Democracy: Normative Theory

Thomas D Christiano, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA

Ó 2001 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
This article is reproduced from the previous edition, volume 5, pp. 3413–3419, Ó 2001, Elsevier Ltd.

Abstract

Normative democratic theory deals with the ethical foundations of democracy and democratic institutions. It does not offer
in the first instance a scientific study of those societies that are called democratic. It aims to provide an account of when and
why democracy is ethically desirable as well as ethical principles for guiding the design of democratic institutions. It is
inherently interdisciplinary and must call on the results of political science, sociology, and economics in order to give this
kind of concrete guidance. This brief outline of normative democratic theory focuses attention on three distinct issues in
recent work. First, it outlines some different approaches to the question of why democracy is morally desirable at all. Second,
it explores the problem of the rationality of participation in large democratic societies given the inevitably small impact of
participants on the outcomes. It also discusses blueprints of democratic institutions for dealing with this. Third, it surveys
different accounts of the proper characterization of equality in the processes of representation. The last two parts display the
interdisciplinary nature of normative democratic theory.

Foundational Questions legislation and the impact of democracy on the characters of

the participants. John Stuart Mill (1991) argued that demo-
To fix ideas, the term ‘democracy’ refers very generally to cratic ways of deciding tend to be superior to nondemocratic
a method of group decision making characterized by a kind of ways on account of the fact that they produce superior legis-
equality of input among the participants. That equality may lation in three distinct ways. Strategically, democracy is thought
be the mere formal equality of one person, one vote in an to produce superior outcomes to other forms of rule just
election for representatives to an assembly, or it may be more because it forces decision makers to take into account the
robust, including equality in the processes of deliberation and interests, rights and opinions of most people in society. Since
coalition building. ‘Democracy’ may refer to any of these democracy gives some political power to each, more people are
political arrangements. Normative democratic theorists taken into account than under aristocracy or monarchy.
attempt to determine which one of these kinds of arrange- Epistemologically, democracy is thought to be the best
ments is desirable, ethically speaking, and in what contexts. decision-making method on the grounds that it is generally
For instance, Joseph Schumpeter (1956) argues, with some more reliable in helping participants discover the right deci-
force, that the first highly formal kind of democracy is highly sions. Since democracy brings a lot of people into the process of
desirable while the second is dangerous. On the other hand, decision making, it can take advantage of many sources of
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1967) is apt to argue that the first information and critical assessment of laws and policies.
kind of democracy is akin to slavery while only robustly Democratic decision making tends to be more informed than
egalitarian democracies have political legitimacy. To evaluate other forms about the interests of citizens and the causal
their arguments we must decide on the merits of the different mechanisms necessary to advance those interests. Furthermore,
principles and conceptions of humanity and society from the broad-based discussion typical of democracy enhances the
which they proceed. critical assessment of the different moral ideas that guide
decision makers.
Regarding its effects on character, many have noted with
The Justification of Democracy Mill and Rousseau that democracy tends to make people stand
up for themselves more because it makes collective decisions
We can evaluate democracy ethically along at least two depend on them more than monarchy or aristocracy do. Hence,
different dimensions. We can evaluate a group decision- in democratic societies individuals are encouraged to be more
making method in terms of the outcomes of using it and autonomous. In addition, democracy tends to get people to
compare the values of those outcomes with those of other think carefully and rationally more than other forms of rule
possible methods of political decision making. We can also because it makes a difference whether they do or not. Finally,
evaluate democracy in terms of qualities that are inherent in the some have argued that democracy tends to enhance the moral
method itself. We can ask whether there is something inher- qualities of citizens. When they participate in making deci-
ently fair about making democratic decisions on matters on sions, they have to listen to others, they are called upon to
which people disagree. justify themselves to others and they are forced to think in part
in terms of the interests of others. Some have argued that when
people find themselves in this kind of circumstance, they come
Instrumental Values genuinely to think in terms of the common good and justice.
Hence some have argued that democratic processes tend to
The instrumental values often attributed to democracy can be enhance the autonomy, rationality, and morality of partici-
broadly classed into two categories: the quality of the resulting pants. Since these beneficial effects are thought to be

International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, Volume 6 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.63017-9 85
86 Democracy: Normative Theory

worthwhile in themselves, they count in favor of democracy Democracy, it is said, extends the idea that each ought to be
and against other forms of rule. master of his or her life to the domain of collective decision
Some argue in addition that the above effects on character making. First, each person’s life is deeply affected by the larger
also tend to enhance the quality of legislation. A society of social, legal, and cultural environment in which he or she lives.
rational, autonomous, and moral decision makers is more Second, only when each person has an equal voice and vote in
likely to produce good legislation than a society ruled by a self- the process of collective decision making will each have
centered person or small group of persons who rule over control over this larger environment. Thinkers such as Carol
slavish and unreflective subjects. Gould (1988) conclude that only when some kind of
More detailed knowledge of the effects of political insti- democracy is implemented will individuals have a chance at
tutions can be used to discriminate in favor of particular self-government. Since individuals have a right to self-
kinds of democratic institutions or modifications of them. government, they have a right to democratic participation.
For instance, in the United States, James Madison (1788) This right is established at least partly independently of the
argued in favor of a fairly strong federal government on the worth of the outcomes of democratic decision making. The
grounds that local governments are more likely to be idea is that the right to self-government gives one a right,
oppressive to minorities. Of course, the soundness of any of within limits, to do wrong. Just as an individual has a right to
the above arguments depends on the truth or validity of the make some bad decisions for himself or herself, so a group of
associated substantive views about justice and the common individuals have a right to make bad or unjust decisions for
good as well as a causal theory of the consequences of themselves. Here we can see the makings of an argument
different institutions. against instrumentalism. To the extent that an instrumentalist
It is also the case that many theorists argue against any kind wishes to diminish a person’s power to contribute to the
of democracy on instrumental grounds. Hobbes (1968) argues democratic process for the sake of enhancing the quality of
that democratic institutions are inferior to monarchical decisions, he or she is committed to thinking that there is no
government on the grounds that they are more likely to breed moral loss in the fact that our power has been diminished; but
destabilizing dissension among subjects. Plato (1974) argues if the liberty argument is correct our right to control our lives is
that democracy is inferior to various forms of monarchy, aris- violated by this.
tocracy, and even oligarchy on the grounds that democracy One major difficulty with this line of argument is that it
tends to undermine the expertise necessary to properly gov- appears to require that the basic rule of decision making be
erned societies. Some recent thinkers have argued in favor of consensus or unanimity. If each person must freely choose the
giving over complete control over society to the market, on the outcomes that bind him or her, then those who oppose the
grounds that democracy tends to produce serious economic decision are not self-governing. They live in an environment
inefficiencies. More modest versions of these arguments have imposed on them by others. So only when all agree to a deci-
been used to justify modification of democratic institutions. sion are they freely adopting the decision.
The trouble is that there is rarely agreement on major issues
in politics. Indeed, it appears that one of the main reasons for
Instrumentalism
having political decision-making procedures is that they can
settle matters despite disagreement. Hence it is hard to see how
Instrumentalists argue that these instrumental values of the
any political decision-making method can respect everyone’s
democratic process are the only bases on which to evaluate
liberty.
democracy or compare it with other forms of political decision
making. The standards one uses depend on one’s conception of
a just and good society. For example, libertarian instrumentalists
Democracy as Public Justification
such as Friedrich Hayek (1960) argue that democracy is desirable
only to the extent that it protects liberty and private property.
One distant relative of the self-government approach is the
account of democracy as a process of public justification
Noninstrumental Values defended by, among others, Joshua Cohen (1998). The idea
behind this approach is that laws and policies are legitimate to
Few theorists deny that political institutions must be at least in the extent that they are publicly justified to the citizens of the
part evaluated in terms of the outcomes of having those insti- community. Public justification is justification to each citizen
tutions. Some argue, in addition, that some forms of decision as a result of free and reasoned debate among equals. Citizens
making are morally desirable independent of the consequences justify laws and policies to each other on the basis of mutually
of having them. A variety of different approaches have been acceptable reasons. Democracy, properly understood, is the
used to show that democracy has this kind of intrinsic value. context in which individuals freely engage in a process of
The most common of these come broadly under the rubrics of reasoned discussion and deliberation on an equal footing. The
liberty and equality. ideas of freedom and equality provide guidelines for struc-
turing democratic institutions.
The aim of democracy as public justification is reasoned
Liberty consensus among citizens. However, a serious problem arises
when we ask about what happens when disagreement remains.
Some argue that the basic principles of democracy are founded Two possible replies have been suggested to this kind of worry. It
in the idea that each individual has a right to liberty. has been urged that forms of consensus weaker than full
 Democracy: Normative Theory 87

consensus are sufficient for public justification and that the society. There are three distinct problems here. First, Plato
weaker varieties are achievable in many societies. For instance, argued that some people are innately more intelligent than
there may be consensus on the list of reasons that are acceptable others and that those persons ought to rule. Second, others
publicly but disagreement on the weight of the different reasons. have argued that a society must have a division of labor. If
Or there may be agreement on general reasons but disagreement everyone were engaged in the complex and difficult task of
about particular interpretations of those reasons. What would politics, little time or energy would be left for the other
have to be shown here is that such weak consensus is achievable essential tasks of a society. Conversely, if we expect most people
in many societies and that the disagreements that remain are not to engage in other difficult and complex tasks, how can we
incompatible with the ideal of public justification. expect them to have the time and resources sufficient to devote
themselves intelligently to politics?
Third, since individuals have so little impact on the
Equality outcomes of political decision making in large societies, they
have little sense of responsibility for the outcomes. Some have
Many democratic theorists have argued that democracy is a way argued that it is not rational to vote since the chances that a vote
of treating persons as equals when there is good reason to will affect the outcome of an election are nearly indistin-
impose some kind of organization on their shared lives, but guishable from zero. Worse still, Anthony Downs (1957) has
they disagree about how best to do it. On one version, defen- argued that almost all of those who do vote have little reason to
ded by Peter Singer (1973), when people insist on different become informed about how best to vote. On the assumption
ways of arranging matters properly, each person in a sense that citizens reason and behave roughly according to the
claims a right to be dictator over their shared lives. However, Downsian model, either the society must in fact be run by
these claims to dictatorship cannot all hold up. Democracy a relatively small group of people with minimal input from the
embodies a kind of peaceful and fair compromise among these rest or it will be very poorly run.
conflicting claims to rule. Each compromises equally on what These observations pose challenges for any robustly egali-
he or she claims as long as the others do, resulting in each tarian or deliberative conception of democracy. Without the
having an equal say over decision making. In effect, democratic ability to participate intelligently in politics one cannot use
decision making respects each person’s point of view on one’s votes to advance one’s aims, nor can one be said to
matters of common concern by giving each an equal say about participate in a process of reasoned deliberation among equals.
what to do in cases of disagreement. So, either equality of political power implies a kind of self-
One difficulty is that this view relies on agreement much as defeating equal participation of citizens in politics or
the liberty views described above. What if people disagree on a reasonable division of labor seems to undermine equality of
the democratic method or on the particular form democracy is power.
to take? Are we to decide these latter questions by means of Plato and Hobbes argued against democracy in any form on
a higher order procedure? And if there is disagreement on the these grounds. Some modern theorists of democracy, called
higher order procedure, must we also democratically decide elite theorists, have argued against any robustly egalitarian
that question? The view seems to lead to an infinite regress. forms of democracy on these grounds. They argue that high
Another egalitarian defense democracy asserts that it embodies levels of citizen participation tend to produce bad legislation
the equal consideration of the interests of the citizens of designed by demagogues to appeal to poorly informed and
a society when there is disagreement about how best to orga- overly emotional citizens. They look upon the alleged apathy
nize their shared life. On this account, equal consideration of and uninformedness of citizens evidenced in many empirical
interests requires that individuals’ judgments be taken into studies in the 1950s and 1960s as highly desirable social
account equal when there is disagreement. Respect for each phenomena. Joseph Schumpeter’s assertion that the “demo-
citizen’s judgment is grounded in the fallibility of everyone’s cratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at
judgment as well as the generally recognized tendency of the political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to
moral judgments of persons to be biased toward their own decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”
interests. Each citizen would have good reason to think that (Schumpeter, 1956: p. 269) still stands as a concise statement
his or her interests were not being given the same weight as of the elitist view. In this view, the emphasis is placed on
others if he or she had less decision-making power than the responsible political leadership. Political leaders are to avoid
others. On this account, since each person has a preeminent divisive and emotionally charged issues and make policy and
interest in being recognized as an equal member of the law with little regard for the fickle and diffuse demands made
community, only equality in decision-making power is by ordinary citizens.
compatible with equal consideration of interests. The principle An approach that is in part motivated by the concerns above
of equal consideration of interests also implies limits to what but that attempts to avoid elitism is the interest group pluralist
can be up for democratic control and so the infinite regress account of politics. Robert Dahl’s early statement of the view is
noted above is avoided. very powerful. “In a rough sense, the essence of all competitive
politics is bribery of the electorate by politicians. The farm-
er. supports a candidate committed to high price supports,
Democratic Citizenship the businessman. supports an advocate of low corporation
taxes. the consumer. votes for candidates opposed to a sale
A vexing problem of democratic theory has been to determine tax” (Dahl, 1959: p. 69). In this conception of the democratic
whether ordinary citizens are up to the task of governing a large process, each citizen is a member of an interest group with
88 Democracy: Normative Theory

narrowly defined interests that are closely connected to their informed points of view. Empirical evidence suggests that
everyday lives. On these subjects citizens are supposed to be individuals are motivated by moral considerations in politics
fairly well informed and interested in having an influence. On in addition to their interests. Accordingly, many propose that
this account, democracy is not rule by the majority but rather democratic institutions be designed to support the inclination
rule by coalitions of minorities. to engage in moral and open-minded discussion with others.
The account ensures that individuals can participate roughly Once we approach the idea of citizenship from a moral
as equals to the extent that it narrowly confines the issues with point of view and we recognize the importance of a division of
which each individual is concerned. labor, the question arises of what the appropriate role for
A third approach inspired by the kinds of problems above a citizen in a democracy is. If we think that citizens are too often
may be called the neoliberal approach to politics favored by uninformed, we should ask two questions. What ought citizens
public choice theorists such as James Buchanan and Gordon have knowledge about in order to fulfill their role? What
Tullock (1965). Against elite theories, they contend that elites standards ought citizens’ beliefs live up to in order to be
and their allies will tend to expand the powers of government adequately supported? Some have proposed that citizens know
and bureaucracy for their own interests and that this expansion about their particular sectors of society and not others. We have
will occur at the expense of a largely inattentive public. They seen that this view has a number of difficulties. Christiano
argue against the interest group pluralist theorists that the (1996) proposes, along with others, that citizens must think
problem of participation occurs within interest groups more or about what ends the society ought to aim at and leave the
less as powerfully as among the citizenry at large. Only some question of how to achieve those aims to experts. This kind of
interest groups are likely to succeed in organizing to influence view needs to answer to the problem of how to ensure that
the government. Hence only some interest groups will succeed politicians, administrators, and experts actually do attempt to
in influencing government and they will do so largely for their realize the aims set by citizens. And it must show how insti-
own benefit while spreading the costs to others. tutions can be designed so as to establish the division of labor
Neoliberals argue that any way of organizing a large and while preserving equality among citizens. But if citizens genu-
powerful democratic state is likely to produce serious ineffi- inely do choose the aims and others faithfully pursue the
ciencies. They infer that one ought to transfer many of the means to achieving those aims, then citizens are in the driver’s
current functions of the state to the economic market and limit seat in society.
the state to the enforcement of basic property rights and It is hard to see how citizens can satisfy any even moderate
liberties. These can be more easily understood and brought standards for beliefs about how best to achieve their political
under the control of ordinary citizens. aims. Knowledge of means requires an immense amount of
But the neoliberal account of democracy must answer to two social science and knowledge of particular facts. For citizens to
large worries. First, citizens in modern societies have more have this kind of knowledge generally would require that we
ambitious conceptions of social justice and the common good abandon the division of labor in society. On the other hand,
than are realizable by the minimal state. The neoliberal account citizens do have first-hand and daily experience with thinking
thus implies a very serious curtailment of democracy of its own. about the values and aims they pursue. This gives them
More evidence is needed to support the contention that these a chance to satisfy standards of belief regarding what the best
aspirations cannot be achieved by the modern state. Second, the aims are. Still the view is not defensible without a compelling
neoliberal approach ignores the problem of large private institutional answer to the question of how to ensure that
concentrations of wealth and power that are capable of pushing others are genuinely pursuing the means to achieve the aims
small states around for their own benefit and imposing their specified by citizens.
wills on populations without their consent. The assumptions
that lead neoliberals to be skeptical about the large modern
state imply equally disturbing problems for a neoliberal society. Legislative Institutions
A considerable amount of the literature in political science
and the economic theory of the state are grounded in the A number of debates have centered on the question of what
assumption that individuals act primarily and perhaps even kinds of legislative institution are best for a democratic society.
exclusively in their self-interest narrowly construed. The What choice we make here will depend heavily on the kind of
problem of participation and the accounts of the democratic underlying ethical justification of democracy, our conception
process described above are in large part dependent on this of citizenship, and our empirical understanding of political
assumption. While these ideas have generated interesting institutions and how they function. The most basic types of
results and have become ever more sophisticated, there has formal political representation available are single-member
been a growing chorus of opponents. Against the self-interest district representation, proportional representation, and
axiom, defenders of deliberative democracy and others claim group representation. In addition, many societies have opted
that citizens are capable of being motivated by a concern for the for multicameral legislative institutions. In some cases,
common good and justice. They also claim, with Mill and combinations of the above forms have been tried.
Rousseau, that such concerns are not merely given prior to Single-member district representation returns single repre-
politics but that they can evolve and improve through the sentatives of geographically defined areas containing roughly
process of discussion and debate in politics. They assert that equal populations to the legislature and is present most
much debate and discussion in politics would not be intelli- prominently in the USA and the UK. The most common form
gible were it not for the fact that citizens are willing to engage in of proportional representation is party-list proportional
open-minded discussion with those who have distinct morally representation. In a simple form of such a scheme, a number of
 Democracy: Normative Theory 89

parties compete for election to a legislature that is not divided amorphous sector of the population can very often be best met
into geographical districts. Parties acquire seats in the legisla- by using ambiguous, vague, and often irrelevant appeals to the
ture as a proportion of the total number of votes they receive in citizens. Thus, instead of encouraging reasonable compromise,
the population as a whole. Group representation occurs when the scheme tends to support tendencies toward ignorance,
the society is divided into nongeographically defined groups superficiality, and fatuousness in political campaigns and in
such as ethnic or linguistic groups or even functional groups the citizenry. It encourages political leaders to take care of the
such as workers, farmers, and capitalists and returns represen- real issues of politics in back rooms while they appeal to citi-
tatives to a legislature from each of them. zens by means of smoke and mirrors. Of course, those who
Many have argued in favor of single-member district legis- agree in the main with the elitist-type theories will see nothing
lation on the grounds that it has appeared to them to lead to wrong in this; indeed, they may well champion this effect.
more stable government than other forms of representation. Proportional representation requires that parties be relatively
The thought is that proportional representation tends to frag- clear and up front about their proposals, so those who believe
ment the citizenry into opposing homogeneous camps that that democracy is ethically grounded in the appeal to equality
adhere rigidly to their party lines and that are continually vying tend to favor proportional representation.
for control over the government. Since there are many parties Advocates of group representation such as Iris Marion
and they are unwilling to compromise with each other, Young (1993) have argued that some historically disen-
governments formed from coalitions of parties tend to fall franchised groups may still not do very well under proportional
apart rather quickly. The post-War experience of governments representation. They may not be able to organize and articulate
in Italy appears to confirm this hypothesis. Single-member their views as easily as other groups. Also, minority groups can
district representation, in contrast, is said to enhance the still be systematically defeated in the legislature and their
stability of governments by virtue of its favoring a two-party interests may be consistently set back even if they do have some
system of government. Each election cycle then determines representation. For these groups, some have argued that the
which party is to stay in power for some length of time. only way to protect their interests is legally to ensure that they
Charles Beitz (1989) argues that single-member district have adequate and even disproportionate representation.
representation encourages moderation in party programs One worry about group representation is that it tends to
offered for citizens to consider. This results from the tendency freeze some aspects of the agenda that might be better left to
of this kind of representation toward two-party systems. In the choice of citizens. For instance, consider a population that
a two-party system with majority rule, it is argued, each party is divided into linguistic groups for a long time, and suppose
must appeal to the median voter in the political spectrum. that only some citizens continue to think of linguistic conflict
Hence they must moderate their programs to appeal to the as important. In the circumstances, such schemes may tend to
median voter. Furthermore, they encourage compromise be biased in an arbitrary way that favors the views or interests of
among groups since they must try to appeal to a lot of other those who do think of linguistic conflict as important.
groups in order to become part of one of the two leading
parties. These tendencies encourage moderation and compro- See also: Appeasement: Political; Law and Democracy; Politics
mise in citizens to the extent that political parties, and interest and Participation.
groups, hold these qualities up as necessary to functioning well
in a democracy.
In criticism, advocates of proportional and group repre- Bibliography
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