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AUTHORITY
30 Apr 1971, DoDD 5200.10; CRD D/A ltr, 24
Aug 1981
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SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION
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wom
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NOTICE:
BY LAW.
CHAFF COUNTERMEASURES
AND AIR DEFENSE RADAR DESIGN
By: John H. Bryan
Preparedi'r:
REDSTONE ARSENAL OF THE U.S. ARMY ORDNANCE CORPS
HUNTSfILLE, ALABAMA
EVANS SIGNAL LABORATORY OF THE U.S, ARMY SIGNAL ENGINEERING LABORATORIES
FORT MONMOUTH, NEW JERSEY
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1825
SR;
MI N 1 0 *RK
I ',/ prW59
* - hniea-kpart-6
CHAFF COUNTERMEASURES
IAND AIR DEFENSE RADAR DESIGN
S R IProieoA.E L235-TJ3o
Preparedfor:
REDSTONE ARSENAL OF THE U.S. ARMY ORDNANCE CORPS
HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA
I1- - --
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ID. R.SCHEUICH, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF ENGINEERING RESEARCH
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[ FOREWORD
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This report was first published in
August 1958 as an internal memorandum. In
order to make this information more widely
available, it is now being published as a
technical report.
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[ ABSTRACT
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[CONTENTS
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I FOREWORD ............. ............................. ii
I INTRODUCTION...................... 1
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I CONTENTS (Continued)
REFERENCES .. .. ........................... 70
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I ILLUSTRATIONS
F
rFig.
Fig. 1
2
Unit-Power Chaff Spectrum for Zero Mean Velocity ....
Unit-Power Chaff Spectrum for Non-Zero Mean Velocity . .
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Frequency .. ..... 30
f Fig. 5 Two-Pulse MI Canceler Response vs.
Fig. 6 Two-Pulse MTI Response with Two Repetition Rates . . . . 30
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[CHAFF COUNTERMEASURES AND AIR DEFENSE RADAR DESIGN
Ii I INTRODUCTION
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Some of the operational aspects of the chaff problem are then emphasized
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II BASIC CHAFF CHARACTERISTICS
f" a. Operational
the use of auxiliary equipment with an attendant weight penalty; (2) can
b. Technical
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Ib. Technical
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j the chaff space and weight allowancos in a bomber may be used to cover
either a wide or a narrow band of frequencies, and how the chaff may be
I Package", for conixlaii~iit umv
1. CHAFF RETURN VARIATIONS AND THEIR STATISTICAL DESCRIPTION
1 chaff cloud is not at all constant, however, even after the chaff has
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b. Range-to-Range Variation
Significantly, however, not only the mean level but also the amplitude
4
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jrespect the chaff returns are like ground clutter.
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Next, let us stop the radar's azimuth scan, keeping the dipoles
fixed in position, but change the transmitted frequency slightly. The
I phases of the individual dipole returns both with respect to the radar
and with respect to each other will now be changed slightly. It is the
latter that determines the amplitude of the resultant return. If there
are n cycles of RF energy in each pulse to begin with, this number can
be increased to n + 1 by increasing the frequency by an amount equal to
the reciprocal of the pulse length. This is sufficient, if the dipoles
are well distributed throughout a resolution cell, to produce a change
fashion, falling and being blown about by local winds. The distances
that the dipoles move between pulses will determine the differences in
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If the wind is uniform in speed and has a fixed radial velocity with
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Ivelocity of the chaff cloud. (The subscripu im stands for internal
motion.) The unit-power spectrum of amplitude fluctuations has the
form shown in Fig. 1 if the mean velocity is zero.
Wim~f)W Mf
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5 )Lfw 0 )Lfw
FIG. 1 FIG. 2
UNIT-POWER CHAFF SPECTRUM UNIT-POWER CHAFF SPECTRUM
FOR ZERO MEAN VELOCITY FOR NON-ZERO MEAN VELOCITY
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breaks in the trail or corridor, chaff must occupy each resolution.
element in the space through which the aircraft is to be screened.
This fact has led to a conventional rule-of-thumb which states the
chaff density requirement as one equivalent cross section per reso-
jlution cell. We shall next consider briefly how this requirement may
be modified, assuming for simplicity throughout the discussion that
the radar does not have advanced moving-target discrimination capa-
bility against chaff.
Hult has shown (Ref. 3, p.3) that if the look time or scan time of
a radar is greater than the correlation time of the chaff, the total
quantities of chaff required are not a sensitive function of the radar
resolution, but depend on the chaff decorrelation, which is a function
of the radar frequency. The net result is that for such radars
(primarily, it appears, high-frequency tracking radars), no great in-
crease in chaff density is required if the pulse length is simply
shortened.
For radars whose scan time is short compared with the chaff cor-
relation time, the chaff density requirement is determined by the
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4. FREQUENCY COVERAGE
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INDIVIDUAL
COMPOSITE
DIPOLE LENGTHS
COMPOSITE CALCULATED BY
900- STANDARD ROLLING MILLS*
o - /,.-, \ -
I '' "-o \ Z .,
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FIG.
bandwidth of a single
F of
tunable band length
any radar usedof atdipole is or
present large enoughfor
planned to the
cover
nearthefuture
to further reduce the bulk and weight of chaff by using narrower widths and
by using aluminized glass filament dipoles in place of the foil dipoles.
As the chaff is made narrower, the bandwidth of the individual dipoles
Idecreases somewhat, but this decrease can be compensated for by using a
slightly larger number of dipoles, cut, perhaps, to slightly different
lengths. Notable among U.S. chaff developments is the RR-66 package of
fiber chaff, which weighs about three ounces and covers with the same
Icross section the same band as the one-pound RR-39/AL package.
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F
IIII ANTICIPATED DELIVERY SYSTEMS
IThe way in which chaff is sown may have a strong influence on its
success in protecting bombers against air defense radars. Each method
I of sowing requires a delivery system with certain capabilities and some
limitations. These systems must be examined in order to estimate the
quality and quantity of protection that a bomber may obtain by means of
chaff. They also suggest the attack situations in which chaff may be
1 most helpful and thzse in whici its use is questionable.
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of aircraft attack a target; that is, when chaff must be depended upon
for self-protection. The basic reason for this is simply that since the
I can resolve the lead chaff-dispensing aircraft from the chaff trail and
f lead aircraft in the chaff trail, emerge from it, they too can be re-
solved, even if they are dispensing chaff. In this situation, the lead
aircraft, at least, needs additional protection; jamming, for example,
B. FORWARD-LAUNCHED CHAFF
launching chaff from which an enemy could choose for the protection of
bombing aircraft against U.S. defense radars.
following parameters are important: the distance between the bomber and
I the forward edge of the chaff trail; the density of the trail; and the
length of time (or distance) over which the trail can be maintained.
* The word "deflection" here describes the path of the missile, which is
deflected out of the path of the dispensing aircraft by gravity while
flying ahead of the aircraft.
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I These are all functions of the type of dispensing vehicle carried by
the bomber.
for each 500 feet travelled. The weight of this required quantity of
chaff is an important operational consideration.
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area at X-band, about four ounces of dipoles are required..* Hence, for
each n.mi., against an S-band search radar of known frequency with a
I or one pound per n.mi. for 4 square meters using standard foil chaff.
If narrow foil chaff were used (0.008 inch wide), this weight requirement
jcould be cut by a factor of 4, with some sacrifice in bandwidth. By the
use of fiber chaff it might be cut by another factor of 2.
-- 40 square meters, this is 2800 square meters per n.mi. This quantity of
standard foil chaff would weigh about 2800/60 x 4/16 or 12 pounds per
n.mi. This again could be reduced by use of narrow foil or fiber chaff.
D. DISPENSING TIME
against the ground defenses--or has destroyed them. The detection range
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this use with 300+ pounds of chaff payload and 100+ n.-mi. range for a
Itotal system weight of about 1,500 pounds per missile. These longer-
range screening missiles introduce guidance and aircraft navigation
problems which may prove to be severe. The subsonic missile, which
would have to be programmed against ground defense radars, would probably
be of much less use against interceptor attack than short-range de-
flection chaff-sowing rockets.
{Some idea of the chaff load that a bomber may carry on a conserva-
tive bombing mission in the future may be gathered from the following
comparative figures; It was reported by Lincoln Laboratory, (December
1955), (Ref. 6, p.63) that each B-47 bomber would normally carry 800
pounds of chaff in addition to 500 to 1,000 pounds of electronic jamming
I equipment. As much as 6,000 pounds of chaff could be carried with a
corresponding sacrifice in bomb load. The U.S. B/RB-66 series of
faircraft can carry up to 3,160 pounds of chaff by sacrificing bomb load,
but can carry 1,160 pounds of chaff and four dispensers without such a
sacrifice by means of a tail cone and two wing pods. Members of the
Applied Physics Laboratory.in an informal discussion, have indicated
that a possible threat could include, as payload for a Bison or Bear on
a round-trip intercontinental mission without refueling, 1,000 pounds of
chaff with 4,000 pounds of jamming equipment plus a 2,000-pound bomb
Ii load. Goble, chaff consultant, estimates a Soviet threat including
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F. MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS
IIn the next few years the increasing capability of U.S. SAC forces
to respond quickly to an early-warning alert and to effect speedy retali-
I ation may well diminish the likelihood of a large-scale massed-formation
attack by Soviet bombers. In this event, an attack might take the form
S01 small numoers ox bomoers in isolated groups aLLacking siwulLaiuou~iy
(approximately) various targets (e.g., SAC bases) about the country,
from high or low altitudes. It might be expected, therefore, that a
trend might develop toward enemy bomber self-defense against rapid-
reaction-time defense systems, i.e., against SAM systems. (It seems
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IIt should perhaps be emphasized that the weight allowances for ECM
estimated in Sec. III-C assume a round-trip bombing mission. There is
I no particular basis for such a conservative assumption in anticipating
a Soviet bomber attack on CONUS defenses. The payload increase and
I increased ECM capability allowable on a one-way mission might, in fact,
make such a mission attractive to the Soviets in circumstances where a
round-trip mission might not be. On a one-way mission the total payload,
including bombs, could be at least doubled. It could be expected that
the weight allowance for chaff as well as for Jamming could then be
increased by at least a factor of 2.
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Ieffect similar to that of receiver noise--a basic distinction should be
made between those whose primary aim is simply to avoid saturation by
1. INCREASED RESOLUTION
* Since this report was written, the author has been informed of
in-
vestigations by Roger Manasse of Lincoln Laboratories and by
Westinghouse of methods of exploiting this clutter reduction effect
for target enhancement by using very large bandwidths and matched
pulses.
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IControl (IAGC) for extending the effective dynamic range of the receiver,
and such circuits as Fast Time Constant (FTC) for reducing the low-
frequency components that characterize extended clutter.
The mean level of the clutter returns may be removed with a differ-
entiating fast-time-constant circuit. Used with either a non-limiting
linear or a logarithmic receiver, this will reduce the intensity of range-
I extended clutter on the display and enable large targets to be seen within
it. It is thus effective in helping to prevent reporting of false targets.
It provides, however, no subclutter visibility.
The logarithmic receiver is also useful for preserving the beats pro-
duced by the return from chaff and the target. These beats, which
would be lost in a limiting radar receiver, may be used to identify
targets.
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4. VELOCITY DISCRIMINATION
AI Techniques for velocity discrimination to reduce clutter depend on
correlation of chaff returns from pulse to pulse to permit their elimi-
naticn through cancellation or high-ps-; filtering A variety nf tpch-
niques are employed. These will be discussed individually below, under the
general headings: "doppler" phase-shift MTI, true doppler detection, and
absolute speed detection.
a. "Doppler" Phase-Shift MrI
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CIRCUITRY OR
HIGH PASS FILTERING
FIG. 4
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0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 a 9 IO TARGET DOPPLER FREUENCY
RADAR REPETITION RATE
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characterized by n = 1/8.
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coherent-I! radar. Although ground clutter will not be as
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MTI system uses the chaff (or ground) returns themselves as the
reference signal instead of using a signal generated at the re-
velocities.
length and then compares this signal with the undelayed signal in
a phase detector, followed by conventional cancellation. A simpli-
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I7ANTENNA
[ L.O. MIXER
LIMITING
IF. AMPLIFIER
I TIME
0DELAY
I PHASE
DETECTOR
I I TIME
DELAY
T
T= Pr
.3 MTI VIDEO
FIG. 9
j SIMF'LIIHE BLOUCK DIAGRAM OP UNE fTYPE
OF NONCOHERENT MTI CIRCUITRY
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b. CW Radar
* CW radar does have the disadvantage that distant targets may have to
compete with nearby clutter for recognition. If the clutter source is
at the same range as the target, however, this will not be important.
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CW radars for both acquisition and tracking have been incorporated Into
j the low-altitude Hawk missile system.
noncoherent MTI.
5. VIDEO CENSORING
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Iprevent the display of clutter which might confuse an operator or over-
mapping. The operator maps out the clutter area on a PPI display with a
that provide subchaff visibility, i.e., which actually suppress the chaff
returns relative to the target returns. It may be seen from the pre-
ceding section that only one class of techniques promises to provide
140 n.mi. at 600 knots past the radar as indicated, a trajectory that
might commonly be found in an area surveillance system. The lower hori-
I zontal scrle in each of the plots shows the radial velocity of the target
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I U)
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TARGET
t0
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RADIAL
150
VELOCITY, KNOTS
200 250
FIG. 10
FPS-20 THREE-PULSE CANCELLATION MTI RESPONSE
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AIRCRAFT
SHAPED CASCADED MTI CANCELLATION FLIGHT PATHOF REPRESENTED
PORTION
i 1.2 RADAR SCAN RATE 5 RPM
O
600 KT
cc 0.6
"J 06 -- 200 n
-J-04
II 02
.0 1 23 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 t2 13 14 15
A I I TIME,I MNUTES
I I i I I I
ON0 55 60 6.5 70
S.
75 '/ 8.0
TIME, MINUTES
85 9.0
i' 95 100 105
I I I l I l I I I I
EFRFIG. 11
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I aircraft corresponding to the time from entry into the 200-n.-mi. circle.
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fV SUBCHAFF VISIBILITY OF U.S. AIR DEFENSE RADARS
Idict their subchaff visibility to some extent by analysis. When they have
been built, it should be pospible to confirm or correct such predictions
j in field tests.
I A. FPS-20
I ations that can defeat it: chaff in shearing winds or turbulent air, and
moving chaff in the same region as ground clutter. Both of these will
j give an unwanted return that will clutter the radar display. The co-
* Actually, the original FPS-20 design did not have the anti-chaff
receiver; it is a "fix.4
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Ii mode at a 5-rpm scan rate is shown in Fig. 10. The noncoherent MTI
response about the mean chaff radial velocity is the same except that it
[has even symmetry about this velocity. It may be seen that after chaff
has achieved a velocity dispersion of a few tens of knots, a signifi-
cantly large return may be expected from it.*
IDIRECTION OF
A FIG. 12
OVERLAPPING CHAFF TRAILS PRODUCED BY
MISSILES FIRED AT 10-SECOND INTERVALS
I
The frequency power spectrum of amplitude fluctuations in the chaff
return before limiting is expected to have a standard deviation equal
t2Ov/ , where av is the standard deviation about the mean wind ve-
locity and X the wavelength. The spectrum of the amplitude variations
in the output of the phase detector is expected to be nearly the same
since the same mechanism that produces the amplitude fluctuations in
the return also produces the phase fluctuations. The canceler may be
thought of as a high-pass filter for pulse-to-pulse variations. As
the velocity dispersion increases, the spectrum widens, and the "filter"
passes an increasing fraction of the clutter power spectrum. When the
standard deviation of wind velocity about the mean is about 20 knots,
the chaff return will be about one-third of what it would be if the
jchaff were a point target moving at optimum speed (and optimum phase).
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This is the average wind shear about the usual peak wind velocity
found at these altitudes.
* This is discussed in some detail in Appendix B.
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[- B. FPS-28
According to information currently available, the experimental model
of FPS-28 is to be equipped with three types of MrI designed against
chaff:
(1) Coherent range-gated filter
~(2) Coherent delay-line MTI
The delay-line MTI can be used with a repetition rate of 1,000 pps.*
A government-furnished delay-line canceler is to be used. The charac-
teristics of this canceler are not known.** It may have a response curve
similar to that of the FPS-20 radar, with the frequency scale expanded so
that the first blind speed is at about 500 knots. The width of the
blind-speed band at this speed will depend on the design of the canceler,
J but will be proportional to twice the width of chaff spectrum rejected.
If it is adjusted in the noncoherent mode, for example, to suppress
clutter from wind-dispersed chaff that has a standard deviation in radial
velocity of 40 knots, a blind-speed band 100 knots wide, or wider, might
• The radar can also use a repetition rate of 333 pps to extend its un-
ambiguous range, but this does not appear to be attractive for anti-
Ii chaff use.
•* The FPS-20 canceler has double (or three-pulse) cancellation with
feedback for control of the scanning clutter response. The exact
shape of the FPS-28 canceler may not depend on scanning effects,
which are not expected to be severe for FPS-28, but rather it may be
designed against a wide chaff spectrum.
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I rates, 1,200 pps and 800 pps, used on alternate scans.* The high-pass
filter used for clutter suppression has a cut-off frequency of 200 cps,
j Chaff does not present a point target, however, but one composed of a
random assortment of unresolved scatterersi these may give rise to high-
radar:
* This effectively cuts in half the data rate on targets with radial
velocities between 300 and 900 knots; i.e., the result is a 20-second
data rate on most aircraft of interest, but the radar is not blind to
any target velocity above 100 knots on a pair of consecutive scans.
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j clutter rejection begins to decline, i.e., when the chaff radial velocity
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FIG° 13
] IDEALIZED GATED-FILTER MTI RESPONSE SHOWN WITH SPECTRUM OF
1 CHAFF WITH NON-ZERO MEAN RADIAL VELOCITY
We -exp (-,g
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z
0
STANDARD DEVIATION
40-30 24 IS OF DIPOLE VELOCITIES
z =
- I-- , I0KNOTS
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z20
F- 49
75 KNOTS
0 20 40 so 80 100
MEAN RADIAL DIPOLE VELOCITY, V, KNOTS
FIG. 14
RELATIVE CHAFF AMENUATION BY IDEALIZED FPS-28 COHERENT
RANGE-GATED FI.TER MTI AS A FUNCTION OF WIND CONDITIONS
(SCANNING EFFECTS NEGLECTED)
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ditions in the jet stream belt in the area near the industrial heartland
of the U.S.
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70 -
60 -
W 50 - 50% 20%
LL-
I U,~40
U)
30
! ,o- /
I S20 -
10
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00 20 40 60 80 too 120 140
FIG. 15
SYNTHETIC WIND-SPEED PROFILES-WIND VELOCITIES EXCEEDED
.50 PERCENT AND 20 PERCENT OF THE WINTER IN THE WINDIEST
AREA OF NORTH AMERICA (NORTHEASTERN PART)
I very small vertical spread immediately after dispensing, the chaff cloud
increases its vertical dimension at the rate of about 600 feet per
1 minute (the rate of fall of the fastest falling chaff) for about seven
minutes, after which the cloud, about 4,000 feet in height, settles
down uniformly at a rate of 300 feet per minute. The dipoles in the
cloud may be distributed approximately normally in altitude within the
4,000-foot core. According to the wind shear figures quoted previously,
Ia shearing gradient of about 25 to 50 knots can be expected across this
core. If this gradient is constant in altitude, a standard deviation in
Idipole velocities of about 6 to 12 knots would result. The mean velocity,
as may be seen for conditions represented in Fig. 14, might be expected
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reduce the clutter level to receiver noise level while displaying the
target aircraft* (assumed non-fluctuating). At low velocity deviations,
jhowever,the radar response is sensitive to changes in mean wind ve-
Ivelocity, with the high mean velocity that such winds would have, the
radar would have almost no subchaff visibility. This effect would not be
expected to last very long, not more than a few minutes, unless fresh
better against the deflection-missile chaff trail than the FP-20 radar.
We may represent the spectrum of the double trail of Fig. 12 somewhat as
shown in Fig. 16, where f, corresponds to the mean radial velocity of the
upper trail and f2 to that of the lower trail. The width of each is pro-
j portional to the standard deviation of velocities among the dipoles. If
the mean velocities are spaced by 30 knots and are both below 100 knots,
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"f2 -f, f, f2
0A-Z39-231
I FIG. 16
APPROXIMATE SPECTRUM OF DOUBLE CHAFF TRAIL
i BEFORE AND AFTER ALTITUDE DISPERSION
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Ithe higher one will produce considerably greater clutter residue
(clutter after filtering) than the lower as long as the individual
Ispectra are fairly narrow. As dispersion of dipole velocities takes
place, however, the two spectra will tend to merge, as indicated by the
dotted lines, with a resultant spectrum that assumes an approximately
normal shape. Thus Fig. 14, which assumes a normal or Gaussian spectrum,
may again be used directly to estimate subchaff visibility. (A time of
the order of several minutes might be required for this dispersion.)
Using the same sowing pattern as indicated against FPS-20, and taking
as the mean wind radial velocities 40 and 70 knots for the two trails,
the radar even without velocity compensation can be expected to have
good subchaff visibility initially, unless the chaff is immediately dis-
persed in velocity by turbulent air. if the chaff falls at the rates
Ialready described, however, after a few minutes the spread in dipole
velocities will have widened the spectrum appreciably. The standard
deviation may be on the order of 20 or 25 knots, or more. If the mean
radial velocity were 75 knots, the radar would have only a few db of
relative chaff attenuation. It will be observed that in Fig. 15 the
lower trail has been assumed to have the larger mean radial velocity.
This is characteristic of altitudes above 35,000 feet. If the well-
Idispersed chaff cloud should encounter a high-mean-velocity wind at
lower altitudes, the clutter residue (after filtering) would increase,
t and the subchaff visibility could approach zero.
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1~~ 100 ,
mi. mi
FIG. 17
TANGENTIAL COURSE OF AIRCRAFT PAST RADAR
FOR ILLUSTRATION OF BLIND ZONE
* It is not known that the FPS-28 is planned to display its full range
capability on the scans when it uses an 800-pps repetition rate. This
might, however, be desirable in view of the radar's limited range in
this mode. The example, in any case, is illustrative.
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VI THE STATUS OF CHAFF THREAT EVALUATION
section.
I A. WIND EFFECTS
pulse, every third pulse, etc., but how such a device could aid in
in such operations?
nonlinear receiver effects. This work may have already been accomplished
elsewhere, but is unknown to the author.
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Effects of chaff on specific U.S. SAM system radars have not been
Imentioned specifically in this report, nor have effects on constel-
lations of such systems. Some thinking along these lines has been done
in this country. Hult (Ref. 5, p. 3), for example, has pointed out that
if the number of trails sown by a group of aircraft exceeds the number
of tracking radars that can be used to search them, chaff may be useful
if sown only against search radars; otherwise, it would have to be sown
against the trackers as well.
N C. ECCM COMPATIBILITY
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I APPENDIX A
CALCULATION OF RIEFERENCE GAIN OF RANGE-GATED FILTER PWI
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[APPENDIX A
and it will be called the output signal power. Since the output clutter
power is R (C, 0, -- ), the output-signal to clutter-power ratio, desig-
nated X0 , is given by the ratio
G(v) E(v)
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mI where G is independent of target velocity and E(v) is independent of
clutter characteristics. G is numerically equal to the average of G(v)
[ over all target velocities, v, and so can be construed as the "expected"
gain in the probabilistic sense that a target whose velocity is unknown
I is equally likely to be moving at all velocities. It is desirable, of
course, for G to be as large as possible. The form of the output power
residue, in general, is the sum of a number of terms arising from a
number, say N, of pulses:
I P-1 N-
P Zajak p(tj - tk)
j=O k=O
Emerson derives an expression for G(v) for the type of system here
examined by considering the input to the filter to be an infinite train
I of pulses. The expression given above takes the form
S00 I J=O
Z_ Z
00
k=O
f(tj)f(tk)Pc(tj-tk)-
-C F F f(tj)f(tk)Pc(tj-tk)
SG )J=O k=O
IC S 00 00o
f(tJ)f(tk)Pc(tj - tk )
C E F,
IJ=O k=O
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I where f(t) is the impulse time response function of the filter, and tj
represents the times of arrival of the pulses in the gated channel; the
Since
00
Ps Wx =f10 eW 5 (f)df
I and
Pc (x) = f ei W Wc(f)df
H(f)Ws(f)df
I O( = f
G(v) LO
I ODH(f)Wc(f)df
i in Fig. 13.
G(v) = C H(fd)
df
If fo00 H(f )wc(f)
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ffH(f)c(f)df
The calculation of G(v) for the FPS-28 radar will assume a single
For the FPS-28 radar, it may be assumed that the range of target
lower data rate over most of this band, and including the blind-speed
band from 0 to 100 knots, we might obtain a modified or weighted average
A f 2
e-(f-fd) /2a
2
]df + Ae e[
-
(f- fd)2 /2a2 I ]df
I -((F+3)1/2 ](F-B)/2
Letting g --(-Id)io
13/F
( F + B- 2 f d ) / 2
)/20
S
L__ [(gd)/2]d 1- e-~ 2 /2d
e- [(g2)/2]g 1 [(g)/2]dg
-00 -OD
1 -(F-B+2fd)/2a1
J2/2d e- 1 -[(F+8+2fd)/20"]
f e- [(g2 )/2]d
+ -' e-[(g2)/2]dg -
I -OD -()
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or
B/F
I[(F+B-2fd)/2a] - *(F-B-2fd)/2a] + *[-(F-B+2fd)/2a] - 4[-(F+B+2fd)/2a]
17 where
x
0 (x) fe(t2)/2]dt
_03
1- G = 4I(800-fd)/a)]-
0.9
P[(200-fd)/aI - *[(250+i)/al +
_ _ _ _ _
[(8OO+fd)/a]
_ _ _
I
This function is plotted for various values cf fd and a, or rather for
V It has been suggested by Emerson that the Gaussian shape for the
clutter spectrum would be more realistic if it were truncated at ±2a,
thereby removing the effects of implied very high fluctuation frequencies
jwhich might not be found in the physical situation* or would be below the
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For an assumed Gaussian-shaped antenna pattern, the rms pulse-to-
pulse phase fluctuation incurred in scanning past a distributed target
Isuch as a chaff trail is given in Vol. I of the MIT Radiation Laboratory
Series (Ref. 9, p. 646) as 1.66/n -F radians, where n is the number of
pulses per beamwidth. At a rotation rate of 6 rpm, beamwidth of
1.3 degrees in azimuth, and repetition rate of 1,000 pps, n will be
given by 1,000 pulses/sec x 10 sec/3600 x 1.30 : 36 pulses/beamwidth.
Then rms pulse-to-pulse phase shift is
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APEDII
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j APPENDIX B
The clutter signal from any re~olution cell of the radar can be
conveniently represented vectorially, the length of the vector repre-
senting its amplitude, and the angle with a given axis representing its
RF phase as measured, for example, at the radar receiver. Composed of
many individual reflections from bodies within the resolution cell, the
Iresultant vector represents the net signal that the radar "sees." It
is shown below for one resolution cell containing five individual
j
| F----
RESULTANT R
I/
5 ~ .--
6 -
SeC
sFeN
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i /" -* ,----
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* The phase of this signal on its arrival at the receiver may be assigned
* a value zero for each pulse, and the phase of simultaneously arriving
signals referred to or measured from it. (In noncoherent MI no phase
reference signal is generated within the receiver.)
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/ \ \
R2R
S\/ /
canceler. By delaying part of the return by one pulse length and phase-
BLOCK I 1 2 ,l I --- w- V
I I I I
BLOCK U 4 5 I
B, the next; and 3 and 6 are in C, the last. Cell A will have an
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R R
I /I RB
a, R +'1 ,
AR / 1I "
R /
N,.
I /
From these rough vector diagrams we can draw some general conclusions.
It will be noted that whereas 0, has undergone a change of about
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I25
, degrees during the repetition period, 02 has changed by about 45
degrees.* The difference between thpse nu'bers can be seen from the
vector diagrams to be attributaLe to ;r, ter variation in range (not
in time) of the clutter amplitude uetween B and C than in that between
A and B. Such range-to-range fluctuations are a characteristic feature
of chaff return, as discussed in Sec. II.
I If
all the amplitudas of the individual returns above, (R1 , R 2 , R,
etc.) were equal, then the first-order effects described above would
produce a cancelable output. The dependence of phase angle on ampli-
tudes of unequal components, however, makes it very likely that for a
radar with short wavelength and high repetition rate, uncancelable
phase shifts would occur as a result cf mean velocity differences
alone, producing strong clutter on the display. Dispersion effects in
the two blocks would also, of course, contribute to this clutter.
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* The radar response depends, of course, on the ability to cancel the
phase detector responses to signals having these phase differences;
25 degrees corresponds to the shift resulting from a mean wind
velocity of 5 knots; 45 degrees to a shift resulting from a mean wind
velocity of 10 knots. A target characterized by a 45-degree pulse-
to-pulse phase shift gets about one-third of maximum response. Con-
sid ably larger phase shifts could, of course, readily occur in
high-speed winds.
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i REFERENCES
10. S. M, Van Voorhis, editor, Microwave Receivers, MIT Rad Lab Series,
Vol. 23, p. 581, (McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., N.Y., 1948).
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