16 As contained in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, Series of 2002.

91
VOL. 768, AUGUST 91

24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
tion. Hence, it should have been specified that the maximum period of respondents’ detail should
not exceed one year.
Petitioners assert, and we quote:
There is a cancer of corruption we must extinguish. The drive to rid the government of graft and
corruption deserves the support of everyone.
The principle of good governance cannot, should not, be trivialized nor oversimplified by tenuous
whimpering and individualism intended to detract from the urgent need to cleanse the Republic from a
mainstream culture of unabated corruption, perpetuated with impunity and sense of self-entitlement. The
issue at hand is not about who, but what; it is not about individual loss, but about national gain. Whether
from the birth pains of reform, this nation can gain a foothold, nay, a stride into restoring this nation into its
prideful place from the clutches of a “kleptocratic mafia” that had gained a strangehold into one of the
nation’s primary sources of revenue.17

Indeed, we commend and support the reforms being undertaken in the different agencies of
the government. However, we cannot allow department heads to take shortcuts that will
undermine and disregard the basic procedures of the law.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We sustain the validity of Executive
Order No. 140. We rule that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the action for
declaratory relief filed by respondents. We further rule that Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-
2013 was not validly issued.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta,** Del Castilloand Mendoza, JJ., concur.
_______________
17 Rollo, p. 10.
** Designated acting member per Raffle dated 10 August 2015.

92
92 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
Leonen, J., See Separate Dissenting Opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

Respectfully, I dissent.
The Civil Service Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over questions regarding personnel
actions affecting civil service employees.1 It is the sole arbiter that decides controversies
regarding the civil service at first instance.2 Courts should not directly assume jurisdiction based
on allegations of unconstitutionality and invalidity of government regulations when the question,
in essence, involves a personnel action.
This is a Petition for certiorari and prohibition with very urgent prayer for the immediate
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction3 filed
by the Department of Finance and the Bureau of Customs before this court, assailing the Manila
Regional Trial Court’s Order4 dated October 1, 2013 issued by Executive Judge Marino M. Dela
Cruz, Jr., the Order5 dated October 4, 2013 issued by Presiding Judge Felicitas O. Laron-
Cacanindin, and all other subsequent Orders preventing the implementation of Customs
Personnel Order No. B-189-2013.6 The Department of Finance and Bureau of Customs also pray
for the dismissal of the Petition for declaratory relief filed by private respondents before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.7
_______________
1 Olanda v. Bugayong, 459 Phil. 626, 632; 413 SCRA 255, 260 (2003) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, Third Division].
2 Id.
3 Rollo, pp. 10-50.
4 Id., at pp. 54-56.
5 Id., at pp. 57-63.
6 Id., at p. 44.
7 Id.

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VOL. 768, AUGUST 93

24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
On September 2, 2013, President Benigno Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 1408 creating
the Customs Policy Research Office in the Department of Finance.9 The Customs Policy Research
Office shall review the Bureau of Customs’ administration policies, rules, and procedures, and
provide recommendations for their improvement.10 Section 3 of Executive Order No. 140 provides
for the composition of the Customs Policy Research Office:
SECTION 3. Personnel and Staffing Complement.—The [Customs Policy Research Office] shall be
composed of its organic personnel, as approved by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) upon
recommendation of the [Department of Finance] Secretary, augmented and reinforced by [Department of
Finance] and [Bureau of Customs] personnel as well as those detailed or seconded from other agencies,
whether attached to the [Department of Finance] or not. In addition, the [Customs Policy Research Office],
upon approval of the [Department of Finance] Secretary, may hire or engage technical consultants to
provide necessary support in the performance of its mandate.11

Executive Order No. 140 was published on September 17, 2013 in Manila Bulletin and
Philippine Star.12Section 9 of Executive Order No. 140 provides:

SECTION 9. Effectivity.—This Order shall take effect immediately upon publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.13
On September 17, 2013, or on the same day of publication of Executive Order No. 140, Bureau
of Customs Commis-
_______________
8 Id., at pp. 64-67.

9 Id., at p. 14.
10 Id., at p. 65; Exec. Order No. 140 (2013), Sec. 1.
11 Rollo, p. 66.
12 Id., at p. 14.
13 Id., at p. 67.

94
94 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
sioner Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon issued Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013,14 with the
approval of Department of Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima.15 Customs Personnel Order No.
B-189-2013 detailed 27 Bureau of Customs personnel to the Customs Policy Research Office
under the Department of Finance.16 Thus:
September 17, 2013
CUSTOMS PERSONNEL ORDER
No. B-189-2013

Under Section 3 of Executive Order No. 140, Series of 2013, the Customs Policy Research Office (“the
CPRO”) shall be composed of its organic personnel, augmented and reinforced by personnel from the
Department of Finance and Bureau of Customs as well [as] those detailed or seconded from other agencies.
Pursuant to the foregoing, the following personnel are detailed from the Bureau of Customs to [Customs
Policy Research Office] under the Department of Finance:
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 69-70.

15 Id., at p. 14.
16 Id., at p. 69; BOC Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013, par. 1.

95
VOL. 768, AUGUST 95

24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
All orders, circulars, memoranda, issuances contrary to or inconsistent herewith are hereby
revoked and/or modified, and all concerned shall be guided accordingly.

96
96 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
This Order shall be effective immediately and valid until sooner revoked.
For strict compliance.
(signed)
ROZZANO RUFINO B. BIAZON
Commissioner of Customs

APPROVED:
(signed)
CESAR V. PURISIMA
Secretary
Date: ________17

Only 1218 of the affected employees complied with the directive in Customs Personnel Order
No. B-189-2013 and reported to the Customs Policy Research Office after its effectivity on
September 17, 2014.19
The other 1520 affected employees refused to comply with the Order21 and instead filed on
September 30, 2013 a Petition22 for declaratory relief with an application for a temporary
restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.23
The 15 employees assailed the validity of Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013.24 They
argued that Customs Per-
_______________
17 Rollo, pp. 69-70.

18 Id., at p. 71. 12 out of the 27 affected employees did not file for a Petition for declaratory relief.
19 Id., at p. 400.
20 Id., at p. 71.
21 Id., at p. 400.
22 Id., at pp. 71-93. The Petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 13-130820.
23 Id., at p. 15.
24 Id., at p. 72.

97
VOL. 768, AUGUST 97

24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
sonnel Order No. B-189-2013 violated (a) Section 70325 of Republic Act No. 1937 or the Tariff and
Customs Code;26 (b) their right to security of tenure as career service officers defined under Book
V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Section 7 of Executive Order No. 292;27 and (c) Section 3 of
Executive Order
_______________
25 Rep. Act No. 1937 (1957), Sec. 703, as amended, provides:
SECTION 703. Assignment of Customs Officers and Employees to Other Duties.—The Commissioner of Customs may,
with the approval of the Secretary of Finance, assign any employee of the Bureau of Customs to any port, service, division
or office within the Bureau or assign him duties as the best interest of the service may require, in accordance with the
staffing pattern or organizational set up as may be prescribed by the Commissioner of Customs with the approval of the
Secretary of Finance: Provided, That such assignment shall not affect the tenure of office of the employees nor result in
the change of status, demotion in rank and/or deduction in salary. (Emphasis supplied)
26 Rollo, pp. 76-77.
27 Id., at p. 77; Exec. Order No. 292 (1987), Book V, Title I, SubTitle A, Chap. 2, Sec. 7 provides:
SECTION 7. Career Service.—The Career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to
be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination, or based on highly technical qualifications; (2)
opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure.
The Career Service shall include:

(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination is
required;
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the faculty and
academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research
institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director,
Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant

98
98 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
No. 140.28 They further argued that Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 was invalid for
having been issued prior to the effectivity of Executive Order No. 140.29 They relied on Article
230 of the Civil Code that provides that laws become effective 15 days after complete
publication.31
On October 1, 2013, Executive Judge Marino M. Dela Cruz, Jr. granted a 72-hour temporary
restraining order to stop the implementation of Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013.32 The
case was then raffled to Branch 17 presided by Judge Felicitas O. Laron-Cacanindin (Judge
Laron-Cacanindin).33
_______________
Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the
Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President;
(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the President, such
as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;
(5) Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate merit system;
(6) Personnel of government-owned or -controlled corporations, whether performing governmental or proprietary
functions, who do not fall under the noncareer service; and
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled.
28 Rollo, pp. 80-81.
29 Id., at pp. 80 and 84.
30 Civil Code, Art. 2, as amended by Exec. Order No. 200 (1987), provides:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
31 Rollo, p. 84.
32 Id., at pp. 15-16.
33 Id., at p. 16.

99
VOL. 768, AUGUST 99

24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
On October 4, 2013,34 the Department of Finance and the Bureau of Customs filed a Motion to
Dismiss.35 They argued that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the employees’
Petition for declaratory relief and that the requisites for the filing of a Petition for declaratory
relief were lacking.36
In the Order dated October 4, 2013, Judge Laron-Cacanindin extended the temporary
restraining order to 20 days after finding that Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 had
“violate[d] the rules on detail because it failed to provide the duration of the detail.”37In the same
Order, Judge Laron-Cacanindin stated that the Order was without prejudice to further findings
of the court after trial on the merits of the main case for declaratory relief.38
In the Order39 dated October 21, 2013, Judge Laron-Cacanindin denied the employees’
application for a writ of preliminary injunction.40 The denial of their application for a writ of
preliminary injunction prompted six (6) of the employees who filed the Petition to report to the
Customs Policy Research Office.41 The returning employees reasoned that they reported for work
so they would not be charged with insubordination.42
On October 21, 2013, the Department of Finance and Bureau of Customs filed this Petition
for certiorari and prohibition.43
_______________
34 Id.
35 Id., at pp. 94-115.
36 Id., at pp. 98-99.
37 Id., at p. 39.
38 Id., at p. 62.
39 Id., at pp. 323-326.
40 Id., at p. 326.
41 Id., at p. 351. The employees were Arnel C. Alcaraz, Ma. Lourdes V. Mangaoang, Romalino G. Valdez, Lilibeth S.
Sandag, Ma. Liza S. Torres, and Raymond P. Ventura.
42 Id.
43 Id., at p. 9.

100
100 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
This court required the 15 employees to file a Comment on the Petition.44 After filing the
Comment,45 the Department of Finance and Bureau of Customs were ordered to file a Reply.46
In their Petition for certiorari, the Department of Finance and Bureau of Customs argued that
the Civil Service Commission, not the Regional Trial Court, had jurisdiction over the subject
matter of this case and that the 15 employees failed to exhaust all available administrative
remedies before filing their Petition for declaratory relief.47 According to the Department of
Finance and Bureau of Customs, Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 was a personnel
action, and questions involving personnel actions in the civil service should be lodged before the
Civil Service Commission.48
Further, the Department of Finance and Bureau of Customs argued that some of the
requirements for filing a Petition for declaratory relief were absent.49 First, a declaratory relief is
available only when the government issuance being questioned is a national law or an ordinance
of general application.50 Since Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 was an internal
personnel order whose application was limited within the Bureau of Customs, it cannot be a
subject of a Petition for declaratory relief.51 Second, the declaratory relief was no longer available
because Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 had been breached prior to the filing of the
Petition.52 The 15 employees allegedly committed a breach when they failed to report to the
Customs Policy Research Office upon the effectivity of Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013
_______________
44 Id., at p. 125.
45 Id., at pp. 127-154.
46 Id., at p. 359.
47 Id., at pp. 24-25.
48 Id., at p. 28.
49 Id., at p. 24.
50 Id., at p. 33.
51 Id.
52 Id., at p. 35.

101
VOL. 768, AUGUST 101

24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
on September 17, 2013.53Third, a declaratory relief was not available to the 15 employees because
they had an adequate remedy with the Civil Service Commission.54
Regarding the duration of the detail, the Department of Finance and Bureau of Customs
argued that the detail was not indefinite and that pursuant to Civil Service Commission
Resolution No. 02118155 or the Policies on Detail, the detail shall only last for at most, one (1)
year.56
In their Comment dated January 8, 2014, the 15 employees countered that the Regional Trial
Court had jurisdiction as the main issue was the validity and constitutionality of Customs
Personnel Order No. B-189-2013.57 The resolution of this issue required the exercise of judicial
review, which was beyond the competence of the Civil Service Commission.58
Since the 15 employees’ Petition for declaratory relief alleges that Customs Personnel Order
No. B-189-2013 is unconstitutional and invalid, those allegations should suffice for the Regional
Trial Court to assume jurisdiction.59
According to the 15 employees, Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 is unconstitutional
for violating their right to security of tenure.60 Their detail to the Customs Policy and Research
Office amounts to constructive dismissal61 as they are now “mere researchers[.]”62
_______________
53 Id.
54 Id., at p. 37.
55 Id., at pp. 116-118.
56 Id., at pp. 39-40.
57 Id., at p. 135.
58 Id., at p. 140.
59 Id., at p. 143.
60 Id., at pp. 137-140.
61 Id., at pp. 149-150.
62 Id., at p. 142.

102
102 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
The 15 employees argue that all the requisites for the filing of a Petition for declaratory relief
are present.63 They claim that Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 is a government
regulation, affecting their rights, duties, rank, and status.64 Hence, Customs Personnel Order No.
B-189-2013 is a proper subject of a Petition for declaratory relief.65 They also argue that Customs
Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 is void, producing no effect.66 According to them, a void or
unconstitutional law or issuance cannot be a source of an obligation so it cannot be breached.67
This case should consider the following issues:
First, whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over private respondents’ Petition for
declaratory relief;
Second, whether all the requisites for the filing of a Petition for declaratory relief are present;
and
Finally, whether Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 is void because of its indefinite
term.

I.

The Constitution confers jurisdiction over the Civil Service Commission for cases involving the
civil service. Article IX(B), Section 1(1) of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 1. (1) The Civil Service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commissioncomposed of a
Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public administration, and must
not have been candidates for any elective position in the elec-
_______________
63 Id., at pp. 141-144.

64 Id., at pp. 141-143.
65 Id., at p. 143.
66 Id.
67 Id.

103

24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
tions immediately preceding their appointment. (Emphasis supplied)

As part of the Civil Service Commission’s mandate to administer the civil service, Article
IX(B), Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the centralpersonnel agency of the Government, shall
establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system,
integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a
management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress
an annual report on its personnel programs. (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution gives the Civil Service Commission quasi-judicial powers through Article
IX(A), Sections 6 and 7, which provide:
SECTION 6. Each Commission En Banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice
before it or before any of its offices. Such rules, however, shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights.
SECTION 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case
or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorariby the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
(Emphasis supplied)

104
104 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
As the “central personnel agency of the Government,”68 Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3,

Section 12(11) of Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:
SECTION 12. Powers and Functions.—The [Civil Service] Commission shall have the following
powers and functions:
....
(11) Hear and decide administrative casesinstituted by or brought before it directly or on
appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and
of the agencies attached to it. Officials and employees who fail to comply with such
decisions, orders, or rulings shall be liable for contempt of the Commission. Its decisions,
orders, or rulings shall be final and executory. Such decisions, orders, or rulings may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days
from receipt of a copy thereof[.] (Emphasis supplied)

Further, for the implementation of Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12(11) of
Executive Order No. 292,69Sections 5(B)(3), 6(B)(3), and 7(B)(2) of Civil Service Commission
Memorandum Circular No. 19-99 or the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service lay down the different offices of the civil service where complaints involving
personnel actions should be filed. Hence:
_______________
68 Const., Art. IX(B), Sec. 3.

69 CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99 (1999), second Whereasclause.

105

24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
SECTION 5. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission Proper.70—The Civil Service Commission Proper
shall have jurisdiction over the following cases:
....
B. Non-Disciplinary
....
3. Protests against the appointment, or other personnel actions, involving third level officials;71 and
....
SECTION 6. Jurisdiction of Civil Service Regional Offices.—The Civil Service Commission Regional
Offices shall have jurisdiction over the following cases:
....
B. Non-Disciplinary
....
3. Decisions of national agencies and local government units within their geographical boundaries
relative to personnel actions and non-disciplinary cases brought before it on appeal; and
....
_______________
70 CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99 (1999), Rule I, Sec. 2(c) provides:
SECTION 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms.—. . .
c. COMMISSION PROPER refers to the Civil Service Commission-Central Office.
71 CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99 (1999), Rule I, Sec. 2(o) provides:
SECTION 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms.— . . .
o. THIRD LEVEL refers to positions in the Career Executive Service (CES) which include Undersecretary, Assistant
Secretary, Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director and other officers of equivalent rank.

106
106 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
SECTION 7. Jurisdiction of Heads of Agencies.—Heads of Departments, agencies, provinces, cities,

municipalities and other instrumentalities shall have original concurrent jurisdiction, with the
Commission,72 over their respective officers and employees.
....
B. Non-Disciplinary
....
2. Complaints on personnel actions and other non-disciplinary actions of their respective personnel.
(Emphasis supplied)

As the “central personnel agency of the Government”73with quasi-judicial powers74and as the
body tasked to administer the civil service,75 the Civil Service Commission is the “sole arbiter of
controversies relating to the civil service[,]”76 including personnel actions, as this court has
ruled.77
The material allegations in the Complaint or Petition and the character of the relief sought
determine which court has jurisdiction.78 In private respondents’ 44 paragraphs in their Petition
for declaratory relief filed before the Regional Trial Court, they alleged:
_______________
72 CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99 (1999), Rule I, Sec. 2(b) provides:
SECTION 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms.— . . .
b. COMMISSION refers to the Civil Service Commission (Central Office and Regional Offices).
73 Const., Art. IX(B), Sec. 3.
74 Const., Art. IX(A), Secs. 6 and 7.
75 Const., Art. IX(B), Sec. 1(1).
76 Corsiga v. Defensor, 439 Phil. 875, 883; 391 SCRA 267, 272-273 (2002) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
77 Mantala v. Salvador, G.R. No. 101646, February 13, 1992, 206 SCRA 264, 267 [Per CJ. Narvasa, En Banc].
78 Department of Agrarian Reform v. Cuenca, 482 Phil. 208, 216; 439 SCRA 15, 22 (2004) [Per J.Panganiban, Third
Division].

107

24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
8. On 17 September 2013, without waiting for [Executive Order] No. 140’s effectivity on 2 October 2013,
the [Bureau of Customs] issued [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013, signed by [Bureau of Customs]
Commissioner Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon and approved by [Department of Finance] Secretary, Cesar V.
Purisima on even date. [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 states:
Under Section 3 of
Executive Order No.
140, Series of 2013,
the Customs Policy
Research Office (the
“CPRO”) shall be
composed of its
organic personnel,
augmented and
reinforced by
personnel from the
Department of
Finance and Bureau
of Customs as well as
those (sic) detailed or
seconded from other
agencies. Pursuant to
the foregoing, the
following personnel
are detailed from the
Bureau of Customs
to [the Customs
Policy Research
Office] under the
Department of
Finance:
....
9. Thus, [private respondents’] original and permanent appointments in plantilla positions as Collectors
of Customs VI and V were effectively and constructively revoked even before the effectivity of [Executive
Order] No. 140 creating the [Customs Policy Research Office]. They are all “detailed” to the [Customs Policy
Research Office] without any appointment papers providing for their specific functions, status, salary grades,
ranks, and designation. By virtue of the assailed issuance, [private respondents’] were all removed from their
respective permanent positionsas Collectors of Customs to form a supposed “research body.”
10. The Department of Budget and Management (DBM), pursuant to [Executive Order] No. 140 has not
even approved the composition of the organic personnel of the [Customs Policy Research Office]. Neither has
the [Department of Finance] appeared to have made the requisite recommendation for that purpose, as
mandated by [Executive Order] No. 140.

108
108 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
11. While they have not been officially notified thereof, [private respondents] were reliably informed of
the issuance of [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 and [petitioners’] attempt to unlawfully
“detail” them to the [Customs Policy Research Office].
....
13. While the [Bureau of Customs] Commissioner’s authority to reorganize is recognized, it is neither
absolute nor unbridled. The exercise thereof should not violate the law and the 1987 Constitution. The
Constitution clearly mandates that “no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause provided by law.”
14. Section 703 of [Republic Act] No. 1937, as amended, provides that:
Assignment of
Customs Officers and
Employees to other
duties.—The
Commissioner of
Customs may, with
the approval of the
Secretary of Finance,
assign any employee
of the Bureau of
Customs to any port,
service, division or
office within the
Bureau or assign him
duties as the best
interest of the service
may require, in
accordance with the
staffing pattern or
organizational setup
as may be prescribed
by the Commissioner
of Customs with the
approval of the
Secretary of
Finance: Provided,
that such assignment
shall not affect the
tenure of office of the
employees nor result
in the change of
status, demotion in
rank and/or
deduction of salary.
15. Section 2 of [Republic Act] No. 6656 [or An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service
Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization] further provides that due
notice and hearing are required to removea public officer or employee pursuant to a bona
fidereorganization, viz.:
No officer or employee in the career service shall be removedexcept for a valid cause and after due notice
and hearing. A valid

109

24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.

cause
for removalexists
when, pursuant to
a bona
fide reorganization, a
position has been
abolished or
rendered redundant
or there is a need to
merge, divide, or
consolidate positions
in order to meet the
exigencies of the
service, or other
lawful causes
allowed by the Civil
Service Law.
16. Thus, while the necessity and indispensability of reorganization when public interest demands may
be justified, civil service employees, much more career service officers with permanent appointments like
[private respondents], cannot be removed, suspended, or demotedfrom office except for cause provided by
law.
....
18. In this case, [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 allegedly “detailed” all 15 [private
respondents], together with 12 other Collectors of Customs, to an advisory capacity of a policy coordinating
body (CPRO) under the guise of reorganization, thus effectively rendering vacant the 27 positions of collector
of customsthroughout the country.
19. Section 8, Rule VII of Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 91-1631, otherwise known as
the “Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations,” provides that a “detail” is “the movement of an employee
from one department or agency to another which is temporary in nature, which does not involve a reduction
in rank, status or salary and does not require the issuance of another appointment.”
20. The patent nullity of [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 is readily apparent since Section
703 of [the Tariff and Customs Code] merely authorizes the [Bureau of Customs] Commissioner to assign or
move [Bureau of Customs] personnel only within the Bureau. Since the [Customs Policy Research Office] is a
newly created “office” outside of the [Bureau of Customs], the [Bureau of Customs] Commissioner’s issuance
of [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 which “details” [private respondents] to the [Customs Policy
Research Office] is clearly an ultra viresact, and is therefore inva-

110
110 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
lid. In fact, the [Bureau of Customs] Commissioner’s own admission proves this ultra vires and invalid
issuance, thus:
“It is more than a
reshuffle because
[private respondents]
have actually
been transferred to
the [Department of
Finance], out of the
Bureau of Customs,”
Biazon said in an
ANC interview,
confirming news first
reported by the
Philippine Daily
Inquirer. “Instead of
just reassignment
[to] another port,
they’re
basically reassigned
to another office.”
“After their
transfer out of the
[Bureau of Customs],
the next-in-rank
collectors or division
heads are taking
over as officers-in-
charge of the
different ports,” he
said.

21. There is no bona fidereorganization that took place. [Private respondents’] mass “detail” to the
[Customs Policy Research Office] was without any clear or definite direction as to their career status and
functions. As a consequence, [private respondents] were intentionally and effectively placed on a “floating
status.”
22. Furthermore, [Executive Order] No. 140 clearly provides that the [Customs Policy Research Office]
shall be composed of its organic personnel, and that said policy research body — after the organization of its
own organic personnel — shall merely be augmented and reinforced by Department of Finance and Bureau
of Customs personnel. Despite the absence of any organic personnel, much less approval from the
Department of Budget and Management or even a recommendation from the [Department of Finance],
[private respondents] have, in speed haste, already been ordered to be “detailed” by the [Bureau of Customs]
to the [Customs Policy Research Office], and thus, effectively removed from their current respective
permanent positions.
23. The landmark case of Dario v. Mison, et al., where the Supreme Court voided the personnel
reorganization within the [Bureau of Customs], is highly instructive in this case, thus:
111

24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
Reorganizations in
this jurisdiction have
been regarded as
valid provided they
are pursued in good
faith. . . .
....
24. By no stretch of the imagination can the issuance of [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 be
said to have been carried out in good faith. The undue haste in issuing [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-
1892013 clearly shows that respondents are attempting to beat the deadline on the COMELEC election ban
on personnel movement from 28 September 2013 to 28 October 2013 due to the
forthcoming Barangay Elections. It cannot be denied that [Executive Order] No. 140, which was signed by
the President on 2 September 2013, has yet to take effect on 2 October 2013, which is 15 days after its
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. On 17 September 2013, however, the [Bureau of
Customs] already issued [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013, which is based on [Executive Order]
No. 140, and attempted to serve copies thereof to [respondents] on 26 to 27 September 2013 supposedly just
in time before the COMELEC election ban on personnel movement takes effect on 28 September 2013.
25. More importantly, [Executive Order] No. 140 mandates that the transfer of [Bureau of Customs]
personnel should merely augment or reinforce the organic personnel of the [Customs Policy Research Office].
Obviously, without any organic personnel, there is still nothing to augment or reinforce. . . . Hence, [private
respondents’] “detail” to the [Customs Policy Research Office] absent any compliance with the requirements
under [Executive Order] No. 140, was surely carried out in bad faith, and was meant to illegally remove
[private respondents] from their respective permanent positions, in blatant violation of the law and the
Constitution.
26. It should also be stressed that [private respondents] were appointed as Collectors of Customs with
Position Titles VI and V, with specific functions, duties, titles, and ranks clearly provided for in their
respective appointment papers. In contrast, their supposed “detail” to

112
112 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
the [Customs Policy Research Office] under [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 does not even
provide for a definite period of duty, their titles, new functions, or ranks.
27. Moreover, under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 06-05, otherwise known as the “Guidelines on
Designation,” it is clear that:
....
B. Designees can
only be designated to
positions within the
level they are
currently occupying.
However, Division
Chiefs may be
designated to
perform the duties of
third level positions
First level
personnel cannot be
designated to
perform the duties of
second level
positions.
....
29. The basis of [private respondents’] reassignment or the exigency necessary to remove them from
their positions is likewise inexistent. Such blanket “detail” relinquishes [private respondents’] permanent
positions as Collectors of Customs without due process and is contrary to their Constitutional right to
security of tenure. Clearly, the disparity between the positions of a Collector of Customs and a mere
researcher is blatant. Therefore, the transfer from the former to the latter unmistakeably
denotes demotion. . . .
....
30. In the case of Pastor v. City of Pasig, the Supreme Court held that a reassignment or even detail
which is indefinite and which results in a reduction of rank and status is effectively a constructive
dismissal from the service. . . .
....
31. The principles on constructive dismissal clearly find analogous application to [private respondents].
By definition, constructive dismissal is a quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a

113

24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
diminution of pay. The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee’s
position would have felt compelled to give up his position under the circumstances. It is an act amounting to
dismissal but is made to appear as if it were not. Constructive dismissal is therefore a dismissal in disguise.
The law recognizes and resolves this situation in favor of employees in order to protect their rights and
interests from the coercive acts of the employer. Thus, the Supreme Court has ruled that the management
prerogative to transfer an employee “cannot be used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an
undesirable worker.”
32. Evidently, [private respondents’] “detail” to the [Customs Policy Research Office] operated as a
blanket and forced relinquishment of their permanent positions as Collectors of Customs in violation of their
right to security of tenure. In view thereof, it behooves upon this Honorable Court to correct such abuse of
powers and retain [private respondents] to their rightful ranks.
....
35. . . . in accordance with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Tañada v. Tuvera, laws and executive
issuances shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation.
36. In this case, [Executive Order] No. 140 was published in the 17 September 2013 issue of the
broadsheet newspaper, Manila Bulletin. Thus, following the above legal standards, it is clear that
[Executive Order] No. 140 has yet to take legal effect on 2 October 2013. In other words, the [Bureau of
Customs’] issuance of [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 on 17 September 2013 simply has no legal
basis, and is therefore premature and patently invalid. To deprive [private respondents] of their permanent
positions as Collectors of Customs and to “detail” all 15 of them indefinitely as members of a research body
on the basis of an invalid [Bureau of Customs] and [Department of Finance] order are not only illegal but
also unconstitutional for being violative of [private respondents’] right to security of tenure.

114
114 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
37. An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords
no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been
passed. . . . For these reasons, [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 should be nullified and
set aside, and its enforcement enjoined.
38. . . . The consequence [of implementing Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013] that is
also readily obvious is the chaos entailed in port operations, the collection of much needed
Government revenues and public service as [private respondents] perform functions either as
District Collectors of all the 17 Collection Districts in the country, or as Deputy Collectors for
administration, assessment and operation in those different ports.
....
41. It cannot be overemphasized that the issuance of [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-
2013 is illegal, and blatantly violates existing law and the Constitution. As above mentioned,
respondents intend to have [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 immediately effective.
Thus, there is a manifest urgency for this Honorable Court to immediately restrain [petitioners]
from implementing [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 upon receipt of this petition and
before the matter can be heard on notice. Otherwise, grave injustice and irreparable injury would
be suffered by [private respondents], in that:
(a) [Executive
Order] No.
140, on
which
[Customs
Personnel
Order] No.
B-189-2013
is based, has
yet to take
effect upon
publication
in two (2)
newspapers
of general
circulation.
[Executive
Order] No.
140 was
published in
the 17
September
2013 issue of
the Manila
Bulletin,hence,
it will only
take effect on
2 October
2013.
[Customs
Personnel
Order] No.
B-189-2013
cannot be
given any
effectivity as
it is invalid
for being
115

24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
blatantly
premature
and without
legal basis;
(b) [Customs
Personnel
Order] No.
B-189-2013
violates
[Executive
Order] No.
140, as the
latter
mandates
that the
[Department
of Finance],
with the
approval of
the
[Department
of Budget
and
Management],
has to
recommend
the
composition
of the
organic
personnel of
the [Customs
Policy
Research
Office]. No
such
recommendation
by the
[Department
of Finance],
much less
the approval
of the
[Department
of Budget
and
Management],
has been
made. In
fact,
[Executive
Order] No.
140 provides
that the
transfer of
[Bureau of
Customs]
personnel
should
merely
augment or
reinforce the
organic
personnel of
the [Customs
Policy
Research
Office].
Obviously,
without any
organic
personnel,
there is still
nothing to
augment or
reinforce.
The
[Customs
Policy
Research
Office] is
thus in
limbo, as
there is yet
no organic
personnel in
place;
(c) [Customs
Personnel
Order] No.
B-189-2013
is also
contrary to
Section 703
of [Republic
Act] No.
1937, as
amended,
which
provides that
“(t)he
Commissioner
of Customs
may, with
the approval
of the
Secretary of
Finance,
assign any
employee of
the Bureau
of Customs
to any port,
service,
division or
office within the
Bureau or
assign him
duties as the
best interest
of the service
may
require.”
Even
Commissioner
Biazon, in an
interview
with [the
ABS-CBN
News
Channel]
admitted
that “it is
more than a
reshuffle
because they
have actually
been
transferred
to the
[Department
of Finance],
out of the
Bureau of
Customs.”
The
Commissioner
of Customs
thus
committed
an illegal
and ultra
vires act in
“detailing”
[private
respondents]
to the
[Customs
Policy

115

24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
Research
Office], an
office
admittedly
outside the
[Bureau of
Customs];
(d) [private
respondents’]
“detail” to
the [Customs
Policy
Research
Office] is
[petitioners’]
scheme to
constructively
dismiss and
demote
[private
respondents].
[Customs
Personnel
Order] No.
B-189-2013
operates as a
blanket and
forced
relinquishment
of [private
respondents’]
permanent
positions as
Collectors of
Customs in
violation of
their
constitutional
right to
security of
tenure.
[Private
respondents]
are all
“detailed” to
the [Customs
Policy
Research
Office]
without any
appointment
papers
providing for
their specific
functions,
status,
salary
grades,
ranks, and
designation,
thereby
intentionally
and
effectively
placing them
on “floating
status”; and
(e) [Private
respondents]
would be
unduly
displaced
from their
permanent
positions
with the
appointment
and/or
designation
by the
[Bureau of
Customs] of
new
Collectors of
Customs.79(Emphasis
supplied,
citations
omitted)

An examination of the text of the Petition for declaratory relief readily shows that private
respondents originally questioned a personnel action. They essentially questioned their detail to
the Customs Policy and Research Office.
Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 of Executive Order No. 292 defines a
personnel action:
SECTION 26. Personnel Actions.—. . .
As used in this Title, any action denoting the movement or progress of personnel in the civil service shall
be known as personnel action. Such action shall include appointment through certification, promotion,
transfer, re-

117

24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
instatement, reemployment, detail, reassignment, demotion, and separation. (Emphasis supplied)

The assailed Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 is a personnel action because it details
27 employees from the Bureau of Customs to the Customs Policy Research Office. It is a
movement of personnel in the civil service.
Cases involving personnel actions are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission and not within the trial courts’ jurisdiction.80
The issue is not novel.
In Olanda v. Bugayong,81respondent Leonardo G. Bugayong (Bugayong), as President of the
Philippine Merchant Marine Academy, relieved petitioner Menelieto A. Olanda (Olanda) from his
post as the Dean of the College of Marine Engineering of the Philippine Merchant Marine
Academy82 and imposed a three (3)-month suspension83on the latter for allegedly “misusing
classified information.”84 Olanda filed before the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales a Petition
for “quo warranto, mandamus, and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and damages, claiming that there was no valid cause to deprive him of his
position[.]”85
This court ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction.86 Hence:
_______________
80 Olanda v. Bugayong, supranote 1 at pp. 632-633; p. 260; Mantala v. Salvador, G.R. No. 101646, February 13, 1992,
206 SCRA 264, 267 [Per CJ. Narvasa, En Banc]; and Corsiga v. Defensor, supra note 76 at pp. 883-884; p. 271.
81 Id.
82 Id., at p. 629; p. 256.
83 Id., at p. 630; p. 257.
84 Id., at p. 629; p. 256.
85 Id., at p. 630; p. 257.
86 Id., at p. 633; p. 260.

118
118 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
Disciplinary cases and cases involving “personnel actions” affecting employees in the civil service
including “appointment through certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail,
reassignment, demotion and separation” are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission which is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service.
....
It was thus error for the trial court, which does not have jurisdiction, to, in the first, [sic] place take
cognizance of the petition of petitioner assailing his relief as Dean and his designation to another position.
This leaves it unnecessary to dwell on the issues herein raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court, hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.87 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

In Casimina v. Judge Legaspi,88 petitioner Pablo B. Casimina (Casimina), General Manager of
the Philippine Fisheries Development Authority, issued Special Order No. 82, which reassigned
private respondent Emmanuel T. Illera (Illera), Port Manager of the Iloilo Fishing Port Complex,
from Iloilo to the central office in Quezon City.89 After the denial of his request for
reconsideration,90 Illera filed for injunction with a prayer for temporary restraining order and a
writ of preliminary injunction against Casimina before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo “to
restrain [Casimina] from transferring him to the central office in Quezon City.”91
_______________
87 Id., at pp. 632-633; pp. 259-260.

88 500 Phil. 560; 462 SCRA 171 (2005) [Per J. Corona, Third Division].
89 Id., at p. 563; p. 173.
90 Id., at pp. 565-566; p. 176.
91 Id., at p. 566; id.

119
24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
Casimina filed an Omnibus Motion to dismiss the Complaint on the ground of, among others,
lack of jurisdiction.92 This court ruled that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
Petition.93 “[T]his case falls within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) because
it involves the movement of government personnel to promote order and efficiency in public
service.”94
In Mantala v. Salvador,95Dr. Julia P. Regino (Regino) filed a formal protest before the
Committee on Evaluation and Protest of the Department of Health questioning the appointment
of Dr. Mariquita J. Mantala (Dr. Mantala).96 The Committee on Evaluation and Protest upheld
Dr. Mantala’s appointment.97Upon appeal and reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission also
upheld Dr. Mantala’s appointment.98 The Resolution of the Civil Service Commission became
final and executory.99 Regino then filed an action for quo warranto and mandamusbefore the
Regional Trial Court in Quezon City.100 The trial court annulled and set aside Dr. Mantala’s
appointment and directed the Secretary of Health to withdraw Dr. Mantala’s appointment and to
issue another for Regino.101 Dr. Mantala then filed a Petition for Review on certioraribefore this
court.102 This court granted the Petition and annulled the Decision of the trial court:103
_______________
92 Id.
93 Id., at p. 570; p. 180.
94 Id.
95 G.R. No. 101646, February 13, 1992, 206 SCRA 264 [Per CJ.Narvasa, En Banc].
96 Id., at p. 265.
97 Id.
98 Id., at p. 266.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id., at p. 267.
103 Id., at p. 269.

120
120 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
Disciplinary cases, and cases involving “personnel actions” affecting employees in the civil service —
including “appointment through certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail,
reassignment, demotion and separation,” and, of course, employment status and qualification standards —
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. The Constitution declares the
Commission to be “the central personnel agency of the Government,” having power and authority to
administer the civil service; to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before
any of its offices; and to render decision in “any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the
date of its submission for decision or resolution,” which decision, or order or ruling “may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.”
....
It was thus error, because beyond its competence, for the respondent Trial Court to take cognizance of
the quo warrantoand mandamus action instituted by Dr. Regino which was in essence a protest against the
appointment of Dr. Mantala.104 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In all these cases, this court upheld the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission over
complaints involving the movement of personnel in the civil service.

II.

The doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction precludes trial courts from resolving a
controversy involving a question that is within the exclusive jurisdiction of an administrative
tribunal.105The doctrine disallows courts “to arrogate
_______________
104 Id., at pp. 267-268.

105 Javier v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96617, October 14, 1992, 214 SCRA 572, 576 [Per J. Nocon, Second Division].

121

24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged
with an administrative body of special competence.”106
In Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Company, Inc.,107the plaintiff
Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers filed a Complaint before the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) against the Samar Mining Company, Inc. (Samar Mining) alleging breach
of their closed-shop agreement.108 Samar Mining filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that the
regular courts had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Complaint.109 Samar Mining
argued that the Court of Industrial Relations (now National Labor Relations Commission) had
jurisdiction over cases involving conditions of employment.110 The Court of First Instance granted
the Motion to Dismiss.111
Upon appeal, this court applied the “exclusion theory,”112 i.e., “where jurisdiction is conferred
in express terms upon one court, and not upon another [and where] it has been held that it is the
intention that the jurisdiction conferred shall be exclusive”113 and upheld the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations (now National Labor Relations
Commission).114 Hence:
But judicial wisdom in this particular matter would seem to favor adherence to the exclusion theory, what
with the litigant’s ordinary duty to exhaust administrative reme-
_______________
106 Catipon, Jr. v. Japson, G.R. No. 191787, June 22, 2015, 759 SCRA 557, 574 [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
107 94 Phil. 932 (1954) [Per J.Bengzon, En Banc].
108 Id., at p. 933.
109 Id., at p. 934.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id., at p. 941.
113 Id.
114 Id., at pp. 941-942.

122
122 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
dies and the “doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction,” sense-making and expedient,
“That the courts
cannot or will not
determine a
controversy involving
a question which is
within the
jurisdiction of an
administrative
tribunal prior to the
decision of that
question by the
administrative
tribunal, where the
question demands
the exercise of sound
administrative
discretion requiring
the special
knowledge,
experience, and
services of the
administrative
tribunal to determine
technical and
intricate matters of
fact, and a
uniformity of ruling
is essential to comply
with the purposes of
the regulatory
statute
administered.” (42
Am. Jur. 698)115

This court also made a similar ruling in Javier v. Court of Appeals.116 In Javier, Normito
Javier (Normito) was “employed by private respondent Jebsens Maritime, Inc. as a
boatswain[.]”117 Normito, however, died at sea.118Upon learning of her husband’s death, Lolita
Javier (Lolita) went to the office of Jebsens Maritime, Inc. and the latter “promised to give the
corresponding death benefits[.]”119 After Jebsens Maritime, Inc. had failed to pay the promised
death benefits, Lolita filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Makati for a sum of
money for herself and on behalf of her six (6) minor children against Jebsens Maritime, Inc. and
its shipmaster.120
This court ruled that under Section 3(d)121 of Executive Order No. 247 or the Reorganization
Act of the Philippine Over-
_______________
116 Supra note 105.
117 Id., at p. 573.
118 Id., at p. 574.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Exec. Order No. 247 (1987), Sec. 3(d) provides:
SECTION 3. Powers and Functions.—

123

24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
seas Employment Administration, it was the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration

that had original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lolita’s Complaint and that the trial court had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of her Complaint.122Hence, under the doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction, the trial court cannot resolve the controversy.123 This court ordered
the Regional Trial Court to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.141
In Catipon, Jr. v. Japson,125 respondent Jerome Japson (Japson), “a former Senior Member
Services Representative of [the] [Social Security System], Bangued, filed a letter-complaint
[before] the Civil Service Commission-[Cordillera Administrative Region] Regional
Director[.]”126 He alleged that petitioner Macario U. Catipon, Jr. (Catipon) made deliberate false
entries in his application to take the Civil Service Professional Examination.127 The Civil Service
Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region Regional Director found Catipon guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.128
Catipon appealed to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the appeal.129 The Court of Appeals
held that instead of filing the appeal before the Court of Appeals, Catipon should have appealed
to the Civil Service Commission, based on Sections
_______________
(d) Exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all claims arising out of an employer-employee
relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment including the
disciplinary cases[.]
122 Supra note 105 at pp. 575-576.
123 Id., at p. 576.
124 Id., at pp. 575 and 577.
125 Supra note 106.
126 Id., at p. 562.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id., at p. 567.

124
124 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
5(A)(1),130 43,131 and 49132 of the Civil Service Commission Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases.133
_______________
130 CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99 (1999), Rule I, Sec. 5(A)(1) provides:
SECTION 5. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission Proper.—The Civil Service Commission Proper shall
have jurisdiction over the following cases:
A. Disciplinary
1. Decisions of Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it on petition for review[.]
131 CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99 (1999), Rule III, Sec. 43 provides:
SECTION 43. Filing of Appeals.—Decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities
and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty (30) days suspension or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days salary, may be appealed to the Commission Proper within a period of fifteen (15) days from
receipt thereof.
In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be
initially appealed to the department head and finally to the Commission Proper. Pending appeal, the same shall be
executory except where the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation
by the Secretary concerned.
A notice of appeal including the appeal memorandum shall be filed with the appellate authority, copy furnished
the disciplining office. The latter shall submit the records of the case, which shall be systematically and
chronologically arranged, paged and securely bound to prevent loss, with its comment, within fifteen (15) days, to
the appellate authority.
132 CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99 (1999), Rule III, Sec. 49 provides:
SECTION 49. Petition for Review.—A complainant may elevate the decision of the Civil Service Regional Office
dismissing a complaint for lack of a prima facie case before the Commission Proper through a Petition for Review
within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of said decision.
133 Supra note 106 at p. 567.

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vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
This court affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals134 and held:

The [Court of Appeals] is further justified in refusing to take cognizance of the petition for review, as
“[t]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve
a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.” When petitioner’s recourse lies in an appeal to the Commission Proper in accordance with the
procedure prescribed in [Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service], the [Court of
Appeals] may not be faulted for refusing to acknowledge petitioner before it.135(Emphasis supplied)
Hence, considering the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission to hear and
decide administrative cases, including those involving personnel actions, as granted by the
Constitution, the Regional Trial Court cannot assume jurisdiction based on the doctrine of
primary administrative jurisdiction.
In sustaining the trial court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the Petition for declaratory relief,
the ponencia held that the case falls under an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.136The ponencia states:
In this case, respondents allege that [Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013] is contrary to law and
unconstitutional. Respondents assail [Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013] as patently illegal,
arbitrary, and oppressive. This case clearly falls within the exceptions
_______________
134 Id., at p. 574.
135 Id., citing Vidad v. Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 42, G.R. No. 98084, October 18, 1993, 227
SCRA 271, 276 [Per J.Vitug, En Banc].
136 Ponencia, p. 87.

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126 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
where exhaustion of administrative remedies need not be resorted to by respondents.137

Private respondents, citing Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong
Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. (KBMBPM) v. Dominguez,138likewise argue that
exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies apply.139 Hence:
Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other exceptions, such as
when the question involved is purely legal, as in the instant case, or where the questioned act is patently
illegal, arbitrary or oppressive.140
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply and, consequently, its
exceptions.
The doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction is different from the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies.
Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, when an administrative agency is
granted primary jurisdiction over the subject matter, the courts “cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal
prior to the decision of that question by the administrative tribunal[.]”141The doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction presupposes that the administrative agency has jurisdiction over the
subject matter while the court does not. The Complaint or Petition, therefore, cannot be filed
before the court. As the issue is
_______________
137 Id.
138 G.R. No. 85439, January 13, 1992, 205 SCRA 92, 110 [Per J.Davide, Jr., En Banc].
139 Rollo, p. 140.
140 Id.
141 Supra note 105 at p. 576.

127

24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
jurisdictional, there should be no exception to the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction.
When the complaint or petition is filed before a court with no subject matter jurisdiction, the
court has no other option but to dismiss the case.142
On the other hand, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party
may seek intervention from the court, he or she should have already exhausted all the remedies
in the administrative level.143 If there is still a remedy available within the administrative
machinery, “then such remedy should be exhausted first before [the] court’s judicial power can be
sought.”144 The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies presupposes that both the
courts and the administrative agency have concurrent jurisdiction. This is because nonobservance
of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the court’s
jurisdiction.145 In Soto v. Jareno,146 this court ruled:
Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only
effect of noncompliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action,
which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed
waived and the court can then take cognizance of the case and try it.147(Emphasis supplied)
_______________
142 See Katon v. Palanca, Jr., 481 Phil. 168, 183; 437 SCRA 565, 575 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
143 Rosales v. Court of Appeals, 247-A Phil. 437, 443-444; 165 SCRA 344, 350 (1988) [Per J. Bidin, Third Division].
144 Paat v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 146, 152; 266 SCRA 167, 175 (1997) [Per J. Torres, Jr., Second Division].
145 Soto v. Jareno, 228 Phil. 117, 119; 144 SCRA 116, 119 (1986) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
146 Id.
147 Id., at p. 119; p. 119, citing C.N. Hodges v. Municipal Board of Iloilo City, 125 Phil. 442, 447-448; 19 SCRA 28, 33-
34 (1967)
[Per J. Ruiz Castro, En Banc], Municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet v. Court of First Instance of Baguio-Benguet, 208
Phil. 78, 83; 123 SCRA 81, 86 (1983) [Per J.Escolin, Second Division], Pineda v. Court of First Instance of Davao, 111 Phil.
643, 650; 1 SCRA 1020, 1026-1027 (1961) [Per J.Concepcion, En Banc], and Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development
Corporation v. Mendoza, 112 Phil. 960, 965; 2 SCRA 1064, 1069 (1961) [Per J.Concepcion, En Banc].

128
128 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
Hence, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies presupposes that the court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint or petition. Otherwise, it can never have the
power to take cognizance of the case as contemplated by Soto.
While both the court and the administrative agency have jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the general rule is that the courts, because of comity, practicality, and convenience, will not
interfere with the administrative process until the process comes to an end.148 This is because
availing administrative remedies entails lesser expenses and results in a speedier resolution of
controversies.149 On the other hand, since the court and the administrative agency have
concurrent jurisdiction, exceptions may be warranted by the circumstances,150 and the court may
choose to assume jurisdiction over the controversy.
_______________
148 Supra note 144 at p. 153; p. 176.

149 Id.
150 Id. This court held: “However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called
upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1)
when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part
of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department
secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to
require exhaustion of administrative remedies

129
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vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
Hence, when jurisdiction is exclusively granted to an administrative agency, the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply. Here, considering that the Civil Service
Commission is granted exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving personnel actions, the doctrine
of primary administrative jurisdiction, not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
applies.
The exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies likewise do not apply
because the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to resolve the dispute in the first place. In
order for the exceptions to apply, the court to which the petition was prematurely filed should
have jurisdiction; otherwise, the orders of the court would be null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
Decisions or orders rendered by tribunals and agencies that do not have subject matter
jurisdiction are null and void.151 Hence, the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies should not be applicable since the Regional Trial Court, the court to
which the Petition for declaratory relief was filed, lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and any order
or decision rendered by it would be null and void.

Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng
Muntinlupa, Inc. (KBMBPM) cited by private respondents finds no application here.
In KBMBPM, petitioners questioned the takeover by the Department of Agriculture of the
management of petitioner KBMBPM, a service cooperative organized by and composed
_______________
would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private
land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when
there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.” (Citations omitted)
151 Atuel v. Valdez, 451 Phil. 631, 646; 403 SCRA 517, 529 (2003) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].

130
130 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
of vendors of the New Muntinlupa Public Market.152 There is no personnel action involved
in KBMBPM. Hence, private respondents’ reliance on the case is misplaced.
The ponencia held that “[w]hen respondents raised the issue of validity and constitutionality of
[Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013], the issue took the case beyond the scope of the [Civil
Service Commission’s] jurisdiction because the matter is no longer limited to personnel action.
Thus, the [Regional Trial Court] did not abuse its discretion in taking cognizance of the
action.”153
The constitutional issues alleged in the Petition for declaratory relief do not suffice for the
Regional Trial Court to assume jurisdiction.
The Civil Service Commission cannot be ousted from its jurisdiction “by the simple expediency
of appending an allegedly constitutional or legal dimension to an issue”154that clearly involves a
personnel action.155
In Corsiga v. Judge Defensor,156 petitioner Eduardo Corsiga (Corsiga), “then Regional
Irrigation Manager of the [National Irrigation Administration], Region VI, issued Regional Office
Memorandum (ROM) No. 52, reassigning private respondent [Romeo Ortizo (Ortizo)] to [the]
Aganan-Sta. Barbara River Irrigation System[.]”157Ortizo filed before the “Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City a complaint for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for issuance of [a] Temporary
Restraining Order
_______________
152 Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc.
(KBMBPM) v. Dominguez, supra note 138 at pp. 95-96.
154 Department of Agrarian Reform v. Trinidad Valley Realty & Development Corporation, G.R. No. 173386, February
11, 2014, 715 SCRA 650, 670 [Per J. Villarama, Jr., En Banc].
155 Id.
156 Supra note 76.
157 Id., at p. 879; p. 269.

131

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vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.”158 He argued that the transfer or assignment without his
consent is a violation of his constitutional right to security of tenure.159 Corsiga moved to dismiss
the Petition for lack of jurisdiction.160
This court ruled that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over Ortizo’s
Complaint.161 Hence:
It is the intent of the Civil Service Law, in requiring the establishment of a grievance
procedure in Rule XII, Section 6 of the same rules, that decisions of lower level officials be
appealed to the agency head, then to the Civil Service Commission. Decisions of the Civil Service
Commission, in turn, may be elevated to the Court of Appeals. Under this set up, the trial court
does not have jurisdiction over personnel actions and, thus, committed an error in taking
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 22462. The trial court should have dismissed the case on motion of
petitioner and let private respondent question RMO [sic] No. 52 before the NIA Administrator, and
then the Civil Service Commission. As held in Mantala v. Salvador, cases involving personnel
actions, reassignment included, affecting civil service employees, are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.162 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Despite allegations of Regional Office Memorandum No. 52’s constitutional infirmities, this
court still upheld the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission over cases involving
personnel actions.
In Department of Agrarian Reform v. Trinidad Valley Realty & Development
Corporation,163 Trinidad Valley Realty &
_______________
158 Id., at p. 880; pp. 269-270.

159 Id., at p. 882; p. 272.
160 Id., at p. 881; p. 270.
161 Id., at pp. 883-884; pp. 273-274.
162 Id.

132
132 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
Development Corporation and the other respondents (Trinidad Valley Realty & Development
Corporation, et al.) are registered owners of a parcel of land in Negros Oriental.164 The
Department of Agrarian Reform placed a substantial portion of the land under the coverage of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657.165Administrative
Order No. 10, Series of 1989, Administrative Orders No. 12, Series of 1989, No. 9, Series of 1990,
and No. 2, Series of 1996, Administrative Order No. 10, Series of 1990, Joint DAR-LRA
Memorandum Circular No. 20, Series of 1997, and Executive Order No. 405, among others,
(collectively, Orders) were then issued.166
Private respondents Trinidad Valley Realty & Development Corporation, et al. filed before the
Regional Trial Court a Petition for declaration of unconstitutionality through certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus against the Land Registration Authority, the Department of Agrarian
Reform, and the beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program questioning
the Orders.167 This was later amended to an ordinary action of annulment of land titles.168 In its
Answer, the Department of Agrarian Reform asserted that “jurisdiction over all agrarian reform
matters is exclusively vested in the [Department of Agrarian Reform,]”169 not in the regular
courts. This court ruled that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction.170
The Court likewise ruled in the similar case of [Department of Agrarian Reform] v. Cuencathat “[a]ll
controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive
_______________
163 Supra note 154.
164 Id., at pp. 653-654.
165 Id., at p. 654.
166 Id., at pp. 661-662.
167 Id., at p. 654.
168 Id., at p. 656.
169 Id., at p. 655.
170 Id., at p. 671.

133

24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), even though they raise questions that are also legal or constitutional in nature.” In said
case, it was noted that the main thrust of the allegations in the Complaint was the propriety of the Notice of
Coverage and “not x x x the ‘pure question of law’ spawned by the alleged unconstitutionality of EO 405 —
but x x x the annulment of the DAR’s Notice of Coverage.” The Court thus held that:
To be sure, the
issuance of the
Notice of Coverage
constitutes the first
necessary step
towards the
acquisition of private
land under the
CARP. Plainly then,
the propriety of the
Notice relates to the
implementation of
the CARP, which is
under the quasi-
judicial jurisdiction
of the DAR. Thus,
the DAR could not
be ousted from its
authority by the
simple expediency
of appending an
allegedly
constitutional or
legal dimension to
an issue that is
clearly agrarian.
The legal recourse undertaken by Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. is on all-
fours with the remedy adopted by the private respondents in Cuenca. In this case, Trinidad Valley Realty
and Development Corporation, et al. cloaked the issue as a constitutional question — assailing the
constitutionality of administrative issuances promulgated to implement the agrarian reform law — in order
to annul the titles issued therein. In Cuenca, private respondents assailed the constitutionality of EO 45 in
order to annul the Notice of Coverage issued therein. The only difference is that in Cuenca, private
respondents directly filed with the RTC their complaint to obtain the aforesaid reliefs while in this case,
Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. filed their original petition for certiorari with
the RTC after the protest of Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation against the coverage of its
landholding under CARP was dismissed by the DAR Regional Director and such dismissal was affirmed by
DAR

134
134 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
OIC Secretary Jose Mari B. Ponce. But in both cases, it is evident that the constitutional angle was
an attempt to exclude the cases from the ambit of the jurisdictional prescriptions under RA
6657.171 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Invocations of issues of validity and constitutionality of Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-
2013 will not suffice for the courts to assume jurisdiction, if the order sought to be declared
invalid is a personnel action. Since the questioned order is a personnel action, the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission as the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the
civil service must be upheld.
In any case, detail of government personnel to other offices does not involve and violate the
employees’ security of tenure in the absence of any grave abuse of discretion or improper motive
or purpose.172
Hence, the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over private respondents’ Petition for
declaratory relief.

III.

Private respondents rely on Commissioner of Customs, et al. v. Hypermix Feeds
Corporation.173 They argue that based on Hypermix, “[t]he determination of whether a specific
rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the [C]onstitution
is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.”174 They add that the “Constitution vests the
power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, or-
_______________
171 Id., at pp. 670-671.

172 Borres v. Canonoy, 195 Phil. 81, 92-93; 108 SCRA 190, 200 (1981) [Per J. De Castro, First Division].
173 680 Phil. 681; 664 SCRA 666 (2012) [Per J. Sereno, Second Division].
174 Rollo, p. 141.

135

24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
der, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts.”175
In Hypermix, Hypermix Feeds Corporation filed a Petition for declaratory relief before the
Regional Trial Court, with the Petition challenging the validity and constitutionality of Customs
Memorandum Order (CMO) 27-2003.176 CMO 27-2003 classified wheat according to (1) importer
or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge, and imposed different tariff rates
depending on such classification.177 This court concluded that “a petition for declaratory relief is
the right remedy given the circumstances of the case.”178Hypermix cannot be applied because the
circumstances in that case differ from the circumstances here as Hypermix does not involve a
personnel action.
IV.

A petition for declaratory relief may prosper only if there is no breach or violation yet of the
assailed government regulation, and adequate relief is not available through other means or
other forms of action or proceeding.
Rule 63, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance,
or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or valid-
_______________
175 Id.
176 Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds Corporation, supranote 173 at p. 686; p. 672.
177 Id., at pp. 684-685; pp. 667-668.
178 Id., at p. 691; p. 674.

136
136 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
ity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. (Emphasis supplied)

In Republic v. Roque,179this court enumerated the requisites for a petition for declaratory relief
to prosper:
Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief: first, the subject
matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order
or regulation, or ordinance; second, the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and
require judicial construction; third, there must have been no breach of the documents in question; fourth,
there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one between persons whose
interests are adverse; fifth, the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth, adequate relief is
not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.180(Emphasis in the original,
citation omitted)

The third and sixth requisites are absent. The Complaint before the lower court did not simply
ask for a declaration of a hypothetical breach. Adequate relief through the Civil Service
Commission was also available.
Executive Order No. 140 was published on September 17, 2013. According to Section 9,
Executive Order No. 140 shall take effect immediately. On September 17, 2013, Bureau of
Customs Commissioner Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon issued Customs Personnel Order No. B-189--
2013. On September 30, 2013, private respondents filed their Petition for declaratory relief. There
was no denial by private respondents that they did not report for work upon Custom Personnel
Order No. B-
_______________
179 G.R. No. 204603, September 24, 2013, 706 SCRA 273 [Per J.Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
180 Id., at p. 283.

137

24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
189-2013’s effectivity.181Private respondents Arnel C. Alcaraz, Ma. Lourdes V. Mangaoang,

Romalino G. Valdez, Lilibeth S. Sandag, Ma. Liza S. Torres, and Raymond P. Ventura only
reported for work after the trial court’s denial of their application for a writ of preliminary
injunction.182
By not reporting for work upon the issuance of Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 on
September 17, 2015, private respondents committed a breach of the Order. Since they committed
the breach prior to the filing of their Petition for declaratory relief, the petition is no longer
available.
In Martelino, et al. v. National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, et al.,183 petitioners
(Martelino, et al.) obtained housing loans from respondents National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation and Home Development Mutual Fund.184 National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation and Home Development Mutual Fund directly released the proceeds of the housing
loans to the subdivision developer, Shelter Philippines, Inc. (Shelter).185
Shelter did not complete the subdivision pursuant to its subdivision plan.186Martelino, et al. then
filed a Petition for declaratory relief to determine whether they can suspend payment to National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation and Home Development Mutual Fund because of Shelter’s
failure to complete the subdivision and whether interests and penalties should also be
suspended.187

_______________
181 Rollo, pp. 400-401.

182 Id., at p. 351.
183 579 Phil. 145; 556 SCRA 663 (2008) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
184 Id., at p. 148; p. 668.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id., at pp. 148-149; p. 669.

138
138 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
This court found that at the time of the filing of their Petition for declaratory relief,
Martelino, et al. already suspended payment of their amortizations to National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation and Home Development Mutual Fund.188 Hence, this court concluded that
the Regional Trial Court cannot assume jurisdiction over the Petition for declaratory
relief.189Hence:

Indeed, under Section 1, Rule 63, a person must file a petition for declaratory relief before breach or
violation of a deed, will, contract, other written instrument, statute, executive order, regulation, ordinance
or any other governmental regulation. In this case, the petitioners had stated in their petition that
respondents assessed them interest and penalties on their outstanding loans, initiated foreclosure
proceedings against petitioner Rafael Martelino as evidenced by the notice of extrajudicial sale and
threatened to foreclose the mortgages of the other petitioners, all in disregard of their right to suspend
payment to Shelter for its failure to complete the subdivision. Said statements clearly mean one thing:
petitioners had already suspended paying their amortization payments. Unfortunately, their actual
suspension of payments defeated the purpose of the action to secure an authoritative declaration of their
supposed right to suspend payment, for their guidance. Thus, the RTC could no longer assume jurisdiction
over the action for declaratory reliefbecause its subject initially unspecified, now identified as P.D. No. 957
and relied upon — correctly or otherwise — by petitioners, and assumed by the RTC to be Rep. Act No. 8501,
was breached before filing the action. As we said inTambunting, Jr. v. Sumabat:
. . . The purpose of
the action [for
declaratory relief] is
to secure an
authoritative
statement of the
rights and
obligations of the
parties under a
statute, deed,
contract, etc. for their
_______________
188 Id., at p. 155; p. 676.
189 Id.

139

24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged breach. It may be
entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, contract, etc. to which it refers. Where
the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the
court can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action.... Under such circumstances, inasmuch as a cause of
action has already accrued in favor of one or the other party, there is nothing more for the court to explain or
clarify short of a judgment or final order.190 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan,191petitioner Crisostomo B. Aquino (Aquino) is “the
president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc.
(Boracay West Cove).”192 The Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued Executive Order No. 10,
Series of 2011, ordering the closure and demolition of a hotel owned by Boracay West Cove.193 On
June 10, 2011, Executive Order No. 10 was implemented partially.194
To stop the implementation of Executive Order No. 10, Aquino filed a Petition
for certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief before the Court of Appeals.195 The Court of Appeals
dismissed the Petition on the ground that the correct remedy was for Aquino “to file a petition for
declaratory relief with the Regional Trial Court.”196
_______________
190 Id., at pp. 155-156; pp. 676-677.

191 G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014, 737 SCRA 145 [Per J.Velasco, Jr., Third Division].
192 Id., at p. 152.
193 Id., at p. 154.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id., at p. 155.

140
140 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
This court disagreed with the Court of Appeals and stated:
An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments
involved or of the rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure
an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for
their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an
alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained before the breach or violation of the statute, deed or contract to
which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have
not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of
action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of
rights, and a commission of wrongs.
In the case at bar, the petition for declaratory relief became unavailable by [Executive Order No. 10’s]
enforcement and implementation. The closure and demolition of the hotel rendered futile any possible
guidelines that may be issued by the trial court for carrying out the directives in the challenged [Executive
Order No. 10]. Indubitably, the CA erred when it ruled that declaratory relief is the proper remedy given
such a situation.197 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

In City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority,198 the City of Lapu-Lapu and the
Province of Bataan demanded from the Philippine Economic Zone Authority payment of real
property taxes.199 The Philippine Economic Zone Authority filed a Petition for declaratory relief
before the Regional Trial Court, “praying that the trial court declare it ex-
_______________
197 Id., at p. 157.
198 G.R. No. 184203, November 26, 2014, 742 SCRA 524 [Per J.Leonen, Second Division].
199 Id., at p. 547.

141

24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
empt from payment of real property taxes.”200 This court ruled that the Regional Trial Court had
no jurisdiction to decide Philippine Economic Zone Authority’s Petition for declaratory
relief.201 This court explained:
We rule that the [Philippine Economic Zone Authority] erred in availing itself of a petition for declaratory
relief against the City. The City had already issued demand letters and real property tax assessment against
the [Philippine Economic Zone Authority], in violation of the [Philippine Economic Zone Authority’s] alleged
tax-exempt status under its charter. The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, the subject matter of [Philippine
Economic Zone Authority’s] petition for declaratory relief, had already been breached. The trial court,
therefore, had no jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief.
There are several aspects of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is “the power to hear and
determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.” It is conferred by law,
which may either be the Constitution or a statute. Jurisdiction over the subject matter means “the nature of
the cause of action and the relief sought.” Thus, the cause of action and character of the relief sought as
alleged in the complaint are examined to determine whether a court had jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Any decision rendered by a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action is
void.202 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Further, Tambunting, Jr. v. Spouses Sumabat203declared that when a court assumed
jurisdiction over a Petition for declaratory relief when there was already a breach of the sub-
_______________
200 Id., at p. 543.
201 Id., at p. 566.
202 Id.
203 Tambunting, Jr. v. Sumabat, 507 Phil. 94; 470 SCRA 92 (2005) [Per J. Corona, Third Division].

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REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
ject instrument or government regulation, the orders made by that court would be null and void
for want of jurisdiction.204Hence:
In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if
its subject, i.e., the statute, deed, contract, etc., has already been infringed or
transgressed before the institution of the action. Under such circumstances, inasmuch as a
cause of action has already accrued in favor of one or the other party, there is nothing more for
the court to explain or clarify short of a judgment or final order.
Here, an infraction of the mortgage terms had already taken place before the filing of Civil Case No. C-
7496. Thus, the CFI lacked jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the case in 1979. And in the absence of
jurisdiction, its decision was void and without legal effect. As this Court held in Arevalo v. Benedicto:
Furthermore, the
want of jurisdiction
by a court over the
subject-matter
renders its judgment
void and a mere
nullity, and
considering that a
void judgment is in
legal effect no
judgment, by which
no rights are
divested, from which
no rights can be
obtained, which
neither binds nor
bars any one, and
under which all acts
performed and all
claims flowing out of
are void, and
considering further,
that the decision, for
want of jurisdiction
of the court, is not a
decision in
contemplation of law,
and, hence, can never
become executory, it
follows that such a
void judgment cannot
constitute a bar to
another case by
reason of res
judicata.205(Emphasis
supplied, citations
omitted)\
_______________
204 Id., at pp. 98-99; p. 96.

205 Id., at p. 99; pp. 96-97.

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24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
This was reiterated in Malana, et al. v. Tappa, et al.206 where this court declared:
Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for
declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a
court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been
infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action.207
Private respondents argue that Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 is void, producing no
effect. Hence, “there is actually no breach, real or imaginary, to speak of in this case.”208
Subscribing to petitioners’ theory will render ineffective the phrase “before breach or violation
thereof” found in Section 1 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court when a petitioner questions the
validity of a written instrument or governmental regulation. By arguing that the instrument or
regulation questioned is void at the onset, a petitioner may file any time a petition for declaratory
relief with no regard to whether he or she violated the “void” instrument or regulation.
Private respondents’ belated compliance with Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013
cannot cure the defect of want of jurisdiction. In Gomez v. Palomar, etc., et al.,209 this court
declared:
The prime specification of an action for declaratory relief is that it must be brought “before breach or
violation” of the statute has been committed. Rule 64, Section 1
_______________
206 616 Phil. 177; 600 SCRA 189 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
207 Id., at p. 189; p. 202.
208 Rollo, p. 143.
209 134 Phil. 771; 25 SCRA 827 (1968) [Per J. Castro, En Banc].

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REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
so provides. Section 6 of the same rule, which allows the court to treat an action for declaratory relief as an
ordinary action, applies only if the breach or violation occurs after the filing of the action but before the
termination thereof.
Hence, if, as the trial court itself admitted, there had been a breach of the statute before the filing of this
action, then indeed the remedy of declaratory relief cannot be availed of, much less can the suit be converted
into an ordinary action.210 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

Considering that there was already a breach of Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013
when private respondents filed their Petition for declaratory relief, the Regional Trial Court can
no longer act on the Petition for want of jurisdiction.
For a Petition for declaratory relief to prosper, there should be no other adequate relief
available to petitioners.211 “If adequate relief is available through another form of action or
proceeding, the other action must be preferred over an action for declaratory relief.”212
In Ferrer, Jr., et al. v. Mayor Roco, Jr., et al.,213this court affirmed the dismissal of a Petition
for declaratory relief where the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction applied because it
meant that there was another adequate remedy available to petitioners.214
Here, private respondents’ correct remedy was to file a Complaint or Petition before the Civil
Service Commission to
_______________
210 Id., at p. 779; p. 832.

211 Republic v. Roque, supranote 179 at p. 283.
212 City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority, supra note 198 at p. 562.
213 637 Phil. 310; 623 SCRA 313 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
214 Id., at pp. 318-319; p. 320.

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24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
assail their detail to the Customs Policy Research Office. Since they have another adequate
remedy available to them, their Petition for declaratory relief must fail.
All told, a Petition for declaratory relief was not an available remedy for private respondents.
It was, therefore, error for the Regional Trial Court to assume jurisdiction over private
respondents’ Petition for declaratory relief. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court dated October
1, 2013, October 4, 2013, and October 21, 2013 are declared void for want of jurisdiction. All other
Orders of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to private respondents’ Petition for declaratory relief
are also void for lack of jurisdiction.
The Regional Trial Court should be directed to dismiss private respondents’ Petition for
declaratory relief.

V.

Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 provides that it “shall be effective immediately and
valid until sooner revoked.”215
Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 021181 entitled Policies on Detail and dated
September 13, 2002 “govern[s] the detail of employees in all agencies of the
government.”216 Section 2 of Policies on Detail provides:
Section 2. Duration of the Detail.—The detail shall be allowed only for a maximum period of one
year. Details beyond one year may be allowed provided it is with the consent of the detailed employee. The
extension or renewal of the period of the detail shall be within the authority of the mother agency.
_______________
215 Rollo, p. 70; BOC Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013, penultimate paragraph.
216 CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, Series of 2002.

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ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
If the employee believes that there is no justification for the detail, he/she may appeal his/her case to the
proper Civil Service Commission Regional Office. Pending appeal, the detail shall be executory unless
otherwise ordered by said regional office. Decision of said regional office may be further appealed to the
Commission En Banc.217 (Emphasis supplied)

Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013’s provision stating that “[t]his Order shall be
effective immediately and valid until sooner revoked” appears contrary to Section 2 of Resolution
No. 02-1181. Pursuant, however, to Section 2 of Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 02-
1181, Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 should be read as valid only for a period of one
(1) year. Consistency in executive issuances is of utmost importance.218 As much as possible, it is
the duty of the courts to harmonize and reconcile them.219
In Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Presiding Judge Angeles,220 this court
ruled:
Thus, there is no real inconsistency between LOI 444 and EO 133. There is, admittedly, a rearranging of
the administrative functions among the administrative bodies affected by the edict, but not an abolition of
executive power. Consistency in statutes as in executive issuances, is of prime importance, and, in the
absence of a showing to the contrary, all laws are presumed to be consistent with each other. Where it is
possible to do so, it is the duty of courts, in the construction of statutes, to harmonize and reconcile them,
and to adopt a construction of a statutory provision which harmonizes and reconciles it with other statutory
provisions. The fact that a
_______________
217 Rollo, p. 117.
218 Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Angeles, 331 Phil. 723, 747; 263 SCRA 421, 444 (1996)
[Per J. Torres, Jr., Second Division].
219 Id., at p. 748; p. 444.
220 Id.

147

24, 2015
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient
to cause an implied repeal of the latter, since the law may be cumulative or a continuation of the old
one.221 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Similarly, this court should also uphold as much as possible the validity of Customs Personnel
Order No. B-189-2013 as a valid exercise of executive power to conform to the Policies on Detail.
“Every inten[t] of the law should lean towards its validity, not its invalidity.”222 Hence, the
duration of Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013, being independent and severable from the
order of detail itself, should be the only provision declared void.
Since there is no record that private respondents consented to be detailed for more than one (1)
year from September 17, 2013, Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013, while effective for the
duration of one (1) year from enactment, already ceased to take effect.
The ponencia ruled that Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 violates Section 3 of
Executive Order No. 140 because at the time of its issuance, the Customs Policy Research Office
had no organic personnel yet.223The ponencia also ruled that the Department of Finance
Secretary had not yet issued rules and regulations for the Customs Policy Research Office.224
There is nothing in Executive Order No. 140 that requires that the organic personnel of the
Customs Policy Research Office must first be organized and that rules must first be is-
_______________
221 Id., at pp. 747-748; p. 444.
222 San Miguel Corporation v. Avelino, 178 Phil. 47, 53; 89 SCRA 69, 75 (1979) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division].
224 Id.

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REPORTS
ANNOTATED
vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
sued by the Department of Finance Secretary before the Bureau of Customs can start forming its
team that will augment and reinforce the organic personnel of the Customs Policy Research
Office. Courts should avoid as much as possible any construction invalidating administrative
issuances.225Unless there is a clear violation of Executive Order No. 140, Customs Personnel
Order No. B-189-2013 should remain valid.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition should be GRANTED. Private respondents’ Petition for
declaratory relief filed before the Regional Trial Court should be DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction.
Petition partially granted, validity of Executive Order No. 140 sustained. Regional Trial Court
has jurisdiction over action for declaratory relief filed by respondents.
Notes.—A party who seeks the intervention of a court of law upon an administrative concern
should first avail himself of all the remedies afforded by administrative processes. (Special
People, Inc. Foundation vs. Canda, 688 SCRA 403 [2013])
It is true that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an ironclad rule, but
recognizes exceptions. (Ejera vs. Merto, 714 SCRA 397 [2014])

——o0o——

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G.R. No. 209331. August 24, 2015.

Administrative Agencies; Civil Service Commission; Jurisdiction; The Civil Service

VOL. 768, AUGUST 75

VOL. 768, AUGUST 77

VOL. 768, AUGUST 79

VOL. 768, AUGUST 81

3 Id., at pp. 57-63.

VOL. 768, AUGUST 83

5 Corsiga v. Defensor, 439 Phil. 875; 391 SCRA 267 (2002).

VOL. 768, AUGUST 85

VOL. 768, AUGUST 87

10 Vigilar v. Aquino, 654 Phil. 755; 639 SCRA 772 (2011).

Validity of CPO 189-2013

VOL. 768, AUGUST 89

16 As contained in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, Series of 2002.

VOL. 768, AUGUST 91

Peralta,** Del Castilloand Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Leonen, J., See Separate Dissenting Opinion.

VOL. 768, AUGUST 93

8 Id., at pp. 64-67.

14 Id., at pp. 69-70.

VOL. 768, AUGUST 95

17 Rollo, pp. 69-70.

VOL. 768, AUGUST 97

VOL. 768, AUGUST 99

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VOL. 768, AUGUST 101

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63 Id., at pp. 141-144.

VOL. 768, AUGUST 103

tions immediately preceding their appointment. (Emphasis supplied)

As the “central personnel agency of the Government,”68 Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3,

68 Const., Art. IX(B), Sec. 3.

VOL. 768, AUGUST 105

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SECTION 7. Jurisdiction of Heads of Agencies.—Heads of Departments, agencies, provinces, cities,

VOL. 768, AUGUST 107

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VOL. 768, AUGUST 109

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VOL. 768, AUGUST 111

112 SUPREME COURT

VOL. 768, AUGUST 113

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VOL. 768, AUGUST 115

VOL. 768, AUGUST 115

VOL. 768, AUGUST 117

instatement, reemployment, detail, reassignment, demotion, and separation. (Emphasis supplied)

118 SUPREME COURT

87 Id., at pp. 632-633; pp. 259-260.

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104 Id., at pp. 267-268.

VOL. 768, AUGUST 121

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VOL. 768, AUGUST 123

seas Employment Administration, it was the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration

124 SUPREME COURT

This court affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals134 and held:

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