THIRD DIVISION

ANGELINA SORIENTE and ALL G.R. No. 160239

OTHER PERSONS CLAIMING
RIGHTS UNDER HER,
Petitioners, Present:

CORONA, J., Chairperson,

CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

THE ESTATE OF THE LATE

ARSENIO E. CONCEPCION, Promulgated:
represented by NENITA S.
CONCEPCION, November 25, 2009
Respondents.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] of the Order[2] dated October 3,

2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213,
National Capital Judicial Region in Civil Case No. MC-03-407-A, which affirmed
the Decision dated April 8, 2003 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong
City, Branch 59 in Civil Case No. 17973, ordering petitioner to vacate the property,
subject matter of this unlawful detainer case, and surrender the possession thereof to
respondent.

The facts, as stated by the trial court,[3] are as follows:

 Respondent Nenita S. Concepcion established that she was the registered
owner of the lot occupied by petitioner Angelina Soriente at No. 637 Cavo F.
Sanchez Street, Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila. The lot, with an area of 295
square meters, is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 12892[4] issued
by the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District II.

During the lifetime of Arsenio E. Concepcion, who acquired the lot in 1978,
he allowed and tolerated the occupancy of the lot by petitioner, who was already
staying on the property. Petitioner was allowed to stay on the lot for free, but on a
temporary basis until such time that Concepcion and/or his family needed to develop
the lot.

After Arsenio E. Concepcion died on December 27, 1989, his family initiated
steps to develop the lot, but petitioners occupancy of the lotprevented them from
pursuing their plan.

Verbal demands to vacate the lot was made on petitioner. Petitioner pleaded
for time to transfer to another place, but she never left.

In June 2000, Elizabeth Concepcion-Dela Cruz, daughter of respondent, filed

a complaint for conciliation proceedings before the barangay at the instance
of respondent. However, the parties did not reach a settlement, which resulted in the
issuance of a Certificate to File Action[5] dated February 17, 2001 by the Barangay
Captain of Barangay Hagdan Bato Itaas, Mandaluyong City.

Respondent sent petitioner a demand letter dated September 22, 2000 by

registered mail, demanding that she peacefully surrender the property and extending
financial assistance for her relocation. Despite receipt of the demand letter,
petitioner did not vacate the premises.

On April 27, 2001, respondent filed against petitioner a Complaint[6] for

unlawful detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch
59 (trial court). The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 17973. The
Complaint alleged that respondent was the registered owner of the subject property,
while petitioner had no title to the property and her free occupancy thereof was
merely tolerated by respondent. Moreover, petitioner was occupying the premises
together with her family, and she had maintained boarders for a fee. Respondent
prayed that petitioner be ordered to vacate the lot, surrender the possession thereof
to respondent, pay monthly rent of P5,000.00 from June 2000 until she vacates the
premises, and pay actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as litigation
expenses.

It appears from the records of the case that petitioner Soriente, as a defendant
in the lower court, did not file a separate Answer, but affixed her signature to the
Answer filed by defendant Alfredo Caballero in another ejectment case, docketed as
Civil Case No. 17974, which was filed by respondent against Caballero. Hence,
respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to Render Judgment[7] under Section 7,
Rule 70 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure for Sorientes failure to file an
Answer to the Complaint. Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Render
Judgment.[8]
In an Order[9] dated December 5, 2001, the trial court denied the Motion to
Render Judgment. It stated that the allegations of the Complaint in Civil Case No.
17973 and 17974 are similar, the only substantial difference being the time when
defendants occupied the subject property allegedly through the tolerance of Arsenio
Concepcion. The trial court believed that in signing the Answer filed in Civil Case
No. 17974, Soriente intended to adopt the same as her own, as both defendants
Caballero and Soriente had a common defense against plaintiffs (respondents)
separate claim against them. The trial court denied the Motion to Render Judgment
in the interest of justice and considered that the two cases, including Civil Case No.
17932 against Severina Sadol, had been consolidated.
Pursuant to Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, the
trial court set a preliminary conference on October 9, 2001 at 8:30 a.m. The
preliminary conference was reset to November 15, 2001, and then to December 18,
2001 because the Motion to Render Judgment was still pending resolution. On
December 18, 2001, the preliminary conference was reset to January 24, 2002 as
prayed for by defendants on the ground that their common counsel was absent
despite proper notice, and plaintiff (respondent) did not object to the resetting.[10]

On January 24, 2002, the scheduled preliminary conference was again reset
to March 5, 2002 because no notice was sent to defendants counsel, and plaintiff
(respondent) and her counsel were both absent despite proper notice.

On March 5, 2002, the trial court reset the preliminary conference to April 16,
2002 on the ground that there was no notice sent to defendants counsel.

In the scheduled preliminary conference held on February 18, 2003, only

plaintiffs (respondents) counsel and defendants Severina Sadol and Alfredo
Caballero were present. Plaintiffs (respondents) counsel submitted a secretarys
certificate attesting to the existence of a board resolution authorizing him to enter
into a compromise agreement. A representative of defendant (petitioner) Angelina
Soriente appeared, but failed to submit a Special Power of Attorney authorizing her
to enter into a compromise agreement. Counsel for defendants was not in court, and
there was no proof of service on her for the hearing. However, defendants Sadol and
Caballero informed the court that they informed their counsel of the hearing
scheduled that day. In view of the absence of defendant Angelina Soriente or her
authorized representative, plaintiffs (respondents) counsel moved that the case be
submitted for decision, and that he be given 15 days within which to submit his
position paper.[11]

In its Order[12] dated February 18, 2003, the trial court granted the motion of
plaintiffs (respondents) counsel and considered the case against defendant
(petitioner) Angelina Soriente submitted for decision in accordance with Section 7
of the Rules on Summary Procedure.[13]

On April 8, 2003, the trial court rendered a Decision[14] holding that

respondent established by preponderance of evidence that she was entitled to the
relief prayed for. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant Angelina Soriente

and all other persons claiming rights under her to:

1. Vacate the subject premises and surrender the possession thereof

to plaintiff;
2. Pay the amount of PESOS: FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) per
month as reasonable compensation for use and occupation of
the premises as of June 2000 until she finally vacates the subject
premises;
3. Pay the amount [of] PESOS: THREE THOUSAND (P3,000.00)
as attorneys fees; and
4. Pay the litigation expenses and cost of suit.[15]

Petitioner appealed the trial courts Decision to the RTC of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 213, raising the following issues:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the plaintiff was able to establish that she
is the registered owner of the lot occupied by the defendant-appellant instead of
dismissing the complaint outright for lack of legal capacity to sue.
 2. The lower court erred in holding that the plaintiff was able to establish by
preponderance of evidence that she is entitled to the relief prayed for despite
lack of jurisdiction.
3. The lower court erred in holding that this instant case subject of this appeal be
decided in accordance with Section 7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure.[16]

In an Order[17] dated October 3, 2003, the RTC affirmed the trial courts
Decision, disposing thus:

PRESCINDING FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS,

judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING IN TOTO the decision dated April 8,
2003 rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 59, Mandaluyong City.[18]

The RTC held:

Case records readily disclosed that the ownership of the subject lot belongs
to the late Arsenio E. Concepcion, married to herein Plaintiff-Appellee Nenita S.
Concepcion, as evidenced by the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12892 (Annex A
in the complaint for Unlawful Detainer). This Certificate of Title shall be received
as evidence in all courts of the Philippines and shall be conclusive as to all matters
contained therein principally, the identity of the owner of the land covered thereby
except as provided in the Land Registration Act. Said title can be attacked only for
fraud within one year after the date of the issuance of the decree of registration.
Such attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding. The title represented
by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged or diminished in a
collateral proceeding such as this instant appeal from the decision rendered by the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City in an ejectment case. As should be
known by Appellant Soriente through counsel, no title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession. Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner
Arsenio E. Concepcion but also against his hereditary successors because the latter
merely steps into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are merely the
continuation of the personalities of their predecessors-in-interest (Barcelona v.
Barcelona, 100 Phil 251; PD 1529, Sec. 47). x x x

xxxx

Noteworthy to mention in the case at bar is the ruling laid down

in Calubayan v. Pascual, 21 SCRA 146, where the Supreme Court [held] that a
person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise
 that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is
the proper remedy against [him]. x x x[19]

Petitioner filed this petition raising the following issues:

I
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF
WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT SHE IS THE REGISTERED OWNER OF
THE LOT OCCUPIED BY THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT INSTEAD OF
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT OUTRIGHT FOR LACK OF LEGAL
CAPACITY TO SUE.

II
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF
WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE THAT
SHE IS ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF PRAYED FOR DESPITE LACK OF
JURISDICTION.

III
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THIS
INSTANT CASE SUBJECT OF THIS APPEAL BE DECIDED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 7 OF THE RULES ON SUMMARY
PROCEDURE.[20]

Petitioner appealed from the RTCs decision directly to this Court on pure
questions of law. There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question
of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged
facts.[21]

Moreover, Republic v. Sandiganbayan[22] ruled:

x x x A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct
application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the
truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt
or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as
 well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the
situation.[23]

The Court notes that petitioner raised both questions of fact and law in her
petition. The Court shall resolve only the pertinent questions of law raised.

First, petitioner questioned respondent Nenita Concepcions capacity to sue as

a representative of the Estate of her husband, Arsenio Concepcion, alleging absence
of proof of the issuance of the requisite letters testamentary or letters of
administration evidencing her legal capacity to sue in behalf of the Estate of Arsenio
Concepcion in contravention of Section 4, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, thus:
Sec. 4. Capacity. Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued in
a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of
persons that is made a party, must be averred. A party desiring to raise an issue as
to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued in
a representative capacity, shall do so by specific denial, which shall include such
supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleaders knowledge.

Petitioner asserts that lack of legal capacity to sue is a ground for dismissal
under Section 1 (d) of Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court, and considering that a
motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading under the summary procedure, the
trial court failed to exercise its duty to order the outright dismissal of the complaint
as mandated under Section 4[24] of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

Petitioners contention lacks merit.

Section 4, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Sec. 4. Capacity. x x x A party desiring to raise an issue as to the legal
existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued in a
representative capacity, shall do so by specific denial, which shall include such
supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleaders knowledge.[25]

Based on the provision cited above, the RTC correctly ruled:

The argument is not tenable. This court, upon cursory reading of the
provisions of Rule 8, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, in relation to the Rules on
Summary Procedure, finds it relevant to note x x x that although a Motion to
Dismiss or a Motion for Bill of Particulars cannot be availed of to challenge the
 capacity of the party under the Rules on Summary Procedure, the
DefendantAppellant should have at least SPECIFICALLY DENIED such capacity
of the party in the Answer, which should have included such supporting particulars
as are peculiarly within the pleaders knowledge. The case records clearly disclosed
that no such specific denial was made by the appellant and this court believes that
the lower court had carefully and dutifully taken into account the applicable rules
particularly Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, in relation to
Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence, before
rendering the assailed decision dated April 8, 2003. The presumption of the regular
performance of duties applies in this case and the same shall prevail over mere
allegations of the herein Defendant-Appellant.[26]

Further, as the successor-in-interest of the late Arsenio E. Concepcion and co-

owner of the subject property, respondent Nenita S. Concepcion is entitled to
prosecute the ejectment case not only in a representative capacity, but as a real party-
in-interest. Article 487 of the Civil Code states, Any one of the co-owners may bring
an action in ejectment. Hence, assuming that respondent failed to submit the proper
documents showing her capacity to sue in a representative capacity for the estate of
her deceased husband, the Court, in the interest of speedy disposition of cases, may
deem her capacitated to prosecute the ejectment case as a real party-in-interest being
a co-owner of the subject property considering that the trial court has jurisdiction
over the subject matter and has also acquired jurisdiction over the parties, including
respondent Nenita S. Concepcion.

Second, petitioner questions whether respondent has established by a

preponderance of evidence that she is entitled to the relief prayed for, which is the
ejectment of petitioner from the subject property. Petitioner contends that respondent
admitted in her Complaint that her right to the subject property arose only in 1978,
when the late Arsenio E. Concepcion acquired the same. Petitioner alleges that to
the contrary, substantial evidence exists that she and her predecessors-in-interest
have continuously and openly occupied and possessed, in the concept of owner, the
subject property since time immemorial.

The Court holds that the RTC correctly affirmed the ejectment of petitioner
from the property.

To make out a case of unlawful detainer under Section 1,[27] Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, the Complaint must allege that the defendant is unlawfully
withholding from the plaintiff the possession of certain real property after the
expiration or termination of the formers right to hold possession by virtue of a
contract, express or implied, and that the action is being brought within one year
from the time the defendants possession became unlawful.[28]

The Complaint alleged that petitioner occupied the subject property by

tolerance of the late Arsenio Concepcion. While tolerance is lawful, such possession
becomes illegal upon demand to vacate by the owner and the possessor by tolerance
refuses to comply with such demand.[29]Respondent sent petitioner a demand letter
dated September 22, 2000 to vacate the subject property, but petitioner did not
comply with the demand. A person who occupies the land of another at the latters
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by
an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.[30] Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, the one-year period within which a complaint for unlawful detainer
can be filed should be counted from the date of demand, because only upon the lapse
of that period does the possession become unlawful.[31] Respondent filed the
ejectment case against petitioner on April 27, 2001, which was less than a year from
the date of formal demand. Clearly, therefore, the action was filed within the one-
year period prescribed for filing an ejectment or unlawful detainer case.

The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or

material possession.[32] All that the trial court can do is to make an initial
determination of who is the owner of the property, so that it can resolve who is
entitled to its possession absent other evidence to resolve ownership.[33] Courts in
ejectment cases decide questions of ownership only it is necessary to decide the
question of possession.[34] The reason for this rule is to prevent the defendant from
trifling with the summary nature of an ejectment suit by the simple expedient of
asserting ownership over the disputed property.[35]

In this case, the trial court found that respondent owns the property on the
basis of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12892,[36] which was issued in the name of
Arsenio E. Concepcion, x x x married to Nenita L. Songco. It is settled rule that the
person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.[37] Hence,
as the registered owner of the subject property, respondent is preferred to possess
it.[38]

The validity of respondents certificate of title cannot be attacked by petitioner

in this case for ejectment. Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.[39] It cannot be altered,
modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance
with law.[40] The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only be
assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.[41] Whether or not the
petitioner has the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of
the trial court to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.[42]

Although petitioner alleges that substantial evidence exists that she and her
predecessors-in-interest had continuously and openly occupied and possessed, in the
concept of owner, the subject property since time immemorial, petitioner failed to
present evidence to substantiate her allegation. Whereas respondent holds a Torrens
title over the subject property; hence, she is entitled to the possession of the
property.[43]
The court's adjudication of ownership in an ejectment case is merely
provisional, and affirmance of the trial courts decision would not bar or prejudice an
action between the same parties involving title to the property, if and when such
action is brought seasonably before the proper forum.[44]

Lastly, petitioner contends that the lower court erred in deciding this case in
accordance with Section 7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, thus:
SEC. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. Not later than
thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a preliminary conference shall be
held. The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases shall be applicable to the preliminary
conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.

The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be

a cause for the dismissal of his complaint. The defendant who appears in the
absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in
accordance with Section 6 hereof. All cross-claims shall be dismissed.

If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall be entitled to

judgment in accordance with Section 6 hereof. This Rule shall not apply
where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action
who had pleaded a common defense shall appear at the preliminary
conference.[45]

Section 6 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, which is referred

to by Section 7 above, states:

SEC. 6. Effect of failure to answer. Should the defendant fail to answer the
complaint within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or on motion
of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged
in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein: Provided, however,
 That the court may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorneys
fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This is without
prejudice to the applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if there
are two or more defendants.

Petitioner asserts that considering that the cases against her, defendants
Caballero and Sadol were consolidated, and she and defendant Caballero signed and
filed one common Answer to the Complaint, thus, pleading a common defense, the
trial court should not have rendered judgment on her case based on Section 7 of the
1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure when she failed to appear in the
preliminary conference.

The contention lacks merit.

The Court notes that the ejectment case filed by respondent against petitioner
was docketed in the trial court as Civil Case No. 17973, the case against Alfredo
Caballero was docketed as Civil Case No. 17974, while the case against Severina
Sadol was docketed as Civil Case No. 17932. These cases were consolidated by the
trial court.

Under Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, if a sole

defendant shall fail to appear in the preliminary conference, the plaintiff shall be
entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 of the Rule, that is, the court shall
render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the Complaint and
limited to what is prayed for therein. However, [t]his Rule (Sec. 7) shall not apply
where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action, who
had pleaded a common defense, shall appear at the preliminary
conference. Petitioner claims that the preceding provision applies to her as a
defendant, since the ejectment cases were consolidated by the trial court, and she
and Caballero filed the same Answer to the Complaint; hence, the trial court should
not have rendered judgment against her when she failed to appear in the preliminary
conference.[46]

The Court holds that the italicized provision above does not apply in the case
of petitioner, since she and Caballero were not co-defendants in the same case. The
ejectment case filed against petitioner was distinct from that of Caballero, even if
the trial court consolidated the cases and, in the interest of justice, considered the
Answer filed by Caballero in Civil Case No. 17974 as the Answer also of petitioner
since she affixed her signature thereto.
 Considering that petitioner was sued in a separate case for ejectment from that
of Caballero and Sadol, petitioners failure to appear in the preliminary
conference entitled respondent to the rendition of judgment by the trial court on the
ejectment case filed against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. 17973, in
accordance with Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 3, 2003

of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213, National Capital
Judicial Region in Civil Case No. MC-03-407-A is AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA