Babiera To Albero
Babiera To Albero
Babiera To Albero
488
Birth Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was presented to attest to the pregnancy of
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Hermogena during that time. Moreover, at the time of her supposed birth, Hermogena was
88 already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to have given birth at such a late age, it
was highly suspicious that she did so in her own home, when her advanced age necessitated
Babiera vs. Catotal proper medical care normally available only in a hospital.
Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue, because Article 171 of the
Family Code states that the child’s filiation can be impugned only by the father or, in special
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the legitimacy of a child is not subject to a collateral
attack. This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the
present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
is one “who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party Pablito C. Pielago, Sr. for petitioner.
entitled to the avails of the suit.” The interest of respondent in the civil status of petitioner Dulcesimo Tampus for respondent.
stems from an action for partition which the latter filed against the former. The case
concerned the properties inherited by respondent from her parents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Same; Same; Family Code; Article 171 of the Family Code applies to instances in
which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife’s child, i.e., to declare that such child is
an illegitimate child, but not to an action to establish that such child is not the wife’s child at A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof that it is
all.—Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of fictitious. Thus, void is a certificate which shows that the mother was already
this provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy fifty-four years old at the time of the child’s birth and which was signed neither
of his wife’s child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed by the civil registrar nor by the supposed mother. Because her inheritance rights
offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give are adversely affected, the legitimate child of
birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an 490
illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter’s child at
all. Verily, the present action does not impugn petitioner’s filiation to Spouses Eugenio and 490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place. Babiera vs. Catotal
Same; Same; Birth Certificates; Prescription; An action to cancel a person’s Birth
such mother is a proper party in the proceedings for the cancellation of the said
Certificate for being allegedly void ab initio does not prescribe, and the prescriptive period set
forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply.—This argument is bereft of merit. certificate.
The present action involves the cancellation of petitioner’s Birth Certificate; it does not Statement of the Case
impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Submitted for this Court’s consideration is a Petition for Review on
Code does not apply. Verily, the action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe, Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking reversal of the March 18,
1
Same; Same; Same; While it is true that an official document such as a Birth
Certificate enjoys the presumption of regularity, the specific facts that there were already the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte in Special Proceedings No. 3046, the
irregularities regarding the CA ruled as follows:
489 “IN VIEW HEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the instant
appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the defendant-appellant, TEOFISTA
VOL. 333, JUNE 15, 2000 48
BABIERA, a.k.a. Teofista Guinto.” 4
CA Decision, p. 10; rollo, p. 29. The Decision was written by J. Demetrio G. Demetria, with the
4
concurrence of JJ. Ramon A. Bercelona (Division chairman) and Presbiterio J. Velasco, Jr. (member).
instant petition is barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code.’
491 The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
“Subsequently, ‘Attys. Padilla, Ulindang and Padilla appeared and filed an
VOL. 333, JUNE 15, 2000 491 answer/opposition in behalf of private respondent Teofista Babiera, [who] was later on
Babiera vs. Catotal substituted by Atty. Cabili as counsel for private respondent.’
“In the answer filed, TEOFISTA averred ‘that she was always known as Teofista
The Facts Babiera and not Teofista Guinto; that plaintiff is not the only surviving child of the late
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise: spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena C. Babiera, for the truth of the matter [is that]
“Presentation B. Catotal (hereafter referred to as PRESENTACION) filed with the Regional plaintiff Presentation B. V. Catotal and [defendant] Teofista Babiera are sisters of the full-
Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch II, Iligan City, a petition for the cancellation of the blood. Her Certificate of Birth, signed by her mother Hermogena Babiera, x x x Certificate
entry of birth of Teofista Babiera (herafter referred to as TEOFISTA) in the Civil Registry of of Baptism, x x x Student’s Report Card x x x all incorporated in her answer, are eloquent
Iligan City. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3046. testimonies of her filiation. By way of special and affirmative defenses,
“From the petition filed, PRESENTACION asserted ‘that she is the only surviving child defendant/respondent contended that the petition states no cause of action, it being an
of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, who died on May 26, 1996 attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and
and July 6, 1990 respectively; that on September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by ‘hilot’ Hermogena Cariñoza Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant petition
in the house of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge of said pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and
spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and 493
Hermogena Babiera, caused the registration/recording of the facts of birth of her child, by VOL. 333, JUNE 15, 2000 493
simulating that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena,
then 54 years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging her Babiera vs. Catotal
signature x x x; that petitioner, then 15 years old, saw with her own eyes and personally finally that the instant petition is barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of
witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their house, assisted by ‘hilot’; that the Family Code.” 5
the birth certificate x x x of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
birth, signature of informant forged, and it contained false entries, to wit: a) The child is
made to appear as the legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena The Court of Appeals held that the evidence adduced during trial proved that
Cariñosa, when she is not; b) The signature of Hermogena Cariñosa, the mother, is petitioner was not the biological child of Hermogena Babiera. It also ruled that no
falsified/forged. She was not the informant; c) The family name BABIERA is false and evidence was presented to show that Hermogena became pregnant in 1959. It
unlawful and her correct family name is GUINTO, her mother being single; d) Her real further observed that she was already 54 years old at the time, and that her last
mother was Flora Guinto and her status, an illegitimate child; The natural father, the pregnancy had occurred way back in 1941. The CA noted that the supposed birth
carpenter, did not sign it; that the respondent Teofista Barbiera’s birth certificate is void ab took place at home, notwithstanding the advanced age of Hermogena and its
initio, and it is patently a simulation of birth, since it is clinically and medically impossible concomitant medical complications. Moreover, petitioner’s Birth Certificate was
for the supposed parents to bear a child in 1956 because: a) Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera,
not signed by the local civil registrar, and the signature therein, which was
was already 54 years old; b) Hermogena’s last child birth was in the year 1941, the year
petitioner was born; c) Eugenio was already 65 years old, that the void and simulated birth purported to be that of Hermogena, was different from her other signatures.
certificate of Teofista Guinto would affect the hereditary rights of petitioner who The CA also deemed inapplicable Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code,
492 which stated that only the father could impugn the child’s legitimacy, and that
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED the same was not subject to a collateral attack. It held that said provisions
contemplated a situation wherein the husband or his heirs asserted that the child 3. (3)If the child was born after the death of the husband.
of the wife was not his. In this case, the action involved the cancellation of the
child’s Birth Certificate for being void ab initio on the ground that the child did It appears that respondent invoked Rule 108 in the present action. Although the said Rule allows
9
Petitioner’s Memorandum, which was signed by Atty. Pablito C. Pielago, Sr. Respondent’s Memorandum,
signed by Atty. Dulcesimo Tampos, had been received earlier. A close reading of this provision shows that it applies to instances in which the
494 father impugns the legitimacy of his wife’s child. The provision, however,
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The
present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In
Babiera vs. Catotal
other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate
child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter’s child at all.
1. “1)Respondent (plaintiff in the lower court a quo) does not have the legal Verily, the present action does not impugn petitioner’s filiation to Spouses
capacity to file the special proceeding of appeal under CA GR No. CV- Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in
56031subject matter of this review on certiorari; the first place.
2. 2)The special proceeding on appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031 is In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled thus: 11
improper and is barred by [the] statute of limitation (prescription); “Petitioner’s insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family
[and] Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. These articles provide:
3. 3)The Honorable Court of Appeals, the fifteenth division utterly failed to xxx xxx xxx
“A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a
hold, that the ancient public record of petitioner’s birth is superior to
situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or
the self-serving oral testimony of respondent.” 7
biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a
husband
_______________
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious. graphical or clerical errors and not material or substantial ones (see Leonor v. CA, 256 SCRA 69, April 2, 1996), the
propriety of the present remedy was not raised as an issue. Hence, the Court finds no reason to pass upon it. It should be
First Issue: Subject of the Present Action observed, however, that the trial court ordered the publication of the Petition and the date of hearing in a newspaper of
Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue, because Article general publication and caused the service of copies thereof to the Office of the Solicitor General, the Iligan City local civil
registrar and the Office of the Iligan City Prosecutor.
171 of the Family Code states that the child’s filiation can be impugned only by
8
10 Civil Case No. 2389.
the father or, in special circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the legitimacy of a 11 229 SCRA 468, January 24, 1994.
496
child is not subject to a collateral attack.
This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate 496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that a real Babiera vs. Catotal
party in interest is one “who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” The inter- 9
the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically
_______________ impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the
300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other
Petition, p. 3; rollo, p. 11.
7
scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period
8
conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either
prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases: parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue
influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive
1. (1)If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action; period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the
2. (2)If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to
apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of See Santos v. Aranzanso, 116 SCRA 1, August 21, 1982.
13
the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear The civil registrar was G.L. Caluen.
14
submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim 498
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is 498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
apropos, viz.:
‘Petitioners’ recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not well- Babiera vs. Catotal
taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because different from her signatures in other documents presented during the trial.
this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim
Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show that
their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta
Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent’s child at all. Being Hermogena is not the former’s real mother. For one, there is no evidence of
neither [a] legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Hermogena’s pregnancy, such as medical records and doctor’s prescriptions, other
Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.’” (Emphasis supplied.)
12
than the Birth Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was presented to attest to the
Second Issue: Prescription pregnancy of Hermogena during that time. Moreover, at the time of her supposed
Petitioner next contends that the action to contest her status as a child of the late birth, Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to
Hermogena Babiera has already prescribed. She cites Article 170 of the Family have given birth at such a late age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her
Code which provides the prescriptive period for such action: own home, when her advanced age necessitated proper medical care normally
_______________ available only in a hospital.
The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of
Ibid., pp. 472-474, per Puno, J.
12
Hermogena Babiera which states that she did not give birth to petitioner, and
497
that the latter was not hers nor her husband Eugenio’s. The deposition reads in
VOL. 333, JUNE 15, 2000 497 part:
Babiera vs. Catotal “q Who are your children?
“Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year
a Presentacion and Florentino Babiera.
from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a
proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took q Now, this Teofista Babiera claims that she is your legitimate child with
place or was recorded.
your husband Eugenio Babiera, what can you say about that?
“If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as
defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they a She is not our child.
should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been
xxx xxx xxx
concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted
from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said q Do you recall where she was born?
birth, whichever is earlier.”
a In our house because her mother was our house helper.
This argument is bereft of merit. The present action involves the cancellation of
petitioner’s Birth Certificate; it does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the q Could you recall for how long if ever this Teofista Babiera lived with you
prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. in your residence?
Verily, the action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe, because it a Maybe in 1978 but she [would] always go ou[t] from time to time.
was allegedly void ab initio. 13
q Now, during this time, do you recall if you ever assert[ed] her as your
Third Issue: Presumption in Favor of the Birth Certificate
Lastly, petitioner argues that the evidence presented, especially Hermogena’s daughter with your husband?
testimony that petitioner was not her real child, cannot overcome the a No, sir.” 15
——o0o——
there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family of the Regional Trial Court at Caloocan City which dismissed the petition for the
Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: “Children conceived or born during the settlement of the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles, thereat commenced by the
marriage of the parents are legitimate.” herein respondent Aleli “Corazon” Angeles-Maglaya.
Same; Same; Same; The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family The legal dispute between the parties started when, on March 25, 1998, in the
Code may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Caloo-
child’s parents were legally married and that his/her conception of birth occurred during the _______________
subsistence of that marriage.—A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely
on and invoke such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce 1Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, with Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and
evidence to prove that fact. For, a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed. Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; Annex “A,” Petition; Rollo pp. 192-215.
However, it cannot be over-emphasized, that while a fact thus prima facie established by 365
legal presumption shall, unless overthrown, stand as proved, the presumption of legitimacy
under Article 164 of the Family Code may be availed only upon convincing proof of the VOL. 469, SEPTEMBER 2, 2005 365
factual basis therefor, i.e., that the child’s parents were legally married and that his/her Angeles vs. Maglaya
conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Else, the presumption
can City, respondent filed a petition for letters of administration and her
2
Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating proof of plea, petitioner alleged having married Francisco on August 7, 1948 before Judge
paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother
Lucio M. Tianco of the Municipal Court of Rizal, a union which was ratified two
jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses.
(2) months later in religious rites at the Our Lady of Grace Parish in Caloocan
City, and that Francisco represented in their marriage contract that he was single Angeles vs. Maglaya
at that time. Petitioner also averred that respondent could not be the daughter of and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the handwritten word “Yes” appears on the
Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the space below the question “Legitimate? (Legitimo?)”; pictures taken during
corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Pressing on, petitioner respondent’s wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya; and a copy of her
further alleged that respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of marriage contract. Likewise offered were her scholastic and government service
Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract records.
between After respondent rested her case following her formal offer of exhibits,
_______________
petitioner filed a “Motion to Dismiss” under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of
2Annex “B,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 218-221. Court. In it, she prayed for the dismissal of the petition for letters of
3Annex “C” Petition, Rollo, pp. 232 et seq. administration on the ground that the petition failed “to state or prove a cause of
366 action”, it being her stated position that “[P]etitioner [Corzaon], by her evidence,
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED failed to establish her filiation vis-à-vis the decedent, i.e., that she is in fact a
legitimate child of Francisco M. Angeles.” 10
petitioner likewise averred that she and Francisco had, during their marriage, that respondent failed to prove her filiation as legitimate child of Francisco,
legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat, et al. Petitioner thus urged that she, being the dismissed the petition, thus:
surviving spouse of Francisco, be declared as possessed of the superior right to the “WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby ordered DISMISSED for failure of the
administration of his estate. [respondent] to state a cause of action in accordance with Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the 1997
In her reply to opposition, respondent alleged, inter alia, that per certification Rules of Civil of Procedure.” (Word in bracket added)
of the appropriate offices, the January to December 1938 records of marriages of Respondent then moved for reconsideration, which motion was denied by the trial
the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where the alleged 1938 Francisco- court in its Order of December 17, 1999. Therefrom, respondent went on appeal
12
Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. In the same reply, respondent to the Court of Appeals where her recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
dismissed as of little consequence the adoption adverted to owing to her having 66037.
interposed with the Court of Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption _______________
entered by the RTC at Caloocan. 4
12 Rollo, p. 482.
testified having been in open and continuous possession of the status of a 368
legitimate child. Four (4) other witnesses testified on her behalf, namely: Tomas
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Angeles, Francisco Yaya, Jose O. Carreon and Paulita Angeles de la
6 7 8
Cruz. Respondent also offered in evidence her birth certificate which contained
9 Angeles vs. Maglaya
an entry stating that she was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo, As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision
Manila, to Francisco Angeles dated May 29, 2002, reversed and set aside the trial court’s order of dismissal
13
Employed as auto mechanic by Liberty Taxi Corporation where Francisco was President and
7
intestate estate of Francisco Angeles.
General Manager. SO ORDERED.”
A former town mate and employee of Francisco.
8 The appellate court predicated its ruling on the interplay of the following main
Niece of Francisco.
9
premises:
367
VOL. 469, SEPTEMBER 2, 2005 367
1. 1.Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss filed with the trial court, albeit premised It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably
on the alleged failure of the underlying petition for letter of overlooked the universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. There is no presumption
administration to state or prove a cause of action, actually partakes of a of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more con-
_______________
demurrer to evidence under Section 1 of Rule 33; 14
2. 2.Petitioner’s motion being a demurer, it follows that she thereby waived 15 See Note # 11, supra.
her right to present opposing evidence to rebut respondent’s testimonial 16 276 SCRA 582 (1997).
Page 15 of the CA Decision, Rollo, p. 206.
and documentary evidence; and
17
370
3. 3.Respondent has sufficiently established her legitimate filiation with
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the deceased Francisco.
Angeles vs. Maglaya
Hence, petitioner’s instant petition for review on certiorari, on the submission vincing than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well-
settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in re-
The rationale for this rule has been explained in this wise:
_______________
‘The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . . actually fixes a status for the child born
in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. x x x
13See Note #1, supra. xxx xxx xxx
14Sec. 1. Demurrer to evidence.—After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, ‘Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170 [of the Family Code], the action to
the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and law the plaintiff has shown impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be bought. The status conferred by the presumption,
no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The obvious intention of the law is to prevent
granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to the status of a child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty. It also aims to force early
present evidence. action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child so that the evidence material to the matter . . .
369 may still be easily available.’
xxx xxx xxx
VOL. 469, SEPTEMBER 2, 2005 369 ‘Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife . . . .’ (Words in bracket
Angeles vs. Maglaya added; Emphasis ours)
versing the trial court’s order of dismissal; (2) in treating her motion to dismiss as
15
Contextually, the correct lesson of Tison, which the appellate court evidently
a demurrer to evidence; (3) in holding that respondent is a legitimate daughter of misapplied, is that: (a) a child is presumed legitimate only if conceived or born in
Francisco; and (4) in decreeing respondent’s appointment as administratrix of wedlock; and (b) the presumptive legitimacy of such child cannot be attacked
Francisco’s intestate estate. collaterally.
We resolve to grant the petition. A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke
The principal issue tendered in this case boils down to the question of whether such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce
or not respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and evidence to prove that fact. For, a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact
18
Genoveva Mercado. The Court of Appeals resolved the issue in the affirmative presumed. However, it cannot be over-emphasized, that while a fact thus prima
and, on the basis of such determination, ordered the trial court to appoint facie established by legal presumption shall, unless
_______________
respondent as administratrix of Francisco’s estate.
We are unable to lend concurrence to the appellate court’s conclusion on the Tison vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 582 (1997).
18
legitimate status of respondent, or, to be precise, on her legitimate filiation to the 371
decedent. A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and VOL. 469, SEPTEMBER 2, 2005 371
lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no
legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code Angeles vs. Maglaya
cannot be more emphatic on the matter: “Children conceived or born during the overthrown, stand as proved, the presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of
19
marriage of the parents are legitimate.” the Family Code may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis
20
In finding for respondent, the Court of Appeals, citing and extensibly quoting therefor, i.e., that the child’s parents were legally married and that his/her
from Tison vs. Court of Appeals, stated that since petitioner “opted not to present
16 conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Else, the
any contrary evidence,” the presumption on respondent’s legitimacy stands presumption of law that a child is legitimate does not arise.
“unrebutted.” 17 In the case at bench, the Court of Appeals, in its decision under review, did
Following is an excerpt from Tison: not categorically state from what facts established during the trial was the
presumption of respondent’s supposed legitimacy arose. But even if perhaps it
wanted to, it could not have possibly done so. For, save for respondent’s
gratuitous assertion and an entry in her certificate of birth, there is absolutely no Mercado and Francisco were married in 1938, it follows that the marriage of
proof of the decedent’s marriage to respondent’s mother, Genoveva Mercado. To Francisco to petitioner Belen Angeles in 1948, or prior to Genoveva’s death, would
stress, no marriage certificate or marriage contract—doubtless the best evidence _______________
of Francisco’s and Genoveva’s marriage, if one had been solemnized —was offered
21
in evidence. No priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing authority was called to TSN Oct. 29, 1998 pp. 43 & 47.
23
373
the witness box to declare that he solemnized the marriage between the two.
None of the four (4) witnesses respondent presented could say anything about, let VOL. 469, SEPTEMBER 2, 2005 373
alone affirm, that supposed marriage. At best, their testimonies proved that Angeles vs. Maglaya
respondent was Francisco’s daughter. For example, Tomas Angeles and Paulita necessarily have to be bigamous, hence void, in which case petitioner could not be,
24
Angeles de la Cruz testified that they know respondent to be their cousin because as respondent alleged in her petition for letters of administration, a “surviving
his (Tomas’) father and her (Paulita’s) mother, who are both Francisco’s siblings, spouse” of the decedent. We quote the pertinent allegation:
told them so. And one Jose Carreon would testify seeing respondent in 1948 in
22
4. The surviving heirs of decedent are the petitioner [Corazon] herself who is 58 years old,
Francisco’s house and BELEN S. Angeles, the surviving spouse of deceased Francisco M. Angeles by his
_______________ second marriage, who is about 77 years old . . . .YEARS OLD . . . ” (Emphasis and word in
bracket added)
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 406 SCRA 190, 268 (2003), citing Defensor-Santiago, RULES OF
19
We can concede, because Article 172 of the Family Code appears to say so, that
COURT ANNOTATED, 1999 ed., p. 857.
the legitimate filiation of a child can be established by any of the modes therein
Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
20
374
Angeles were married in 1938, respondent never, thru the years, even question
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
what would necessarily be a bigamous Francisco-Belen Sagad marriage. Ironical
as it may seem, respondent herself undermined her very own case. As it were, she Angeles vs. Maglaya
made certain judicial admission negating her own assertion—as well as the “married” is written in the certificate to indicate the union of Francisco and
appellate court’s conclusion—that Francisco was legally married to Genoveva. As Genoveva.
may be recalled, respondent had declared that her mother Genoveva died in 1988, Petitioner, however, contends, citing jurisprudence, that “[I]t was error for the
implying, quite clearly, that when Francisco contracted marriage with petitioner Court of Appeals to have ruled . . . that[respondent’s] Birth
Belen S. Angeles in 1948, Genoveva and Francisco were already “spouses.” Now, Certificate indubitablyestablishes that she is the legitimate daughter of Francisco
then, if, as respondent maintained despite utter lack of evidence, that Genoveva and Genoveva who are legally married.”
The contention commends itself for concurrence. The reason is as simple as it Give this certificate evidential relevancy, and we thereby pave the way for any scheming
is elementary: the Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco unmarried mother to extort money for her child (and herself) from any eligible bachelor or
against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was affluent pater familias. How? She simply causes the midwife to state in the birth certificate
that the newborn babe is her legitimate offspring with that individual and the certificate
signed by the attending physician, one Rebecca De Guzman, who certified to
will be accepted for registration . . . . And any lawyer with sufficient imagination will realize
having attended the birth of a child. Such certificate, albeit considered a public the exciting possibilities from such mischief of such prima facie evi-
record of a private document is, under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, _______________
evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its execution: the fact of birth of a
child. Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating
25
28 Rollo, pp. 134-135.
Sayson vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 321 (1999).
proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the
29
376
father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses. Dr. Arturo 26
of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is void; the signature of the alleged father is Just like her Birth Certificate, respondent can hardly derive comfort from her
necessary. 27
marriage contract to Atty. Maglaya and from her student and government records
_______________
which indicated or purported to show that Francisco Angeles is her father. The
same holds true for her wedding pictures which showed Francisco giving
25 Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence.—Documents consisting of entries in public records made in
the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facieevidence of the facts therein stated. All other respondent’s hands in marriage. These papers or documents, unsigned as they are
public documents are evidence . . . of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the by Francisco or the execution of which he had no part, are not sufficient evidence
latter. of filiation or recognition. And needless to stress, they cannot support a finding of
31
27 Tolentino, Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, 1990 ed., p.
540, citing Bercilles vs. Government Service Insurance System, 128 SCRA 53 (1984) and Reyes vs. Court of The argument may be advanced that the aforesaid wedding pictures, the
Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 (1985). school and service records and the testimony of respondent’s witnesses lend
375 support to her claim of enjoying open and continuous possession of the status of a
VOL. 469, SEPTEMBER 2, 2005 375 child of Francisco. The Court can even concede that respondent may have been
Angeles vs. Maglaya the natural child of Francisco with Genoveva. Unfortunately, however, that angle
is not an, or at issue in the case before us. For, respondent peremptorily
The conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the Birth Certificate of
predicated her petition for letters of administration on her being a legitimate
respondent, unsigned as it were by Francisco and Genoveva, establishes—and
child of Francisco who was legally married to her mother, Genoveva, propositions
“indubitably” at that—not only respondent’s filiation to Francisco but even her
which we have earlier refuted herein.
being a legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva, taxes credulity to the
If on the foregoing score alone, this Court could very well end this disposition
limit. In a very real sense, the appellate court regarded such certificate as
were it not for another compelling consideration which petitioner has raised and
defining proof of filiation, and not just filiation but of legitimate filiation, by
which we presently take judicially notice of.
inferring from it that Francisco and Genoveva are legally married. In the apt
As may be recalled, respondent, during the pendency of the proceedings at the
words of petitioner, the appellate court, out of a Birth Certificate signed by a
trial court, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the annulment of the
physician who merely certified having attended “the birth of a child who was born
decision of the RTC Caloo-
alive at 3:50 P.M.,” created “a marriage that of ‘Francisco and Genoveva,’ and _______________
filiation (that said child) is the daughter of ‘Francisco.’ ” 28
It cannot be over-emphasized that the legitimate filiation of a child is a Crisolo vs. Macadaeg, 94 Phil. 862 (1954).
30
matter fixed by law itself. It cannot, as the decision under review seems to
29
Bercilles vs. Government Service Insurance System, supra; (1984); Reyes vs. Court of Appeals,
31
suggest, be made dependent on the declaration of the attending physician or supra; Colorado vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 47 (1985).
377
midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn child. For then, an unwed mother,
with or without the participation of a doctor or midwife, could veritably invest VOL. 469, SEPTEMBER 2, 2005 377
legitimate status to her offspring through the simple expedient of writing the Angeles vs. Maglaya
putative father’s name in the appropriate space in the birth certificate. A long can granting the petition of spouses Francisco Angeles and petitioner Belen S.
time past, this Court cautioned against according a similar unsigned birth Angeles for the adoption of Concesa A. Yamat and two others. In that petition,
certificate prima facieevidentiary value of filiation:
docketed with the appellate court as CA-G.R. SP No. 47832 and captioned “Aleli Resolution dated January 24, 2005 resolved to “NOTE WITHOUT ACTION”
‘Corazon’ Angeles Maglaya vs. Hon Jaime T. Hamoy, Consesa A. Yamat, Teodora Maglaya’s second motion for reconsideration.
A. Santos, Franco Angeles and Belen S. Angeles,” respondent alleged that as In the light of the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47832, as
legitimate daughter of Francisco, she should have been notified of the adoption affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 163124, there can be no serious
proceedings. objection to applying in this case the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, one of 35
Following a legal skirmish, the Court of Appeals referred the aforementioned two (2) concepts embraced in the res judicataprinciple. Following
annulment case to RTC, Caloocan for reception of evidence. Eventually, in a _______________
Decision dated December 17, 2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed CA-G.R. SP
32
No. 47832 on the ground, inter alia, that herein respondent is not, contrary to her Rollo, p. 1232.
33
Ibid., p. 1233.
34
claim, a “legitimate daughter” of Francisco, nor “a child of a lawful wedlock The rule on conclusiveness of judgment precludes the relitigation of particular facts or issues in
35
between Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado.” Wrote the appellate another action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action (Calalang vs. Register of
court in that case: Deeds of Quezon City, 231 SCRA 88 (1994).
“Petitioner [Aleli “Corazon Maglaya] belabors with repetitious persistence the argument 379
that she is a legitimate child or the only daughter of Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. VOL. 469, SEPTEMBER 2, 2005 379
Mercado . . . .
In the case at bench, other than the self-serving declaration of the petitioner, there is Angeles vs. Maglaya
nothing in the record to support petitioner’s claim that she is indeed a legitimate child of the the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, herein respondent is precluded from
late Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado. x x x In other words, Francisco M. claiming that she is the legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado.
Angeles was never married before or at anytime prior to his marriage to Belen Sagad, In fine, the issue of herein respondent’s legitimate filiation to Francisco and the
contrary to the claim of petitioner that Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado were latter’s marriage to Genoveva, having been judicially determined in a final
married in 1938. judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, has thereby become res
While petitioner may have submitted certifications to the effect that the records of
judicata and may not again be resurrected or litigated between herein petitioner
marriages during the war years . . . were totally destroyed, no secondary evidence was
presented by petitioner to prove the existence of the marriage between Francisco M. Angeles and respondent or their privies in a subsequent action, regardless of the form of
_______________ the latter. 36
and Genoveva Y. Mercado, even as no witness was presented to confirm the celebration of the nature of a demurer to evidence has become moot and academic. It need not
such marriage . . . . detain us any minute further.
Petitioner presented pictures. x x x However, it is already settled law that photographs Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator
are not sufficient evidence of filiation or acknowledgment.
of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin
To be sure, very little comfort is provided by petitioner’s birth certificate and even her
marriage contract. . . . Reason: These documents were not signed by Francisco . . . . Equally of the decedent. When the law speaks of “next of kin,” the reference is to those
38
inconsequential are petitioner’s school records . . . . all these lacked the signatures of both who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedent’s property; one 39
adoption proceedings, as her consent thereto is not essential or required.” (Emphasis in the See Note #10, supra.
37
original; words in bracket added) Under Sec. 6(b), Rule 78, Rules of Court, the administration of the estate of a person who dies
38
intestate shall be granted to the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in
Significantly, the aforesaid December 17, 2003 Decision of the appellate court the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to
in CA-G.R. SP No. 47832 was effectively affirmed by this Court via its Resolution have appointed, if competent and willing to serve.
dated August 9, 2004 in G.R. No. 163124, denying Aleli “Corazon” Maglaya’s Ventura vs. Ventura, 160 SCRA 810 (1988).
39
380
petition for Review on Certiorari, and Resolution dated October 20,
33
——o0o——
_______________
381
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
obtain a certification that no record of her birth could be found in the civil registry, if such
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
were the case. We find petitioner’s silence concerning the absence of her birth certificate
Labagala vs. Santiago telling. It raises doubt as to the existence of a birth certificate that would show petitioner to
be the daughter of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Her failure to show her birth
G.R. No. 132305. December 4, 2001. *
certificate would raise the presumption that if such evidence were presented, it would be
IDA C. LABAGALA, petitioner, vs. NICOLASA T. SANTIAGO, AMANDA T. adverse to her claim. Petitioner’s counsel argued that petitioner had been using Santiago all
SANTIAGO and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. her life. However, use of a family name certainly does not establish pedigree.
Actions; Filiation; Legitimacy; Prescription; Article 263 of the Civil Code refers to an 362
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a man’s 3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
child by his wife—it does not refer to situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at
all of a particular couple; An action for recovery of title and possession is outside the scope of 62
Article 263 on prescriptive periods.—Article 263 of the Civil Code should be read in Labagala vs. Santiago
conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter on paternity and filiation in the Civil
Contracts; Simulated Contracts; Admission by the vendee that he did not pay any
Code. A careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations where a
centavo for the property, makes the sale void.—Clearly, there is no valid sale in this case.
doubt exists that a child is indeed a man’s child by his wife, and the husband (or, in proper
Jose did not have the right to transfer ownership of the entire property to petitioner since
cases, his heirs) denies the child’s filiation. It does not refer to situations where a child is
2/3 thereof belonged to his sisters. Petitioner could not have given her consent to the
alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple. Article 263 refers to an action to
contract, being a minor at the time. Consent of the contracting parties is among the
impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a man’s child by
essential requisites of a contract, including one of sale, absent which there can be no valid
his wife. However, the present case is
_______________ contract. Moreover, petitioner admittedly did not pay any centavo for the property, which
makes the sale void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 1471. If the price is
*SECOND DIVISION. simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in reality a donation, or
361 some other act or contract.
VOL. 371, DECEMBER 4, 2001 3
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
61
Labagala vs. Santiago The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
not one impugning petitioner’s legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that Public Attorney’s Office for petitioner.
petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all. Venancio B. Padilla for private respondents.
Moreover, the present action is one for recovery of title and possession, and thus outside the
scope of Article 263 on prescriptive periods.
Same; Same; Baptismal Certificates; A baptismal certificate is evidence only to prove QUISUMBING, J.:
the administration of the sacrament on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the
declarations therein stated with respect to a person’s kinsfolk.—Petitioner opted not to This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the decision dated March 4,
present her birth certificate to prove her relationship with Jose and instead offered in 1997, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32817, which reversed and set
1
evidence her baptismal certificate. However, as we held in Heirs of Pedro Cabais v. Court of aside the judgment dated October 17, 1990, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
2
p. 9). In the TSN, the case No. is listed as 56626. See Exhibit “G” to “G-11”, records, pp. 165-176.
4Records, p. 17. of the property originally covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 64729, in the name of
5The purported deed of sale is dated “___ day of February, 1979” but was notarized on March 19, Jose T. Santiago and presently covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 172334, in the
1979. See records, pp. 147-148; TSN, June 29, 1989, p. 19. name of herein defendant [herein petitioner] and which is located at No. 3075-A Rizal
6Records, p. 161. Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila, as per complaint, and the adjudication to plaintiffs
7Id., at 3, 18. per decision in Civil Case No. 56226 of this Court, Branch VI, and the remaining one-third
8Id., at 4. (1/3) pro indiviso share adjudicated in said decision to defendant Jose T. Santiago in said
364
case, is hereby adjudged and adjudicated to herein defendant as owner and entitled to
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED possession of said share. The Court does not see fit to adjudge damages, attorney’s fees and
costs. Upon finality of this judgment, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 172334 is ordered
Labagala vs. Santiago cancelled and a new title issued in the names of the two (2) plaintiffs and the defendant as
pointed out that it is highly improbable for petitioner to have paid the supposed owners in equal shares, and the Register of Deeds of Manila is so directed to effect the same
consideration of P150,000 for the sale of the subject property because petitioner upon payment of the proper fees by the parties herein.
was unemployed and without any visible means of livelihood at the time of the SO ORDERED. 10
alleged sale. They also stressed that it was quite unusual and questionable that According to the trial court, while there was indeed no consideration for the deed
petitioner registered the deed of sale only on January 26, 1987, or almost eight of sale executed by Jose in favor of petitioner, said deed constitutes a valid
years after the execution of the sale. 9 donation. Even if it were not, petitioner would still be entitled to Jose’s 1/3 portion
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that her true name is not Ida C. of the property as Jose’s daughter. The trial court ruled that the following
Labagala as claimed by respondent but Ida C. Santiago. She claimed not to know evidence shows petitioner to be the daughter of Jose: (1) the decisions in the two
any person by the name of Ida C. Labagala. She claimed to be the daughter of ejectment cases filed by respondents which stated that petitioner is Jose’s
Jose and thus entitled to his share in the subject property. She maintained that daughter, and (2) Jose’s income tax return which listed petitioner as his daughter.
she had always stayed on the property, ever since she was a child. She argued It further said that respondents knew of petitioner’s existence and her being the
daughter of Jose, per records of the earlier ejectment cases they filed against VOL. 371, DECEMBER 4, 2001 367
petitioner. According to the court, respondents were not candid with the court in
refusing to recognize petitioner as Ida C. Santiago and insisting that she was Ida Labagala vs. Santiago
C. Labagala, thus affecting their credibility. ties and within the period limited by law.” Petitioner also cites Article 263 of the
13
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of Civil Code in support of this contention. 14
the trial court. For their part, respondents contend that petitioner is not the daughter of
_______________ Jose, per her birth certificate that indicates her parents as Leo Labagala and
Cornelia Cabrigas, instead of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. They argue 15
The present controversy arose prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
14
sufficient evidence to prove her filiation by Jose Santiago, making her his sole Esperanza and Cornelia were sisters. See rollo, p. 16.
15
heir and thus entitled to inherit his 1/3 portion. She points out that respondents 368
had, before the filing of the instant case, previously “considered” her as the11
Petitioner asserts further that respondents cannot impugn her filiation Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert
collaterally, citing the case of Sayson v. Court of Appeals in which we held that
12
and prove that a person is not a man’s child by his wife. However, the present
“(t)he legitimacy of (a) child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for case is not one impugning petitioner’s legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not
that purpose, by the proper par- merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child
_______________ of Jose at all. Moreover, the present action is one for recovery of title and
17
possession, and thus outside the scope of Article 263 on prescriptive periods.
Id., at 17.
11
Petitioner’s reliance on Sayson is likewise improper. The factual milieu
G.R. Nos. 89224-25, 205 SCRA 321 (1992).
12
present in Sayson does not obtain in the instant case. What was being challenged
367
by petitioners in Sayson was (1) the validity of the adoption of Delia and according to the rites of the Catholic Church, by the priest who baptized subject child, but it
Edmundo by the deceased Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and (2) the legitimate does not
_______________
status of Doribel Sayson. While asserting that Delia and Edmundo could not have
been validly adopted since Doribel had already been born to the Sayson couple at 19 Records, p. 179.
the time, petitioners at the same time made the conflicting claim that Doribel was 20 Rollo, pp. 52-53.
TSN, August 11, 1988, p. 10.
not the child of the couple. The Court ruled in that case that it was too late to
21
22 Exhibit “10”.
question the decree of adoption that became final years before. Besides, such a 370
challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally but in a 370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
direct proceeding. 18
In this case, respondents are not assailing petitioner’s legitimate status but Labagala vs. Santiago
are, instead, asserting that she is not at all their brother’s child. The birth prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate concerning
the relationship of the person baptized.
certificate presented by respondents support this allegation.
23
We agree with the Court of Appeals that: A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of
_______________ filiation. More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which only shows
24
that income tax has been paid and the amount thereof. 25
16 See Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105625, 229 SCRA 468, 473 (1994). This case We note that the trial court had asked petitioner to secure a copy of her birth
deals with Articles 164, 166, 170, and 171 of the Family Code. Article 263 of the Civil Code is now Article certificate but petitioner, without advancing any reason therefor, failed to do so.
170 of the Family Code.
Neither did petitioner obtain a certification that no record of her birth could be
17 Cabatbat-Lim v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-69679, 166 SCRA 451, 457 (1988).
18 Sayson v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 12, at 326-328. found in the civil registry, if such were the case. We find petitioner’s silence
369 concerning the absence of her birth certificate telling. It raises doubt as to the
VOL. 371, DECEMBER 4, 2001 369 existence of a birth certificate that would show petitioner to be the daughter of
Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Her failure to show her birth certificate
Labagala vs. Santiago would raise the presumption that if such evidence were presented, it would be
The Certificate of Record of Birth (Exhibit H) plainly states that . . . Ida was the child of the
19
adverse to her claim. Petitioner’s counsel argued that petitioner had been using
spouses Leon Labagala and [Cornelia] Cabrigas. This document states that it was Leon
Santiago all her life. However, use of a family name certainly does not establish
Labagala who made the report to the Local Civil Registrar and therefore the supplier of the
entries in said Certificate. Therefore, this certificate is proof of the filiation of Ida. Appellee pedigree.
however denies that Exhibit H is her Birth Certificate. She insists that she is not Ida Further, we note that petitioner, who claims to be Ida Santiago, has the same
Labagala but Ida Santiago. If Exhibit H is not her birth certificate, then where is hers? She birthdate as Ida Labagala. The similarity is too uncanny to be a mere
26
did not present any though it would have been the easiest thing to do considering that coincidence.
according to her baptismal certificate she was born in Manila in 1969. This court rejects During her testimony before the trial court, petitioner denied knowing
such denials and holds that Exhibit H is the certificate of the record of birth of appellee Ida . Cornelia Cabrigas, who was listed as the mother in the birth certificate of Ida
.. Labagala. In her petition before this Court, however, she stated that Cornelia is
Against such evidence, the appellee Ida could only present her testimony and a
the sister of her mother, Esperanza. It appears that petitioner made conflicting
baptismal certificate (Exhibit 12) stating that appellee’s parents were Jose Santiago and
Esperanza Cabrigas. But then, a decisional rule in evidence states that a baptismal statements that affect her credibility and could cast a long shadow of doubt on her
certificate is not a proof of the parentage of the baptized person. This document can only claims of filiation.
prove the identity of the baptized, the date and place of her baptism, the identities of the _______________
baptismal sponsors and the priest who administered the sacrament—nothing
more. (Citations omitted.)
20
Heirs of Pedro Cabais v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 106314-15, 316 SCRA 338, 344 (1999),
23
citing Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals, et al., No. L-49542, 100 SCRA 73, 84 (1980).
At the pre-trial conducted on August 11, 1988, petitioner’s counsel admitted that Id., at 343.
24
petitioner did not have a birth certificate indicating that she is Ida Santiago, Exhibit “11”.
25
though she had been using this name all her life. 21 TSN, June 29, 1989, p. 3.
26
Petitioner opted not to present her birth certificate to prove her relationship 371
with Jose and instead offered in evidence her baptismal certificate. However, as 22 VOL. 371, DECEMBER 4, 2001 371
we held in Heirs of Pedro Cabais v. Court of Appeals: Labagala vs. Santiago
. . . a baptismal certificate is evidence only to prove the administration of the sacrament on
the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the declarations therein stated with Thus, we are constrained to agree with the factual finding of the Court of Appeals
respect to [a person’s] kinsfolk. The same is conclusive only of the baptism administered, that petitioner is in reality the child of Leon Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas, and
contrary to her averment, not of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Not In sum, we find no reversible error attributable to the assailed decision of the
being a child of Jose, it follows that petitioner can not inherit from him through Court of Appeals, hence it must be upheld.
intestate succession. It now remains to be seen whether the property in dispute WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of
was validly transferred to petitioner through sale or donation. Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32817 is AFFIRMED.
On the validity of the purported deed of sale, however, we agree with the Costs against petitioner.
Court of Appeals that: _______________
. . . This deed is shot through and through with so many intrinsic defects that a reasonable
mind is inevitably led to the conclusion that it is fake. The intrinsic defects are extractable 29 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Article 1327.
from the following questions: a) If Jose Santiago intended to donate the properties in 30 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Article 1318.
question to Ida, what was the big idea of hiding the nature of the contract in the facade of
31 TSN, June 29, 1989, pp. 17, 25.
32 Rollo, pp. 54-55. Articles 725 and 741 of the Civil Code state:
the sale? b) If the deed is a genuine document, how could it have happened that Jose Art. 725. Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who
Santiago who was of course fully aware that he owned only 1/3 pro indiviso of the properties accepts it.
covered by his title sold or donated the whole properties to Ida? c) Why in heaven’s name did Art. 741. Minors and others who cannot enter into a contract may become donees but acceptance shall be done
through their parents or legal representatives.
Jose Santiago, a college graduate, who always signed his name in documents requiring his 373
signature (citation omitted) [affix] his thumbmark on this deed of sale? d) If Ida was [the]
child of Jose Santiago, what was the sense of the latter donating his properties to her when VOL. 371, DECEMBER 4, 2001 373
she would inherit them anyway upon his death? e) Why did Jose Santiago affix his
Adiong vs. Court of Appeals
thumbmark to a deed which falsely stated that: he was single (for he was earlier married to
Esperanza Cabrigas); Ida was of legal age (for [s]he was then just 15 years old); and the SO ORDERED.
subject properties were free from liens and encumbrances (for Entry No. 27261, Notice of Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Adverse Claim and Entry No. 6388, Notice of Lis Pendens were already annotated in the Buena, J., On official leave.
title of said properties). If the deed was executed in 1979, how come it surfaced only in 1984 Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
after the death of Jose Santiago and of all people, the one in possession was the baptismal Notes.—When a putative father manifests openly through words and deeds
sponsor of Ida? 27
his recognition of a child, the courts can do no less than confirm said
Clearly, there is no valid sale in this case. Jose did not have the right to transfer acknowledgment. (Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 1 [1997])
ownership of the entire property to petitioner since 2/3 thereof belonged to his Questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of
sisters. Petitioner could not have
28
illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims
_______________
thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding
instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action for
Rollo, pp. 54-55.
27
days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for ________________
biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case
of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or Composed of Associate Justice Pedro Ramirez (Chairman); Associate Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy
1
ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or (Ponente) and Associate Justice Ricardo Galvez.
undue influence. 470
Same; Same; Same; Appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles 470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
to the case at bench.—Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to
apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals
the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned
submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and various properties especially in Laguna. Isabel died on April 25, 1982. Vicente
_______________
followed her in the grave on November 13, 1989. He died intestate.
*SECOND DIVISION.
The fight for administration of Vicente’s estate ensued. On September 24,
469 1990, private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar
VOL. 229, JANUARY 24, 1994 4 (Vicente’s sister and nephew, respectively) instituted Sp. Proc. No. 797 (90) before
the RTC of San Pablo City, 4th Judicial Region, Br. 30. They prayed for the
69 issuance of letters of administration of Vicente’s estate in favor of private
Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals respondent Aguilar. They alleged, inter alia, viz:
Isabel. xxx
Same; Same; Same; The totality of contrary evidence presented by the private “4. The decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be they ascendants or
respondents sufficiently rebutted the truth of the content of petitioner’s Certificate of Live descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted; despite claims or
Birth.—We sustain these findings as they are not unsupported by the evidence on record. representation to the contrary, petitioners can well and truly establish, given the chance to
The weight of these findings was not negated by the documentary evidence presented by the do so, that said decedent and his spouse Isabel Chipongian who pre-deceased him, and
petitioner, the most notable of which is her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. “3”) purportedly whose estate had earlier been settled extra-judicial, were without issue and/or without
showing that her parents were the late Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. This descendants whatsoever, and that one Marissa Benitez Badua who was raised and cared for
Certificate registered on December 28, 1954 appears to have been signed by the deceased by them since childhood is, in fact, not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is
Vicente Benitez. Under Article 410 of the New Civil Code, however, “the books making up therefore not a legal heir; x x x”
the Civil Registry and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the
and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.” As related above, the totality sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of administering his estate.
of contrary evidence, presented by the private respondents sufficiently rebutted the truth of The parties further exchanged reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal postures.
the content of petitioner’s Certificate of Live Birth. Of said rebutting evidence, the most The trial court then received evidence on the issue of petitioner’s heirship to
telling was the Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Isabel
the estate of the deceased. Petitioner tried to prove that she is the only legitimate
Chipongian (Exh. “E”) executed on July 20, 1982 by Vicente Benitez, and Dr. Nilo
Chipongian, a brother of Isabel. In this notarized document, they stated that “(they) are the
child of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. She submitted
sole heirs of the deceased Isabel Chipongian because she died without descendants or documentary evidence, among others: (1) her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3); (2)
ascendants”. In executing this Deed, Vicente Benitez effectively repudiated the Certificate of Baptismal Certificate (Exh. 4); (3) Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for
Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his daughter (Exhs.
10 to 21); and (4) School Records (Exhs. 5 & 6). She also testified that the said 1. case and in adopting or upholding private respondent’s theory that the
spouses reared and continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the instant case does not involve an action to impugn the legitimacy of a
other hand, private respondents tried to prove, mostly thru testimonial evidence, child;
that the said spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage; that the late 2. “2.Assuming arguendo that private respondents can question or impugn
Isabel, then directly or indirectly, the legitimacy of Marissa’s birth, still the
471 respondent appellate Court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
VOL. 229, JANUARY 24, 1994 471 gave more weight to the testimonial evidence of witnesses of private
respondents whose credibility and demeanor have not convinced the
Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals
trial court of the truth and sincerity thereof, than the documentary and
thirty six (36) years of age, was even referred to Dr. Constantino Manahan, a testimonial evidence of the now petitioner Marissa Benitez-Badua;
noted obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment. Their primary witness, Victoria
3. “3.The Honorable Court of Appeals has decided the case in a way not in
Benitez-Lirio, elder sister of the late Vicente, then 77 years of age, categorically2
——o0o——
479
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Same; Same; Same; Court not prepared to concede that the priest who officiates
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
numerous baptismal ceremonies can remember the parents of the children he has baptized in
Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals the absence of proof that he is a close friend of the alleged parents.—Petitioners capitalize on
the testimony of Father Liberato Fernandez who solemnized the baptismal ceremony of
G.R. No. 108366. February 16, 1994. *
petitioner Claro. However, on cross examination, Father Fernandez admitted that he has to
JOHN PAUL E. FERNANDEZ, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF be shown a picture of the private respondent by Violeta Esguerra to recognize the private
APPEALS and CARLITO S. FERNANDEZ, respondents. respondent. Indeed, there is no proof that Father Fernandez is a close friend of Violeta
Evidence; Appeals; Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals may be reviewed by the Esguerra and the private respondent which should render unquestionable his identification
Supreme Court only under exceptional circumstances, such as when the findings of the of the private respondent during petitioner Claro’s baptism. In the absence of this proof, we
appellate court clash with those of the trial court.—The rule is well-settled that findings of are not prepared to concede that Father Fernandez who officiates numerous baptismal
facts of the Court of Appeals may be reviewed by this court only under exceptional ceremonies day in and day out can remember the parents of the children he has baptized.
circumstances. One such situation is when the findings of the appellate court clash with
those of the trial court as in the case at bench. It behooves use therefore to exercise our
PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
extraordinary power, and settle the issue of whether the ruling of the appellate court that
private respondent is not the father of the petitioners is substantiated by the evidence on
record. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Same; Family Relations; Paternity and Filiation; Documentary evidence rejected as Erlinda B. Espejo for petitioners.
insufficient to prove filiation; Photographs of a person at baptism and in the house do not 132
prove that he is the father.—We shall first examine the documentary evidence offered by the 132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
petitioners which the respondent court rejected as insufficient to prove their filiation.
Firstly, we hold that petitioners cannot rely on the photographs showing the presence of the Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals
private respondent in the baptism of petitioner Claro. These photographs are far from proofs C.B. Carbon & Associates for private respondent.
that private respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As explained by the private
respondent, he was in the baptism as one of the sponsors of petitioner Claro. Secondly, the
PUNO, J.:
pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing private respondent showering affection to
Claro fall short of the evidence required to prove paternity.
________________ The legal dispute between the parties began when the petitioners filed Civil Case
No. Q-45567 for support against the private respondent before the RTC of Quezon
SECOND DIVISION.
*
131
City. The complaint was dismissed on December 9, 1986 by Judge Antonio P.
Solano, who found that “(t)here is nothing in the material allegations in the
1
VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 16, 1994 1 complaint that seeks to compel (private respondent) to recognize or acknowledge
31 (petitioners) as his illegitimate children,” and that there was no sufficient and
Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals
competent evidence to prove the petitioners’ filiation. 2
Same; Same; Same; Same; Baptismal Certificate has scant evidentiary value.—
Petitioners plodded on. On February 19, 1987, they filed the case at bench,
Thirdly, the baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro naming private respondent as his another action for recognition and support against the private respondent before
father has scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that private respondent another branch of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 87. The case was docketed
participated in its preparation. In Macandang v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980), we as Civil Case No. Q-50111.
also ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can The evidence shows that VIOLETA P. ESGUERRA, single, is the mother and
only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. guardian ad litem of the two petitioners, CLARO ANTONIO FERNANDEZ and
They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect JOHN PAUL FERNANDEZ. Violeta and the private respondent, CARLITO S.
to the child’s paternity.
FERNANDEZ, met sometime in 1983, at the Meralco Compound tennis courts. A
Same; Same; Same; Same; Certificate of live birth where the alleged father not shown
to have had a hand in its preparation not competent evidence of paternity.—Fourth, the
Meralco employee and a tennis enthusiast, Carlito used to spend his week-ends
certificates of live birth of the petitioners identifying private respondent as their father are regularly at said courts, where Violeta’s father served as tennis instructor.
not also competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again, the records do not show Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons. She claimed that they
that private respondent had a hand in the preparation of said certificates. In rejecting these started their illicit sexual relationship six (6)
certificates, the ruling of the respondent court is in accord with our pronouncement in Roces ________________
v. Local Civil Registrar,102 Phil. 1050 (1958). We reiterated this rule in Berciles v.
Systems, 128 SCRA 53 (1984), when we held that “a birth certificate not signed by the 1 Presiding judge of Branch 86, RTC Quezon City.
alleged father therein indicated is not competent evidence of paternity.” 2 In this regard, Judge Solano held:
xxx
“(Petitioners’) certificates of birth imputing filiation to defendant as the putative father are incompetent evidence.
“The baptismal certificates, upon the other hand, is not an indubitable writing that is impressed with authority to
establish filiation with those alleged as the parents of the child baptized.
Carlito frequented the said restaurant during their affair. Arcagua stated he
“The oral testimony of Violeta Esguerra, uncorroborated as it were, by competent evidence, is inadequate to sustain a never saw Violeta Esguerra and respondent Carlito together at the said
conclusion that defendant indeed is the father of plaintiffs.” restaurant. Private respondent also declared he only learned he was named in the
133
birth certificates of both petitioners as their father after he was sued for support
VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 16, 1994 133 in Civil Case No. Q-45567.
Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals Based on the evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court ruled in favor of
months after their first meeting. The tryst resulted in the birth of petitioner Claro petitioners, viz.:
Antonio on March 1, 1984, and of petitioner John Paul on February 11, 1985. “In view of the above, the Court concludes and so holds that the plaintiffs minors
(petitioners herein) are entitled to the reliefs prayed for in the complaint. The defendant
Violeta further claimed that she did not know that Carlito was married until the
(herein private respondent) is hereby ordered to recognize Claro Antonio Carlito Fernandez,
birth of her two children. She averred they were married in civil rites in October, now aged 6, and John Paul Fernandez, now aged 4 1/2, as his sons. As the defendant has
1983. In March, 1985, however, she discovered that the marriage license which admitted that he has a supervisory job at the Meralco, he shall give the plaintiffs support in
they used was spurious. the amount of P2,000 each a month, payment to be delivered to Violeta Esguerra, the
To bolster their case, petitioners presented the following documentary children’s mother and natural guardian, within the first five (5) days of the month, with
evidence: their certificates of live birth, identifying respondent Carlito as their arrears reckoned as of the filing of the complaint on February 19, 1987.
father; the baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro which also states that his “SO ORDERED.”
father is respondent Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken during the baptism of On appeal, the decision was set aside and petitioners’ complaint dismissed by the
petitioner Claro; and pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the home respondent Court of Appeals in its impugned decision, dated October 20, 1992. It
8
of Violeta Esguerra. found that the “proof relied upon by the (trial) court (is) inadequate to prove the
Petitioners likewise presented as witnesses, Rosario Cantoria, Dr. Milagros 3
(private respondent’s) paternity and filiation of (petitioners).” It further held that
Villanueva, Ruby Chua Cu, and Fr. Liberato Fernandez. The first three
4 5 6
the doctrine of res judicata applied because of the dismissal of the petitioners’
witnesses told the trial court that Violeta Esguerra had, at different complaint in Civil Case No. Q-45567. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was
times, introduced the private respondent to them as her “husband”. Fr.
7
denied on December 22, 1892.
________________
Fernandez, on the other hand, testified that Carlito was the one who presented
himself as the father of petitioner Claro during the latter’s baptism. 8Through its Fifth Division, composed of Associate Justices Serafin E. Camilon (chairman), Jorge S.
In defense, respondent Carlito denied Violeta’s allegations that he sired the Imperial (ponente) and Cancio C. Garcia. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 29182.
two petitioners. He averred he only served as 135
_________________
VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 16, 1994 135
She is a neighbor of Violeta Esguerra.
3 Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals
She is the obstetrician who delivered the petitioners. Dr. Villanueva is the mother-in-law of Violeta
4
Petitioners now contend that the respondent appellate court erred in: (1) not
Esguerra’s brother.
She is a friend and former officemate of Violeta Esguerra.
5
giving full faith and credit to the testimony of Violeta Esguerra; (2) not giving
He is the priest who officiated over the baptism of petitioner Claro Antonio Fernandez. Fr.
6 weight and value to the testimony of Father Liberato Fernandez; (3) not giving
Fernandez actually testified in Civil Case No. Q-45567. The whole records of the earlier case were probative value to the numerous pictures of respondent Carlito Fernandez taken
presented as evidence in this case.
In the case of Rosario Cantoria, she first met private respondent Carlito (who was introduced by
7
during the baptismal ceremony and inside the bedroom of Violeta Esguerra; (4)
Violeta as her “husband”) when she (Rosario) was taking care of Violeta after the birth of petitioner John not giving probative value to the birth certificates of petitioners; (5) giving so
Paul Fernandez. Dr. Villanueva was first introduced to Carlito (as Violeta’s “husband”) on March 1, 1984, much credence to the self-serving and incredible testimony of respondent Carlito
after she (Dr. Villanueva) delivered petitioner Claro Antonio Fernandez. Ruby Chua Cu met Violeta’s Fernandez; and (6) holding that the principle of res judicata is applicable in the
“husband” (Carlito) at the baptism of petitioner Claro Antonio Fernandez.
134 case at bar.
We find no merit in the petition.
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The rule is well-settled that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals may be
Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals reviewed by this court only under exceptional circumstances. One such situation
one of the sponsors in the baptism of petitioner Claro. This claim was is when the findings of the appellate court clash with those of the trial court as in
corroborated by the testimony of Rodante Pagtakhan, an officemate of respondent the case at bench. It behooves us therefore to exercise our extraordinary power,
Carlito who also stood as a sponsor of petitioner Claro during his baptism. The and settle the issue of whether the ruling of the appellate court that private
private respondent also presented as witness, Fidel Arcagua, a waiter of the respondent is not the father of the petitioners is substantiated by the evidence on
Lighthouse Restaurant. He disputed Violeta’s allegation that she and respondent record.
We shall first examine the documentary evidence offered by the petitioners “x x x Section 5 of Act No. 3793 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines explicitly
which the respondent court rejected as insufficient to prove their filiation. Firstly, prohibited, not only the naming of the
137
we hold that petitioners cannot rely on the photographs showing the presence of
the private respondent in the baptism of petitioner Claro (Exh. “B-8”, Exh. “B-12”, VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 16, 1994 137
Exh. “H” and Exh. “I”). These photographs are far from proofs that private Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals
respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As explained by the private father or the child born outside wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the recognition, is not
respondent, he was in the baptism as one of the sponsors of petitioner Claro. His filed or made by him, but, also, the statement of any information or circumstances by which
testimony was corroborated by Rodante Pagtakhan. he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make or
Secondly, the pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing private record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person and the
respondent showering affection to Claro fall short of the evidence required to certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of the latter, is
prove paternity (Exhibits “B”, “B-1”, “B-2”, “B-7”, “B-14” and “B-15”). As we held incompetent evidence of fathership of said child.” (Italics supplied)
in Tan vs. Trocio, 192 SCRA 764, viz: We reiterated this rule in Berciles, op. cit,when we held that “a birth certificate
“x x x The testimonies of complainant and witness Marilou Pangandaman, another maid, to not signed by the alleged father therein indicated is not competent evidence of
show unusual closeness between Respondent and Jewel, like playing with him and giving paternity.”
him toys, are not convincing enough to prove paternity. The same must be said of We have also reviewed the relevant testimonies of the witnesses for the
136 petitioners and we are satisfied that the respondent appellate court properly
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED calibrated their weight. Petitioners capitalize on the testimony of Father Liberato
Fernandez who solemnized the baptismal ceremony of petitioner Claro. He
Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals
declared on the witness stand:
x x x (the) pictures of Jewels and Respondent showing allegedly their physical likeness to
each other. Said evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity and much less would prove “Q Do you recall Father, whether on that occasion when you called for the
violation of complainant’s person and honor.” (Italics supplied)
father and the mother of the child, that both father and mother were
Thirdly, the baptismal certificate (Exh. “D”) of petitioner Claro naming private
respondent as his father has scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that present?
private respondent participated in its preparation. On this score, we held A Yes.
in Berciles vs. Systems, et al. 128 SCRA 53 (1984):
Q Would you able to recognize the father and the mother who were present
“As to the baptismal certificate, Exh. “7-A”, the rule is that although the baptismal record of
a natural child describes her as a child of the decedent, yet, if in the preparation of the at that time?
record the decedent had no intervention, the baptismal record cannot be held to be a
A Yes.
voluntary recognition of parentage. x x x The reason for this rule that canonical records do
not constitute the authentic document prescribed by Arts. 115 and 117 to prove the Q Please point to the court?
legitimate filiation of a child is that such canonical record is simply proof of the only act to
A There (witness pointing to the defendant, Carlito Fernandez).
which the priest may certify by reason of his personal knowledge, an act done by himself or
in his presence, like the administration of the sacrament upon a day stated; it is no proof of Q For instance, just give us more specifically what question do you
the declarations in the record with respect to the parentage of the child baptized, or of prior
remember having asked him?
and distinct facts which require separate and concrete evidence.”
In Macandang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980), we also ruled that while A Yes, like for example, ‘do you renounce Satan and his works?’
baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as Q What was the answer of Fernandez?
evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They
A Yes, I do.
are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with
respect to the child’s paternity. Q I just want to be sure, Father, will you please look at the defendant again.
Fourth, the certificates of live birth (Exh. “A”, Exh. “B”) of the petitioners I want to be sure if he is the person who appeared before you on that
identifying private respondent as their father are not also competent evidence on
occasion?
the issue of their paternity. Again, the records do not show that private
respondent had a hand in the preparation of said certificates. In rejecting these A I am sure.”
certificates, the ruling of the respondent court is in accord with our (TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 14-16)
pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar, 102 Phil. 1050(1958), viz:
However, on cross examination, Father Fernandez admitted that he has to be We shall not pass upon the correctness of the ruling of the respondent
shown a picture of the private respondent by Violeta Esguerra to recognize the appellate court applying the doctrine of res judicata as additional reason in
private respondent, viz: dismissing petitioners’ action for recognition and support. It is unnecessary
138 considering our findings that petitioners’ evidence failed to substantiate their
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED cause of action.
139
Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals
VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 18, 1994 139
“Q When was the, approximately, when you were first shown this picture
People vs. Bostre
by Violeta Esguerra? IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED and the Decision of the
A I cannot recall. respondent court CA-G.R. CV No. 29182 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
Q At least the month and the year? SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
A It must be in 1986. Petition dismissed; Reviewed decision affirmed.
Q What month in 1986? Notes.—The Department of Social Services and Development cannot enforce
A It is difficult. . . the criminal sanctions of Presidential Decree No. 603 (Dempsey vs. Regional Trial
Court, 164 SCRA 384 [1988]).
Q When was the first time you know you are going to testify here? A paramour is one who loves or is loved illicitly. One taking the place without
A Let us see, you came there two times and first one was you want to get a the legal rights of the husband or wife. A mistress; called also lover (People vs.
baptismal certificate and then the second time was I asked you for what Quizada, 160 SCRA 516 [1988]).
is this? And you said it is for the court.
——o0o——
Q On the second time that Ms. Violeta Esguerra went to your place, you
were already informed that you will testify here before this Honorable © Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
Court?
A Yes.
Q And you were shown this picture?
A Yes.
Q And you were informed by this Ms. Violeta Esguerra that this man
wearing the blue T-shirt is the father?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, it was Violeta Esguerra who . . .
A Yes.”
(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 18 to 22)
Indeed, there is no proof that Father Fernandez is a close friend of Violeta
Esguerra and the private respondent which should render unquestionable his
identification of the private respondent during petitioner Claro’s baptism. In the
absence of this proof, we are not prepared to concede that Father Fernandez who
officiates numerous baptismal ceremonies day in and day out can remember the
parents of the children he has baptized.
We cannot also disturb the findings of the respondent court on the credibility
of Violeta Esguerra. Her testimony is highly suspect as it is self-serving and by
itself, is insufficient to prove the paternity of the petitioners.
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 483 Accused-appellant Constable Moreno L. Tumimpad and co-accused Constable
Ruel C. Prieto were charged with the crime of rape committed against a 15-year
People vs. Tumimpad old Mongoloid child in a complaint dated on May 24, 1991, signed by her mother,
G.R. No. 109144. August 19, 1994. * Mrs. Pastora L. Salcedo, which reads:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MORENO L. That during the period between the last week of March 1989 and the first week of April
TUMIMPAD, accused-appellant. 1989, in Barangay Lower Lamac, Oroquieta City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
Rape; Evidence; Blood Test; Paternity; Blood test is adduced to show that the alleged this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
father or any one of many others of the same blood type may be the father of the child, but the feloniously, have (sic) carnal knowledge with Sandra Salcedo, complainant’s daughter, a
culpability of the alleged rapist is mainly established by the testimonial evidence of the woman who is a mongoloid and so weak of mind and in intellect as to be capable of giving
victim herself and her witnesses.—Accused-appellant simplistically and quite erroneously rational and legal consent. 1
argues that his conviction was based on the medical finding that he and the victim have the Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and
same blood type “O.” Accused-appellants’ culpability was established mainly by testimonial due trial ensued.
evidence given by the victim herself and her relatives. The blood test was adduced as The facts as established by evidence are as follows:
evidence only to show that the alleged father or any one of many others of the same blood Sandra Salcedo at the time of the incident was a 15-year old Mongoloid and
type may have been the father of the child. daughter of Lt. Col. Teofisto Salcedo and Pastora Salcedo. She had a mind of a
Same; Same; Same; Same; Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of five-year old child, who still needed to be fed and dressed up. Her vocabulary was
blood samples of the mother, the child, and the alleged father, it can be established limited and most of the time she expressed herself by motions.
conclusively that the man is not the father of a particular child.—As held by this Col. Teofisto Salcedo was then Provincial Commander of Misamis Occidental.
Court in Janice Marie Jao vs. Court of Appeals:Paternity—Science has Four security men were assigned to him, two of whom were accused Constable
demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the mother, the child, and Ruel Prieto and accused-appellant Moreno Tumimpad.
the alleged father, it can be established conclusively that the man is not the The Salcedo family, composed of Col. Salcedo, his wife Pastora, his son
father of a particular child. But group blood testing cannot show only a possibility Alexander and wife and daughter Sandra, lived in a two-storey officers’ quarters
that he is. Statutes in many states, and courts in others, have recognized the inside Camp Lucas Naranjo, Provincial Headquarters, in Oroquieta City. The
value and the limitations of such tests. Some of the decisions have recognized the upper storey of the house was occupied by Col. Salcedo, his wife and Sandra while
conclusive presumption of non-paternity where the results of the test, made in the the
prescribed manner, show the impossibility of the alleged paternity. This is one of _______________
the few cases in which the judgment of the Court may scientifically be completely
accurate, and intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred where the finding 1Records, p. 2.
is allowed to turn on oral testimony conflicting with the results of the test. The 485
findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the fact of paternity as VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 485
they show only a possibility that the alleged father or any one of many others People vs. Tumimpad
with the same blood type may have been the father of the child.
lower storey had two (2) rooms, one of which was occupied by the four security
men and the other by Alexander Salcedo and his wife.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Br. 14. It was on August 7, 1989, when Sandra complained of constipation. Mrs.
Salcedo then brought her to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a checkup. Medication
_______________
was given to Sandra but her condition did not improve. Sandra became irritable
and moody. She felt sick and unhappy.
*FIRST DIVISION.
484 The following day, August 8, 1989, Sandra saw Moreno Tumimpad coming out
from the kitchen and told her mother, “Mama, patayin mo 'yan, bastos.” 2
487
During the investigation conducted by the CIS, about thirty (30) pictures of
different persons were laid on the table and VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 487
_______________ People vs. Tumimpad
Center showed that Jacob Salcedo has a type “O” blood, Sandra Salcedo type “B,”
T.S.N., August 1, 1991, p. 9.
accused Ruel Prieto type “A” and accused-appellant type “O.”
2
486
crime charged but acquitted the other accused, Ruel Prieto, on reasonable doubt,
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED stating that he “has a different type of blood with (sic) the child Jacob Salcedo as
People vs. Tumimpad his type of blood is “A,” while that of child Jacob Salcedo is type “O.”
Sandra was asked to pick up the pictures of her assailants. Sandra singled out the The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
pictures of Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. Later, Sandra was brought out of
7
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused, PO1 Moreno Tumimpad,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, as charged in the information, and
the investigation room to a police line-up of ten people, including Moreno
pursuant to the provisions of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, there
Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. She was again asked to point to her assailants. being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime,
Without hesitation, Sandra fingered Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. 8
said accused Moreno Tumimpad is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
Mrs. Pastora Salcedo testified that she requested her two-daughters-in-law, PERPETUA; to indemnify the offended girl, Sandra Salcedo, in the amount of P20,000.00;
Joy Salcedo and Celsa Salcedo, to ask Sandra the identity of the persons who and to suffer the other accessory penalties provided for by laws; and to pay the costs of the
sexually molested her. 9 proceedings.
Joy confirmed in her testimony that she asked Sandra who sexually molested On reasonable doubt, accused Ruel Prieto is hereby declared ACQUITTED from the
her. Sandra revealed that Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto were the ones who charge.
SO ORDERED.
raped her. Sandra demonstrated how she was raped. First, her thighs were
13
demonstrated how she was sexually abused by the two accused, including the way 1. 1.The lower court erred in not appreciating the impossibility of
her nipples were touched saying “dito hawak,” and holding her breasts to committing the offense charged without detection.
emphasize. She likewise went through the motion of removing her panty, uttering 2. 2.The lower court erred in convicting the accused-appellant based on
at the same time “hubad panty.” major blood grouping test known as ABO and RHS test, not a paternal
Sandra identified in open court accused Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto as test known as chromosomes or HLA test.
the persons who raped her and said she wished them dead, as they did something
bad to her. She once again demonstrated how she was sexually abused. She held
11
The appeal is devoid of merit.
her two thighs with her two hands next to her sexual organ saying, “panty” and Accused-appellant argues that it was impossible for him to have committed
then placed her hand on her breast and gestured as if she were sucking. She also the crime of rape because most of the time he
touched her private organ and made a push and pull movement. 12 _______________
Rollo, p. 23.
13 TSN, August 1, 1991, pp. 6, 10.
14
488 Id., p. 6.
15
489
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
VOL. 235, AUGUST 489
People vs. Tumimpad
19, 1994
and his co-accused Ruel Prieto were together with Col. Salcedo on inspection
tours while the victim was always in the company of her mother. He further People vs. Tumimpad
contends that it was likewise impossible for Sandra, if she had really been
Q What part of the ground floor she used (sic) to
molested, not to have shouted out of pain, she being a virgin. As if adding insult
to injury, accused-appellant suggests that it was Sandra’s brother, Cristopher stay?
Salcedo, allegedly a drug user, who could have raped her. A Because she is found (sic) of music she stay in the
We are not convinced.
living room.
It is true that the accused usually went with Col. Salcedo during inspection
tours but sometimes they were left behind and would play pingpong or card Q Did she has (sic) any playmates?
games with Sandra at the ground floor of the house. While Sandra was always A Moreno and Prieto.
with her mother, there were times when she was left alone in the house with the
Q Have you seen actually the 2 accused playing with
accused. 14
Q How many security men remain if you can recall when your husband A Yes, playing pingpong and playing cards. 16
part (sic) and did a push and pull movement and she cried.
x x x
Q When you said that there was a push and pull movement of the body and
“Q By the say, (sic) Mrs. Salcedo, you said a while ago when you were at
when this was being done did you feel pain?
the headquarters you were able to do your choirs, (sic) doing laundry
A Yes pain.
jobs in the second storey of your house. Do you know where is your
Q What part of your body is painful?
daughter Sandra at that time?
RECORD:
A Yes, she spent her time at the second floor.
_______________ The witness touching her private parts.
Q Did you also see blood on your sexual organ? Q When (sic) Moreno and Ruel are inside the courtroom now, can you
A Yes. point to them?
Q Where did you see these blood? A Yes.
_______________
Q Will you please point to them?
Id., pp. 10-11.
16 PROS. RAMOS:
490
May we request the accused to stand up your honor?
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
RECORD:
People vs. Tumimpad
Both accused stood up from where they were sitting inside the
RECORD:
courtroom.
The witness touching her private parts.
PROS. RAMOS:
Q When this push and pull movement was being made, did you see a
Who is that person (prosecutor Ramos point to accused Moreno
man’s organ?
Tumimpad?
A Yes sir.
A Moreno.
Q Where did you see this male organ? 491
A Yes. Melinda Joy Salcedo, the victim’s sister-in-law, testified that Sandra
demonstrated to her how she was ravished by the two accused, thus:
Q What part of your house did Moreno and Ruel remove your panty?
Q Now, will you please tell us what did Sandra Salcedo told (sic) you as to
A Downstairs Moreno and Ruel remove panty.
how she was abused?
Q What part of the ground floor, was it outside or inside the room?
A By what she had stated there were also actions that she made.
A In the room.
Q Will you please demonstrate to this Honorable Court how did Sandra thigh.
Salcedo was abused as narrated or demonstrated to you by Sandra Q What else had transpired next?
Salcedo? A No more.
A According to her she was held in her thigh and then she was hugged and Q Now, whenever Sandra Salcedo mentioned the names of accused
then the panty was taken off and making a push and pull movement Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto, have you ob served whose names
(witness demonstration by holding her thigh? was usually mentioned first by Sandra Salcedo?
Q Now, after Sandra Salcedo told you and demonstrated to you how she was A She mentioned first the name of Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel.
abused. What else did Sandra Salcedo tell you if she had told you any Q And what happened after that?
more matter? A I informed my mother-in-law of what Sandra Salcedo had told us.
A She did not say anything more. Q When did you tell your mother-in-law about what Sandra Salcedo told
Q Now, when Sandra Salcedo refused to talk or say anything else. What you and Celsa?
happened next? A That very evening sir. 18
A Then it was Celsa who asked her. Accused-appellant simplistically and quite erroneously argues that his conviction
was based on the medical finding that he and the victim have the same blood type
Q Where were you when Celsa asked Sandra Salcedo? “O.”
A I was just beside her. Accused-appellants’ culpability was established mainly by testimonial
Q You said that after Sandra Salcedo refused to talk, Celsa did the evidence given by the victim herself and her relatives. The blood test was adduced
as evidence only to show that the alleged father or any one of many others of the
questioning, did you hear the question being asked by Celsa to Sandra same blood type may have been the father of the child. As held by this Court
Salcedo? in Janice Marie Jao vs. Court of Appeals: 19
_______________
A Yes.
_______________
Id., pp. 9-11.
18
———o0o———
494
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
evidence submitted in the action for compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet the
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph.
Ilano vs. Court of Appeals 244
243
present case, petitioner is obliged to recognize Merciditas as his spurious child. This
was
provision should be read in conjunction with Article 289 of the Civil Code which provides: ________________
“Art. 289. Investigation of the paternity or maternity of (other illegitimate) children x x x is
permitted under the circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284.” 1Exhs. “A,” “A-1,” “A-2,” “A-3” and “A-4”.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Last paragraph of Art. 283 of the Civil Code 245
permits hearsay and reputation evidence with respect to illegitimate children.—The last
paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that practically covers all the other VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 23, 1994 245
cases in the preceding paragraphs. “Any other evidence or proof that the defendant is the Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
father is broad enough to render unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. When the
provided also by Melencio with a maid by the name of Nena. Petitioner used to morning of December 30, 1963. Petitioner arrived after five o’clock in the
give her P700.00 a month for their expenses at home. afternoon. When the nurse came to inquire about the child, Leoncia was still
In June, 1962, Leoncia, who was conceiving at that time, was fetched by unconscious so it was from petitioner that the nurse sought the information.
petitioner and they transferred to San Juan St., Pasay City. In October, 1962, she Inasmuch as it was already past seven o’clock in the evening, the nurse promised
delivered a still-born female child at the Manila Sanitarium. The death certificate to return the following morning for his signature. However, he left an instruction
was signed by petitioner. Thereafter, while they were living at Highway 54,
2 to give the birth certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving early
Makati, private respondent Merciditas S. llano was born on December 30, 1963 the following morning.
also at the Manila Sanitarium. Her birth was recorded as Merciditas de los Prior to the birth of Merciditas, Elynia used to accompany her aunt and
Santos llano, child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz sometimes with petitioner in his car to the Manila Sanitarium for prenatal check-
Ilano. Leoncia submitted receipt issued by the Manila Sanitarium to show that
3 up. At times, she used to go to his office at 615 Sales St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, upon
she was confined there from December 30, 1963 until January 2, 1964 under the his instructions to get money as support and sometimes he would send notes of
name Mrs. Leoncia llano. 4 explanation if he cannot come which she in turn gave to her aunt. They stayed at
15
The support by petitioner for Leoncia and Merciditas was sometimes in the 112 Arellano St., then at Sta. Cruz, Manila in 1966 before they finally transferred
form of cash personally delivered by him, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (niece of to Gagalangin in 1967. Petitioner lived with them up to June, 1971 when he
Leoncia) or thru Merciditas herself; and sometimes in the form of a check like
5 6 stopped coming home.
Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532, the signature appearing thereon
7 Petitioner’s defense was a total and complete denial of any relationship with
having been identified by Leoncia as that of petitioner because he often gives her Leoncia and Merciditas. He disowned the handwritten answers and signatures
checks which he issues at home and saw him sign the checks. Both petitioner and
8 opposite column 16 of the death
his daughter admitted that the check and signature are those of the former. 9
________________
During the time that petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband and wife,
he showed concern as the father of Merciditas. When Merciditas was in Grade I at TSN, July 18, 1973, p. 57; TSN, October 1, 1973, p. 28.
11
the St. Joseph Parochial School, he signed her Report Card for the fourth and TSN, October 18, 1974.
13
fifth grading periods as her parent. Those signatures were both identified by
10
Exh. “1.”
14
Leoncia and Merciditas because he signed them at Exhs. “E,” “E-1” “E-2,” “E-3” and “E-4”.
15
________________ 247
246
signature is his. He was sick on December 30, 1963 and was hospitalized on
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED January 7, 1964. He does not understand why this case was filed against him.
16 17
Ilano vs. Court of Appeals Melencio admitted that he was the one who procured the apartment for
their residence in their presence and of Elynia. Since Merciditas started to have
11 Leoncia, leased it in his name, paid the rentals and bought the necessities
discernment, he was already the one whom she recognized as her Daddy. He 12 therefor. He and Leoncia lived together and shared the same bed. They later
treated her as a father would to his child. He would bring home candies, toys, and transferred to San Juan St., Pasay City and to Highway 54, Makati. He stopped
anything a child enjoys. He would take her for a drive, eat at restaurants, and visiting her in March or April, 1963 because he planned to get married with
even cuddle her to sleep. 13 another which he eventually did in September, 1963.
When petitioner ran as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite, he gave Diosdado Datu, fish vendor, usually delivered to the apartment fishes ordered
Leoncia his picture with the following dedication: “To Nene, with best regards, by Melencio which were received by Leoncia.
Temiong.” 14 Nilda llano Ramos, daughter of petitioner, does not know Leoncia; neither has
In May, 1963, Ruth Elynia Mabanglo, niece of Leoncia, lived with Leoncia and she been brought to their family home in Imus, Cavite, On December 30, 1963,
petitioner. She accompanied her aunt when she started having labor pains in the her father was at their home because he got sick on December 25, 1963 and was
advised to have a complete bed rest. Her father was hospitalized on January 7, recognized illegitimate child of defendant ARTEMIO G. ILANO with all the rights
1964. She denied that her father was at the Manila Sanitarium on December 30, appurtenant to such status.
1963; that he fetched a certain woman on January 2, 1964, at the Manila Defendant is directed to pay the plaintiff support in arrears at the rate of EIGHT
HUNDRED (P800.00) PESOS a month from the date of the filing of the complaint on
Sanitarium because he was at their home at that time, and that her father lived
August 16, 1972 up to August 15, 1975; ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS a month
with a certain woman in 1963 up to June, 1971 because all this time he was living from August 16, 1975 to August 15, 1978; ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
with them in Imus, Cavite. He was working and reporting to the office everyday _______________
and when he goes to Guagua or Manila on business, her mother or brother goes
with him. 18 Records, p. 693.
249
Victoria J. llano, petitioner’s wife, further corroborated the previous
testimonies about petitioner’s sickness on December 30, 1963 and hospitalization VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 23, 1994 249
on January 7, 1964. It could not be true that her husband, during the years 1963 Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
to 1968, lived three (3) (P1,300.00) PESOS a month from August 18, 1978 to August 15, 1981; and ONE
________________
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P1,500.00) a month from August 16, 1981 up to the time
she reached the age of majority on December 30, 1984.
TSN, October 9, 1978, p. 13.
16
Defendant is further ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney’s
TSN, December 11, 1978, p. 25.
fees plus the costs.
17
248
SO ORDERED.” 19
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED The motion for reconsideration was denied in the resolution dated February 26,
Ilano vs. Court of Appeals 1992. 20
times a week with a certain Leoncia de los Santos because her husband never Hence, the present petition.
slept out of their house and that in his capacity as President and Chairman of the We shall resolve the following pertinent errors allegedly committed by
Board of the Filipinas Telephone Company he does not go to Guagua even once a respondent court:
year because they have a branch manager, Melencio Reyes.
After weighing the contradictory testimonies and evidence of the parties, the 1. 1)in awarding “back support” even in the absence of recognition or of a
trial court was not fully satisfied that petitioner is the father of Merciditas, on the judgment declaring petitioner father of Merciditas with finality;
basis of the following: 2. 2)in not ruling that an adulterous child cannot file an action for
recognition; and
1. 1)petitioner and Leoncia were not in cohabitation during the period of 3. 3)in deciding matters of substance manifestly against established
Merciditas’ conception; decisions of this Court.
2. 2)testimony of Melencio that he frequented the apartment where Leoncia
was living, took care of all the bills and shared the same bed with her; Petitioner argues that since the complaint against him has been dismissed by the
3. 3)the birth certificate of Merciditas was not signed by petitioner; trial court, therefore, there was absolutely no obligation on his part to give
4. 4)petitioner denied his signature in the monthly report card of support to Merciditas. It would have been only from the date of the judgment of
Merciditas; and the trial court that support should have commenced, if so granted. Under the law
5. 5)there is no clear and sufficient showing that support was given by in force when the complaint was filed, an adulterous child cannot maintain an
petitioner to Merciditas. action for compulsory recognition. In order that the birth certificate may
constitute a voluntary recognition, it must be signed by the father. Equivocal act,
Thus, it rendered judgment on April 4, 1981 dismissing the complaint. 18
such as signing under the caption “parent” in the report card, is not sufficient.
Fortunately for private respondent, respondent Court of Appeals did not share Merciditas has never been to the family home of petitioner at Imus, Cavite; nor
the same view as the trial court. A review of the testimonial and documentary introduced to his family; nor brought around town by him, treated as his child,
evidence adduced by private respondent led respondent court to the firm introduced to other people as his child, led people to believe that she was part of
conclusion that petitioner is her father, entitling her to support. The dispositive his family.
portion of its decision dated December 17, 1991 reads: The petition utterly lacks merit.
“WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and judgment is hereby Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegiti-
________________
rendered declaring plaintiff MERCEDITAS S. ILANO as the duly acknowledged and
Rollo, p. 55.
19
2. (2)When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged
Rollo, p. 58.
20
father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
250 3. (3)When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED the supposed father;
4. (4)When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
Ilano vs. Court of Appeals father.”
mate children or those who are conceived and born out of wedlock were generally
classified into two groups: (1) Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were those
While the aforementioned provision speaks of the obligation of the father to
born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the
recognize the child as his natural child, for the purpose of the present case,
child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (Article 119,
petitioner is obliged to recognize Merciditas as his spurious child. This provision
old Civil Code; Article 269, new Civil Code) and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous,
should be read in conjunction with Article 289 of the Civil Code which provides:
adulterous or illicit, were those born of parents who, at the time of conception, “ART. 289. Investigation of the paternity or maternity of (other illegitimate) children x x x is
were disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal permitted under the circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284.”
impediments. Since petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the time
21
In reversing the decision of the trial court, respondent court found, as it is
Merciditas was conceived, she is a spurious child. In this regard, Article 287 of
22
likewise our finding, that private respondent’s evidence to establish her filiation
the Civil Code provides that illegitimate children other than natural in with and the paternity of petitioner is too overwhelming to be ignored or brushed
accordance with Article 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction are
23
aside by the highly improbable and fatally flawed testimony of Melencio and the
entitled to support and such successional rights as are granted in the Civil Code. inherently weak denials of petitioner:
The Civil Code has given these rights to them because the transgressions of social “Significantly, the Court a quo believed that plaintiff’s mother and defendant carried an
conventions committed by the parents should not be visited upon them. They intimate relations. It nonetheless was not
were born with a social handicap and the law should help them to surmount the _______________
26 Castro, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., supra, citing Alabat v. Vda. de Alabat, 21 SCRA 1479 [1967]; Mise v.
before Article 287 can be availed of, there must first be a recognition of Rodriguez, 95 Phil. 396 [1954]; Magallanes, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 795 [1954]; Canales v. Arrogante, et
paternity either voluntarily or by court action. This arises from the legal
25 al., 91 Phil. 6 [1952]; Malonda v. Malonda, 81 Phil. 149 [1948]; Buenaventura v. Urbano, et al., 5 Phil. 1 [1905]; and Reyes
v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985].
principle that an unrecognized spurious child like a natural child has no rights 252
from his parents or to their estate because his rights spring not from the filiation
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
or blood relationship but from his acknowledgement by the parent. In other
words, the rights of an illegitimate child arose not because he was the true or real Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
child of his parents but because satisfied that defendant is the father of the plaintiff because it is not convinced that her
________________ mother and defendant were in cohabitation during the period of her conception, and took
into account the testimony of Melencio S. Reyes who frequented the apartment where
Castro, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 50974-75, May 31, 1989, 173 SCRA 656.
21 Leoncia de los Santos was living and who positively testified that he took care of all the bills
TSN, March 5, 1979, p. 6.
22
and that he shared the same bed with plaintiff’s mother.
ART. 269. x x x. Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
23
The court a quo completely ignored the fact that the apartment at Guagua was rented
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural. by the defendant, and that Melencio Reyes, who was a mere employee and godson of the
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines by Arturo M. Tolentino, 1983
defendant with a monthly salary of P560.00 was a mere subaltern of the latter, and only
24
Melencio (TSN, pp. 3-4, 1/25/74). The apartment in Guagua was rented in the name of
relevant law on the matter is Article 283 of the Civil Code, which provides: Melencio. As Leoncia does not speak the Pampango dialect (TSN, p. 50, 8/18/73), Artemio
“ART. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his
gave Leoncia the instruction to call upon Melencio for whatever Leoncia needs (TSN, pp. 11-
natural child:
12, 1/25/74). Thus, it was Melencio who procured all the supplies and services needed in the
apartment for which procurement Melencio gives to Leoncia the corresponding receipts of
1. (1)In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense payment for liquidations of cash advances Artemio or the Guagua Telephone System or
coincides more or less with that of the conception;
Leoncia herself, gives to Melencio (Exh. A, A-1 to 14; TSN, p. 32, 8/13/73; TSN, pp. 7, 12 and 254
14, 1/25/74). 254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
At the Guagua apartment, Artemio would visit Leoncia three or four times a week and
sleeps there (TSN, p. 47, 8/13/73). Artemio was giving Leoncia an allowance of P700.00 a Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
month (TSN, p. 38, 7/18/73). Leoncia got pregnant and Artemio found it difficult to commute “The address ‘Ne’ in the beginning of these notes refer to Leoncia whose nickname is ‘Nene’
between Cavite and Guagua so that in June 1962, Artemio transferred but which Artemio shortens to ‘Ne’. Miling is the nickname of Melencio. The ‘Gracing”
Leoncia to Calle San Juan, Pasay City (TSN, pp. 19-20, 7/18/73) where they were known mentioned in Exh. ‘F-1’ refer to Gracia delos Santos, a sister-in-law of Leoncia who was with
as husband and wife (id. p. 41). In leaving Guagua for San Juan, Pasay City, Leoncia was Artemio when Leoncia was removed from the hospital during the birth of Merciditas.’ (pp.
fetched by Artemio in a car driven by Artemio himself. (pp. 9-11, Appellant’s Brief) 17-19, Appellant’s Brief). These tiny bits of evidence when pieced together ineluctably gives
Even as Artemio and Leoncia lived and transferred to several places heretofore lie to defendant’s diversionary pretense that it was with Melencio S. Reyes with whom the
mentioned, Melencio continued to be a trusted man Friday of Artemio who would deliver mother lived with during her period of conception.
notes (Exh. “F”, “F-1” and “F-3”) and money from Artemio to Leoncia. For reference, among The attempt of Melencio S. Reyes to show that he was the lover of Leoncia being in the
the notes identified by Leoncia as having come from defendant were the following: apartment and sharing together the same bedroom and the same bed hardly inspires belief.
253 xxx xxx x x x.
VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 23, 1994 253 Undoubtedly, the role played by Melencio S. Reyes in the relationship between Leoncia
and appellant (sic) was that of a man Friday although appellant (sic) would not trust him to
Ilano vs. Court of Appeals the hilt and unwittingly required him to submit to Leoncia an accounting of his
‘Exh. “F-1” expenditures (Exhs. A, A-1 to A-14) for cash advances given to him by Leoncia, Artemio or
Guagua Telephone System which would not have been the case, if it were true that there
‘Dear Ne, was an intimate relationship between him and plaintiff’s mother.
Evidently, following the instruction of his employer and Godfather, Melencio foisted on
the court a quo the impression that he was the lover and paramour of Leoncia but since
Magsimula akong makausap ni Gracing ay nagkaroon ako ng diferencia sa paa at ngayon ay
there was really no such relationship, he could not state the place in San Juan or Highway
masakit pa.
54 where he took Leoncia, nor how long they stayed there belying his pretence (sic) of an
‘Si Miling ay ngayon lamang nakarating dito kung hindi ka aalis diyan ay si Miling na
intimate relationship with piaintiff’s mother.”
lamang and utusan mo sa Makati kung may kailangan ka dian.
27
Sgn.’ Having discredited the testimonies of petitioner and Melencio, respondent court
‘Mayroon akong nakitang bahay na mayayari malapit sa municipio ng Makati. then applied paragraph (2) of Article 283:
Ipakikita ko sa iyo kung papayag ka. The court a quo did not likewise consider the evidence as sufficient to establish that plaintiff
‘Sabihin mo kay Miling kung hindi ka aalis diyan bukas ay pupunta ako. was in continuous possession of status of a child in view of the denial by appellee of his
‘Walang makitang bahay sa San Juan. paternity, and there is no clear and sufficient evidence that the support was really given to
Sgn.’ plaintiff’s mother. The belated denial of paternity after the action has been filed against the
putative father is not the denial that would destroy the paternity of the child which had
already been recognized by defendant by various positive acts clearly evidencing that he is
Exh. “F-2”
plaintiff’s father. A recognition once validly made is irrevocable. It cannot be withdrawn. A
mere change of mind would be incompatible with the
‘Ne, sa Viernes ay pupunta ako dian marami akong ginagawa. _______________
Sgn.’
27 Rollo, pp. 43-49.
Exh. “F-3” 255
father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal Granting ex gratia argumenti that private respondent’s evidence is not sufficient
affection and care. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 1983 ed., p. 602). proof of continuous possession of status of a spurious child, respondent court
(Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86302, September 24, 1991.) applied next paragraph (4) of Article 283:
It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of Merceditas (sic) at the Manila “x x x plaintiff’s testimonial and documentary evidence x x x (is) too replete with details that
Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior to the delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal examination are coherent, logical and natural which cannot be categorized as mere fabrications of an
accompanied by Artemio (TSN, p. 33, 5/17/74). After delivery, they went home to their inventive and malicious mind of which Leoncia de los Santos was not shown to possess.
residence at EDSA in a car owned and driven by Artemio himself (id. p. 36). _______________
Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of ‘Ilano’ since birth without any objection on the part
of Artemio, the fact that since Merceditas (sic) had her discernment she had always known Rollo, pp. 50-53.
28
and called Artemio as her ‘Daddy’ (TSN, pp. 28-29, 10/18/74); the fact that each time 257
Artemio was at home, he would play with Merceditas (sic), take her for a ride or restaurants
to eat, and sometimes sleeping with Merceditas (sic) (id. p. 34) and does all what a father VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 23, 1994 257
should do for his child—bringing home goodies, candies, toys and whatever he can bring her Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
which a child enjoys which Artemio gives to Merceditas (sic) (TSN, pp. 38-39, 5/17/74) are The natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff from the genesis of the relationship
positive evidence that Merceditas (sic) is the child of Artemio and recognized by Artemio as between Leoncia and appellee, their living together as husband and wife in several places,
such. Special attention is called to Exh. “E-7” where Artemio was telling Leoncia the need the birth of the first still-born child, the circumstances of plaintiff’s birth, the act of appellee
for a ‘frog test’ to know the status of Leoncia. in recognizing and supporting plaintiff, find ample support from the testimonial and
Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) was documentary evidence which leaves no room to reasonably doubt his paternity which may
sometimes in the form of cash personally delivered to her by Artemio, thru Melencio, thru not be infirmed by his belated denials.
Elynia (Exhs. “E-2” and “E-3”, and “D-6”), or thru Merceditas (sic) herself (TSN, p. 40, Notably, the court a quo did not consider plaintiff’s evidence as lacking in credibility but
5/17/74) and sometimes in the form of a check as the Manila Banking Corporation Check did not deem them as convincing proof that defendant is the father since the Certificate of
No. 81532 (Exh. “G”) and the signature appearing therein which live Birth was not signed by appellee and since the monthly report card is not sufficient to
256
establish recognition, considering the denial of the defendant of his signature appearing
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED thereon.
While defendant’s signature does not appear in the Certificate of Live Birth, the
Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
evidence indubitably disclose(s) that Leoncia gave birth on December 30, 1963 to Merceditas
was identified by Leoncia as that of Artemio because Artemio often gives her checks and (sic) at 4:27 p.m. at the Manila Sanitarium. Artemio arrived at about 5:00 (TSN, p. 25,
Artemio would write the check at home and saw Artemio sign the check (TSN, p. 49, 5/17/74). At about 7:00 p.m., a nurse came (id., p. 26) who made inquiries about the biodata
7/18/73). Both Artemio and Nilda admitted that the check and signature were those of of the born child. The inquiries were directed to Artemio in the presence of Elynia who
Artemio (TSN, p. 53, 10/17/77; TSN, p. 19, 10/9/78). heard the answers of Artemio which the nurse took down in a sheet of paper (id. p. 28). The
During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, Artemio inquiries were about the name of the father, mother and child. After the interview the nurse
has shown concern as the father of Merceditas (sic). When Merceditas (sic) was in Grade 1 told them that the information has to be recorded in the formal form and has to be signed by
at the St. Joseph Parochial School, Artemio signed the Report Card of Merceditas (sic) (Exh. Artemio (id., p. 30) but because there is no office, as it was past 7:00 p.m. the nurse would
“H”) for the fourth and fifth grading period(s) (Exh. “H-1” and “H-2”) as the parent of just return in the morning for Artemio’s signature. Artemio gave the instruction to the
Merceditas (sic). Those signatures of Artemio where both identified by Leoncia and nurse to give the biodata to Leoncia for her signature as he was leaving very early the
Merceditas (sic) because Artemio signed Exh. “H-1” and “H-2” at their residence in the following morning as in fact Artemio left at 5:00 a.m. of December 31, 1963 (id. p. 33).
presence of Leoncia, Merceditas (sic) and of Elynia (TSN, p. 57, 7/18/73; TSN, p. 28, 10/1/73). Artemio stayed in the hospital in the evening of December 30, 1963 (id. p. 26). As pointed
x x x. out in Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656:
xxx xxx x x x. ‘The ruling in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila(102 Phil. 1050 [1958] and Berciles v. Government
When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite Artemio gave Service Insurance System (128 SCRA 53 [1984]) that if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the
Leoncia his picture with the following dedication: To Nene, with best regards, Temiong”. placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity
(Exh. “1”). (pp. 19-20, Appellant’s Brief) does not apply to this case because it was Eustaquio himself who went to the municipal building and gave
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the totality of all the data about his daughter’s birth. x x x.’
the evidence indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The entry in x x x the totality of the evidence, as pointed to above, is more than sufficient to establish
the Certificate of Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated therein as married beyond reasonable doubt that appellee is the father of the plaintiff Merceditas (sic) Ilano.
does not mean that Leoncia is not appellee’s daughter. This particular entry was caused to 258
be made by Artemio himself in order to avoid embarrassment. 258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
It is difficult to believe that plaintiff’s mother, who is a mere dressmaker, had long
beforehand diabolically conceived of a plan to make it appear that defendant, who claims to Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
As elucidated in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, Supra:
xxx xxx xxx The other allegation of petitioner that the appeal was prosecuted almost ten
‘x x x although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find that she has nevertheless established that status by
years after the decision of the trial court was rendered does not deserve any
another method. consideration because it appears that it is being raised for the first time in this
‘What both the trial court and the respondent did not take into account is that an illegitimate child petition. 33
is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by “any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of
laws,” according to the Civil Code, x x x. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his Appeals dated December 17, 1991 and its resolution dated February 26, 1992 are
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under AFFIRMED.
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.’ ” 29
SO ORDERED.
The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that practically Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Padilla, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.
covers all the other cases in the preceding paragraphs. “Any other evidence or Petition denied; Assailed decision and resolution affirmed.
proof that the defendant is the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the ________________
other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for
compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet the requirements of the first three Rollo, pp. 54-55.
32
paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph. This paragraph 30
Cordero v. Cabral, G.R. No. 36789, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 532.
33
260
permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with
respect to illegitimate filiation. 31
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
As a necessary consequence of the finding that private respondent is the Gaco vs. National Labor Relations Commission
spurious child of petitioner, she is entitled to support. In awarding support to her, Notes.—The mother is in the best position to know whether petitioner was
respondent court took into account the following: really her son (Chua Keng Giap vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 158 SCRA
“The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a 18 [1988]).
right to recover the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the
Illegitimate children have rights of the same nature as legitimate and adopted
date of judicial
________________ children (Dempsey vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. LXXV, Olongapo City, 164 SCRA
384[1988]).
Rollo, pp. 49-50; 53-54.
29
Navarro v. Bacalla, G.R. No. 20607, October 14, 1965, 15 SCRA 114.
30
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines by Arturo M. Tolentino, 1983 Edition, pp.
31 ——o0o——
607-608.
259
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 23, 1994 259
Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
or extrajudicial demand. (Article 203, Family Code of the Philippines.)
The complaint in this case was filed on August 14, 1972. Plaintiff, having been born on
December 30, 1963, was about nine (9) years old at the time and was already of school age
spending about P400.00 to P500.00 a month for her school expenses alone, while defendant
was earning about P10,000.00 a month. She attained the age of majority on December 30,
1984 (Article 234, Supra). She is therefore entitled to support in arrears for a period of
twelve (12) years four (4) months and fourteen (14) days, which is hereby fixed at P800.00 a
month for the first three (3) years; and considering the declining value of the peso as well as
her needs as she grows older, at a graduated increase of P1,000.00 a month for the next
three (3) years; P1,300.00 a month for the succeeding three (3) years; and P1,500.00 a
month for the last three (3) years, four (4) months and fourteen (14) days until she attained
the age of majority.
This being an action for legal support, the award of attorney’s fees is appropriate under
Article 2208 (6) of the Civil Code. Moreover, the court deems it just and equitable under the
given facts and circumstances that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered.” 32
We concur with the foregoing disposition, in the absence of proof that it was
arrived at arbitrarily.
VOL. 232, JUNE 2, 1994 745
Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 86639. June 2, 1994. *
MA. THERESA R. ALBERTO, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, INTESTATE ESTATE OF JUAN M. ALBERTO and YOLANDA R. ALBERTO, respondents.
Family Relations; Filiation; Recognition; Illegitimate Children; Evidence; Hearsay Rule; Declaration against interest may be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.—The
testimony of Jose Tablizo established his recognition of Ma. Theresa Alberto as his daughter. He testified that Juan M. Alberto showed him two report cards of Ma. Theresa which showed
straight “A’s.” He said “Boy! Great!” and Juan M. Alberto said that those were the grades of his daughter. This testimony is now being discredited for being hearsay. This Court holds that the
same falls within the exceptions to the hearsay rule. Sec. 38, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides as follows: “Sec. 38. Declaration Against Interest.—The declaration made by a person
deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted at the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant’s own interest that a reasonable
man in his position would not have made his declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Failure to present relatives who could have negated petitioner’s testimony that she had been acknowledged by them as the eldest daughter of the deceased
gives rise to the presumption that their testimonies would be detrimental to the respondents had they been presented as witnesses.—As found by the trial court, recognition of petitioner’s status as a
natural daughter of Juan M. Alberto was made, not only by the latter, but by his relatives as well—Fr. Cipriano Arcilla, Jose Alberto, Aurita Solidum and Saturnina Alberto, among others.
Private respondent only had to present any one of those relatives to negate petitioner’s testimony that she had been acknowledged by them as the eldest daughter of the deceased. Her failure to
do so baffles this Court. If indeed Ma. Theresa Alberto were fabricating her testimony, the family of the deceased would have been more than willing to destroy the claims of an intruder. Under
the circumstances, it is safe for us to assume that had any of the relatives mentioned by petitioner been presented as witness for
_______________
*THIRD DIVISION.
746
ROMERO, J.:
When a putative father manifests openly through words and deeds his recognition of a child, the courts can do no less than confirm said acknowledgment. As the immortal
bard Shakespeare perspicaciously said: “Let your own discretion be your tutor; suit the action to the word, the word to the action.” Herein deceased father cannot possibly be
charged with indecisiveness or vacillation for he suited his action to his word and his word to his action.
In the instant case, we have, therefore, affirmed the decision of the probate court declaring petitioner as having acquired the status of a natural child of the deceased
Juan M. Alberto and, as such, entitled to participate in the latter’s, estate.
On September 18, 1953, a child named Ma. Theresa Alberto was born out of wedlock to one Aurora Reniva with Juan M. Alberto as the alleged father. Accordingly, she
used “Alberto” as her surname in all her school records and correspondences.
On September 18, 1967, Juan M. Alberto, felled by a bullet from an assassin’s gun, died intestate.
His widow, Yolanda R. Alberto, filed a petition for the administration of his estate on January 10, 1968. After the publication of notices, she was appointed as the
administratrix of the estate. After the Inventory and Appraisal and the Administratrix’ Accounting were approved on August 1, 1970 and on April 29, 1971 respectively, the
proceedings were ordered closed and terminated.
On September 15, 1978, Ma. Theresa Alberto filed a motion for leave to intervene as oppositor and to re-open the proceedings praying that she be declared to have
acquired the status of a natural child and as such, entitled to share in the estate of the deceased. The motion was granted by the probate court.
Upon the presentation by the parties of their respective evidence during the trial, the probate court was convinced that indeed, Ma. Theresa Alberto had been in
continuous possession of the status of a natural child. Thereupon, it rendered a decision compelling the decedent’s heirs and estate to recognize her as a natural daughter
and to allow her to participate in the estate proceedings. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
748
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of oppositor and against the estate of the deceased Juan M. Alberto—
1. (a)Declaring oppositor Ma. Theresa R. Alberto as having acquired the status of a natural child of the late Gov. Juan M. Alberto;
2. (b)Ordering the administratrix and widow of the deceased and their children, namely, Mary Joy, Maria Rebecca, Juan, Jr., Juan III, Maria Yolanda and Juan IV, all surnamed Alberto,
to recognize and acknowledge oppositor as an acknowledged natural child of the late Gov. Alberto;
3. (c)Declaring oppositor as one of the heirs of the late Gov. Juan M. Alberto;
4. (d)Ordering the administratrix to partition the deceased’s estate and turn over to oppositor her participation therein equivalent to one-half (1/2) of the share of each legitimate child;
and
5. (e)Ordering the administratrix to pay oppositor the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.
1. “1)In the case at bar, the Court believes, and so holds, that the oppositor has been in continuous possession of the status of a child of Juan Alberto by his direct acts
as well as the acts of his family, as follows:
1. (a)The deceased gave the oppositor sums of money for her schooling;
2. (b)The deceased made known to his friends and relatives that she was his daughter; and
3. (c)He made known to the personnel of the International School where oppositor was enrolled that she was his daughter.
1. 2)The following incidents would show the direct acts of the family of the deceased
1. (a)When the deceased’s younger sister, Mrs. Aurita Alberto Solidum asked that the oppositor be sent to her house in her Sunday best to meet her father for the first
time;
2. (b)When Fr. Arcilla brought the oppositor to the bedside of the deceased in the hospital and Fr. Arcilla asked the guard to give way to her as she was a member of
the family;
_______________
1. (c)When the step-mother of the deceased, during the wake, introduced the oppositor to her youngest sister as an elder sister.
1. 3)Prescinding from the foregoing, there is sufficient evidence to prove that the oppositor is the child of the deceased.
1. (a)Of an indiscretion that led to the conception of and giving birth to the oppositor;
2. (b)that Mrs. Aurita Solidum arranged the meeting between the oppositor and the deceased at the MOPC; (This particular testimony was corroborated by Cristeta
Andaya, former maid of Mrs. Solidum, and by the oppositor) and
3. (c)that Juan Alberto had been sending her money from time to time.
1. (a)She had her first meeting with her father at the MOPC where he gave her P500.00 personally and two telephone numbers where he could be contacted and
where they talked about her name, age and other matters.
2. (b)She had other meetings with her father at the MOPC on which occasions her father also gave her money.
3. (c)The deceased visited her two times at the International School whose rules on visitors were strict and when her father visited her, the secretary of the principal
told her that her father was waiting for her. This showed that the deceased had identified himself to the personnel of the school that he was the father of the
oppositor.
4. (d)He promised to see her in her school during her birthday on September 18, 1968 but was not able to do so because of his untimely death.
5. (e)The deceased promised to bring the oppositor to Catanduanes but failed likewise because of his death.
6. (f)When oppositor and her mother went to the PGH on the occasion of her father’s death, Fr. Arcilla held her by the hand and asked the guard to make way for her
because she was a child of Juan Alberto.
7. (g)After the wake for her deceased father, the deceased’s step-mother, Saturnina Alberto, introduced her as a sister to Joy Alberto her half-sister.
8. (h)Congressman Jose Alberto allowed her associates, upon her representations, to use the ballroom of the Regent of Manila for practice purposes. Congressman
Alberto was the
750
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
1. (a)There was a strong physical resemblance between the deceased and the oppositor.
2. (b)The deceased and the oppositor wrote similarly.
3. (c)It was known among the friends of the deceased, particularly the Breeze Gang, composed of the witness, Jose Tablizo, the deceased and 4 others.
4. (d)Sometime in 1967, the deceased showed him the report card of the Oppositor and beasted of her high grades.
5. (e)The friends of the deceased had a party in Virac, Catanduanes for the oppositor whom they considered as the deceased’s daughter. (This was corroborated by
Silverio Taberara.)
1. 4)Atty. Martiniano Vivo testified that Commissioner of Immigration Edmundo Reyes, as lawyer for the deceased, made an appointment with him (Atty. Vivo) for a
conference, at which they discussed the latter’s letter to the deceased regarding the oppositor. In said conference, Com. Reyes said that the deceased was not
denying that he was the father of the oppositor. And because of his marital status and the fact that he was a public official, he wanted to avoid public scandal with
the promise to support the oppositor quietly through a cousin, Fr. Arcilla.” 2
The Court of Appeals reversed the above decision of the probate court on the strength of the following observations:
“Assuming the foregoing to be true, we do not believe they satisfy the degree of proof to establish that oppositor was in continuous possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased.
‘In one case, the following facts were proved; that two nurses took care of the children at the expense of the defendant; that said defendant kissed the children, called them sons, and ordered that they be taken care of very
well; that he gave the money for the necessities of the mother and the six children, the
_______________
1. 1)that prior to Juan M. Alberto’s marriage to Yolanda Reyes, herein private respondent, Juan M. Alberto and Aurora Reniva, mother of herein petitioner, were
sweethearts;
2. 2)that as a consequence of an indiscretion, Aurora Reniva conceived and gave birth to herein petitioner Ma. Theresa Alberto on September 18, 1953;
3. 3)that petitioner used ‘Alberto’ as her surname in all her school records and Juan M. Alberto was known to be her father;
4. 4)that through Fr. Arcilla, a first cousin of Juan M. Alberto, money was given to Aurora Reniva;
5. 5)that when petitioner was about nine (9) years old, Mrs. Aurita Solidum, the youngest sister of Juan M. Alberto, arranged the first meeting between petitioner and
Juan M. Alberto at the MOPC and during said meeting, they talked about petitioner, the deceased gave petitioner P500.00 and two telephone numbers;
6. 6)that Juan M. Alberto would have visited petitioner on her birthday in her school, International School, if not for his untimely death on September 18, 1967;
7. 7)that when petitioner and her mother went to the PGH on the occasion of Juan M. Alberto’s death, Fr. Arcilla held her by the hand and asked the guard to make
way for her as she was a daughter of Juan M. Alberto;
8. 8)that after the wake for deceased Juan M. Alberto, his step mother, Saturnina Alberto introduced petitioner to Joy Alberto as the latter’s sister;
9. 9)that the siblings of Juan M. Alberto regarded petitioner as their niece and introduced her to their children as the eldest daughter of Juan M. Alberto;
10. 10)that the children of Juan M. Alberto’s siblings regarded her as their cousin;
11. 11)that petitioner was known by Juan M. Alberto’s friends as his daughter;
12. 12)that Juan M. Alberto showed Jose Tablizo the grades of petitioner and remarked that those were the grades of his daughter.
753
VOL. 232, JUNE 2, 1994 753
Alberto vs. Court of Appeals
Private respondent, Yolanda Alberto, the sole witness for private respondents, denied that Juan M. Alberto ever recognized Ma. Theresa Alberto as his daughter. She
presented in evidence Aurora Reniva’s letters to Juan M. Alberto dated December 23, 1955, September 27, 1954 and March 15, 1960; Aurora Reniva’s letter to Fr. Arcilla
dated December 23, 1955; letter of Zenaida Reniva to Juan M. Alberto dated September 16, 1953, to prove that Juan M. Alberto refused to recognize Ma. Theresa Alberto as
his own. 4
However, these letters do not prove that Juan M. Alberto refused to recognize Ma. Theresa Alberto. All that the letters stated was that Aurora Reniva was having a
difficult time raising a child by her own self and therefore, she was seeking the assistance of Juan M. Alberto. Private respondent quoted as Exhibit “3-B” the portion of
Aurora Reniva’s letter dated March 15, 1960 which says:
“x x x I am just wondering why after all those years of patient waiting, you still do not give a damn to her.” 5
The letter itself shows that Juan M. Alberto was not completely indifferent towards Ma. Theresa Alberto. He did provide her support whenever he could.
The latest letter that was presented in evidence was dated March 15, 1960. At the time, petitioner and Juan M. Alberto had
_______________
Court holds that the same falls within the exceptions to the hearsay rule. Sec. 38, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
“Sec. 38. Declaration Against Interest.—The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted at the declaration was at the
time it was made so far contrary to declarant’s own interest that a reasonable man in his position would not have made his declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons.”
As found by the trial court, recognition of petitioner’s status as a natural daughter of Juan M. Alberto was made, not only by the latter, but by his relatives as well—Fr.
Cipriano Arcilla, Jose Alberto, Aurita Solidum and Saturnina Alberto, among others. Private respondent only had to present any one of those relatives to negate petitioner’s
testimony that she had been acknowledged by them as the eldest daughter of the deceased. Her failure to do so baffles this Court. If indeed Ma. Theresa Alberto were
fabricating her testimony, the family of the deceased would have been more than willing to destroy the claims of an intruder. Under the circumstances, it is safe for us to
assume that had any of the relatives mentioned by petitioner been presented as witness for private respondent, their testimonies would be detrimental to the latter’s cause.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that petitioner has been in continuous possession of the status of a natural child of the
_______________
What a poignant novel this daughter could well author as she now seeks to establish indubitable parental links with a father who sired her some forty-one years ago. Why
he desisted from marrying the mother of this girl at a time when no impediment blocked the way is a matter one can merely conjecture at.
While he did contract marriage subsequently with another woman, it was only too clear that he had no intentions of closing definitively that chapter in his life when he
begat his first-born.
_______________
8Rollo, p. 67.
756
Juan M. Alberto died during the minority of petitioner, that is, on September 18, 1967—the day petitioner turned fourteen. As such, petitioner had four years from the time
she reached twenty-one on September 18, 1974, which was then the age of majority, within which to bring the aforesaid action. Thus, petitioner had until September 18,
1978 within which to file the action for recognition. Petitioner filed her motion for leave to intervene as oppositor and to re-open the proceedings with the prayer that she be
declared to have acquired the status of a natural child and as such, entitled to share in the estate of the deceased, on September 15, 1978. Said motion was, therefore,
seasonably filed three days before the expiration of the four-year period.
758
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jurilla vs. Commission on Elections
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and that of the probate court AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano (Chairman), Bidin, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, decision reversed.
Note.—Reputation has been held admissible as evidence of age, birth, race, or race-ancestry, and on the question of whether a child was born alive. Unlike that of
matters of pedigree, general reputation of marriage may proceed from persons who are not members of the family—the reason for the distinction is the public interest that is
taken in the question of the existence of marital relations (In Re: Florencio Mallare, 59 SCRA 45 [1974]).
——o0o——