Supreme Court

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-39276 February 24, 1975
JOSE ESPELETA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CELSO AVELINO, as Presiding Judge, CFI, Cebu City, Branch XIII; and
SHELL PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
Buenaventura A. Reposar and Manuel Benedicto for petitioner.
Fernan, Osmeña and Associates for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
It is the sad plaint of petitioner in this certiorari proceeding that he was denied
procedural due process when respondent Judge in a spirit of unwanted generosity
towards private respondent corporation, Shell Philippines, Inc., acceded to its plea
that the testimony of a witness deemed by him as vital to his case be ignored and
disregarded in its entirety for failure to be present in court on the day set for her
cross-examination. There was a motion for postponement, but it did not prosper.
The challenged order is self-explanatory: "The oral motion of plaintiff's counsel
Rodolfo Bellaflor that the direct testimony of Adelfa Montano, the last witness for the
defendant, not having been finished and she not having been cross-examined due
to her failure to appear this morning in spite of the fact that she was duly notified in
open court of today's hearing, be considered stricken from the records, and that the
plaintiff be allowed to present a rebuttal witness in connection with the testimony of
defendant Jose Espeleta, being well taken, is hereby granted. The records show
that this is not the first time that the counsel for defendant Manuel Benedicto had
sent a telegram to this Court while he is in Tacloban City, requesting postponement
of the hearing of this case after having been duly notified of said hearing, which
actuation is tantamount to delaying the administration of justice. Having presented
its rebuttal witness, Maximo Villarin, plaintiff closed its case. The defendant is given
ten (10) days from receipt hereof within which to offer in writing his documentary
evidence, but with regards only to those documents he identified during his
testimony, considering that those presented and identified during Montano's
testimony (as well as her testimony) are already considered stricken from the
records. Plaintiff Shell Philippines, Inc. is also given the same number of days from
receipt of defendant's written offer of documentary evidence within which to submit
its manifestation or objection."1
If respondent Judge were to be sustained, then clearly evidence which for petitioner
was indispensable for his side of the case to be aired would be treated as non-
existent. To that extent, he was not heard at all. Nor is it of legal relevance that
respondent Judge was provoked to take the step he did just because it was not the
first time petitioner had sought continuance, for as pointed out in the petition, private
respondent did at one time move to have the hearing postponed on the ground that
its first witness would get married on the scheduled date.2 The crucial point is to
ascertain whether in thus ruling, respondent Judge had eroded petitioner's right to a
day in court. Slated differently, the specific issue then is whether the concept of
fairness that is basic to procedural due process would be satisfied if under the
circumstances disclosed, the right to be heard of petitioner if not rendered nugatory
would thus be emasculated. Not once but twice he moved to reconsider, but
respondent Judge did not budge from his stand, now assailed as being vitiated by
constitutional infirmity.3 In view of the decidedly liberal interpretation of the cardinal
precept of due process that justice be done to the parties both procedurally and
substantively, consistently adhered to from United States v. Ling Su Fan,4 a 1908
decision, to Philippine Maritime Industrial Union v. Court of Industrial
Relations,5 promulgated of last year, petitioner is entitled to the remedy sought.
We grant certiorari.
1. Why there was an impairment of the right to be heard on a matter rightfully

deemed essential was in the petition set forth thus: "This case is for Recovery of
Sum of Money filed by private respondents [Shell] alleging that your Petitioner
purchased products of [Shell] in the total sum of P264,250.29 and that out of this
sum your Petitioner allegedly paid P242,029.04 only leaving a balance of
P22,221.25 still unpaid; while your Petitioner in his answer alleged that the unpaid
balance was only P14,376.79 and to be deducted from this amount was the sum of
P8,711.28 value of the liters of gasoline not actually delivered by private respondent
to your Petitioner during the period from January, 1972 to August, 1972, and the
amount of P5,994.00 representing the cost of gasoline leakage and wastage caused
by the leak of the underground tank plus the usual allowance for evaporation. Your
Petitioner therefore, felt it necessary to present Miss [Adelfa Montano], a Certified
Public Accountant to show to the lower court the true figures of the transactions after
accounting. It will be noted that the only witness for the Plaintiff was Mr. Joseph
Smith, Sales representative of [Shell] and resident of 286-A Sikatuna St., Cebu City,
who was not privy to the bookkeeping and accounting of the accounts of transaction
during the entire period. Your Petitioner felt therefore the need of presenting Miss
[Adelfa Montano] a Certified Public Accountant who unfortunately was a new
employee in the Office of the Department of Local Government and Community
Development at the time she was supposed to continue her testimony on that fateful
day of April 4, 1974 and therefore could not disregard the orders of her superiors to
make an urgent audit in Baybay, Leyte and instead informed Atty. Manuel Benedicto
of her unavailability so that Atty. Benedicto could make the proper representation
with the Honorable lower court for possible deferment."6 The two-page answer of
private respondent did not even bother to deny the importance for petitioner of the
testimony of Miss Montano stricken from the records. Under the circumstances, the
stress on the absence of procedural due process is understandable for as a result of
the order of respondent Judge now sought to be set aside, there is more than just a
probability that petitioner would be condemned to pay before he had been fully
heard. It cannot be truly asserted then that the proceedings satisfied the
constitutional standard for a judicious inquiry. To that extent, it would make a
mockery of the requirement that the judgment should be only after a trial where the
litigants are given full and unimpeded opportunity to sustain their respective claims
and to have their evidence duly considered and weighed. Unless, the challenged
order then were set aside, petitioner can assert a grievance grounded on the due
process guarantee.7
2. Respondent Judge would justify the aforesaid order by characterizing the request
for postponement as "tantamount to delaying the administration of justice." 8 He was
not exactly mindful of a 1916 admonition of this Court, through the pen of Justice
Carson, in Lino Luna v. Arcenas, 9 when it warned that "a sound discretion in this regard should be exercised by
the trial judge, and the highly commendable desire for the dispatch of business should not be permitted to turn the scales of justice
10
rather than accede to a reasonable request for a continuance." Again, while it is true that it is within a court's discretionary
11
power to act on a motion for continuance, it is far from unlimited. Due heed must be paid to the procedural due process
12
mandate. So it was decided as far back as 1929, in Cing Hong So v. Tan Boon Kong, with Justice Romualdez as ponente: "In
cases like the present where a party litigant, without malice, fault, or inexcusable neglect, is not prepared for the trial of a case, the
court exceeds the discretion conferred upon it by law in denying to said litigant a reasonable opportunity to prepare for the trial and
13
to obtain due process of law and proper protection under the law." Restated differently, the controlling doctrine is summed up
14
he words of Justice A. Reyes, in Capitol Subdivision, Inc. v. Province of Negros Occidental, promulgated in 1956: "Liberality
should be exercised in granting postponements of trial to obtain presence of material evidence and to prevent miscarriage of
15
justice." This, for the quite obvious reason: "While the granting or refusal of motions for continuance is discretionary, that
16
discretion must be exercised wisely with a view to substantial justice." So procedural due process requires on Luciano v.
17
Tan, the infirmity consisting in a refusal to grant postponement was cured by the Court reopening the case precisely to comply
with such a basic precept. That approach ought to have been followed by respondent Judge when he was asked to reconsider not
once but twice. He ought to have fixed a date for Miss Montano to be subjected to cross-examination, thereby complying with the
constitutional safeguard of assuring the parties their day in court.
3. One other matter. A reminder to counsel for respondents, Rodolfo M. Bellaflor by

name, may not be out of place. His performance in this certiorari proceeding invites
attention. When asked to comment, he did so in a one-page pleading. When
required to answer, he was not that terse or laconic; he actually was able to make
use of two pages. In the memorandum that he prepared for respondents, he
appeared to have really extended himself. He had four pages to show for it,
although the last sheet of paper contained merely his signature and the notation that
copy was furnished opposing counsel. There is something to be said for brevity, but
not in this case. It is even more deplorable that there appeared to be a total lack of
awareness of the due process implications of the petition. There was the rather
unorthodox assertion that a constitutional question was one essentially factual. It
was not so much the brevity then of his pleadings but their failure to come to grips
with the crucial issue that vitiated whatever persuasive aspect they might have had.
Insofar as this particular litigation is concerned then, it may be said that he hardly
lived up to the role expected of one called upon to defend his client's cause with
zeal and of an officer of the court appearing before this Tribunal.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted and the order of April 4, 1974,
issued by respondent Judge is set aside, nullified and considered as totally devoid
of any force or effect. The case is remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings in accordance with law and in consonance with this decision, more
specifically that the testimony of Miss Montano remains in the records subject to the
test of cross-examination, if any, by private respondent. Costs against Shell
Philippines, Inc.
Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
In the result. Considering the state of the dockets of our trial courts now, I cannot
share the apparently liberal attitude towards postponements discernible in the main
opinion, although in the case at bar, I agree that respondent judge should have
taken into account the peculiar situation of petitioner's witness, Miss Montano.

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-39276 February 24, 1975

JOSE ESPELETA, petitioner,

Buenaventura A. Reposar and Manuel Benedicto for petitioner.

Fernan, Osmeña and Associates for respondents.

1. Why there was an impairment of the right to be heard on a matter rightfully

3. One other matter. A reminder to counsel for respondents, Rodolfo M. Bellaflor by

Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

BARREDO, J., concurring:

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