ng where the publication is to be made..

ISSUE: Whether or not the court has the jurisdiction to decide the issue beyond

the contemplation of the law.

RULING: We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all

since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. Publica

tion in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication

requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. At any rate, this Court

is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if

we find it

27 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA

655

28 MARION REYNOLDS STOGNER, PETITIONER v.CALIFORNIA

29 Andresons Group, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

30 ISLAMIC DIRECTORATE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CA

31 Villanueva v. CA,

32 South Central Bell Telephone Company (Petitioners) Vs. Alabama

33 People of The Philippines vs. Dioscoro Pinuila, Et Al., Absalon

Bignay, defendant and appellant.€

34 Solid Manila Corporation v. Bio Hong Trading CO.,

35 Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine B

looming Mills Co., Inc.,

36 ECHEGARAY VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

37 JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO

38 Tecson, et al v. Comelec, GR No. 161434

39 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Health Dept

any or anyone related to it upon penalty of loss of its state business license.

Upon HVIRA s enactment, the State of California issued administrative sub poenas a

gainst several subsidiaries of European Insurance Companies participating in ICH

EIC.

Federal Government informed California officials that HVIRA would damage ICHEIC,

the only effective means to process quickly and completely unpaid Holocaust era

insurance claims, and that this would derail the GFA.

State Commisioner refused and continued to enact.

Petitioner insurance entities therefore filed this suit challenging the constitu

tionality of HVIRA.

District Court issued preliminary injunction against enforcing HVIRA, and grante

d petitioners summary judgement

Ninth Court reversed holding that HVIRA did not violate Federal foreign policy

ISSUE

WON HVIRA interferes with the National Government s conduct of foreign relations.

W/N The HVIRA of the State of California violates Federal foreign policy

HELD

Yes, The HVIRA of the State of California violates Federal Foreign policy

The decision was penned by Souter, J.

The judgement of the CA for the Ninth Circuit is reversed. HVIRA is preempted or

blocked.

Reasons

At the moment there is conflict in the interest of State power against policies

on foreign relations, the State must yield.

There is sufficiently clear conflict between HVIRA and the president s foreign pol
icy, as expressed both in the executive agreements with Germany, Austria, and Fr

ance, and in statements by high level Executive Branch officials to require pree

mption here even without any consideration of the State s interest.

NOTES:

california wanted to help victims of holocaust by passing a law called HVIRA

HVIRA forces insurance companies to disclose information on all transactions mad

e during 1920-1945

Why pass this law?

What happened?

American insurance companies were asking the courts to put a stop to HVIRA and s

ay the HVIRA was in conflict with the foreign policy of the president.

the holy see vs Eriberto u. rosario, jr.

GRN 101949, December 1, 1994. 238 SCRA 524

Nature of the Case: This is a petition for certiorari to reverse and set aside t

he Orders dated June 20, 1991 and September 19, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court

, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila in Civil Case No. 90-183.

Facts

On April 17, 1988, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., on behalf the petitioner, the

Holy See, and Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC), agreed to sell to Ramon Licup

a parcel of land (Lot 5-A located in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila

and registered in the name of petitioner) and lots 5-B and 5-D registered under

PRC with the following conditions: earnest money of P100,000.00 be paid by Licup

to the sellers and that the sellers clear the said lots of squatters. In the sa

me month, Licup assigned his rights over the property to private respondent, Sta

rbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. and informed them of the assignment. Thereafter,

private respondent demanded from Msgr. Cirilos the fulfillment of the assignmen

t; however, Msgr. Cirilos informed private respondent of the squatters' refusal

to vacate the lots, proposing instead either that private respondent undertake t

he eviction or that the earnest money be returned to the latter. Private respond

ent counter-proposed that if it would undertake the eviction of the squatters, t

he purchase price of the lots should be reduced from P1,240.00 to P1,150.00 per

square meter. Msgr. Cirilos returned the earnest money of P100,000.00 and wrote

private respondent giving it seven days from receipt of the letter to pay the or

iginal purchase price in cash. Private respondent sent the earnest money back to

the sellers, but later discovered that on March 30, 1989, petitioner and the PR

C, without notice to private respondent, sold the lots to Tropicana Properties a

nd Development Corporation (Tropicana), as evidenced by two separate Deeds of Sa

le, one over Lot 5-A, and another over Lots 5-B and 5-D; and that the sellers' t

ransfer certificate of title over the lots were cancelled, transferred and regis

tered in the name of Tropicana. Tropicana induced petitioner and the PRC to sell

the lots to it and thus enriched itself at the expense of private respondent. P

rivate respondent demanded the rescission of the sale to Tropicana and the recon

veyance of the lots, to no avail and private respondent is willing and able to c

omply with the terms of the contract to sell and has actually made plans to deve

lop the lots into a townhouse project, but in view of the sellers' breach, it lo

st profits of not less than P30,000,000.00.

ISSUE

W/n tHE HOLY SEE HAS SOVEREiGN IMMUNITY in the sale of the parcel of land (lot 5

-a).

HELD

YES. The Holy See has sovereign immunity in the sale of the parcel of land (lot

5-A).
Claim to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is stated in the Public International

Law. When state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomati

c immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where

it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.

The Department of Foreign Affairs was allowed by the Court to intervene on the s

ide of petitioner by filing a memorandum of support for the petitioner s claim of

sovereign immunity.

The Holy See exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is

represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio. The petitioner is, therefore

, a foreign state enjoying sovereign immunity.

The immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or a

cts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure ge

stionis. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereo

f, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain

or profit. The petitioner s sale of the land is a commercial transaction that is

an act jure imperii. The petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary co

urse of a real estate business, the said transaction can be categorized as an ac

t jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subseq

uent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said

property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippi

nes.

The petition for certiorari was granted and the complaint against petitioner was

dismissed.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. LANTION€

GR No. 139465€ January 18, 2000.

FACTS

Petitioner is the secretary of justice who has in his possession the extradition

papers to be filed against private respondent Mark Jimenez. Private respondent

requested the petitioner for copies of such documents against him and asks for a

mple time for him to submit a response to it. Petitioner declined to grant such

a request in line with article 7 of the RP-US Extradition treaty. Private respon

dent filed a petition against the petitioner at the RTC of the National Capital

Judicial Region for mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition, with an application f

or the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction. His defense is th

at the petitioner's actions violate his basic due process rights upheld by the C

onstitution's due process clause. Respondent judge issued an order on August 10,

1999 favoring the side of the private respondent. Thus, the petitioner elevated

its case to the Supreme Court for certiorari.

ISSUE

W/N UPHOLD A CITIZEN'S BASIC DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OR THE GOVERNMENTS IRONCLAD DUTI

ES UNDER A TREATY

HELD

THE PETITION IS DISMISSED for lack of merit. The court grants that the right to

information is implemented by the right of access to information within the cont

rol of the government. But in the case at hand, the invocation of this right by

the petitioner is premature since no official action of our own government has y

et been done. Only when such formal action is present that the court will favor

the interests necessary for the proper functioning of government The court also

argues that there is no conflict between the RP-US treaty and the Constitution.

All they see is a void in the provisions of the treaty as regards to the basic d

ue process rights of the extraditee. The court disagrees with such provisions of

the treaty.

The court also rejects the petitioner's confidentiality argument as it is overtu

rned by the petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make available

at that time will be obtainable in trial.

The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that the essence of due p

rocess in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one side or to

seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of. The Court will not

tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of

a law or treaty.

THE COURT UPHELD THE BASIC DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT. The pet

itioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition paper

s against him and to provide ample time for him to submit his comment with suppo

rting evidence.

International School Alliance of Educators v. Hon Leonardo A. Quisumbing

GR # 128845, June 1, 2000

FACTS: Petitioner questioned the difference in salary rates between foreign€€and€ loca

l€€ hires during the collective bargaining agreement held June 1995. Another issue i

s whether foreign hires should be included in the approptiate bargaining unit.

€€€€€€€€€€€€ On Sept. 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. June 10,1996, DOLE issu

esolving the parity and representation issues in favor of the school. Motion for

reconsideration was also denied by DOLE Sec. Quisumbing.

ISSUE:

1.WON the difference in salary rates between foreign and local hires constitutes

racial discrimination and contrary to the principle of "equal pay for equal wor

k".

2. WON foreign hires be included in the apprpriate bargaining unit.

€
HELD:

YES on the first issue. Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications

, skill, effort and responsiblity, under similar conditions, should be paid simi

lar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its "international character" not

hwithstanding.

NO, on the second issue. It does not appear that foreign hires have indicated th

eir intention to be grouped together with local hires for purposes of collective

bargaining. The collective bargaining in this school also shows that these grou

ps were always treated separately.Foreign hires have limited tenure, local hires

enjoy security of tenure.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN P

ART. The orders of the Sec. of Labor and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and Marc

h 19, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, insofar as they uphold the practi

ce of respondent School of according foreign hires higher salaries than local hi

res.

Carino vs. Commission on Human Rights

FACTS: On Sept. 14, 1990, members of the Manila Public School Teachers Associat

ion (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT), staged a protest rally at

the DECS premises without disrupting classes as a last call for the government t

o negotiate the granting of demands.€ This action elicited no response from the Se
cretary of Education thus provoking some 800 public school teachers, among them

members of MPSTA and ACT to undertake "mass concerted actions" in Liwasang Bonif

acio to "dramatize and highlight" their plight.€ The "mass actions" consisted in s

waying away from their classes.€

Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions we

re served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hr

s. or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to

initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire the
ir replacements.

The directives notwithstanding, the mass actions proceeded with more teachers jo

ining in the next few days, among them were the 8 respondents (teachers at the R

amon Magsaysay High School in Manila).

The teachers failed to heed the return-to-work order and were subsequently charg

ed on the principal's report, given 5 days to answer the charges and preventivel

y suspended for ninety days.

Respondents Budoy, Babaran del Castillo and Esber filed separate answers and opt

ed for a formal investigation, and also moved for "suspension of the administrat

ive proceedings pending resolution.|

Their motion for suspension was denied in November of 1990 as well as their moti

on for reconsideration and due to this, "the respondents led by their counsel st

aged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings."€ After

evaluation of the evidence, Esber was dismissed and Babaran, Budoy and del Casti

llo

were suspended for nine months.€ MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the

RTC against Carino which was dismissed and later went to the Supreme Court.

In the meantime, the respondent teachers proceeded to the Commission on Human Ri

ghts to complain the fact that while they were participating in "mass actions, t

hey learned of their replacements as teachers (allegedly without notice and for

reasons unknown to them).€ Consequently, the Commission scheduled a dialogue on Oc

t. 11, 1990

and sent a subpoena to Sec. Carino requiring his attendance.€ In the said dialogue

, the Commission issued an Order and expressed its intention to try and decide o

r hear and exercise its jurisdiction.€ Sec. Carino filed a motion to ismiss the sa
id Order but the Commission denied.€ Thus, this case.€

ISSUE:€ Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Cons

titution to determine with character of finality and definiteness the same issue

s which have been passed upon and decided by the DECS Secretary and whether or n

ot, like a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdictio

n over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific

type of cases.

HELD:€ NO for both issues.

REASONS:€ The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicati

ve power is that it may investigate and fact-finding is not adjudication.€ It cann

ot try and decide cases as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do.

PARAS, J., Concurring.

€€€€€€ The Commission should realize that while there are "human rights", there are also co

responding "human obligations."

Francisco. Et. Al. vs The House of Representatives

G. R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003

Facts:

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complai

nt (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and

seven Associate Justices of this Court for culpable violation of the Constitutio

n, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes. The complaint was endorsed

by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilang

alen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 in ac
cordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of

the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement

by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within t

en session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days

thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Mem
bers, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such r

eferral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be ca

lendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt the

reof.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachm

ent complaint was sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the same on October 22,

2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this

effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the sai

d Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first compla

int or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to

dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary Genera

l of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarl

ac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chi

ef Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legisla

tive inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachm

ent complaint was accompanied by a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by

at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Issue:

These petitions raise five substantial issues:

I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constit

ute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.

II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Se

ction 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.

III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into t
he Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitu

tionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted

by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Secti

on 3, Article XI of the Constitution.

V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of

Article XI of the Constitution.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment

Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28,

2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint again

st Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilbe

rto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secr

etary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred unde

r paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

RATIO:

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the imp

eachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial a

ction taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.

Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, anothe

r may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following

Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former P

resident Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven

associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Comm
ittee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Re

presentatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the

Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition again

st the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable office

r within a one-year period.

Ebranilag vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu.

FACTS:

Petitioners are 43 high school students and elementary school students of public

schools in the towns around Cebu as represented by their parents.

The parents and consequently the children are affiliated in a religious sect kno

w as Jehovah's Witness.

J.W. admittedly teach their children not so salute the flag, sing the national a

nthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of

worship" or religious devotion, which they cannot conscientiously give to anyone

or anything except God."

On the above ceremonies in their respective schools, the children does not raise

their hand nor sing nor pledge but only stand attention during the ceremony.

The Schools of Cebu expelled these students based on R.A 1265 and Department ord

er No. 8 series of 1955 which govern rules and regulations for conducting the fl

ag ceremony in all educational institutions. This is also called the Flag Salute

Law.

ISSUE:

Does the State have the right to impose its will on a religious belief on the co

ntext that the ceremony in question is not an act of worship?

HELD: Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest

priority and the amplest protection among human rights for it involves the relat

ionship of man to his Creator.€ Forcing a small religious group, through the iron

hand of law to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs,

will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted auth

orities. something that the ceremony is supposed to foster.€

Also, standing attention and not disturbing the ceremony could not possibly dist

urb the peace, or pose a grave and present danger of serious evil to public safe

ty, public morals, health or any other legitimate public interest.

Aguirre vs Aguirre

GRN L-33080 August 15, 1974. 58 SCRA 461

FACTS

Leoncia, Luis, and Luningning Aguirre filed a petition for review of a decision

of the Court of Appeals that was actually in favor of them but the petitioners c

laimed that it was short of what they should be entitled to under the law.

Respondents were Vicenta, Felipe, Andrea, Caridad, Soccoro, Severino (substitute

to deceased father Dominador), Luis Aguirre Jr. and Cristeta Lamahang, and the

CA.

The Court of First Instance of Batangas acted favorably on the partition and dam

ages of the properties among the descendants of the spouses Gregorio Aguirre and

Regina Antolin. But petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals because of the

failure of the trial court to award them damages on the ground of insufficiency

of evidence.

But the CA said this was an error and found out that the damages suffered by the

petitioners amounted to P1,000 yearly since 1955. But the dispositive (transfer

of ownership) portion of CA s decision simply says P1,000 without qualification;

hence the petition for review.

The P1,000 represents the value of corn, rice, mangoes copras, salt, among other

s which the plaintiffs were entitled to but were not able to received because of
 unjustified acts of the defendants. P800 was supposed to have originated from the

properties of Gregorio Aguirre and Regina Antolin while P200 was supposed to ha

ve come from properties of Melencio Aguirre and Fructuosa Perez.

Properties of Melecio Aguirre and Fructuosa Perez included unsurveyed coconut la

nds with an area of 500 hectares. The coconut plantation in Jaybanga, Lobo, Bata

ngas has 3,000 fruit bearing coconut tress while the rice lands were cultivated

by about 50 families, residing as permanent tenants.

Petitioners received shares of palay, salt, mangoes, corn only until 1954. In 19

55, Felipe, Dominador, Caridad and Socorro divided the 1/6 of the share due the

petitioners and gave these to a certain Cristeta Lamahang.

Aside from the P1,000 yearly damage, the CA also awarded attorney s fees of P5,000

; moral damages of P2,000; exemplary damages of P1,000 and even fees for expert

witness of P500.

ISSUES

Whether the CA erred in failing to qualify the yearly damages to petitioners

Whether the CA erred in failing to sentence defendants to pay petitioners intere

sts and costs;

Whether petitioners are entitled to corresponding adjustment of the amounts gran

ted to them as a result of the rise in the dollar exchange rate;

HELD

CA s decision was affirmed with modification:

Yes. The dispositive portion of its decision simply says P1,000 without qualific

ation, which is a manifest ambiguity, if not inconsistency. There can be hardly

any doubt that it was the intention of the CA to allow the recovery of the yearl

y damages it found out to have suffered by the petitioners. We must admit that th

e delays in the administration of justice could be avoided if greater care were

taken in the drafting of the dispositive portions of decisions

Yes. Petitioners were entitled to interest at the legal rate from the date of th

e judgment of the trial court.

No. There is no sufficient legal basis for this.

People vs. Malmstedt

GR No. 91107 June 19, 1991

Facts:

1. Accused is Mikael Malmstedt

2. Upon information that illegal drugs were being transported from Sagada, NARCO

M official setup a checkpoint at Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province to check all in

coming vehicles from the Cordillera Region. A bus was stopped at about 130 in th

e afternon where the accused was riding. A routine inspection was conducted by

officers of NARCOM and accused was questioned by officers when his waist was not

iced to be sporting a bulge. Officer's asked for accused passport and when the

accused failed to comply, officers asked him to bring out whatever was causing t

he bulge. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag that contained what w

as suspected to be hashish. Thereafter the suspect was invited outside the bus

for questioning. Accused stopped to get two travelling bags and when officers op

ened the bag they found two teddy bears. It was only after the officers opened

the bag that the accused finally presented his passport. The officers noticed th

at the two teddy bears also had bulges which did not appear to be foam stuffing.

It was later when the suspect was brought to NARCOM headquarters at Camp Dangw

a, La Trinidad, Benguet that the officers confirmed that all the bulges were pac

kets of hashish.

Issue:

W/N search without warrant is legal when searchis made pursuantto a lawful arres

t?
W/N the search that led to Malmstedt's arrest was legal.

Held:

Yes. The officers search fall under warrantless search incident to lawful arres

t. Accused was searched and arrested while transporting illegal drugs (hashish)
. The crime of transporting was actually being committed when the search was ma

de. The accused was caught flagrante delicto.

The receipt of information that a foreigner from Sagada had illegal drugs in his

possession and the fact that the accused failed to produce his passport gave ri

se to probable cause which justified the warrantless search.

Dissenting opinion: (minority opinion)

The fruits of the search (illegal drugs) retroactively established probable caus

e or in other words justified the illegal search made by the officers. In essenc

e the officers were fishing for evidence illegally but since their actions produ

ced a successful arrest it gave them the probable cause they needed to justify t

he search. The drugs are inadmissible in evidence since the search was made ill

egally.

Barnes v. Glen theatre, Inc. 501 U.D. 560

Facts:

Glen theatre, Inc. and Kitty Kat lounge as represented by Ms. Darlene Millier, a

n employee, would like to have complete nudity dancing/performances in their est

ablishments located in the state of Indiana.

The state has a public indecency statute w/c prohibits complete nudity in public

places and requires dancers to wear pastiesa or G-strings, thus petitioners can

not hold their performances.

The petitioners claim that the indecency statute is contrary or is an infringeme

nt on their First Amendment right on freedom of statement and that complete nudi

ty is an expressive activity protected by the Amendment.

Lower court rule in favor of petitioner saying that statute is facially overbroa
d.

Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the decision back to lower court saying t

hat the type of dancing the petitioners are pursuing is not expressive activity

coveret by the Amendment.

Appealed once more, C.A. reversed the decision saying that it is an activity pro

tected by the First Amendment for it impedes the extending of the message of ero

ticism by the dancers.

Supreme court now has the case as granted certiorari.

Issues:

whether or not complete nudity dancing is expressive activity covered by the Fir

st Amendment on freedom of statement.

whether or not the Indiana public indecency statute is an infringement on the pe

titioners First Amendment rights.

Holding:

Issue 1- C.A. decision affirmed (nude dancing is a protected activity)

Issue 2 C.A. decision reversed (indecency statute is not an infringement of the

First Amendment)

Reasons

Issue 1

Jurisprudence supports or says so: Doran v. Salem Inc, California v. Largue, Sch

ad v. borough of Mt. Ephraimm. ( nude dancing is not without the First Amendment)

Issue 2 - O Brien Test (U.S. v O brien)

The indecency statute is a general law regulating conduct and not specifically d

irected at expression(nude dancing)

Govt regulation is sufficiently justified if within constitutional powers of gov

t(Le roy v. Sidley)

govt interest is unrelated to suppression of free statement. Wearing of pasties

or G-strings does not suppress statement as ruled by the court. Nudity is target

ed by the statute, not eroticism or expression.

Incidental restriction on First Amendment rights to freedom of statement should

be no greater than is essential for furtherance of govt. interest.

CHURCH OF LUKUMI BABALU AYE VS. CITY OF HIALEAH

91-948. Decided June 11, 1993€

FACTS:€

In April, 1987, the Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye leased land in the city of Hiale

ah, Florida and announced plans to establish a church, school, cultural center a

nd a museum.

According to its president and priest, petitioner Ernesto Pichardo, the Church s g

oal was to bring the practice of the Santeria religion, including its ritual of

animal sacrifice, out into the open.

The Church began the process of obtaining utility service and receiving the nece

ssary licensing, inspection and zoning approvals, which it all received by early

August, 1987.

The announcement of plans to establish a Santeria Church in Hialeah prompted the

city council to hold an emergency public session on June 9, 1987.

Resolutions and ordinances passed at this and later meetings are the following:

first, Resolution 87-66, which expressed the city residents concern that certain rel

igions may propose to engage in practices inconsistent with public morals, peace

or safety and declared that the City reiterates its commitment to a prohibition a

gainst any and all acts of any and all religious groups which are inconsistent w

ith public morals, peace or safety; second, Ordinance 87-40, which incorporated

in full, except as to penalty, Florida s animal cruelty laws; third, Resolution 87

-90, which noted the city residents great concern regarding the possibility of pub
lic ritualistic animal sacrifices and the state-law prohibition and declared the

city policy to oppose the ritualistic sacrifices of animals within Hialeah, and an

nounced that any person or organization practicing animal sacrifice will be prose

cuted ; fourth, Ordinance 87-52, which defined sacrifice as to unnecessarily kill, to

rment, torture or mutilate an animal in a public or private ritual or ceremony n

ot for the primary purpose of food consumption and prohibited the owning or posse

ssing of an animal intending to use such animal for food purposes with the restric

tion to any individual or group that kills, slaughters or sacrifices animals for

any type of ritual, regardless of whether or not the flesh or blood of the anima

l is to be consumed, exempting slaughtering by licensed establishment(s) of animals

specifically raised for food purposes ; fifth, Ordinance 87-71, which defined sacr

ifice as had Ordinance 87-52, and provided that it shall be unlawful for any pers

on, persons, corporations or associations to sacrifice any animals within the co

rporate limits of the City of Hialeah, Florida ; and sixth, Ordinance 87-72, which

defined slaughter : as the killing of animals for food and prohibited slaughter outs

ide of areas zoned for slaughterhouse use, with the exemption for the slaughter

and processing for sale of small numbers of hogs and/or cattle per week in accord

ance with an exemption provided by state law. All these ordinances and resolution

s passed the city council by unanimous vote. Violations of each of the four ordi

nances were punishable by fines not exceeding $500 or imprisonment not exceeding

60 days, or both.

Following the enactment of these ordinances, the Church and Pichardo filed this

action, alleged violations of their rights under the Free Exercise Clause and so

ught for a declaratory judgment and monetary relief, against the City of Hialeah

and its mayor and members of the city council in their individual capacities.
The District Court ruled for the City. Upon the elevation of the case to the Cou

rt of Appeals, the said body affirmed and concluded that the ordinances were con

sistent with the Constitution. The case was then petitioned to the US Supreme Co

urt.

ISSUE€

whether or not the resolutions and ordinances passed by the city council of Hial

eah violated the rights of the Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye and its congregants u
nder the Free Exercise Clause. €

HELD€

The SC reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, finding the decision of th

e inferior tribunals incompatible with the Free Exercise Clause. The laws passed

were neither neutral nor of general applicability. The SC further presented ind

icators of bias against the religion and its practice of animal sacrifice in the

process of the formulation of the pieces of legislation stated above. The laws

were also not deemed necessary in attaining a compelling governmental interest,

the only exemption to the requirements of neutrality and general applicability.

DOUGHERTY vs. EVANGELISTA

G.R. No. L-2644, Nov. 24, 1906

FACTS: In 1895, Jose Evangelista, defendant, borrowed 2,000 pesos, at 6 per cent

interest from the R.C. bishop of the diocese of Nueva Segovia.€ Defendant gave a

receipt reciting that the money came from the funds of Cofradia de las Animas of

the Cathedral of Vigan.€ He did not state in the receipt the fact that he borrowe

d the money from

the bishop.€ After a year, the defendant signed a document acknowledging that 120

pesos (the amount of the unpaid) interest be advanced to him by the bishop and a

dded to his preexisting loan.€ Evangelista contests the right of Dennis J. Dougher

ty, R.C. bishop of the diocese, to recover the money loaned by his predecessor c

laiming that the administration of funds of a Cofradia did not rest with the bis

hop.

ISSUE:€ Whether the bishop has the right to recover from Evangelista.

HELD:€€ Yes.€ From the RC bishop of Nueva Segovia he took the money, and to the RC bis
hop of Nueva Segovia he must repay it.€ (Verbatim from the decision)

RATIO:€€ €€€€€ Whatever relations the bishop held with the Cofradia, it is plain that he ma

the loan as administrator in behalf of the Cofradia.€ Barlin vs. Ramirez 1 (5 Off.

Gaz., 130)€ Court holds that the defendant should not challenge at the due of his

payment, the same right he didn't question at the time of borrowing.*note that

the lower court judgment was for the plaintiff without specifying Philippine or

other currency.€ This is the basis for the defendant to appeal.€ (See Facts 2)

FACTS 2:€€ The defendant was asked by the court to serve his answer to a previously

overruled demurrer.€ He was notified of this on Jan.7, bound within 5 days therea

fter to serve his answer, but he neglected to except to the order.€ He duly made o

ut and verified on Jan. 12.€ He served it on March 2, deposited it in the post off

ice of Laoag, expecting it to reach Vigan before the opening of the term of cour

t on March 7.€ It was delayed.€ The service was received by the clerk on March 13.€ Ju

dgment against him was entered by default.€ He then moved for a new trial under Su

bsec. 1 of Sec. 145 of Code of Civil Procedure on ground of accident of surprise

ISSUE 2:€ Whether there should be a new trial

HELD:€€ The decision of the lower court was held valid.€ Costs against the defendant.

REASON:€ The delay of post was not the only reason for the non-arrival of the answ

er.€ The defendant offered no excuse for neglecting to answer 6 weeks after the ex

piration of the legal time.€ Rule of stare decisis was enforced Gaspar vs. Molina

1 (3,) Off. Gaz., 651).€ The Court held that the word pesos must be understood as

the established currency of the country at the time it was rendered.€ Since the de

fendant did not move for a new trial on grounds that it was against the weight o

f evidence, the court assumes that the proofs were sufficient to justify it.
DISSENTING OPINION:

CARSON J., dissenting

Carson agrees with the decision save for particularly the part where the judgmen

t seems to hold that when the judgment is rendered in pesos it should be interpr

eted as pesos Philippine currency.€ He states that while this may be the general r

ule, this court has no right to give a wholly different meaning from the court's

(from which the case originated from) intention.€ He believes that there is "no d

oubt that the pesos mentioned in the disposing part of the judgment of the trial

court were of the same class as those mentioned in the decision and findings an

d the original contract, and not pesos Philippine currency".€ (Verbatim from disse

nting opinion)€ He believes that the case should be sent back for the taking of fu

rther evidence as to the relative value of pesos de plata in the cotract vs. pes

os Philippine currency with instructions to the lower court to render judgment a

ccordingly.

HELVERING v. HALLOCK et al. (two cases).

SAME v. SQUIRE.

ROTHENSIES v. HUSTON.

BRYANT et al. v. HELVERING.

Nos. 110-112, 183, and 399. 309 U.S. 106, Jan. 29, 1940.

This case covers 5 subcases (110-112, 183 and 399)

These cases raise the same question, namely, transfers of property inter vivos m

ade in trust, the particulars of which will later appear, are within the provisi

ons of 302(c) of the Revenue Act of 1926

The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including t
he value at the time of his death of all property, rent or personal, tangible or

intangible, wherever situated.

To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made

a transfer, by trust or otherwise, in contemplation of or enjoyment at or after

his death, or of which he has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwis

e, under which he has retained his life or for any period not ascertainable with

out reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before h

is death (1) the possession or enjoyment o, or the right to the income from the

property, or (2) the right either alone or in conjunction with any person, to de

signate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income theref

rom: except in the case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full considerati

on in money or money s worth. Any transfer of a material part of his property in t

he nature of a final disposition or distribution thereof, made by the decedent w

ithin two years prior to his death without such consideration, shall, unless sho

wn to the contrary, be deemed to have been made in contemplation of death within

the meaning of this title. (subchapter) (Section 302c of the Revenue Act of 1926

) [placed this for reference]

HELVERING v. HALLOCK et al. (two cases).

Henry Hallock in 1919 created a trust under a separation agreement, giving the i

ncome to his wife for life, with the provision that if and when Anne Lamson Hall

ock should die and in such event, the trust shall terminate and said Trustee sha

ll pay Henry if he is living any accrued income, then remaining in said trust fu

nd. If Henry is not living then and in such event payment and delivery over shal
l be made to the son and daughter Levitt Hallock and Helen Hallock.

Settlor died in 1932, his divorced wife, the life beneficiary, survived him.

The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trust instrument had conveyed (transf

erred) the 'whole interest' of the decedent, subject only to a 'condition subseq

uent,' which left him nothing 'except a mere possibility of reverter.'

SAME v. SQUIRE.

Nature of the Case: To review a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the

Sixth Circuit, 102 F.2d 1, affirming a decision of Board of Tax Appeal, commiss

ioner brings certiorari.

ROTHENSIES v. HOUSTON.

Decedent by an ante-nuptial agreement in 1925 conveyed property in trust, the in

come to be paid to his prospective wife during her life, subject to the followin

g disposition of the principal:

'In trust if the said Rae Spektor shall die during the lifetime of said George F

. Uber to pay over the principal and all accumulated income thereof unto the sai

d George F. Uber in fee, free and clear of any trust. 'In trust if the said Rae

Spektor after the marriage shall survive the said George F. Uber to pay over the

principal and all accumulated income unto the said Rae Spektor-then Rae Uber-in

fee, free and clear of any trust.'

Mrs. Uber outlived her husband, who died in 1934.

The Circuit Court of Appeals deemed Becker v. St. Louis Trust Co., supra, contro

lling against the inclusion of the trust corpus in the gross estate.

Nature of the Case: To review a judgment if Circuit Court of Appeals for thr Thi

d Circuit, affirming judgment for the plaintiff, the collector brings certiorari

BRYANT v. HELVERING.

Testator provided for the payment of trust income to his wife during her life an

d upon her death to the settlor himself if he should survive her.

The instrument, which was executed in 1917, continued: 'Upon the death of the su

rvivor of said Ida Bryant and the party of the first part, unless this trust sha
ll have been modified or revoked as hereinafter provided, to convey, transfer, a

nd pay over the principal of the trust fund to the executors or administrators o

f the estate of the party hereto of the first part.' There was a further provisi

on giving to the decedent and his wife jointly during their lives, and to either

of them after the death of the other, power to modify, alter or revoke the inst

rument.

The wife survived the husband, who died in 1930.

The Board of Tax Appeals allowed the Commissioner to include in the decedent's g

ross estate only the value of a 'vested reversionary interest' which the Board h

eld the grantor had reserved to himself. On appeal by the taxpayer, the Circuit

Court of Appeals sustained this determination.

Nature of the Case: To review a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit, 104 F. 2d 1011, affirming the decision of the board, the execut

ors bring certiori.

ISSUE

WON the doctrine of stare decisis compel us to accept the distinctions made in t

he St. Louis Trust cases as starting points for still finer distinctions spun ou

t of the tenuosities of surviving feudal law.

WON a principle shall prevail over its later misapplications.

HELD

NO, the Court thinks not. The Klein case rejected the presupposition of such dis

tinctions for the fiscal judgments which 302(c) demands.

NO, The Court holds that they are not bound by reason or by the considerations t

hat underlie stare decisis to persevere in distinctions taken in the application

of a statute which, on further examination, appear consonant neither with the p

urposes of the statute nor with this Court's own conception of it. They therefor

e reject as untenable the diversities taken in the St. Louis Trust cases in appl

ying the Klein doctrine-untenable because they drastically eat into the principl
e which those cases professed to accept and to which we adhere.

In Nos. 110, 111, 112 and 183, the judgments are REVERSED. In No. 399, the judgm

ent is AFFIRMED.

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS concurs in the result upon the ground that each of these c

ases is controlled by our decision in Klein v. United States, 283 U.S. 231 , 51

S.Ct. 398. [309 U.S. 106, 123]

ADDITIONAL

This case covers 5 cases (110-112, 183 and 399) They raise the same question, na

mely, whether transfers of property inter vivos made in trust, are within the pr

ovisions of 302(c) of the Revenue Act of 1926.[2] All involve dispositions of pr

operty by way of trust in which the settlement provides for return or reversion

of the corpus to the donor upon a contingency terminable at his death. Whether t

he transfer made by the decedent in his lifetime is 'intended to take effect in

possession or enjoyment at or after his death' by reason of that which he retain

ed, is the crux of the problem. We must put to one side questions that arise und

er sections of the estate tax law other than 302(c)-sections, that is, relating

to transfers taking place at death. Section 302(c) deals with property not techn

ically passing at death but with interests theretofore created. The taxable even

t is a transfer inter vivos. But the measure of the tax is the value of the tran

sferred property at the time when death brings it into enjoyment.

In each case the Commissioner of Internal Revenue included the trust property in

the decedent's gross estate. In deciding these cases, the lower courts came ac

ross three recent decisions (Klein v. US where the court rejected formal distinct

ions pertaining to real property as irrelevant criteria in this field of taxatio

n that the death of the grantor was the indispensable and intended event which br
ought the larger estate into being for the grantee and effected its transmission

from the dead to the living, thus satisfying the terms of the taxing act and ju

stifying the tax imposed. , Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co. a nd Becker v. St. L

ouis Trust Co. which had distinctions from the Klein doctrine.) In none of the t

hree cases did the dominion over property which finally came to the beneficiary

fall by virtue of the grantor's will, except by his provision that his own death

should establish such final and complete dominion. And yet a mere difference in

phrasing the circumstance by which identic interests in property were brought i

nto being-varying forms of words in the creation of the same worldly interests-w

as found sufficient to exclude the St. Louis Trust settlements from the applicat

ion of the Klein doctrine. Because of the difficulties the lower courts found in

applying the distinctions made by these cases and the seeming disharmony of the

ir results, when judged by the controlling purposes of estate tax law, it was br

ought to the higher court.

M TUASON & CO., INC., VS. MARIANO

(L-33140 October 23, 1978) 85 SCRA 644

FACTS:

Manuela and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the Court of Fir

st Instance of Rizal, wherein they prayed that they be declared the owners of a

certain parcel of land.€ They claimed that the land was acquired by their father b

y Spanish title.

The Aquials alleged that J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon th

e land.€ They further alleged that the land in question had been fraudulently or e

rroneously included in OCT No. 735, and was registered in the names of the petit
ioners Tuason.€ The Aquials also claimed that the TCT were issued to defendants J.

M. Tuason and Co., Inc., University of the Philippines and the National Waterwor

ks and Sewerage System (NAWASA).

The Aquials prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared

void due to irregularities in the land registration proceedings.€ J.M. Tuason and
Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, imp

roper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment.€ The lower court denied the

motion

ISSUE:

W/N OCT NO. 735 AND THE TITLES DERIVED THEREFROM CAN BE QUESTIONED AT THIS LATE

HOUR BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS

HELD/RULING:

NO.€ The court noted that the supposed irregularities in the land registration pro

ceedings were the same issues raised n the civil cases decided by Judge Eulogio

Mencras.€ In that case, Judge Mencias ruled that OCT 735 was invalid.€ On the appeal

to the Supreme Court, that decision was reversed, and the validity of OCT No. 7

35 was once

more upheld.

The court underscored the governing principle of Stare Decisis et non quieta mov

ere.€€ The holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid should no longer be open

to attack.

AYER PROD PTY. LTD v. JUDGE CAPULONG

160 SCRA 865 (1988)

FACTS:

Hal McElroy, an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer Pr

oductions Pty. Ltd. envisioned the filming for commercial viewing the historic E

DSA revolution. The proposed motion picture would essentially be a reenactment

of the events that made possible the revolution; it is designed to be viewed in

a 6-hour mini-series television play, presented in a docu-drama style, creating 4

fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documenta

ry footage as background.

In a letter dated 16 Dec 1987, Hal McElroy informed Juan Ponce Enrile about the

projected motion picture. Enrile replied that he would not approve of the use, a

ppropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of

any member of his family in any cinema, film, or other medium of commercial exp

loitation. Enrile further advised McElroy that in the production, showing, or d

istribution of said or similar film, no reference whatsoever (whether written, v

erbal or visual) should be made to him or any member of his family, much less to

any matter purely personal to him. McElroy acceded to this demand, deleted Enr

ile s name from the movie script, and proceeded with the project.

On 23 Feb 1988, Enrile filed a Complaint alleging that the production of the min

i-series film without his consent and over his objection constitutes an obvious

violation of his right of privacy. The RTC ruled for Enrile and ordered the Aye

r Prod to cease and desist from producing and filming The Four Day Revolution .

ISSUE:

Whether Ayer Prod., in filming The Four Day Revolution , is validly exercising its

freedom of speech and of expression protected under the Constitution.

HELD:

YES. The right of freedom of expression occupies a preferred position in he hei

rarchy of civil liberties (Phil Blooming Mills). It is not, however, without l

imitations.

The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limi

tation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of

the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television
and the movies, is the balancing-of-interests test. The principle requires a cou

rt to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests ob

servable in a given situation or type of situation.

Here, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by Enrile and t

he right of freedom of expression invoked by Ayer Prod. Taking into account the

interplay of those interests, the SC holds that under the particular circumstan

ces presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreemen

t entered into by Ayer Prod., the validity of such agreement will have to be uph

eld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when ex

pression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.

Whether the balancing-of-interests test or the clear and present danger test be

applied in respect of the instant Petitions, the Court believes that the product

ion and filming by Ayer Prod. of the projected motion picture does not, in the c

ircumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon Enrile s right to

privacy.

Note: The Court also put into consideration that the portrayal of Enrile in the

movie was as a public figure. Public figure has been defined as a person who,

by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or

calling which gives the public a legitimate in his doings, his affairs, and his

character, has become a public personage .

Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent, their right

of privacy for 3 reasons:

they had sought publicity and consented to it

their personalities and their affairs had already become public

the press had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public about th
ose who have become legitimate matters of public interests.

In the case at bar, film was not intrusive of Enrile s right to privacy because he

was a public figure. The court defined public figure as a person who, by his a

ccomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling

which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his

character, has become a public personage. It includes anyone who has arrived at

a position where public attention is focused upon him as a person. As a public

person, Enrile had lost, to some extent, their right to privacy. Aside from tha

t, the EDSA Revolution was clearly a subject matter of public interest. It was

not about the personal life of Enrile. It merely included Enrile as a public fi

gure and not as a private person. Since only his actions as a public figure are

referred to in the film, a license from Enrile was not needed to show such acti

ons.

Lawrence v. Texas

On June 30, 1986, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled1 that a Georgia s

tate law which specified that sodomy was a crime punishable by between one month

and twenty years in prison was constitutionally permissable, dismissing claims

that such a law violated the privacy rights of those engaging in sodomy as being

obviously invalid on the grounds that "Proscriptions against that conduct have

ancient roots."

On June 26, 2003. the Supreme Court of the United States, ruling in a similar ca

se involving a law in the state of Texas which criminalized sodomy between membe

rs of the same sex (while not banning sodomy between members of the opposite sex

, or between humans and animals), held that the "right to privacy" was violated
by the law and that laws banning sodomy are invalid.

Justice Byron White, who had been appointed by President Kennedy, wrote the majo

rity opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick. The centerpiece of his argument was that the

right-to-privacy cases, notably Griswold v. Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. Baird

, had all been focused on family issues: child rearing and education, procreatio

n, marriage, and the like, and that it was "evident that none of the rights anno

unced in those cases bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right o

f homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy", and that it was the province of the
courts to protect those rights which were "implicit in the concept of ordered li

berty", which sodomy was not.

Seventeen years later, in the case Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court consider

ed the case of two men who were arrested when police, responding to a weapons co

mplaint, entered their home and found them having sex. In the oral arguments for

the case, lawyers for the arrested men made two arguments:

There is a constitutional right to privacy that encompasses sodomy, and Bowers s

hould be overturned.

A law which bans homosexual sodomy but not heterosexual sodomy is an unconstitut

ional violation of the Equal Protection Clause, and therefore this law should be

overturned.

The majority opinion handed down by Justice Anthony Kennedy (who was appointed b

y President Reagan) threw out the Bowers decision wholesale, arguing that there

is some validity to the equal protection argument but that the current case requ

ires a re-assessment of Bowers. It agreed with the dissent in Bowers that "The s

tatutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled

to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose wi

thout being punished as criminals." Moreover, the community's moral disapprobati

on of homosexuality does not justify the use of the power of the State to enforc

e those views. This should have been obvious when Bowers was decided, Kennedy's

opinion says. Moreover, case law since then has undermined what little validity

the decision had; in particular, the decision in Romer v. Evans that Colorado co

uld not name homosexuals as a solitary class of persons who were deprived of pro

tection under state antidiscrimination laws seriously undermined much of the arg

ument in Bowers. It concluded that "the rationale of Bowers does not withstand c
areful analysis ... Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not co

rrect today. It ought not to remain binding precedent."

Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, another Reagan appointee, who was in the majority i

n Bowers, declined to overrule it, but would overturn the Texas law on equal pro

tection grounds.

Justice Antonin Scalia, in dissent, complains that the overturning of Bowers is

a reckless disregard for precedent, and that the argument for overturning it cou

ld just as reasonably be made about Roe. In addition, he accuses the majority of

unveiling the decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which was marked by "ext

raordinary deference to precedent" as being, in essence, a lie.

Scalia's opinion proceeds to insist that (a) there is no emerging awareness that

liberty gives substantial protection to adult decisions regarding sex, and that

even if there were, an emerging awareness cannot possibly be deeply rooted in t

he nation's legal tradition, and therefore emerging awareness cannot uncover a n

ew fundamental right. Moreover, it is right for a state to "further the belief o

f its citizens that certain forms of sexual behavior are immoral and unacceptabl

e". He dismisses out of hand the equal protection claim on the grounds that if p

rohibiting same-sex marriage doesn't violate equal protection, criminalizing hom

osexual sodomy without criminalizing heterosexual sodomy can't possibly do so ei

ther.

He concludes with a denunciation of the decision as "the product of a law-profes

sion culture that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda", add

ing "It is clear from this that the Court has taken sides in the culture war," a

nd insisting that laws protecting gay people from discrimination deprive many am

ericans of their right to "[protect] themselves and their families from a lifest
yle that they believe to be immoral and destructive." He warns that gay marriage

will be next.

Justice Thomas joined the dissent but added a shot of his own, echoing one of th

e dissenters in Griswold: he would vote to repeal the sodomy law, were he a legi

slator, on the grounds that ti is "uncommonly silly". But as a Justice, his job

is to interpret the Constitution, and he can see no Constitutional bar to this l

aw.

Johnson vs. Texas

(509 U.S. 350)

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

Facts:

On March 23, 1986, Dorsie Lee Johnson Jr., then 19 and along with Amanda Miles d

ecided to rob Allup s convenience store in Synder, Texas after some planning and s

urveying the area.

Johnson announced the holdup and ordered the store attendant, Jack Huddleston to

lie on the floor.

After Huddleston complied with the order, Johnson shot him in the back of the ne

ck, killing him.

The pair had emptied the cash registers of about $160 and each grabbed a carton

of cigarettes.

A few weeks after the commission of the crime, Johnson was arrested for another

robbery and attempted murder in Colorado City, Texas.

Johnson confessed to the murder of Huddleston and the robbery of Allsup s and was

tried and convicted of capital murder.

Two issues were raised to the jury:

Whether the conduct of Johnson which caused the death of Huddleston could result

to another death

Whether there is a probability that Johnson would commit crimes that would pose

as a continuing threat or danger to society in the future

Jury answered yes to both questions.

The trial court sentenced Johnson to death.

Johnson appealed the decision, stating that the jury did not take into considera

tion his youth in deciding the verdict. He contends that petitioner s age must be
considered as a mitigating factor in the decision. Defense presented petitione

r s father to strengthen the claim, painting him as still immature and reckless du

e to his youth.

Issue: Whether the age of the petitioner should be considered by the jury in han

dling out a decision

Decision: Yes. The judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

Reasons: Youth was considered by the jury in handling out a sentence. Petitione

r s age is considered as a mitigating factor. He may change as he grows older. H

owever, the possibility of him committing dangerous acts in the future partly du

e to his present actions cannot be ignored.

Dissent: His youth must not be taken against him.

Reasons: Youth is more than chronological fact. The emotional and mental immatu

rity of young people may cause them to respond to events in ways that adult woul

d not. The jurors could not give effect to this aspect of Johnson s youth.

Morales vs Paredes

55 Phil 565, G. R. No. L-34428. December 29, 1930]

Facts

Pedro, Rosendo, and Prudencio Gavino applied for the registration of a parcel of

land situated in the poblacion of the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan,

and on June 23, 1930, the application was granted and a decision to that effect

rendered. Baltazar Morales, the petitioner, now claims to be the owner of the la

nd but was not advised on the registration proceedings until the early part of S

eptember 1930. He eventually filed a motion, through his counsel Nicolas Belmont

e, on September 18 in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan for the re

consideration of the June 23 decision and as the record shows, the motion may st

ill be pending. Without dismissal of the motion mentioned, the movant brought th

e present action before the Supreme Court (SC) praying that the aforesaid decisi

on be set aside and that a new trial be granted in accordance with Section 513 o

f the Code of Civil Procedure.

Issue

Whether Mr. Morales has legal contention in his petition filed at the SC.

Held

No. The plaintiff has unfortunately mistaken his remedy. Assuming without decidi

ng that the allegations of fraud in his complaint are true, the proper remedy is

to petition for a review under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (LRA). T

he plaintiff s contention that such review cannot be made until the final decree h

as been issued is not in accordance with the view adopted by the SC as can be gl

eaned in the case of Rivera vs. Moran (48 Phil., 836), wherein it was pointed ou

t by the court that Sec. 38 of the LRA, which provides that a petition for revie

w of such a decree on the grounds of fraud must be filed within one year after en

try of the decree , be given further reflection and that what it meant would have

been better expressed by stating that such petitions must be presented before th

e expiration of one year from the entry of the decree. Statutes must be given a

reasonable construction and there can be no possible reason for requiring the co

mplaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging his clai

m of fraud. The plaintiff s view of the extent of actions under Sec. 513 of the Co

de of Civil Procedure is erroneous. The SC had no jurisdiction to reopen judgmen

ts under that section if other adequate remedies are available, and such remedie

s are not lacking in the present case. The case is therefore dismissed by the SC
with the costs against the plaintiff.

LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and VICENCIO VDA. DE SIMEON

G.R. No. L-28126 November 28, 1975

Facts of the Case:

On June 25, 1965, Emiliano Simeon and Alberta Vicencio, husband and wife, brough

t an action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to compel spouses Vita Uy Le

e and Henry Lee to resell to them a parcel of land situated in Sitio Parugan-Iba

Barrio San Jose, Antipolo, Rizal. The land, a homestead with an area of about 2

.7342 hectares, is presently covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57279

issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the names of defendants Vita Uy Lee

and Henry Lee. Defendants filed in due time their answer with affirmative defens

es. After trial, the court decided in favor of Simeon and Vicencio. The counterc

laim of the defendants are dismissed. Defendants (now petitioners) filed a motio

n for new trial and later an urgent motion for reconsideration which were both d

enied by the trial court in its orders of March 23, 1964 and June 25, 1964. The

case is now before Us on a petition for certiorari filed by spouses Vita Uy Lee

and Henry Lee. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the Court of F

irst Instance of Rizal was affirmed in toto. A timely motion for reconsideration

was filed by defendants-appellants (now petitioners) to no avail.

Petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals erred in not making "sufficient a

nd complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised as to fully conserve

petitioners' right to appeal to this Supreme Court on questions of law. before i

t."

More specifically, petitioners assail the failure of the Court of Appeals to inc
lude in its decision the complete text of the three letters sent by respondent (

now substituted by surviving spouse) Emiliano Simeon to petitioner Vita Uy Lee b

efore the expiration of the period within which redemption could be made petitio

ners intimating that such omission has impaired their position on appeal as anot

her question is raised by them on the basis of the terminology of the three lett

ers.
Issues:

Whether or not the period to reconvey the property, subject of this case, under

the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141 has prescribed (expired or lapsed)..

Ruling:

Yes it has prescribed (expired or lapsed). The rule that tender of payment of th

e repurchase price is necessary to exercise the right of redemption finds suppor

t in civil law. Article 1616 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, in the absenc

e of an applicable provision in Commonwealth Act No. 141, furnishes the guide, t

o wit: "The vendor cannot avail himself of the right of repurchase without retur

ning to the vendee the price of the sale ...".

It is clear that the mere sending of letters by vendor Simeon expressing his des

ire to repurchase the property without an accompanying tender of redemption pric

e fell short of the requirements of law. Having failed to properly exercise his

right of redemption within the statutory five-year period, the right is lost and

the same can no longer be revived by the filing of an action to compel redempti

on after the lapse of the period. Petitioner Vita Uy Lee was justified in ignori

ng the letters sent her by respondent Emiliano Simeon because the mere mention t

herein of respondent's intention to redeem the property, without making tender o

f payment, did not constitute a bona fide offer of repurchase. The rule that ten

der of the repurchase price is dispensed with where the vendee has refused to pe

rmit the repurchase is premised on the ground that under such circumstance the v

endee will also refuse the tender of payment. From petitioner Lee's silence whic

h we have shown above to be justified, no such deduction can be made. Unlike a f

lat refusal, her silence did not close the door to respondent Simeon's subsequen

t tender of payment, had he wished to do so, provided that the same was made wit
hin five-year period. Yet he neglected to tender payment and, instead, merely fi

led an action to compel reconveyance after the expiration of the period.

The Supreme Court, therefore, in the light of the above ruling reversed the deci

sion oif the Court of Appeals.

Mariano Ulep vs. Legal Clinic

GR. No. 553, June 17, 1993

FACTS:

Petitioner is a member of the legal profession. He claims that he is offended a

nd ashamed by the advertisements issued by The Legal Clinic as they are _champer

tous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession and destructive of the confiden

ce of the community in the integrity_ of lawyers. Respondent meanwhile admits t

he publication and issuance of said advertisements but claims that it is not eng

aged in the practice of law. The Legal Clinic renders support services through

paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the services offered by respondent (The Legal Clinic) as advertis

ed constitutes practice of law.

In either case, whether the same can properly be suspect of advertisements herei

n complained.

HELD:

YES. The Court agrees with the observations of the various bar associations that

the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute the practice of law. Th

e use of the name _The Legal Clinic_ gives the impression that respondent corpor

ation is being operated by lawyers and thus renders legal services. While some o
f the services being offered merely involve mechanical and technical know how, t

hese will not suffice to justify an exception. Though respondent corporation do

es not represent clients in court, it is still engaged in the practice of law as

this is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, g
iving legal advice and contract drafting. Moreover, the advertisements in quest

ion (annex B)are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals

, public order and public policy.

What is important is that respondent corporation is engaged in the practice of l

aw by the nature of the services it offers (though rendered by paralegals) which

thereby brings it within the statutory prohibitions against the publication of

such advertisements. _It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his ta

lents or skills_law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himsel

f and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by a

dvertising his services or offering them in public._

The Court resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN respondent from issuing or causing the

publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the s

ame tenor and purpose as Annexes a and B.

IN RE: DALMACIO DE LOS ANGELES

Case No. 350 €August 7, 1959€

FACTS:

Atty. Dalmacio de los Angeles was convicted of the crime of attempted bribery in

a final decision rendered by the Court of Appeals and was sentenced to two year

s, four months and one day of destierro and to pay a fine of P2300, with subsidi

ary destierro in case of insolvency.€

ISSUES:

Under Section 1, Rule 128, of the Rules of Court, he was required to show cause

why he should not be disbarred.€

In written explanation he appealed to the sympathy and mercy of this Court consi

dering that he has six children to support.€

He made manifest to the court that if he ever committed what is attributed to hi

m, it was merely due to an error of judgment.€

DECISION:

He was disbarred from the roll of attorneys.€

Under Section 25, Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed from his office a

s attorney if he is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude the reason be

hind this rule being that the continued possession of a good moral character is

a requisite condition for the rightful continuance of the lawyer in the practice

of law with the result that the loss of such qualification justifies his disbar

ment.€

And since bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude, this court i

s constrained to decree his disbarment as ordained by Section 21 of Rule 127.

NIELSON & COMPANY, INC. vs. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY.

26 SCRA 540 GRN L-21601 December 28, 1968

Facts:

Operating agreement between Nielson and Co., Inc and Lepanto Consolidated Mining

Company, whereby the former operated and managed the latter s mining property.

Contract was entered into on Jan. 30, 1937, for five years, with an option to re

new for the same term on the same basis. Contract was renewed in 1941.

Dec. 1941 WW II

Jan. 1942 mining operations ceased.

Feb. 1942 mills, plants and other property were destroyed and occupied by the Ja

panese Army.

1945 Japanese forces are ousted and parties regain control of the property.
1945 disagreement between Nielson and Lepanto as to w/n contract is to expire in

1947.

June 26, 1948 mining operations officially resumed under Lepanto.

Terms of the contract: Both parties to this agreement fully recognize that the t
erms of this Agreement are made possible only because of the faith or confidence

that the Officials of each company have in the other; therefore, in order to as

sure that such confidence and faith shall abide and continue, NIELSON agrees tha

t LEPANTO may cancel this Agreement at any time upon ninety (90) days written no

tice, in the event that NIELSON for any reason whatsoever, except acts of God, s

trike and other causes beyond its control, shall cease to prosecute the operatio

n and development of the properties herein described, in good faith and in accor

dance with approved mining practice.

Nielson contends that the contract was suspended and should be extended.

Lepanto contends that the contract expired in 1947 and that period of suspension

did not extend the contract.

The Court of First Instance (CFI) in Manila held for the defendant, Lepanto.

Nielsen appealed to the Supreme Court (SC) and the SC reversed the decision of t

he CFI; It held that the contract was suspended until Jan. 26, 1948, when mining

operations resumed.

Lepanto seeks for motion for reconsideration based on the ff grounds:

1. That the contract entered into was a contract of agency which was effect

ively revoked and terminated in 1945;

2. That the court erred in holding that the period of suspension extended t

he life of the management contract.

3. The court erred in reversing the ruling of the trial judge that the mana

gement agreement was only suspended but not extended on account of the war.

4. The court erred in reversing the finding of the trial judge that Nielson

's action had prescribed, but considering only the first claim and ignoring the

prescriptibility of the other claims.

5. The court erred in holding that the period of suspension of the contract

on account of the war lasted from February 1942 to June 26, 1948.

6. Assuming arguendo that Nielson is entitled to any relief, the court erre

d in awarding as damages (a) 10% of the cash dividends declared and paid in Dece

mber, 1941; (b) the management fee of P2,500.00 for the month of January, 1942;

and (c) the full contract price for the extended period of sixty months, since t

hese damages were neither demanded nor proved and, in any case, not allowable un

der the general law of damages.

7. Assuming arguendo that appellant is entitled to any relief, the court er

red in ordering appellee to issue and deliver to appellant share's of stock toge

ther with fruits thereof.

8. The court erred in awarding to appellant an undetermined amount of share

s of stock and/or cash, which award cannot be ascertained and executed without f

urther litigation.

9. The court erred in rendering judgment for attorney's fees.

Issue 1: W/N management contract be considered a contract of agency and t

herefore effectively revoked and terminated.

Held: No, the SC held that this ground of the motion for reconsideration be br

ushed aside.

It is the rule, and the settled doctrine of this Court, that a party cannot chan

ge his theory on appeal-that is, that a party cannot raise in the appellate cour

t any question of law or of fact that was not raised in the court below or which

was not within the issue made by the parties in their pleadings

(Obiter) Even if allowed, it cannot be sustained. It is the SC s view that the man

agement contract is not a contract of agency but a contract of lease of services

hence cannot be unilaterally revoked.

Issue 2: W/N the contract was actually suspended and extended until 1948,

on account of the war and its aftermath.

Held: Yes, the contract was suspended and extended until 1948.

The management contract provides as follows: In the event of inundation,

flooding of the mine, typhoon, earthquake or any other force majeure, war, insur
rection, civil commotion, organized strike, riot, fire, injury to the machinery

or other event or cause reasonably beyond the control of NIELSON and which adver

sely affects the work of mining and milling; NIELSON shall report such fact to L

EPANTO and without liability or breach of the terms of this Agreement, the same

shall remain in suspense, wholly or partially during the terms of such inability

. Also, since damages caused by the war were severe, rebuilding of the mines had

to be undergone and thus causing the operations to officially resume on June 26,

1948.

Issue 3: W/N damages awarded to Nielson is proper; (a) 10% of the cash di

vidends declared and paid in December, 1941; (b) the management fee of P2,500.00

for the month of January, 1942; and (c) the full contract price for the extende

d period of sixty months; (d) to issue and deliver to appellant share's of stock

together with fruits thereof; (e) an undetermined amount of shares of stock and

/or cash, and; (f) attorney's fees.

Held: Awards (a), (b), (c), and (f), with proper discretion of the court, are

granted. Awards (d), and (c), however, are not granted.

Awards (a), (b), (c) are awarded because it is based on the stipulations

stated in the contract agreed upon by both parties.

Award (f), is granted since attorney s fees are given to the discretion of

the court.

Award (d) and (c) is not granted because it is under the Corporation Law that st

ock dividends can only be given to stockholders of the said corporation, of whic

h, Nielson and Co., Inc., is not a part of.

Valmonte v. De Villa
G.R. No. 83988. May 24, 1990. 185 SCRA 665

Facts:

Petitioners are members of the Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People s Rights.

Their petition for prohibition seeking the declaration of checkpoints as uncon

stitutional was dismissed. Petitioners filed the instant motion and supplementa

l motion for reconsideration. Respondents are General Renato de Villa and the N

ational Capital region District Command. Checkpoints may be allowed and install

ed by the government. In its decision, the Court does not legalize all checkpoi

nts, declaring instead that checkpoints are not illegal per se. In fact, checkp

oints are used as security measure in order to entrap criminals, considering rec

ent and on-going events such as the sixth attempted coup d etat staged last Decemb

er 1, 1989, the NPA move against the armed forces, murders, sex crimes and smugg

ling. As long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to

a body search and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search,

said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual s right again

st unreasonable search. A routine checkpoint stop involves only a brief detenti

on of travelers, answering a brief question or two. If vehicles are stopped and

extensively searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies reas

onable belief that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the

vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense.

Issue:

W/n checkpoints are constitutional.

Held:

Yes. Completely banning checkpoints is to lose sight of the fact that the real

objective behind their use is necessary. The government has the equal right, un
der its police power, to select the reasonable means and methods for best achiev

ing them. Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude on the motoring public and ca

nnot be considered as violative of an individual s right against unreasonable sear

ch. Potential interference is minimal and checkpoint operations involve less di

scretionary enforcement activity. The Court s decision was concerned with power,

on whether the government employing the military has the power to install said c

heckpoints, and does not validate nor condone abuses committed by the military m

anning the checkpoints. The Court assumes that the men in uniform are assigned

to the checkpoints to protect the citizenry.

Motion for reconsideration is denied.

COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 110318 August 28, 1996.

FACTS

Petitioners are foreign corporations that lodged a formal complaint with the NBI

for violation of PD No. 49,as amended, a.k.a. Decree on the Protection of Intell

ectual Property and sought its assistance in their anti-film piracy drive. Survei

llance operations of various video establishments in Metro Manila were then made

, including that of Sunshine Home Video Inc. in Magallanes, Makati.

On November 14, 1987, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes applied for a search warra

nt with the court a quo against Sunshine. Agent Reyes and other witnesses, Mr. R

ene C. Baltazar and Atty. Rico V. Domingo, provided affidavits and depositions d

uring the hearing of the application for the warrant. Search Warrant No. 87-053

for violation of sec. 56 of PD No. 49 was then issued. On December 14, 1987, at

1:45 p.m., the warrant was served and a receipt of properties tendered to Mr. Da

nilo A. Pelindario, registered owner-proprietor of Sunshine.

On December 16, 1987, A Return of Search Warrant was filed with the Court.

Then, a Motion To Lift the Order of Search Warrant was filed but was later denied

for lack of merit.

A Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of denial was filed and then granted b

y the court, citing the fact that master tapes of copyrighted films were never p

resented in the proceedings for the issuance of the search warrants in question.

Petitioners thereafter appealed the order of the Trial Court granting private re

spondents motion for reconsideration, to the Court of Appeals. Said appeal was di

smissed and the motion for reconsideration thereof denied. Hence. This petition

was brought to Court particularly challenging the validity of respondent court s r

etroactive application of the ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Co

urt of Appeals, et al., promulgated on August 19, 1988 (long after hearing of ap

plication for search warrant of Sunshine) in dismissing petitioner s appeal and up

holding the quashal of the search warrant by the trial court.

ISSUE

Whether or not the ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appe

als, et al., ordering that for the determination of probable cause to support th

e issuance of a search warrant in copyright infringement cases involving videogr

ams, the production of the master tape for comparison with the allegedly pirated

copies is necessary, should be retroactively applied as grounds for quashal of

a search warrant previously issued.

HELD

NO. The 20th Century Fox ruling cannot be retroactively applied to the instant c

ase because there was satisfactory compliance with the then prevailing standards

under the law for determination of probable cause. The lower court could not ha

ve possibly expected more evidence from petitioners in their application for a s

earch warrant other than what the law and jurisprudence, then existing and judic

ially accepted, required with respect to finding of probable cause.

 Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are neverthele

ss evidence of what the laws mean. According to the Article 8 of the New Civil C

ode, Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution sh

all form part of the legal system. The settled rule supported by numerous author

ities is a restatement of the legal maxim legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet th

e interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force
of law. But when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is a

dopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply t

o parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals,

and necessarily inclusive of the order of the lower court dated Nov. 22, 1988, a

re hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The order of the court a quo of September 5, 1

988 upholding the validity of Search Warrant No. 87-053 is hereby REINSTATED and

said court is DIRECTED to take and expeditiously proceed with such appropriate

proceedings as may be called for in this case. Treble costs are further assessed

against private respondents.

NOTES

PRINCIPLE OF PROSPECTIVITY

o Applies not only to original or amendatory statutes and administrative r

ulings and circulars, but also, and properly so to judicial decisions.

o Lex prospicit, non respicit the law looks forward not backward

20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

164 SCRA 655

Facts:

The petitioner sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NB

I) to conduct searches and seizures in connection with the latter s anti-film pira

cy campaign. Through a letter-complaint dated August 26, 1985, the petitioner a

lleged that certain videotape outlets all over the Metro Manila were engaged in

the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films, in video tape form w

hich constitutes a flagrant violation of Presidential Decree No. 49 (Decree on t

he Protection of Intellectual Property)

Acting on the letter-complaint, the NBI conducted surveillance and investigation

of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed three (3) ap

plications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by the private re

spondents. These applications were consolidated and heard by the Regional Trial

Court of Makati, Branch 132.

On September 4, 1985, the lower court issued the desired search warrants on the

basis of probable cause.

After the raids occurred, respondents then filed for a Motion to Lift Search War

rants.

Acting on the Motion to Lift Search Warrants, the lower court issued an order li

fting the warrants issued earlier. The petitioner thereafter filed a motion for

reconsideration, but was denied. The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner fo

r certiorari likewise filed by the petitioner.

Issue: W/N the search warrants were properly lifter by the judge for want of pro

bably cause.

Ruling:

Yes, Based on Sec. 2 Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that no warrant sh

all be issued except upon probable cause. This constitutional guarantee is a ti

me-honored precept, which circumscribes governmental action with regard to the p

rocurement of a search warrant.

In the case of Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, AFP, the Court had occasion to de

fine probably cause for a valid search as such facts and circumstances which woul

d lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been

committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. It was likewise held by the Court that this consti

tutional provision demands no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or

his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be ju

stified in order to convince the judge, not the individual making the affidavit a

nd seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.

In the case at bar, the lower court lifted the questioned search warrants agains

t the private respondents on the ground that it acted on the application for the

issuance of the said search warrants and granted it on the misrepresentations o

f applicant NBI and its witnesses that infringement of copyright or a piracy of

a particular film have been committed. The lower court ruled that there was no

probable cause that the private respondents violated PD No. 49. As found by the

lower court, the NBI agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal knowle

dge of the subject matter of their testimony which has the alleged commission of

the offense by the private respondents. Only the petitioner s counsel who was al

so a witness during the application for the issuance of the search warrants stat

ed that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the privat

e respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petiti

oner. However, the lower court did not give much credence to his testimony in v

iew of the fact that the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not sh

own to the court during the application.

It was thus ruled that the presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted f

ilms which the pirated films allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of

search warrants against those who have in their possession the pirated films.

The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reprodu

ced from master tapes that it owns.

The essence of copyright infringement is the similarity or at least the substant

ial similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, t

he applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them wit

h the purchased evidence of the videotapes allegedly pirated to determine whethe

r the latter is unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the co

pyrighted films to the probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of

the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant

Moreover, the Court ruled that the questioned warrants were in the nature of gen

eral warrants, against citing the case of Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, AFP, w

herein the search warrants in question were declared void by the Supreme Court.

The articles described in the search warrants television sets, video cassette r

ecorders, rewinders, and tape cleaners are articles which can be found in a vide

o tape store engaged in the legitimate business of lending or renting out of vid

eo tapes.

MARION REYNOLDS STOGNER v. CALIFORNIA

US Supreme Court No. 01-1757, June 26, 2003

Overview. California enacted a criminal statute of limitations in 1993 which exp

anded the time to prosecute a child sex abuse case if the original statute of li

mitations period had expired and the prosecution of the child sex abuse case was

initiated within one year of the victim s report to the police.

Facts. The defendant Stogner was charged with child sex abuse for offenses that

occurred between 1955 and 1973, and at the time the offenses were alleged to hav

e occurred the statute of limitations in California was three years. The state o

f California prosecuted Stogner under a new statute of limitations.

Issue. Does the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution permit th

e prosecution of a criminal offense which has been previously time-barred by a s

tatute of limitations.

Held. The United States Supreme Court held that the California law violates the
Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. The Court stated that th

e California law threatens the kinds of harm that the Clause seeks to avoid, for

the Clause protects liberty by preventing governments from enacting statutes wit

h manifestly unjust and oppressive retroactive effects. The Court also emphasized

that California s new statute of limitations inflicts punishment in cases that we

re not subject to punishment because the original statute of limitations had run

. Finally, the Court stated that numerous courts have concluded that the Ex Post

Facto Clause forbids resurrection of a time-barred prosecution.

Andresons Group, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 114928. January 21, 1997

FACTS:

Petitioner questions the decision of the Court of Appeals which set aside the tw

o orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalookan City, Branch 122 which de

nied private respondents Motion to Dismiss petitioner s complaint on the ground of

lis pendens.

Private respondent Willy Denate entered into an agency agreement with petitioner

as its commission agent for the sale of distilled spirits in Davao City.

November 8, 1991 Denate filed a civil action for collection of sum of money agai

nst petitioner in RTC of Davao City. Denate alleged he was entitled to the amoun

t of P882,107.95, representing commissions that petitioner failed and refused to

pay.

December 19, 1991 Petitioner filed complaint for collection of money from Denate

amounting to P1,618,467.98 after deducting commissions and remittances in RTC o

f Kalookan.

February 5, 1992 Denate filed a Motion to Dismiss the case filed against him by

petitioner on the ground of lis pendens, citing the case filed earlier in RTC of

Davao.

February 14, 1992 petitioner filed its opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.
April 24, 1992 RTC of Kalookan decides that the instant motion was without merit

since jurisdiction has already been acquired by the RTC of Kalookan.

May 29, 1992 Denate filed Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC

on July 1, 1992. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals which set a

side the order of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Should the action in the Kalookan RTC be dismissed on the ground of lis pendens?

HELD:

Yes. To constitute the defense of lis pendens, it must appear that not only are

the parties the same but there is substantial identity in the cause of action an

d relief sought. It is also required that the identity be such that any judgment

which may be rendered in the other would, regardless of which party is successf

ul, amount to res judicata on the case on hand.

All these requisites are present in the instant case. Petitioner s argument that t

he Davao Court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the parties while the Kalo

okan Court already did is untenable. A civil action is commenced by filing a com

plaint with the court. (Investors Finance Corp. v. Elarde, 163 SCRA 60 1988) Nei

ther is it required that the party be served with summons before lis pendens sho

uld apply. (Salacup v. Maddela 91 SCRA 275,279 1979)

In conceptualizing lis pendens, litis pendentia is a sanction of public policy a

gainst multiplicity of suits. The principle upon which a plea of another action

pending is sustained is that the latter action is deemed unnecessary and vexatio

us. The rule on litis pendentia does not require that the later case yield to th

e earlier. The criterion used in determining which case should be abated is the

more appropriate action or which court would be in a better position to serve the
interests of justice.

Applying these criteria, and considering that both cases involve a sum of money

collected in and around Davao, the Davao Court would be in a better position to

hear and try the case, as the witnesses and evidence would be coming from said a

rea.
ISLAMIC DIRECTORATE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CA

GR No. 117897, May 14, 1997. SCRA 272

FACTS:

In 1971, Islamic leaders organized and incorporated the ISLAMIC DIRECTORATE OF T

HE PHILIPPINES (IDP).

In the same year, IDP purchased property in Culiat, Tandang Sora, Q.C.

In 1972, Martial Law was declared and most members fled to escape political pros

ecution.

Thereafter, two Muslim groups came about, the Carpizo Group and the Abbas/Tamano

group. Both claim to be the legitimate IDP.

In 1986, SEC declared that neither were legitimate IDP. Both were prescribed to

prepare and adopt by-laws for submission. Once approved, elections can occur but

neither adhered

In 1989, with no properly concluded Board of Trustees of the IDP, the Caprizo Gr

oup, sold two lands to private respondent Inglesia Ni Cristo (INC) authorizing M

s Ligon as the mortgagee.

In 1991, the Tamano Group, filed a petition (SEC case No.4012) before the SEC se

eking to declare null and void the sale of property by the Caprizo Group. Tamana

won the case in 1993.

Meanwhile, the INC filed a civil case no. Q-90-6937 against Ms. Ligon, to comply

with Caprizo s obligations, which was ruled in 1991 in favor of the INC despite t

he judge being informed of the SEC case No. 4012.

Tamano Group sought to intervene in the civil case no. Q-90-6937, but was denied

on grounds of lack of juridical personality of the IDP-Tamano Group.

Ligon,then filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari in GRN SP-279
73 which was dismissed so she further petitioned it for review before the Suprem

e Court docketed as GRN 107751.

In 1993, INC filed a Motion of Intervention in SEC case No. 4012 but was denied

because the cause had been final and executory.

INC filed it in the Court of Appeals by way of certiorari docketed as CA-C.G. SP

No. 33295. The petition was granted in 1993.

IDP-Tamano Group then filed for instant petition for review in 1994 stating the

Court of Appeals gravely erred in:

Not upholding the jurisdiction of the SEC to declare nullity of the sale.

Encouraging multiplicity of suits

Not applying the principles of estoppel and laches.

While this pended, the Supreme Court rendered judgment in GRN 107751. Ms. Ligon s

petition denied and affirmed the 1992 decision in CA-G.R No. SP-27973.

ISSUE:

Whether or not res judicata applies in the Court of Appeals decision for grantin

g INC s petition in CA-C.G. SP No. 33295.

Whether or not the Courts of Appeal commit reversible error in setting aside tha

t portion of the SEC s Decision in SEC case no. 4012 which declared the sale of la

nd between the IDP-Caprizo group and INC, null and void.

HELD:

NO. Res judicata basically means that the case before the court has already been

resolved by another court, with the same parties, therefore the court at hand s

hould be dismissed. There are two concepts by which res judicata is known. The f

irst being bar by prior judgment where between the first case where the judgment w

as rendered and the second case the judgment was invoked, there is identity in p
arties, subject matters, and cause of action. When the three identities are pres

ent the judgment on the merits rendered in the first constitutes an absolute bar

to the subsequent action. The other concept which is conclusive of judgment , wher

ein there is identity of parties in both cases but no identity of cause of actio

n, then the judgment is conclusive in the second case only as to those matters a

ctually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely in

volve d therein.
Neither of these cases find res judicata because while there is identity in the

subject matter (the IDP property), there is no identity in the parties of both c

ases.

YES. The CA committed reversible error as according to Sec 3 and 5 of the Presid

ential Decree No. 902-A, there can be no question as to the authority of the SEC

to pass ruling on who the legitimate Board of Trustees are within a corporation

. Based on this reasoning that they can declare who the Board are, it can also b

e said that they can declare those that are not on the Board or are considered i

llegitimate. Since it was found that no correct elections occurred nor any rulin

g was passed on as to who was the legitimate IDP, Caprizo had no right, under th

e IDP s name to sell any land that belonged to the IDP. This is found in Article 1

318 of the New Civil Code which states that to constitute a valid contract all t

hree elements must be present: consent of the contracting parties, object certai

n which is the subject matter of the contract and cause of obligation which is e

stablished. Clearly, there was no consent of the contracting parties since the C

aprizo group is not the legitimate owner.

Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals

G.R No. 110921. January 28, 1998

Facts:

On March 16, 1989, petitioner Baltazar Villanueva filed a complaint for reconvey

ance of property with damages against Grace Villanueva and Francisco Villanueva.

The complaint was dismissed on October 29, 2990 for failure of the plaintiff and

his counsel to appear during the pre-trial and trial.

A motion for reconsideration was filed to reinstate the complaint but was denied
by the Court finding the motion not well taken and not meritorious.

On November 26, 1991, petitioner filed another complaint at the Regional Trial C

ourt, OC, for annulment of title and damages with prayer for a temporary restrai

ning order and/or writ of preliminary injunction involving the same real propert

y.

A motion to dismiss was file by private respondent on the ground that the petiti

oner s cause of action is barred by prior judgment to which petitioner filed an op

position.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the Court, in the exerci

se of its equity jurisdiction would not disregard the fundamental principle that

the rules of procedure are not to be applied with rigidity since they are desig

ned to help secure justice, not to override the same.

Furthermore, the petitioner filed a Supplemental Complaint. The same was admitte

d by the trial court.

The private respondents moved to dismiss raising once again the reasons for foru

m-shopping, res judicata and estoppel.

The trial court denied said motion to dismiss.

The private respondents filed a petiotion for certiorari with the Court of Appea

ls assailing the orders of the lower court.

The C.A rendered a decision upholding the ground for dismissal but urge private

respondents there to elevate this decision to the Supreme Court who alone has po

wer to suspend the rules.

ISSUES

Whether or not res judicata applies to the two complaints filed by the petitione

r?
If res judicata is applicable, whether or not the facts and circumstances are ju

stifiable for the relaxation or suspension of res judicata in favor of obtaining

substantial justice?

HELD

Yes, res judicata applies to both cases since all four elements for res judicata

are present. These are:

a) The former judgment or order must be final

b) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered a

fter a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at

the trial of the case.

c) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the sueje

ct matter and the parties

d) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties

, of subject matter and of cause of action.

No, because the facts and circumstances are not justifiable for the relaxation o

f res judicata. The records show no reason for petitioner s failure to prosecute.

The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied for not being well-taken and

not meritorious. Moreover, if petitioner felt aggrieved by the order of denial h

e should have filed an appeal, therefrom, instead of allowing said order to beco

me final and executory. The fact that petitioner did not further pursue the matt

er signifies that either he acknowledged the correctness of the order or he real

ized that it was not worth continuing the case. Moreover, it took him ten months

to file the second case after the dismissal of the first, exhibiting a lackadai

sical attitude unworthy of judicial sympathy. For his fault and complacence, pet

itioner cannot now take refuge under the rule that justice should not be sacrifi

ce to technicality.

Therefore the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

South Central Bell Telephone Company vs. Alabama

Facts:

1. The state (Alabama) requires each corporation doing business in that state to
pay a franchise tax based upon the firm s capital.

Domestic firm (organized under the laws of Alabama) must pay tax in an a

mt. Equal to 1% of the par value of the firm s stock

Foreign firm (organized under the laws of a state other than Alabama) mu

st pay tax in an amt. Equal to 0.3% of the value of the actual amount of capital

employed in Alabama

Alabama law grants domestic firms considerable leeway in controlling their own t

ax base and liability as the firm can set its stock s value at a level well below

its book or market value. Alabama law does not grant a foreign firm the same ben

efits.

In 1986, the Reynolds company and 3 other foreign corporations sued Alabama s tax

authorities because they wanted a refund of the foreign franchise tax they had p

aid on the reason that the tax discriminated against foreign corporations. Thoug

h this tax law may benefit the foreign companies, it was more beneficial for loc

al companies because the latter can shrink its tax base significantly simply by

setting the par value of its stock at a low level. As a result, accdg to Reynold

s, the tax burden that the foreign corps. has was much higher than the burden on

domestic corporations and the tax thus violated both the Commerce and Equal pro

tection clauses (see reference).

The Alabama Supreme court rejected the claims. W/o denying that the franchise ta

x imposed a special burden upon foreign corps.

While the Supreme Court was deciding on that, a different foreign corp, South Ce

ntral Bell (SCB) brought this lawsuit. They had the same claim as Reynolds thoug

h in different tax years. They agreed to wait for the outcome of the former clai

m before filing the suit.

The evidence they presented showed that the Reynolds were wrong, that the tax th

e domestic corps pay does not offset discrimination in the franchise tax. The tr

ial court agreed with the Bell plaintiffs that their evidence, taken together wi

th the recent Com. Clause cases, clearly and abundantly demonstrates that the fra

nchise tax on foreign corps. Discriminates against them for no other reason than

the state of their incorporation.

The state, argued that the Alabama SC s decision rested upon an adequate state gro

und namely state-law principles. The SC rejected its plaintiffs claims on the mer
its and relied upon Reynolds Metals. There is no valid defense that could be mad

e.

Turning to the merits, it is concluded that this court s commerce clause precedent

requires the Court to hold Alabama s franchise tax unconstitutional.

Issue:

The basic question of this case is whether the franchise tax Alabama assesses on

foreign corporations violates the Commerce Clause

Whether the Alabama courts refusal to permit the Bell s plaintiffs to raise their c

onstitutional claims because of res judicata (a matter not open to controversy) d

eprived the plaintiffs of the due process of law guaranteed by the fourteenth ame

ndment

Whether the franchise tax discriminates against interstate commerce, in violati

on of the commerce clause

HELD:

The decision of the Alabama Supreme Court is reversed and the case is remanded f

or further proceedings not inconsistent the following opinion.

Rather than dispute any of these matters, the State says that the flaw in the pet

itioners claim lies not in the application to the Alabama s corporate franchise tax

of this Court s recent negative CC cases. The flaw lies rather in the negative CC

cases themselves. The State adds that the Court should formally reconsider and aba

ndon its negative CC

THUS answered the court, We will not entertain this invitation however because t

he State did not make clear it intended to make this argument until it filed its

brief on the merits.

Turning to the merits, it is concluded that this court s commerce clause precedent
requires us to hold Alabama s franchise tax unconstitutional.

Justice Connor, concurring the state s failure to properly raise its challenge to o

ur negative commerce clause supports a decision not to pass on the merits of thi

s claim.

Justice Thomas, concurring I agree it would be inappropriate to take up the Stat

e s invitation to reconsider our negative CC doctrine in this case because the Stat

e did not make clear it intended to make this argument until it filed its brief

on the merits.

REFERENCE:

The Commerce Clause is a grant of power to Congress, not an express limitation o

n the power of the states to regulate the economy.€ At least four possible interpr

etations of the Commerce Clause have been proposed.€ First, it has been suggested

that the Clause gives Congress the exclusive power to regulate commerce.€ Under th

is interpretation, states are divested of all power to regulate interstate comme

rce.€ Second, it has been suggested that the Clause gives Congress and the states

concurrent power to regulate commerce.€ Under this view, state regulation of comme

rce is invalid only when it is preempted by federal law.€ Third, it has been sugge

sted that the Clause assumes that Congress and the states each have their own mu

tually exclusive zones of regulatory power.€ Under this interpretation, it becomes

the job of the courts to determine whether one sovereign has invaded the exclus

ive regulatory zone of the other.€ Finally, it has been suggested that the Clause

by its own force divests states of the power to regulate commerce in certain way

s, but the states and Congress retain concurrent power to regulate commerce in m

any other ways.€ This fourth interpretation, a complicated hybrid of two others, t

urns out to be the approach taken by the Court in its decisions interpreting the
Commerce Clause.

People of The Philippines vs. Dioscoro Pinuila€

No. L-11374. May 30, 1958

Facts:
The defendant A. Bignay, along with co-accused D.Pinuila and Conrado Diaz, were

charged in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, with the murder of th

e sleeping Buenaventura Dideroy in the early morning of October 20,1948 aboard B

arge No. 560 of the Visayan Stevedoring Company, which was at that time anchored

offshore from the mouth of the Victorias River in the municipality of Victorias

in the province of Negros Oriental. The mastermind of the crime was D.Pinuila,

who had a grudge against the victim, and it was he who paid the other two an amo

unt of two pesos each for their help in killing B.Dideroy. They were witnessed b

y Bonifacio del Cano, a

shipmate of the victim, who awoke and managed to survive the attack; he positive

ly identified them later at the trial. A motion for dismissal was filed by the d

efense on the grounds that the jurisdiction of the Court had not yet been establ

ished as the scene of the crime was on a boat floating offshore and not actually

on the grounds of the municipality of Victorias. The motion was sustained by th

e Court and the case dismissed, but this was appealed by the Government. Despite

the objections of the defense who invoked the principle of double-jeopardy, the

Court of Appeals decided on March 28,1952 that the jurisdiction of the trial co

urt had indeed been proven, therefore the appeal of the Government did not invol

ve double-jeopardy and remanded the case for further proceedings. In the

interim however, the accused were released due to a court order by a petition fo

r habeas corpus, and only A.Bignay was able to be reapprehended for a resumption

of criminal proceedings. During the retrial, the defense no longer raised the i

ssue of double jeopardy, and concentrated on the issue of the validity of eviden

ce beyond reasonable doubt. The defendant was found guilty of having committed m

urder, but after taking into consideration the time he had already spent incarce
rated before his release and after his rearrest, a total of 7 years, as well as

his voluntary surrender and other factors, the court became inclined to be lenie

nt to the defendant. By applying the law on indeterminate sentence, the court th

en found him entitled to the minimum degree of the penalty for the crime reclusi

on temporal, thus sentencing him to a term of not less than 12 years of prsion m

ajor and not more than 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal. Howe

ver, while the case was discussed and before it was voted upon, Chief Justice Pa

ras raised the question of double-jeopardy and claimed that the defendant should

now be acquitted, having been placed in jeopardy already once.

Issue:

Whether or not the defendant is indeed in double-jeopardy, and should therefore

be acquitted.

Held:€

No. In the opinion of the Court, with 9 justices concurring and 2 dissenting, th

e defendant has already been proven guilty indeed beyond reasonable doubt, and t

he question of double-jeopardy had already been answered when the Court revoked

the original order for dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case for fu

rther proceedings, in the process ruling that appeal did not violate prohibition

against double-jeopardy. Since the ruling had already long been decided, it sho

uld have already become "the law of the case", meaning that it could not be modi

fied or changed anymore, especially since the defense failed to raise the questi

on of double-jeopardy in the retrial, and this failure may be regarded as a waiv

er of that particular defense. Furthermore, while the "law of the case" rule is

subject to judicial discretion, this discretion is supposed to be used wisely wi

th the objective of helping justice by punishing the guilty, not thwarting it by

letting the guilty escape unpunished.

Solid Manila Corporation vs. Bio Hong Trading Co.

G.R. No. 90596 April 8, 1991

Facts:

Solid Manila Corp. owned a parcel of land in the vicinity of another parcel owne
d by Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc.

The private respondent (i.e., Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc.) acquired the land from

a prior owner who, in the deed of sale, indicated an easement of way (covering

approximately 914 sq. m. of private respondent s lot) for the construction of a pr

ivate alley

In consideration for the easement, the prior owner decreased the selling price b

y Php 287,200

The construction of the private alley was annotated in the private respondent s ti

tle. The pertinent provisions were:

alley shall not be closed

alley shall remain open at all times, and no obstructions whatsoever shall be pla

ced thereon

shall allow the public to use the same

Sometime in 1983, private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unha

mpered use of the alley

While the appeal of the private respondent at the Court of Appeals (CA) was in p

rogress for the original case, the private respondent filed for a petition at th

e Regional Trial Court (RTC) to cancel the annotation. The court granted such p

etition.

Issues:

Whether or not the CA erroneously reversed the trial court s summary judgement?

Whether or not the CA erroneously held that merger had extinguished the easement

Held:

The Supreme Court (SC) ruled in favor of the petitioner on both counts. The dec
ision of the CA was set aside; the RTC s decision was however reinstated. Additio

nally, the private respondent and its counsel were asked to show cause why they

should not be punished for contempt of court. The counsel was also facing admin

istrative charges for forum shopping.

Rationale:

The Supreme Court found merit on the petition with regard to the summary judgmen

t rendered by the RTC. The SC invalidated the private respondent s defense of mer

ger because of the defense s impossibility. Also, the SC ruled that the sale undo

ubtedly preserved the existing easement which affirmed the RTC s decision to rende

r a summary judgment. Further, the decision of the CA on the case referred to a

t the last bullet point of the case facts concerning the nullification of the ea

sement (i.e., the annotation) became the LAW OF THE CASE. By the CA s decision, t

he rights of the parties regarding the easement were established. This was used

by the SC to render a favorable holding to the petitioner.

The SC ruled that there was no merger since there was no full ownership of both

lands. Besides, the SC pointed out that the servitude was a personal one.

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION VS PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO

. INC.

51 SCRA 189. NO. L-31195, JUNE 5, 1973

FACTS

Petitioner/s is a legitimate labor union composed of employees of the respondent

. Petitioners (Tolentino, Padgrigano, Roxas, de Leon, Paciente, Vacuna, Pagcu, M

unsod are officers of PBMEO

That on March 1, 1969, the union decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malaca
nang on March 4 to protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. Those par

ticipating in the demonstration are workers in the 1st shift, regular 2nd and 3r

d shifts.

The unions informed the Company of their planned demonstration

On March 2, the Company learned of the demonstration and on March 3 at 11 am, it

called for a meeting where the union confirmed the demonstration.

The Company warned the union that the workers of the 1st shift, without leave of

absence approved by the company who fail to report on March 4 shall be dismisse

d because it is a violation of the NO LOCKOUT, NO STRIKE in the existing Collect

ive Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

Another meeting was convoked at 5 pm reiterating the same and appealing to the P

BMEO but the union countered that it was too late to change their plans.

March 4, at 950 am, PBMEO adviser Wilfred Ariston sent a cablegram to the compan

y containing REITERATING REQUEST EXCSUE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMO MARCH 4,

1969

Company filed charges against petitioner in the 1st shit with violation of the C

BA

Under the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), PBMEO was found guilty of bargain

ing in bad faith and the officers of PBMEO, as a consequence, were considered to

have lost their status as employees in PBMCI

On Sept 19, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of said order dated S

ep 15 on the grounds that it is contrary to law and evidence as well asked for 1

0 days within which to file their arguments

Their motion was 2 days late according to the rules of CIR and accordingly DISMI

SSED.

ISSUES

W/N the of the motion for reconsideration filed by PBMEO which was DISMISSED be

reversed and the officers of the PBMEO who were removed from employment be reins

tated.

HELD
Yes. The decision of the CIR to dismiss the petition based on technicality (bein

g 2 days late) was rendered null and void. (The constitutional rights have domin

ance over procedural rules.) And, the company was directed to reinstate the eigh

t officers with full backpay from date of separation minus the one day s pay and w

hatever earnings they might have realized from other sources during their separa

tion from service. (The removal from employment of the officers were deemed too

harsh a punishment for their actions)

ECHEGARAY VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 132601. January 19, 1999.

FACTS:

LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.

Motion for Reconsideration of a decision of the Supreme Court. Theodore O. Te f

or petitioner, Adviento, Mallonga, Adviento Law Offices for private complainant

Rodessa Baby R. Echegaray.

The decision in this case which was death penalty through lethal injection has b

een declared final and executory by Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC Br. 104, Que

zon City.

The Secretary of Justice compelled the Judge Ponferrada to give him a certified

true copy of the Warrant of Execution dated Nov. 17, 1998 bearing the date of ex

ecution of convice Leo Echegaray for there was no exact date published.

The date of execution was set at 3:00 p.m. of January 4, 1999.

A Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order was filed by pe

titioner on December 28, 1998 due to supervening events about the review and rep

eal of R.A. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) and R.A. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law).
The Supreme Court held a special session on January 4, 1999 to deliberate on pet

itioner s Very Urgent Motion.

The Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order and suspended the executi

on until June 15, 1999.

The Solicitor General filed a Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconside

ration stating that the Congress would reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659.
The Supreme Court granted the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental

Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and lifted the Temporary Restrainin

g Order issued January 4, 1999.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the rule on finality of judgment has deprived the Supreme Court o

f its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment.

HELD:

No. The finality of judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powe

rs over the case. According to the well established jurisprudence of Retired Ju

stice Camilo Quiason on this issue: the finality of a judgment does not mean tha

t the court has lost all its powers over the case. By the finality of a judgmen

t, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.

Even after the judgment has become final the court retains jurisdiction to exec

ute and enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court

to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same

. The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose

of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes fin

al.

G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001

ESTRADA vs. Ombudsman

G.R. No. 146738 March 2, 2001

Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was el

ected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-Presid

ent. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing
on June 30, 1998. On October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singso

n went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving mi

llions of pesos from jueteng lords. October 5, 2000,

Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority Leader, accused the pet

itioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from Governor Singson fr

om November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from G

overnor Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur.

Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. However, petitioner

strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign. This led to the resign

ation of economic advisers, department heads, etc. on November 13, House Speaker

Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment. This caused political convulsio

ns in both houses of Congress. On November 20, the Senate formally opened the im

peachment trial of the petitioner. On December 7, the impeachment trial started.

Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank, testified that sh

e was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose

Velarde" on documents involving a P500 million investment agreement with their b

ank on February 4, 2000. On January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who served as pet

itioner's Secretary of Finance took the witness stand. He alleged that the petit

ioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing c

harges of insider trading. January 16, when by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judge

s ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evi

dence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under t

he name "Jose Velarde." By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine

and speeches were delivered against the petitioner and the eleven senators. On J

anuary 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. January 20
, at 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly tr

ansfer of power started at Malacañang Mabini Hall. Outside the palace, there was a

brief encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada protesters which resul

ted in stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The negotiations consumed all m

orning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the o
ath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine. At about 12:00 noon, C

hief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of t

he Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang

Palace. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immed

iately discharged the powers the duties of the Presidency. On February 7, the Se

nate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus of

ficio and has been terminated. After his fall, the petitioner's legal problems a

ppeared in clusters. The ombudsman, to investigate the charges, created a specia

l panel. The petitioner filed for a petition with a prayer of preliminary injunc

tion.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the cases at bar involve a political question

2. Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.

Held:

1. No. The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions.

2. No. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character

. They involve plunder, bribery

and graft and corruption. These crimes, especially plunder which carries the dea

th penalty, are not covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting p

resident.

The petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macap

agal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.

Tecson, et al vs. Comelec

GR 161434, March 3, 2004

FACTS:

On December 31, 2003, Ronald Allan Kelley, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., file

d his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of

the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino Party at the Commis

sion on Elections. On January 9, 2004, Victorino X. Fornier initiated a petition

before the COMELEC to disqualify the said candidate as he had misrepresented hi

mself in his COC for he was not a natural born Filipino. He was able to produce

several public documents that supported his petition to the COMELEC. On January

23, 2004, the COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The petitioner s

oon after filed for reconsideration but it was denied on February 6, 2004. Four

days after, February 10, 2004, the petitioner assailed the decision of the COMEL

EC to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

W/n Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe Jr. is a natural born Filipino c

itizen or not.

HELD:

YES. FPJ is a natural-born Filipino as it was proven that his father was also a

Filipino citizen. This statement in turn was proven as documents were able to sh

ow that Lorenzo Pou, FPJ s grandfather, was a Filipino. The death certificate of P

uo presented by the respondent shows that Pou died at the age of 84 in 1954 in P

angasinan. By taking into account Pou s age at the year of his death, he would hav

e been born in 1870. Furthermore, the petitioner was not able to show that Pou w

as not in the Philippines during this period of time. It would then have to be a

ssumed that Pou was in the Philippine Islands all this time. This would make Pou

a Filipino citizen by virtue of the Philippine Bill of 1902 which declared that
Filipino citizens are those who resided in the Philippine Islands. Pou s citizens

hip would then extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of FPJ. By the time FPJ w

as born, the 1935 Constitution had taken into effect and it had declared that ch

ildren, regardless of whether they are legitimate or illegitimate, are considere

d to be Filipino citizens if their fathers are Filipino citizens themselves. Thi

s fact also erases any doubts that were raised by the petitioner that FPJ was al

so illegitimate which would have prevented him from taking on the citizenship of

his father.

CRUZAN vs DIRECTOR, MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et. al.

497 US 261, 111 L Ed 2d 224, 110 S Ct 284 [No. 88-1503]

FACTS

Petitioners are the parents of Nancy Beth Cruzan who filed a certiorari with the

U.S. Supreme Court.

A car accident left Nancy Cruzan in a persistent vegetative state. After it beca

me apparent that Nancy Cruzan had practically no chance of regaining her mental

faculties, her parents asked the hospital employees to terminate the artificial

nutrition and hydration procedures keeping her alive. The employees refused to h

onor the request without court approval.

Her parents then sought judicial authorization of their request. A guardian ad l

item was appointed for their daughter. Following the hearing, the Missouri trial

court, directed the employees of the hospital to carry out the parent s request.

Because based on the evidence, Nancy Cruzan will never recover because of the gr

avity of the injuries she sustained.

However, both the state and the guardian ad litem appealed the decision. The Sup

reme Court of Missouri reversed the decision, expressing that:

although the woman was in a persistent vegetative state, she was neither dead with

in the meaning of Missouri statutory definition of death nor terminally ill;

the woman s right to refuse treatment whether such right proceeded from a constitu
tional right of privacy or common-law right to refuse treatment did not outweigh M

issouri s strong policy favoring the preservation of life;

the woman s conversation with her housemate was unreliable for the purpose of dete

rmining her intent, and thus insufficient to support the parents claim to exercis

e substituted judgment on the woman s behalf;

no person could assume the choice of terminating medical treatment for an incomp

etent person in the absence of either formalities required under the living will

statute or clear and convincing, inherently reliable evidence, which was absent i

n the case at hand.

ISSUE

Whether or not, the Due Process Clause allows Missouri to require an incompetent

patient in an irreversible persistent vegetative state to remain on life suppor

t.

HELD

YES. Missouri requirement that incompetent s wishes as to withdrawal of life susta

ining treatment be proved by clear and convincing evidence held not violative of

the due process.

The due process clause of the Federal Constitution Fourteenth Amendment did not

forbid a state from requiring that evidence of an incompetent individual s wishes

as to the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment be proved by clear and convinc

ing evidence, and thus a state could apply such standard in proceedings where a

guardian sought discontinue nutrition and hydration of a person diagnosed to be

in persistent vegetative state.

The Missouri Supreme Court did not commit constitutional error in deciding that

the woman s desire to have hydration and nutrition withdrawn was not proved at tri
al pursuant to the standard of clear and convincing evidence enunciated by the c

ourt in its decision.

Since the due process clause did not require a state to repose the right to judg

e whether an incompetent patient wishes to have life-sustaining medical treatmen

t withdrawn with anyone but the patient herself, a state was not required to rep

ose a right of substituted judgment as to such decision with close family member
s of the patient, and it could choose to defer to only the patient s wishes.

WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON vs. PAULA COLE JONES

FACTS:

William Jefferson Clinton, was elected president in 1992 and re-elected in 1996.€

His term expires Jan. 20, 2001.€ In 1991 he was governor of State of Arkansas.€ Paul

a Corbin Jones lived in Arkansas in 1991 and was employee of the Arkansas Indust

rial Development Commission.€ On May 6, 1994, respondent filed a complaint in the

US DC for the District of Arkansas by naming petitioner and Danny Ferguson, a fo

rmer State Police officer, as defendants.€ The complaint alleges two federal claim

s and two state claims.

The allegations were that- on May 8, 1991 during an official conference held at

the Excelsior Hotel in Arkansas, the petitioner alleges that Ferguson persuaded

her to leave her desk and to visit the petitioner in a business suite at the hot

el where petitioner made "abhorrent" sexual advances that respondent vehemently

rejected.€ Respondent further claims that her superiors at work subsequently dealt

with her in a hostile and rude manner and changed her duties to punish her for

rejecting those advances.€ Finally, respondent alleges that after petitioner was e

lected president, Ferguson defamed her by making a statement to a reported that

implied she had accepted petitioner's alleged overtures and that various persons

authorized to speak for the president publicly branded her a liar by denying th

at incident had occurred.

In response to complaint, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of pre

sidential immunity until he is no longer president at which time the respondent

may refile the instant suit.€ DC Judge denied the motion on immunity grounds but o
rdered any trial stayed until the ends of petitioner's presidency.€ Both parties a

ppealed.€ A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motio

n to dismiss but reversed the order of postponing the trial.€

The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contention of petitioner that he has immunity from suit groun

ded purely in the identity of his office should be granted or not.

HELD:

Respondent has a right to an orderly disposition of her claims.€

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.€ An official's abso

lute immunity should extend only to acts in performance of particular functions

of his office and not beyond the scope of any action taken in an official capaci

ty.€ "The sphere of protected action must be related closely to the immunity's jus

tifying purposes."

FREEDMAN v. MARYLAND

380 U.S. 51. March 1, 1965.

FACTS:

Freedman exhibited the film Revenge at Daybreak at his Baltimore theater without s

ubmitting the film to the Maryland Board of censors.

Freedman was convicted of exhibiting a motion picture without submitting it firs

t to the Maryland State Board of Censors for their approval.

He argued that censorship impaired freedom of expression.

The conviction was affirmed by the Maryland Court of Appeals.

The Supreme Court reverses.

ISSUE: whether censorship of a film is a violation of the First and Fourteenth A

mendments (Freedom of expression)

HELD:

1. Submitting a film for review by the censors is not necessarily unconstit

utional.

2. A licensing statute can be challenged if it endangers freedom of express

ion.

NEAR v. STATE OF MINNESOTA

No. 91. (283 U.S. 697) June 1, 1931

FACTS:

In 1927, defendant J.M. Near, publisher of a periodical known as The Saturday Pre

ss was tried by Floyd B. Olson, County Attorney of Hennepin County, in behalf of

the State of Minnesota,

Near was charged with violation of a state statute. Chapter 285 of the Session L

aws of Minnesota for the year 1925 which provides for the abatement, as a public

nuisance, of a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other

periodical.

Near invoked the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the US.

Complainant alleged that The Saturday Press, on September 24, 1927 and on 8 subs

equent dates until November 19, 1927, published articles which were malicious, sc

andalous and defamatory concerning certain public officials the Minneapolis Tribu

ne, the Jewish race and members of the grand jury impaneled in November, 1927.

The district court found the defendant guilty. Judgment was entered that The Sat

urday Press as a public nuisance and enjoined the defendants from producing, edit

ing, publishing, circulating, having in their possession, selling or giving away

any publication whatsoever which is a malicious, scandalous or defamatory newsp

aper as defined by law and also from further conducting said nuisance under the

name and title of said The Saturday Press or any other name or title.
Near appealed from this judgment to the Minnesota Supreme Court. The Court affir

med the judgment.

Near then appealed to the US Supreme Court.

ISSUE: whether a statute permitting suppression by injunction of business of pub

lishing malicious, scandalous

or defamatory newspaper or periodical, is an infringement of the liberty of the

press guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment which protects press from previous rest

raint on publication.

HELD: a statute permitting suppression by injunction of business of publishing

malicious, scandalous or

defamatory newspaper or periodical, is an infringement of the liberty of the pre

ss guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the public officers named i

n the case and those associated with the charges of official dereliction, may be

deemed impeccable, cannot affect the conclusion that the statute imposes an unc

onstitutional restraint on publication. Judgment reversed

People of the Philippines vs. Cayat

[No. 45987 May 05, 1939]€

FACTS: €

Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, was prosecuted for violat

ing sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639. Cayat, a member of the non-Christian tribe

s had willfully, unlawfully, and illegally received, acquired, and have in his p

ossession and his control, a bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other

than the so-caled native wines and liquors which the members of that tribes have

accustomed themselves t make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639. The trial co
urt have found him guilty of the crime and charged him to pay a fine of fifty pe

sos or suffer imprisonment in case of solvency.€

Section 2 of Act No. 1639 states that it is unlawful for any native of the Phili

ppine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe to buy, receive, or have

in possesion or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or any intoxicating l

iquors of any kind other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the m

embers of such tribes have been accustomed themselves prior to the passage of th

e Act and it is the duty of any police officer to seize and destroy any such liq

uors found unlawfully possessed by the members of a non-Christian tribe€

Section 3 of Act No. 1639 states that any violation of the provisions of section

s 1 and 2 of this Act shall be punishable by a fine of not exceeding two hundred

pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months in the discretion of

the court€

The Act was created because the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the n

on-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes thereby hamper

ing the efforts of the Government to raise their standard of life and civilizati

on.€

The appellant challenges the constitutionality of Act 1639 on the following grou

nds: a.) that it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;

b.) that it is violative of the due process clause of the constitution; and c.)

that it is an improper exercise of the police power of the state€

ISSUE:€

Whether or not Act 1639 is unconstitutional on the following grounds: a.) that i

t is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws; b.) that it is

violative of the due process clause of the constitution; and c.) that it is an i

mproper exercise of the police power of the state€

HELD:€

NO. Act number 1639 is not unconstitutional. €

1. Act 1639 is not discriminatory and it does not deny the equal protection of t
he laws. The counsel for the appellant mentioned that the Act causes discriminat

ion among non-Christian tribes. Act 1639 was created to secure peace and harmony

and not meant to mar the civilization and culture of these tribes. The guarante

e of equal protection before the law is not violated by a legislation based on r

easonable classification such as Act No. 1639. Under the constitution, for an Ac

t to be reasonable, it must rest through substantial distinctions, must be germa

ne to the purposes of the law, must not be limited to existing conditions only,

and must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act 1639 rests on substantial distinctions because the Act was intended to meet

the peculiar conditions to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Chri

stian tribes.

Act 1639 is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to ensure peace a

nd order in and among non-Christian tribes because in the past, as disclosed by

the lower courts, the free use of highly intoxicating liquor by the non-Christia

n tribes often resulted to lawlessness and crimes thereby hampering the Governme

nt s effort to raise their standard of life and civilization

Act 1639 is not limited to existing conditions only. The Act is intended to appl

y for all times as long as those conditions exists. The legislature understood t

hat civilization is a slow process and with it must go measures of security and

protection

Act 1639 apply equally to all members of the same class.

2. Act 1639 does not violate the due process clause of the constitution. The app

ellant contends that the provision of law empowering any police officer to seize

and destroy any prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the possesion of a membe

r of a non-Christian tribe is a violation of the due process of law provided by

the Constitution. But Act No. 1639 is not involved in the case at bar. Besides,

notices and hearings are not necessary to constitute the due process of law. The

due process of law means simply: that there shall be a law prescribed in harmon

y with the general powers of the legislative department of the government; that

it should be reasonable in its operations; that it shall be enforced according t

o the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and that it shall be applicable t

o all citizens of the state or to all of a class. Thus, for example, a person s pr

operty ay be seized by the government in payment for taxes w/o judicial hearing.€
3. Act No. 1639 is not an improper exercise of the police power of the state. An

y measure intended to promote health, peace, prosperity, harmony, and wealth is

a legitimate exercise of the police power. Act No. 1639 is designed to promote p

eace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to thei

r moral and intellectual growth and eventually hasten their unification and equa

lization with the rest of their Christian brothers. €

Act No. 1639 does not seek to mark non-Christian tribes as inferior. The Governm

ent has endeavored to raise their culture and civilization to secure them the be

nefits of their progress with the ultimate end of placing them with their other

members of society on the basis of true equality.€

PEOPLE v. MARTI

G.R. No. 81561. January 18, 1991

Facts:

On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 AM, appellant Andre Marti and common

-law wife Shirley Reyes went to the booth of the Manila Packaging and Export Serv

ices in Pistang Pilipino Complex, Manila, to send 4 gift-wrapped packages to his

friend Walter Fierz of Switzerland.

The proprietress, Anita Reyes, asked for the packages to be examined and inspect

ed, appellant refused.

The supposed content of the packages were books, cigars and gloves.

The proprietor, Job Reyes, following standard operating procedure before final d

elivery to Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, opened the boxes for final

inspection. A peculiar odor emanated from the glove box, his curiosity aroused,

discovered dried leaves contained in the packages for the gloves.

Mr. Reyes wrote a letter and sent samples of the dried leaves to the Narcotics S

ection of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for laboratory examination

at about 1:30 PM of the same day. After being interviewed by the Chief of the N

arcotics Section, Mr. Reyes and 3 NBI agents and a photographer proceeded to Mr.

Reyes office to inspect the remaining 3 other packages.

The packages that supposed to contain cigars and books were opened by Mr. Reyes

and was also discovered to contain dried leaves, which were dried marijuana leav

es.

The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the boxes after signing Recei

pt , acknowledging custody of the packages.

On August 27, 1987, the appellant was invited by the NBI to shed light on the at

tempted shipment of the dried marijuana leaves, which were examined by the Foren

sic Chemistry section of the NBI.

The appellant denied that the packages were his, instead he claimed that after a

30 minute conversation with a German national named Michael, the latter request

ed him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000 for the cost of shipment because

the German was about to leave the country the following day.

The lower court convicted the appellant of violating RA 6425, or the Dangerous D

rugs Act.

The appellant appealed the decision.

Issues:

Whether the lower court erred in admitting in evidence the illegally searched an

d seized objects contained in the parcels.

Whether the lower court erred in convicting appellant despite the undisputed fac

t that his rights under the constitution while under custodial proceedings were
not observed.

Whether the lower court erred in not giving credence to the explanation of the a

ppellant on how the four parcels came into his possession.

HELD:

No.

The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to

acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alle

ged unlawful intrusion by the government. The constitutional proscription agains

t unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only

against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.

Thus it can only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arb

itrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If a search is made upon

the request of the law enforcers, a warrant must be generally be first secured i

f it to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at t

he behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own

and private purposes, and without the intervention of police authorities, the r

ight of unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of pr

ivate individual, not the law enforcers, is involved.

Records show that there is nothing to indicate, an undisputed fact, that appellan

t was not informed of his constitutional rights or that he gave statements witho

ut assistance of counsel.

The appellant s disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and contrary to human expe

rience. It can easily be fabricated. Evidence to be believed, must no only com

e from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as

the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under

the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342[1968]..)

Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals

253 SCRA 699 [GRN. 107383, February 20, 1996]€

FACTS:€Petitioner, Cecilia Zulueta is married to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo M

artin. That petitioner accused her husband of infidelity. That on March 26, 1982
, petitioner went to the clinic of private respondent, who is a doctor of medici

ne, without the consent of the latter. That on the same date mentioned, petition

er opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband and took 157 documents and pape

rs consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged param

ours. The documents found by petitioner were seized for use as evidence in a cas

e for legal separation filed by Zulueta. Dr. Martin brought this action below fo

r recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner.

The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, decided in favor of private respon

dent, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of properties described and orderin

g petitioner to return the properties to Dr. Martin and pay him nominal and mora

l damages and attorney s fees, and cost of the suit. Furthermore, petitioner and h

er attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or submitting/admitting

as evidence the documents and papers in question.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision made by the Regional Trial

Court. Hence, this petition.€

ISSUE:€W/N the documents and papers in question are admissible in evidence.€

HELD:€NO. The Supreme Court held that the documents and papers in question are ina

dmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of com

munication and correspondence [to be] inviolable (Sec.3,Par.1,Art.III,1987 Consti)

is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggriev

ed by her husband s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional p

rovision is to be enforced. The only exception to the provision in the constitut

ion is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order r

equires otherwise as provide by law. (Sec.3,Par.1,Art.III,1987 Consti) Any violati

on of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose i
n any proceeding. (Sec.3,Par.2,Art.III,1987 Consti)

A person, by contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or his right t

o privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available t

o him or to her.

The law ensures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making

it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other wit
hout consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. (Sec.22,Rule130

,Rules of Court). Neither maybe examined without the consent of the other as to

any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marria

ge, save for specified exceptions. (Sec.24,Rule130,Rules of Court)

PETITION DENIED.

Goesaert v. Cleary

335 US 404€

Facts: The case is an appeal from the US District Court for the Eastern District

of Michigan, actions by Valentine Goesaert, Margaret Goesaert, Gertrude Nadrosk

i and Caroline McMahon against Owen J. Cleary and others to restrain the enforce

ment of Pub.Acts Mich.1945, No. 133, 19a. from a judgment denying an injunction

of the enforcement of the Michigan law. The particular public act is claimed to

be in violation of the equal protection clause that the state of Michigan is pla

ying favorites among women without rhyme and reason by making an exception in fa

vor of the wives and daughters of the owners of the liquor establishment instead

of denying to all women the opportunities for bartending.

The judgment was affirmed with Justice Rutledge, Justice Douglas and Justice Mur

phy dissenting.

Issue:

Whether or not the enforcement of Public Acts of Michigan 1945, No. 133, 19a is

in violation of the equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment*€

Pub.Acts Mich 1945, No. 133 19a: Michigan Statue requiring licensing of bartende

rs in cities of 50,000 or more but providing that no female shall be licensed un

less she is the wife or daughter of the male owner of licensed liquor establishm
ent

The equal protection clause precludes irrational discrimination as between perso

ns or groups of persons in the incidence of a law, but does not require situatio

ns which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they we

re the same

Held:

No. Although Michigan cannot forbid females generally from being barmaids/barten

ders and at the same time make an exception in favor of the wives and daughters

of the owners of liquor establishments, the US Constitution does not require sit

uations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though the

y were the same. Michigan has not violated its duty to afford equal protection of

its laws since bartending by women may, in allowable legislative judgment, give ri

se to moral and social problems against which it may devise preventive measures,

the legislature need not go to the full length of prohibition if it believes th

at as to a defined group of females other factors are operating to eliminate or

reduce the moral and social problems otherwise calling for prohibition. The Michi

gan law therefore believes that ownership of a bar by a barmaid s husband or fathe

r minimizes hazards that may confront a barmaid. €

Dissenting Judges: The statute should be held invalid as a denial of equal prote

ction for the statute arbitrarily discriminates between male and female owners o

f liquor establishments. While a male owner may employ his wife or daughter as b

armaids, a female bar owner may neither work as a barmaid herself nor employ her

daughter in that position, even if a man is present in the establishment to kee

p order.
O SULLIVAN v. BOERCKEL

No. 97-2048. June 30, 1999

FACTS:

In 1977, respondent Darren Boerckel was tried in the Circuit of Montgomery Count
y, Illinois, for the rape, burglary, and aggravated battery of an 87-year-old wo

man.

Central evidence against him was his written confession.

Jury convicted him on all three charges. Sentenced to 20-60 years in prison on r

ape charge and shorter terms on the other two.

Boerckel appealed to Appellate Court of Illinois. His claims were rejected. The

court affirmed his convictions and sentences.

Boerckel next filed a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court

. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the petition for leave to appeal, and this C

ourt denied Boerckel s subsequent petition for a writ of certiorari.

In 94, Boerckel filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC

S 2554 in the US Dictrict Court for the Central District of Illinois. The amende

d petition asked for relief on 6 grounds:

that Boerckel had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights

that his confession was not voluntary

that the evidence against him was insufficient to sustain the conviction

that his confession was the fruit of an illegal arrest

that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal

that his right to discovery of exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland (196

3) was violated

Boerckel amended federal habeas petition raised three claims he had not included

in his petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court.

ISSUE: whether a state prisoner must present his claims to a state supreme court

in a petition for discretionary review in order to satisfy the exhaustion requi

rement.
HELD: In order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a state prisoner must pres

ent his claims to a state supreme court in a petition for discretionary review w

hen that review is part of the State s ordinary appellate review procedure.

EMPLOYMENT DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES OF OREGON v SMITH

[No. 88-1213, April 17, 1990]

FACTS

Respondents Smith and Black were fired by a private drug rehabilitation organiza

tion because they ingested peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, for sacramental purpos

es at a ceremony of their Native American Church. Their applications for unemplo

yment compensation were denied by the State of Oregon under a state law disquali

fying employees discharged for work-related misconduct . On grounds of violating th

e respondent s First Amendment free exercise rights, the State Court of Appeals re

versed. State Supreme Court affirmed but vacated judgment and remanded for a det

ermination whether sacramental peyote use is proscribed by State s controlled subs

tance law, which makes it felony to knowingly or intentionally possess the drug.

Pending that determination, the Court refused to decide whether such use is pro

tected in the Constitution. State Supreme Court held that sacramental peyote use

violated, and was not excepted from the state law prohibition, but concluded th

at prohibition was invalid under Free Exercise Clause

ISSUE

W/N FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE PERMITS STATE TO PROHIBIT SACRAMENTAL PEYOTE USE AND TH

US ALLOW DENIAL OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS TO PERSONS DISCHARGED FOR SUCH USE

HELD

Free exercise of religion clause permits a state to include religiously inspired

use of peyote within the reach of the state s general criminal prohibition on the

use of that drug; where there is no contention that the state s drug law represen

ts an attempt to regulate religious beliefs, or the raising of one s children in t

hose beliefs
The free exercise of religion clause thus permitted Oregon to deny unemployment

benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs because of such religiously inspir

ed use

Generally applicable, religion-neutral criminal laws that have the effect of bu

rdening a particular religious practice need not be justified, under free exerci

se of religion clause, by a compelling government interest.

Webb Vs. De Leon

95-404

Facts :

Petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with temporary restraining or

der and preliminary injunction to

annul and set aside the Warrants of Arrest issued against petitioners by respond

ents Judges Raul E. de Leon and Amelita Tolentino in Crim. Case No. 95-404

Enjoin the respondents from conducting any proceeding in the aforementioned crim

inal case

dismiss said criminal case or include Jessica Alfaro as one of the accused there

in.

On June 19, 1994, the NBI filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint charging petitio

ners Hubert Webb,Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano, Miguel Rodriguez, Joey F

ilart, Hospicio Fernandez, Artemio Ventura, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong wit

h RAPE and HOMICIDE.

As a result, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief Sta

te Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuño to conduct the preliminary investigation of those c

harged with rape and killing on June 30, 1991 Carmela N. Vizconde (19yrs), Estra
llita Nicolas-Vizconde(51yrs./mom) and Anne Marie Jennifer(7yrs./sister) in thei

r home at #80 W Vinzons, St.,B.F. Homes.

During the preliminary Investigation, the NBI presented the following

Sworn statement dated May 22, 1995 of their principal witness Maria Jessica M. A

lfaro who allegedly saw the commission of the crime.

Sworn statements of two of the former housemaids of the Webb Family in the perso

ns of Nerissa E. Rosales and Mila S. Gaviola

Sworn statement of Carlos J. Cristobal who alleged that on March 9, 1991, he was

a passenger of UA Flt No. 808 bound for new york and who expressed doubt on whe

ther petitioner Webb was his co passenger in the trip

Sworn statement of Lolita Birrer, a former live-in partner of Gerardo Biong, who

narrated the manner of how Biong investigated and tried to cover up the crime.

Sworn statements of Belen Dometita and Teofilo Minoza, two of the Vizconde maids

, and statements of Normal White (security guard), and Manciano Gatmaitan (engr)

Autopsy reports showing that Carmela had 9 stab wounds, Estrellita 12, and Jenni

fer 19. The genital examination of Carmela confirmed the presence of spermatozoa

Petitioner Webb before submitting his counter-affidavit, filed with DOJ a Motion

for Production and Examination of Evidence and Documents for the NBI to produce

the following.

Certification issuede by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation on the admissi

on to and stay of Hubert Webb in the United States from March 9,1991, to October

22,1992.

Lab Report SN-91-17 of the Medico Legal Officer, Dr. Prospero Cabanayan, M.D.
Sworn statements of Gerardo C. Biong other than the S.S. dated Oct 7,1991

Photographs and fingerprints lifted from the Vizconde Residence taken during th

e investigation

Investigation records of NBI on Engr. Danilo Aguas, et al

List of names of 135suspects investigated by the NBI per Progress Report dated S

ept. 2,1991 submitted by Atty. Arlis Vela, Supervising Agent.

Records of Arrest, Interview, and other written statements of Jessica Alfaro oth

er than the May 22,1995 conducted by the NBI and other police agencies
Transmittal letter to the NBI, including the reports of investigation conducted

by Supt. Rodolfo C. Sision, Regional D.D., NCRC

Names of NBI officials/agents composing the task force Jecares, including their

respective positions and duties.

Statements made by other persons in connection with the crime charged.

The DOJ granted the motion and the NBI submitted photocopies of the documents. N

BI alleged that it lost the original of the April 28, 1995 S.S. of Alfaro. This

compelled Webb to file Civil Case No. 951099 in the RTC of Makati, Br,. 63 for t

he purpose of obtaining the original said sworn statement. Later on, Atty. Artur

o L. Mercader Jr produced a copy of said original in compliance with a subpoena

decus tecum. The Original was submitted by petitioner Webb to DOJ with other evi

dence. Webb failed to receive the copy of BU Report despite his request for its

production.

Petitioner Webb claims that he didn t commit the crime since he left for the U.S.M

arch 1,1991, and returned Oct. 27, 1992. This alibi was reinforced by Honesto Ar

agon, Lecinia Edrosolano, Sylvia Climaco, Gina Roque, Sonia Rodriguez, Edgardo V

entura and Pamela Francisco.

Bought a bought a bicycle and a 1986 toyota during the period, and was issued by

the state of California Driver s License No. A8818707 on June 14, 1991.

Submitted a letter dated July 25, 1995 of Mr. Robert Heafner, Legal Atache of th

e US Embassy, citing certain records tending to confirm, among others, his arriv

al at San Francisco, Cali, on March 9,1991, as a passenger of UA flight 808.

Hospicio Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio Lejano, Peter Estrada, Miguel Ro

driguez, and Gerardo Biong submitted S.S. and responses and a motion to dismiss

denying their complicity in the rape-killing of the Vizcondes.

Only Joey Filart and Artemio Ventura failed to file their counter affidavits tho

ugh they were served with subpoena in their last known address.

Gatchalian, in his S.S.alleged that from 11p.m. of June 29, 1991 until 3a.m. of

the following day, he was at the residence of his friends, Carlos and Andrew Syy

ap, at New Alabang Village, watching video tapes. Also claims petitioner Lejano

was with him.

On Aug. 8, 1995, the DOJ panel issued a resolution finding Probable Cause to hol

d respondents for Trial and recommended that an Information for rape with homici

de be filed against petitioners and their co-respondents. This was filed in the

RTC of Paranaque under CC No. 95-404 and raffled to branch 258 presided by Judge

Zosimo V. Escano. It was however Judge Raul de Leon, pairing Judge of Judge Esc

ano, who issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners.

Aug 11, 1995, Judge Escano voluntarily inhibited himself from the case to avoid

an suspicion about his impartiality considering his employment with the NBI befo

re his appointment on the bench.

The case was re-raffled to Branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino, who

issued new warrants of arrest against petitioners and their co-accused.

Aug 11, 1995, petitioner Webb voluntarily surrendered to the police at Camp Ric

ardo Papa Sr., Bicutan. The rest gave themselves up after filing their own petit

ions before the court.

ISSUE : If petition filed by appellants are of merit

Petitioners state the

Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they failed to

conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest.

DOJ panel also gravely abused in holding that there is probable cause to charge
them with rape and homicide.

DOJ panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their pre

liminary investigation

DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge

Jessica Alfaro in the Information as an Accused.

HELD:

These petitions were found to be bereft of merit.

After going through the S.S., the DOJ Panel then weighed these inculpatory evide
nce against the exculpatory evidence stating basically that..

The documents by respondent Webb to support his alibi can t outweigh the evidence

submitted by complainant. Positive identification will outweigh any alibi. Just

because he alleged that he was issued several documents in the US, this does not

mean that he couldn t have been in the country. Just because a receipt was issued

containing the respondents name does not guarantee that it was the actual buyer

Gatchalian s defense of alibi was not corroborated by Lejano.

The procedure entailing the issuance of the Warrant of Arrest was completed. (se

c 3,4,5 of rule 126)

Judges Tolentino and Lejano did not gravely abuse since the issuance of the warr

ant. The issuance of the warrant does not solely depend on their complete and pe

rsonal determination of probable cause, but could be satisfied with documents su

bmitted by the fiscal on the basis of probable cause.

a. Clear insufficiency of evidence on record thus making it necessary for f

urther personal examination

b. There is an eye witness account given by Alfaro

c. The alibi defense of Webb was disputed by the S.S. of their former maids

The respondents were not deprived of their rights, in fact they were proactive i

n the preliminary investigations. There was a trial period of 27 days,

Alfaro qualified under the qualifications of State Witness. (RA 6982 sec 10)

d. There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose disch

arge is requested

e. There is no other direct evidence available except the testimony of the

said accused

f. The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its m

aterial points.

g. Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty

h. Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving

moral turpitude.

The failure to provide discovery procedure during preliminary investigation does

not negate its use by a person under investigation when indispensable to protec

t his constitutional right to life

wHEREFORE, the petitions are dismissed for lack of showing of grave abuse of disc

retion on the part of the respondents. Costs against petitioners.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. ESTRADA

[A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC June 29, 2001.]

FACTS

Petitioners are people who filed the request to the Sandiganbayan for this Court

to allow the live television and radio coverage of the trial in the mentioned C

ourt of the plunder cases against the former President Joseph E. Estrada. Their

request is based on the purpose of assuring the public of full transparency in t

he proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history. It is obvious, for them,

that the foregoing cases involve a matter of public concern and interest. Allow

ing live radio and television coverage satisfies the constitutional right of eve

ry citizen to be informed on matters of public concern. The accused, Mr. Estrada

, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines opposed such request. They contend t

hat live radio and television coverage is contrary to what jurisprudence tells u

s, wherein the fundamental rights of the accused is to be preferred over the rig
ht to public information. They argue that such coverage will not only affect the

life and liberty of the accused but the very credibility of the Philippine crim

inal justice system. They say that live radio and television coverage will not s

ubserve the ends of justice but will only pander to the desire for publicity of

a few grandstanding lawyers.

ISSUE

W/N THE PETITION FOR THE SANDIGANBAYAN TO ALLOW LIVE TELEVISION AND RADIO COVERA
GE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SAID COURT OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA.

HELD

THE PETITION IS DENIED. The Sandiganbayan should not allow live television and r

adio coverage of the trial in the mentioned Court of the plunder cases against t

he former President Joseph E. Estrada.

Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary

is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made

an object of public s attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not

by any outside force or influence.

The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the

right to public information. This is why the coverage is not totally restricted

but is limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and

their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. Neverthe

less, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount

right of the accused to due process.

An accused has a right to public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, mo

re than anyone else. Moreover, a public trial is not synonymous to a publicized

trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to co

me, sit in available seats, conduct with decorum and observe the trial process.

Although it is difficult to quantify, it is a fact, nonetheless, that live telev

ision and radio coverage indeed has an influence the testimony of witnesses and

the decision of judges. It can also serve as a form of mental harassment to the

defendant. These effects cannot be evaluated but it is farcical to build around

them an impregnable armor against the influence of the most powerful media of pu
blic opinion. The effect of television may escape the ordinary means of proof bu

t it is not far-fetched for it to gradually erode our basal conception of a tria

l such as we know it now.

People vs. Rodrigueza

Facts: NARCOM agent Ciriaco Taduran got a tip from an informer€of an on-going€€illegal€t

raffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga, Albay.

€€€€€€€€€ Taduran posed as a buyer and paid Don Rodrigueza (accused/appelant) P200 in marke

for 100 gms. of marijuana in a buy-bust operation but let the accused go.

€€€€€€€€€ Subsequently,NARCOM agents raided the house of the accused without a search warra

arrested his two companions without a warrant of arrest.

€€€€€€€€€ When accused showed up at the headquarters, he was arrested and told to sign€ a w

counsel without the presence of counsel.

€€€€€€€€€ RTC convicted accused under the Dangerous Drug Act.

€€€€€€€€€ Accused appealed.

Issue: Did the RTC err and was the Arrest and Seizure violative of the constitut

ional rights of the accused?

Decision: Judgement Reversed.

Reasons: 1. Prosecution erred in using evidence illegally obtained. There was no

search and arrest warrant.

€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ 2. Sworn statement of the accused waiving counsel was without the presence o

ation of Sec. 12(1),Art.II ofthe Phil. Constitution.

Agent Taduran, by letting Accused go after the buy-bust, violated the buy-bust p

rinciple.

Marcos v. Manglapus
Daza v. Singson

Bondoc vs. Pineda

September 26, 1991, 201 SCRA 792

Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari and mandamus.

Facts: In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M

. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc

of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of Represe

ntative for the fourth district of the province of Pampanga.

On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bond

oc filed a protest (HRET no. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribu

nal (HRET). By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won ove

r Pineda by margin of twenty-three (23) votes. The reexamination and reappreciat

ion of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc s lead over Pineda to 107 votes.

Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman Ceril

les to proclaim the winner of the case.

Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991 to his Chief Congressman Jose S. Co

juangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc case

but also but also that he voted for Bondoc consistent with justice and self-resp

ect , and to honor gentlemen s agreement among the members of the HRET that they would

abide by the result of the appreciation of the contested ballot.

Congressman Cojuangco notified the chairman of the tribunal to withdraw the nomi

nation and to rescind the election of Camasura to the HRET and seeks to cancel t

he promulgation of the tribunal s decision in Bondoc v. Pineda case.

Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives could change its representati
ve in House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal at the request of the dominant

political party.

Ruling: No. If the House Electoral Tribunal would serve the interest of the part

y in power, the independence of the Electoral Tribunal as embodied in the Consti

tution, will no longer be protected. The resolution of the House of Representati

ves removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyal

ty to the LDP, because he cast his votes in favor of the Nacionalista Party s cand

idate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the Ho

use Electoral Tribunal to the Sole judge of the election contest between Pineda

and Bondoc.

To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the

House Electoral Tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in

power (LDP) which tree justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member woul

d be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope

at the treshold of the tribunal.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge

their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence-even i

ndependence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to p

arty and breach of the party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion

of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from HRET for hav

inf cast a conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the

examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the

tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion an

injustice, and a violation of the constitution. It s resolution of expulsion agai

nst Congressman Camasura is therefore, null and void.

Alejandrino vs. Quezon
Osmena vs. Pendatun

Civil Liberties Union vs. The Executive Secretary

February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317

Nature of the case: Petition to review the order of the Executive Secretary.

Facts: Petitioner challenged the Executive Order no. 284, which in effect, allow

s members of the cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretary to hold

other government offices or positions in addition to their primary position, al

beit subject to the limitations imposed, runs counter to Sec. 13 Art. VII of the

Constitution.

Respondent on the hand, argued that the same Constitutional provision provided a

proviso stating that unless otherwise provided in this constitution . They furthe

r contended that his proviso refers to if allowed by law or by the pressing func

tions of his position.

Issue: Does the of E.O 284 violates the Constitutional limitation prohibiting ap

pointive officials from holding two offices?

Ruling: Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to

impose stricter prohibition on President, Vice-President, members of the cabine

t, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or emp

loyment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition

must be read with equal severity. The language of Sec. 13 Art. VII is prohibito

ry so that it must be understood as intended to be positive and unequivocal nega

tion of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment.

The 1987 constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, m

embers of the cabinet, their deputies or assistant from holding during their ten
ure multiple offices or employment in the government except in those cases speci

fied in the constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to post held

without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law an

d as required by the primary functions at their office.

Sec. 13, Art VII in relation to Sec. 7 par.2 Art. IX-B of the 1987 Const

itution, E.O. No. 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of

positions that the cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries ma

y hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions

in the government and government corporations. E.O. No. 284 allows them to hold

multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of

Swc.13, Art. VII of the Constitution prohibiting them from doing so unless othe

rwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

Noblejas v. Teehankee 23 SCRA 405 (1968)

Borjal v. CA 301 SCRA 1 (1999)

Hizon-Pamintuan v. People 234 SCRA 63 (1994)

Garcia v. Mojica 314 SCRA 207 (1999)

Tan v. COMELEC 142 SCRA 727 (1986)

Municipality of Malabang v. Benito 27 SCRA 533(1969)

Minucher v. CA 397 SCRA 244(1992)

Chavez v. Public Estates Authority 384 SCRA 152 (2002)

Uy v. Commission on Audit 328 SCRA 607 (2000)

UP Board of Regents v. Rasul 200 SCRA 685 (2001)

Azarcon v. Bunaga 399 SCRA 365 (2003)

People v. Garcia 313 SCRA 279 (1999)

Churchhill v. Rafferty 32 Phil 580 (1915)

Ass. Small v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform 175 SCRA 343 (1989)

People v. Fajardo 104 SCRA 443 (1958)

Gonzales v. Hechanova 9 SCRA 230 (1963)

Rodriguez v. Tan 91 PHIL 724 (1952)

Manalo v. Sistoza 312 SCRA 239 (1999)

In re: Laureta 148 SCRA 382 (1987)

EBRALINAG vs. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOL OF CEBU

MARCH 01, 1995, 219 SCRA 256

Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action for certiorari, mandamus and prohibitio

Facts: All petitioners are Jehovah s witnesses were expelled from their classes by

the school authorities for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthe

m and recite the patriotic pledge as required by R.A.1265 and D.O.#8 of the DECS

Jehovah s witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing t

he national anthem for they believe that those are Acts of worship or religious dev

otion which they cannot conscientiously give to anyone except God? They consider t

he flag as an image or idol representing the state. The action of the local auth

orities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transience s constitution protect

s against official control.

Issue: Whether or not the children of Jehovah s witnesses may be expelled from sch

ool for disobedience of R.A.1265 and D.O.#8 series of 1955.

Ruling

Religious freedom is a fundamental right, which is entitled to the highe

st priority, and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the

relationship of man to his creator.

We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehova hs witnesse

s with regard to the observarnce at the flag ceremony out of respect for their r

eligious beliefs, however bizarre those beliefs may join to others. Nevertheless,

their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them aright to

disrupt such patriotic exercises.

Wherefore, the position for certiorari and prohibition is granted.

Generoso R. Sevilla vs. Court of Appeals and Nerito L Santos

June 9, 1992, 209 SCRA 637

J. Griño Aquino

Nature of the Case: Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals

Facts

Generoso R. Sevilla was acting City Engineer of Cabanatuan City. In the

advent of the 1986 revolution the OIC Mayor of Cabanatuan appointed Nerito L. Sa

ntos as City Engineer of Cabanatuan City and a memorandum was given to Sevilla i

nforming him of the same, said memorandum was received by another person on his

behalf. A few months later Generoso R. Sevilla was designated as acting District

Engineer of Pasay City, Then on Feb. 3, 1987 he was removed from the office by
the New Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).

Generoso R. Sevilla returned to Cabanatuan and filed a quo warranto petition aga

inst Nerito L. Santos.

Generoso R. Sevilla contends that being a Presidential appointee he could not be

removed from office by the OIC Mayor and supposing that the OIC Mayor indeed ha

ve authority his separation was illegal because there was no ground for said sep

aration and replacement.

Issue

Whether or not an acting appointment is merely temporary

Ruling

An acting appointment is merely temporary petitioner s appointment has lap

sed upon appointment of Santos as permanent and not acting Civil Engineer of Cab

anatuan. Petitioner was an incumbent City Engineer of Palayan when he was design

ated acting City Engineer of Cabanatuan. There is a difference between designati

on and appointment. Appointment is a selection by the proper authority of an ind

ividual who is to exercise the functions of an office; Designation, on the other

hand, connotes merely an imposition of additional duties upon a person already

in public service by virtue of an earlier appointment or election.

Appointment of City Engineer by Mayor confirmed by the Department of Pub

lic Works and Highways is effective.Petitioner s right to discharge his function a

s acting City Engineer of Cabanatuan was extinguished when a permanent appointme

nt to the same office was made.

Antonio Bengzon III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Teodoro

C. Cruz

May 7, 2001

GR No. 142840. 357 SCRA 545

J. Kapunan

Nature of the case: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Facts

Teodoro C. Cruz, being born on 1960 in Tarlac to Filipino parents is und

oubtably a natural-born Filipino Citizen.

On 1985 Teodoro C. Cruz was enlisted in the United States Marine Corps a

nd without consent of the republic of the Philippines took an oath of allegiance

to the United States as a consequence thereof he had lost his Filipino citizens

hip.

On 1990, in connection with his service in the United States Marine Corp

s, he became a naturalized US citizen.

On 1994 he reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation un

der RA 2630. He ran for election as Representative of the 2nd District of Pangas

inan in 1998 and won.

Subsequently Antonio Bengson III filed a case for quo warranto ad cautel

am claiming that Cruz was not qualified for the position since he is not a natur

al-born citizen as required under Art. Vi, Sec 6 of the Constitution.

HRET dismissed the petition declaring Cruz the duly elected Representati

ve of the 2nd District of Pangasinan.

Issue
 Whether or not a natural born Filipino who became an American Citizen, c

an still be considered a natural born citizen upon his reacquisition of Philippi

ne Citizenship

Ruling

The Court ruled that the act of repatriation under RA 2630 allows him to

recover or return to his original status before he lost his Philippine citizens

hip. His original status as natural born Filipino was restored, needless to say

he is qualified for the position of Representative of the Lower House.

HRET was empowered by the Constitution to be the sole judge of all conte

sts relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the H

ouse.

The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal s decision can only be annulled up

on showing of grave abuse of discretion on HRET s part. In the case at bar there w

as no showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excessive jurisd

iction thus the petition was dismissed.

Morohombsar vs. Alonto, Jr.

February 25, 1991

GR No. 937711. 194 SCRA 390

Gutierrez, Jr., J.
Nature of the case: Petition to review the order of the President of the Mindana

o State University.

Facts

On March 22, 1988, the petitioner was designated as officer-in-charge of

the Office of the Vice Chancellor for Academic affairs of MSU in a concurrent c

apacity with her position then as VP for External Studies. On January 2, 1989, t

he Office of the VP for the External Studies was merged with the OVCAA and as su

ch the functions for the former were to be exercised by the latter. The petition

er was appointed acting Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs on the same day. Th

e Board of Regents of the MSU approved her appointment as acting Vice-Chancellor

for Academic Affairs. On March 14, 1990 respondent Ahmad E. Alonto, MSU Preside

nt wrote the petitioner informing her that he has decided to tap the petitioner s

talent for the MSU system as VP for academic affairs which position is under adm

inistrative staff. The petitioner did not accept the position. A certain Batara

was later appointed but refused the same. Now, the petitioner assails her remova

l as Vive-Chancellor by the respondent President.

Issue

Whether or not her removal is valid.

Ruling

A bona fide appointment in an acting capacity is essentially temporary a

nd revocable in character and the holder of such appointment may be removed anyt

ime even without hearing or cause. A person who accepts an appointment in an act

ing capacity extended and received without any protest or reservation and who ac

ts thereunder for a considerable time cannot be heard to say that the appointmen

t was, in reality permanent and theretofore there can be no removal except for c
ause.

Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora

July 10, 2001

GR No. 142801-802 360 SCRA 718

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

Nature of the case: Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus

Facts

On June 30, 1987, former President Corazon Aquino, issued Executive No.

127 establishing the Economic Intelligence And Investigation Bureau as part of t

he organization of the Ministry of Finance. On March 17, 1989, President Aquino

issued Memorandum Order No. 255 providing that the EIIB shall be the agency pri

mary responsibility for anti-smuggling operations in all land areas and inland w

aters and waterways outside the areas of sole jurisdiction of the Bureau of Cust

oms. On January 7, 2000, President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order No 191

entitled deactivation of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau and

later issued executive Order No. 196 creating the President Anti Smuggling Task

Force Aduana . And on March 29, 2000 President Estrada issued Executive Order No.

233 providing that all EIIB personnel occupying positions specified therein shal

l be separated from service pursuant to a bona fide reorganization resulting to

abolition, redundancy, merger, division, or consolidation of positions.

Issue
 Whether or not there is a violation of their right to security of tenure

Ruling

The general has always been that the power to abolish a public office i

s lodge with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the powe

r to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either created by

the Constitution, statute or by authority by law. Thus, where the office was cr

eated by the constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature th

at brought to existence. The exception, however, is that as afar as bureaus, age

ncies r offices in the executive department are concerned, the President s power t

o control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular of a parti

cular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reo

rganization measures.

AQUILINO T. LARIN, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

October 16, 1997

GRN 112745

TORRES, JR., J.

Nature of the case: Challenged in this petition is the validity of petitioner's

removal from service as Assistant Commissioner of the Excise Tax Service of the

Bureau of Internal Revenue.

Facts

A decision was rendered by the Sandiganbayan convicting herein petitione

r Aquilino T. Larin, Revenue Specific Tax Officer, then Assistant Commissioner o

f the Bureau of Internal Revenue and his co-accused of the crimes of violation o
f Section 268 (4) of the National Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 (e) of R.A

3019 in Criminal Cases Nos. 14208-14209.

The fact of petitioner's conviction was reported to the President of the Philipp

ines by the then acting Finance Secretary Leong through a memorandum.

It is clear from the foregoing that Mr. Larin has been found beyond reasonable d

oubt to have committed acts constituting grave misconduct. Under the Civil Servi

ce Laws and Rules which require only preponderance of evidence, grave misconduct

is punishable by dismissal.

Acting by authority of the President, Sr. Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A.

Quisumbing issued Memorandum Order No. 164 which provides for the creation of a

n Executive Committee to investigate the administrative charge against herein pe

titioner Aquilino T, Larin.

The committee directed the petitioner to respond to the administrative charged a

gainst him, and the petitioner complied on it.

Consequently, the President, in the assailed Administrative Order No. 101 found

petitioner guilty of grave misconduct. In the administrative charge and imposed

upon him the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of his leave credits and retir

ement benefits including disqualification for reappointment in the government se

rvice.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed directly with this Court the instant petition to que

stion basically his alleged unlawful removal from office.

Issue
Whether or not the petitioner was unlawfully removed from office?

Ruling

The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner was given every chance to present hi

s side. The rule is well settled that the essence of due process in administrati

ve proceedings is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard

and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense. The records cl

early show that on petitioner submitted his letter-response dated to the adminis

trative charge filed against him. Aside from his letter, he also submitted vario

us documents attached as annexes to his letter, all of which are evidences suppo

rting his defense, prior to this, he received a letter from the Investigation Co

mmittee requiring him to explain his side concerning the charge. It cannot there

fore be argued that petitioner was denied of due process.

WENCESLAO P. TRINIDAD vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

December 15, 1999

GRN 134657

BUENA, J.

Nature of the case: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus

with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction seekin

g to set aside the resolution of the Commission on Elections En Banc.

Facts

Petitioner Wenceslao Trinidad and private respondent Jovito Claudio both

ran for the position of mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections.

On May 18, 1998 private respondent Claudio was proclaimed by the Pasay City Boar

d of Canvassers as the elected mayor with 55,325 votes over petitioner Trinidad'
s 55,097 votes.

On May 23, 1998, petitioner filed a petition for correction of manifest errors a

nd annulment of proclamation. Alleged as grounds, among others, were the double

canvassing of five election returns and the inclusion of a bogus election return

in the canvass.

On June 8, 1998, petitioner filed a supplemental petition averring an error in t

he Summary of Statement of Votes for District II of Pasay City (No. 094338). It

was alleged that in the said summary of statement of votes Trinidad gathered 100

9 votes per Statement of Vote (SOV) No. 094284. But in SOV No. 094284 it was ref

lected therein that he obtained 1099 votes.

On June 9, 1998, an order was issued by the COMELEC requiring the parties to fil

e their simultaneous memoranda within five days after which the case will be dee

med submitted for resolution with or without memoranda.

The Pasay City Board of Canvassers filed its Answer on given date. Thereafter, o

r on June 15, 1998, private respondent Claudio filed his answer/memorandum (with

counter-petition for correction).

In the counter-petition it was stated that some statements of votes contained er

rors which, if corrected, would entitle Claudio to an additional forty (40) vote

s but would result in petitioner's being deducted thirteen (13) votes.

Petitioner contested the filing of private respondent's answer/memorandum (with

counter-petition for correction) in his Manifestation and Comments dated July 18

, 1998. In the said pleading, petitioner reiterated his plea for the addition of

90 votes to his total and manifested two (2) new errors, namely: (1) the electi

on returns from five precincts were not canvassed and (2) there were some discre

pancies in the election returns of nine precincts. These errors as well as the u

ncanvassed returns, if corrected and accounted for in the total number of votes,

would allegedly give petitioner an edge of eighteen (18) votes over private res

pondent: 55,229 votes to Claudio's 55,211 votes

The Commission dismisses the petition for annulment of proclamation of responden

ts Jovito O. Claudio and Reynaldo Mateo and the Supplemental Petition for correc

tion of the Summary of the Statement of Votes. We AFFIRM the proclamation of res

pondents Claudio and Mateo with the margin of votes indicated above.

Issue

Whether or not respondent commission on election committed grave abuse o

f discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in affirming the proclamation of

respondent Jovito Claudio as elected mayor of Pasay City.

Ruling

We take pains to emphasize that the same was filed only on July 18, 1998, thirty

-four (34) days after the case had been submitted for resolution on June 14, 199

8.When a case is already deemed submitted for decision or resolution, the court

can only consider the evidence presented prior to this period. It can not and mu

st not take into account evidence presented thereafter without obtaining prior l

eave of court. For as held in the case of Arroyo vs. House of Representatives El

ectoral Tribunal,

"(t)he rule in an election protest is that the protestant or counter protestant

must stand or fall upon the issues he had raised in his original or amended plea
ding filed prior to the lapse of the statutory period for filing of protest or c

ounter protest."

A pre-proclamation controversy praying for the correction of manifest errors mus

t be filed not later than five (5) days following the date of proclamation while

an election protest must be filed within ten (10) days after the proclamation o

f the results of the election.

At this juncture, we have to point out that the said Manifestation and Comments,

whether it be considered a pre-proclamation controversy or an election protest,

was filed beyond the reglementary period to do so.

CAYO G. GAMOGAMO, vs. PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORP.

May 7, 2002.

G.R. No. 141707

DAVIDE, JR., C .J p:

Nature of the case: The pivotal issue raised in the petition in this case is whe

ther, for the purpose of computing an employee's retirement pay, prior service r

endered in a government agency can be tacked in and added to the creditable serv

ice later acquired in a government-owned and controlled corporation without orig

inal charter.

Facts

Petitioner Cayo F. Gamogamo was first employed with the Department of Health (DO

H) as Dental Aide. He was promoted to the position of Dentist 1. He remained emp

loyed at the DOH for fourteen years until he resigned on 2 November 1977.
Petitioner was hired as company dentist by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LUSTEV

ECO), a private domestic corporation. Subsequently, respondent PNOC Shipping and

Transport Corporation (hereafter Respondent) acquired and took over the shippin

g business of LUSTEVECO, petitioner was among those who opted to be absorbed by

the Respondent. Thus, he continued to work as company dentist. Respondent assum

ed without interruption petitioner's service credits with LUSTEVECO, but it did

not make reference to nor assumed petitioner's service credits with the DOH. The

n President Fidel V. Ramos issued a memorandum approving the privatization of PN

OC subsidiaries, including Respondent

Petitioner retired after serving the Respondent and LUSTEVECO for 17 years and 4

months upon reaching his 60th birthday. He received a retirement pay which is

equivalent to one month pay for every year of service and other benefits.

Petitioner filed a complaint at the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) f

or the full payment of his retirement benefits. Petitioner argued that his servi

ce with the DOH should have been included in the computation of his years of ser

vice. Hence, with an accumulated service of 32 years he should have been paid a

two-month pay for every year of service per the retirement plan.

Issue

Whether or not petitioner maintains that his government service with the

DOH should be recognized and tacked in to his length of service with Respondent

because LUSTEVECO, which was later bought by Respondent, and Respondent itself,

were government-owned and controlled corporations and were, therefore, under th

e Civil Service Law.

Ruling

We cannot uphold petitioner's contention that his fourteen years of serv

ice with the DOH should be considered because his last two employers were govern

ment-owned and controlled corporations, and fall under the Civil Service Law.

Article IX(B), Section 2 paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution states

Sec. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumen

talities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controll

ed corporations with original charters.

It is not at all disputed that while Respondent and LUSTEVECO are govern

ment-owned and controlled corporations, they have no original charters; hence th

ey are not under the Civil Service Law.

In any case, petitioner's fourteen years of service with the DOH may not remain

uncompensated because it may be recognized by the GSIS pursuant to the afore quo

ted Section 12, as may be determined by the GSIS. Since petitioner may be entitl

ed to some benefits from the GSIS.

Adiong v. COMELEC 315 SCRA 712 (1992)

Macasiano v. Diokno 212 SCRA 464 (1992)

Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Notre 163 SCRA 182 (1988)

Bito-Onon v. Fernandez 350 SCRA 732 (2001)

Abbas v. COMELEC

Secretary of Justice v. Lantion

Philip Morris case

Nicaragua v. U.S. case

Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading 3 SCRA 351 (1961)

Bayan v. Zamora 342 SCRA 449 (2000)

Antonio Bengzon III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Teodoro

C. Cruz

May 7, 2001

GR No. 142840. 357 SCRA 545

J. Kapunan

Nature of the case: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Facts

Teodoro C. Cruz, being born on 1960 in Tarlac to Filipino parents is und

oubtably a natural-born Filipino Citizen.

On 1985 Teodoro C. Cruz was enlisted in the United States Marine Corps a

nd without consent of the republic of the Philippines took an oath of allegiance

to the United States as a consequence thereof he had lost his Filipino citizens

hip.
 On 1990, in connection with his service in the United States Marine Corp

s, he became a naturalized US citizen.

On 1994 he reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation un

der RA 2630. He ran for election as Representative of the 2nd District of Pangas

inan in 1998 and won.

Subsequently Antonio Bengson III filed a case for quo warranto ad cautel

am claiming that Cruz was not qualified for the position since he is not a natur

al-born citizen as required under Art. Vi, Sec 6 of the Constitution.

HRET dismissed the petition declaring Cruz the duly elected Representati

ve of the 2nd District of Pangasinan.

Issue

Whether or not a natural born Filipino who became an American Citizen, c

an still be considered a natural born citizen upon his reacquisition of Philippi

ne Citizenship
Ruling

The Court ruled that the act of repatriation under RA 2630 allows him to

recover or return to his original status before he lost his Philippine citizens

hip. His original status as natural born Filipino was restored, needless to say

he is qualified for the position of Representative of the Lower House.

HRET was empowered by the Constitution to be the sole judge of all conte

sts relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the H

ouse.

The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal s decision can only be annulled up

on showing of grave abuse of discretion on HRET s part. In the case at bar there w

as no showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excessive jurisd

iction thus the petition was dismissed.

Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan

April 18, 2001

G.R. No. 128055,

Vitug, J.

Nature of case: Petition for review on certiorari.

Facts

The herein petitioner was alleged in violating the Republic Act No.3019,

otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act upon willfully, law

fully and criminally approve the application for the legalization of the stay of

disqualified aliens. Thus, the Sandiganbayan ordered for her preventive suspens

ion.
Issue

Whether or not the herein respondent acted grave abuse of discretion in

issuing the said order.

Ruling

Section 13 of R.A 3019 does not state the public officer concerned must

be suspended only in the office where he is allegedly to committed the acts with

which he has been charged -the use of the word â officeâ would indicate that it applies

to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particu

lar office under which he stands accused. Hence, R.A.3019 does not exclude from

its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore the Sandiganbayan did n

ot err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

Petition for certiorari is dismissed.

Guingona Jr. vs. Gonzales

October 20,1992

G.R, No.106971,

Campos, Jr., J

Nature of the case: petition of prohibition

Facts
 The herein petitioner, in behalf of his party (LAKAS â NUCD) filed a petitio

n for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prohibit the said respondents fro

m sitting and assuming the position of members of the Commission on Appointments

and to prohibit Senator Neptali Gonzales, as ex officio Chairman, of said Commi

ssion from recognizing and allowing the respondents to sit as members of the sai

d Commission. Petitioner had allegedly that it was violative of the rule of prop

ortional representation, and the right of the minority political parties in the

Senate consistent with the Constitution in combining their fractional representa

tion in the Commission on Appointments to complete one seat therein and to decid

e who among the Senators in their ranks shall be additionally nominated and elec

ted.

Issue

Whether or not the said respondents are entitled as members of the said

Commission.

Ruling

The provision of Section 18 is a proportional representation is mandator

y in character and does not leave and discretion to the majority party in the Se

nate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation. The Court

declares the election of Senator Alberto Romulo and Senator Wigberto Tanada as m

embers of the Commission on Appointments as null and void for being violation of

the rule on proportional representation under Section 18 of Article VI of the 1

987 Constitution.

Hence, petition is granted.

Cunanan vs. Tan

May 10, 1962

G.R. No. L-19721

Padilla, J.

Nature of the case: Petition for quo warranto.

Facts

The herein petitioner having been qualified and assumed the duties and f

unction as acting Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation Administration, Depa

rtment of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Fortunately, on November 6, 1961, t

he President extended to the said petitioner an ad interim appointment of his po

sition as Deputy Administrator. However, the Commission on appointment composed

of six Senators and seven members of the House of Representatives rejected the s

aid ad interim appointment. The herein respondent was designated by the Presiden

t as acting Deputy Administrator of said office without the consent of the petit

ioner.

Issue

Whether or not the petitioners ad interim appointment was valid by the l

egitimate Commission of Appointment.

Ruling

The court holds that the rejection of the ad interim appointment of peti

tioner by 13 alleged members of the Commission of Appointments and designation o

f herein respondents in the same position as acting Deputy Administrator of the

Reforestation Administration, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources wh

en said office was not vacant are null and void. Hence, the petitioner was entit

led to hold the said office and the respondent should vacate the same and turn i

t over to petitioner.

Bondoc vs. Pineda

September 26, 1991

201 SCRA 792

Grino- Aquino, J.

Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari and mandamus.

Facts

In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pined

a of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the

Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative

for the fourth district of the province of Pampanga.

On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due ti

me, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET no. 25) in the House of Representatives Elector

al Tribunal (HRET). By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc

won over Pineda by margin of twenty-three (23) votes. The reexamination and rea

ppreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc s lead over Pineda to 107

votes. Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressm

an Cerilles to proclaim the winner of the case.

Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991 to his Chief Congressman Jo

se S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bon

doc case but also but also that he voted for Bondoc consistent with justice and s
elf-respect , and to honor gentlemen s agreement among the members of the HRET that th

ey would abide by the result of the appreciation of the contested ballot.

Congressman Cojuangco notified the chairman of the tribunal to withdraw

the nomination and to rescind the election of Camasura to the HRET and seeks to

cancel the promulgation of the tribunal s decision in Bondoc v. Pineda case.

Issue

Whether or not the House of Representatives could change its representative in H

ouse of Representatives Electoral Tribunal at the request of the dominant politi

cal party.

Ruling

No. If the House Electoral Tribunal would serve the interest of the party in pow

er, the independence of the Electoral Tribunal as embodied in the Constitution,

will no longer be protected. The resolution of the House of Representatives remo

ving Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to th

e LDP, because he cast his votes in favor of the Nacionalista Party s candidate, B

ondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Elec

toral Tribunal to the Sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bond

oc.

To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the

House Electoral Tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in

power (LDP) which tree justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member woul

d be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope

at the treshold of the tribunal.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge

their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence-even i

ndependence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to p

arty and breach of the party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion

of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from HRET for hav

inf cast a conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the

examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the

tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion an

injustice, and a violation of the constitution. It s resolution of expulsion agai

nst Congressman Camasura is therefore, null and void.

Civil Liberties Union vs. The Executive Secretary

February 22, 1991

194 SCRA 317

Fernan, C.J.

Nature of the case: Petition to review the order of the Executive Secretary.

Facts

Petitioner challenged the Executive Order no. 284, which in effect, allows membe

rs of the cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretary to hold other

government offices or positions in addition to their primary position, albeit su

bject to the limitations imposed, runs counter to Sec. 13 Art. VII of the Consti

tution.

Respondent on the hand, argued that the same Constitutional provision pr

ovided a proviso stating that unless otherwise provided in this constitution . The
y further contended that his proviso refers to if allowed by law or by the press

ing functions of his position.

Issue

Does the of E.O 284 violates the Constitutional limitation prohibiting appointiv

e officials from holding two offices?

Ruling

Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose

stricter prohibition on President, Vice-President, members of the cabinet, their

deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment

in the government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be

read with equal severity. The language of Sec. 13 Art. VII is prohibitory so th

at it must be understood as intended to be positive and unequivocal negation of

the privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment.

The 1987 constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, m

embers of the cabinet, their deputies or assistant from holding during their ten

ure multiple offices or employment in the government except in those cases speci

fied in the constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to post held

without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law an

d as required by the primary functions at their office.

Sec. 13, Art VII in relation to Sec. 7 par.2 Art. IX-B of the 1987 Const

itution, E.O. No. 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of

positions that the cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries ma

y hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions
in the government and government corporations. E.O. No. 284 allows them to hold

multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of

Swc.13, Art. VII of the Constitution prohibiting them from doing so unless othe

rwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

Flores vs. Drilon

June 22, 1993

223 SCRA 568

Bellosillo, J.

Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action. Prohibition

Facts

The constitutionality of Sec. 13 par (d) of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the b

ases conversion and development Act of 1992 under which respondent Mayor Richard

J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer o

f the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) is challenged in this original pet

ition with a prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restra

ining order to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of public funds of p

ublic funds by way of salaries and other operational expenses attached in the of

fice.

Petitioners who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.U. Facility at

the Subic Zambales and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees

Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, maintain that the proviso in

par. (d) Sec. 13, herein, infringes on the following constitutional and statutor

y provisions: (A) Sec. 7, first par. Art IX-B of the Constitution which states A
rt IX-B of the Constitution, which states that No elective Official shall be elig

ible for the appointment in any capacity to any public officer and position duri

ng his tenure, because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective Official a

nd the Subject post are public offices of the government whose appointments are

not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to

appoint, since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the Presi

dent who appointed the Mayor to the subject post (c) Sec. 26 par. (g) of the Omn

ibus Election Code.

Issue

Whether or not the appointive was valid in the view of the provision of

the Local Government Code.

Ruling

Sec. 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the constitutional of Sec. 13

par (d) of RA 7227 for no legislative act can prevail over fundamental law of t

he land.

The view that an elective official maybe appointed to another post if al

lowed by law or by the primary functions of his office ignores the clear-cut dif

ference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec.7, Art. IX-B of the Cons

titution holding of multiple offices by an appointive officials when allowed by

law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to

be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment

or designation of an elective official to the government post except as particu

larly recognized in the constitution itself.

As an incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for a

ppointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive of t

he SBMA; hence his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contra

venes that the Constitution cannot be sustained. He, however remains Mayor of Ol

aongapo City and his Acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he

may be considered a de facto officer.

Manalo vs. Sistoza

People vs. Marti

Jan. 18, 1991

Gr no. 81561

Bidin, J.

Nature of the Case:

Facts

This is an appeal from a decision rendered by the€ special criminal court

of Manila RTC convicting the accused appellant of violation of the provisions of

RA 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act. On August 14, 1987 the app

ellant and his common law wife Shirley Reyes€went to the booth of the Manila Packi

ng and Export Forwarders carrying with them the 4 gift wrapped packages to be se

nt to a friend in Zürich, Switzerland. He claimed that only books, cigars and glov

es are contained in the boxes. The Proprietress Anita Reyes, no longer insisted

on inspecting the packages. Before the€ delivery of the appellant's box to the bur

eau of customs, Anita and her husband Job Reyes, following the sop, opened the b

oxes for final inspection. When€ he opened Marti's box, a peculiar odor emanated w

ithin, his curiosity aroused, he squeezed the box allegedly containing the glove
s and felt dried leaves inside. He€ took several grams of the content inside. Job

Reyes forthwith prepared a letter to NBI requesting the lab to examine the sampl

es. NBI made an inventory and took charge of the boxes. They tried to locate Mar

ti but the address that he used in his passport was that of Manila Central Post

Office, On August 27, 1987, they invited Marti to NBI as he was cling his mail a

t the post office. Information was filed and appellant was then accused of viola

tion of RA 6425.

Issue

Whether or not the lower court erred in admitting in evidence the illegally sear

ched and seized objects contained in four parcels and erred in convicting appell

ant despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while und

er custodial proceedings.

Ruling

The court sees no error committed by the trial court. The evidence was o

btained€and surrendered by a private person in his private€capacity and that absence

in government interference would mean that the constitutional guarantee cannot

be invoked against the state. In his second contention, the court examined the r

ecords of the case and found nothing to indicate as an undisputed fact that the

appellant was not informed of constitutional rights.

People of the Philippines vs. de Castro

July 31, 1997

G.R. No. 119068.

Padilla; J
Nature of the Case:

Facts

An information, dated 14 November 1991, 1 was filed by Provincial Prosec

utor Alejandro A. Pulido of Cagayan charging Dante, Oscar, Rito, Joel, George, a

ll surnamed Castro, Caridad Menor y Castro alias Caring and Genesia Garcia y Cas

tro with the crime of murder.

On 10 February 1992, the accused, assisted by counsel, were arraigned an

d pleaded not guilty to the charge. Defense counsel waived pre-trial for the acc

used and moved for continuous trial which commenced on 2 March 1992 and terminat

ing on 15 February 1994 when both prosecution and defense submitted the case for

resolution.

On 10 May 1994, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 02 of Tuguegarao, Cagay

an rendered a decision where the parties are guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In

the present case, however, the issue is not whether the private respondents enga

ged in any prohibited activity which may warrant the imposition of disciplinary

sanctions against them as a result of administrative proceedings. As already obs

erved, the resolution of this case revolves around the question of due process o

f law, not on the right of government workers to strike.

Issue

Whether or not the right of due process by the parties has been violated

Ruling

In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to includ

e the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the instituti
on of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real oppor

tunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witn

esses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal ve

sted with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charge

d administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; an

d (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence subm

itted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made k

nown to the parties affected. The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 kno

wn as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers admi

nistrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law ex

pressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers' administrativ

e cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as chair

man, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teache

rs' organization and a supervisor of the division. Mere membership of said teach

ers in their respective teachers' organizations does not ipso facto make them au

thorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of R

A 4670. Under this section, the teachers' organization possesses the right to in

dicate its choice of representative to be included by the DECS in the investigat

ing committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of edu

cation or the director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant cas

e, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as member

s of its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers

' organization as its representative in said committee.

It is as clear as day to us that the Court of Appeals committed no rever

sible error in affirming the trial court's decision setting aside the questioned
orders of petitioners; and ordering the unqualified reinstatement of private re
spondents and the payment to them of salaries, allowances, bonuses and other ben

efits that accrued to their benefit during the entire duration of their suspensi

on or dismissal. 21 Because the administrative proceedings involved in this case

are void, no delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to private respondents. M

oreover, the suspension or dismissal meted on them is baseless. Private responde

nts should, as a consequence, be reinstated 22 and awarded all monetary benefits

that may have accrued to them during the period of their unjustified suspension

or dismissal. 23 This Court will never countenance a denial of the fundamental

right to due process, which is a cornerstone of our legal system. Wherefore, p

remises considered, the petition is hereby denied for its utter failure to show

any reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals. The assailed Decision

is thus AFFIRMED.

Yap vs Lutero

April 30, 1959

Gr no. L- 12669

Concepcion, J.

Nature of the case: Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Iloil

o City.

Facts

On September 12, 1956, petitioner Yap was accused, in Criminal Case No.

16054 of the Municipal Court of Iloilo City, of reckless driving, in violation o

f a city ordinance. December 10, 1956, he was again charged in Criminal Case No.

16443 of the same court, with serious physical injuries through reckless imprud
ence. Petitioner moved to quash the latter information on the ground of double j

eopardy. This motion was denied by the respondent municipal judge. Meanwhile, th

e petitioner was acquitted in Case No. 16054. Petitioner instituted the present

case for certiorari in the Court of First Instance, charging the respondent with

grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash. The Petition was dism

issed; however, on motion for reconsideration, the decision was

set aside by an order directing the respondent to desist from further proceeding

s in Criminal Case No. 16443. Respondent has brought the case for review, conten

ding that the case of People vs. Francisco Diaz.

Issue

Whether or not the lower court erred in ruling that the accused is guilt

y of reckless driving in violation a city ordinance.

Ruling

This pretense is untenable. Firstly, the crime of damage to property thr

ough reckless driving-with which Diaz stood charged in the court of first instan

ce-is a violation of Revised Penal Code, not the Automobile Law. Hence, Diaz was

not twice accused of a violation of the same law. Secondly, reckless driving an

d certain crimes committed through reckless driving are punishable under differe

nt provisions of said Automobile Law. Hence, from the viewpoint of Criminal Law,

as distinguished from Political or Constitutional Law-they constitute, strictly

different offenses, although, under certain conditions, one offense may include

the other, and, accordingly, once placed in jeopardy for one, the plead of doub

le jeopardy may be in order as regards the other, as in the Diaz case. The issue

in the case at bar hinges, therefore, on whether or not, under the information

in Case No. 16443, petitioner could-if he failed to plead double jeopardy-be con
victed of the same act charged in Case No. 16054, in which he has already been a

cquitted. The information in Case No. 16054 charged the petitioner with reckless
driving; while in Case No. 16443 he was accused of serious physical injuries th

rough reckless imprudence. Thus, if the injuries mentioned in the second informa

tion were not established by the evidence, petitioner could be convicted in the

first case of the very same violation of municipal ordinance charged in case No.

16064, unless he pleaded double jeopardy.

Decision affirmed.

People vs. Relova

De la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals

2002

305 SCRA 303

Bellosillo, J

Nature of the Case:

Facts

Petitioners was public schools teachers from various schools in Metro Ma

nila who were simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and eventually dis

missed by then sec. of DECS. It was immediately implemented. Petitioners appeal

ed to Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) and then to the Civil Service Commiss

ion (CSC). The CSC found petitioners guilt of conduct prejudicial to the best int

erest of the service for having been participated in the mass actions and imposed

the reduced penalty of 6 months. However CSC ordered petitioners automatic rei

nstatement in the service without back wages, in view of the length of time they r

e out in the service by reason of the immediate dismissal. Petitioners filed pet
itions for certiorari with this court which were referred to CA. CA dismissed th

e petitions for lack of merit. Petitioner contends that they should not be penal

ized because they were merely exercising their constitutional right to free asse

mbly.

Issue

Whether or not petitioners are exercising right to assembly and entitled

to award of back wages for the period they were not allowed to work while await

ing resolution of their appeals.

Ruling

No. Petitioners did not exercise their constitutional rights within re

asonable limits. They committed acts prejudicial to the best interest of the ser

vice by staging mass protest on regular school days, abandoning their classes an

d refusing to go back even after they have been ordered to do so. Petitioners ar

e not entitled to back wages on the ground that the petitioners were neither exo

nerated nor unjustifiably suspended, two (2) circumstances necessary for the gr

ant of back wage in administrative disciplinary cases.

Fabella vs. CA

November 28,1997

G.R. No. 110379

Panganiban, J.

Nature of the case: Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Facts

On Sept.17, 1990, then DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-work ord

er to all public school teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes o

n various dates during the period Sept. 26, 1990 to Oct. 18, 1990. The mass act

ion had been staged to demand payment of 13th month differentials, clothing allo

wances and passage of a debt-cap bill in Congress, among other things.

On Oct. 18, 1990 Secretary Carino filed Administrative cases against her

ein petitioner-appellees, who are teachers of the Mandaluyong High School. The

charge sheets required petitioner-appellees to explain in writing why they shoul

d not be punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of civil

service laws and regulations.

Secretary Carino ordered petitioner-appellee to be placed under preventi

ve suspension. Administrative hearing started on Dec. 20. 1990. Petitioner-appe

llees counsel objected to the procedure adopted by the committee and demanded tha

t he be furnished of the copy of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the

investigation. As he received no response from committee, counsel walked out.

Later, however, counsel was able to obtain a copy of the guidelines.

The teachers filed an injunctive suit with the RTC in Quezon City, charg

ing the committee with fraud and deceit however the court denied the order. The

y amended the complaint and made it one for certiorari and mandamus. Petitioner

-appellee Adriano S. Valencia filed a motion to intervene and the trial court gr

anted his motion. The DECS investigating committee rendered a decision finding

the appellees guilty. The teachers filed a petition in the Supreme Court which

issued a resolution en banc declaring void the trial court s order of dismissal a

nd reinstating petitioner-appellee s action. The trial court set the case for he
aring which denied the motion for reconsideration and the manifestation and moti

on.

On July 3, 1992 the Solicitor General informed the trial court that Carino had c

eased to be DECS Secretary and asked for his substitution. But the trial court

failed to act on his motion. The trial court rendered a decision in which it st

arted the dismissal of the teachers is not justified, it being arbitrary and vio

lative of the teacher s right to due process. The petition was granted. From thi

s decision former DECS Secretary Carino filed an appeal with the Court of Appeal

s which affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence this petition for review.

Issue

Whether or not private respondents were denied due process of law.

Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit. In administrative proceedings, due process has

been recognized to include the following 1) the right to actual constructive no

tice of the institution of proceedings which may affect the resondent s legal righ

ts, 2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of couns

el, to present witness and evidence in one s favor, and to defend one s right, 3) a

tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a pe

rson charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impar

tiality and 4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evid

ence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records

or made known to the parties affected. The legislature enacted a special law, R

.A. 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specially c

overs administrative proceedings involving public school teacher s organization an

d a superior of the division.

 In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear admin

istrative charge against private respondents did not include a representative of

the local or in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher s organi

zation as required by Section 9. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to ha

ve no competent jurisdiction. Thus all proceedings undertaken by them were nece

ssarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal

of private respondents. The inclusion of of a representative of a teacher s orga

nization in these committees was indispensable to insure an impartial tribunal.

It was this requirement that would have given a substance and meaning to the ri

ght to be heard. In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the teac

hers appointed by the DECS as members of its investigating committee was ever de

signated or authorized by the teacher s organization as its representative in said

committee. Indeed in the case at bar neither the DECS Secretary nor the DECS-N

CR regional director personally conducted the investigation but entrusted it to

a committee composed of a division supervisor, secondary and elementary school t

eachers and consultants. But there was no representative of the teacher s organiz

ation. This is a serious flaw in the composition of the committee because the p

rovision for the representation of a teacher s organization is intended by law for

the protection of the rights of teachers facing administrative charges. When c

ounsel walked out of the hearing, the teachers did not waive their rights based

on such action of counsel. The walk out was staged in protest against the proce

dures of the committee. The committee concluded its investigation and ordered t

he dismissal of the teachers without giving the teachers the right to full acces

s of the evidence against them and the opportunity to defend themselves. The pe

tition is hereby denied.

Halili vs. Court of Appeals

March 12, 1998

287 SCRA 465

Panganiban, J.

Nature of the case: Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Facts

Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, leaving real properties in the Ph

ilippines. His forced heir was his widow Helen Meyer Guzman and his son David Re

y Guzman both defendant appellee are also American citizens. Helen executed a de

ed of quitclaim, assigning, tampering, and conveying to David Rey all her rights

, title and interests in and over six parcels of land which the two of them inhe

rited from Simeon. Among the said parcels of land is that now in litigation. Dav

id Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to Emiliano Cataniag.

Petitioners who are owners of the adjoining lot filed a complaint before

the RTC questioning the validity and constitutionality of the two conveyances a

nd claiming ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption.

The trial court dismissed the complaint. It ruled that Helen Guzman s waiv

er of her inheritance in favor of her son was not contrary to the constitutional

prohibition against the sale of land to an alien, since the purpose of the waiv

er was simply to authorize David Rey Guzman to dispose of their properties in ac

cordance with the Constitution and the law of the Philippines and not to subvert

them.

The Court of Appeals denied their appeal. Hence this petition.

Issue
Whether or not the conveyance from Helen Meyer Guzman to her son David R
ey Guzman is illegal and should be declared null and void.

Ruling

The petition has no merit. Neither do we find any reversible error in th

e appellate courts holding that the sale of the subject land to Cataniag renders

moot any question on the constitutionality of the prior transfer made by Helen

Guzman to her son David Rey.

True Helen s deed of quitclaim collided with the Constitution Art. 12 Sec.

7. In fine non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands of the p

ublic domain except only by way of legal succession. But what is the effect of a

subsequent sale by the disqualified alien vendee to a qualified Filipino citize

n? Jurisprudence is consistent that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien

who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfer to a citizen, the flaw is the or

iginal transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is render

ed valid.

Accordingly, since the disposed land is now owned by Cataniag, a Filipin

o citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed the objective of

the constitutional provision - to keep one land in Filipino hands - has been se

rved.

US vs. Barrias

September 24, 1908

GR No. 4349

Nature of the Case: The power of the Commissioner to prescribe rules and regulat

ion based on the legislative act promulgated by Congress.

Facts
 Defendant was charged for violating paragraphs 70 and 83 of Circular No.

397 of the Insular Collector of Customs which prohibits heavily loaded casco, l

ighter or other similar craft to move in the Pasig River without being towed by

steam or moved by other adequate power. Defendant questions the validity of para

graph 70 of Circular No. 397

Issue

Whether or not there was an illegal delegation of legislative power.

Ruling

The judgment of the Court of First Instance is revoked and defendant is

convicted of misdemeanor and punished by a fine of 25 dollars. Act No. 1136 is v

alid and there was no illegal delegation of legislative power. The criminal offe

nse is fully and completely defined by the Act and the task given to the commiss

ioner was a mere matter of detail.

Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto

August 22, 2001

317 SCRA 272

Pardo, J.

Nature of the Case: Special civil action for certiorari to annul and set aside t

he resolution of the Ombudsman.

Facts

On Oct. 8, 1992, Fidel V. Ramos, issued Administrative Order No.13, crea

ting the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans. President R

amos issued a Memorandum Order No.61 directing the Committee to include in its i

nvestigation, inventory and study all non-performing loans which shall embrace b

oth behest and non-behest loans. The Committee reported that the Philippines See

ds, Inc. was one of the 21 corporations which obtained behest loans. In his inst

ructions, handwritten on the cover of the aforementioned report, Pre. Ramos dire

cted Committee Chairman Magtanggol C. Guingundo to proceed with administrative a

nd judicial actions against the 21 firms in this batch with positive findings as

soon as possible. The Committee filed with the Ombudsman a sworn complaint agai

nst the Directors of PSI and the Directors of the Development Bank of the Philip

pines who approved the loans for the violation of par. E & G of Sec.3 of R.A. 30

19.

In its Resolution, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on the ground o

f prescription. Relying on the case of People vs. Dinsay, a case decided by the

C.A.

Issue

Whether or not the public respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his discre

tion in holding that the prescriptive period in this case should be counted from

the date of the grant of the behest loans involved and not from the date of dis

covery of the same by the Committee.

Ruling

We agree with the Ombudsman that Sec.15 of Art. 11 of the Constitution a

pply to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and not to criminal acti
ons such as the complaint against the respected firms. This is clear from the pr

oceedings of the Constitutional Commission of 1986. The upshot of the discussion

is the prosecution of offense arising from, relating or incident to or involvin

g ill-gotten wealth contemplated in Sec.15 Art.11 of the Constitution may be bar

red by prescription. The applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive

period is Sec.2 of Act. No.326 in the special law violated. It stated that if th

e commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall commence to ru

n on the day it was committed.

In the case at bar, the Ombudsman forthwith dismissed the complaint with

out even requiring the respondents to submit their counter-affidavits and solely

on the basis of dates the alleged behest loans were granted or the dates of the

commission of the alleged offense was committed.

Since the computation of the prescriptive period for the filing of the c

riminal actions should commence from the discovery of the offense, the Ombudsman

clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing outright the case. P

etition granted.

Fariñas vs. Barba

April 19, 1996

GR No. 116763

Mendoza, J.

Nature of the Case: Appointment of the Governor in case of permanent vacancy cau

sed by a Sangguniang Bayan Member who does not belong to any political party.
Facts

A member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, who does

not belong to any political party, resigned after going without leave to the Un

ited State. To fill the vacancy, respondent Mayor recommended to petitioner Gove

rnor, the appointment of Edward Palafox. Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas made t

he same recommendation but to respondent Mayor. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan dis

approved the recommendation and Petitioner Governor appointed Nacino as member o

f the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas.

Issue

In case of a permanent vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan caused by the ce

ssation from office of a member who does not belong to any political party, who

can appoint the replacement and in accordance with what procedure.

Ruling

There is only one rule governing appointments to the Sangguniang Baranga

y. Any vacancy therein caused by the cessation from office of a member must be m

ade by the mayor upon the recommendation of that Sanggunian. The reason is that

members of the Sangguniang Barangay are not allowed to have party affiliations.

Indeed there is no reason for supposing that those who drafted Section 4

5 intended to make the manner of filling vacancies in the Sanggunians, created b

y members who do not belong to any political party, different from the manner of

filling such vacancies when created by members who belong to political party or

parties. The provision for the first must approximate the provision for the sec

ond situation. Any difference in procedure must be limited to the fact that in t

he case of vacancies caused by those who have political affiliations there is a

party which can nominate a replacement while there is none in the case of those
who have no political affiliation. Accordingly, where there is no political part

y to make a nomination, the Sanggunian, where the vacancy occurs, must be consid

ered the appropriate authority for making the recommendation, by analogy to vaca

ncies created in the Sangguniang Barangay whose members are by law prohibited fr

om having any party affiliation.

Neither petitioner Al Nacino nor respondent Edward Palafox is entitled t

o the seat in the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. For while petitioner Al Naci

no was appointed by the provincial Governor, he was not recommended by the Sangg

uniang Bayan of San Nicolas, on the other hand, respondent Edward Palafox was re

commended by the Sangguniang Bayan but it was the Mayor and not the provincial G

overnor who appointed him.

Gamboa vs. Aguirre

July 20, 1999

GR No. 134213

Ynares-Santiago, J.

Nature of the Case:

Facts

Sometime in August, 1995, the Governor of Negros Occidental designated V

ice-Governor Romeo Gamboa, Jr. as Acting Governor for the duration of his offici

al trip abroad until his return. Later, when the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) h

eld its regularsession, respondent members thereof questioned the authority of G

amboa to preside therein in view of his designation as Acting Governor. When the

court declared Gamboa temporarily legally incapacitated to preside over the ses
sions of the SP during the period that he is the Acting Governor, Gamboa filed t

his petition for review.

Issue

Whether or not an incumbent Vice-Governor, while concurrently the Acting

Governor, continue to preside over the sessions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan

Ruling

A Vice-Governor who is concurrently an Acting Governor is actually a qua

si-Governor. This means that, for purposes of exercising his legislative preroga

tives and powers, he is deemed as a non-member of the SP for the time being. Und

er RA 7160, the governor was deprived of the power to preside over the SP as he

is not a member thereof. Hence, being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor can

not continue to simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office since th

e nature and duties of the Provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to

discharge them. The creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governo

r creates a corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor w

henever the latter acts as Governor by virtue of such temporary vacancy. This ev

ent constitutes an inability on the part of the regular presiding officer (Vice-

Governor) to preside during SP sessions, which thus calls for the operation of t

he remedy set in Art. 49(b) of the Local Government Code concerning the election

of a temporary presiding officer. The continuity of the Acting Governor s (Vice-G

overnor) powers as presiding officer of the SP is suspended so long as he is in

such capacity. Under Sec. 49 (b), in the event of the inability of the regular p

residing officer to preside during SP session, the members present sand constitu

ting a quorum shall elect from among themselves presiding officer.

Victoria Amigable, Plaintiff-Appellant, Vs. Nicolas Cuenca, As Commissioner Of P

ublic Highways And Republic Of The Philippines, Defendants-Appellees.

G.R. No. L-26400

February 29, 1972

Makalintal, J.

Nature of the case: State immunity from suit and the capacity of a citizen to su

e the government.

Facts

Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot

No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City as shown by Transfer Certificate of T

itle No. T-18060, which superseded Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-3272 (T-

3435) issued to her by the Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No ann

otation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property appe

ars at the back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sa

le, the government used a portion of said lot, with an area of 6,167 square mete

rs, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Aveunes. On February 6, 1959 A

migable filed in the court a quo a complaint, which was later amended on April 1

7, 1959 upon motion of the defendants, against the Republic of the Philippines a

nd Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the re

covery of ownership and possession of the 6,167 square meters of land traversed

by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the payment of compensatory da

mages in the sum of P50,000.00 for the illegal occupation of her land, moral dam

ages in the sum of P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00 and the c

osts of the suit.

Issue
 Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the f

acts of the case.

Ruling

YES. If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for pro

perty taken for public use were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of th

is character should not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental imm

unity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a

citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing l

aw at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment o

f the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled

to such payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon

the land so condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the

judgment." If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners wo

uld not be in the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely

because there was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the government w

ould stand to benefit. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fi

delity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be m

aintained. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property

for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to

be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction

of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit co

uld still be appropriately invoked.

Alexander A. Krivenko, Petitioner-Appellant, Vs. The Register Of Deeds, City Of

Manila, Respondent And Appellee.

G.R. No. L-630

November 15, 1947

Moran, C.J.

Nature of the case: Constitutional right of an alien, if any, to own residentia

l land in the Philippines.

Facts

Alexander A. Krivenko, alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalen

a Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the registration of which was interrupted b

y the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but was denie

d by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he cann

ot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the four

th branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta, and t

hat court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, fro

m which Krivenko appealed to this Court.

Issue

Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential l

and.

Ruling

NO. One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Articl

e XIII of the Constitution and which was embodied in the report of the Committee

on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other Natural Resources of the

Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests, and other natural

resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should

, therefore, be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that nation
and for their posterity." Delegate Ledesma, Chairman of the Committee on Agricu

ltural Development of the Constitutional Convention, in a speech delivered in co

nnection with the national policy on agricultural lands, said: "The exclusion of

aliens from the privilege of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning

real estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws of the Philippines to ke

ep pace with the idea of preserving the Philippines for the Filipinos." And, of

the same tenor was the speech of Delegate Montilla who said: "With the complete

nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be understood that o

ur God-given birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands. Lands

and natural resources are immovables and as such can be compared to the vital or

gans of a person's body, the lack of possession of which may cause instant death

or the shortening of life. If we do not completely nationalize these two of our

most important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come when we shall be

sorry for the time we were born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for w

hat kind of independence are we going to have if a part of our country is not in

our hands but in those of foreigners?" Professor Aruego says that since the ope

ning days of the Constitutional Convention one of its fixed and dominating objec

tives was the conservation and nationalization of the natural resources of the c

ountry. This is ratified by the members of the Constitutional Convention who are

now members of this Court, namely, Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice Briones, a

nd Mr. Justice Hontiveros. And, indeed, if under Article XIV, section 8, of the

Constitution, an alien may not even operate a small jitney for hire, it is certa

inly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a piece of land.

Export Processing Zone Authority vs.

The Commission On Human Rights, Teresita Valles, Loreto Aledia And Pedro Ordonez

G.R. No. 101476

April 14, 1992

Griño-Aquino, J.

Nature of the case: To ascertain the power of the CHR to issue a writ of injunct

ion or restraining order against supposed violators of human rights.

Facts

On May 30, 1980, P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and designating certain

parcels of land in Rosario and General Trias, Cavite, as the "Cavite Export Proc

essing Zone" (CEPZ). For purposes of development, the area was divided into Phas

es I to IV. A parcel of Phase IV was bought by Filoil Refinery Corporation, form

erly Filoil Industrial Estate, Inc. The same parcel was later sold by Filoil to

the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). Before EPZA could take possession o

f the area, several individuals had entered the premises and planted agricultura

l products therein without permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. To c

onvince the intruders to depart peacefully, EPZA, in 1981, paid a P10,000-financ

ial-assistance to those who accepted the same and signed quitclaims. Among them

were Teresita Valles and Alfredo Aledia, father of respondent Loreto Aledia.Ten

years later, on May 10, 1991, respondent Teresita Valles, Loreto Aledia and Pedr

o Ordoñez filed in the respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint complai

nt (Pinagsamahang Salaysay) praying for "justice and other reliefs and remedies"

("Katarungan at iba pang tulong"). The CHR conducted an investigation of the co

mplaint.

Issue

Whether or not the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction o

r restraining order against supposed violators of human rights.

Ruling
 NO. The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preve

ntive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights

have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdicti

on on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if

that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdi

ction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. It is never derived by im

plication. Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned

in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a p

reliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on

behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice,

the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary

injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is

pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of th

e Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instanc

e [now Regional Trial Court] in any action pending in an inferior court within h

is district." A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is ava

ilable only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of

the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose

Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez

G.R. No. 113888

August 19, 1994

Quiason, J.

Nature of the case: Petitions for review of orders or resolution. En Banc

Facts
 This is a consolidation of four cases upon to rule on the conflicting cl

aims of authority between the Legislative and the Executive. Providing the focus

for the contest between the President and the Congress over the control of the

national budget. Judicial intervention is being sought by a group of concerned t

axpayers on the claim that Congress and the President have impermissibly exceede

d their respective authorities, and by several Senators on the claim that the Pr

esident has committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without jurisdiction in

the exercise of his veto power.

Issue

Whether or not the Presidential veto of the special provision in the app

ropriation for debt services and the automatic appropriation of funds is valid.

Ruling

The Court went one step further and ruled that provisions are beyond the e

xecutive power to veto, but such sections were not provisions in the budgetary sen

se of the term, they are inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items fo

r the purpose of the President s veto power.

The petitions were dismissed, except with respect to G.R. Nos. 113766 an

d 113105 only insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the special

provision on debt service and G.R. No. 113888 only insofar as it prays for the a

nnulment of the veto.

Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Commission on Audit

G.R. 91890

June 9, 1995

Romero, J.
Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action for certiorari and prohibition. En Banc

Facts

Philippine Airlines, Inc seeks to review and annul and reverse the

decision of the Commission on Audit and to prohibit, enjoin and

prevent COA from enforcing or in any way implementing Department

Order No. 19, Circular No. 498 and 88-565 that PAL is required to

purchase its fuel requirements solely from Petron Corporation. Pal

sought for reconsideration for preferring to bid out and secure its

fuel supply from more than one supplier and such order should not be

applied to PAL. COA denied PAL's request for reconsideration, that

such order be applied to GOCC,including subsidiaries.

Issue

€ Whether the Commission on Audit committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in holding

that Department Order No. 19 of the defunct Department of General

Services applies to Pal?

Ruling

€€€€€ Pursuant to the government's privatization program, PAL's

shares of stock were bidded out, resulting in the acquisition by PR

Holdings, a private corporation, of 67% of PAL's outstanding stocks.

PAL, having ceased to be a government-owned or controlled

corporation, is no longer under the audit jurisdiction of the COa.

Accordingly, the question raised in this petition has clearly become

moot and academic.

€€€€€ The petition is dismissed for being moot and academic.

Joel B. Caes, , vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court

November 6, 1989.

Gr. No. 126379

Cruz, J.

Nature of the Case: Petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate App

ellate Court.

Facts

On November 21, 1981, petitioner Joel Caes was charged in two separate informati

on with illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of marijuana befor

e the court of First Instance of Rizal.

On August 31, 1982, Caes was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was schedul

ed for October 13, 1982, but this was reset upon agreement of the parties.

In view of the failure of the prosecution witnesses to appear on several schedul

ed hearings and also for the hearing which is an indication of lack of interest,

upon motion of the trial fiscal for the provisional dismissal of the cases and

with the conformity of the accused, the above-entitled cases are hereby ordered

provisionally dismissed.

On January 9, 1984, a motion to revive the cases was denied on October 9 filed b
y Major Dacanay who alleged that they could not attend the hearing for lack of n

otice.

Issue

The present petition is based in two agreements to wit: a. that the motion to re

vive the cases was invalid because it was not filed by the proper party nor was

a copy served on the petitioner; and b. the revival of he cases would place the

petitioner in double jeopardy in violation of the Bill of Rights.

Ruling

It is axiomatic that the prosecution of a criminal case is the responsibility of

the government prosecution and must always be under his control. This is true e

ven if a private prosecutor is allowed to assist him and actually handles the ex

amination of the witnesses and the introduction of other evidence. The witnesses

, even if they are the complaining witnesses, cannot act for the prosecutor of t

he case. Although they may ask for the filing of the case, they have no personal

ity to move for its dismissal or revival as they are not even parties thereto no

r as they represent the parties to the action. Their only function is to testify

. In a criminal prosecution, the plaintiff is represented by the government pros

ecutor, or one acting under his authority, and by no one else.

On the second issue, the position of the public respondent is that double jeopar

dy has not attached because the case was only provisionally dismissed and it was

with the conformity of the accused. The petitioner denies that he consented to

the dismissal and submits that the dismissal was final notwithstanding its descr

iption.

Fittingly described as res judicata in prison grey , the right against double jeopa

rdy prohibits the prosecution of a person for a crime of which he has been previ
ously acquitted or convicted. The purpose is to set the effects of the first pro

secution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be s

ubjected to the danger and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same o

ffense.

It has been held in a long line of cases that to constitute double jeopardy, the

re must be a. a valid complaint or information b. filed before a competent court

c. to which the defendant had pleaded and d. of which he had been previously ac

quitted or convicted or which was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his

express consent.

There is no question that the first three requisites are present in the case at

bar. What we must resolve is the effect of the dismissal, which the petitioner c

ontends finally and irrevocably terminated the two cases against him. Its submis

sion is that the dismissal was not provisional simply because it was so designat

ed, more so since he had not expressly consented thereto.

Petition Granted.

People of the Philippines, vs. Court of Appeals

June 26, 1998.

Gr. No. 7498990

Narvasa, C.J.

Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court

of Appeals.

Facts
On December 14, 1995, Senior Inspector PNP James Brillantes applied for search w

arrant before Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who had

allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Sa

n Jose del Monte, Bulacan.

The following day, December 15, 1995, search warrant against Mr. Hussain was iss

ued not at Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four (4) Pakistani n

ationals and in the seizure of their personal belongings, papers and effects suc

h as wallet, wrist watches, pair of shoes, jackets, t.shirts, belts, sunglasses

and traveling bags including cash amounting to $ 3,550.00 and P 1,500.00 aside f

rom US $ 5,175.00 (receipted) which were never mentioned in the warrant.

The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of foregoing verdict, describing to Cou

rt of Appeals the following errors 1. sanctioning the lower courts precipitate a

ct of disregarding the proceedings before the issuing court and overturning the

latters determination of probable cause and particularly of the place to be sear

ched.

Issue

Whether or not a search warrant was validly issued as regards the apartment in w

hich private respondents were the actually residing.

Ruling

The government insists that the police officers who applied to Quezon City Regio

nal Trial Court for the search warrant had direct, personal knowledge of the pla

ce to be searched and the things to be seized. It claims that one of the said of

ficers, in fact, had been able to surreptitiously later the place to be searched

or to the search: this being the first of four (4) separate apartments behind t

he Abigail Variety Store and they were also the same police officers who eventua
lly effected the search and seizure. They thus had personal knowledge of the pla

ce to be searched and had the competence to make a sketch thereof; they knew exa

ctly what objects should be taken therefrom; and they had presented evidence suf

ficient to establish probable cause. That may be so; but unfortunately, the plac

e they had in mind-the first of four (4) separate apartment units (No.1) at the

rear of Abigail Variety Store - was not what the judge who issued the warrant himse

lf had in mind, and was not what was ultimately described in the search warrant.

Wherefore the judgment if the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals is her

eby affirmed.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals

August 7, 1996

G.R. No.91885

Panganiban, J.

Nature of the Case: Petition for review under Rule 45 to set aside the decision

1 of the court of appeals, 2 Promulgated on November 27, 1989 and the resolution

3 denying reconsideration, promulgated on January 17, 1990 in CA-GR. CV. No. 17

828 entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Laureano Bros., Co, Inc.

Facts

It appears that under the contract (date not indicated in the pleadings)

, private respondent Laureano Brothers, Inc, undertook to supply petitioner repu

blic of the Philippines with plumbing materials for the use of the National Wate

r and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) which procurement was financed by the United S

tates Government through the International Cooperation Administration (ICA). How

ever, all the materials delivered by private respondent to nawasa were rejected

because they did not conform to the agreed specifications. Refusing to refund th

e money paid for says materials, private respondent was sued by the Republic in

the then Court of first Instance of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 44566.

A decision was rendered by the trial court based on a compromise agreem

ent whereby private respondent agreed to pay the petitioner the amount of US$358

,882.02 or its equivalent in Philippine peso. A disagreement on the rate of exch

ange for conversion of the dollars into pesos was settled by this court in G.R.

No. L-250554 by fixing such rate at P3.91 per US$1.00. This judgment became fina

l and executory on July 27, 1968. On April 16, 1973, the trial court issued an o

rder authorizing private respondent to sell the attached property. On May 31, 19

73, Firma Techno Machineries, Inc, purchased the said lot and building through a

deed of sale registered on June 1, 1973. Thereafter, private respondent remitte

d to NEDA the net proceeds of P881,003.01 deducting P68,995.99 representing taxe

s. On December 10, 1973, NEDA disapproved said sale on the ground that the price

was too low and that the conditions imposed by the trial court were not allowed

. NEDA thus returned the two checks it received (P10,000.00 earnest money and O8

81,004.01 net proceeds of the sale) and filed an action to annul the sale.

Issue

Whether or not the five-year period within which to enforce the decision

in Civil case No. 44566 was interrupted by the period when the question of the

legality if the sale of respondent s properties was pending in the Court of Appeal

s and before this Honorable Court.

Ruling

The court held that there is no question that the decision in favor of
the Republic has not been satisfied and the private respondent has not paid its

obligation under such judgment. The only question is how such decision shall be

enforced against the obligor. Under the Rules, 7 a Judgment may be executed withi

n five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final an

d executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statut

e of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.

Wherefore the petition is granted and the assailed decision is ANNULLED

and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is hereby directed to issued t

he writ of execution in Civil Case No. 44566 for the enforcement of the decision

therein.

Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez vs. Court of Appeals

August 4, 1994.

G.R. No. 110662.

Padilla, J.

Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court

of Appeals.

Facts

On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Tria

l Court of Quezon City a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages agains

t petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license an

d/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. The complaint was docketed as C

ivil case No. Q-90-5360 and raffled to Branch 94, RTC of Quezon City presided ov

er by respondent Judge Romeo F. Zamora.

Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent s oral offer of e

vidence on 9 June 1992; on the same day, the trial court admitted all of private

respondent s offered evidence. A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was d

enied on 23 June 1992.

A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals a

ssailing the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.

Issue

Whether or not the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was

properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals.

Ruling

The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an

interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordi

nary appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds f

or assailing the interlocutory order.

However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the re

medy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may a

llow certiorari as a mode of redress.

In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of

the evidence offered by private respondent, including tape recordings of telepho

ne conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape recordings

were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the mili

tary to wire tap his home telephone.

Clearly, respondent trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afor

e-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in qu

estion. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations
allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is m

andatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28545 is hereb

y set aside. The subject cassette tapes are declared inadmissible in evidence

Hon. Renato C. Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines an

d Manila Pilots Association

December 12, 1997

G.R. No. 111953.

Romero, J.

Nature of the Case: Petition for review of a decision of the Regional Trial Cour

t of Manila, Branch 6.

Facts

The PPA was created on July 11, 1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 505.

On December 23, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 857 was issued revising the PPA s ch

arter.

On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilot Association and the Manila P

ilots Association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92

before the Department of Transportation and Communication, but they informed by

then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that the matter of reviewing, recalling or an

nulling PPA s administrative issuances lies exclusively with its Board of Director
s as its governing body.

Consequently, respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injun

ction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and damages,

before Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. which was docketed as Ci

vil Case No. 93-65673.

Issue

Whether or not the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate respondent s right to

exercise their profession and their right to due process of law.

Ruling

The court a quo pointed out that the Bureau of Customs, the precursor of the PPA

, recognized pilotage as a profession and, therefore a property right under Call

anta v. Carnation Philippines, Inc. Thus, abbreviating the term within which tha

t privilege may be exercised would be an interference with the property rights o

f the harbor pilots. Consequently, any withdrawal or alteration of such property r

ight must be strictly made in accordance with the constitutional mandate of due

process of law. This was apparently not followed by the PPA when it did not cond

uct public hearings prior to the issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92; respondents alleg

edly learned about it only after its publication in the newspapers. From this de

cision, petitioners elevated their case to this Court on certiorari.

Wherefore, the instant petition is hereby dismissed and the assailed decision of

the court a quo dated September 6, 1993, in Civil Case No. 93-65673 is affirmed

Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez

G.R. No. 113888

August 19, 1994

Nature of the case: Petitions for review of orders or resolution.

Facts: This is a consolidation of four cases upon to rule on the conflicting cla

ims of authority between the Legislative and the Executive. Providing the focus

for the contest between the President and the Congress over the control of the n

ational budget. Judicial intervention is being sought by a group of concerned ta

xpayers on the claim that Congress and the President have impermissibly exceeded

their respective authorities, and by several Senators on the claim that the Pre

sident has committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without jurisdiction in

the exercise of his veto power.

Issue: Whether the Presidential veto of the special provision in the appropriati

on for debt services and the automatic appropriation of funds is valid?

Ruling: The Court went one step further and ruled that "provisions" are beyond t

he executive power to veto, but such sections were not "provisions" in the budge

tary sense of the term, they are "inappropriate provisions" that should be treat

ed as "items" for the purpose of the President's veto power.

€€€€€ The petitions were dismissed, except with respect to G.R. Nos. 113766 and 113105 onl

y insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the special provision on

debt service and G.R. No. 113888 only insofar as it prays for the annulment of

the veto.

Gloria vs. Court of Appeals

1999
306 SCRA 287

Mendoza, J.

Nature of the case:

Facts

Private respondents are public schools teachers. During the teacher s str

ike, they did not report to work. For this reason they were administratively cha

rge and place under preventive suspension. The investigation was concluded befor

e the lapse 90-day suspension and private respondents were found guilty. Respond

ent Margallo was dismissed from service while other respondents were suspended f

or 6 months. Respondent Margallo appealed to the Merit Systems and Preventive Bo

ard (MSPB) which found him guilty. Other respondent also appealed but it was dis

missed. On appeal, Civil service Commission (CSC) affirmed the decision of the M

SPB with respect to Margallo, but found the other three (Abad, Bandigas, Someban

g) guilty of reasonable office rules and regulations and ordered them reinstated

to their former positions. Rspondent filed petition for certiorari in this Cour

t. The case was referred to Court of Appeals (CA) which rendered decision (1) af

firming the decision of CSC with respect to Amparo, Bandigas, Somebang but (2)

reversing the CSC ordered suspension of Margallo. The appellate court found him

guilty of reasonable office rules and regulations only and imposed him the pena

lty of reprimand. Private respondents moved for a reconsideration, contending th

at they should be exonerated of all charges against them and that they be paid s

alaries during their suspension. CA ruled that they are entitled to the payment

of salaries during their suspension beyond 90 days . Petitioner Gloria moved for a

reconsideration, but the motion was denied. Hence this petition. Petitioner con

tends that the administrative investigation was concluded within the 90 day peri
od of preventive suspension and that the continued suspension of private respond

ents is due to their appeal, hence the government should not be held answerable

for payment.

Issue

Whether or not respondents are entitled to payment of salaries during t

he period of their suspension and appeal.

Ruling

Yes, they are entitled. There are two kinds of preventive suspension of

civil service employee who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or s

uspension: (1) preventive suspension pending investigation (§51) and (2) preventiv

e suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority

is suspension or dismissal and after review, the respondent is exonerated. As a

lready stated, CA ordered DECS to pay private respondents their salaries, allowa

nces and other benefits beyond the 90 day preventive suspension . In other words, n

o compensation was due for the period of the preventive suspension pending inves

tigation but only for the period of preventive suspension pending appeal in the

event the employee is exonerated.

Wherefore decision of CA, dated Sept. 3, 1996, is hereby AFFIRMED with t

he modification that the award of salaries to private respondents shall be compu

ted from the time of their dismissal/suspension by DECS until their actual reins

tatement, for a period not exceeding five years.

CAES vs. IAC

November 6, 1989, G.R. Nos. 74989-90

Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari.

FACTS: On November 21, 1981, petitioner Joel Caes was charged in two separate in

formations with illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of marijua

na before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The cases were consolidated on

December 10, 1981.

Arraignment was originally scheduled on January 11, 1982, but was for some reaso

n postponed.

On August 31, 1982, Caes was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was schedu

led for October 13, 1982, but this was reset upon agreement of the parties.

On April 19, 1983, the trial of the case had not yet started. It was reset becau

se the prosecution witnesses were again absent.

On June 3, 1983, a sheriffs return informed the trial court that the prosecution

witnesses, namely, Capt. Carlos Dacanay and Sgt. Bonifacio Lustado had been per

sonally served with subpoena to appear and testify at the hearing scheduled on J

une 6, 1983.

On November 14, 1983, the prosecution moved for the provisional dismissal of the

case because its witnesses had not appeared. On the same date, Judge Alfredo M.

Gorgonio issued the following order:

The failure of the prosecution witnesses to appear on several scheduled hearing

and also for the hearing today which is an indication of lack of interest, upon

motion of the trial fiscal for the provisional dismissal of these cases and with

the conformity of the accused, the above-entitled cases are hereby ordered Prov

isionally Dismissed.

On January 9, 1984, a motion to revive the cases was filed by Maj. Dacanay (he h

ad been promoted in the meantime) and Sgt. Lustado who alleged that they could n
ot attend the hearing scheduled on November 14, 1983, for lack of notice.

On May 18, 1984, the respondent judge issued the following order:

On the "Motion for the Revival of the Case" no opposition has been filed and con

sidering that the dismissal of these cases was only provisional, for reasons sta

ted in the motion, the same is granted.

The petitioner questioned the judge's order which was dismissed for lack of meri

t on May 20, 1986, and reconsideration was denied on June 17, 1986. Hence, this

petition.

ISSUES

a) Whether or not the motion to revive the cases was invalid because it was riot

filed by the proper party nor was a copy served on the petitioner; and

b) Whether or not the revival of the cases would place the petitioner in double

jeopardy in violation of the Bill of Rights.

RULING: It is axiomatic that the prosecution of a criminal case is the responsib

ility of the government prosecutor and must always be under his control. The wit

nesses, even if they are the complaining witnesses, cannot act for the prosecuto

r in the handling of the case. Although they may ask for the filing of the case,

they have no personality to move for its dismissal or revival as they are not e

ven parties thereto nor do they represent the parties to the action. In a crimin

al prosecution, the plaintiff is represented by the government prosecutor, or on

e acting under his authority, and by no one else.

The mere fact that the government prosecutor was furnished a copy of the motion

and he did not interpose any objection was not enough to justify the action of t

hese witnesses. The prosecutor should have initiated the motion himself if he th

ought it proper. The presumption that he approved of the motion is not enough, e
specially since we are dealing here with the liberty of a person who had a right

at least to be notified of the move to prosecute him again. The fact that he wa

s not so informed made the irregularity even more serious.

On the second issue, the position of the public respondent is that double jeopar

dy has not attached because the case was only provisionally dismissed and it was

with the conformity of the accused.

To constitute double jeopardy, there must be: (a) a valid complaint or informati
on; (b) filed before a competent court; (c) to which the defendant had pleaded;

and (d) of which he had been previously acquitted or convicted or which was dism

issed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

There is no question that the first three requisites are present in the case at

bar. A case may be dismissed if the dismissal is made on motion of the accused h

imself or on motion of the prosecution with the express consent of the accused.

Such a dismissal is correctly denominated provisional. The consent cannot be pre

sumed nor may it be merely implied from the defendant's silence or his failure t

o object, otherwise, the dismissal will be regarded as final.

There are instances in fact when the dismissal will be held to be final and to d

ispose of the case once and for all even if the dismissal was made on motion of

the accused himself. The first is where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to

the evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested. Such dismiss

al has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal.

The other exception is where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accuse

d, because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial. This is in effect a fai

lure to prosecute.

As the record shows, the petitioner was arraigned on August 31, 1982, but was ne

ver actually tried until the cases were dismissed on November 14, 1983, followin

g eleven postponements of the scheduled hearings, mostly because the prosecution

was not prepared. Meantime, the charges against him continued to hang over his

head even as he was not given an opportunity to deny them because his trial coul

d not be held.

Under these circumstances, Caes could have himself moved for the dismissal of th

e cases on the ground of the denial of his right to a speedy trial.

The circumstance that the dismissal of the cases against the petitioner was desc

ribed by the trial judge as "provisional" did not change the nature of that dism

issal. As it was based on the "lack of interest" of the prosecutor and the conse

quent delay in the trial of the cases, it was final and operated as an acquittal

of the accused on the merits. No less importantly, there is no proof that Caes

expressly concurred in the provisional dismissal. Implied consent, as we have re

peatedly held, is not enough; neither may it be lightly inferred from the presum

ption of regularity, for we are dealing here with the alleged waiver of a consti

tutional right. Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the accuse

d.

We conclude that the trial judge erred in ordering the revival of the cases agai

nst the petitioner and that the respondent court also erred in affirming that or

der. Caes having been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, and not

having expressly consented to the "provisional" dismissal of the cases against

him, he was entitled to their final dismissal under the constitutional prohibiti

on against double jeopardy.

It is possible that as a result of its in attention, the petitioner has been nee

dlessly molested if not permanently stigmatized by the unproved charges. The oth

er possibility, and it is certainly worse, is that a guilty person has been allo

wed to escape the penalties of the law simply because he may now validly claim t

he protection of double jeopardy. In either event, the responsibility clearly li

es with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City for its negligence an

d ineptitude.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DECLARO

February 9, 1989, G.R. No. L-64362

Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari of the order of dismissal

of the Regional Trial Court of Aklan.

FACTS: As a result of a traffic accident that occurred at about 9:00 o'clock in

the morning of July 7, 1980 at Barangay Laguinbanua West, Numancia, Aklan, Edgar

lbabao was charged for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence in

a complaint that was filed on September 5, 1980 in the Municipal Circuit Court o
f Malinao, Aklan. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1028-N wherein a ce

rtain Crispin Conanan was the offended party. On October 1, 1980, an information

for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against the

same accused in the Regional Trial Court of Aklan. The case was docketed as Cri

minal Case No. 1421 with one Eduardo Salido as the offended party. This second c

ase arose from the same incident.

Upon the arraignment of the accused in Criminal Case No. 1028-N, he entered a pl

ea of not guilty. The case was first set for hearing on January 19, 1983. Both t

he offended party and the prosecuting fiscal failed to appear at the scheduled h

earing despite due notice. Counsel for the accused thus verbally moved for the d

ismissal of the case for lack of interest on the part of the prosecution. This m

otion was granted. A motion for reconsideration of the said order was filed by t

he fiscal on January 27, 1983. The motion for reconsideration was granted in an

order dated May 27, 1983. The case was, therefore, set for trial. However, upon

a motion for reconsideration filed by the accused, the inferior court issued ano

ther order dated August 30, 1983, dismissing the case anew.

Considering that the said case had been dismissed on January 19, 1983, counsel f

or the accused filed a motion to dismiss Criminal Case No. 1421 on the ground th

at the dismissal of the prior case is a bar to the prosecution of the latter. Th

e trial court dismissed Criminal Case No. 1421 on the ground of double jeopardy.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the prosecution but was denied.

Thus, this petition filed by the private prosecutor with the conformity of the p

rovincial fiscal. Petitioner argues that double jeopardy has not set-in in this

case because:

(1) The dismissal of Criminal Case No. 1028-N was at the instance and with the e
xpress consent of accused and his counsel.

2) The second offense charged is not the same as the first, nor is it an attempt

to commit the same or a frustration thereof, nor does it include or is necessar

ily included in the first.

(3) Criminal Case No. 1028-N is not yet terminated.

ISSUES

Whether or not there is double jeopardy.

Whether or not there is a violation of the right of the accused to a speedy tria

l.

RULING: To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be presen

t: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first je

opardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be fo

r the same offense as that in the first.

Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent

court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) whe

n the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwi

se terminated without the express consent of the accused.

Although there are criminal cases which were dismissed upon motion of the accuse

d because the prosecution was not prepared for trial since the complainant and/o

r his witnesses did not appear at the trial and where this Court held that the d

ismissal is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the

defendant for the same offense the facts and the circumstances of the present c

ase do not warrant a similar ruling.

In the present case, the accused was duly notified that the case was set for hea

ring on January 19, 1983. On said date of hearing neither the complainant nor th
e fiscal appeared despite due notice. This was the first date of hearing after a

rraignment. The court a quo should not have dismissed the case and should have i

nstead reset the case to another date to give the prosecution another day in cou

rt.

Thus, while a violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial can serve

as a basis for the dismissal of a case, this must be balanced with the right of

the prosecution to due process.

In the instant case, the complaining witness and the prosecutor failed to appear
only in the first hearing. Even if the court did not dismiss the case but merel

y postponed the hearing to another date, there would not have been a denial of t

he right of the accused to a speedy trial. The right of the accused to have a sp

eedy trial is violated when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for

and secured, or when, without good cause or justifiable motive, a long period o

f time is allowed to elapse without his case being tried. None of said situation

s exists in the present case. Surely, it cannot be said that there was a violati

on of the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial. The more pruden

t step that the court a quo should have taken was to postpone the hearing to giv

e the prosecution another opportunity to present its case. The dismissal of the

case by the trial court on the ground that the accused is entitled to a speedy t

rial is unwarranted under the circumstances obtaining in this case.

Double jeopardy will apply even if the dismissal is made with the express consen

t of the accused, or upon his own motion, only if it is predicated on either of

two grounds, i.e., insufficiency of the evidence or denial of the right to a spe

edy trial. In both cases, the dismissal will have the effect of an acquittal. Si

nce the dismissal in this case does not fall under either of these two instances

and it was made with the express consent of the accused, it would not thereby b

e a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.

MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS

October 27, 1989, G.R. No. 88211

Nature of the case: Motion for reconsideration on the Court s decision dated Septe

mber 15,1989 dismissing the petition, after finding that the President did not a

ct arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return

of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present

circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting

their return to the Philippines.

FACTS: On September 28, 1989, former President Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii.

In a statement, President Aquino said:

In the interest of the safety and for the tranquility of the state and order of

society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to

our country until such time as the government, be it under this administration

or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide.

On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners, raisi

ng the following major arguments:

1. to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippin

es is to deny them not only the inherent right of citizens to return to their co

untry of birth but also the protection of the Constitution and all of the rights

guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution;

2. the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has

, she had exercised it arbitrarily; and

3. there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Ma

rcos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner s arguments are impressed with merit.

RULING: The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening even

t, has not changed the factual scenario under which the Court's decision was ren

dered. The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has be

en viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased.

It cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has
unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power an

d which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution.

The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in

the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Const

itution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Con
stitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reactio

n to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation

of specific power of the President, particularly those relating to the commander

-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power.

Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his

(or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of

the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the

remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in

compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she h

ad acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at thi

s decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.

The Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

PHIL. ROCK INDUSTRIES, INC. vs. BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS

December 15,1989, G.R. No. 84992

Nature of the Case: Appeal on decision dated March 21, 1987 by the Court of Appe

als setting aside the decision and order of execution pending appeal which the R

egional Trial Court of Manila issued in favor of the Philippine Rock Industries

in Civil Case No. 82-11394, authorizing the immediate execution of its decision

against the funds deposited in the Philippine National Bank (PNB) of the respond

ent Board of Liquidators as liquidator of the defunct Reparations Commission.

FACTS: On July 30, 1982, PHILROCK filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, B

ranch 38, a complaint against the Board of Liquidators for Specific Performance

or Revaluation with Damages, praying that the defective rock pulverizing machine

ry which it purchased from REPACOM be replaced with a new one in good and operab
le condition according to the specifications of their contract, or, in the alter

native, to refund the value of the defective rock pulverizing machinery at 31 %

of its contract price. PHILROCK also prayed for actual damages of P 5,000 per mo

nth for losses it allegedly incurred due to the increased expenses of maintainin

g the plant, P 4,000 per day as unrealized profits, exemplary damages, attorney

fees of P 50,000, plus expenses and costs of the suit.

On April 23, 1987, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of PHILROCK and

ordered REPACOM and the Board of Liquidators-

1. To reimburse Plaintiff Philrock for the expenses it had invested and incurred

in connection with its purchase of the said rock pulverizing plant from REPACOM

in the total amount of P l02,837.66;

2. To pay Plaintiff Philrock compensatory damages for unrealized profits from Ma

y, 1966 and up to December 31, 1983 in the amount of P 33,896,844.47;

3. To pay Plaintiff Philrock the amount of P 671,925.32 as reimbursement for the

expenses incurred in storage and maintenance of the rock pulverizing plant at P

hilrock's plant site from June 1, 1966 up to December 31, 1982;

4. To pay Plaintiff Philrock exemplary damages of P 200,000.00;

5. To pay Plaintiff Philrock's (sic) Attorney's fee of P 50,000.00;

6. To pay the costs of this suit.

On May 5, 1987, PHILROCK filed an urgent motion for execution pending appeal.

On May 14, 1987, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the State, filed a notice o

f appeal and an opposition to the "Motion for Execution Pending Appeal" on the g

round that the funds sought to be garnished by PHILROCK are public funds, hence,

exempt from attachment and execution.

On May 19, 1987, an order of Garnishment was served to PNB against the funds of
REPACOM in the account of the Board of Liquidators to satisfy the judgment in fa

vor of PHILROCK.

On March 21, 1988, the Court of Appeals held that:

... the funds deposited by the Board of Liquidators in the Philippine National B

ank may not be garnished to satisfy a money judgment against the petitioner as t

hese funds are public funds.

ISSUE: Whether or not the funds of REPACOM in the account of the Board of Liquid

ators in the Philippine National Bank may be garnished to satisfy a money judgme

nt against the BOARD.

RULING: The Board of Liquidators is a government agency under the direct supervi

sion of the President of the Republic created by EO 372, dated November 24, 1950

. It is tasked with the specific duty of administering the assets and paying the

liabilities of the defunct REPACOM. Hence, when a suit is directed against said

unincorporated government agency which, because it is unincorporated, possesses

no juridical personality of its own, the suit is against the agency's principal

, i.e., the State.

The sale of the rock pulverizing plant to PHILROCK by the Board of liquidators,

although proprietary in nature was merely incidental to the performance of the B

oard's primary and governmental function of settling and closing the affairs of

the REPACOM. Hence, its funds in the Philippine National Bank are public funds,

which are exempt from garnishment.

It should be mentioned that when the State consents to be sued, it does not nece

ssarily concede its liability. Even when the government has been adjudged liable

in a suit to which it has consented, it does not necessarily follow that the ju

dgment can be enforced by execution against its hands for, every disbursement of

public funds must be covered by a corresponding appropriation passed by the Leg

islature.

Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power o

f the courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the s

tate has been judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for i

tself whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgme
nt against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property

to satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an implication that the legisla

ture will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the satisfacti

on thereof.

Funds should be appropriated by the legislature for the specific purpose of sati

sfying the judgment in favor of PHILROCK before said judgment may be paid.

SUMMERS vs. OZAETA

October 25, 1948, G.R. No. L-1534

Nature of the Case:

FACTS: Prior to February 16, 1946, the petitioner was a cadastral judge. On said

date he qualified for and assumed the position of judge-at-large of first insta

nce by Secretary of Justice, the petitioner having received an ad interim appoin

tment on February 11, 1946. On July 9, 1946, petitioner's ad interim appointment

was disapproved by the Commission on appointment, as a result of which the resp

ondent Secretary of Justice duty informed the petitioner that latter was thereup

on separated from the service. Thereafter and until the present action was insti

tuted on July 11, 1947, his efforts were limited to the task of being reappointe

d. It was argued that then petitioner did not cease to be a cadastral judge. At

any rate, the petitioner does not pretend that he has ever rendered service as c

adastral judge or received any of its emoluments subsequent to the rejection of

his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments.

It is now argued by the petitioner that under section 9, Article VIII, of the Co

nstitution, he is entitled to continue as cadastral judge during good behavior u

ntil he reaches the age of seventy years or becomes incapacitated to discharge t

he duties of said office; that the positions of cadastral judge and judge-at-lar

ge are not incompatible and that therefore by the acceptance of the latter offic

e he did not cease to be a cadastral judge, especially where his ad interim appo

intment was disapproved by the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner s argument is with merit.

RULING: There can be no doubt about the constitutional right of member of the Su

preme Court and judge of inferior court to hold offices during good behavior unt

il they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the

duties of their office. Said right is waivable.

Petitioner's voluntary acceptance of the position of judge-at-large consequent u

pon his taking of the oath of office on February 16, 1946, amounted to a waiver

of his right to hold the position of cadastral judge during the term fixed and g

uaranteed by the Constitution.

An ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph (4), section 10,

Article VII, of the Constitution, which provides that the " President shall hav

e the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such app

ointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appoint

ments or until the next adjournment of the Congress." It is an appointment perma

nent in nature, and the circumstance that it is subject to confirmation by the C

ommission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.

In the case at bar, the petitioner accepted and qualified for the position of ju

dge-at-large by taking the oath of office of judge-at-large, and not merely of a

n "acting" judge-at-large. As stated in Zandueta vs. De la Costa, supra, the pet

itioner "knew, or at least he should know, that his ad interim appointment was s

ubject to the approval of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembl

y and that if said commission were to disapprove the same, it would become ineff

ective and he would cease discharging the office.

In a situation faced by the petitioner, the safer course to follow would have be

en for him to await the confirmation of the ad interim appointment before qualif

ying for and assuming the position of judge-at-large.

The petitioner cannot seek refuge in the general principle that the acceptance o

f a second office may be held as amounting to a vacation of the first, the two o

ffices must be incompatible.

The situation before us is undoubtedly not one wherein he may appropriately hold

two compatible offices at one time such, for instance, as the positions of town

recorder and county and probate judge but one wherein he cannot legally hold tw

o offices of similar category at the same time, like two positions of judge of f

irst instance. Two offices are incompatible when viewed in the light of the publ

ic policy expressed in the statutes creating them and defining their powers and

duties. To hold otherwise would be to say that, in certain instances, there shou

ld be but two magistrates in the township, and it would become wholly without fo

rce and effect.

It becomes unnecessary to determine whether petitioner's acts after he was notif

ied by the Secretary of Justice about his separation from the service, constitut

e an implied acquiescence therein or an abandonment of the position of cadastral

judge.

SIMON, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

January 5, 1994, G.R. No. 100150

Nature of the case: A petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining or

der and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to prohibit public respon

dent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "

Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."

Facts: A demolition order was signed Carlos Quimpo, in his capacity as an Execut

ive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the O
ffice of the City Mayor, which was sent and received by herein private responden

ts. It was an order to leave after 3 days, the area in North Edsa to give way to

the "People's Park".

Led by their President Roque Fermo, the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorpor

ated filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR ag

ainst the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for
a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to st

op the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and cari

nderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. €On 2

3 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from

demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vend

ors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to

appear before the CHR.

On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31

July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July

1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls,

sari-sari stores and carinderia, €the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, or

dered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in f

avor of the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food und

er the Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist fr

om further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead

to a citation for contempt and arrest."

A motion to dismiss, dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction.

During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, ar

guing that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolve

d. The petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the cou

rts.

On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitione

rs, stating that the Commission's authority should be understood as being confin

ed only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and th

at "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political ri
ghts, (but) their privilege to engage in business."

On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resoluti

on, along with the contempt charge that had meantime been filed by the private r

espondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the ground that the

motion to dismiss was still then unresolved).

In an Order, dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt

for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia d

espite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.

On 1 March 1991, the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss

and supplemental motion to dismiss.

In an Order, dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was de

nied.

Issue: Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to investigate the

alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose sta

lls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by th

e Mayor of Quezon City.

Ruling: The petition has merit.

The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987

Constitution. €It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Ex

ecutive Order No. 163, €issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative p

ower at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the Presidential Comm

ittee on Human Rights.

In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR th

eorizes that the intention of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to

make CHR a quasi-judicial body. €This view, however, has not heretofore been shar
ed by this Court. In Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, €the Court, through then

Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is "on

ly the first of the enumerated powers and functions that bears any resemblance t

o adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no way be synonymous

to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:

. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental la

w to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate muc

h less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power

is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as

regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. B

ut fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial funct

ion of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The func

tion of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy

is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the facul

ty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be

accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions t

o the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, fin

ally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be prov

ided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Macasiano vs. Diokno

1992, G.R. No. 97764

Nature of the case: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules

of Court seeking the annulment of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of M

akati, Branch 62, which granted the writ of preliminary injunction applied for b

y respondents Municipality of Parañaque and Palanyag Kilusang Bayan for Service ag

ainst petitioner.

Facts: Respondent municipality passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized the clos

ure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets

located at Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea marke

t thereon. The said ordinance was approved by the municipal council pursuant to

MMC Ordinance No. 2, authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or m
unicipal streets, roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for

flea market and/or vending areas, under certain terms and conditions.

The Metropolitan Manila Authority approved Ordinance No. subject to the followin

g conditions:

1. That the aforenamed streets are not used for vehicular traffic, and that the

majority of the residents do not oppose the establishment of the flea market/ven

ding areas thereon;

2. That the 2-meter middle road to be used as flea market/vending area shall be

marked distinctly, and that the 2 meters on both sides of the road shall be used

by pedestrians;

3. That the time during which the vending area is to be used shall be clearly de

signated;

4. That the use of the vending areas shall be temporary and shall be closed once

the reclaimed areas are developed and donated by the Public Estate Authority.

The municipal council of Parañaque issued a resolution authorizing Parañaque Mayor W

alfrido N. Ferrer to enter into contract with any service cooperative for the es

tablishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vendin

g areas.€In pursuant to the resolution, respondent municipality and respondent Pal

anyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall

operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets with

the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Par

añaque. Consequently, market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said

streets.

Petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic

Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and
J. Gabriel St. in Baclaran.

Hence, respondents municipality and Palanyag filed with the trial court a joint

petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary in

junction.

The trial court issued an order upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 86 of th

e Municipality' of Parañaque and enjoining petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano from en

forcing his letter-order against respondent Palanyag.

Issue: Whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council

of Parañaque authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as

sites for flea markets is valid.

Ruling: The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into pro

perty for public use and patrimonial property (Art. 423, Civil Code). As to what

consists of property for public use, Article 424 of Civil Code states:

Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities,

consists of the provincial roads, city streets, the squares, fountains, public w

aters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said province

s, cities or municipalities.

All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed

by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.

Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension an

d Opena streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore consid

ered public properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the local gover

nment which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the ab

solute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoeve

r to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority

is vested upon them by Congress. One such example of this authority given by Con

gress to the local governments is the power to close roads as provided in Sectio

n 10, Chapter II of the Local Government Code, which states:

Sec. 10. Closure of roads. A local government unit may likewise, through its hea

d acting pursuant to a resolution of its sangguniang and in accordance with exis

ting law and the provisions of this Code, close any barangay, municipal, city or

provincial road, street, alley, park or square. No such way or place or any par
t of thereof shall be close without indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby.

A property thus withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpos

e for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be l

awfully used or conveyed.

However, the aforestated legal provision which gives authority to local governme

nt units to close roads and other similar public places should be read and inter

preted in accordance with basic principles already established by law. These bas

ic principles have the effect of limiting such authority of the province, city o

r municipality to close a public street or thoroughfare. Article 424 of the Civi

l Code lays down the basic principle that properties of public dominion devoted

to public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commer

ce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by the local government unit to pr

ivate persons. Aside from the requirement of due process which should be complie

d with before closing a road, street or park, the closure should be for the sole

purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when c

ircumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for publ

ic use or public service.

Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that respondent municipality has the authori

ty to pass the disputed ordinance, the same cannot be validly implemented becaus

e it cannot be considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to n

on-compliance by respondent municipality of the conditions imposed by the former

for the approval of the ordinance.

Respondent municipality has not shown any iota of proof that it has complied wit

h the foregoing conditions precedent to the approval of the ordinance. The alleg

ations of respondent municipality that the closed streets were not used for vehi
cular traffic and that the majority of the residents do not oppose the establish

ment of a flea market on said streets are unsupported by any evidence that will

show that this first condition has been met. Likewise, the designation by respon

dents of a time schedule during which the flea market shall operate is absent.

Further, it is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran area are congest

ed with people, houses and traffic brought about by the proliferation of vendors

occupying the streets. To license and allow the establishment of a flea market

along J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets i
n Baclaran would not help in solving the problem of congestion. We take note of

the other observations of the Solicitor General.

The powers of a local government unit are not absolute. They are subject to limi

tations laid down by toe Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code. Moreo

ver, the exercise of such powers should be subservient to paramount consideratio

ns of health and well-being of the members of the community.

People vs. Macam

1994, G.R. Nos. L-91011-12

Nature of the case: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Co

urt, Branch 104, Quezon City, finding Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque guilty beyo

nd reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.

Facts: In Criminal Case No. Q-53781, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro and Eugenio Ca

wilan, Jr., were accused of Robbery with Homicide as defined and penalized under

Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code.

On or about the 18th day of August, 1987, in Quezon City, the accused rob one BE

NITO MACAM entered the residence of Benito Macam and rob properties valued in th

e total amount of P454,000.00. And by reason of the crime of Robbery, said accus

ed attacked Leticia Macam, thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal injuri

es which were direct and immediate cause of her death, and on the occasion of sa

id offense, Benito Macam, Salvacion Enrera, and Nilo Alcantara, all sustained ph

ysical injuries which have required medical attendance.

Together with Criminal Case No. Q-53781, Criminal Case No. Q-53783 was filed aga

inst Eugenio Cawilan, Sr. for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwi

se known as the Anti-Fencing Law.

After the prosecution had presented its evidence, accused Eduardo Macam, Antonio

Cedro and Eugenio Cawilan, Jr., assisted by their respective counsels, changed

their plea from "not guilty" to "guilty.

The trial court rendered its judgment finding appellants guilty beyond reasonabl

e doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide in Criminal Case No. Q-53781 and a

cquitting Eugenio Cawilan, Sr. of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law in Criminal

Case No. Q-53783.

Issue: Whether or not their arrest without a warrant and their uncounseled ident

ification by the prosecution witnesses during the police line-up at the hospital

are violative of their constitutional rights.

Ruling: In Gamboa v. Cruz, it was held that the right to counsel attaches upon t

he start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask

questions to elicit information, confessions or admissions from the accused.

The counsel guarantee was intended to assure the assistance of counsel at the tr

ial, inasmuch as the accused was "confronted with both the intricacies of the la

w and the advocacy of the public prosecutor." However, as a result of the change

s in patterns of police investigation, today's accused confronts both expert adv

ersaries and the judicial system well before his trial begins. It is therefore a

ppropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution eve

n before the trial. The law enforcement machinery at present involves critical c

onfrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pre-trial proceedings "where

the result might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a

mere formality." A police line-up is considered a "critical" stage of the proce

edings.

After the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an uncouns

eled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. This is particularly true

in the case at bench where the police officers first talked to the victims befo

re the confrontation was held. The circumstances were such as to impart improper

suggestions on the minds of the victims that may lead to a mistaken identificat

ion. Appellants were handcuffed and had contusions on their faces.

However, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellant's identifi

cation at the police line-up. Hence, the exclusionary sanctions against the admi

ssion in evidence of custodial identification of an uncounseled accused can not

be applied. On the other hand, appellants did not object to the in-court identif

ication made by the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution witnesses, who made t

he identification of appellants at the police line-up at the hospital, again ide

ntified appellants in open court. Appellants did not object to the in-court iden

tification as being tainted by the illegal line-up. In the absence of such objec

tion, the prosecution need not show that said identifications were of independen

t origin.

The arrest of appellants was made without the benefit of a warrant of arrest. Ho

wever, appellants are estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. Th

is issue is being raised for the first time by appellants before this Court. The

y have not moved for the quashing of the information before the trial court on t

his ground. Thus, any irregularity attendant to their arrest was cured when they

voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court by ente

ring a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial.

People vs. Lamsing

1995, G.R. No. 105316

Nature of the Case: This is an appeal from the decision rendered by the Regional

Trial Court, Branch 88, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant guilty of the sp

ecial complex crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing him accordingly.

Facts: The case arose from the killing in the early hours of November 1, 1989 of

Winnie Cabunilas, a security guard, while on duty at the construction site of a

Synergy building on Aurora Boulevard, Cubao, Quezon City.

Four days after the killing, accused-appellant was arrested by policemen, while

in a drinking spree with friends at a basketball court near the scene of the cri

me. He was detained and in a police lineup, was identified by witnesses as one o

f those responsible for the death of Winnie Cabunilas.

On November 9, 1989, an information was filed against him and a John Doe for the

special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

Upon being arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. As the other accused

was at large, trial proceeded against accused-appellant alone.

The prosecution evidence is the testimony of the witness Elizabeth de los Santos

.€The witness said that at dawn of November 1, 1989, she was roused from her sleep

by the cries of a distressed person calling for his "mama". She got up, partly

opened the door and saw, at a distance of about one meter, two male persons, one

of them holding Winnie Cabunilas and the other one stabbing him. She identified

the person who stabbed Cabunilas as the accused-appellant.

Appellant denied involvement in the crime. However, the trial court found the te

stimony of Elizabeth de los Santos credible.

Issue: Whether or not the accused was denied due process.

Ruling: That Elizabeth De los Santos' testimony was uncorroborated does not make

it less worthy of credit. Uncorroborated testimony can stand alone if, as in th

is case, it is intrinsically credible and there is no showing that it was improp

erly or maliciously motivated. So long as it is credible and trustworthy and is

sufficient to support a finding of guilt, its probative value is not diminished

and corroborative testimony of another eyewitness becomes dispensable.

On the other hand, accused-appellant's defense consists merely of alibi which wa

s correctly rejected by the trial court. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses be
cause it is easy to fabricate it while it is difficult to disprove it. It cannot

prevail over the positive identification by the witness, especially where it is

not physically impossible for the accused to be present at the place of the cri

me or its vicinity at the time of its commission. Positive identification by an

independent witness who has not been shown to have any reason or motive to testi
fy falsely must prevail over simple denials and unacceptable alibis of the accus

ed.

The accused complains that he was made to join a police lineup where he was iden

tified by three persons, including Elizabeth De los Santos, without the assistan

ce of counsel. It was settled in Gamboa v. Cruz, however, that the right to coun

sel guaranteed in Art. III, Section 12(1) of the Constitution does not extend to

police lineups because they are not part of custodial investigations. The reaso

n for this is that at that point, the process has not yet shifted from the inves

tigatory to the accusatory. The accused's right to counsel attaches only from th

e time that adversary judicial proceedings are taken against him.

People vs. Acol

1994, G.R. Nos. 106288-89

Nature of the case: Two passengers who were apprehended after they supposedly st

aged a hold-up inside a passenger jeepney on September 29, 1990 were haled to co

urt, not for the felonious asportation, but for possession of the two unlicensed

firearms and bullets recovered from them which were instrumental in the commiss

ion of the robo.

Facts: At around 3:45 in the morning of September 29, 1990, when Percival Tan wa

s driving his jeepney, two men boarded the vehicle in Cubao. When they crossed P

asay Road, the two wayfarers, together with two other companions, announced a ho

ld-up. Percival Tan was instructed to proceed atop the Magallanes interchange wh

ere the other passengers were divested of their personal belongings, including t

he jacket of passenger Rene Araneta. Thereafter, the robbers alighted at the She

ll Gas Station near the Magallanes Commercial Center after which Percival Tan an
d his passengers went to Fort Bonifacio to report the crime. A CAPCOM team was f

orthwith formed to track down the culprits. Victim Rene Araneta who went with th

e responding police officers, upon seeing four persons, one of whom was wearing

his stolen jacket, walking casually towards Fort Bonifacio, told the police auth

orities to accost said persons. After the CAPCOM officers introduced themselves,

the four men scampered to different directions but three of them, namely, Tirso

Acol, Pio Boses, and Albert Blanco, were apprehended. Tirso Acol and Pio Boses

were each found in possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver with bullets

. After the arrest, the three men were brought to Fort Bonifacio and were identi

fied by Percival Tan and the passengers who ganged up on the accused.

Pio Boses and Tirso Acol pleaded innocent to the charges levelled against them.

Issue: Whether or not the accused were denied due process.

Ruling: It is axiomatic to the point of being elementary that herein accused- ap

pellant can not feign denial of due process where he had the opportunity to pres

ent his defense, through his own narration on the witness stand.

The search in the case at bar falls within the purview of Section 5(b) of Rule 1

13 which serves as an exception to the requisite warrant prior to arrest:When an

offense has in fact been committed, and the has €personal knowledge of facts indi

cating that the person to be arrested has committed it

The police team was formed and dispatched to look for the persons responsible fo

r the crime on account of the information related by Percival Tan and Rene Arane

ta that they had just been robbed.€And since accused-appellant's arrest was lawful

, it follows that the search made incidental thereto was valid. Moreover, the un

licensed firearms were found when the police team apprehended the accused for th

e robbery and not for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.€The principle
imparted by Justice Padilla in Cruz was based on the ruling of this Court in Ma

goncia vs. Palacio that:. . . When, in pursuing an illegal action or in the comm

ission of a criminal offense, the offending police officers should happen to dis

cover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded f

rom performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilt
y person and the taking of the corpus delicti.

EBRALINAG vs. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU

1995, 251 SCRA 569

Nature of the case:

Facts: The petitioners 43 high school and elementary school students in the town

s of Daan Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Carcar, and Taburan, Cebu province. All minors

, they are assisted by their parents who belong to the religious group known as

Jehovah' Witnesses which claims some 100,000 "baptized publishers" in the Phil

ippines.

All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the p

ublic school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the not

ional anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 126

5 of July 11, 1955, and by Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of Depar

tment of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsor

y in all educational institutions. Republic Act No. 1265 provides:

"Sec. 1. All educational institutions shall henceforth observe daily flag ceremo

ny, which shall be simple and dignified and shall include the playing or singing

of the Philippine National Anthem.

"Sec. 2. The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to issue o

r cause to be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ce

remony herein provided.

"Sec. 3. Failure or refusal to observe the flag ceremony provided by this Act an

d in accordance with rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of Education,

after proper notice and hearing, shall subject the educational institution conc
erned and its head to public censure as an administrative punishment which shall

be published at least once in a newspaper of general circulation.

"In case of failure to observe for the second time the flag ceremony provided by

this Act, the Secretary of Education, after proper notice and hearing, shall ca

use the cancellation of the recognition or permit of the private educational ins

titution responsible for such failure."

Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing

the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that thos

e are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion which they "cannot conscientiousl

y give x x x to anyone or anything except God". They feel bound by the Bible's c

ommand to "guard ourselves from idols-1 John 5:21". They consider the flag as an

image or idol representing the State. They think the action of the local author

ities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitat

ions on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit tha

t the Constitution protects against official control.

Issue: Whether school children who are members of a religious sect known as Jeho

vah's Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refus

ing, on count of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony whic

h includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, salut

ing the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.

Ruling: The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippine

s, an emblem of national sovereignty of national unity and cohesion and of fre

edom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Unde

r a system of complete separation of church and state in the government, the fla

g is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag does not i
nvolve any religious ceremony. The flag salute is no more a religious ceremony

than the taking an oath of office by a public official or by a candidate for adm

ission to the bar."

"In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru th

e Secretary of Education is not imposing a religion or religious belief or a rel

igious test on said students. It is merely enforcing a non-discriminatory scho

ol regulation applicable to all alike whether Christian, Moslem, Protestant or J

ehovah's Witness. The State is merely carrying, at the duty imposed upon it by t

he Constitution which charges it with supervision over and regulation of all edu

cational institutions, to establish and maintain a complete and adequate system

of public education, and see to it that all schools aim to develop, among othe

r things, civic conscience and teach the duties of citizenship."

"The children of Jehovah's Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in th

e flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption

to the requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of th

e school population which by far constitutes the great majority."

"The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and can

not mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and nondiscriminator

y laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority."

"The right to religious profession and worship has a twofold aspect, via., freed

om to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long

as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to

regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the pub

lic welfare"

Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take part in the compulsory

flag ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offe

nd their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the

observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag

ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate

in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, the
re is no warrant for their expulsion.

"Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country

, x x x--assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion-i

s not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious lib

erty. A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means." (Meyer vs. Nebras

ka, 262 U.S. 390, 67 L. ed. 1042, 1046.)

Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where

they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 19

87 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to "

protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education x x x and to

make such education accessible to all" (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).

We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witness with

regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religiou

s beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, th

eir right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to

disrupt such patriotic exercises.

SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR

1988, 167 SCRA 393

Nature of the case:

FACTS: In this consolidated case, three principal issues were raised.

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioner were denied due process when information for libel wer

e filed against them although the case was still under review by the Secretary o

f Justice and subsequently, by the President.

Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when responden

t RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the com

plainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and

Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may ini

tiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a compl

aint affidavit.
RULING: Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that the reason which ne

cessitates presidential immunities from suit impose correlative disability to fi

le suit. He contends that is criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the Presiden

t s filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness f

or the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court s jurisdiction. This would

in an indirect way, defeat, her privilege of immunity from suit, or by testifyin

g on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of co

urt or perjury.

This privilege of immunity from suit-perhaps to the President by virtue of the o

ffice and may be invoked only by the holder of the office, not by any other pers

on in the President s behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case cannot raised pr

esidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against it

s accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from wai

ving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection aff

orded by the privilege and submit to the court s jurisdiction. The choice of wheth

er to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President s prerogative.

It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

TORRES VS. GONZALES

1987, 152 SCRA 272

Nature of the case: Original petition for Habeas Corpus

FACTS: A conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President on co

ndition that petitioner would not again violate any of the penal laws of the Phi

lippines. Should condition be violated, he will be proceed against in the manner

prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the condition pardon and was consequentl

y released from confinement. Subsequently, the Board of Pardons and parole resol

ved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon bas

ed upon the evidence showing that the petitioner had been charged 20 counts of e

stafa in a criminal case which were then pending trial before the RTC and on his

conviction by the RTC of the crime of sedition which is now pending appeal befo

re the IAC. Respondent Minister of Justice based on the board s resolution, recomm

ended cancellation of the conditional pardon. President cancelled the conditiona

l pardon after which the respondent issued by authority of the President, an Ord

er of Arrest and recommitment against petitioner. Petitioner was accordingly arr

ested. It was the petitioner s contention that he did not violate his conditional

pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the 20 counts estafa

nor of the crime of sedition. Petitioner also contends that he was not given th

e opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and thus deprived of his rights

under due process clause of the Constitution.

ISSUE

1) Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment is necessary in t

his case.

2) Whether or not petitioner was denied due process.

RULING: These issues were discussed in three cases before and can be summed up a

s follows:

1) The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of

a conditional pardon are purely executive acts that are not subject to scrutiny

2) The determination of the occurrence of a breach of condition of a pardon

 and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive ac

t, not subject to a judicial scrutiny under Sec 649i) of the Rev. Administration

Code; or it may be judicial act consisting of a trial for and conviction of vio

lation of a conditional pardon under Art. 159 Revised Penal Code. Where the Pres
ident opts to proceed under Sec 64(i) of the Rev. Adm. Code no judicial pronounc

ement of guilt of a subsequent crime if necessary, in order that a convict may b

e recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.

Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process and because the con

ditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in hi

s trials and conviction for the offense which he was conditionally pardoned, Sec

64(i) of the Rev. Adm. Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.

In this case, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under S

ec 64(i) of the Rev. Adm. Code that choice is an exercise of the President s execu

tive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

LLAMAS VS. ORBOS

202 SCRA 844, 1991

Nature of the case: Petition to review the resolution of the Executive Secretary

FACTS: Petitioner Rodolfo Llamas is the incumbent Vice Governor of the Province

of Tarlac, he assumed the position by virtue of a decision of the office of the

President, the governorship. Private respondent Mariano Ocampo II is the incumbe

nt governor of the province of Tarlac and was suspended from office for a period

of 90 days, due to a verified complaint filed by petitioner against respondent

Governor before the Department of Local Government charging him with alleged vio

lation of the local government code and the anti-graft and corrupt practices law

. Public respondent Orbos was Executive Secretary at that time and is being impl

eaded herein in that official capacity for being issued, by authority of the Pre

sident, the assailed resolution granting executive clemency to respondent Govern

or.
Petitioner s main argument is that the President may grant executive clemency only

in criminal cases, based on Art. VII Sec 19 of the Constitution. According to t

he petitioner, the qualifying phrase after conviction by final judgment applies s

olely to criminal cases and no other law allows the grant of executive clemency

or pardon to anyone who has been convicted in an administrative case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President of the Philippines has the power to grant ex

ecutive clemency in administrative cases.

RULING: The President has the power to grant executive clemency in administrativ

e case because the law does not distinguish. The constitution does not distingui

sh between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, wit

h sole exclusion of impeachment cases. There is no valid and convincing reasons

why t he President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It i

s the view of the SC that is the President can grant reprieves, commutations and

pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reas

on can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly l

ess serious than criminal offenses.

The President in the exercise of her power of supervision and control over all e

xecutive-departments may substitute her decision for that of her subordinate, mo

st especially where the basis therefore would be to serve the greater public int

erest. It is clearly within the power of the President not only to grant executiv

e clemency but also to reverse or modify the ruling issued by a subordinate again

st an erring public official.

RIVERA vs. COMELEC

July 12, 1991, G.R. No. 95336

Nature of the case: Petition to review the decision of the Commission on Electio

ns.
Facts: Juan Garcia Rivera and private respondent Juan Mitre Garcia were candidat

es for the position of Mayor of Guinobatan, Albay in the January 1998 elections.

The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Rivera as the duly elected Mayor b

y the majority of ten votes.

Garcia filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court(RTC) . The trial

court found Garcia to have obtained 6, 376 votes against Rivera's 6, 222.

Rivera appealed to the Comelec through its First Division, the COMELEC sustained

with modification the appealed judgment of the RTC declaring Garcia as the duly

elected Mayor of Gunibatan, Albay.

Rivera's motion for reconsideration was acted upon by the COMELEC en banc. COMEL

EC denied the motion. Garcia commenced to discharge the duties and functions of

Mayor of Guinobatan by virtue of a writ of execution implementing the COMELEC de

cision until when he has served notice of this Court's temporary restraining ord

er issued upon Rivera's motion.

Rivera filed the present petition seeking the annulment of the COMELEC en banc d

ecision. Garcia contends that the Constitution declares the decisions of the COM

ELEC on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials to

be final, executory, and not appealable.

Issue: Whether or not the decisions of the COMELEC in election contests involvin

g elective municipal and baranagy officials, being final and executory and not a

ppealable, preclude the filing of a special civil action for certiorari.

Ruling: NO. The provision of Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution tha

t decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests invo

lving elective municipal and baranagay offices shall be final, executory and not

appealable applies only to questions of fact and not of law. The said provision
was not intended to divest the Supreme Court of its authority to resolve questio

ns of law as inherent in the judicial power conferred upon it by the Constitutio

n.

The challenged COMELEC decision was not arrived at capriciously or whimsically b

y respondent. It is settled that in a petition for certiorari, findings of fact

of administrative bodies are final unless grave abuse of discretion has marred s

uch factual determinations. The Court find none in the case.

The Court resolved to dismiss the petition.

LAZATIN v. COMELEC

January 25, 1998. G.R. No. 8007.

Nature of the case: Special civil action for certiorari.

Facts: Petitioner filed the instant petition assailing the jurisdiction of the C

OMELEC to annul his proclamation after he had taken his oath of office, assumed

office, and discharged the duties as Congressman of the First District of Pampan

ga. The petitioner claims that the House Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC

is the sole judge of all election contests(Sec. 17 Art.VI of the 1987 Constituti

on).

Issue: Whether or not the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all elec

tion contests involving house of representatives.

Ruling: YES. Petitioner has been proclaimed winner of the Congressional election

s in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and a

ssumed his duties as congressman. For the Supreme Court to take cognizance of th

e electoral protest against him would be usurp the functions of the House Electo

ral Tribunal. The alleged invalidity of the proclamation despite alleged irregul
arities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the

rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises,

to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.

The revocation by the COMELEC of petitioner's proclamation is set aside.

SCHNECKENBURGER vs. MORAN

July 31, 1936, 63 Phil. 249

Nature of the Case: Petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent the Court of F

irst Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed agai

nst the petitioner.

FACTS: The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila,

Philippine Islands. He was subsequently charged in the Court of First Instance o

f Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to t

he jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both under the Constitution of t

he United States and the Constitution of the Philippines the court below had no

jurisdiction to try him.

Petitioner contends that the Court of First Instance of Manila is without jurisd

iction to try the case filed against the petitioner for the reason that under Ar

ticle III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Cour

t of the United States has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassad

ors, other public ministers, and consuls, and such jurisdiction excludes the cou

rts of the Philippines and even under the Constitution of the Philippines origin

al jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and co

nsuls, is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the person of

the petitioner.

RULING: Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner

.
This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that a

consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or min

ister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which he is

accredited. A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of t

he laws of the country where he resides.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMPIL

May 15, 1995, G.R. No. 95028

Nature of the case: A petition for certiorari.

Facts: On 23 October 1987, just before midnight, robbers struck on MJ Furnitures

located along Tomas Mapua Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, which doubled as the dwell

ing of its proprietors, the spouses Manuel and Mary Jay. The intruders made thei

r way into the furniture shop through the window grills they detached on the sec

ond floor where the bedroom of the Jays was located. Two (2) of the robbers fort

hwith herded the two (2) maids of the owners into the bathroom. They then rushed

to the ground floor where they saw Manuel sprawled on the floor among the piece

s of furniture which were in disarray. He succumbed to thirteen stab wounds.

In the investigation that followed, a furniture worker in MJ Furnitures, told op

eratives of the Western Police District (WPD) that just before the incident that

evening, he saw his co-workers Marlo Compil, Baltazar Mabini and Jose Jacale go

to the back of the furniture shop. Linda then confirmed the information of Bart

olome to the police investigators who also learned that the trio who were all fr

om Samar failed to report for work the day after the incident, and that Baltazar

Mabini was planning to go to Tayabas, Quezon, to be the baptismal godfather of

his sister's child.

Thus on 27 October 1987, WPD agents went to the parish church of Tayabas, Quezon

, to look for Baltazar Mabini and his companions. From the records of the parish
they were able to confirm that suspect Baltazar Mabini stood as godfather in th

e baptism of the child of his sister Mamerta and Rey Lopez. Immediately they pro

ceeded to the house of Lopez who informed them that Baltazar Mabini and his comp

anions already left the day before, except Compil who stayed behind and still pl

anning to leave.

After being positively identified as one of the workers of the Jay spouses, accu

sed Marlo Compil who was lying on a couch was immediately frisked and placed und

er arrest. After regaining his composure and upon being interrogated, Compil rea

dily admitted his guilt and pointed to the arresting officers the perpetrators o

f the heist from a picture of the baptism of the child of Mabini's sister. Compi

l was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further investigat

ed. On their way back to Manila, he was again questioned. He confessed that shor

tly before midnight on 23 October 1987 he was with the group that robbed MJ Furn

itures. He divulged to the police officers who his companions were and his parti

cipation as a lookout for which he received P1,000.00. He did not go inside the

furniture shop since he would be recognized. Only those who were not known to th

eir employers went inside. Compil said that his cohorts stabbed Manuel Jay to de

ath. He also narrated that after the robbery, they all met in Bangkal, Makati, i

n the house of one Pablo Pakit, a brother of his co-conspirator Rogelio Pakit, w

here they shared the loot and drank beer until four-thirty in the morning. Then

they all left for Quezon and agreed that from there they would all go home to th

eir respective provinces.

From Tayabas, Quezon, the arresting team together with accused Compil proceeded

to the house of Pablo Pakit who confirmed that his younger brother Rogelio, with

some six (6) others including Compil, went to his house past midnight on 23 Oct
ober 1987 and divided among themselves the money and jewelry which, as he picked

up from their conversation, was taken from Sta. Cruz, Manila. They drank beer u

ntil past four o'clock the next morning.

The day following his arrest, accused Compil after conferring with CLAO lawyer M

elencio Claroz and in the presence of his sister Leticia Compil, brother Orville

Compil and brother-in-law Virgilio Jacala, executed a sworn statement before Cp

l. Patricio Balanay of the WPD admitting his participation in the heist as a loo

kout. He named the six (6) other perpetrators of the and asserted that he was me

rely forced to join the group by Jose Jacale and Baltazar Mabini who were the ma

sterminds: According to Compil, he was earlier hired by Mabini to work for MJ Fu

rnitures where he was the foreman.

Meanwhile WPD agents had gathered other leads and conducted follow-up operations

in Manila, Parañaque and Bulacan but failed to apprehend the cohorts of Compil.

Later on, an Information for robbery with homicide was filed against Marlo Compi

l. Assisted by a counsel de oficio he entered a plea of "Not Guilty" when arraig

ned. After the prosecution had rested, the accused represented by counsel de par

te instead of adducing evidence filed a demurrer to evidence. However, the RTC o

f Manila, Br. 49, denied the demurrer, found the accused guilty of robbery with

homicide, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

On appeal, accused Compil claims that "(he) was not apprised of his constitution

al rights (to remain silent and seek the assistance of counsel) before the polic

e officers started interrogating him from the time of his arrest at the house of

Rey Lopez, then at the Tayabas Police Station, and while on their way to Manila

. . . . (he) was made to confess and declare statements that can be used agains

t him in any proceeding." And, the belated arrival of counsel from the CLAO pri
or to the actual execution of the written extrajudicial confession did not cure

the constitutional infirmity since the police investigators had already extracte

d incriminatory statements from him the day before, which extracted statements f

ormed part of his alleged confession. He then concludes that "[w]ithout the admi

ssion of (his) oral . . . and . . . written extrajudicial (confessions) . . . (h

e) cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homi

cide based on the testimonies of other witnesses" which are replete with "serio

us and glaring inconsistencies and contradictions."

Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellant was denied of his constitutional rig
ht.

Ruling: In People v. Rous, the Court held that an extrajudicial confession may b

e admitted in evidence even if obtained without the assistance of counsel provid

ed that it was read and fully explained to confessant by counsel before it was s

igned. However the Court adopts the view in Gamboa v. Cruz where the Court En Ba

nc ruled that "[t]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigatio

n, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit inform

ation and/or confessions or admissions from respondent/accused. At such point or

stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the p

ernicious practice of extorting forced or coerced admissions or confessions from

the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offen

se."

In the case at bench, it is evident that accused-appellant was immediately subje

cted to an interrogation upon his arrest in the house of Rey Lopez in Tayabas, Q

uezon. He was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further qu

estioned. And while on their way to Manila, the arresting agents again elicited

incriminating information. In all three instances, he confessed to the commissio

n of the crime and admitted his participation therein. In all those instances, h

e was not assisted by counsel.

The belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day even if prior to the ac

tual signing of the uncounseled confession does not cure the defect for the inve

stigators were already able to extract incriminatory statements from accused-app

ellant. The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the police investigatio

n is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus o

n a particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to carry ou
t a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statem

ents, and not the signing by the suspect of his supposed extrajudicial confessio

n. Thus in People v. de Jesus the Court said that admissions obtained during cu

stodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to

writing and signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constit

ution.

What is more, it is highly improbable for CLAO lawyer Melencio Claroz to have fu

lly explained to the accused who did not even finish Grade One, in less than ten

(10) minutes as borne by the records, the latter's constitutional rights and th

e consequences of subscribing to an extrajudicial confession.

While the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is so convincing that it

mentions details which could not have been merely concocted, and jibes with the

other pieces of evidence uncovered by the investigators, still we cannot admit

it in evidence because of its implicit constitutional infirmity. Nevertheless, t

he Court finds other sufficient factual circumstances to prove his guilt beyond

reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROUS

March 27, 1995, G.R. No. 103803-04

Nature of the case: A petition for certiorari.

Facts: Socrates Rous alias Bobby, Rolando Laygo y Collado alias Lando, Primitivo

Garcia alias Bong/Peming, Virgilio Pradis, and Celestino Rabina were charged wi

th the crime of Highway Robbery with Homicide. Further accused, except Laygo, we

re charged with violation of Republic Act No. 6539, the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1

972.
After joint trial against Laygo and Rous only, as the other accused were never a

rrested and have remained at large, the court a quo rendered a decision acquitti

ng Rous of the charge of carnapping, but finding both Rous and Laygo guilty unde

r the charge of Highway Robbery and sentencing each to an imprisonment term of r

eclusion perpetua, aside from the payment in solidum of civil indemnity.

From said decision, Rolando Laygo and Socrates Rous appealed, with both of them
ascribing as error the admission of their extrajudicial confessions.

Accused-appellant Laygo contends that his extra-judicial confession is inadmissi

ble in evidence because the taking thereof was started and finished without the

assistance of counsel.

Issue: Whether or not the confession is admissible.

Ruling: We reject this argument.

The record shows that the investigating officer fully informed accused-appellant

Laygo of his right to counsel and categorically asked Laygo whether he wanted t

he assistance of counsel, to which inquiry, Laygo expressed his desire to be so

assisted by counsel. Thereupon, the investigating officer, Sgt. Robert Gaddi, br

ought him to the office of Atty. Abraham Datlag. Accused-appellant and Atty. Dat

lag conferred for a while; thereafter, Sgt. Gaddi and accused-appellant returned

to the CIS Office of Sgt. Gaddi and Sgt. Gaddi started the investigation. Atty.

Datlag arrived soon after the investigation started and left before the last th

ree questions were asked, instructing them to follow him to his office. After th

e extra-judicial statement of Laygo was finished, Gaddi and accused-appellant La

ygo went to the office of Atty. Datlag who read and examined Exhibit C, after wh

ich, Atty. Datlag conferred with Laygo and then advised Laygo to sign Exhibit C.

Laygo did so and Atty. Datlag thereupon likewise signed Exhibit C.

From the above facts, we find that there was more than substantial compliance wi

th the constitutional requirement that a person under investigation for the comm

ission of a crime should be provided with counsel, (Section 12 (1), Article III,

The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines). The very purpose of said

constitutional requirement is to prevent the use of coercion in extracting a con

fession from a suspect. Any form of coercion, whether physical, mental, or emoti
onal in extracting confessions stamps the confession with the taint of inadmissi

bility (People vs. Cuison, 106 SCRA 98 [1981]). Nowhere in the evidence is it sh

own that coercion was ever employed by the investigating officer in obtaining th

e confession of accused-appellant Laygo. The investigation was even witnessed by

the relatives of Laygo.

The fact that Atty. Datlag arrived shortly after the investigation of Laygo had

begun and left before the confession was concluded does not negate the validity

and admissibility of said confession for the reason that after the confession wa

s put down in writing, accused-appellant and the investigating officer proceeded

to the office of Atty. Datlag and the latter then read the confession, conferre

d with Laygo and then advised Laygo to sign the confession. It will be readily s

een that the confession was voluntary and the signing thereof by Laygo was done

upon advice of counsel. The constitutional requirements were thus fully complied

with. Moreover, the presence of Rolando's uncle, Tiburcio Laygo and the latter s

wife, Fely, clearly precluded the use of coercion in extracting the confession.

A confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by the str

ong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly c

onfess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience. A confession is a

dmissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of

violence, intimidation, threat, or promise of reward or leniency (People vs. Da

sig, 221 SCRA 549 [1993]). There is not a speck of evidence to show that the con

fession of Laygo was extracted by such means or promise. Atty. Datlag would not

have affixed his signature to the extrajudicial confession of Laygo as counsel f

or Laygo had he known or had he been informed by Laygo of any infirmity in its e

xecution. Said confession is, therefore, admissible in evidence.

The same ruling applies to the extrajudicial confession (Exhibit G) of accused-a

ppellant Rous. Although Atty. Ferrer, the counsel of Rous, was not present when

the confession was taken, after the confession was prepared, Sgt. Gaddi brought

Rous to the office of Atty. Ferrer who read the confession and fully explained i

t to Rous. Only after Atty. Ferrer had interviewed Rous and fully explained the

confession and apprised Rous of his rights and the consequences of his answers d

id Rous sign said confession. It is clear, therefore, that Rous signed his confe

ssion upon advice and in the presence of his counsel, without any violence, inti
midation or threats being employed against him. Said confession suffers from no

infirmity and, is therefore, admissible in evidence. Furthermore, the prosecutio

n presented a medical certificate (Exhibit H) issued by Dr. Cesar S. Bernabe of

the Ilocos Regional Hospital attesting that he physically examined accused-appel

lant Rous and found no injury on his body, evidently showing that no violence wa

s used against accused-appellant Rous.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, without special pronou

ncement as to costs.

PEOPLE vs. FLORES

December 8, 1994, G.R. Nos. 111009-12

Nature of the case: A petition for certiorari.

Facts: Jose Flores y Salinas, Manuel Corpuz y Lacuata, Romeo Artienda y Galvez,

Jr., Amado Merca y Lopez, Edwin "Eden" Tubiera y Detabli, Leonito Macapagal and

one other unknown person who remains at-large, were charged before the Regional

Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, with the crimes of Murder with Unintentiona

l Abortion, two (2) counts of Murder and Frustrated Murder in four (4) separate

informations

Upon arraignment, all the accused present pleaded not guilty to all the offenses

charged. The cases were tried jointly and on 2 July 1993, the trial court rende

red a decision finding Jose Flores y Salinas, Manuel Corpuz y Lacuata, Romeo Art

ienda y Galvez, Jr., Amado Merca y Lopez, and Edwin Tubiera y Detabli GUILTY of

the crimes filed against them. For insufficiency of evidence, the Court finds th

e accused Leonito Macapagal NOT GUILTY of the crimes charged and hence his acqui

ttal him.
All five (5) convicted accused appealed the judgment to this Court claiming, amo

ng others, that THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS

' DEFENSE OF ALIBI DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME WAS FULLY CORROBORATED BY WITN

ESSES WHOSE REPUTATION FOR PROBITY COULD NOT BE IMPUGNED.

Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellants right to be presumed innocent was vi

olated because their alibis were not given credence.

Ruling: In People v. Salveron, the Court held that: The alibi itself, although co

rroborated . . was not convincing enough in the face of the positive identificat

ion.

Furthermore, in People v. Cortes the Court ruled that: Justifiably, courts have al

ways looked upon the defense of alibi with suspicion and have received the same

with caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also bec

ause of its easy fabrication. It cannot prevail over the clear, direct and posit

ive testimony of prosecution witness Dignos identifying appellants as the perpet

rators of the crime.

In the cases at bench, the alibis presented do not clearly show that it was impo

ssible for the accused-appellants to be at the locus criminis at the time the cr

imes were committed. It is of note that a certain police officer, Robert Cabrera

, who could have corroborated the alibis of Manuel Corpuz and Jose Flores, if th

e defense version were to be given credence, was never presented. The presumptio

n therefore is that his testimony would be adverse to the defense.

The other defense witnesses who tried to establish the alibis of the other accus

ed-appellants can hardly be considered to be disinterested witnesses. Against My

rna Diones' positive identification that the five (5) accused-appellants were th

e perpetrators, the alibis would have to fail.

Accused-appellants in their Reply brief also argue that since Myrna Diones admit

ted having fallen unconscious after she was struck in the head, she could not ha

ve testified to the actual commission of the crimes. Hence, accused-appellants c

onclude that the findings of the trial court that they committed the crimes are

really without basis.

The argument is specious. What occurred subsequent to Myrna Diones' becoming unc

onscious is adequately established by the other circumstances testified to by My

rna.

Myrna Diones was able to convincingly testify to the participation of the five (

5) accused-appellants in taking her and her three (3) female companions to Nagui

lian Road in the early hours of 19 June 1992. Myrna testified that her two (20 c

ompanions in the Fiera-typed vehicle were handcuffed, tied around the neck with

rope and mauled by the accused-appellants. Myrna testified that she, herself, wa

s stabbed and hit three (3) times with a wooden club by accused-appellant Edwin

Tubiera before she fell unconscious. The acts of accused-appellants clearly show

that there was a conspiracy to inflict potentially fatal injuries on the four (

4) women. Myrna and the three (3) deceased victims sustained injuries consistent

with Myrna's account of how they were mauled, stabbed and strangled with ropes.

That accused-appellants were the authors of the crimes committed is adequately e

stablished by circumstantial evidence which proves with moral certainty that acc

used-appellants not only conspired in inflicting injuries on Myrna Diones and th

e three (3) deceased victims but that they also conspired in committing the crim

es of Murder with Unintentional Abortion, Double Murder and Frustrated Murder.

Finally, the offer of accused-appellants to compromise, which was never denied,

constitutes additional evidence against their innocence.

Clearly, the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of accused-appella

nts has been overcome by proof which to a moral certainty establishes their guil

t for the crimes of Double Murder, Murder with Unintentional Abortion and Frustr

ated Murder.

The five (5) accused-appellants are still fortunate that the court could not the
n impose the penalty of death upon them, for undoubtedly they would have been se

ntenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death for having violated, so heinously

at that, the laws which they had sworn to uphold as members of the police force

WHEREFORE, the joint decision rendered by the trial court in Criminal Case Nos.

92-CR-1358, 92-CR-1365, 92-CR-1366 and 92-CR-1407 convicting the five (5) accuse

d-appellants is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

APOLONIO CABANSAG vs. FERNANDEZ

October 18, 1957, G.R. No. L-8974

Nature of the case: This is a contempt proceeding which arose in Civil Case No.

9564 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan wherein Apolonio Cabansag and

his lawyers Roberto V. Merrera were found guilty and sentenced the first to pay

a fine of P20 and the last two P50 each with the warning that a repetition of th

e of offense will next time be heavily dealt with.

Facts: Apolonio Cabansag filed on January 13, 1947 in the Court of First Instanc

e of Pangasinan a complaint seeking the ejectment of Geminiana Fernandez, et al.

from a parcel of land. However, the case was only partially heard during the p

eriod of seven years.

On December 30, 1953, President Magsaysay assumed office, he issued Executive Or

der No. I creating the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC), whi

ch was later superseded by Executive Order 19 promulgated on March 17, 1954. And

on August 12, 1954 Apolonio Cabansag, apparently irked and disappointed by the

delay in the disposition of his case, wrote the PCAC, a letter copy which he fur

nished the Secretary of Justice and the Executive Judge of the Court of First In
stance of Pangasinan.

Counsel for defendants, filed a motion before Judge Morfe praying that Apolonio

Cabansag be declared in contempt of court for an alleged scurrilous remark he ma

de in his letter to the PCAC to the effect that he, Cabansag, has long been depr

ived of his land "thru the careful maneuvers of a tactical lawyer", to which cou

nsel for Cabansag replied with a counter-charge praying that Atty. Fernandez be

in turn declared in contempt because of certain contemptuous remarks made by him

in his pleading. Acting on these charges and counter- charges, on September 14,

1954, Judge Morfe dismissed both charges but ordered Cabansag to show cause in

writing within 10 days why he should not be held liable for contempt for sending

the above letter to the PCAC which tended to degrade the court in the eyes of t

he President and the people. Cabansag filed his answer stating that he did not h

ave the idea to besmirch the dignity or belittle the respect due the court nor w

as he actuated with malice when he addressed the letter to the PCAC; that there

is no single contemptuous word in said letter nor was it intended to give the Ch

ief Executive a wrong impression or opinion of the court; and that if there was

any inefficiency in the disposal of his case, the same was committed by the judg

es who previously intervened in the case.

Issue: Whether or not the writing of said letter tend to draw the intervention o

f the PCAC in the instant case which will have the effect of undermining the cou

rt's judicial independence?

Ruling: We agree that the trial court that courts have the power to preserve the

ir integrity and maintain their dignity without which their administration of ju

stice is bound to falter or fail. This is the preservative power to punish for c

ontempt. This power is inherent in all courts and essential to their right of se

lf-preservation. In order that it may conduct its business unhampered by publica

tions which tends to impair the impartiality of its decisions or otherwise obstr

uct the administration of justice, the court will not hesitate to exercise it re

gardless of who is affected. For, "as important as is the maintenance of unmuzzl

ed press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizen is the maintenance o

f the independence of the judiciary".The reason for this is that respect of the

courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such said institut
ion would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

The question that now arises is: Has the lower court legitimately and justifiabl

y exercised this power in the instant case?

We are therefore confronted with a clash of two fundamental rights which lie at

the bottom of our democratic institutions-the independence of the judiciary the

right to petition the government for redress of grievance. How to balance and re

concile the exercise of these rights is the problem posed in the case before us.

Two theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting ri

ghts of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary

between freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "

clear and present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as i

nterpreted in a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment

or utterance must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely hi

gh" before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is th

e "substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "dis

orderly and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite

rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe pub

lished. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridg

ed unless there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the a

dministration of justice.

Thus, speaking of the extent and scope of the application of this rule, the Supr

eme Court of the United States said "Clear and present danger of substantive evi

ls as a result of indiscriminate publications regarding judicial proceedings jus

tifies an impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press

only if the evils are extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely hi
gh. . . . A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitution

al protection of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a judici

al proceeding still pending in the courts, upon the theory that in such a case i

t must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of justi

ce. The possibility of engendering disrespect for the judiciary as a result of t

he published criticism of a judge is not such a substantive evil as will justify

impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press."

No less important is the ruling on the power of the court to punish for contempt
in relation to the freedom of speech and press. We quote; "Freedom of speech an

d press should not be impaired through the exercise of the punish for contempt o

f court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question are a serious a

nd imminent threat to the administration of justice. A judge may hold in contemp

t one who ventures to publish anything that tends to make him unpopular or to be

little him. . . . The vehemence of the language used in newspaper publications c

oncerning a judge's decision is not alone the measure of the power to punish for

contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent not merely a l

ikely, threat to the administration of justice.

And in weighing the danger of possible interference with the courts by newspaper

criticism against the right of free speech to determine whether such criticism

may constitutionally be punished as contempt, it was ruled that "freedom of publ

ic comment should in borderline instances weigh heavily against a possible tende

ncy to influence pending cases."

The question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is whether the words us

ed are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear

and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that congres

s has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.

The "dangerous tendency" rule, on the other hand, has been adopted in cases wher

e extreme difficulty is confronted determining where the freedom of expression e

nds and the right of courts to protect their independence begins. There must be

a remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle of this rule lies in that t

he freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the right to petition for redr

ess of grievance, while guaranteed by the constitution, are not absolute. They a

re subject to restrictions and limitations, one of them being the protection of

the courts against contempt (Gilbert vs. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325.)

This rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a dangerous

tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable.

It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or

unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in gene

ral terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated t

o incite persons to acts of force, violence or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if

the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the

substantive evil the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the

legislative body seeks to prevent. (Gitlow vs. New York, 268 U.S. 652.).

The question then to be determined is: Has the letter of Cabansag created a suff

icient danger to a fair administration of justice? Did its remittance to the PCA

C create a danger sufficiently imminent to come under the two rules mentioned ab

ove?

Even if we make a careful analysis of the letter sent by appellant Cabansag to t

he PCAC which has given rise to the present contempt proceedings, we would at on

ce see that it was far from his mind to put the court in ridicule and much less

to belittle or degrade it in the eyes of those to whom the letter was addressed

for, undoubtedly, he was compelled to act the way he did simply because he saw n

o other way of obtaining the early termination of his case.

The only disturbing effect of the letter which perhaps has been the motivating f

actor of the lodging of the contempt charge by the trial judge is the fact that

the letter was sent to the Office of the President asking for help because of th

e precarious predicament of Cabansag. While the course of action he had taken ma

y not be a wise one for it would have been proper had he addressed his letter to
the Secretary of Justice or to the Supreme Court, such act alone would not be c

ontemptuous. To be so the danger must cause a serious imminent threat to the adm

inistration of justice. Nor can we infer that such act has "a dangerous tendency

" to belittle the court or undermine the administration of justice for the write

r merely exercised his constitutional right to petition the government for redre

ss of a legitimate grievance.

Under such a state of affairs, appellant Cabansag cannot certainly be blamed for

entertaining the belief that the only way by which he could obtain redress of h

is grievance is to address his letter to the PCAC which after all is the office

created by the late President to receive and hear all complaints against officia
ls and employees of the government to facilitate which the assistance and cooper

ation of all the executive departments were enjoined (Executive Order No. 1, as

amended by Executive Order No. 19). And one of the departments that come under t

he control of the President is the Department of Justice which under the law has

administrative supervision over courts of first instance.(Section 83, Revised A

dministrative Code) The PCAC is part of the Office of the President. It can, the

refore, be said that the letter of Cabansag though sent to the PCAC is intended

for the Department of Justice where it properly belongs. Consequently, the sendi

ng of that letter may be considered as one sent to the Department of Justice and

as such cannot constitute undue publication that would place him beyond the man

tle of protection of our constitution.

DONALD BAER vs. HON. TITO V. TIZON

May 3, 1974, G.R. No. L-24294

Nature of the case: A petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of the o

rders of the respondent judge.

FACTS: On November 17, 1964, respondent Edgardo Gener filed a complaint for inju

nction with the Court of First Instance of Bataan against petitioner, Donald Bae

r, Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo.

He alleged that he was engaged in the business of logging in an area situated in

Barrio Mabayo, Municipality of Morong, Bataan and that the American Naval Base

authorities stopped his logging operations. He prayed for a writ of preliminary

injunction restraining petitioner from interfering with his logging operations.

A restraining order was issued by respondent Judge on November 23, 1964.

Counsel for petitioner, upon instructions of the American Ambassador to the Phil

ippines, entered their appearance for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction

of respondent Judge on the ground that the suit was one against a foreign sover

eign without its consent.

Then, on December 12, 1964, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, wherein such g

round was reiterated. It was therein pointed out that he is the chief or head of

an agency or instrumentality of the United States of America, with the subject

matter of the action being official acts done by him for and in behalf of the Un

ited States of America. It was added that in directing the cessation of logging

operations by respondent Gener within the Naval Base, petitioner was entirely wi

thin the scope of his authority and official duty, the maintenance of the securi

ty of the Naval Base and of the installations therein being the first concern an

d most important duty of the Commander of the Base.

There was, on December 14, 1964, an opposition and reply to petitioner's motion

to dismiss by respondent Gener, relying on the principle that "a private citizen

claiming title and right of possession of certain property may, to recover poss

ession of said property, sue as individuals, officers and agents of the Governme

nt, who are said to be illegally withholding the same from him, though in doing

so, said officers and agents claim that they are acting for the Government." Tha

t was his basis for sustaining the jurisdiction of respondent Judge. Petitioner,

thereafter, on January 12, 1965, made a written offer of documentary evidence,

including certified copies of telegrams of the Forestry Director to Forestry per

sonnel in Balanga, Bataan dated January 8, and January 11, 1965, directing immed

iate investigation of illegal timber cutting in Bataan and calling attention to

the fact that the records of the office show no new renewal of timber license or

temporary extension permits.

The above notwithstanding, respondent Judge, on January 12, 1965, issued an orde

r granting respondent Gener's application for the issuance of a writ of prelimin

ary injunction and denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the opposition to the

application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUES

Whether or not the invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign

state without its consent is appropriate.

Whether or not the Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo, posses

s diplomatic immunity.

RULING

The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state without

its consent is appropriate. Based from the opinion of Justice Montemayor: "It is
clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manil

a have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question

of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the

action. The U.S. Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit

which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not onl
y a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latte

r's consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign government

without said government's consent, which renders more obvious the lack of juris

diction of the courts of his country. The principles of law behind this rule are

so elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cit

e authorities in support thereof." Then came Marvel Building Corporation v. Phil

ippine War Damage Commission, where respondent, a United States agency establish

ed to compensate damages suffered by the Philippines during World War II was hel

d as falling within the above doctrine as the suit against it "would eventually

be a charge against or financial liability of the United States Government becau

se ..., the Commission has no funds of its own for the purpose of paying money j

udgments." To the same effect is Parreno v. McGranery, as the following excerpt

from the opinion of Justice Tuason clearly shows: "It is a widely accepted princ

iple of international law, which is made a part of the law of the land (Article

II, Section 3 of the Constitution), that a foreign state may not be brought to s

uit before the courts of another state or its own courts without its consent."

There should be no misinterpretation of the scope of the decision reached by thi

s Court. Petitioner, as the Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongap

o, does not possess diplomatic immunity. He may therefore be proceeded against i

n his personal capacity, or when the action taken by him cannot be imputed to th

e government which he represents. Thus, after the Military Bases Agreement, in M

iquiabas v. Commanding General and Dizon v. The Commanding General of the Philip

pine-Ryukus Command, both of them being habeas corpus petitions, there was no qu

estion as to the submission to jurisdiction of the respondents. As a matter of f

act, in Miquiabas v. Commanding General, the immediate release of the petitioner

 was ordered, it being apparent that the general court martial appointed by resp

ondent Commanding General was without jurisdiction to try petitioner. Thereafter

, in the cited cases of Syquia, Marquez Lim, and Johnson, the parties proceeded

against were American army commanding officers stationed in the Philippines. The

insuperable obstacle to the jurisdiction of respondent Judge is that a foreign

sovereign without its consent is haled into court in connection with acts perfor

med by it pursuant to treaty provisions and thus impressed with a governmental c

haracter.

The infirmity of the actuation of respondent Judge becomes even more glaring whe

n it is considered that private respondent had ceased to have any right of enter

ing within the base area. This is made clear in the petition in these words: "In

1962, respondent Gener was issued by the Bureau of Forestry an ordinary timber

license to cut logs in Barrio Mabayo, Morong, Bataan. The license was renewed on

July 10, 1963. In 1963, he commenced logging operation inside the United States

Naval Base, Subic Bay, but in November 1963 he was apprehended and stopped by t

he Base authorities from logging inside the Base. The renewal of his license exp

ired on July 30, 1964, and to date his license has not been renewed by the Burea

u of Forestry. .. In July 1964, the Mutual Defense Board, a joint Philippines-Un

ited States agency established pursuant to an exchange of diplomatic notes betwe

en the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the United States Ambassador to provide

"direct liaison and consultation between appropriate Philippine and United State

s authorities on military matters of mutual concern,' advised the Secretary of F

oreign Affairs in writing that: "The enclosed map shows that the area in which M

r. Gener was logging definitely falls within the boundaries of the base. This ma

p also depicts certain contiguous and overlapping areas whose functional usage w
ould be interfered with by the logging operations.'" 36 Nowhere in the answer of

respondents, nor in their memorandum, was this point met. It remained unrefuted

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted, nullifying and setting

aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge in Civil Cas

e No. 2984 of the Court of First Instance of Bataan. The injunction issued by th

is Court on March 18, 1965 enjoining the enforcement of the aforesaid writ of pr

eliminary injunction of respondent Judge is hereby made permanent.

PHILIPPINE COLUMBIAN ASSOCIATION vs. DOMINGO D. PANIS

December 21, 1993, G.R. No. L-106528

Nature of the case: An appeal by certiorari to review the decision and resolutio

n of the respondent judge.

FACTS: In 1982, petitioner instituted ejectment proceedings against herein priva

te respondents before the metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. Judgment was rende

red against the said occupants, ordering them to vacate the lot and pay reasonab

le compensation therefor. This judgment was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court

, the Court of Appeals and subsequently by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 85262.

As a result of the favorable decision, petitioner filed before the Metropolitan

Trial Court of Manila, a motion for execution of judgment, which was granted on

April 9, 1990. A writ of demolition was later prayed and likewise issued by the

same court on May 30, 1990.

On June 8, 1990, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch

27, Manila, a petition for injunction and prohibition with preliminary injuncti

on and restraining order against the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila and peti

tioner herein (Civil Case No. 90-53346) to enjoin their ejectment from and the d

emolition of their houses on the premises in question.

On June 28, 1990, the City of Manila filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No

. 90-53531 against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila

, for the expropriation of the 4,842.90 square meter lot subject of the ejectmen

t proceedings in Civil Case No. 90-53346. Petitioner, in turn, filed a motion to

dismiss the complaint, alleging, inter alia, that the City of Manila had no pow

er to expropriate private land; that the expropriation is not for public use and

welfare; that the expropriation is politically motivated; and, that the deposit
of P2 million in the City of Manila representing the provisional value of the l

and, was insufficient and was made under P.D. 1533, a law declared unconstitutio

nal by the Supreme Court.

The land subject of this case is the 4,842.90 square meter lot, which was former

ly a part of the Fabie Estate. As early as November 11, 1966, the Municipal Boar

d of the City of Manila passed Ordinance No. 5971, seeking to expropriate the Fa

bie Estate. Through negotiated sales, the City of Manila acquired a total of 18,

017.10 square meters of the estate, and thereafter subdivided the land into home

lots and distributed the portions to the actual occupants thereof.

The remaining area of 4,842.90 square meters, more or less, was sold in 1977 by

its owner, Dolores Fabie-Posadas, to petitioner. Since the time of the sale, the

lot has been occupied by private respondents. On 23, 1989, the City Council of

Manila, with the approval of the Mayor, passed Ordinance No. 7704 for the exprop

riation of the 4,842.90 square meter lot.

ISSUE: Whether or not expropriation will prosper.

RULING: Petitioner forgot that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, R.A. N

o. 409, expressly authorizes the City of Manila to "condemn private property for

public use" (Sec. 3) and "to acquire private land . . . and subdivide the same

into home lots for sale on easy terms to city residents" (Sec. 100).

The Revised Charter of the City of Manila expressly grants the City of Manila ge

neral powers over its territorial jurisdiction, including the power of eminent d

omain, thus:

General powers. The city may have a common seal and alter the same at pleasure,

and may take, purchase, receive, hold, lease, convey, and dispose of real and pe

rsonal property for the general interest of the city, condemn private property f
or public use, contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued, and prosecute a

nd defend to final judgment and execution, and exercise all the powers hereinaft

er conferred (R.A. 409, Sec. 3).

Section 100 of said Revised Charter authorizes the City of Manila to undertake u

rban land reform, thus:

Sec. 100. The City of Manila is authorized to acquire private lands in the city
and to subdivide the same into home lots for sale on easy terms for city residen

ts, giving first priority to the bona fide tenants or occupants of said lands, a

nd second priority to laborers and low-salaried employees. For the purpose of th

is section, the city may raise the necessary funds by appropriations of general

funds, by securing loans or by issuing bonds, and, if necessary, may acquire the

lands through expropriation proceedings in accordance with law, with the approv

al of the President . . .

The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power

to acquire private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots f

or sale to bona fide tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salar

ied employees of the city. That only a few could actually benefit from the expro

priation of the property does not diminish its public use character. It is simpl

y not possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all who need them.

Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into

a flexible concept, influenced by changing conditions (Sumulong v. Guerrero, su

pra; Manotok v. National Housing Authority, 150 SCRA 89 [1987]; Heirs of Juancho

Ardona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]). Public use now includes the broader noti

on of indirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban land

reform and housing.

The due process requirement in the expropriation of subject lot has likewise bee

n complied with. Although the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner was not set

for hearing as the court is required to do (National Housing Authority v. Valenz

uela, 159 SCRA 396 [1988]), it never questioned the lack of hearing before the t

rial and appellate courts. It is only now before us that petitioner raises the i

ssue of due process.

Indeed, due process was afforded petitioner when it filed its motion for reconsi

deration of the trial court's order, denying its motion to dismiss.

The Court of Appeals, in determining whether grave abuse of discretion was commi

tted by respondent courts, passed upon the very same issues raised by petitioner

in its motion to dismiss, which findings we uphold. Petitioner therefore cannot

argue that it was denied its day in court.

The amount of P2 million representing the provisional value of the land is an am

ount not only fixed by the court, but accepted by both parties. The fact remains

that petitioner, albeit reluctantly, agreed to said valuation and is therefore

estopped from assailing the same. It must be remembered that the valuation is me

rely provisional. The parties still have the second stage in the proceedings in

the proper court below to determine specifically the amount of just compensation

to be paid the landowner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

May 17, 1993, G.R. No. 103125

Nature of the case: Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appea

ls.

FACTS: This Court is asked to decide whether the expropriation of agricultural l

ands by local government units is subject, to the prior approval of the Secretar

y of the Agrarian Reform, as the implementor of the agrarian reform program.

On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines

Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Govern

or to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site

, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultur

al crops and a housing project for provincial government employees.

The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of

the price offered for their property. In an order dated December 6, 1989, the tr

ial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines

Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court

of the amount of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to
answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the ex

propriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of possession in

an order dated January18, 1990.

ISSUE: Whether the Expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units

is subject to the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform as the

implementor of the agrarian reform program.

RULING: The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolutio

n is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would

inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Cama

rines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the community in

valuable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage indu

stry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would b

e enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of

the Constitution.

To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can n

o longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, br

idges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use

of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these proje

cts would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then b

e the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is f

or a public purpose or public use.

The petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is s

et aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Provin

ce of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b) ord

ers the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires t
he Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agraria

n Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents' property from agricultura

l to non-agricultural use.

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILS., INC. vs. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN RE

FORM.

July 14, 1989, G.R. No. 78742

Nature of the case: A petition for certiorari.

FACTS: The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on

grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and th

e constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public u

se without just compensation. They contend that President Aquino usurped legisla

tive power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is invalid also f

or violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to pro

vide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to

Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.

ISSUE: Whether or not constitutionality of P.D. No.27, E.O. Nos.228 and 229, and

R.A. No.6657.

RULING: The said laws are constitutional. The argument of the small farmers that

they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limi

ts has also become academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. However, no eviden

ce has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification

have been violated.

Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to

each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same pa
rticulars. 31 To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it

must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpos

es of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) i
t must apply equally to all the members of the class. 32 The Court finds that al

l these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary an

d discriminatory.

WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:

1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUST

AINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.

2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only u

pon full payment of compensation to their respective owners.

3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are r

etained and recognized.

4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. N

o. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the condit

ions therein prescribed.Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions

are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

WRIGHT vs. COURT OF APPEALS

August 15, 1994, G.R. No. 113213

Nature of the case: A petition for certiorari, to set aside the order of deporta

tion.

FACTS: Petitioner, an Australian Citizen, was sought by Australian authorities f

or indictable crimes in his country. Extradition proceedings were filed before t

he Regional Trial Court of Makati, which rendered a decision ordering the deport

ation of petitioner. Said decision was sustained by the Court of Appeals; hence,

petitioner came to this Court by way of review on certiorari, to set aside the

order of deportation. Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty givin
g retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law w

hich violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. He assails the trial

court's decision ordering his extradition, arguing that the evidence adduced in

the court below failed to show that he is wanted for prosecution in his country

. Capsulized, all the principal issues raised by the petitioner before this Cour

t strike at the validity of the extradition proceedings instituted by the govern

ment against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the judge extraditing the petitioner valid.

RULING: The order of the trial court is affirmed.Desiring to make more effective

cooperation between Australia and the Government of the Philippines in the supp

ression of crime, the two countries entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the

7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance with the provision

s of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by

the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective thirty (30) days after bo

th States notified each other in writing that the respective requirements for th

e entry into force of the Treaty have been complied with.

The provisions of Article 6 of the said Treaty pertaining to the documents requi

red for extradition are sufficiently clear and require no interpretation. The wa

rrant for the arrest of an individual or a copy thereof, a statement of each and

every offense and a statement of the acts and omissions which were alleged agai

nst the person in respect of each offense are sufficient to show that a person i

s wanted for prosecution under the said article.

Furthermore, the 'Charge and Warrant of Arrest Sheets' attest to the fact that p

etitioner is not only wanted for prosecution but has, in fact, absconded to evad

e arrest and criminal prosecution. Since a charge or information under the Treat
y is required only when appropriate, i.e., in cases where an individual charged

before a competent court in the Requesting State thereafter absconds to the Requ

ested State, a charge or a copy thereof is not required if the offender has in f

act already absconded before a criminal complaint could be filed. As the Court o

f Appeals correctly noted, limiting the phrase "wanted for prosecution" to perso
n charged with an information or a criminal complaint renders the Treaty ineffec

tive over individuals who abscond for the purpose of evading arrest and prosecut

ion.

In signing the Treaty, the government of the Philippines has determined that it

is within its interests to enter into agreement with the government of Australia

regarding the repatriation of persons wanted for criminal offenses in either co

untry. The said Treaty was concurred and ratified by the Senate in a Resolution

dated September 10, 1990. Having been ratified in accordance with the provision

of the 1987 Constitution, the Treaty took effect thirty days after the requireme

nts for entry into force were complied with by both governments.

THE HOLY SEE VS ROSARIO

December 1, 1994, G.R. No. 101949

Nature of the case: This is a petition for certiorari.

Facts: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican Cit

y in Rome and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio.

Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporatio

n engaged in the real estate business.

The petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land registered in the na

me of the petitioner. Said lot is contiguous to two other lots registered in th

e name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The three lots were sold to

Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the selle

rs. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.

In view of the squatters to vacate the lots, a dispute arose as to who of the pa

rties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Co
mplicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of one of the

lots to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).

Private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court for annulment

of the sale and specific performance and damages.

Petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the complaint based sovereign immu

nity from suit.

The trial court denied petitioner s motion to dismiss after finding that petitione

r shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in que

stion .

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. The trial court issued an order deferring

the resolution on the motion for reconsideration.

Hence, petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.

Thereafter, a motion for intervention was filed by the Department of Foreign Aff

airs.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.

Ruling: Yes. Petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and f

irmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign c

annot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the court of another soverei

gn. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign

is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state,

but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.

In the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be

considered commercial and as constituting acts jure gestionis, we have to come ou

t with our own guidelines. The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state
with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. The logical question is whet

her the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of busine

ss. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the p

articular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature.

In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary co
urse of a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized a

s an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition an

d subsequent of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said p

roperty for the site of its mission. Private respondent failed to dispute said

claim.

The lot was acquired by petitioner as a donation. The donation was not made for

a commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the of

ficial residence of the papal nuncio. The decision to transfer the property and

the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental charac

ter. Petitioner did not sell the lot for profit or gain. It merely wanted to d

ispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossib

le for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation.

US VS. RUIZ

May 22, 1985, G.R. No. L-35645

Nature of the Case: This is a petition for review.

Facts: The United States of America (US) had a naval base in Zambales. The base

was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippin

es and the United States.

The US invited the submission of bids for several projects. Eligio de Guzman & C

o., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, th

e company received from the US two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price

proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company complied with it

s requests.

Thereafter, the company received a letter from petitioner stating that the compa
ny did not qualify to receive an award for the projects and said projects had be

en awarded to third parties.

The company sued the US.

The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of question

ing the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and

the persons of the defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts an

d omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant US, a foreign so

vereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit. Subsequ

ently, defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion.

Issue: Whether or not defendants may be sued.

Ruling: No. Defendants may not be sued.

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the co

urts of another State without its waiver or consent. However, State immunity no

w extends only to governmental acts or acts jure imperii.

A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus

be sued only when it enters into business contracts.

In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devot

ed to the defense of both the US and the Philippines, indisputably a function of

the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to

commercial or business purposes.

US VS GUINTO

February 26, 1990, G.R. No. 76607

Nature of the case: These cases have been consolidated because they all involve

the doctrine of State immunity.

Facts: In GR No. 76607, private respondents are suing several officers of the US

Air Force in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contract for bar
ber services. The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon, over the objection of the pri

vate respondents, who claimed that he had made a bid for four facilities, includ

ing the Civil Engineering Area, which was not included in the invitation to bid.

Petitioners explained that said concession was not awarded to Dizon but was al

ready operating such, and the expiration of the contract had been extended. Pri

vate respondents filed a complaint. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on th

e ground that the action was in effect a suit against the US, which had not waiv

ed its suability. The trial court denied the motion.

In GR No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint against petitioners for his dis

missal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center. It had been ascertained a

fter investigation that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cook

ing the vegetables served to the club customers. The club manager suspended him

and thereafter referred the case to the board of arbitrators. The board unanim

ously found him guilty and recommended his dismissal.

In GR No. 80018, Luis Bautista was employed as a barracks boy in an extension of

Clark Air Base. He was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by in

dividual petitioners herein. As a result of the filing of the charge, Bautista

was dismissed from his employment. He then filed a complaint for damages.

In GR No. 80258, according to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handc

uffed and unleashed dogs on them which bit them in several parts of their bodies

and caused extensive injuries to them. The defendants deny this and claim the

plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were

struggling and resisting arrest.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner may not be sued.

Ruling: The doctrine of State immunity is based on the justification given by Ju

stice Holmes that there can be no legal right against the authority which makes t

he law on which the right depends . The doctrine is sometimes derisively called th

e royal prerogative of dishonesty because of the privilege it grants the state to

defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. T

he rule says that the state may not be sued without its consent, which clearly i

mports that it may be sued if it consents. The consent of the State may be mani

fested expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general law

or special law. Consent is implied when the State enters into a contract or it

commences litigation.

In the case of the United States of America, the customary rule of international

law on state immunity is expressed with more specificity in the RP-US Treaty.

There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, wi

ll be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a

contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract

involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be impli

ed. State immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts or acts

jure imperii.

In GR No. 80018, petitioners therein were acting in the exercise of their offici

al functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant

and thereafter testified against him at his trial. It follows that for discharg

ing their duties as agents of the US, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts

imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. The

agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent even if he is so d

enominated, as in the case at bar.

In GR No. 80258, the record is too meager to indicate if the defendants were rea
lly discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority w

hen the incident in question occurred. Only after it shall have determined in w

hat capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident in question

will this Court determine, if still necessary, if the doctrine of state immunit

y is applicable.

In GR No. 79470, the Court can assume that the restaurant services partake of th

e nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the US government in its proprie

tary capacity. Such services are not extended to the American servicemen for fr
ee as a perquisite of membership in the Armed Forces of the US. Neither does it

appear that they are exclusively offered to these servicemen; on the contrary,

it is well known that they are available to the general public as well, includin

g the tourists. Such services are undoubtedly operated for profit, as a commerc

ial and not a governmental activity. The consequence of this finding is that th

e petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the dismis

sal of the damage suit against them by Genove. For that matter, not even the US

government itself can claim such immunity. The reason is that by entering into

employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions,

it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. There was not

hing arbitrary about the proceedings. The petitioners acted quite properly in t

erminating the private respondent s employment for his unbelievably nauseating act

. It is surprising that he should still have the temerity to file his complaint

for damages after committing his utterly disgusting offense.

In GR No. 76607, the barbershops subject of the concessions granted by the US go

vernment are commercial enterprises operated by private persons.

This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complain

t filed by the private respondents in the court below. The contracts in questio

n being decidedly commercial, the conclusion reached in the US vs Ruiz case cann

ot be applied.

IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE

September 12, 1974, A.M. No. 533

Nature of the Case: An administrative case against respondent herein based on hi

s citizenship.
Facts: On complaint of then Acting Immigration Commissioner, Martiniano P. Vivo,

this Court ordered the investigation of the matter of citizenship of Florencio

Mallare, who was admitted to the Philippine Bar on March 5, 1962, for the purpos

e of determining whether his name should be stricken from the roll of persons au

thorized to practice law in the Philippines.

After an investigation conducted by this Court's Legal Officer Investigator, a d

ecision was rendered by this Court on April 29, 1968, holding that by prepondera

nce of evidence, it appeared that respondent Mallare's father, Esteban Mallare,

was a Chinese up to his death; and his mother admittedly being a Chinese, respon

dent is likewise a Chinese national. Consequently respondent Florencio Mallare w

as declared excluded from the practice of law; his admission to the bar was revo

ked, and he was ordered to return to this Court, the lawyer's diploma previously

issued to him.

Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision, which was denied by the Co

urt in its resolution of January 10, 1969. On February 4, 1969, respondent petit

ioned the Court for the reopening of the case and for new trial on the ground, i

nter alia, of newly discovered evidence, the introduction of which could alter t

he decision previously promulgated. The evidence proposed to be presented consis

ted of (1) an entry in the registry of baptism of the Immaculate Concepcion Chur

ch at Macalelon, Quezon, purporting to show that Estaben Mallare (respondent's f

ather) is the natural son of Ana Mallare, a Filipino; and (2) testimonies of cer

tain persons who had a known Esteban Mallare and his mother during their lifetim

e.

Considering that the respondent, as a duly admitted member of the bar, should be

given ample opportunity to establish the true facts about his citizenship and t
hat no effort should be spared to ascertain the truth before strippling him of t

he privilege granted to him by the Court since 1962, and denying him the practic

e of his chosen profession which he has honorably discharged as far as the recor

ds show.

Respondent's petition to set aside the decision of this Court of April 29, 1968,

as well as the resolution of January 10, 1969, is premised upon three basic arg

uments, to wit: (a) Respondent's father, Esteban Mallare, being the natural son
of Ana Mallare, a Filipino, was a Filipino citizen; (b) Esteben Mallare, the son

of a Filipino mother, by his own overt acts, had chosen Philippine citizenship;

and (c) respondent, a legitimate son of Esteban Mallare, is a Filipino citizen.

Issue: Whether or not the citizenship of respondent's father, Esteban Mallare, f

or if Esteban were a Filipino as respondent claims, the latter axiomatically wou

ld also be a Filipino and the objection against his inclusion in the Roll of Att

orneys in the Philippines would lose legal basis.

Ruling: After a painstaking study of the original and additional evidences herei

n presented, the Court finds sufficient grounds to warrant a definite setting as

ide of Our decision of April 29, 1968, and a definitive declaration that respond

ent Florencio Mallare is a Filipino citizen and therefore with qualification and

right to continue the practice of law in the Philippines.

In Our decision of April 29, 1968, respondent's claim that he is a Filipino was

denied for lack of evidence proving the Philippine citizenship of his father, Es

teban Mallare. It was ruled that Ana Mallare (Esteban's mother) can not be consi

dered a Filipino, there being no proof that she was "an inhabitant of the Philip

pines continuing to reside therein who was a Spanish subject on the eleventh day

of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine"; that the landing certificate issue

d by the Bureau of Immigration which referred to respondent's mother, Te Na, as

"wife of Dy Esteban, P.I. citizen", was based upon an ex parte determination of

the evidence presented by therein applicant and consequently carries little evid

entiary weight as to the citizenship of her said husband; and that the affidavit

of Esteban Mallare, executed on February 20, 1939, to the effect that he had ch

osen to follow the citizenship of his Filipino mother was not only self-serving,

but also it can not be considered a re-affirmation of the alleged election of c

itizenship since no previous election of such citizenship has been proved to exi

st.

With the additional evidence submitted by respondent pursuant to the authority g

ranted by this Court, the aforementioned void in the proof of respondent's citiz

enship has been duly filled.

The witnesses, all natives of Macalelon, who had personal knowledge of the perso

n, birth and residency of both Ana Mallare and her son Esteban, were one in thei

r declaration that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog who had continuously resided in the

place, and that Esteban, her son, was reputedly born out of wedlock. Such declar

ations constitute admissible evidence of the birth and illegitimacy of Esteban M

allare. Reputation has been held admissible as evidence of age, birth, race, or

race-ancestry, and on the question of whether a child was born alive. Unlike tha

t of matters of pedigree, general reputation of marriage may proceed from person

s who are not members of the family the reason for the distinction is the public

interest that is taken in the question of the existence of marital relations.

The principle could not have been more true than in a Philippine rural community

where relationships not in conformity with established contentions become the s

ubject of criticisms and public cynosure. Thus, the public reputation in Macalel

on that Esteban was Ana's natural child, testified to by the witness, would cons

titute proof of the illegitimacy of the former. Besides, if Estaban were really

born out of legal union, it is highly improbable that he would be keeping the su

rname "Mallare" after his mother, instead of adopting that of his father. And it

would be straining the imagination to perceive that this situation was purposed

ly sought by Esteban's parents to suit some ulterior motives. In 1903, we can no

t concede that alien inhabitants of his country were that sophisticated or legal
ly-oriented.

The assertion of the witnesses, which have not been controverted, that Ana Malla

re is a Tagalog (and, therefore, a Filipino citizen), cannot be assailed as bein

g mere conclusions devoid of evidentiary value. The declarations were not only b

ased on the reputation in the community regarding her race or race-ancestry, whi

ch is admissible in evidence, but they must have certain factual basis. For it m

ust be realized that in this Philippine society, every region possesses certain

characteristics all its own. Thus, a Tagalog would normally detect if a person h
ails from the same region even from the way the latter speaks. Considering that

the witnesses testified having known, and lived with, Ana Mallare in Macalelon,

their declaration that she is a Tagalog should receive a high degree of credibil

ity.

Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself

a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights

and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil.

332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra vs

. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952; Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 195

3; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act taken o

n the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the citizenship p

rivileges to which he is rightfully entitled.

And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were legally married to an alien, Es

teban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a pos

itive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Es

teban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as

1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the

elections and campaigning for certain candidate. These acts are sufficient to sh

ow his preference for Philippine citizenship. 15 Indeed, it would be unfair to e

xpect the presentation of a formal deed to that effect considering that prior to

the enactment of Commonwealth Act 625 on June 7, 1941, no particular proceeding

was required to exercise the option to elect Philippine citizenship, granted to

the proper party by Section 1, subsection 4, Article IV of the 1935 Philippine

Constitution.
AZNAR vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

May 25, 1990, G.R. No. 83820

Nature of the case: A petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Co

mmission on Elections (COMELEC) dated June 11, 1988, which dismissed the petitio

n for the disqualification of private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña as candidate

for Provincial Governor of Cebu Province.

Facts: On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed his cer

tificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor o

f Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.

On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for

short), as represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumb

ent Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualificat

ion of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citi

zen, being a citizen of the United States of America.

Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board to co

ntinue canvassing but to suspend the proclamation.

At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the petitioner presented the

following exhibits tending to show that private respondent is an American citiz

en: Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1 of the Bureau of Immigration s

igned by private respondent dated November 21, 1979; Alien Certificate of Regist

ration No. 015356 in the name of private respondent dated November 21, 1979; Per

mit to Re-enter the Philippines dated November 21, 1979; Immigration Certificate

of Clearance dated January 3, 1980.

Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen,

alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and
son of the late President Sergio Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and

subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has

been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out

of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter

in the Philippines since 1965.

On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to p

roclaim the winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes, pri
vate respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu.

Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition fo

r disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient p

roof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.

Hence, the present petition.

Issues:

a) Whether or not the dismissal of the petition by the COMELEC was valid an

d proper.

b) Whether or not the private respondent is a Filipino citizen.

Ruling: The petition is not meritorious.

A) There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a

registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of candidac

y was filed can be raised under the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wi

t:

(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:

'Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy

. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of c

andidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material

representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. T

he petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the ti

me of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after the

notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. and

(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:

'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of any M

ember of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the gro
und of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall f

ile a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after

the proclamation of the results of the election.

The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy on N

ovember 19, 1987 and that the petitioner filed its petition for disqualification

of said private respondent on January 22, 1988. Since the petition for disquali

fication was filed beyond the twenty five-day period required in Section 78 of t

he Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that said petition was filed out of time.

The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannot also be treat

ed as a petition for quo warranto under Section 253 of the same Code as it is un

questionably premature, considering that private respondent was proclaimed Provi

ncial Governor of Cebu only on March 3, 1988.

B) We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the respondent's citiz

enship and qualification to hold the public office to which he has been proclaim

ed elected. There is enough basis for us to rule directly on the merits of the c

ase, as the COMELEC did below.

Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, t

herefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of Provi

ncial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence.

In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct p

roof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the mod

es provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalizatio

n in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by s

ubscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a for

eign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmeña did no
t lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or b

y any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.

In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the U

nited States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private r

espondent was issued alien certificate of registration and was given clearance a

nd permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and Depor

tation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an A

merican and "being an American", private respondent "must have taken and sworn t

o the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws.

Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and wh

o are not. Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of t

he United States does not concern Us here.

By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that privat

e respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prov

e that private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated

, however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.

CRUZ vs. TANTUICO

October 28, 1988, G.R. No. L-49535

Nature of the case: A petition for review on certiorari in seeking relief from t

he Court, in addition to the setting aside of certain orders of respondent COA A

cting Chairman, in the issuance of an order for the release of petitioner's reti

rement benefits.

Facts: An investigation of an anomaly, involving treasury warrants, revealed tha

t it was the handiwork of a "syndicate" composed of employees of the Budget Comm

ission and the Department of Education and Culture (DEC). Using falsified comput

ations and service records, some sixty-eight (68) treasury warrants were issued

and made payable to fictitious or "ghost" teachers in Region IX (Zamboanga del S

ur), all of which appeared to be genuine and duly signed by the authorized signa

tories of the DEC. Twenty-eight (28) of these warrants are the subject of this c

ase.

The Auditor assigned to the Treasury Vault and Banking Audit Division of the Bur
eau of Treasury requested the National Cashier to "cause the dishonor of the sub

ject warrants and the encashment thereof charged back to the account of the bank

s concerned or to Miss Cruz, as the case may be. The first charge back against M

iss Cruz as made on August 17, 1976 in the amount of the P15,308.91 and subseque

ntly increased by P6,236.17 on August 23, 1976 thus making her total cash accoun

tabilities amount to P21,545.08. The Auditor also formally demanded that petitio

ner produce the missing funds while the Acting National Cashier required her to

increase her cash accountability.

In her written explanations to these demands, petitioner stressed that she paid

the warrants in good faith as there was nothing on their faces or in the endorse

ments to raise any doubt as to their genuineness. Petitioner requested that in l

ieu of charging her for the shortage, "the same be dropped from the cash book an

d simultaneously recorded as a receivable (from the guilty party/parties) on the

books of the Bureau of Treasury.

Acting on the matter which was formally referred to him, the respondent Commissi

on on Audit (COA) Acting Chairman issued an order stating among others that:

appearing from these papers that it was Miss Romana Cruz, Cashier IV, Cash Divisi

on, that Bureau, who paid the treasury warrants in question totalling P21,545.08

to wrong or fictitious payees and, therefore, is the last indorser liable for t

he value thereof, it is hereby directed that she be required to restore and rest

itute to that Bureau the said amount, without prejudice to her right of recourse

against the guarantors of said warrants, if any.

In case of failure of Miss Cruz to effect the restitution of said amount as here

in directed, her salary should be withheld pursuant to Section 624 of the Revise

d Administrative Code and applied in settlement of her liability.

Manifesting his disagreement with the above ruling, the Treasurer under the 5th

indorsement opined ". . . that the loss of government funds arising from the enc

ashment of the subject treasury warrants as a result of the negligent act of the

DEC in issuing these treasury warrants to fictitious persons, should be borne b

y the DEC and not by Miss Romana Cruz who paid them in good faith and pursuant t

o her duty as Cashier IV of this Treasury to pay treasury warrants and governmen

t checks presented to her for payment.

Hence this petition by the petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be held liable for the treasury warrants

Ruling: It is not disputed that on the face of the treasury warrants, there appe

ared no irregularity The warrants were signed by the authorized signatories of t

he DEC. Furthermore, Editha Gonzales, the party who presented the treasury warra

nts for encashment, was a bona fide employee of the DEC who regularly cashed war

rants with the petitioner and was therefore known to her personally. Considering

these circumstances, the encashment by the petitioner of the subject treasury w

arrants did not amount to an act of negligence for which she should be made liab

le.

Having established that petitioner was not negligent in encashing the treasury w

arrants, justice dictates that she should not be made personally liable for the

consequent losses.

As mentioned above, no neligence attended the petitioner's encashment of the tre

asury warrants. Even assuming that. she could be held liable for non- compliance

with or violation of some rule or regulation, this Court agrees with the petiti

oner that Section 624 of the Revised Administrative Code cannot be construed to

authorize a deduction of the value of the treasury warrants from her retirement

benefits. Said section provides:

Sec. 624. Retention of salary for satisfaction of indebtedness. When any person is

indebted to the Government of the Philippine Islands (or Government of the Unit

ed States), the Insular Auditor may direct the proper officer to withhold the pa

yment of any money due him or his estate, the same to be applied in satisfaction

of such indebtedness.
The question to be determined is whether or not the gratuity of the petitioner i

n this case can be withheld and applied to the payment of his remaining indebted

ness to the San Lazaro Investment Fund notwithstanding the provision of section

3 of Act No. 4051 that the gratuity provided for in this Act shall not be attach

ed or levied upon execution. *** The respondents contend that the withholding of

the corresponding amount of the petitioner's gratuity was made with a view to i

ts application to the payment of his indebtedness to the Government, and that su

ch action is authorized by section 624 of the Administrative Code which provides

that "When any person is indebted to the government of the Philippine Islands o

r Government of the United States, the Insular Auditor may direct the proper off

icer to withhold the payment of any money due him or his estate, the same to be

applied in satisfaction of such indebtedness.

While Section 3 of Act No. 4051 refers merely to attachment or levy upon executi

on, we are of the opinion that the exemption should be liberally construed in fa

vor of the pensioner. Pension in this case is a bounty flowing from the gracious

ness of the Government intended to reward past services and, at the same time, t

o provide the pensioner with the means with which to support himself and his fam

ily. Unless otherwise clearly provided, the pension should insure wholly to the

benefit of the pensioner. It is true that the withholding and application of the

amount involved was had under section 624 of the Administrative Code and not by

any judicial process, but if the gratuity could not be attached or levied upon

execution in view of the prohibition of section 3 of Act No. 4051, the appropria

tion thereof by administrative action, if allowed, would lead to the same prohib

ited result and enable the respondents to do indirectly what they can not do dir

ectly under section 3 of Act No. 4051. Act No. 4051 is a later statute having be
en approved on February 21, 1933, whereas the Administrative Code of 1917 which

embodies section 624 relied upon by the respondents was approved on March 10 of

that year. Considering section 3 of Act No. 4051 as an exception to the general

authority granted in section 624 of the Administrative Code, antagonism between

the two provisions is avoided.

TANTUICO, JR. vs. DOMINGO

February 28, 1994, G.R. No. 96422

Nature of the case: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,

with prayer for temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, under Ru

le 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Facts: Petitioner was a former chairman of the Commission on Audit. Petitioner a

pplied for clearance from all money, property and other accountabilities in prep

aration for his retirement. He obtained the clearance applied for, which covered

the period from 1976 to December 31, 1985. The clearance had all the required s

ignatures and bore a certification that petitioner was "cleared from money, prop

erty and/or other accountabilities by this Commission.

After the EDSA Revolution, petitioner submitted his courtesy resignation to Pres

ident Corazon C. Aquino. He relinquished his office to the newly appointed Chair

man, now Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr. on March 10, 1986. That same

day, he applied for retirement effective immediately.

Petitioner sought a second clearance to cover the period from January 1, 1986 to

March 9, 1986. All the signatures necessary to complete the second clearance, e

xcept that of Chairman Guingona, were obtained. The second clearance embodies a

certificate that petitioner was "cleared from money, property and/or accountabil

ity by this Commission. Chairman Guingona, however, failed to take any action th

ereon.

Chairman Guingona was replaced by respondent Chairman. A year later, respondent

Chairman issued COA Office Order No. 87-10182, which created a committee to inve

ntory all equipment acquired during the tenure of his two predecessors.

Not satisfied with the audit reports he received, respondent Chairman created a

special audit team for the purpose of conducting a financial and compliance audi
t of the COA transactions and accounts during the tenure of petitioner from 1976

to 1984. The special audit team submitted its report stating: (i) that the audi

t consisted of selective review of post-audit transactions in the head offices a

nd the State Accounting and Auditing Center; (ii) that the audit disclosed a num

ber of deficiencies which adversely affected the financial condition and operati

on of the COA, such as violations of executive orders, presidential decrees and

related rules and regulations; and (iii) that there were some constraints in the

audit, such as the unavailability of records and documents, and personnel movem

ents and turnover. While the report did not make any recommendation, it instead

mentioned several officials and employees, including petitioner, who may be resp

onsible or accountable for the questioned transactions.

In a letter dated December 21, 1989, a copy of which was received by petitioner

on December 27, 1989, respondent Chairman informed petitioner of the approval of

his application for retirement under R.A. No. 1568, effective as of March 9, 19

86. However, respondent Chairman added:

. . . In view, however, of the audit findings and inventory report adverted to a

bove, payment of only one-half (½) of the money value of the benefits due you by r

eason of such retirement will be allowed, subject to the availability of funds a

nd the usual accounting and auditing rules. Payment of the balance of said retir

ement benefits shall be subject to the final results of the audit concerning you

r fiscal responsibility and/or accountability as former Chairman of this Commiss

ion.

In a letter dated January 22, 1990, petitioner requested full payment of his ret

irement benefits.

Petitioner submitted a letter-complaint, wherein he cited certain defects in the

manner the audit was conducted. He further claimed that the re-audit was not au

thorized by law since it covered closed and settled accounts.

Issue: Whether or not the non-payment of petitioner s full retirement benefits is

legal and proper.

Ruling: Regardless of petitioner's monetary liability to the government that may

be discovered from the audit concerning his fiscal responsibility as former COA
Chairman, respondent Chairman cannot withhold the benefits due petitioner under

the retirement laws.

In said case, where petitioner herein was one of the respondents, we found that

the employee had been cleared by the National Treasurer from all money and prope

rty responsibility, and held that the retirement pay accruing to a public office

r may not be withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the government.

In Tantuico, we cited Justice Laurel's essay on the rationale for the benign rul

ing in favor of the retired employees, thus:

. . . Pension in this case is a bounty flowing from the graciousness of the Gove

rnment intended to reward past services and, at the same time, to provide the pe

nsioner with the means with which to support himself and his family. Unless othe

rwise clearly provided, the pension should inure wholly to the benefit of the pe

nsioner. It is true that the withholding and application of the amount involved

was had under Section 624 of the Administrative Code and not by any judicial pro

cess, but if the gratuity could not be attached or levied upon execution in view

of the prohibition of Section 3 of Act No. 4051, the appropriation thereof by a

dministrative action, if allowed, would lead to the same prohibited result and e

nable the respondent to do indirectly what they can not do directly under Sectio

n 3 of the Act No. 4051. Act No. 4051 is a later statute having been approved on

February 21, 1933, whereas the Administrative Code of 1917 which embodies Secti

on 624 relied upon by the respondents was approved on March 10 of that year. Con

sidering Section 3 of Act No. 4051 as an exception to the general authority gran

ted in Section 624 of the Administrative Code, antagonism between the two provis

ions is avoided.

Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 1568 (An Act to Provide Life Pension to the Auditor
General and the Chairman or Any Member of the Commission of Elections), the bene

fits granted by said law to the Auditor General and the Chairman and Members of

the Commission on Elections shall not be subject to garnishment, levy or executi

on. Likewise, under Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended (The Revised Governm

ent Service Insurance Act of 1977), the benefits granted thereunder "shall not b

e subject, among others, to attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes."

Well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor

of the retiree because the intention is to provide for the retiree's sustenance

and comfort, when he is no longer capable of earning his livelihood.

DAZA vs. SINGSON

December 21, 1989, G.R. No. 86344

Nature of the case: Petitioner challenges his removal from the Commission on App

ointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent.

Facts: After the congressional elections of May 1987, the House of Representativ

es proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments

among the several political parties represented in that chamber in accordance w

ith Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution.

In September 1988, the LDP was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment

in the HOR. Twenty-four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from tha

t party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and corresponding

ly reducing their former party to only 17 members. On the basis of this developm

ent, the HOR raised its representation in the CA by withdrawing the seat occupie

d by the petitioner and giving this to the newly formed LDP.

Respondent Singson was added as a member from the LDP. The petitioner went to th
e Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the commission and the assumption

of his seat by the respondent. The respondent questions the court s jurisdiction o

n the ground that it is political in nature.

Issue: Whether or not the SC has the competence to act, in the case at bar, sinc

e it involved the legality of the act of the HOR in removing the petitioner from

the CA.
Ruling: The Court declared that it has the competence to act on the matter at ba

r. The case is not a discretionary act of the HOR that may not be reviewed by th

e court because it is political in nature. What is involved is the legality not

the wisdom of the act of the HOR in removing the petitioner from the Commission

on Appointments. This is not a political question because, as Chief Justice Conc

epcion explained in Tañada vs. Cuenco:

The term political question connotes in legal parlance, a question of policy. In

other words, it refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are to

be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full

discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive bran

ch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom. Not

legality, of a particular measure.

Garcia vs. De la Peña

February 9, 1994, 229 SCRA 766

Nature of the Case: Administrative Matter in the Supreme Court. Partiality, abus

e of authority and grave abuse of discretion.

Facts: Petitioner Garcia filed an administrative case before the Supreme Court a

gainst respondent Judge Meljohn dela Peña for partiality, abuse of authority and g

rave abuse of discretion for presiding over a criminal case in which the respond

ent's brother was a complainant and petitioner Garcia's wife was an accused in s

aid criminal case. A complaint was earlier filed by the complainant against res

pondent judge before the Office of the Ombudsman, which however, dismissed the c

omplaint.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of an administrative case by the Ombudsman,

filed against an erring judge precludes the Supreme Court from taking cognizance

of the resolution of such administrative case filed before it by the petitioner

Ruling: Respondent judge dismissed from the service. The dismissal of the crimi

nal aspect of the same complaint by the Office of the Ombudsman in its resolutio

n of March 23, 1993 will not affect the resolution of this case which basically

relates to the power of the Supreme Court under Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1

987 Constitution to exercise administrative supervision over all courts and cour

t personnel, from the presiding justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal t

rial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that ca

n oversee the judges and court personnel's compliance with all laws and pertinen

t rules and take proper administrative action against them, in the event that th

ey commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into

this power without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Buenaseda vs. Flavier

September 21, 1993, 226 SCRA 645

Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari to nullify the order of the Ombudsma

Facts: Private respondent Juan Flavier, among others, filed an administrative co

mplaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner Dra. Brigida S. Bu

enaseda, among others, for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act.

Petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition and an Urgent Supplemental Manifesta

tion stressing the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction or temporary r

estraining order. Petitioners likewise seek the nullification of the order of s

uspension by the Ombudsman. The Solicitor General submitted its comment finding
that the authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has

no direct power to suspend. Respondents argue that the power of the Ombudsman t

o preventively suspend government officials and employees is vested under Sectio

n 24 of R.A No. 6770 as being contemplated by Sec. 13 (8) of Art. XI of the 1987

Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend Government official

s and employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pendi

ng the investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officia

ls and employees.

Ruling: Petition dismissed. When the Constitution vested on the Ombudsman the p

ower "to recommend the suspension" of a public official or employees, it referre

d to "suspension," as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the wor

d "suspension" in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases,

e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Section 24 of R.A No. 6770, which grants

the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees

facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute.

The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisite therei

n set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges.

Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to th

e appropriate official the discipline or prosecution of erring public officials

or employees. In order to make an intelligent determination whether to recommen

d such actions, the Ombudsman has to conduct an investigation. In turn, in orde

r for him to conduct such investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner,

he may need to suspend the respondent.

Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

April 18, 1990, 184 SCRA 426

Nature of the Case: Petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Facts: Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating

contract by the Government through the Bureau of Energy Dev't. (BED) for the ex

ploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar. However, it turned out that the

Marinduque Mining & Industrial Corp. (MMIC) shall be the logical coal operator.

Thus, IEI & MMIC executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby IEI assigned a

nd transferred to MMIC all its rights and interests in the two coal blocks which

are the subject of IEI's coal operating contract. Eventually, IEI filed with t

he Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati Br. 150 an action for rescission of the

MOA with damages on the ground of certain violations of the provisions of the MO

A.

The RTC ordered the rescission of the MOA. The CA reversed the RTC ruling that

the latter has no jurisdiction over the action considering that, under PD No. 12

06, it is the BED that has the power to decide controversies relative to the exp

loration, exploitation and development of coal blocks. Hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the civil court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the su

it for rescission of the MOA concerning a coal operating contract over coal bloc

ks.

Ruling: Petition denied. While the action filed by IEI sought the rescission of

what appears to be an ordinary civil contract cognizable by a civil court, the

fact is that the Memorandum of Agreement sought to be rescinded is derived from

a coal-operating contract and is inextricably tied up with the right to develop

coal-bearing lands and the determination of whether or not the reversion of the
coal operating contract over the subject coal blocks to IEI would be in line wit

h the integrated national program for coal-development and with the objective of

rationalizing the country's over all coal-supply-demand balance. IEI's cause o

f action was not merely the rescission of a contract but the reversion or return

to it of the operation of the coal blocks. The doctrine of primary jurisdictio

n is applicable in this case. Such principle applies where a claim is originall

y cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the clai

m requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been

placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case the

judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administra

tive body for its view.

Rosario vs. CA

1992, 211 SCRA 384

Nature of the case: Petition for review of the decision of the CA

FACTS: There was a land dispute that arose between petitioner Juanito A. Rosari

o and private respondent Alejandro Cruz over a lot. The controversy stemmed from

the "land for the landless program". The City of Manila through its City Tenant

's Security Commission (Commission) undertook to subdivide and award parcels of

land to the occupants thereof. Lot 3, Block 3 was subdivided into three lots, d

esignated as lots 3-A, 3-B and 3-C with areas of 56.5 sq. m. each. Private respo

ndent, as original lessee of the area, sublet his house on lot 3-A to petitioner

. Both parties filed with the City Tenant's Security Commission their applicati

ons to purchase lots 3-A and 3-C. The Commission awarded lot 3-A to Rosario whil

e lot 3-C was awarded to Cruz. Not satisfied, Cruz opposed the award of lot 3-A

to Rosario. Eventually the Commission revoked its resolution awarding lot 3-A

to Rosario. Rosario filed an action to quiet title before the Court of First In

stance (CFI) which dismissed the complaint on the ground that petitioner did not
exercise his right to exhaust administrative remedies by filing an appeal to th

e Office of the President before seeking a judicial review thereof. The CA like

wise dismissed petitioner's appeal filed before it. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is

a hard and fast rule, the failure to resort thereto warrants the dismissal of t

he case before the judicial tribunal.

RULING: Decision of the CA reversed. Failure to exhaust administrative remedie

s is not, however, necessarily fatal to an action. Citing Soto vs. Jareno, 114

SCRA 116, the Court ruled that failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of

administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. The only

effect of non compliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant

of a cause of action which is a ground for a motion to dismiss.

It does not appear in this case that a motion to dismiss, based on non-exhausti

on of administrative remedies had been filed. The Supreme Court, in the broader

interests of justice has in a number of cases given due course to a petition for

certiorari although the proper remedy is appeal.

Benito vs. COMELEC

1994, 235 SCRA 436

Nature of the case: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari

FACTS: Petitioner Ottomama Benito and the deceased Hadji Murad Kismen Sampiano O

gca were candidates for mayor in the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur in

the May 11, 1992 elections. There was a disqualification case filed against Og

ca and investigations were conducted. However, Ogca was killed in an ambush. P

etitioner, probably not aware of the death of his opponent, filed a motion to su
spend the proclamation of Ogca as elected mayor of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur in w

hich the COMELEC denied the same. The Municipal Board of Canvassers ruled that
the votes of deceased Ogca be excluded from tallying, counting and canvassing.

Herein private respondent appealed the above ruling to the COMELEC praying that

the Municipal Board of Canvassers be enjoined from implementing its ruling. The

COMELEC directed the Municipal Board of Canvassers to proclaim as winner the ca

ndidate who obtained the highest vote. The Municipal Board of Canvassers procla

imed petitioner as the duly elected mayor. The COMELEC declared such proclamatio

n null and void. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death of a candidate who obtained the highest number o

f votes in a regular election shall allow the candidate obtaining the second hig

hest number of votes to be proclaimed as the winner.

RULING: Petition dismissed. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highe

st number of votes dies, or is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible

for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candida

te who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of

the elective office. For to allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take

over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise

the electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance

and meaning of democracy and the people's right to elect officials of their choi

ce.

MARQUEZ vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR

March 16, 1989. G.R. No. 80685. 171 SCRA 337

Nature of the case: Petition for certiorari with the issuance of temporary restr

aining order.

FACTS: Private respondent Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMPIL- KATIPUNAN)

in behalf of seventy nine (79) of its members who are employed at the Little Fol

ks Snack Mobile owned by petitioner, filed on July 16, 1986 with the Office of t

he Director of the National Capital Region, Department of Labor and Employment (

DOLE) a complaint for underpayment of minimum wage, non-payment of ECOLA, non-pa

yment of incentive leave benefits and non-payment of overtime pay. The complaint

was later amended to include non-payment of holiday pay, non-payment of premium

pay on rest day, non-payment of maternity leave benefits and illegal exaction.

Minerva Peran, the representative of the employees during the proceedings before

the hearing officer filed a motion to dismiss claiming that Samahan ng mga Mang

gagawa sa Little Folks Snack Mobile (SAMAHAN) a local chapter of respondent KAMP

IL-KATIPUNAN, to which the seventy nine (79) employees allegedly belong, and pet

itioner employer were able to settle amicably their dispute through a compromise

agreement. The employees opposed the motion on the ground that Minerva Peran wa

s not authorized to enter into the alleged compromise agreement and much less to

move for the dismissal of the complaint. The Regional Director if DOLE rendered

a decision denying the motion to dismiss and directing petitioner to pay the em

ployees their various claims. On appeal, the Secretary of Labor affirmed the dec

ision of the Regional Director. Hence, they filed a petition for certiorari with

the issuance of temporary restraining order, after their two motions for recons

ideration was denied.

Petitioner relies heavily on the amicable settlement which was allegedly entered

into with the employees through their representative Minerva Peran. According t

o petitioner, with the execution of the amicable settlement, the employees' comp

laint was rendered moot and academic and petitioner's submission of a position p

aper became unnecessary. Petitioner also alleged denial of due process when the
Regional Director of DOLE rendered judgment in favor of the employees.

ISSUE

1) Whether or not an amicable settlement entered by a Union Representative is va

lid.
2) Whether or not there was denial of due process.

3) Whether or not the Regional Director has jurisdiction.

RULING:

1) The rule in this jurisdiction is that money claims due to laborers cannot be

the object of settlement or compromise effected by the union, union officers or

counsel without the specific individual consent of each laborer concerned. This

is so because the aggrieved parties are the individual complainants themselves.

Their representative can only assist but not decide for them. In the light of t

he categorical denial by the employees that Peran was authorized to enter into a

n amicable settlement as regards their claims, the Court holds that public respo

ndent Secretary of Labor ruled correctly in upholding the Regional Director's re

jection of the agreement.

2) There is denial of due process when a party is not accorded an opportunity to

be heard in a case filed against him. However, what the law prohibits is the ab

solute lack of an opportunity to be heard. Hence, it has been ruled that there w

as no denial of due process where the employer was duly represented by counsel a

nd given sufficient opportunity to be heard and present his evidence nor where t

he employer's failure to be heard was due to the various postponements granted t

o it or to his repeated failure to appear during the hearings.

Petitioner, in this case, was given at least three chances by the hearing office

r to submit his position paper but failed each time. Even prior to the hearing o

fficer's order for the submission of the position paper, petitioner was given th

e opportunity to traverse the employees' complaint when he was ordered to commen

t on the employees' computation of their claims. The comment was never submitted

since petitioner failed to appear during the two hearings set for the purpose d
espite due notice. Clearly, petitioner was granted ample opportunity to present

his case before the Regional Director.

3) Petitioner impugns the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and the Regiona

l Director to award the money claims of the employees contending that all money

claims of workers arising from an employer- employee relationship are within the

exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter as provided by Art. 217 of the Labo

r Code, as amended. This contention, which is being raised for the first time in

this petition, can no longer be considered by the Court at this stage.

The active participation of the party against whom the action was brought, coupl

ed with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial

body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisd

iction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar sai

d party from later on impugning the court or body's jurisdiction.

CALALANG vs. WILLIAMS

December 2, 1940, G.R. No. 47800

Nature of the case: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.

Facts: Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer o

f Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition agai

nst the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commiss

ion; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secr

etary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the Cit

y of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.

As alleged, the National Traffic Commission s resolution to recommend to the Direc

tor of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that
animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending

from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a. m. to 12:30 p.

m. and from 1:30 p. m. to 5:30 p. m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the

railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a. m. to 11 p.m.

, for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge t

o traffic and as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles ar

e not now allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned

to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Dir

ector of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Co

mmunications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulati

on and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is uncons

titutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

Issue: Whether or not the writ of prohibition may be issued.

Ruling: The writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied.

Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of

the paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules

and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upo

n and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of t

he public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted b

y considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire

to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public

safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law,

and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with persona

l liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and propert

y may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure th

e general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state to this fundamental aim o

f our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a ble

ssing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail

over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should autho

rity be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authorit

y in his mind through education and, personal discipline, so that there may be e

stablished the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness

for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logicall

y so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people.

The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precis

ely the very means of insuring its preservation.

Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,"

but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic force b

y the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception m

ay at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare o

f all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insur

e economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maint

enance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the

members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures leg

ally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers unde

rlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus p

opuli est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recogni

tion of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a soc

iety and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all gro

ups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fun

damental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort.

and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greate

st number."

SCHNECKENBURGER vs. MORAN

July 31, 1936, 63 Phil. 249

Nature of the Case: Petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent the Court of F

irst Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed agai

nst the petitioner.

FACTS: The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila,
Philippine Islands. He was subsequently charged in the Court of First Instance o

f Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to t

he jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both under the Constitution of t

he United States and the Constitution of the Philippines the court below had no

jurisdiction to try him.

Petitioner contends that the Court of First Instance of Manila is without jurisd

iction to try the case filed against the petitioner for the reason that under Ar

ticle III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Cour

t of the United States has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassad

ors, other public ministers, and consuls, and such jurisdiction excludes the cou

rts of the Philippines and even under the Constitution of the Philippines origin

al jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and co

nsuls, is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the person of

the petitioner.

RULING: Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner

This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that a

consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or min

ister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which he is

accredited. A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of t

he laws of the country where he resides.

Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc.

July 20, 1994. G.R. No. 111097

Nature of the case: Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with

prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order

Facts: In light of establishment of casinos in Cagayan de Oro City by PAGCOR, th

e Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 3353 entitled as AN ORDINANCE PROH

IBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT

TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTI

ON THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO. and Ordinance No. 3375-93 entitled AN ORDI

NANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION TH

EREFOR.

Pryce assailed the ordinances and succeeded.

Petitioners assailed the Court of Appeals erred in invalidating the ordinances a

nd that under the Local Government Code s general welfare clause, the petitioner w

as justified in enacting said ordinances.

Issue: Whether or not the said ordinances are valid.

Ruling: The petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent Cou

rt of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per

se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, t

here is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gamb

ling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to d

eal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the

legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or

it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it

may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits l

otteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has co

nsulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less r

everse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of co

nflicting theories. 8 That is the prerogative of the political departments. It i

s settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicibility of st

atutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legisl

ative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of

government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, the

y are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ulti

mately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions ha

s held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive

requirements:

1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.

2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.

3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.

4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.

5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.

6) It must not be unreasonable.

We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local go

vernment units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling an

d other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of

chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitione

rs are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such gam

es of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the section is clear

and unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should b

e interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it

is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling" is associ

ated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as ref
erring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance

, must be prevented or suppressed.

The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 186

9 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exe

rcising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Th

e petitioners have an ingenious answer to this misgiving. They deny that it is t

he ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot pre

vail against a statute. Their theory is that the change has been made by the Loc

al Government Code itself, which was also enacted by the national lawmaking auth

ority. In their view, the decree has been, not really repealed by the Code, but

merely "modified pro tanto" in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino

over the objection of the local government unit concerned. This modification of

P.D. 1869 by the Local Government Code is permissible because one law can chang

e or repeal another law.

It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that

the decree has only been "modified pro tanto," they are actually arguing that i

t is already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the

Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly

speaking, its operations may now be not only prohibited by the local government

unit; in fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by Sectio

n 458 of the Code if the word "shall" as used therein is to be given its accepte

d meaning. Local government units have now no choice but to prevent and suppress

gambling, which in the petitioners' view includes both legal and illegal gambli

ng. Under this construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulat

e or centralize as they must all be prohibited by the local government units pur
suant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this situation, PA

GCOR cannot continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elepha

nt and will no longer be able to exercise its powers as a prime source of govern

ment revenue through the operation of casinos.

It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing

clause, conveniently discarding the rest of the provision which painstakingly me

ntions the specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified) b

y the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. A reading of the entire

repealing clause, which is reproduced below, will disclose the omission:

Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known
as the "Local Government Code," Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Or

der No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed.

(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders,

instructions, memoranda and issuances related to or concerning the barangay are

hereby repealed.

(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regardin

g hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act. No. 5447 regarding

the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by Presidenti

al Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidentia

l Decree No. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Dec

ree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and ren

dered of no force and effect.

(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs lo

cally-funded projects.

(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they

are inconsistent with the provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16, and 29 of Pre

sidential Decree No. 704; Sections 12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as amended;

Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential Decree

No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended,

and

(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive or

ders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof whi

ch are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed

or modified accordingly.

Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed
in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention.

There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the cont

rary, as the private respondent points out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of

funding in two later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a Boar

d of Claims under the Department of Justice for the benefit of victims of unjust

punishment or detention or of violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for meas

ures for the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR revenues are tapped by these t

wo statutes. This would show that the PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by th

e Local Government Code but has in fact been improved as it were to make the ent

ity more responsive to the fiscal problems of the government.

It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against

another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effo

rt to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as t

he handiwork of a coordinate branch of the government. On the assumption of a co

nflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one an

d annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. Th

is is possible in the case before us. The proper resolution of the problem at ha

nd is to hold that under the Local Government Code, local government units may (

and indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territo

ries except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserve

d in such laws must be read into the Code, to make both the Code and such laws e

qually effective and mutually complementary.

This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to

wit, the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern

concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The
petitioners' suggestion that the Code authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of g

ambling would erase the distinction between these two forms of gambling without

a clear indication that this is the will of the legislature. Plausibly, followin

g this theory, the City of Manila could, by mere ordinance, prohibit the Philipp

ine Charity Sweepstakes Office from conducting a lottery as authorized by R.A. 1

169 and B.P. 42 or stop the races at the San Lazaro Hippodrome as authorized by

R.A. 309 and R.A. 983.

In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of arriving at the concl

usion urged on us by the petitioners that the ordinances in question are valid.

On the contrary, we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the ch
aracter and force of a statute, as well as the public policy expressed in the de

cree allowing the playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of

gambling in general.

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a sta

tute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national governmen

t. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them b

y Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to th

e principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy t

o suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from wh

ich they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinan

ce the mandate of the statute.

This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local governmen

t units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengt

hening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy

, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units al

though in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions

. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant st

ill includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable in

novations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local governmen

t units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By a

nd large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local

government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.

BARRIOQUINTO v. FERNANDEZ
January 21, 1949, G.R. No. L-1278

Nature of the case: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Mandamus.

Facts: Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were charged with th

e crime of murder. As the latter had not yet been arrested the case proceeded ag

ainst the former, Jimenez was to life imprisonment. Before the period for perfec

ting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of the Proclamati

on No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with a

n act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to

the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and commit

ted during the period from December 8, 1941, to the date when particular area of

the Philippines where the offense was actually committed was liberated from ene

my control and occupation, and said Jimenez decided to submit his case to the Gu

errilla Amnesty Commission presided by the respondents herein, and the other pet

itioner Loreto Barrioquinto, who had then been already apprehended, did the same

The Amnesty Commission returned the application of the petitioners to the CFI of

Zamboanga, without deciding over the amnesty on the ground that inasmuch as nei

ther Barrioquinto nor Jimenez have admitted having committed the offense, becaus

e Barrioquinto alleged that it was Hipolito Tolentino who shot and killed the vi

ctim, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to application for amnesty.

Ruling: Respondents are entitled to amnesty.

The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting opinion, is predicate

d on a wrong conception of the nature or character of an amnesty. Amnesty must b

e distinguished from pardon.

Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which m

ust be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no not

ice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concu

rrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judic

ial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted

to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, ge

nerally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometime

s after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the cons

equences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolished or

forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does ""nor work the restoration

of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such right

s be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts

the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sent

ence" while amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offe

nse itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged

that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though h

e had committed no offense.

It is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, ad

mit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged and al

lege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence either of the

complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the te

rms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that "invocati

on of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoid

ance." Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may

be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits. F

or, whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with whic

h he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the intere

sted party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants a

nd the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the re

sistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy

, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be "regard

ed as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation,," o

r not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnes

ty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty Commissions c

reated thereby should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply th

e benefits granted therein to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction

, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if

the evidence presented show that the accused is entitled to said benefits.

The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the evidence presented

either by the complainant or prosecution, or by the defense, can not be waived,

because it is of public interest that a person who is regarded by the Amnesty P

roclamation which has the force of a law, not only as innocent, for he stands in

the eyes of the law as if he had never committed any punishable offense because

of the amnesty, but as a patriot or hero, can not be punishment as a criminal.

Just as the courts of justice can not convict a person who, according to the evi

dence, has committed an act not punishable by law, although he confesses being g

uilty thereof, so also and a fortiori they can not convict a person considered b

y law not a criminal, but as a patriot and hero, for having rendered invaluable

services to the nation inn committing such an act.

Vera v. People

January 31,1963, 31 SCRA 711

Nature of the Case: Special proceeding for certiorari to set aside a decision of

the Court of Appeals

FACTS: Petitioners Gaudencio Vera, Restituto, Figueras, Lorenzo Ambas, Justo Flo
rido, Paulino Bayran, and 92 others, as John Does, were charged with the complex

crime of kidnapping with murder of Amadeo Lozanes, alias Azarcon. Upon petition

ers' motion, invoking the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation of the President, ser

ies of 1946, the case was referred to the Eighth Guerilla Amnesty Commission, wh

ich actually tried it.

During the hearing, none of the petitioners-defendants admitted having committed

the crime charged and as there was no admission to their crime the Commission,

in its decision of January 12, 1956, held that it could not take cognizance of t
he case, on the ground that the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, could be i

nvoked only by defendants in a criminal case who.. admitting the commission of t

he crime, plead that said commission was in pursuance of the resistance movement

and perpetrated against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese occupat

ion. Consequently, the Commission ordered that the case be remanded to the court

of origin for trial. Where the court denied the application for amnesty.

ISSUE: Whether or not persons invoking the benefit of amnesty should first admit

having committed the crime of which they were accused.

HELD: Petitioners are not entitled to amnesty in not admitting the crime.

It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act, or seek forgiveness fo

r an act which, according to him., he has not committed. Amnesty presupposes the

commission of a crime, and when an accused maintains that he has not committed

a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation impos

es certain conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prov

e the existence of such conditions. The invocation of amnesty is in the nature o

f a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the al

legations against him but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening

facts which, if proved, would bring the crime charged within the scope of the a

mnesty proclamation.

At any rate, the facts established before the Commission no not bring this case

within the terms of Amnesty Proclamation No. 8. Note that said proclamation exte

nds its provisions to "all persons who committed any act penalized under the Rev

ised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons

aiding in the war effort of the enemy." As found by the Commission, the killing

of the deceased (Lozañes) was not in furtherance of the resistance movement, but
was due to the rivalry between the Hunter's Guerrilla, to which he belonged, and

the Vera's Guerrilla of petitioners.

Joya vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)

August 24, 1993, G.R. No. 96541

Nature of the case: Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Praye

r for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order

Facts: Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, wrote then President Corazon C

. Aquino, requesting her for authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreemen

t between the Republic of the Philippines through PCGG and Christie, Manson and

Woods International, Inc. (Christie's of New York, or CHRISTIE'S) concerning the

scheduled sale on 11 January 1991 of eighty-two (82) Old Masters Paintings and

antique silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila al

leged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his rela

tives and cronies which was authorized.

The Commission on Audit (COA) through then Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo submitted

to President Aquino the audit findings and observations of COA on the Consignme

nt Agreement of 15 August 1990 to the effect that: (a) the authority of former P

CGG Chairman Caparas to enter into the Consignment Agreement was of doubtful leg

ality; (b) the contract was highly disadvantageous to the government; (c) PCGG h

ad a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the U.S.; and, (d) the as

sets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance, he

nce, their disposal was prohibited by law.

Issue: Whether the instant petition complies with the legal requisites for this

Court to exercise its power of judicial review over this case.

Ruling: Petition is denied. Petitioners have failed to show that respondents Exe

cutive Secretary and PCGG exercised their functions with grave abuse of discreti

on or in excess of their jurisdiction.

The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity

of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there

is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the

question must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual case o

r controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportu

nity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be nec

essary to the determination of the case itself.

On the first requisite, the Court have held that one having no right or interest

to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an

action. This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provide

s that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real part

y-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject of the action

and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court w

ill exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it

by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal quest

ion. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such

that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the g

overnmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material intere

st, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from

mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover

, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a de

sire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party.

There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to th

e rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procur

e the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recogni

zed by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governm
ental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds.

Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware were giv

en to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and dignitaries from foreign count

ries on their silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion personal to them. When

the Marcos administration was toppled by the revolutionary government, these pa

intings and silverware were taken from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of M

anila and transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of these prop

erties by the Aquino administration however should not be understood to mean tha

t the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the government wi

thout complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process an

d just compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government

, any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their subseque

nt disposition must be raised only by the proper parties the true owners thereof

whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are pro

tected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the

legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly own

ed, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question thei

r alleged unauthorized disposition.

Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action file

d by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by t

he government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being

questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expend

iture of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administerin

g an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may

be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Obviously, petitioners are not challen

ging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they all

ege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that th

e paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private sources and not wi

th public money.

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case

of controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of o

pposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be mo

ot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cogni

zable by a court of justice. 16 A case becomes moot and academic when its purpos

e has become stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this petiti
on for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auc

tion sale of the artworks on a particular date 11 January 1991 which is long p

ast, the issues raised in the petition have become moot and academic.

At this point, however, the Court need to emphasize that this Court has the disc

retion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of a

n actual case or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved. Howe

ver, there is no such justification in the petition at bar to warrant the relaxa

tion of the rule.

The Court agrees with the certification of the Director of the Museum. Under the

law, it is the Director of the Museum who is authorized to undertake the invent

ory, registration, designation or classification, with the aid of competent expe

rts, of important cultural properties and national cultural treasures. Findings

of administrative officials and agencies who have acquired expertise because the

ir jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only

respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial

evidence and are controlling on the reviewing authorities because of their ackn

owledged expertise in the fields of specialization to which they are assigned.

Marcos v. Manglapus

October 27, 1989, 177 SCRA 668

Nature of the Case: Petition for mandamus and prohibition to order the responden

ts to issue travel documents to the petitioner.

FACTS: This is a petition for mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order

the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate membe

rs of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President s decision to b

ar their return to the Phils. Petitioners advance the view that the President s po
wers are limited to those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, i.e. the

power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices; the power

to execute the laws, the appointing powers, the powers under the commander-in-ch

ief clause; the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans; the power to enter

into treaties of international agreements; the power to submit budget to Congre

ss and all the power to address Congress and that what is not enumerated is impl

iedly to her.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to

the Philippines.

RULING: Yes the President may under her residual powers.

Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific p

owers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as

within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President

cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Const

itution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers

so enumerated in the Constitution. The President has the obligation under the C

onstitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance national in

terest. To the President, the problem is one of the balancing the general welfar

e and common good against the exercise of right of certain individuals. The powe

r involved us the President s residual power to protect the general welfare of the

people. The request of demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return cannot be

considered in the light solely of the Constitution provisions guaranteeing the

right of liberty to abode and travel. It must be treated as a matter that is app

ropriately addressed to the residual unstated powers of the President which are

implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to saf
eguard and protect the general welfare.

It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neit

her legislative nor judicial has to be executive.

The President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whim

sically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to
the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.

It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines wi

ll cause the escalation of violence against the State that would be the time for

the President to step in and exercise the commander-in-chief powers granted her

by the Constitution to suppress or stamp out such violence. The State, acting t

hrough the Government, is not precluded from taking pre-emptive action against t

hreats to its existence if, though still nascent, they are perceived as apt to b

ecome serious and direct. Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of

government. The preservation of the State-the fruition of the people's sovereig

nty-is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and

defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk

from that responsibility.

Cua v. COMELEC

December 17,1987, G.R. No. 80519-21

Nature of the case: Petition to review the order of the Commission on Elections.

Facts: Petitioner Cua was proclaimed as winner in the lone congressional distric

t of Quirino through a 2-1 decision rendered by COMELEC First Division but never

theless was suspended of his proclamation due to the lack of the unanimous vote

required by the procedural rules in COMELEC Resolution No. 1669 dated May 2, 198

4.

The position of the petitioner is that the 2-1 decision of the First Division wa

s a valid decision of the COMELEC itself despite the above rule because of Artic

le IX-A. Section 7 of the new Constitution, providing that "each Commission shal
l decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before

it." He argues that this applies to the votings of the COMELEC both in division

and en banc and that the private respondent himself recognized this when he fil

ed the motion for reconsideration/appeal with the COMELEC en banc.

Respondents argue that in any case no valid decision was reached by the COMELEC

en banc because only three votes were cast in favor of the petitioner and these

did not constitute a majority of the body.

Issue: Whether or not a valid decision was rendered by the COMELEC First Divisio

n.

Ruling: Petition is granted and the public respondent is enjoined from further p

roceeding with the private respondent s motion. The restraining order enjoining pe

titioner from assuming office is lifted.

A 2-1 decision rendered by the First Division is a valid decision as the total n

umber of votes which were three constituted a majority.

After considering the issues and the arguments raised by the parties, the Court h

olds that the 2-1 decision rendered by the First Division was a valid decision u

nder Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the three members

who voted to affirm the First Division constituted a majority of the five membe

rs who deliberated and voted thereon en banc and their decision is also valid un

der the aforecited constitutional provision. Hence, the proclamation of Cua on t

he basis of the two aforecited decisions was a valid act that entitles him now t

o assume his seat in the House of Representatives.

It is expected that the above categorical rulings will put an end to the seeming

ly interminable debates on this matter that have been festering for quite some t

ime now not only in this case but also in other cases still pending in the COMEL
EC. The indecisiveness of the public respondent in the appreciation and applicat

ion of its own rules has seriously prejudiced a considerable number of our peopl

e who remain unrepresented to date in the House of Representatives despite the f

act that the congressional elections were held more than seven months ago.
Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals

March 16, 1994, G.R. No. 110120.

Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with pra

yer for restraining order

Facts: The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan t

o dispose off the 350 tons of garbage it collects daily and the growing concern

and sensitivity to a pollution-free environment of the residents of Barangay Cam

arin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City where these tons of garbage are dumped everyday

is the hub of this controversy elevated by the protagonists to the Laguna Lake

Development Authority (LLDA) for adjudication.

The Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin,

Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Author

ity seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Ta

la Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the hea

lth of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of th

e surrounding area.

The LLDA conducted an on-site investigation and found that the water collected f

rom the leachate and the receiving streams could considerably affect the quality

, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of bacteria,

other than coliform, which may have contaminated the sample during collection or

handling.

The LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order ordering the City Government of Calooca

n, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to comp

letely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other

waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.

The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan.

However, sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was resumed.

After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August 14

, 1992, the LLDA issued another order reiterating the December 5, 1991, order an

d issued an Alias Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City Government of Calooc

an from continuing its dumping operations at the Camarin area.

Issue: Whether or not the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease an

d desist" order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, on the basi

s of the facts presented in this case, enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala

Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.

Ruling: The petition is granted. The temporary restraining order issued by the C

ourt on July 19, 1993 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Gover

nment of Caloocan from dumping their garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camari

n, Caloocan City is hereby made permanent.

To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and ex-part

e cease and desist order" in a language, as suggested by the City Government of

Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct National Pollution Control

Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which, admittedly was not reproduced

in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However, it would be a mistak

e to draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial of the power to issue

the order in question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring

the discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA

by Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.

Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situati

ons like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge
of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of

the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ult

imate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including

multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of c

ourse may take several years. The relevant pollution control statute and impleme
nting regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive

, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort

of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly des

ignated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinar

y requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting

vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police

power.

The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital pu

blic interests" gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the Decla

ration of Principles and State Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article II, Se

ction 16.

As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlati

ve duty of non-impairment. This is but in consonance with the declared policy of

the state "to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill

health consciousness among them." It is to be borne in mind that the Philippine

s is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference

Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human right.

The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practic

al matter of procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise

of its power and authority under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the c

ease and desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by the City Governme

nt of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps would hav

e been necessary.

Flores vs. Drilon

June 22, 1993, G.R. No. 104732.

Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari with prayer for prohibition, prelimi

nary injunction and temporary restraining order

Facts: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, 1 otherwise kno

wn as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent

Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Execu

tive Officer of the Subic Bay etropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in thi

s original petition with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temp

orary restraining order "to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of publ

ic funds by way of salaries and other operational expenses attached to the offic

e . . . ." Paragraph (d) reads that a the President shall appoint a professional

manager as administrator of the Subic Authority.

Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at the Su

bic, Zambales, and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees Assoc

iation in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, maintain that the proviso in par.

(d) of Sec. 13 herein-above quoted in italics infringes on the following constit

utional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Cons

titution, which states that "[n]o elective official shall be eligible for appoin

tment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during hi

s tenure," because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and t

he subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution,

which provides that "[t]he President shall . . . . appoint all other officers o

f the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and t

hose whom he may be authorized by law to appoint", since it was Congress through

the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the sub
ject posts; and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code, stated th

at this act of appointment would result to an election offense.

Issue: Whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states, "Pro

vided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity o

f this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman

and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," violates the constitutiona
l proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other

government posts.

Ruling: The proviso in par. (d), Sec. 13, of R.A. 7227, which states: ". . . Pro

vided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity o

f this Act, the Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman

and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," is declared unconstitution

al; consequently, the appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo City

, respondent Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID.

Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution expresses the policy against the concent

ration of several public positions in one person, so that a public officer or em

ployee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery

of public services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time jo

b.

In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an e

lective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (a

s Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is prec

isely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretch

ing of the imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first pa

r., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of an elec

tive official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic

is of no moment.

In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post

if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-

cut difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of

the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple off
ices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions o

f his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providin

g any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective of

ficial to the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Cons

titution itself, e.g., the President as head of the economic and planning agency

; the Vice-President, who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a member

of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Coun

cil.

The distinction being clear, the exemption allowed to appointive officials in th

e second paragraph cannot be extended to elective officials who are governed by

the first paragraph.

Congress did not contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as ex officio or auto

matically attached to the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of a

ppointment. The phrase "shall be appointed" unquestionably shows the intent to m

ake the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olo

ngapo City. Had it been the legislative intent to make the subject positions ex

officio, Congress would have, at least, avoided the word "appointed" and, instea

d, "ex officio" would have been used.

The analogy with the position of Chairman of the Metro Manila Authority made by

respondents cannot be applied to uphold the constitutionality of the challenged

proviso since it is not put in issue in the present case. In the same vein, the

argument that if no elective official may be appointed or designated to another

post then Sec. 8, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution allowing him to receive double

compensation would be useless, is non sequitur since Sec. 8 does not affect the

constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for ex

ample, an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post under Sec. 3,

Art. VII, may receive the compensation attached to the cabinet position if spec

ifically authorized by law.

As may be defined, an "appointment" is "[t]he designation of a person, by the pe

rson or persons having authority therefor, to discharge the duties of some offic

e or trust," or "[t]he selection or designation of a person, by the person or p

ersons having authority therefor, to fill an office or public function and disch

arge the duties of the same.

Indeed, the power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment in
volves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act

of issuing appointment papers to the appointee. In other words, the choice of t

he appointee is a fundamental component of the appointing power.

In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with

a presidential appointee for the first year of its operations from the effectivi

ty of R.A. 7227, the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing authority to onl

y one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Since only one can q

ualify for the posts in question, the President is precluded from exercising his

discretion to choose whom to appoint. Such supposed power of appointment, sans

the essential element of choice, is no power at all and goes against the very na

ture itself of appointment.

While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the of

ficer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of

Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescrib

e qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Accordingly, while t

he conferment of the appointing power on the President is a perfectly valid legi

slative act, the proviso limiting his choice to one is certainly an encroachment

on his prerogative.

Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all thro

ughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his

elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before

he may be considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an inc

umbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to another publi

c office.

Where, as in the case of respondent Gordon, an incumbent elective official was,

notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed to other government posts, he does

not automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his ineligibility impos

ed by the Constitution. On the contrary, since an incumbent elective official is

not eligible to the appointive position, his appointment or designation thereto

cannot be valid in view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility. This pr

ovision should not be confused with Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the Constitution where

"(n)o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other offic

e or employment in the Government . . . during his term without forfeiting his s

eat . . . ." "Where the constitution, or statutes declare that persons holding o

ne office shall be ineligible for election or appointment to another office, eit

her generally or of a certain kind, the prohibition has been held to incapacitat

e the incumbent of the first office to hold the second so that any attempt to ho

ld the second is void .

As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment

to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his

appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the Constitu

tion cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his act

s as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de

facto officer, "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, u

pon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the

interest of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office were e

xercised . . . . under color of a known election or appointment, void because th

e officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing

or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise

, such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public . . .

. [or] under color of an election, or appointment, by or pursuant to a public un

constitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such.

BASCO v. PAGCOR

May 14, 1991, G.R. No. 91649

Nature of the case: Petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gamin

g Corporation Charter (PD 1869).

Facts: The petitioners seek to annul the PAGCOR Charter PD1869 because it is all

egedly contrary to morals, public policy and order and because it waived the Man

ila City government right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized

by law. Petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared national

policy of the new restored democracy and the people s will as expressed in the 1987

Constitution. The decree is said to have a gambling objective and therefore is co

ntrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Art. II Sec. 1 of Art. VII and c. 3(2) of Ar

t. XIV of the present Constitution. Petitioners contend that PD 1869 constitute

a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees that

the exemption clause in PD 1869 is violative of the principles of local autonomy

. They must be referring to Sec. 13 par 2 of PD 1869 which exempts PAGCOR as the

branches holder from paying any tax, any kind of term income or otherwise as we

ll as fees, charges as levies of whatever nature whether national or local.

Issues

Whether or not the local autonomy clause was violated by PD 1869.

Whether or not the equal protection clause was violated.

Ruling

1.) The petitioner s contentions are without merit.

The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to

impose taxes. Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confe

r that power or the municipality cannot assume it". Its "power to tax" therefore

must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upo

n by the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax".

The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should b

e stressed that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress" which ha

s the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general l

egislative powers". Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local gov

ernments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain

matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.

The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been rev

oked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru

the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and

was vested exclusively on the National Government. Therefore, only the National

Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of ga

mbling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a cons

equence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City

of Manila.

Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Governm

ent. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original cha

rter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government.

PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter

role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrument

ality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR shou

ld be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be

burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.

The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or

in any manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress t

o carry into execution the powers vested in the federal government.

Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire abs

ence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at leas
t, the instrumentalities of the United States and it can be agreed that no state

or political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a way a

s to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to serio

usly burden it in the accomplishment of them.

Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermi

nation of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or en

terprise using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation".

The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "l

imitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operati

ve" law until "amended, repealed or revoked", its "exemption clause" remains as

an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes a

nd fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the prin

ciple of local autonomy.

Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply mean

s "decentralization". It does not make local governments sovereign within the st

ate or an "imperium in imperio."

What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing wi

th gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the Stat

e to retain it or delegate it to local governments.

2.) No valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores

the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The cla

use does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded differen

t treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or a

rbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things

to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.

The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishin

g classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate. Th

e Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinio

n to be treated in law as though they were the same.

If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overt

hrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied. The

equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all occupation
s called by the same name must be treated the same way; the state may do what it

can to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those cases in which h

arm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the public that would insu

re if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact.

The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the

law is and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy i

ssues are within the domain of the political branches of government and of the p

eople themselves as the repository of all state power.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals

August 29, 1996, GRN 119761. 261 SCRA 236

Nature of the Case: Petition for review of a decision of Court of Appeals.

FACTS: Fortune Tobacco Corporation ("Fortune Tobacco") is engaged in the manufac

ture of different brands of cigarettes.

On various dates, the Philippine Patent Office issued to the corporation separat

e certificates of trademark registration over "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cig

arettes. In a letter, dated 06 January 1987, of then Commissioner of Internal Re

venue Bienvenido A. Tan, Jr., to Deputy Minister Ramon Diaz of the Presidential

Commission on Good Government, "the initial position of the Commission was to cl

assify 'Champion,' 'Hope,' and 'More' as foreign brands since they were listed i

n the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies. However, Fortun

e Tobacco changed the names of 'Hope' to Hope Luxury' and 'More to 'Premium More

,' thereby removing the said brands from the foreign brand category. Proof was a

lso submitted to the Bureau (of Internal Revenue ['BIR']) that 'Champion' was an

original Fortune Tobacco Corporation register and therefore a local brand."

A bill, which later became Republic Act ("RA") No. 7654,6 was enacted, on 10 Jun

e 1993, by the legislature and signed into law, on 14 June 1993, by the Presiden

t of the Philippines. The new law became effective on 03 July 1993.

About a month after the enactment and two (2) days before the effectivity of RA

7654, Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 ("RMC 37-93"), was issued by the BIR

which expressed:

"In view of the issues raised on whether 'HOPE.' 'MORE' and 'CHAMPION' cigarette
s which are locally manufactured are appropriately considered as locally manufac

tured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand, this Office is compelled to review the

previous rulings on the matter.

"Under the foregoing, the test for imposition of the 55% ad valorem tax on cigar

ettes is that the locally manufactured cigarettes bear a foreign brand regardles

s of whether or not the right to use or title to the foreign brand was sold or t

ransferred by its owner to the local manufacturer. The brand must be originally

owned by a foreign manufacturer or producer. If ownership of the cigarette brand

is, however, not definitely determinable, 'x x x the listing of brands manufact

ured in foreign countries appearing in the current World

On 03 August 1993, Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with the CTA.On 1

0 August 1994, the CTA upheld the position of Fortune Tobacco.

In its resolution, dated 11 October 1994, the CTA dismissed for lack of merit th

e motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:

Whether RMC 37-93 is merely an interpretative rule the issuance of which needs n

o prior notice and hearing, or an adjudicatory Ruling which calls for the twin r

equirements of prior notice and hearing, and,

Whether RMC 37-93 is discriminatory in nature.

RULING: The Court must sustain both the appellate court and the tax court.

Petitioner stresses on the wide and ample authority of the BIR in the issuance o

f rulings for the effective implementation of the provisions of the National Int

ernal Revenue Code. Let it be made clear that such authority of the Commissioner

is not here doubted. Like any other government agency, however, the CIR may not

disregard legal requirements or applicable principles in the exercise of its qu

asi-legislative powers.

Let us first distinguish between two kinds of administrative issuances - a legis

lative rule and an interpretative rule.

In Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. vs. Department of Finance

Secretary, the Court expressed:

"a legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to imp

lement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. In the same way t

hat laws must have the benefit of public hearing, it is generally required that

before a legislative rule is adopted there must be hearing. In this connection,

the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:

"Public Participation. - If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as f

ar as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford int

erested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of a

ny rule.

"(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the pr

oposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at

least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.

"(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.

"In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rule

s are designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency

is in charge of enforcing."

It should be understandable that when an administrative rule is merely interpret

ative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance

for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already presc

ribed. When, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely pro
viding for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implemen

tation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of those gov

erned, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a ch

ance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance i

s given the force and effect of law.

A reading of RMC 37-93, particularly considering the circumstances under which i

t has been issued, convinces us that the circular cannot be viewed simply as a c

orrective measure (revoking in the process the previous holdings of past Commiss
ioners) or merely as construing Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC, as amended, but h

as, in fact and most importantly, been made in order to place "Hope Luxury," "Pr

emium More" and "Champion" within the classification of locally manufactured cig

arettes bearing foreign brands and to thereby have them covered by RA 7654. Spec

ifically, the new law would have its amendatory provisions applied to locally ma

nufactured cigarettes which at the time of its effectivity were not so classifie

d as bearing foreign brands. Prior to the issuance of the questioned circular, "

Hope Luxury," "Premium More," and "Champion" cigarettes were in the category of

locally manufactured cigarettes not bearing foreign brand subject to 45% ad valo

rem tax. Hence, without RMC 3 7-93, the enactment of RA 7654, would have had no

new tax rate consequence on private respondent's products. Evidently, in order t

o place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More," and "Champion" cigarettes within the scop

e of the amendatory law and subject them to an increased tax rate, the now dispu

ted RMC 37-93 had to be issued. In so doing, the BIR not simply interpreted the

law; verily, it legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due observ

ance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication should not ha

ve been then ignored.

Indeed, the BIR itself, in its RMC 10-86, has observed and provided:

Nothing on record could tell us that it was either impossible or impracticable f

or the BIR to observe and comply with the above requirements before giving effec

t to its questioned circular.

Not insignificantly, RMC 37-93 might have likewise infringed on uniformity of ta

xation.

Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 1, of the 1987 Constitution mandates taxation

to be uniform and equitable. Uniformity requires that all subjects or objects of

taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike or put on equal footing b

oth in privileges and liabilities. Thus, all taxable articles or kinds of proper

ty of the same class must be taxed at the same rate and the tax must operate

with the same force and effect in every place where the subject may be found.

Apparently, RMC 37-93 would only apply to "Hope Luxury," Premium More" and "Cham

pion" cigarettes and, unless petitioner would be willing to concede to the submi

ssion of private respondent that the circular should, as in fact my esteemed col

league Mr. Justice Bellosillo so expresses in his separate opinion, be considere

d adjudicatory in nature and thus violative of due process following the Ang Tib

ay doctrine, the measure suffers from lack of uniformity of taxation. In its de

cision, the CTA has keenly noted that other cigarettes bearing foreign brands ha

ve not been similarly included within the scope of the circular,

All taken, the Court is convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fal

len short of a valid and effective administrative issuance.

A brief discourse on the powers and functions of administrative bodies may be in

structive.

Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule making powers and quas

i-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule maki

ng power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated l

egislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine

of non-delegability and separability of powers.

Interpretative rule, one of the three (3) types of quasi-legislative or rule mak

ing powers of an administrative agency (the other two being supplementary or det

ailed legislation, and contingent legislation), is promulgated by the administra

tive agency to interpret, clarify or explain statutory regulations under which t

he administrative body operates. The purpose or objective of an interpretative r

ule is merely to construe the statute being administered. It purports to do no m

ore than interpret the statue. Simply, the rule tries to say what the statue mea

ns. Generally, it refers to no single person or party in particular but concerns

all those belonging to the same class which may be covered by the said interpre

tative rule. It need not be published and neither is a hearing required since it

is issued by the administrative body as an incident of its power to enforce the

law and is intended merely to clarify statutory provisions for proper observanc

e by the people. In Tañada v. Tuvera,6 this Court expressly said that "interpre
tative regulations x x x need not be published."

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the pow

er of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. I

t is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative

policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by t

he law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.7 The administrative

body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an

act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the po

wer to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the perfo

rmance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it.8 In carrying ou

t their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies are requi

red to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, wei

gh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action a

nd exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons

are affected it is elementary that in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial pow

er due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.

The importance of due process cannot be underestimated. Too basic is the rule th

at no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process

of law. Thus when an administrative proceeding is quasi-judicial in character, n

otice and fair open hearing are essential to the validity of the proceeding. The

right to reasonable prior notice and hearing embraces not only the right to pre

sent evidence but also the opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party

and to meet them. The right to submit arguments implies that opportunity otherwi

se the right may as well be considered impotent. And those who are brought into

contest with government in a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed at the control of t

heir activities are entitled to be fairly advised of what the government propose

s and to be heard upon its proposal before it issues its final command.

There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected in administrative proc

eedings. The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations9 e

numerated these rights (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right of t

he party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in s

upport thereof, (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the d

ecision must have something to support itself, (4) the evidence must be substant

ial; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,

or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6)

the tribunal or any of its Judges must act on its or his own independent conside

ration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views

of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; and, (7) the tribunal should in all

controversial questions render its decision in such manner that the parties to t

he proceeding may know the various issues involved and the reasons for the decis

ion rendered.

In determining whether RMC No. 37-93 is merely an interpretative rule which requ

ires no prior notice and hearing, or an adjudicatory rule which demands the obse

rvance of due process, a close examination of RMC 37-93 is in order. Noticeably,

petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue at first interprets Sec. 142, par.

(c), subpar. (1), of the NIRC, as amended, by citing the law and clarifying or e

xplaining what it means Section 142 (c) (1), National Internal Revenue Code, as

amended by R.A. No. 6956, provides: On locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a

foreign brand, fifty-five (55%) Provided, That this rate shall apply regardless

of whether or not the right to use or title to the foreign brand was sold or tr
ansferred by its owner to the local manufacturer. Whenever it has to be determin

ed whether or not a cigarette bears a foreign brand, the listing of brands manuf

actured in foreign countries appearing in the current World Tobacco Directory sh

all govern.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, sustaining that of the Court of

Tax Appeals, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

VALMONTE vs. BELMONTE, JR.

February 13, 1989. G.R.No. 74930

Nature of the Case: Special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunctio

n.

Facts: Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary i

njunction invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be directed

(a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa member

s belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immed

iately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the

then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or

(b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencin

g their respective loans; and/or

(c) to allow petitioners seem to the public records for the subject information.

The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte

which provides:

xxxAs a lawyer, member of the media and plain citizen of our Republic, I am requ

esting that I be furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (

the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each o

n guarranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. We understand that OIC Mel Lopez of Man

ila was one of those aforesaid MPs. Likewise, may we be furnished with the certi

fied true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection

herewith shall be borne by us.

We are premising the above request on the following provision of the Fre

edom Constitution of the present regime.

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shal

l be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertain

ing to official acts, transactions or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen s

ubject to such limitation as may be provided by law. (Art. IV, Sec. 6).

On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Go

vernment Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner

Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a r

eply, "We are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necesary with

in the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest.

"

On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the i

nstant suit.

In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance o

f a writ of mandamus, among which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust adm

inistrative remedies.

Issue : Whether or not there was a lack of exhaustion of administrative

proceedings.

Ruling

Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a part

y can be allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all m

eans of administrative redress available under the law. The courts for reasons o

f law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available adm

inistrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have

been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administra

tive forum, However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is s

ubject to settled exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is invo

lved.
 The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of th

e scope of the constitutional right to information, is one which can be passed u

pon by the regular courts more competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustee

s, involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, the exception of this cas
e from the application of the general rule on exhaustion of administrative remed

ies is warranted. Having disposed of this procedural issue. We now address ourse

lves to the issue of whether or not mandamus lies to compel respondent to perfor

m the acts sought by petitioners to be done, in pursuance of their right to info

rmation.

We shall deal first with the second and third alternative acts sought to

be done, both of which involve the issue of whether or not petitioners are enti

tled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS.

This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with a controver

sy directly involving the constitutional right to information. In Tanada v. Tuve

ra, and in the recent case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, the Court uph

eld the people's constitutional right to be informed of matters of public intere

st and ordered the government agencies concerned to act as prayed for by the pet

itioners.

An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political,

moral and artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of i

deas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government env

isioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of gov

ernment is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system, gover

nmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority con

ferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of gove

rnment, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom

the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust,

institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the peopl

e from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be were empty words if acces
s to such information of public concern is denied, except under limitations pres

cribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.

Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information

sought is of "public interest" or "public concern", and is not exempted by law f

rom the operation of the constitutional guarantee.

The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public int

erest" and "public concern". As observed in Legaspi: In determining whether or n

ot a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which ca

n be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a terra that eludes exa

ct definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public

may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply be

cause such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the

final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whethe

r the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects

the public.

In the Tañada case the public concern deemed covered by the constitutional

right to information was the need for adequate notice to the public of the vari

ous laws which are to regulate the actions and conduct of citizens. In Legaspi,

it was the "legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions r

equiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligible

s."

A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be en

forced through mandamus proceedings, viz., that the information sought must not

be among those excluded by law.

When the information requested from the government intrudes into the pri
vacy of a citizen, a potential conflict between the rights to information and to

privacy may arise. However, the competing interests of these rights need not be

resolved in this case. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the Court in
Morfe is that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private cap

acity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the

right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. Neither can the GSI

S through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of it

s borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature, and hence may be invoked on

ly by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated.

It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned bor

rowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privac

y, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were a

lleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest th

ey generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those hold

ing responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy a

s compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public

scrutiny.

Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transacti

ons of the GSIS are private in nature and hence, are not covered by the Constitu

tional right to information on matters of public concern which guarantees "(a)cc

ess to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official act

s, transactions, or decisions" only.

It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government corporation perf

orming proprietary functions, are outside the coverage of the people's right of

access to official records.

It is further contended that since the loan function of the GSIS is mere

ly incidental to its insurance function, then its loan transactions are not cove

red by the constitutional policy of full public disclosure and the right to info
rmation which is applicable only to "official" transactions.

In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing

loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may

promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that dam

age to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the d

uties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of oth

er persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured. The petition, as to t

he second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is merito

rious.

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant th

ereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not a

ccord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, ab

stracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matter

s of public concern.

It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue

that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thi

ng demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act r

equired. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act mu

st be clear and specific.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted.

Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. San Diego

December 21, 1989

GRN 89572. 180 SCRA 533

CRUZ, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court

of Valenzuela, M.M., Br. 172. Dizon-Capulong, J.

FACTS

The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with

a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took t

he NMAT three times and flunked it as many times.1 When he applied to take it ag

ain, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule.

He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel

his admission to the test.

In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional right

s to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the pr

ivate respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subje

ct to the outcome of his petition.2 In an amended petition filed with leave of c

ourt, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series

of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due

process and equal protection.

After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declari

ng the challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-

Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a med
ical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.

ISSUE
 Whether or not the three-flunk rule is constitutional?

RULING

We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.

In Tablarin v. Gutierrez,4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT a

s a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who

have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education.

Justice Florentino P. Feliciano declared for a unanimous Court:

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some re

asonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for

admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and

safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps mo

st usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the pratice of medici

ne in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protec

ting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control

the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks

of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legisla

tion and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicin

e first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognize

d as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of mini

mum medical educational requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses

in a recognized medical school-for admission to the medical profession, has also

been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the stat

e. What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation

of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, art

iculates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the profes
sional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading t

he quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That up

grading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consis

ting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the requ

ired degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical. practic

e. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in

our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the c

urrent state of our social and economic development, are widely known.

We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like t

he NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection

of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of me

dical education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such admissio

n tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the M

edical College Admission Test [MCAT]) and quite probably, in other countries wit

h far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account

the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise,

we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of

the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is use

ful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effec

ts of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodie

s and minds for disease or trauma.

However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that the said case was

not applicable. Her reason was that it upheld only the requirement for the admis

sion test and said nothing about the so-called "three-flunk rule."

We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case
at bar. The issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the appli

cant. This may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and, indeed wi
th more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any

less valid than the former in the regulation of the medical profession

There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to r

epeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public gen

erally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interfere

nce of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the att

ainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon i

ndividuals.5

In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence

of a lawful subject and a lawful method.

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the po

lice power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure

that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients

may unwarily entrust their lives and health.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpos

e of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended

to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the

intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.

While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a cons

titutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the

public interest is involved; and the closer the link the longer the bridge to on

e's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources an

d to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all.

These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common go

od while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.

A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patien

ts. If one who wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be

so advised and adviced. Of course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but on

the other hand he may not force his entry into the bar. By the same token, a stu

dent who has demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a

course in nursing, however appropriate this career may he for others.

The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute

. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a p

rofession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admissio

n and academic requirements."

It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our

system of education by directing the student to the course for which he is best

suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swa

mped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lackin

g in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated J

anuary 13,1989, is REVERSED, with costs against the private respondent. It is so

ordered.
Ricardo Valmonte vs. Feliciano Belmonte, Jr.

170 SCRA 256

GRN 74930 February 13, 1989

CORTES, J.:

Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action for Mandamus with Preliminary Injuncti

on to review the decision of the GSIS General Manager.

FACTS

The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte which p

rovides::

As a lawyer, member of the media and plain citizen of our Republic, I am request

ing that I be furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the

) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on g

uaranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. We understand that OIC Mel Lopez of Manila

was one of those aforesaid MPs. Likewise, may we be furnished with the certified

true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection here

with shall be borne by us.

We are premising the above request on the following provision of the Freedom Con

stitution of the present regime.

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be rec

ognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to o

fficial acts, transactions or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject t

o such limitation as may be provided by law. (Art. IV, Sec. 6).

On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government

Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte

wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "W
e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necesary within the p

remises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest."

On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the instant s

uit.

In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a writ

of mandamus, among which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrat

ive remedies

ISSUE
Whether or not there was a lack of exhaustion of administrative proceedings.

RULING

Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be

allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of

administrative redress available under the law. The courts for reasons of law, c

omity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available administrat

ive remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been giv

en opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative for

um, However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject t

o settled exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is involved [Pa

scual v. Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466 (1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G.

R. No. L-30396, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA, 210; Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No. L-22

70, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.] The issue raised by petitioners, which requires

the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to information, is

one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more competently than the GSI

S or its Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus,

the exception of this case from the application of the general rule on exhaustio

n of administrative remedies is warranted. Having disposed of this procedural is

sue. We now address ourselves to the issue of whether or not mandamus lies to co

mpel respondent to perform the acts sought by petitioners to be done, in pursuan

ce of their right to information.

We shall deal first with the second and third alternative acts sought to be done

, both of which involve the issue of whether or not petitioners are entitled to

access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS.

This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with a controversy direc
tly involving the constitutional right to information. In Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R.

No. 63915, April 24,1985, 136 SCRA 27 and in the recent case of Legaspi v. Civi

l Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 530, the Court uphe

ld the people's constitutional right to be informed of matters of public interes

t and ordered the government agencies concerned to act as prayed for by the peti

tioners.

The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 which st

ates:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be rec

ognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to

official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research dat

a used an basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject t

o such limitations as may be provided by law.

An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral an

d artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and

discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned

under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of government

is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental

agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred b

y the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government,

the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the pow

er had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust, institu

tionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from a

buse of governmental power, would certainly be were empty words if access to suc

h information of public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed b

y implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.

Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought i

s of "public interest" or "public concern", and is not exempted by law from the

operation of the constitutional guarantee.

The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public interest" a

nd "public concern". As observed in Legaspi:

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern ther

e is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest"

is a terra that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of

subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affec

t their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of a

n ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on

a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, a

s it relates to or affects the public. [Ibid, at p. 641.]

In the Tañada case the public concern deemed covered by the constitutional right t

o information was the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws

which are to regulate the actions and conduct of citizens. In Legaspi, it was t

he "legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring

civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles."

A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced t

hrough mandamus proceedings, viz., that the information sought must not be among

those excluded by law.

When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of

a citizen, a potential conflict between the rights to information and to privacy

may arise. However, the competing interests of these rights need not be resolve

d in this case. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the Court in Morfe i

s that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, a

nd not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right ca

nnot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. As held in the case of Vass
ar College v. Loose Wills Biscuit Co. [197 F. 982 (1912)], a corporation has no

right of privacy in its name since the entire basis of the right to privacy is a

n injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would

have no such ground for relief. Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager

, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is pur

ely personal in nature (Cf. Atkinson v. John Doherty & Co., 121 Mich 372, 80 N.W

. 285, 46 L.RA. 219 (1899); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22, 31 L.R

.A. 286 (1895)], and hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is cl

aimed to be violated.

It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned borrowers t

hemselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, consi

dering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged t

o have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they gener

ate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding resp

onsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compar

ed to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutin

Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions of t

he GSIS are private in nature and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional r

ight to information on matters of public concern which guarantees "(a)ccess to o

fficial records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, trans

actions, or decisions" only.

It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government corporation performing p

roprietary functions, are outside the coverage of the people's right of access t

o official records.
It is further contended that since the loan function of the GSIS is merely incid

ental to its insurance function, then its loan transactions are not covered by t

he constitutional policy of full public disclosure and the right to information

which is applicable only to "official" transactions.

In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans gr

anted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulg

ate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to o

r loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of

the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other perso

ns entitled to inspect the records may be insured [Legaspi v. Civil Service Comm

ission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.] The petit

ion, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioner

s, is meritorious.

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, a

re entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord th

em a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts,

summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of pub

lic concern.

It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that th

e applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing deman

ded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required.

The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be cl

ear and specific [Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768,

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted and respondent General Manager

of the Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners acce

ss to documents and records evidencing loans granted to Members of the former Ba

tasang Pambansa, as petitioners may specify, subject to reasonable regulations a

s to the time and manner of inspection, not incompatible with this decision, as

the GSIS may deem necessary.

Rodolfo Aguinaldo vs. Luis Santos

August 2l,1992.

GRN 94115. 212 SCRA 768

NOCON, J.

Nature of the Case: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Inj

unction to review the decision of the GSIS General Manager

FACTS

Petitioner was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan, having been

elected to said position during the local elections held on January 17, 1988, t

o serve a term of four (4) years therefrom. He took his oath sometime around Mar

ch 1988.
Shortly after the December 1989 coup d'etat was crushed, respondent Secretary of

Local Government sent a telegram and a letter, both dated December 4, 1989, to

petitioner requiring him to show cause why he should not be suspended or removed

from office for disloyalty to the Republic, within forty-eight (48) hours from

receipt thereof.

On December 7, 1989, a sworn complaint for disloyalty to the Republic and culpab

le violation of the Constitution was filed by Veronico Agatep, Manuel Mamba and

Orlino Agatep, respectively the mayors of the municipalities of Gattaran, Tuao a

nd Lasam, all in Cagayan, against petitioner for acts the latter committed durin

g the coup. Petitioner was required to file a verified answer to the complaint.

On January 5, 1990, the Department of Local Government received a letter from pe

titioner dated December 29, 1989 in reply to respondent Secretary's December 4,

1989 letter requiring him to explain why he should not be suspended or removed f

rom office for disloyalty. In his letter, petitioner denied being privy to the p

lanning of the coup or actively participating in its execution, though he admitt

ed that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers.

Respondent Secretary considered petitioner's reply letter as his answer to the c

omplaint of Mayor Veronica Agatep and others.2 On the basis thereof, respondent

Secretary suspended petitioner from office for sixty (60) days from notice, p

ending the outcome of the formal investigation into the charges against him.

Thereafter, respondent Secretary rendered the questioned decision finding petiti

oner guilty as charged and ordering his removal from office. Installed as Govern

or of Cagayan in the process was respondent Melvin Vargas, who was then the Vice

Governor of Cagayan.

Petitioner relies on three grounds for the allowance of the petition, namely: (1
) that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local government o

fficials under Section 60, Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by the 1987

Constitution; (2) that since respondent Secretary no longer has power to suspend

or remove petitioner, the former could not appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as

Governor of Cagayan; and (3) the alleged act of disloyalty committed by petition

er should be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not he a mere preponde

rance of evidence, because it is an act punishable as rebellion under the Revise

d Penal Code.

While this case was pending before this Court, petitioner filed his certificate

of candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan for the May 11, 1992 electi

ons. Three separate petitions for his disqualification were then filed against h

im, all based on the ground that he had been removed from office by virtue of th

e March 19, 1990 resolution of respondent Secretary. The Commission on Elections

granted the petitions by way of a resolution dated May 9, 1992. On the same day

, acting upon a "Motion to Clarify" filed by petitioner, the Commission ruled th

at inasmuch as the resolutions of the Commission become final and executory only

after five (5)days from promulgation, petitioner may still be voted upon as a c

andidate for governor pending the final outcome of the disqualification cases wi

th this Court.

Consequently, on May 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with t

his Court, d seeking to nullify the resolution of the Commission ordering his di

squalification. The Court, in a resolution dated May 14, 1992, issued a temporar

y restraining order against the Commission to cease and desist from enforcing it

s May 9, 1992 resolution pending the outcome of the disqualification case, there

by allowing the canvassing of the votes and returns in Cagayan to proceed. Howev
er, the Commission was ordered not to proclaim a winner until this Court has dec

ided the case.

On June 9, 1992, a resolution was issued in the aforementioned case granting the

petition and annulling the May 9, 1992 resolution of the Commission on the grou

nd that the decision of respondent Secretary has not yet attained finality and i

s still ending review with this Court. As petitioner won by a landslide margin i

n the elections, the resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as G

overnor of Cagayan

ISSUE

Whether or not Secretary of Department of Local government has the power to sus

pend or remove local government officials as alter ego of the President, and as

embodied in B.P. Blg. 337 has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution and which i

s now vested in the courts.

RULING

Under the environmental circumstances of the case, We find the petition meritori

ous.

Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the

administrative case pending before Us moot and academic. It appears that after

the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes among the

candidates for governor of Cagayan province.

Offenses committed, or acts done, during a previous term are generally held not

to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the Constitution

provides that the penalty in proceeding for removal shall not extend beyond the

removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for a term for whi

ch the officer was elected or appointed.

The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that t

he reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's misconduct to

the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his presen

t term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right

to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must b

e assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that

they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of an

y. It is not for the court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practicall

y overrule the will of the people.' (Lizares v. Hechanova, et al. 17 SCRA 58, 59

-60 [1966]) (See also Oliveros v. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163 [19741)3

Clearly then, the rule is that a public official can not be removed for administ

rative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office

operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of

cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, find

s no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may h

ave committed during the failed coup.

The other grounds raised by petitioner deserve scant consideration. Petitioner c

ontends that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local govern

ment officials as alter ego of the President, and as embodied in B.P. Blg. 337 h

as been repealed by the 1987 Constitution and which is now vested in the courts.

We do not agree. The power of respondent Secretary to remove local government of

ficials is anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory grant from the legi

slative branch. The constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17) and X

(4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President the power of control ov
er all executive departments, bureaus and offices and the power of general super

vision over local governments, and by the doctrine that the acts of the departme

nt head are presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly rejected by

him.4 The statutory grant found in RR Blg. 337 itself has constitutional roots,

having been enacted by the then Batasan Pambansa pursuant to Article XI of the

1973 Constitution, Section 2 of which specifically provided as follows SEC. 2. T

he National Assembly shall enact a local government code which may not thereafte

r be amended except by a majority vote of all its Members, defining a more respo

nsive and accountable local government structure with an effective system of rec

all, allocating among the different local government units their powers, respons

ibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications, election and rem

oval, term, salaries, power, functions, and duties of local government officials

, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local

units. However, any change in the existing form of local government shall not ta

ke effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called

for the purpose.5

A similar provision is found in Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, w

hich reads:

'SEC. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide fo

r a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted throug

h a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative,

and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers

, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election,

appointment, and removal, term and salaries, powers and functions and duties of

local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operati
on of the local units.6

Inasmuch as the power and authority of the legislature to enact a local governme

nt code, which provides for the manner of removal of local government officials,

is found in the 1973 Constitution as well as in the 1987 Constitution, then it

can not be said that BP Blg. 337 was repealed by the effectivity of the present

Constitution.

Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al., 7 this Court had the occa

sion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of th

e present Constitution, until such time as the proposed Local Government Code of

1991 is approved.

The power of respondent Secretary of the Department of Local Government to remov

e local elective government officials is found in Sees. 60 and 61 of B.P. Blg. 3

37.8

As to petitioner's argument of the want of authority of respondent Secretary to

appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor of Cagayan, We need but point to S

ection 48 (1) of B.P. Blg 337 to show the fallacy of the same, to wit In case a

permanent vacancy arises when a governor . . . refuses to assume office, fails

to qualify, dies or is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise

permanently incapacitated to discharge the functionc of his office, the vice-go

vernor ... shall assume the office for the unexpired term of the former.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of public respondent

Secretary of Local Government dated March 19, 1990 in Adm. Case No, P-10437-89,

dismissing petitioner as Governor Cagayan. is hereby REVERSED.

Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres vs. Court of Appeals

1998

284 SCRA 276

Alejandro Manosca vs. Court of Appeals

January 29, 1996

GRN 1064. 252 SCRA 412

VITUG, J

Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court

of Appeals.

FACTS

Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Tagu

ig, Metro Manila, with an area of about four hundred ninety-two (492) square met

ers. When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Fe

lix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Ser

ies of 1986, pursuant to Section 41 of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring th

e land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was, on 06 January 1

986, approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports. Later, the opini

on of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of the measure. In his

Opinion No. 133, Series of 1987, the Secretary of Justice replied in the affirma

tive; he explained:

"According to your guidelines, national landmarks are places or objects that are

associated with an event, achievement, characteristic, or modification that mak

es a turning point or stage in Philippine history. Thus, the birthsite of the fo

under of the Iglesia ni Cristo, the late Felix Y. Manalo, who, admittedly, had m

ade contributions to Philippine history and culture has been declared as a natio

nal landmark. It has been held that places invested with unusual historical inte

rest is a public use for which the power of eminent domain may be authorized x x

x.
"The National Museum and the National Historical Commission are hereby vested wi

th the right to declare other such historical and cultural sites as National Shr

ines, Monuments, and/or Landmarks, in accordance with the guidelines set forth i

n R.A. 4846 and the spirit of this Decree."

Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor-G

eneral, instituted a complaint for expropriation3 before the Regional Trial Cour

t of Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI alleging, inter alia, that:

"Pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, the National Historical I

nstitute issued Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, which was approved on January,

1986 by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, declaring the above

described parcel of land which is the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, founder of

the 'Iglesia ni Cristo,' as a National Historical Landmark. The plaintiff perfor

ce needs the land as such national historical landmark which is a public purpose

."

Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended

expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would

constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for 'the use

, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the

provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.5 Petitioners s

ought, in the meanwhile, a suspension in the implementation of the 03rd August 1

989 order of the trial court.

On 15 February 1990, following the filing by respondent Republic of its reply to

petitioners' motion seeking the dismissal of the case, the trial court issued i

ts denial of said motion to dismiss.6 Five (5) days later, or on 20 February 19

90,17another order was issued by the trial court, declaring moot and academic th

e motion for reconsideration and/or suspension of the order of 03 August 1989 wi

th the rejection of petitioners' motion to dismiss. Petitioners' motion for the

reconsideration of the 20th February 1990 order was likewise denied by the trial

court in its 16th April 1991 order.

ISSUE

Whether or not the "public use" requirement of Eminent Domain is extant

in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492square-meter parcel of la

nd so declared by the National Historical Institute ("NHI") as a national histor

ical landmark.

RULING

We begin, in this present recourse of petitioners, with a few known postulates.

Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency

, as condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of sove

reignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead,

provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather

than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so descri

bed as "the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government"

that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature of

a forced purchase by the State.9 It is a right to take or reassert dominion over

property within the state for public use or to meet a public exigency. It is sa

id to he an essential part of governance even in its most primitive form and thu
s inseparable from sovereignty.10 The only direct constitutional qualification i

s that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensa

tion."11 This proscription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible a

buse and so to protect as well the individual against whose property the power i

s sought to be enforced.

Petitioners assert that the expropriation has failed to meet the guidelines set

by this Court in the case of Guido v. Rural Progress Administration,12 to wit: (

a) the size of the land expropriated; (b) the large number of people benefited;

and, (c) the extent of social and economic reform.13 Petitioners suggest that we

confine the concept of expropriation only to the following public uses,14 i.e.

, the

"x x x taking of property for military posts, roads, streets, sidewalks, bridge

s, ferries, levees, wharves, piers, public buildings including schoolhouses, par

ks, playgrounds, plazas, market places, artesian wells, water supply and sewerag

e systems, cemeteries, crematories, and railroads."

This view of petitioners is much too limitative and restrictive.

The court, in Guido, merely passed upon the issue of the extent of the President

's power under Commonwealth Act No. 539 to, specifically, acquire private lands

for subdivision into smaller home lots or farms for resale to bona fide tenants

or occupants. It was in this particular context of the statute that the Court ha

d made the pronouncement. The guidelines in Guido were not meant to be preclusiv

e in nature and, most certainly, the power of eminent domain should not now be u

nderstood as being confined only to the expropriation of vast tracts of land and

landed estates.

The term "Public use," not having been otherwise defined by the constitution, mu
st be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public exi
gency.16 Black summarizes the characterization given by various courts to the te

rm; thus:

"Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis for taking p

roperty by eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, 'public use' is one which

confers same benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual us

e by public. It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed faciliti

es for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use, whe

ther exercised by one or many members of public, a 'public advantage' or 'public

benefit' accrues sufficient to constitute a public use. Montana Power Co. vs. B

okma, Mont. 457 P. 2d 769, 772, 773.

"Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the right

to take private property in virtue of eminent domain, means a use concerning the

whole community as distinguished from particular individuals. But each and ever

y member of society need not be equally interested in such use, or be personally

and directly affected by it; if the object is to satisfy a great public want or

exigency, that is sufficient. Rindge Co. vs. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700,

43 S. Ct. 689, 692, 67 L.Ed. 1186. The term may be said to mean public usefulnes

s, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit. It may be li

mited to the inhabitants of a small or restricted locality, but must be in commo

n, and not for a particular individual. The use must be a needful one for the pu

blic, which cannot be surrendered without obvious general loss and inconvenience

. A 'public use' for which land may be taken defies absolute definition for it c

hanges with varying conditions of society, new appliances in the sciences, chang

ing conceptions of scope and functions of government, and other differing circum

stances brought about by an increase in population and new modes of communicatio

n and transportation.

The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional pur

poses is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public use

should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that "public use

" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has long been discar

ded.

"We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not de

sirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. See DayBrite

Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 US 421, 424, 96 L. Ed. 469, 472, 72 S Ct 405. Th

e values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as m

onetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the communi

ty should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balan

ced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress and its au

thorized agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide variety

of values. It is not for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the Distric

t of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sa

nitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.

"Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it th

rough the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain i

s merely the means to the end.

It has been explained as early as Seña v. Manila Railroad Co.,19 that:

" A historical research discloses the meaning of the term 'public use' to be on

e of constant growth. As society advances, its demands upon the individual incre

ase and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be

devoted. x x x for 'whatever is beneficially employed for the community is a pu

blic use."'

Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states:

"The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was fel

t that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever proj

ect is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or

parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long

as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes

into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any
doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be su

bdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the tra

nsfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterp

rise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever ma

y be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of

public use."20

Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Land Tenur

e Administration,21 has viewed the Constitution a dynamic instrument and one tha

t "is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically" so as to enable it "to meet

adequately whatever problems the future has in store." Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a not

ed constitutionalist himself, has aptly observed that what, in fact, has ultimat

ely emerged is a concept of public use which is just as broad as "public welfare

."

Petitioners ask: But "(w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that the expropri

ation of (Felix Manalo's) birthplace become so vital as to be a public use appro

priate for the exercise of the power of eminent domain" when only members of the

Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt to give some religious perspectiv

e to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is t

he principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, t

he exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to

recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture

of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of th

e Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived b

y members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but su

ch a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in n

ature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of

property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.

All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be in accord with law a

nd jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.

J.M Tuazon Company Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration

DECEMBER 26, 1961

G.R. L-18672. 31 SCRA 413

FERNANDO, J.

Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition

FACTS

The record shows that the judgements rendered in 1955 by the Court of First Inst

ance (CFI) of Rizal in the two ejectment cases filed by J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.

against respondents, Bruna Rosete and Buenaventura Dizon, were upon regular appe

al, affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.The CFI, after the appellate court s

decision became final and upon return of the records in due course, issued writ

of execution of the judgement against the said respondents as prayed for by the

landowner, Tuason & Company. Subssequently, On November 19, 1960, the CFI issue

d orders of demolition of the houses of the evictees or judgement debtors.

On November 16, 1960 , the landowner also applied for prohibition in the CFI aga

inst the Land Tenure Administration (LTA), the Auditor-General and the Solicitor

-General to restrain from instituting expropriation proceedings of the petitione

r Company s land in Quezon City, generally known as Tatalon Estate by virtue of Repu
blic Act (R.A.) No. 2616, that became law without executive approval on August 3
, 1959 on the basis that said law is unconstitutional, null and void as legislat

ion aimed at depriving it of its property for the benefit of squatters and occup

ants, even if said property had been actually subdivided and its lots were being

sold to public.

ISSUE

Whether or not expropriation proceedings can be had by the LTA pursuance

to R.A. 2616 which the landowner claimed to be unconstitutional?

RULING

The court saw nothing in the terms of R.A. No. 2616 to justify the belie

f that the Legislature intended departure from the normal course prescribed for

eminent domain cases, where the rights of the owner of the land may not be distu

rbed without previous deposit of the provisional value of the property brought t

o be condemned. The effectivity of Section 4 of R.A. 2616, discontinuing ejectm

ent proceedings against a present occupants and restraining any act of dispositi

on of the property, is justifiable only if the Government takes possession of th

e land in question by depositing its value. It needs no argument to show that by

restraining the land owner from enforcing even final judgements in his favor to

recover possession of his property, as well as from disposing of it to persons

of his choice, he is deprived of the substance of ownership, and his title is le

ft as an empty shell. The landowner would then be deprived of those attributes

of ownership that give it value, and his property is virtually taken from him wi

thout compensation and in violation of the Constitution. Particularly, Bill of

Rights requires that private property shall not be taken for public use without p

ayment of just compensation and Article XIII, Section 4 in prescribing that Congre

ss may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands

to be subdivided into small lots an conveyed at cost to individuals, prohibit any

disturbance of property rights without coetaneous payment of just indemnity. H

ence the mere filing of the condemnation proceedings for the benefit of tenants

cannot, by itself alone, lawfully suspend the condemnee s dominical rights, whethe

r of possession, enjoyment, or disposition, And this is especially the case wher

e final and executory judgements of ejectment have been obtained against the occ

upants of the property as in the case at bar. The LTA confesses that it has onl

y Two Million Pesos available funds, an amount way short of the P6,034,865.95 re

asonable assessed value of the property subject of the case. Based on the for

egoing, the court remanded the case to CFI to hear and resolve the prohibition c

ase filed by the landowner with all practicable dispatch.

Tanada vs. Angara

May 2, 1997

G.R. 118295. 272 SCRA 18

PANGANIBAN, J.

Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari

FACTS

The emergence of World Trade Organization (WTO) after half a century and severa

l dizzying rounds of negotiations where the Philippines joined as a founding mem

ber with the goal, brought about the ratification of the WTO Agreement by then P

resident Fidel V. Ramos on the basis, as articulated in his two letters to Senat

e, of improving Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major tradi

ng partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agric

ultural and industrial products. Subsequently, this Agreement was concurred by t

he Senate.

However, this drew unfavorable reactions from various sectors of the Philippine

society, that resulted in the filing of the subject petition-case on the grounds

that:

WTO requires the Philippines to place nationals and products of member-countries

on the same footing as Filipinos and local products;

WTO intrudes, limits and/or impairs the constitutional powers of both Congress a

nd the Supreme Court.

Hence, assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitut

ion to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively contro

lled by Filipinos (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote th

e preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced go

ods, among others.

ISSUES:

Does the petition present a justiciable controversy (involve a political questio

n)?

Does the provisions of WTO Agreement and its three annexes contravene section 19

of Article II, and Sections 10 and 12 of Article XII of the Philippine Constitu

tion?

Do the provisions of said Agreement and its annexes limit, restrict or impair th

e exercise of legislative power by Congress?

Do said provisions unduly impair or interfere with the exercise of judicial powe

r by this court in promulgating rules of evidence?

Was the concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement and its annexes sufficien

t and/or valid, considering that it did not include the final act, ministerial d

eclarations and decisions and the understanding commitments in financial service

s?

RULING

The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters raised in the petition

is clearly set out in the 1987 Constitution, Judicial power includes the duty of

the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are

legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has b

een grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the

part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. As this Court has rep

eatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or

abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that

involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, commi

tted by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government. Th

e Court stress though that in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition,
it will not review the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in

enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of the trade libera

lization as a policy espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule

on the propriety of the government s economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs,

taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions and other import/trade barriers. R

ather it will only exercise its constitutional duty to determine whether or not t

here had bee a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdic

tion on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annex

es.

The Constitution indeed mandates as bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, l

abor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exch

ange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and lim

its protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trad

e practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to

pursue an isolation policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods, se

rvices in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution do

es not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services, and investments

into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exch

ange on the basis of equality and reciprocity. Frowning only on foreign competit

ion that is unfair.

While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on

the domestic level, it is however, subject to restrictions and limitations volu

ntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the

family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-

type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of
Principles and State Policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted pr

inciples of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the

policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nat

ions. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepte

d principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part

of our own laws. A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligations but creates

a legally binding obligation on the parties A state which has contracted valid i

nternational obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications

as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. O

ne of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is PACTA SUNT S

ERVANDA --- international agreements must be performed in good faith.

Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more than justifies the intrusion,

if any actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain unreasonable burde

n consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute se

ttlement inherent in our judicial system.

By signing the Final Act, Secretary Rizalino Navarro, as representative of the P

hilippines, undertook to submit, as appropriate the WTO Agreement for considerat

ion of their respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of

it in accordance with their procedures; and to adopt the Ministerial Declaratio

ns and Decisions (MDD). The assailed Senate Res. No. 97 expressed concurrence i

n exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories namely, concurrence o

f the Senate in the WTO Agreement.

The MDD were deemed adopted without the need for ratification. They were approv

ed by them ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT (General Agreement on T

ariffs and Trade) which provides that representatives of the members can meet to
give effect to those provisions of this Agreemet which invoke joint action and g

enerally with a view to facilitating the operation and furthering of this Agreem

ent.

The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also approved in Marrakes

h does not apply to the Philippines. It applies only to those 27 Members which h

ave indicated their respective schedules of commitments on standstill, eliminati

on of monopoly, expansion of operation of existing financial service suppliers,

temporary entry of personnel, free transfer and processing of information and na

tional treatment with respect to access to payment, clearing systems and refinan

cing available in the normal course of business.

Notwithstanding objections against possible limitations on national sovereignty,

the WTO remains the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veri

table forum for the development of international trade law. Let the people, thr

ough their duly authorized elected officers make their free choice.

PETITION WAS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT.

PEOPLE vs. GALIT

MARCH 20, 1985

G.R. L-51770. 135 SCRA 465

CONCEPCION, JR., J.

Nature of the Case: Appeal from the Judgment of the Circuit Criminal Court of Pa

sig, Rizal.
FACTS

The defendant-appellant, Francisco Galit, was convicted for the crime of Robbery

with Homicide with death sentence as its penalty. Such being the case it is su

bjected to the automatic review of the High Court.

That on or about the 23rd of August, 1977 in the municipality of Montalb

an, Province of Rizal, Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a widow was found dead in the be

droom of her house located at Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal as a result of s

even (7) stab wounds inflicted upon the different parts of her body by a blant i

nstrument. More than two (2) weeks later, police authorities of Montalban pick

ed up the herein defendant, an ordinary contruction worker (pion) living in Mari

kina, Rizal on suspicion of the murder based on the testimony of his son-in-law,

Florentino Valentino. Valentino testified that he heard accused Galit and his

wife s arguments in connection with the robbery and killing of the victim which th

e former, together with two of his accomplices, Juling Dulat and a certain Pabl

ing perpetrated.

ISSUE

Whether or not the alleged extra-judicial confession extracted and the pictures

of the supposed re-enactment obtained from the accused-defendant are admissible

as evidence?

RULING

After a review of the records, the Court found that the evidence presented by th

e prosecution does not support a conviction. In fact, the findings of the trial

court relative to the acts attributed to the accused are not supported by compe

tent evidence. In the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, the court laid down the

correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making an arrest and in cond
ucting a custodial investigation which, At the time the person is arrested, it s

hall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for his ar

rest ad he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of

his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any stateme

nt he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the

right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, pr anyone he chooses by the mo

st expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall

be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accompl

ished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be conducted in

the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his beh

alf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or b

y anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall

not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtaine

d in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpa

tory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no state wit

nesses and not even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The

only evidence against the accused is his alleged confession. Such confession wa

s obtained after such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer which do

es not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his r

ights under the Constitution and our laws. The court said that there should inst

ead be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple wor

ds in dialect or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is f

rom Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the

time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or a friend, In fact his sisters were and other relatives did not kn

ow that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about t

wo weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to v

isit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel an
d yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed re-en

actment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. The court dec

lared that these constitute gross violations of his rights, hence, the alleged c

onfession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evid

ence because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LINDES PAYNOR

SEPTEMBER 9, 1996

G.R. 116222. 261 SCRA 615

REGALADO, J.

Nature of the Case: Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Roxas, Isabela Br. 23

FACTS

On September 18, 1991, on or about 4:00 in the afternoon, a ten-year old pupil n

amed Fesnaida Magaway, while sweeping the ground near her classroom having been

assigned as cleaner that day, witnessed the stabbing incident perpetrated by the

accused-appellant, Lindes Paynor against the victim-teacher of Roxas Central El

ementary School known as Carmelita Aguinaldo. The victim was rushed to the hosp

ital by her fellow teachers but was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA). Through t

he lone testimony of witnessed Magaway and after due investigation, a criminal

case was filed against the accused in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas,

Isabela. RTC rendered its decision on April 21, 1994 declaring the accused guilt

y beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder provided for and penalized unde
r Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and imposes upon him a penalty of reclus

ion perpetua together with all the necessary penalties provided by law, to indem

nify the heirs of victim in the amount of P50,000 pesos, without however, subsid

iary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay cost.

Appellant sought the reversal of that verdict claiming that the lower court erre

d, among others, that there was violation of the MIRANDA DOCTRINE.

ISSUE

Whether or not the accused rightfully raised the issue of violation of the MI

RANDA DOCTRINE when allegedly the police unceremoniously stripped him of his clo

thing and personal items, the latter having been introduced as evidence during t

he trial?

RULING

The court is not persuaded. The protection of the accused under custodial

investigation which is invoked by the accused-appellant, Lindes Paynor, refers t

o TESTIMONIAL COMPULSION. Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution (Bil

l of Rights) provides that such accused shall have the right to be informed of h

is right to remain silent, the right to counsel and the right to waive the right

to counsel in the presence of counsel, and that any confession or admission ob

tained in violation of such rights shall be inadmissible in evidence against him

. As held in People vs. Gamboa, this constitutional right applies only against

testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be ex

amined. In fact, an accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or meas

ured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced or to move his body to enable

the foregoing things to be done, without running afoul of the proscription agai
nst testimonial compulsion.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA) vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

JULY 28, 1989

G.R. 85279. 175 SCRA 686

CORTES, J.

Nature of the Case: Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS

On June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and

barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees

from reporting to work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS.

The reason for the strike was due to SSS s failure to act on the union s demands wh

ich included, among other things, implementation of the provisions of the old SS

S-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues, paymen

t of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay, conversion of

temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into

regular and permanent status and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowan

ces and benefits granted to other regular employees of the SSS, etc. The strike

was reported to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council (PSLMC) which ordere

d the strikers to return to work. For failure of the strikers to heed the PSLMC s

order, SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a complai
nt for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the

strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work.

ISSUE

Whether or not the employees of the Social Security System have the right to str

ike?

RULING

The court held that while the 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justic

e and Human Rights provides that the State shall guarantee the rights of all work

ers to self-organization, collective bargaining, negotiations and peaceful conce

rted activities in accordance with law (Article XIII, Section 31), it is silent

as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike. Resort to the

intent of the framers of the organic law as gleaned from the proceedings of the

Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in

recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners in

tended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only withou

t including the right to strike. Further, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of

the sponsors to the provision that the right to self-organization shall not be

denied to government employees, explained in his answer to the apprehension expr

essed by Commissioner Ambrosio Padilla , When we proposed this amendment providin

g for self-organization of government employees, it does mean that because they

have the right to organize, they also have the right to strike. That is a diffe

rent matter. We are only talking of organizing, uniting as a union. Now then, i

f the purpose of the state is to prohibit the strikes from employees exercising

governmental functions, that could be done because the moment that is prohibited

, then the union which will go on strike will be an illegal union. And that prov
ision is carried in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 875. In R.A. No. 875, workers inclu

ding those from government-owned and controlled are allowed to organize but they

are prohibited from striking. Apropos to the constitutional guarantee of the ri

ght of the government employees to organize, then President Corazon C. Aquino is

sued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 180 which provides that the Civil Service law and

rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shal

l be observed subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress , apparen

tly referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, series of 1987 of the Civil Service

Commission dated April 21, 1987 which prior to the enactment by Congress of appl

icable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of admini

strative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes,

demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass actions which wil

l result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service . The court is of

the considered view that SSS employees are covered by the prohibition against s

trikes considering that under the 1987 Constitution the Civil Service embraces al

l branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the government inclu

ding government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters (Article

IX.B, Section 2(1) and Section 1 of E.O. No. 180) with SSS is one such governmen

t controlled corporation with original charter having created under R.A. No. 116

1. Thus, the court declared that the strike staged by the SSS employees was ill

egal.
BANGALISAN vs. CA

276 SCRA 619

July 31, 1997

REGALADO, J.:

Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

FACTS

Petitioners, except Rodolfo Mariano, were among the 800 public school te

achers who staged "mass actions" on September 17 to 19, 1990 to dramatize their

grievances concerning, in the main, the alleged failure of the public authoritie

s to implement in a just and correct manner certain laws and measures intended f

or their material benefit. On September 17, 1990, the Secretary of the Departmen

t of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) issued a Return-to-Work Order. Petitio

ners failed to comply with said order, hence they were charged by the Secretary

with "grave misconduct; gross neglect of duty; gross violation of Civil Service

law, rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations; refusal to perform

official duty; gross insubordination; conduct prejudicial to the best interest

of the service; and absence without official leave in violation of PD 807, other

wise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines." They were simultaneo

usly placed under preventive suspension. Despite due notice, petitioners failed

to submit their answer to the complaint so, the DECS Secretary rendered a decisi

on finding petitioners guilty as charged and dismissing them from the service ef

fective immediately.

Petitioners Bangalisan et al, filed a motion for reconsideration with the DECS

Secretary who subsequently modified the penalty of dismissal to suspension for n

ine months without pay. Not satisfied with the aforestated adjudication of their
respective cases, petitioners appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) wh

o decided to rule on the merits of their appeal in the interest of justice. All

the petitioners moved for reconsideration of the CSC resolutions but these were

all denied, except that of petitioner Rodolfo Mariano who was found guilty only

of a violation of reasonable office rules and regulations because of his failur

e to inform the school of his intended absence and to file an application for le

ave therefor. This petitioner was accordingly given only a reprimand.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court but thei

r petition was referred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Revised Administrati

ve Circular No. 1-95.4

ISSUE

Whether or not employees in the public service have the right to engage

in strikes.

HELD:

It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public

service may not engage in strikes. While the Constitution recognizes the right

of government employees to organize, they are prohibited from staging strikes, d

emonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will

result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services. The right of gove

rnment employees to organize is limited only to the formation of unions or assoc

iations, without including the right to strike.

Rosales vs. CA

September 15, 1998

165 SCRA 344

BIDIN, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition for Certiorari to review the decision of

the Court of Appeals.

FACTS

On April 11, 1972, the Don Bosco Technical Institute posted the list of honor st

udents for the graduation of its elementary department which was to take place o

n April 22, 1972. Rommel Rosales, a student of Grade VI, candidate for graduatio

n and likewise candidate for Valedictorian, reported to his parents that he was

not listed as Valedictorian of the class but that it was another boy by the name

of Conrado Valerio. The parents of Rommel demanded for a re-computation of the

grades of their son who, they averred, should be class valedictorian and filed a

formal complaint with the Director of Bureau of Private Schools against the sch

ool claiming anomalous ranking of honor pupils for the grade school with a reque

st for a review of the computations made by the school. The Chief of the Legal D

ivision of the Bureau of Private Schools sent a copy of the complaint by first i

ndorsement to the Rector of herein respondent school stating, among others, that

the complaint had lost its validity because the same was filed on the eve of th

e commencement exercises of the school, in violation of the provision of paragra

ph 176, Section XI of the Manual of Regulation for Private Schools requiring com

plaints of the kind to be filed not later than ton (10) days before commencement

exercises. However, defendant Rector indicated that he would welcome an investi

gation in order to erase any doubt as to the selection of the honor students of
the grade school concerned. On May 5, 1972, the Director of Private Schools rend

ered a decision holding that Rommel Rosales was the rightful valedictorian. On N

ovember 29, 1972, Rosales filed a complaint for damages in view of the failure o
f the school to graduate Rommel Rosales as valedictorian of his class. In its an

swer, respondent school prayed that the complaint be dismissed on the ground tha

t the Director of Private Schools acting on its motion dated May 11, 1972 recons

idered and set aside his decision of May 5, 1972 and instead "approved and/or co

nfirmed the selection and award of honors to the students concerned for the scho

ol year 1971-1972 as effected by the school."

Petitioners, in their reply, averred that said motion for reconsideration was my

steriously filed, there being no original copies of the same in the Office of th

e Director of Private Schools which would show the date of filing thereof and th

eir corresponding receipt of a copy thereof by the petitioners. Respondent schoo

l however, insisted that their motion for reconsideration was regularly filed an

d the assailed decision was in fact reconsidered as above stated on December 18,

1972. The records show that petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on J

anuary 11, 1973 of said decision of December 18, 1972 but was denied on January

19, 1973. Thus, on February 7, 1973, petitioners appealed both decisions of Dece

mber 18, 1972 and January 19, 1973 to the Secretary of Education which appeal wa

s still pending at the time of the filing of their complaint in court.

On September 14, 1973, the trial court issued an order finding that plaintiffs h

ave not exhausted all administrative remedies against the defendants and that it

does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions to the requirement. Since

the complaint does not allege exhaustion of said remedies principally on appeal

to the Secretary of Education which was available to him, the Court finds that

the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to constitute cause of action. On

appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the court a quo incurred no error when

it found that the decision of the Director of Private Schools dated May 5, 1972
was far from being final and that the administrative remedies availed of by plai

ntiffs had not yet been exhausted and affirmed the decision appealed from in tot

o.

ISSUE

Whether or not the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is

applicable in this case.

HELD:

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse th

rough court action, as a general rule, cannot prosper until all the remedies hav

e been exhausted at the administrative level. When an adequate remedy may be had

within the Executive Department of the government, but nevertheless, a Litigant

fails or refuses to avail himself of the same, the judiciary shall decline to i

nterfere. This traditional attitude of the courts is based not only on convenien

ce but likewise on respect; convenience of the party litigants and respect for a

co-equal office in the government. If a remedy is available within the administ

rative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to (the)

court.

SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC. vs. HON. ALFONSO ABAD

February 24, 1992

206 SCRA 482

CRUZ, J:

Nature of the Case: Petition for review from the decision and Resolution of the

Court of Appeals.
FACTS
 The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing

it to cut, remove and utilize timber within the concession area covering 29,500

hectares of forest land in Zamboanga del Sur, for a period of ten years. Privat

e respondents filed a petition with the Department of Environment and Natural Re

sources for the cancellation of the TLA, on the ground of serious violations of

its conditions and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations. The same cha

rges were subsequently made, also by the herein private respondents, in a compla

int for injunction with damages against the petitioner in the RTC of Pagadian Ci

ty. The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the c

ourt had no jurisdiction over the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet exhau

sted administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction sought was expressly prohibi

ted by Section I of PD 605.

Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss and also the motion for recon

sideration. The petitioner then elevated the matter to the respondent Court of A

ppeals, which sustained the trial court s decision and in its resolution denying t

he motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of ex

haustion of administrative remedies was not without exception and pointed to the

several instances approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with. The

respondent court found that in the case before it, the applicable exception was

the urgent need for judicial intervention. The decision also declared invalid Se

ction 1 of PD 605, which provides:

Section 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any rest

raining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any

case involving or growing out of the issuance, approval or disapproval, revocat

ion or suspension of, or any action whatsoever by the proper administrative offi
cial or body on concessions, licenses, permits, patents, or public grants of any

kind in connection with the disposition, exploitation, utilization, exploration

and/or development of the natural resources of the Philippines.

This was held to be an encroachment on the judicial power vested in the Supreme

Court and the lower courts by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution. The

respondent court cited Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay,7 where several

presidential decrees were declared unconstitutional for divesting the courts of

the judicial power to determine just compensation in expropriation cases.

ISSUE

Whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was

not correctly applied.

HELD:

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort f

irst to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a contro

versy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the co

urts of justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a

cause of action,8 which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for

the dismissal of the complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to

invoke it operates as a waiver of the objection as a ground for a motion to dis

miss and the court may then proceed with the case as if the doctrine had been ob

served. One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of p

owers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of noninterference wit

h matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the

other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a b

etter position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and

that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by th

eir superiors if given a chance to do so. A no less important consideration is t

hat administrative decisions are usually questioned in the special civil actions

of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed only when there is n

o other plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may be

added that strict enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a co

nsiderable number of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily

loaded dockets.

As correctly suggested by the respondent court, however, there are a number of i

nstances when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly res

orted to immediately. Among these exceptional cases are: 1) when the question ra

ised is purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when th

e act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judici

al intervention: 5) when the claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage

will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;

8) when strong public interest is involved; 9) when the subject of the controver

sy is private land; and 10) in quo warranto proceedings.

In this case, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedy was not correc

tly applied. Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly requ

ire prior resort to administrative remedies, the reasons for the doctrine above

given, if nothing else, would suffice to still require its observance. Even if s

uch reasons were disregarded, there would still be the explicit language of pert

inent laws vesting in the DENR the power and function "to regulate the developme

nt, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the country's forests" and "

to exercise exclusive jurisdiction" in the "management and disposition of all la

nds of the public domain, and in the Forest Management Bureau (formerly the Bure
au of Forest Development) the responsibility for the enforcement of the forestry

laws and regulations" here claimed to have been violated. This comprehensive co

nferment clearly implies at the very least that the DENR should be allowed to ru

le in the first instance on any controversy coming under its express powers befo

re the courts of justice may intervene.

SAMAHANG MAGBUBUKID NG KAPDULA, INC vs. CA

March 25, 1999

305 SCRA 147

PURISIMA, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition for review for Certiorari of a decision of the Cour

t of Appeals.

FACTS

Macario Aro was the former owner of two (2) parcels of agricultural land

in Dasmarinas, Cavite and the members of petitioner Samahang Magbubukid Ng Kapd

ula, Inc. were the tenants thereon. Sometime in 1979, Mr. Aro sold the said parc

els of land to Arrow Head Golf Club, Inc., which was founded by Ricardo Silverio

who envisioned to establish a car assembly plant within the area. In the proces

s, the members of petitioner were evicted. But the establishment of a car assemb

ly plant in the place never materialized. The parcels of land in question were l

ater leased to the spouses Rodriguez for a term of seven (7) years and were the

n developed into a sugarcane plantation, with the herein private respondents as

the regular farmworkers.

The same property was acquired by the Philippine National Bank at a Sheriff's au

ction sale. The members of petitioner sought the assistance of the former Minist

ry of Agrarian Reform now Department of Agrarian Reform, through then Minister

Heherson Alvarez, for their reinstatement as farmworkers thereon, but nothing ca

me out of such efforts. The ownership of subject parcels of land was later trans

ferred to the Asset Privatization Trust which conveyed the same to the Republic

of the Philippines, represented by the DAR. In furtherance of its objective of

instituting agrarian reform in the country, the DAR issued Certificate of Land O

wnership ("CLOA") for the said parcels of land in favor of the petitioner.
ISSUE

1. Whether or not there was a need for the private respondents to exhaust admini

strative remedies before filing their petition for Certiorari with the CA.

2.Whether or not there was observance of due process by the DAR prior to the iss

uance of Certificate of Land Ownership in favor of petitioner

HELD:

1. From the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure, it can be gleaned that dec

isions of the DAR Secretary cannot be questioned before DARAB. Pertinent rules,

provide:

"SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform Ad

judication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, t

o determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matt

ers or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Refo

rm Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A,

Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree

No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.

Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to the foll

owing:

(c) Cases involving the annulment or cancellation of orders or decisions of DAR

officials other than the Secretary, lease contracts or deeds of sale or their am

endments under the administration and disposition of the DAR and LBP;" (Rule II,
DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure)

From the foregoing, it is decisively clear that DARAB may only entertain appeals

from decisions or orders of DAR officials other than the Secretary. It is also

irrefutable that the issuance of subject CLOAs constituted a decision of the Sec

retary, who issued and signed the same. Consequently, the propriety of the recou

rse by private respondents to the respondent court on a petition for certiorari,

to assail the issuance by the DAR of the CLOAs in question, is beyond cavil. Un

der Section 54 of RA 6657, decisions and awards of the DAR may be brought to the

Court of Appeals by certiorari. Time and again, this court has ruled that in ca

ses of denial of due process, exhaustion of available administrative remedies is

unnecessary. The aggrieved party may seek judicial relief outright.

2. Respondent court found that herein private respondents were denied the opport

unity to ventilate their stance before the DAR. But according to the petitioner,

during the investigation and conferences conducted on the question of inclusion

of subject properties in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the gover

nment, Mr. Ruben Rodriguez was notified of the same Records show, however, that

the letter which was supposed to be the notice to the private respondents regar

ding the inclusion of subject properties in the CARP, was ineffective. First of

all, the letter of Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer Serapio T. Magpayo to Mr.

Ruben Rodriguez indicates no receipt of the same by Mr. Rodriguez nor was it sig

ned by Mr. Magpayo. Secondly, if it was ever sent, it was sent too late, the sam

e being dated June 5, 1991, when the said parcels of land had already been award

ed to the members of petitioner. (The CLOAs under controversy were issued on Mar

ch 26, 1991.) Thirdly, the letter was addressed to Mr. Ruben Rodriguez, who no l

onger possessed the said properties as his lease thereover ended on July 8, 1990
.

There is thus a need for further hearings to determine the beneficiaries of subj

ect parcels of land. In such hearings, the private respondents, who were deprive

d of an opportunity to be heard before the DAR, should participate. This is in p

ursuance of the provisions of Section 40(4),17 in relation to Section 2218 of RA

6657, providing for the order or priority of the qualified beneficiaries of CAR

P.
Natividad Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals

February 23, 2000

GR NO.131641. 326 SCRA 338.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court

of Appeals.

FACTS

On 15 March 1985 Natividad Nazareno filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and

Damages against spouses Romeo and Eliza Nazareno. Natividad avers in her complai

nt that she is the sole and absolute owner of a parcel of land located in Naic,

Cavite, covered by TCT No. 51798 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite. Sometime in

April 1981 Natividad's brother, Romeo, and his wife Eliza convinced Natividad t

o lend them TCT No. 51798 to be used as collateral to a loan the proceeds of whi

ch would be used in the completion of the construction of the Naic Cinema on the

subject property. Natividad agreed on the condition that title to her property

would be returned within one (1) year from the completion of the construction of

the cinema. Accordingly, Natividad executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of

spouses Romeo and Eliza over the lot covered by TCT No. 51798. The sale, howeve

r, was simulated because Natividad did not receive any consideration therefor.

The cinema was completed in November 1981 but despite several demands by Nativid

ad, spouses Romeo and Eliza failed and refused to return Natividad's title to th

e property; instead, they had the property transferred in their name. Consequent

ly, TCT No. T-118276 was issued in their name in lieu of TCT No. 51798.

Spouses Romeo and Eliza denied that the property belonged to Natividad. On the c

ontrary, they averred that it originally formed part of the estate of the late M
aximino Nazareno, Jr., father of Romeo and Natividad. According to Romeo, the pr

operty was his share in their inheritance. As regards the deed of sale, he expla

ined that it was only resorted to for the purpose of carrying out and implementi

ng the transfer of the property forming part of the estate of Maximino Nazareno

Jr., the distribution of which was entrusted to Natividad.

The trial court found for the spouses Romeo and Eliza and ruled that although th

e Deed of Absolute Sale was simulated, the same could be treated as an adjudicat

ion and a conveyance to Romeo of his share in the estate of his father.

But the Court of Appeals ruled otherwise. It found that during pre-trial, the pa

rties stipulated that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Natividad and spouses Ro

meo and Eliza was simulated as there was in fact no money consideration. Consequ

ently, the burden of proof was shifted to Romeo to prove that the transfer was i

n reality a conveyance of his share in the estate of his father. But during tria

l, Romeo failed to prove this so-called conveyance of his share. On the other ha

nd, Natividad satisfactorily showed that the property was previously sold to her

by their late father. Romeo failed to disprove this fact. Neither did he succes

sfully cause the deed of sale executed by Maximino Nazareno Jr. in favor of Nati

vidad to be declared null and void. Resultingly, its authenticity and validity r

emained unrebutted.

In short, the Court of Appeals did not sustain the trial court and set aside its

Decision.

The case was brought to us on a Petition for Review on Certiorari but we denied

the petition after having ascertained that the appellate court committed no reve

rsible error. Thus, the Court of Appeals' decision became final and executory on

13 June 1996.
ISSUE

Whether or not there was a deprivation of property without due process o

f law.
RULING

A writ of execution must conform to the judgment to be executed; it may not vary

the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Nor may it go beyond the terms o

f the judgment sought to be executed. Where the execution is not in harmony with

the judgment which gives it life, and in fact exceeds it, it has pro tanto no v

alidity. To maintain otherwise would be to ignore the constitutional provision a

gainst depriving a person of his property without due process of law.

Adjudication of ownership necessarily includes delivery of possession. Indeed, i

t would be defeating the ends of justice should we require that for the parties

to obtain possession of the property duly adjudged to be theirs from those who h

ave no right to remain therein, they must submit to court litigations anew.2 An

exception however exists where the actual possessor has shown a valid right over

the property enforceable even against the owner thereof.

Execution not in harmony with the judgment has no validity. It must conform more

particularly to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the deci

sion, as the only portion of the decision that becomes the subject of execution.

Therefore, to issue a writ of possession in favor of petitioner. Moreover, it is

a settled rule that a writ of possession is improper to eject another from poss

ession unless sought in connection with (1) a land registration proceeding; (2)

an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property; (3) in a judicial foreclosure of

property provided that the mortgagor has possession and no third party has inter

vened; and (4) in execution sales.

It is an undisputed fact that this case is for the annulment of a private sale m

ade by petitioner to private respondent. This action is not a land registration

case nor a foreclosure of mortgage whether judicially or extrajudicially nor was

the subject property sold in execution. Petitioner sought for the issuance of a

writ of possession in connection with a decision in a civil action for annulmen

t of a private sale and damages.

Evidently, the decision of the Court of Appeals required no writ of possession a

s the writ of execution would suffice to place Natividad in possession of Lot 50

4-A-3. A case in point is Perez v. Evite7 wherein the lower court declared Evite

as owner of the disputed land. When the judgment became final and executory, Ev

ite moved for the issuance of a writ of execution which the trial court granted.

Perez moved to quash the writ arguing that the writ was at variance with the de

cision as the decision sought to be executed merely declared Evite owner of the

property and did not order its delivery to him. Perez argued citing the cases of

Jabon v. Alo8 and Talens v. Garcia9 which held that adjudication of ownership o

f the land did not include possession thereof. In resolving in favor of Evite th

is Court held -

Considering that herein plaintiff-appellants have no other claim to possession o

f the property apart from their claim of ownership which was rejected by the low

er court and, consequently, has no right to remain thereon after such ownership

was adjudged to defendant-appellees, the delivery of possession of the land shou

ld be considered included in the decision. Indeed, it would be defeating the end

s of justice should we require that for herein appellees to obtain possession of

the property duly adjudged to be theirs, from those who have no right to remain

therein, they must submit to court litigations anew.

In the instant case, spouses Romeo and Eliza could not use Jabon v. Alo and Tale

ns v. Garcia to support their contention that the adjudication of ownership over

the land does not necessarily include possession. As already decreed in Perez v
. Evite -

It may be observed that in both decisions (Jabon v. Alo and Talens v. Garcia), t

his Court underscored the possibility that the actual possessor has some rights

which must be respected and defined. It is thus evident that the pronouncement w

as made having in mind cases wherein the actual possessor has a valid right over

the property enforceable even against the owner thereof. As example, we gave th

e cases of tenants and lessees. However, it is our view that that above doctrine

may not be invoked in instances where no such right may be appreciated in favor

of the possessor. In the instant case there appears in the appealed order of Ju

ne 30, 1959, the specific finding of the trial court that "the plaintiffs have n
ot given any reason why they are retaining the possession of the property" x x x

x This factual finding cannot be reviewed in this instance as the appeal has be

en taken to us directly on a question of law x x x x

The same ruling would apply in the instant case. The Court of Appeals categorica

lly declared that the claim of spouses Romeo and Eliza over the disputed lot has

utterly no factual basis. Therefore, they have no reason to remain in possessio

n of the property.

But the same could not be said of the Naic Cinema. The matter of ownership and p

ossession of the Naic Cinema was never put in issue. Consequently, petitioner ca

nnot ask for a writ of possession to place her in physical occupancy of the Naic

Cinema. Being declared owner of subject lot does not also mean that she is auto

matically entitled to possession of all the improvements therein. Otherwise, the

actual possessor would be deprived of his property without due process of law.

Finally, petitioner cannot validly claim possession over the Naic Cinema since i

n her complaint and subsequent pleadings, she has admitted not being the owner t

hereof. On the contrary, she claims that the Naic Cinema belongs to the estate o

f her father. On the other hand, respondent spouses have asserted dominion over

the Naic Cinema. Plainly, petitioner cannot wrest possession of the moviehouse f

rom respondent spouses through a mere writ of possession as she herself even dis

claims being the owner thereof. Ownership over the Naic Cinema must be threshed

out in a proper proceeding. A mere prayer for the issuance of a writ of possessi

on will not suffice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals denying

the issuance of a writ of possession is AFFIRMED.

UP BOARD OF REGENTS vs. RASUL

August 16, 1991

G.R. No. 91551. 200 SCRA 685

GANCAYCO, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition to review the decision and order of RTC Pasig, Mani

la.

FACTS

Estrella was appointed as PGH Director. After several weeks, the new UP Preside

nt recommended the reorganization of the PGH and renaming it as UP-PGH Medical C

enter. The Board affirmed the recommendation and declared all seats in the form

er PGH, including that of Estrella, as vacant. Estrella filed an Injunction of

for the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) alleging that he enjoys se

curity of tenure. UP Board argues that it has the power to abolish the position

of PGH Director held by Estrella and that there was a valid reorganization cond

ucted by it.

ISSUE€

Whether or not respondent Dr. Felipe A. Estrella who holds the position of Direc

tor of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) can invoke security of tenure durin

g his term of office notwithstanding the abolition of the said position by the U

niversity of the Philippine Board of Regents.

€
RULING
1.)€€€ As the PGH Director and UP-PGH Medical Director s functions are one and the same,

the abolishing of the former position is not and abolishment, bona fide, agains

t Estrella but only a renaming of office.

2.)€€€ Estrella is protected by the security of tenure by virtue of his appointment.

Hence, the purported reorganization is not valid. The Dario V. Mison doctrine i

s affirmed.

3.)€€€ Assuming there was an abolition, the charter at UP does not grant its power to

abolish but only to merge colleges and departments.

REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN

January 20, 1999.

G.R. No. 123997. 301 SCRA 237.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari, Prohi

bition and Mandamus.€

FACTS

The Republic against Balbanero filed a forfeiture of alleged unexplained wealth

over the amount of ten (10) Million. By reconciliation of records, it was decre

ased into Php165,043.00 to which Balbanero likewise presented appointing documen

ts. He made several motions with the Sandiganbayan for the dismissal of the cas
e and the cancellation or suspension of scheduled hearings for the presentation

of Republic s evidence. The same were all denied by the sandiganbayan. Come hear

ing date, the Republic through the ASGs however were not prepared due to flimsy

excuses of substitution and re-alignment of prosecutors. Republic moves for the

re-schedule of hearing but the Sandiganbayan ordered them to file formal offer

of evidence. Republic contends that it will be deprive of due process by the or

der of the court.

ISSUE

Whether or not there was deprivation of due process.

RULING

Order for filing of formal offer of evidence affirmed. The counsel of the Repub

lic should have prepared with due diligence the cause of its client and not unre

asonably request for postponement of hearings cause at which is due to its own n

egligence.

Under the circumstances, it cannot rightly be said that the OSG was not guilty o

f inexcusable carelessness, presumptiousness, indifference to and neglect of dut

y in assuming that public respondent would grant its oral motion for postponemen

t, coming to court unprepared and without a witness. Hence public respondent was

well within its authority to deny the Republic's oral motion for postponement o

f the hearings set on 19 and 20 October 1995 and require it, instead, to just fo

rmally offer its evidence within fifteen (15) days from notice. Petitioner is no

t guilty of abuse of discretion, much less grave, nor can it be charged by petit

ioner with denial of due process.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is DENI

ED.
GABRITO vs. Court of Appeals

November 24, 1988

G.R. No. 77976.167 SCRA 623.

BIDIN, J.:
Nature of the Case: Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction €to review

the order of the Court of Appeals. Campos, J.

FACTS

Tanâs predecessor applied for a sales application over a parcel of land and had it

leased by Gabrito. Tan later on acquired the land and when he decided to use t

he land for their personal use, demanded its return from Gabrito, although the o

riginal sales application is pending approval. Gabrito failed to heed the deman

d and later on filed a sales application for the same with the Bureau of Lands a

nd praying for annulment of sales application of Tanâ s predecessor. Tan filed a co

mplaint for unlawful detainer against Gabrito and was sustained by the MTC, the

RTC and the CA. Later, Gabrito s application was granted and the prior sales appl

ication of Tana s predecessor was cancelled but Tan filed an appeal of the same wi

th the DENR.

ISSUE

Gabrito interpose the issue of ownership as to the unlawful detainer case.€

RULING€

The issue in unlawful detainer is the possession and the issue with the Bureau o

f Lands is for ownership; although the law grants the Administrative Agency the

power to decide issue on ownership, it does not deprive courts the power to deci

de issue of possession.

The application of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as a c

ondition precedent to the filing of a juridical action is confined to controvers

ies arising out of the dispositive of public lands (Geukoko vs. Araneta, 102 Ph

il. 706 (1957); Marukot vs. Jacinto, 98 Phil. 128 (1957), alienation of public l

ands (Rallos vs. Ruiz, Jr., supra) or to the determination of the respective rig
hts of rival claimants to public lands (Pitarque vs. Sorilla, supra) and not to

possessory actions involving public lands which are limited to the determination

of who has the actual, physical possession or occupation of the land in questio

n (Rallos vs. Ruiz, Jr., supra)."

In fact, the Bureau of Lands in its decision of June 7, 1987, admitted the juris

diction of the courts to decide the case on the question of physical possession,

although not on the question of ownership (Rollo, p. 179).

Under the circumstances, a careful study of the records failed to show any cogen

t reason to disturb the findings of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities; of the

Regional Trial Court, both of Olongapo City and finally of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is Affirmed and the tempo

rary restraining order is lifted. Costs against petitioners.

Sabello vs. DECS

December 26, 1989

G.R. No. 87687. 180 SCRA 623

GANCAYCO, J:

Nature of the Case: Petition for review the decision of the Secretary of Departm

ent of Education, Culture and Sports.

FACTS

Petitioner, was the Elementary School Principal of Talisay and also the Assistan

t Principal of the Talisay Barangay High School of the Division of Gingoog City.

The barangay high school was in deficit at that time due to the fact that the s

tudents could hardly pay for their monthly tuition fees. Since at that time also

, the President of the Philippines who was earnestly campaining was giving aid i

n the amount of P 2,000.00 for each barrio, the barrio council through proper re

solutions alloted the amount of P 840.00 to cover up for the salaries of the hig

h school teachers, with the honest thought in mind that the barrio high school w

as a barrio project and as such therefore, was entitled to its share of the RICD

fund in question.

The only part that the herein petitioner played was his being authorized

by the said barrio council to withdraw the above amount and which was subsequen

tly deposited in the City Treasurer's Office in the name of the Talisay Barrio H

igh School. That was a grave error on the part of the herein petitioner as it in

volves the very intricacies in the disbursement of government funds and of its t

echnicalities. Thus, the herein petitioner, together with the barrio captain, we

re charged of the violation of Republic Act 3019, and both were convicted to suf

fer a sentence of one year and disqualification to hold public office.

 The herein petitioner appealed his case to the Court of appeals, Manila.

The Court of appeals modified the decision by eliminating the subsidiary impriso

nment in case of insolvency in the payment of one-half of the amount being invol

ved. The herein petitioner, being financially battered, could no longer hire a l

awyer to proceed to the highest court of the land.

Finally, the herein petitioner was granted an ABSOLUTE PARDON by the President o

f the Republic of the Philippines, restoring him to 'full civil and political ri

ghts.' With this instrument on hand, the herein petitioner applied for reinstate

ment to the government service, only to be reinstated to the wrong position of a

mere classroom teacher and not to his former position as Elementary School Prin

cipal I.

ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner merits reappointment to the position he held prior to

his conviction that of Elementary Principal I.

RULING

There is here a justiciable controversy. Petitioner claims he must be restored t

o the same position he was in before he was convicted on a mere technical erro

r and for which he was given an absolute pardon.

This is not a hypothetical or abstract dispute. It is not academic or moot for,

to our mind, there is a definite and concrete controversy touching the legal rel

ations of parties having adverse legal relations. This is a real and substantial

controversy admitting of specific relief through a court decree that is conclus

ive in character. The case does not call for a mere opinion or advise, but for a

ffirmative relief .

As a general rule, the question of whether or not petitioner should be reappoint

ed to his former position is a matter of discretion of the appointing authority,

but under the circumstances of this case, if the petitioner had been unfairly d

eprived of' what is rightfully his, the discretion is qualified by the requireme

nts of giving justice to the petitioner. It is no longer a matter of discretion

on the part of the appointing power, but discretion tempered with fairness and j

ustice.

As to the argument that the Department of Education, Culture and Sports cannot b

e sued, the only answer is that its officials can be sued for alleged grave erro

rs in their official acts. Again, We ignore technicality by considering this a s

uit against the officials of this government agency.

Taking into consideration that this petition is filed by a non-lawyer, who claim

s that poverty denies him the services of a lawyer, We also set aside the requir
ement of exhaustion of administrative remedies and resolved to go direct to the

merits of the petition.

In Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., 3 this Court held that the absolute disqualificat

ion from office or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment

prescribed under the penal code and that pardon frees the individual from all t

he penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. Al

though such pardon restores his eligibility to a public office it does not entit

le him to automatic reinstatement. He should apply for reappointment to said off

ice.

In the present case after his absolute pardon, petitioner was reinstated to the

service as a classroom teacher by the Department of Education, Culture and Sport

s.

As there are no circumstances that would warrant the diminution in his rank, jus

tice and equity dictate that he be returned to his former position of Elementary

School Principal I and not to that of a mere classroom teacher.

However, the Court cannot grant his prayer for backwages from September 1, 1971

to November 23, 1982 since in Monsanto 4 this Court said he is not entitled to a

utomatic reinstatement. Petitioner was lawfully separated from the government se

rvice upon his conviction for an offense. Thus, although his reinstatement had b

een duly authorized, it did not thereby entitle him to backwages. Such right is

afforded only to those who have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered r

einstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charge against them.

In the same light, the Court cannot decree that his government service be made c

ontinuous from September 10, 1948 to the present when it is not. At any rate whe

n he reaches the compulsory age of retirement, he shall get the appropriate reti
rement benefits as an Elementary School Principal I and not as a mere classroom

teacher.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in that the Secretary of the Department of Ed

ucation, Culture and Sports and/or his duly authorized representative is hereby

directed to appoint petitioner to the position of Elementary School Principal I

or it equivalent, without pronouncement as to cost. This decision is immediately

executory.

RULLAN vs. VALDEZ

November 28, 1964

G.R. No. L-20031. 12 SCRA 501

DE VEYRA, J.:

Nature of the Case: Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Bagui

o City.

FACTS

Rullan and Valdez are members of Baguio Loakan Placer Mining Association (BLPMA

) at which Valdez owes 40% interest. BLPMA has located and grabbed mining clai

ms at Morning Glory and Silica. Unknown to his co-members, Valdez decreased the

protion at Silica and included the excluded portion to his lease application fo

r Selecta Placer claim. Rullan filed and adverse claim against the same lease a

pplication, pending due course at the adverse claim, Rullan filed an action with

the CFI for the recognition of BLPMA/Rullan s rights over the excluded portion.

Defendant Valdez moved for its dismissal for lack of sufficient allegation of ri
ghts but was denied, on Motion for Reconsideration, Valdez argued that CFI has n

o jurisdiction yet on the action as to the adverse claim in the lease applicatio

n has yet to be given course by Director of Mines. CFI dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE

Is the action on the adverse claim a condition sine qua non for the filing of cl

aim in court?

RULING

No. Section 73 of CA 137 prescribes that the adverse claimants must file their c

laim in the Bureau of Mines and thereafter file an action with the proper court

within twenty (20) days from such filing at adverse claim. The filing in court
stays the application.

The law applicable to the issue before us is Section 73 of Commonwealth

Act No. 137, as amended by Republic Act No. 745, which we quote:

"Sec. 73. At any time during the period of application, any adverse claim may be

filed under oath with the Director of Mines. and shall state in full detail the

nature, boundaries, and extent of the adverse claim, and shall be accompanied b

y all plans, documents, and agreements upon which such adverse claim is based: *

* * Upon the filing of any adverse claim all proceedings except the making and

filing of the affidavit in connection therewith, as herein prescribed, shall be

stayed until the controversy shall have been settled or decided by a court of co

mpetent jurisdiction, or the adverse claim waived. It shall be the duty of the a

dverse claimant, within thirty days after filing his claim, to commence proceedi

ngs in a court of competent jurisdiction to deter. mine the controversy and to p

rosecute the same with reasonable diligence to final judgment, and a failure to

do so shall be considered as a waiver of his adverse claim.

The above statutory provision prescribes the method by which a person h

aving an adverse claim to a certain mineral land can have his day in court. If h

e fails to file an adverse claim within the time therein provided for or fails t

o commence the proceeding within the statutory period, his claim is deemed waive

d. Any person who has an adverse interest in the whole or to a portion of the su

rface of a mining claim for which a lease is applied for by another may file an

adverse claim which must state in full the nature, boundaries and extent thereof

, to be accompanied by the necessary plans, documents and greomonts upon which t

he issue is based. The filing of said adverse claim produces the effect of stayi

ng all the proceedings on the application filed with the Bureau of Mines, except
only in relation to the publication and proof of notice, until the controversy

shall have been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. Since then the fun

ctions of the Bureau of Mines are suspended to, await the action of the court.

This is the situation herein obtained. After plaintiffs had filed their adverse

claim with the Bureau of Mines with regard to the lease application of certai

n mining claims filed by defendant, they at the same time commenced the present

action wherein they squarely brought to the fore the issue of ownership over the

mining claim controverted. The question, therefore, comes well within the juris

diction of the court a quo regardless of whether the action of the Director of M

ines on the adverse claim filed in his office is still pending. This is the reve

rse situation of a case involving the ownership of a portion of public land wher

ein exhaustion of administrative remedies is required, for here the law is speci

fic that the question of ownership affecting an adverse claim must first be dete

rmined by the competent court before administrative action could proceed to its

termination. It is, therefore, error for the court a quo to dismiss the complain

t on the ground that plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies

before coming to court. The situation obtained herein is just the contrary.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside. This case should be

remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. Costs against appellee.

DIZON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

October 9, 1997

GRN 113447. 280 SCRA 400

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court
of Appeals.

Facts

"At about 2: 10 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, policemen f

rom the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Station were conducting

a surveillance along A. Mabini Street, Kalookan City, in front of the Kalookan C

ity Cemetery. The policemen were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas and

a driver named Arnold Enriquez AasdrivingaTarnaraw vehicle which was the officia

l car of the Police Station of Kalookan City. The surveillance was being made be

cause of information that drug addicts were roaming the area in front of' the Ka

lookan City Cemetery.

Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from th

eir vehicle. They then chanced Upon a male person in front of the cemetery who a

ppeared high on drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish eyes and to

be walking in a swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the police

men, the latter approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The

policemen then asked the male person what he was holding in his hands. The male

person tried to resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could s

ee what said male person had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allo

wed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and e

xamined it. He found Suspected Crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wal

let and its marijuana contents.

The male person was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalo

okan City Police Headquarters Lind was turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong fo

r investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned over to Cpl. Tamondong the confiscate

d wallet and its suspected marijuana contents. The man turned out to be the accu

sed ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON.

Upon receipt of the confiscated suspected marijuana residue from Pat, Es

piritu, Cpl. Tamondong wrapped the same with a white sheet of paper on which he
wrote 'Evidence 'A' 4/11/88 Alain Manalili.' The white sheet of paper was marked

as Exhibit 'E-3'. The residue was originally wrapped in a smaller sheet of fold

ed paper. (Exhibit 'E-4').

Cpl. Tamondong next prepared a referral slip addressed to the NBI Forens

ic Chemistry Section requesting a chemical analysis of the subject marijuana res

idue (Exhibit 'D'). Cpl. Tamondong thereafter prepared a Joint Affidavit of the

apprehending policemen (Exhibit 'A'). Pat. Angel Lumabas handcarried the referra

l slip (Exhibit 'D') to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), including th

e subject marijuana residue for chemical analysis. The signature of Pat. Lumabas

appears on the left bottom corner of Exhibit 'D'.

The Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI received the aforesaid referra

l slip and the subject marijuana residue at 7:40 o'clock in the evening of April

11, 1988 as shown on the stamped portion of Exhibit 'D'.

It was NBI Aida Pascual who conducted the microscopic and chemical exami

nations of the specimen which she identified. (Exhibit 'E')13 Mrs. Pascual refer

red to the subject specimen as 'crushed marijuana leaves' in her Certification d

ated April 11, 1988 (Exhibit 'F').14 These crushed marijuana leaves gave positiv

e results for marijuana, according to the Certificate.

Mrs. Pascual also conducted a chromatographic examination of the specime

n. In this examination, she also found that the 'crushed marijuana leaves' gave

positive results for marijuana. She then prepared a Final Report of her examinat

ions (Exhibit 'G'), After conducting the examinations, Ms. Pascual placed the sp

ecimen in a white letter-envelope and sealed it. (Exhibit 'E'). She then wrote i

dentification notes on this letter-envelope. (Exhibit 'E-1').

Pat. Lumabas carried the Certification marked as Exhibit 'F' from the NB
I Forensic Chemistry Section to Cpl. Tamondong. Upon receipt thereof, Cpl. Tamon

dong prepared a referral slip addressed to the City Fiscal of Kalookan City. (Ex
hibit 'C')

On rebuttal, Pat. Espiritu testified that appellant was not riding a tri

cycle but was walking in front of the cemetery when he was apprehended.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the conviction of

(the) accused (and) in Ruling that the guilt of the accused had been proved (be

yond) reasonable doubt.

RULING

The petition has no merit.

The search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the landmark ca

se of Terry vs. Ohio,18 a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designati

on of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate

him, and pat him for weapons.

In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed duri

ng their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk

along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information was a po

pular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the AntiNarcot

ics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristi

c of drug addicts who were "high." The policemen therefore had sufficient reason

to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such

investigation, they found marijuana in petitioner's possession.

Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor General's contention that peti

tioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained

when he failed to raise this issue or to object thereto during the trial. A val
id waiver of a right, more particularly of the constitutional right against unre

asonable search, requires the concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the

right to be waived existed; (2) the person waiving it had knowledge, actual or

constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had an actual intention to relinquish t

he right. Otherwise, the Courts will indulge every reasonable presumption agains

t waiver of fundamental safeguards and will not deduce acquiescence from the fai

lure to exercise this elementary right. In the present case, however, petitioner

is deemed to have waived such right for his failure to raise its violation befo

re the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as distinguished from an ordinar

y appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review, the appeal

is generally limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Issues not raised be

low cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFIC

ATION.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUBEN MONTILLA

January 30, 1998.

GRN 123872 . 285 SCRA 703

REGALADO, J.

Nature of the Case: Appeal from a judgment of the RTC DasmariÔas, Cavite, Br.90

FACTS

That on or about the 20th day of June 1994, at Barangay Salitran, Municipality o

f Dasmariñas, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this

Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then

and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, administer, transport, and del

iver twenty-eight (28) kilos of dried marijuana leaves, which are considered pro

hibited drugs, in violation of the provisions of R.A. 6425 thereby causing damag

e and prejudice to the public interest.

The consequent arraignment conducted on September 14, 1994 elicited a plea of no

t guilty from appellant who was assisted therein by his counsel de parte. Trial

was held on scheduled dates thereafter, which culminated in a verdict of guilty

in a decision of the trial court dated June 8, 1995 and which imposed the extrem

e penalty of death on appellant. He was further ordered to pay a fine in the amo

unt of P500,000.00 and to pay the costs of the proceedings.

It appears from the evidence of the prosecution that appellant was apprehended a

t around 4:00 A.M. of June 20, 1994 near a waiting shed located at Barangay Sali

tran, Dasmariñas, Cavite by SPO1 Concordio Talingting and SPO1 Armando Clarin, bot

h members of the Cavite Philippine National Police Command based in Dasmariñas. Ap

pellant, according to the two officers, was caught transporting 28 marijuana bri

cks contained in a traveling bag and a carton box, which marijuana bricks had a

total weight of 28 kilos.

These two officers later asserted in court that they were aided by an informer i

n the arrest of appellant. That informer, according to Talingting and Clarin, ha

d informed them the day before, or on June 19, 1994 at about 2:00 P.M., that a d

rug courier, whom said informer could recognize, would be arriving somewhere in

Barangay Salitran, Dasmariñas from Baguio City with an undetermined amount of mari

juana. It was the same informer who pinpointed to the arresting officers the app

ellant when the latter alighted from a passenger jeepney on the aforestated day,

hour, and place.

Upon the other hand, appellant disavowed ownership of the prohibited drugs. He c

laimed during the trial that while he indeed came all the way from Baguio City,

he traveled to Dasmariñas, Cavite with only some pocket money and without any lugg

age. His sole purpose in going there was to look up his cousin who had earlier o

ffered a prospective job at a garment factory in said locality, after which he w

ould return to Baguio City. He never got around to doing so as he was accosted b

y SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin at Barangay Salitran.

He further averred that when he was interrogated at a house in Dasmariñas, Cavite,

he was never informed of his constitutional rights and was in fact even robbed

of the P500.00 which he had with him. Melita Adaci, the cousin, corroborated app

ellant's testimony about the job offer in the garment factory where she reported

ly worked as a supervisor, although, as the trial court observed, she never pres

ented any document to prove her alleged employment.

ISSUE

Whether or not the search warrant is valid?

RULING

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a sea

rch and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial war

rant, absent which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the mea
ning of said constitutional provision. Evidence secured on the occasion of such

an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being t

he proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law,

it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. This ex

clusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. Thus, (1) c

ustoms searches; (2) searches of moving vehicles, (3) seizure of evidence in pl

ain view; (4) consented searches; (5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;

and (6) "stop and frisk" measures 18 have been invariably recognized as the tra

ditional exceptions.

A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the a

rresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offe

nder (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commi

ssion of an offense. On the other hand, the apprehending officer must have been

spurred by probable cause in effecting an arrest which could be classified as o

ne in cadence with the instances of permissible arrests set out in Section 5(a).

These instances have been applied to arrests carried out on persons caught in

flagrante delicto. The conventional view is that probable cause, while largely a

relative term the determination of which must be resolved according to the fact

s of each case, is understood as having reference to such facts and circumstance

s which could lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe and conclu

de as to the commission of an offense, and that the objects sought in connection

with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

In the case at bar, as soon as appellant had alighted from the passenger jeepney

the informer at once indicated to the officers that their suspect was at hand b
y pointing to him from the waiting shed. SPO1 Clarin recounted that the informer

told them that the marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling bag and car

ton box which appellant was carrying at the time. The officers thus realized tha

t he was their man even if he was simply carrying a seemingly innocent looking p

air of luggage for personal effects. Accordingly, they approached appellant, int

roduced themselves as policemen, and requested him to open and show them the con

tents of the traveling bag, which appellant voluntarily and readily did. Upon cu

rsory inspection by SPO1 Clarin, the bag yielded the prohibited drugs, so, witho

ut bothering to further search the box, they brought appellant and his luggage t

o their headquarters for questioning.

Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at

the point prior to the search, were already constitutive of probable cause, and

which by themselves could properly create in the minds of the officers a well-gr

ounded and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the law.

The search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality tha

t appellant was then actually committing a crime by illegally transporting prohi

bited drugs. With these attendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was ca

ught in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the search of his belongings wit

hout the requisite warrant were both justified.

Furthermore, that appellant also consented to the search is borne out by the evi

dence. To repeat, when the officers approached appellant and introduced themselv

es as policemen, they asked him about the contents of his luggage, and after he

replied that they contained personal effects, the officers asked him to open the

traveling bag. Appellant readily acceded, presumably or in all likelihood resig

ned to the fact that the law had caught up with his criminal activities. When an
individual voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have the same conduct

ed upon his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof.

It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the law itself provides a specific

penalty where the violation thereof is in its aggravated form as laid down in th

e second paragraph of Section 4 whereby, regardless of Section 20 of Article IV,

if the victim is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense i

n said section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maxi

mum penalty shall be imposed. 32 While the minority or the death of the victim w

ill increase the liability of the offender, these two facts do not constitute ge

neric aggravating circumstances, as the law simply provides for the imposition o

f the single indivisible penalty of death if the offense is attended by either o

f such factual features. In that situation, obviously the rules on the graduatio

n of penalties in Article 63 cannot apply. In herein appellant's case, there was

neither a minor victim nor a consequent death of any victim. Hence, the basic r

ules in Article 63 of the Code govern.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of Dasmariñas, Cav

ite in Criminal Case No. 3401-94 is hereby MODIFIED in the sense that accused-ap

pellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, with

costs against accused-appellant.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. OSCAR L. LEVISTE

March 28, 1996

GRN 104386. 255 SCRA 238

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Nature of the Case: Special action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

FACTS
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by t

he Solicitor General to set aside the order of the respondent Judge dismissing C

riminal Case No. Q-91-17782, on the ground that the prosecution was not prepared

for the first scheduled hearing of the case due to the non-availability of its

witness who was out of town on official business.

"That on or about the 10th day of April 1990, in Quezon City, Philippines and wi
thin the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with mal

icious intent of impeaching the honesty, virtue and reputation of one DEMOCRITO

T. MENDOZA, a well-known labor leader in Cebu and with the malicious intent of i

njuring and exposing said Democrito T. Mendoza to public hatred, contempt and ri

dicule, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously caused (sic) to

be published in Sun Star Daily, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philip

pines based in Cebu City an article.

On May 3, 1991, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. Trial of Crimin

al Case No. Q91-17782 was scheduled for July 29, 1991.2

Three days before said scheduled hearing or on July 26, 199 1, private prosecuto

r Amado A. Caballero filed an urgent motion for postponement,3 citing as ground

therefor, the fact that the complainant, Atty. Democrito T. Mendoza, "would stil

l be out of town during said date for the reason that he would be in Cebu City t

o attend to the strike of some workers in some firms in Cebu City and his person

al presence thereat is very necessary." Since said witness "would be out of the

country during the month of August 1991 to attend to some official transaction

relative to the International Labor Movement" and would be back during the first

week of September 1991, private prosecutor prayed that the scheduled hearing be

reset to a later day, preferably on September 9 or 13, 1991 at 8:30 a.m. Only t

he City Prosecutor of Quezon City was furnished a copy of this motion.

Also on July 26, 1991, private respondent, through Atty. Lorenda Estrella-Amion

of the Public Attorney's Office, filed a motion to dismiss the case on the groun

d that the facts charged in the Information do not constitute an offense.4 Invok

ing Kunkle vs. Cablenews-American and Lyons5 holding it not sufficient that the

offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed but that a t
hird person must be able to identify the complainant as the object of the libelo

us publication, private respondent claimed that the Information did not identify

the person allegedly alluded to in the article and neither did it state that a

third person could identify said Democrito T. Mendoza as the object thereof. Pri

vate respondent stressed that he did not write the article nor cause its publica

tion, and never had the intention to publish the same. The Office of the City Pr

osecutor was duly served a copy of this motion.

On July 29, 1991, the day of the scheduled hearing, private prosecutor manifeste

d in open court that he had filed an urgent motion for postponement, and moved f

or the cancellation of hearing for that day due to the unavailability of the pro

secution witness.

The public prosecutor did not object to the postponement. On the other hand, the

defense manifested that it had filed a motion to dismiss. The respondent Judge

then issued in open court the following Order6 now being assailed:

The private prosecutor filed an urgent motion for the reconsideration of said Or

der, stating that the prosecution had no opportunity to file an objection to the

motion to dismiss as it was served a copy thereof only on the day of hearing it

self. He insisted that the court should have considered as valid the reason for

the absence of the prosecution's principal witness, as his presence in Cebu City

was duly certified to by the Officer-in-Charge of the National Conciliation and

Mediation Board.

On August 7, 1991, the trial court gave the defense five (5) days from notice wi

thin which "to file a comment to the motion for reconsideration furnishing copy

to the opposing counsel who shall have five (5) days to file a reply, after whi

ch the matter shall be deemed submitted .

ISSUES:

Whether or not the grant of the prosecution's motion for postponement have viola
ted the accused's right to a speedy trial

Whether or not would the reversal of the trial court's assailed Orders place th

e accused in double jeopardy?

RULING

To be perfectly clear, we restate the general rule: motions for postponement are

granted only upon meritorious grounds and no party has the right to assume that

his motion will be granted. The grant or denial of a motion for postponement is

addressed to "the sound discretion of the court, (which) should always be predi

cated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts or

of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness should be served th

ereby. After all, postponements and continuances are part and parcel of our proc

edural system of dispensing justice."15 Thus, when no substantial rights are aff

ected and the intention to delay is not manifest, the corresponding motion to tr

ansfer the hearing having been filed accordingly, it is sound judicial discretio

n to allow the same to the end that the merits of the case may be fully ventilat

ed. Unless grave abuse of discretion is shown, such discretion will not be inter

fered with either by mandamus or appeal.

While it is true that any motion that does not comply with the requirements of R

ule 15 should not be accepted for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to judic

ial cognizance,17 this Court has likewise held that where a rigid application o

f the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technica

lities may be disregarded in order to resolve the case. Litigations should, as m

uch as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. As this Co

urt held in Galvez vs. Court of Appeals "an order of the court granting the mot
ion to dismiss despite the absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service t

hereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings x x x (which) cannot depriv

e a competent court of jurisdiction over the case."

In the case at bench, the postponement of the July 29, 1991 hearing was the very

first one ever requested by the private prosecutor. And it was for a valid reas

on: the principal prosecution witness, a labor lawyer, had to be in Cebu City to

attend a conciliation meeting concerning a strike/picket. Such reason is likewi

se easily verifiable, and as already mentioned, was in fact certified to in writ

ing by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board's officerin-charge in Cebu

City. There being no showing that any substantial right of the accused would hav

e been unduly prejudiced by the postponement, respondent Judge should have grant

ed the motion to afford the prosecution a fair opportunity to prosecute its case

. As it is, his precipitate dismissal of the case is tantamount to denying the S

tate due process. In People vs. Navarro20 this Court held that:

The right of an accused to speedy trial is not violated by the mere postponement

of scheduled hearings of the case. Unjustified postponements which prolong the

trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accuse

d to speedy trial. The right to speedy trial allows reasonable continuance so as

not to deprive the prosecution its day in court.21 As held in Gonzales vs. Sand

iganbayan:

x x x (T)he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy tr

ial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capri

cious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of trial are ask
ed for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of

time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally appl

icable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been deni

ed his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matte

r, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, a
nd such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant's as

sertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting

from the delay, are considered."

Anent private respondent's claim that a reopening of the case would place him in

double jeopardy, this Court previously ruled in Tampal that:

"x x x The three (3) requisites of double jeopardy are: (1) a first jeopardy mus

t have attached prior to the second, (2) the first jeopardy must have been valid

ly terminated, and (3) a second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that of

the first. Legal jeopardy attached only: (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) befor

e a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been enter

ed, and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismi

ssed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. (italic

s supplied)

In the instant case, the termination of the case was precisely sought by accused

(private respondent) through his motion to dismiss.

In any event, private respondent's right to speedy trial not having been violate

d, he cannot invoke the right against double jeopardy:

"It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal o

f cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that

would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be s

tressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of th

e accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at ben

ch considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not

been violated by the State. For this reason, private respondents cannot invoke

their right against double jeopardy."23 (italics supplied)

In sum, it must be emphasized that the state, like any other litigant, is entit

led to its day in court, and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case. A

hasty dismissal such as the one in question, instead of unclogging dockets, has

actually increased the workload of the justice system -as a whole and caused unc

alled for delays in the final resolution of this and other cases. Unwittingly, t

he precipitate action of the respondent court, instead of easing the burden of t

he accused, merely prolonged the litigation and ironically enough, unnecessarily

delayed the case - in the process, causing the very evil it apparently sought t

o avoid. Such action does not inspire public confidence in the administration of

justice.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, The Order of J

uly 29, 1991 as well as the Order of November 5, 1991 dismissing Criminal Case N

o. Q-91-17782 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The respondent Judge is ordered

to proceed with the trial and resolution of the case with judicious and deliber

ate dispatch, with a stern warning to avoid similar unjustified and unwarranted

dismissals in the future.

Malaluan vs. COMELEC

March 6, 1996

G.R. 120193. 254 SCRA 397

HERMOSISIMA, Jr.:

Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

FACTS

Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private respondent Joseph Evangelista were both may

oralty candidates in the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, in the Synch

ronized National and Local Elections held on May 11, 1992. Private respondent Jo

seph Evangelista was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly

elected Mayor.

On May 22, 1992, petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Co

urt contesting 64 out of the total 181 precincts of the said municipality. The t

rial court declared petitioner as the duly elected municipal mayor of Kidapawan,

North Cotabato with a plurality of 154 votes. Acting without precedent, the cou

rt found private respondent liable not only for Malaluan s protest expenses but al

so for moral and exemplary damages and attorney s fees. On February 3, 1994, priva

te respondent appealed the trial court decision to the COMELEC. on February 4, 1

994, petitioner filed a motion for execution pending appeal. The motion was gran

ted by the trial court.

By virtue of said order, petitioner assumed the office of MunicipaJ Mayor of Kid

apawan, North Cotabato, and exercised the powers and functions of said office. S

uch exercise was not for long, though. In the herein assailed decision adverse t

o Malaluan s continued governance of the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato

, the First Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ordered Malaluan t

o vacate the office, said division having found and so declared private responde

nt to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor of said municipality. The COMELEC en b

anc affirmed said decision. Malaluan filed this petition before us on May 31, 19

95 as a consequence.

ISSUE

Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in awarding the aforeci

ted damages in favor of private respondent.

RULING

YES. The COMELEC found the election protest filed by the petitioner to be clearl

y unfounded because its own appreciation of the contested ballots yielded result

s contrary to those of the trial court. Assuming, ex gratia argumentis, that thi

s is a reasonable observation not without basis, it is nonetheless fallacious to

conclude a malicious intention on the part of petitioner to molest private resp

ondent on the basis of what respondent COMELEC perceived as an erroneous ruling

of the trial court. In other words, the actuations of the trial court, after the
filing of a case before it, are its own, and any alleged error on its part does

not, in the absence of clear proof, make the suit clearly unfounded for which the

complainant ought to be penalized. Insofar as the award of protest expenses and

attorney s fees are concerned, therefore we find them to have been awarded by res

pondent COMELEC without basis, the election protest not having been a clearly un

founded one under the aforementioned circumstances.

It is significant to note that the term of office of the local officials elected

in the May, 1992 elections expired on June 30, 1995. This petition, thus, has b

ecome moot and academic insofar as it concerns petitioner s right to the mayoralty

seat in his municipality because expiration of the term of office contested in

the election protest has the effect of rendering the same moot and academic.

Sarmiento vs. Mison

156 SCRA 549

G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987

PADILLA, J:

Nature of the Case: Delineation of Constitutional Boundaries. Petition for Prohi

bition.

FACTS

The petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of th

e Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the responden

t Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of

the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the

Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salarie

s and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the

Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed

by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain

the constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmatio

n of the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE

Whether or not Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is

unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on

Appointments.

RULING

NO. Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointm

ents, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public

ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel

or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in thi

s Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose

appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be au

thorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of ot

her officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the head

s of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the

Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effec

tive only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next

adjournment of the Congress.

€€€€€€However laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) which were approved during the effecti

ity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with t

he consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like

the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.

After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937 and P

D No. 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that

, while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that

devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to make, s

uch appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on

Appointments.

Reyes vs. Court of Appeals

February 6, 1997

G.R. No. 111682. 194 SCRA 402

MEDIALDEA, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Inj

unction and Restraining order to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS

Zenaida Reyes was accused of falsifying a deed of sale of four (4) parcels of l

and "by feigning and signing the name of Pablo Floro, who could not affix his si

gnature anymore due to age infirmity, on the said document as seller and causing

it to appear that said Pablo Floro [had] participated in the execution of the s

aid document when in truth and in fact, as said accused well knew, said deed of

sale was not executed and signed by the said Pablo Floro, nor did he ever appear

before any notary public for the purpose of acknowledging the deed above mentio

ned.

€€€€€€Upon being arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits then followe

.
ISSUE

Whether the trial court properly held petitioner to have waived the righ

t to present evidence because of her failure to proceed despite several postpone

ments granted to her.

RULING

NO. It was Atty. Tenorio's absences, then, rather than petitioner's, which appea

r to be the cause for the defense's failure to present its evidence. Atty. Tenor

io's negligence did not consist in error of procedure or even a lapse in strateg

y but something as basic as failing to appear in court despite clear warning tha

t such failure would amount to waiver of her client's right to present evidence

in her defense.

Keeping in mind that this case involves personal liberty, the negligence of coun

sel was certainly so gross that it should not be allowed to prejudice petitioner

's constitutional right to be heard. The judicial conscience certainly cannot re

st easy on a conviction based solely on the evidence of the prosecution just bec

ause the presentation of the defense evidence had been barred by technicality. R

igid application of rules must yield to the duty of courts to render justice whe

re justice is due to secure to every individual all possible legal means to prov

e his innocence of a crime with which he or she might be

charged.

€€€€€€WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of November 29, 1995 is G

ANTED.

€
Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission Committee

November 28, 1975

G.R. No. L-40779. 68 SCRA 277

FERNANDO, J.:

Nature of the Case: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Mandamus.

FACTS

In summer, 1975, Respondent admitted Petitioner for studies leading to an M.A.

in Theology; 4. That on May 30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted to enroll for the s

ame course for the first semester, 1975-76, Respondent told her about the letter

he had written her, informing her of the faculty's decision to bar her from re-

admission in their school; That the reasons stated in said letter, dated May 19,

1975 ... do not constitute valid legal ground for expulsion, for they neither p

resent any violation of any of the school's regulation, nor are they indicative

of gross misconduct.
ISSUE

Whether petitioner Epicharis T. Garcia possesses such right as to allow her to

continue studying at said school and that such right ought to be respected.

RULING

NO. It is not an easy matter then to disregard the views of persons knowledgeab

le in the field, to whom cannot be imputed lack of awareness of the need to resp

ect freedom of thought on the part of students and scholars. Moreover, it could

amount to minimizing the full respect that must be accorded the academic freedom

expressly granted by the Constitution "to institutions of higher learning." It

is equally difficult to yield conformity to the approach taken that colleges and

universities should be looked upon as public utilities devoid of any discretion

as to whom to admit or reject. Education, especially higher education, belongs

to a different, and certainly higher, category.

MOY YA LIM YAO vs. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION

October 4, 1971

G.R. No. L-21289. 41 SCRA 292

BARREDO, J.:

Nature of the Case: Appeal from a decision of CFI of Manila.

FACTS

Lau Yuen Yeung was a Hong Kong national who came to visit the Philippines and wa
s allowed to stay for 1 month. Upon approved extensions however, she was able to

stay for more than one year and later married Moy Ya Lim Yao, a Filipino citize

n. The Commissioner of Immigration however, ordered her to leave the Philippines

as she was already staying beyond the allowed time. Petitioner Moy Ya Lim Yao t

hen filed a petition seeking the issuance of a writ of injunction against the C

ommissioner of Immigration as Lau Yuen Yeung is now a Filipino citizen by virtue

of marriage, which was denied. They then appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung is a Filipino citizen by virtue of marriage.

RULING

Under Sec. 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law, a foreign woman who marries a F

ilipino citizen becomes a Filipino citizen provided she possesses none of the di

squalifications for naturalization. The proviso that she must be one "who might

herself be lawfully naturalized" is not a condition precedent to the vesting or

acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact necessary

to establish her citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e., as a fact established

and proved in evidence. The word "might," as used in that phrase, precisely repl

ies that at the time of her marriage to a Philippine citizen, the alien woman "h

ad (the) power" to become such a citizen herself under the laws then in force. T

hat she establishes such power long after her marriage does not alter the fact t

hat at her marriage, she became a citizen. Lau Yuen Yeung, is hereby declared t

o have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage.

Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice

5 SCRA 108

Monsanto vs. Factoran Jr.

1990

170 SCRA 190

FERNAN, J.:
Nature of the Case: Petition to review the resolution of the Deputy Executive Se

cretary.

FACTS

The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (assista

nt treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other accused of the complex crime

of estafa thru falsification of public documents. Petitioner Monsanto appealed h

er conviction which subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for

reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by the Presi

dent Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted

By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer

requesting that she be restored to the past assistant city treasurer since the

same was still vacant.

ISSUE

Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon

by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position with

out need of a new appointment.

RULING

The Supreme Court held that the pardon does not ipso facto restore convi

cted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of

such conviction.

€ The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part o

f the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsificat

ion of public documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to that when

her guilt and punishment were expunged by her pardon, this particular disability

was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the
office which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in considering her

qualifications and suitability for the public past, the facts constituting her o

ffenses must and should be evaluated and taken into account to determine ultimat

ely whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds. The pardon grante

d to petitioner has resulted in remaining her disqualification from holding publ

ic employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former past as assista

nt city treasurer, she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure required for

a new appointment.
San Juan vs. Civil Service Commission

1991

196 SCRA 69

GUTIERREZ, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition for Certiorari to review the resolution of the CSC.

FACTS

The position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for the province of Ri

zal was left vacant. In a letter dated April 18, 1988, the petitioner informed D

irector Reynaldo Abella of the Department if Budget and Management (DBM) Regio

n IV that Ms. Dalisay Santos assumed office as Acting PBO since March 22, 1988 p

ursuant to a memorandum issued by the petitioner.

€€€€€€

In a Memorandum dated July 26, 1988 addressed to the DBM Secretary, th

en Director Abella of Region IV recommended the appointment of the private res

pondent Cecilia Almajase as PBO of Rizal as the basis of comparative study of al

l Municipal Budget officers of the said province which included three names of t

he petitioner. On August 1, 1988 DBM Undersecretary Nazario S. Cabinguit Jr. sig

ned the appointment papers of the private respondent as PBO of Rizal upon the af

orestated recommendation of Abella.

€€€€€€ In a letter dated August 3, 1988 addressed to Secretary Corague, the petitioner rei

erated his request for the appointment of Dalisay Santos to the contested petiti

on unaware of the earliest appointment made by Secretary Cabuguit.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Department Head free to appoint anyone he foresees i

n the event that the Governor recommends an unqualified person.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the Department of Budget and Managemen

t may appoint provincial budget officers only from the list of qualified recomm

endies nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list

of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements a

nd ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualificati

on as enunciated in EO# 112 Sec 1. The PBO is expected to synchronize his work w

ith DBM. Provincial and Municipal Budgets are prepared at the local level and af

ter completion are forwarded to the national officials for review. It is for thi

s reason that there should be genuine interplay, a balancing of viewpoints, a ha

rmonization of proposals from both the local and national officials. It is for t
he reason that the nomination and appointment involves a sharing of power betwee

n the two levels of government.

€€€€€€

Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions

on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which t

hese provisions are based.

€€€€€€The appointment of respondent Cecilia Almajase is nullified. The Department of Budget

and Management is ordered to appoint the Provincial Budget Officer€of Rizal among

qualified nominees submitted by the Provincial Governor.

USA vs. Ruiz

May 22, 1985.

G.R. No. L- 35645. 136 SCRA 487

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition to review the orders of the CFI of Rizal Br. XV, Ru

iz, J.

FACTS

The United States invited bids for the repair of the military base in Subic. Res

pondent who submitted a bid was asked to confirm the price proposals and to subm

it the name of its bonding company. Respondent complied with the request. Later

on the projects were awarded to another. Respondent sued the US for specific per

formance on the ground that the request was an acceptance pursuant to the biding
practices of US.

ISSUE
 Whether or not the US may be sued in the case at bar.

HELD

The US is immune from suit without its consent. While the immunity exten

ds only to governmental acts and does not extend to proprietary acts, no tacit c

onsent to be sued can be deemed to have been given in this case. The contracts r

elate to the exercise of the sovereign functions of the US. The projects were in

tegral parts of the naval bases devoted to the defense of the US and RP.

USA vs. Guinto

February 26, 1990

182 SCRA 644

CRUZ, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Inj

unction to review the decision of RTC, Angeles City Br.62.

FACTS

The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force stationed

in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contract

s for barbering services in the said base.

€€€€€€

The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for pre

liminary injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against t
he USA which had not waived its non-suitability. The individual defendants as of

ficials or employees of the US Air Force were also immune from suit.

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioners are immune from suit.

HELD:

There is no question that the USA, like any other state will be deemed to have i

mpliedly waived its non-suitability if it has entered into a contract in its pro

prietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract undue its sovereign o

r governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. The barbershops subj

ect of the concessions granted by the US government are commercial enterprises o

perated by private persons. The petitioner cannot plead any immunity from the co

mplaint filed by the private respondents.

Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co.

September 30, 1954

103 PHIL. 473

PARAS, J.:

Nature of the Case: Appeal from an Order of the CFI of Manila.

FACTS

Defendant Pan Oriental took possession of the vessel in question after it

had been repossessed by the Shipping Administration and title thereto reacquire

d by the government, following the original purchaser, Fernando Froilan s, default

in his payment of the unpaid balance and insurance premiums for the said vessel

. Pan Oriental chartered said vessel and operated the same after it had repaired

the vessel and paid the stipulated initial payment, thereby exercising its opti

on to purchase, pursuant to a bareboat charter contract entered between said com

pany and the Shipping Corporation.

€€€€€€The Cabinet resolved to restore Froilan to his rights under the original contract of

ale on condition that he shall pay a sum of money upon delivery of the vessel to

him, that he shall continue paying the remaining installments due, and that he

shall assume the expenses incurred for the repair and by docking of the vessel.

Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Froilan s rights under the contract

of sale, for the reason that when the vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping A

dministration had authority to dispose of said authority to the property, Froila

n having already relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon. Froilan paid

the required cash of P10, 000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to surrender posses

sion of the vessel, he filed an action for in the CFI of Manila to recover posse

ssion thereof and have him declared the rightful owner of said property.
€€€€€€The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil case praying f

r the possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon m

ay be foreclosed.

ISSUE

Whether or not the government s motion to dismiss Pan Oriental counterclai

ms may prosper.

HELD:

Under the circumstances already ad voted to, Pan Oriental cannot be cons

idered a possessor in bad faith until after the institution of the instant case.

However, since it is not disputed that said appellant is entitled to the refund

of such expenses with the right to retain the vessel until he has been reimburs

ed therefore. As it is by the corrected acts of defendant and intervenor Republi

c of the Philippines that the appellant ha a lien far his expenses, appellees Fr

oilan, Compania Maratma, and the Republic of the Philippines are declared liable

for the reimbursement to appellant of its legitimate expenses, as allowed by la

w, with legal interest from the time of disbursement.

AMIGABLE vs. CUENCA

FEBRUARY 29, 1972

G.R. No. L-26400. 43 SCRA 360,

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Nature of the Case: Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Cebu.

FACTS

Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad

Estate in the Cebu City. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the gov

ernment used a portion of said lot for the construction of the Mongo and Gorordo

Avenues. Amigable s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting pa

yment of the portion of her lot which has been appropriated by the government. T

he claim was disallowed. Amigable then filed a complaint with the CFI of Cebu fo

r the recovery of ownership and possession of the land traversed by the Mongo an

d Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the payment of compensatory damages in the su

m of P50,000.00 for the illegal occupation of her land, moral damages in the sum

of P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00 and the costs of the sui

t. Said court rendered a decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the p

laintiff s cause of action on the ground that the government cannot be sued withou

t its consent. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed. Unable to secure a reco
nsideration, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which subsequently

certified the case to the Supreme Court, there being no question of fact involve

d.

ISSUE

Whether or not a registered owner of a parcel of land, where the governm

ent used to construct avenues without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, ma

y properly sue the government.

HELD:

If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken f

or public use were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this character

should not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental immunity from su

it cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had

the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the tim

e, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compens

ation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payme

nt of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the land so

condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment." I

f there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in

the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because ther

e was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the government would stand to

benefit. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to leg

al norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It

is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public u

se, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially

ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court.

There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be

appropriately invoked. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government

appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed a

ny deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant

remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an act

ion to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because

possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of

possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible

at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only rel

ief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and

should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the

basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking. As regards

the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal i

nterest on the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that

payment is made by the government. In addition, the government should pay for at

torney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after hear

ing.
PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION vs. CIR

July 25, 1975

65 SCRA 416

FERNANDO, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari from an order of the CIR.

FACTS

On December 20, 1966, private respondents filed with respondent Court a petitio

n wherein they alleged their employment relationship, the overtime services in e

xcess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay

them overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444. Petition

er Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration denied the allegations and raised

the special defenses of lack of a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction as it

is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation o

f Commonwealth Act No. 444. After the parties submitted the case for decision, t

he then Presiding Judge Arsenio T. Martinez of respondent Court issued an order

sustaining the claims of private respondents for overtime services from December

23, 1963 up to the date the decision was rendered on March 21, 1970, and direct

ing petitioner to pay the same, minus what it had already paid. There was a moti

on for reconsideration, but respondent Court en banc denied the same. Hence, thi

s petition for certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether petitioner, the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, discharges g

overnmental and not proprietary functions.

HELD:
A reference to the enactments creating Petitioner Corporation suffices to demons

trate the merit of petitioner's plea that it performs governmental and not propr

ietary functions. As originally established by Republic Act No. 2265, its purpos

es and objectives were set forth thus: "(a) To promote the effective merchandisi

ng of Virginia tobacco in the domestic and foreign markets so that those engaged

in the industry will be placed on a basis of economic security; (b) To establis

h and maintain balanced production and consumption of Virginia tobacco and its m

anufactured products, and such marketing conditions as will insure and stabilize

the price of a level sufficient to cover the cost of production plus reasonable

profit both in the local as well as in the foreign market; (c) To create, estab

lish, maintain, and operate processing, warehousing and marketing facilities in

suitable centers and supervise the selling and buying of Virginia tobacco so tha

t the farmers will enjoy reasonable prices that secure a fair return of their in

vestments; (d) To prescribe rules and regulations governing the grading, classif

ying, and inspecting of Virginia tobacco; and (e) To improve the living and econ

omic conditions of the people engaged in the tobacco industry." The amendatory s

tatute, Republic Act No. 4155, renders even more evident its nature as a governm

ental agency. Its first section on the declaration of policy reads: "It is decla

red to be the national policy, with respect to the local Virginia tobacco indust

ry, to encourage the production of local Virginia tobacco of the qualities neede

d and in quantities marketable in both domestic and foreign markets, to establis

h this industry on an efficient and economic basis, and, to create a climate con

ducive to local cigarette manufacture of the qualities desired by the consuming

public, blending imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco to improve the qualit
y of locally manufactured cigarettes." The objectives are set forth thus: "To at

tain this national policy the following objectives are hereby adopted: 1. Financ

ing; 2. Marketing; 3. The disposal of stocks of the Agricultural Credit Administ

ration (ACA) and the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) at the be

st obtainable prices and conditions in order that a reinvigorated Virginia tobac

co industry may be established on a sound basis; and 4. Improving the quality of

locally manufactured cigarettes through blending of imported and native Virgini

a leaf tobacco; such importation with corresponding exportation at a ratio of on

e kilo of imported to four kilos of exported Virginia tobacco, purchased by the

importer-exporter from the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration."

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY vs. CEBU CITY

NOVEMBER 5, 1992

215 SCRA 382

Bellosillo, J.

Nature of the Case: Appeal from the decision of the then CFI of Manila, Br. 22.

FACTS

Proclamation No. 430 was issued reserving Block no. 4, Reclamation Area No. 4,

of Cebu City, for warehousing purposes under the administration of National Ware

housing Corporation (NWC). Subsequently, a warehouse was constructed thereon. On

October 4, 1947, E.O. 93 dissolved NWC with NDC, a government-owned or controll

ed corporation (GOCC), taking over its assets and functions. Commencing 1948, Ce
bu City (CEBU) assessed and collected from NDC real estate taxes on the land and

the warehouse thereon. NDC wrote the City Assessor demanding full refund of the

real estate taxes paid to CEBU claiming that the land and the warehouse standin

g thereon belonged to the Republic and therefore exempt from taxation. CEBU did

not acquiesce in the demand; hence, the present suit filed 25 October 1972 in th

e Court of First Instance of Manila, which ruled in favor of NDC. The defendants

appealed to the Court of Appeals which however certified the case to the Suprem

e Court as one involving pure questions of law.

ISSUE

Is a public land reserved by the President for warehousing purposes in favor of

a government-owned or controlled corporation, as well as the warehouse subsequen

tly erected thereon, exempt from real property tax?

HELD:

To come within the ambit of the exemption provided in Art. 3, par. (a), of the

Assessment Law, it is important to establish that the property is owned by the g

overnment or its unincorporated agency, and once government ownership is determi

ned, the nature of the use of the property, whether for proprietary or sovereign

purposes, becomes immaterial. What appears to have been ceded to NWC (later tra

nsferred to NDC) is merely the administration of the property while the governme

nt retains ownership of what has been declared reserved for warehousing purposes

under Proclamation No. 430. However, as regards the warehouse constructed on a

public reservation, a different rule should apply because "the exemption of publ

ic property from taxation does not extend to improvements on the public lands ma

de by pre-emptioners, homesteaders and other claimants, or occupants, at their o

wn expense, and these are taxable by the state." Consequently, the warehouse co

nstructed on the reserved land by NWC (now under administration by NDC), indeed,

should properly be assessed real estate tax as such improvement does not appear

to belong to the Republic.

Since the reservation is exempt from realty tax, the erroneous tax payments coll

ected by CEBU should be refunded to NDC. This is in consonance with Sec. 40, par

. (a) of the former Real Property Tax Code which exempted from taxation real pro

perty owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisi

ons, as well as any GOCC so exempt by its charter.

MELO vs. PEOPLE

March 22, 1950

85 PHIL 766

Moran, C.J.

Nature of the Case: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.

FACTS

Petitioner was charged in the CFI with frustrated murder, for having allegedly i

nflicted upon Benjamin Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill. Sev

eral serious wounds on different parts of the body. On December 29, 1949, at 8 i

n the morning, the accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, and at 10:

15 in the evening of the same day Obillo died from his wounds. Evidence of death

was available to the prosecution only on January 3, 1950, and on the next day,

an amended information was filed charging the accused with consummated homicide.

Melo filed a motion to quash alleging double jeopardy, motion that was denied b

y respondent court, hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the amended information was rightly allowed to stand.

HELD:

The rule is that where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for whi

ch the defendant is responsible, which changes their character of the offense an

d together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct o

ffense. The accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the

new offense. Hence, the amended information was rightly allowed to stand.

CUISON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

April 15,1998

289 SCRA 159

Panganiban, J.

Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court

of Appeals.

FACTS

Respondent Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 39)

rendered a Joint Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. L-3553 and L-3554 finding accu

sed Eduardo Cuison guilty of the crime of double homicide, beyond reasonable dou

bt and therefore sentences him to suffer imprisonment from 6 years and 1 day of

prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum,

for each offense, with the accessories provided by law and to pay the costs. Ac

cused is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of Rafael Sapigao the amount of P30

,000.00 and the heirs of Rulo Castro also the amount of P30,000.00 without subsi

diary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the

said decision was affirmed with the modification that the civil indemnity was i

ncreased to P50,000.00. The Supreme Court denied accused s petition for review. T

he case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Br. 39) for prom

ulgation of the decision. However, respondent Judge promulgated on April 4, 199

5 the decision of the Court of Appeals only with respect to the modified civil l

iability of the accused but did not commit the accused to jail to commence servi

ce of his sentence. The Solicitor General filed a Motion to Clarify Decision. Re

spondent Judge then set the promulgation of the decision anew. The accused, how

ever, filed a Motion to Set Aside Promulgation on the ground to pursue with the

scheduled promulgation will violate the accused s constitutional right against jeo

pardy. In a Resolution dated April 12, 1996, the respondent Judge granted the af

orestated motion.

ISSUE

Whether petitioner s right against double jeopardy was violated.

HELD:

To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven: (1) a

first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy m

ust have been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same o

ffense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense

charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a f

rustration thereof. And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictm

ent; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a val

id plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise termin

ated without the express consent of the accused. As a rule, a criminal prosecuti

on includes a civil action for the recovery of indemnity. Hence, a decision in s

uch case disposes of both the criminal as well as the civil liabilities of an ac

cused. Here, trial court promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not

the criminal. As earlier observed, the promulgation of the CA Decision was not
complete. In fact and in truth, the promulgation was not merely incomplete; it

was also void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the trial judge rendered a substa

ntially incomplete promulgation on April 4, 1995, and he repeated his mistake in

his April 12, 1996 Order. We emphasize that grave abuse of discretion rendered

the aforementioned act of the trial court void. Since the criminal cases have n

ot yet been terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence, double

jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense.

ELEUTERIO C. PEREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

November 29, 1988

G.R. No. L-80838. 168 SCRA 236

CORTES,J.:

Nature of the Case:

FACTS

On October 21, 1974 Yolanda Mendoza filed a criminal complaint against E

leuterio Perez for Consented Abduction. The accused pleaded not guilty and trial

on the merits ensued. On June 28, 1980 a judgment of conviction was rendered ag

ainst Perez. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, and acquitted Perez of th

e crime of Consented Abduction. Subsequent to petitioner's acquittal complainan

t Yolanda Mendoza filed another criminal complaint against Perez on July 22, 198

3, this time for Qualified Seduction. Petitioner Perez filed a motion to quash

invoking double jeopardy.

ISSUE

Whether or not double jeopardy exists for two distinct offenses punishab

le separately by law.

RULING

No.

The rule on double jeopardy is that, "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy o

f punishment for the same offense" [Article IV, Sec. 22 of the 1973 Constitution

, Article III, Sec 21 of the 1987 Constitution.] The term "same offense" means i
dentical offense or any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof or any

offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense ch

arged in the former complaint or information.

However, the plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit, as the

two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law howsoever closely they ma

y appear to be connected in fact. It is a cardinal rule that the protection agai

nst double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offens

e. A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated p

rovisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or e

lement which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of th

e information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewi

se, where two different laws or articles of the same code define two crimes, pri

or jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, alth

ough both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some import

ant act which is not an essential element of the other.

An examination of the elements of these two crimes would show that although they

may have arisen from the same set of facts, they are not identical offenses as

would make applicable the rule on double jeopardy.

There are similar elements between Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction,

namely: (1) that the offended party is a virgin, and, (2) that she must be over

twelve (12) and under eighteen (18) years of age. However, two elements differen

tiate the two crimes. Consented Abduction, in addition to the two common element

s, requires that: (1) the taking away of the offended party must be with her con

sent, after solicitation or cajolery from the offender, and, (2) the taking away

of the offended party must be with lewd designs. On the other hand, an informat
ion for Qualified Seduction also requires that: (1) the crime be committed by ab

use of authority, confidence or relationship, and, (2) the offender has sexual i

ntercourse with the woman.

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. vs

. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA

July 31, 1967

G.R. No. L-24693

CORTES, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS

The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed by the petitio

ners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, H

otel del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general mana

ger of the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila

who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty t

o enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for

the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances. It was then alleged t

hat the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approv

ed by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor

of the City of Manila.

In the answer filed, there was an admission of the personal circumstances regard

ing the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage

in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the

cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or con

stitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a c

ause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to

a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of t

he police power and that only the guests or customers not before the court could
complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty again

st self incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary i

njunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for its dissolut

ion and the dismissal of the petition.

The lower court declared the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila

unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void and made permanent the prelimina

ry injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him fr

om enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether or not challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is unconstitu

tional and violates due process of law.

RULING

No.

It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the

necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinan

ce is void on its face which is not the case here.

On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primaril

y rest the exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasize

d, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, g

ood order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements

of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties

and the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, libert

y or property of any person are subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise

of police power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or un

reasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable const

itutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.

Due process is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dicta

tes of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoide
d. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardoz

o, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due proc

ess is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Cor

rectly it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodimen

t of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty "to those strivings for ju

stice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of rea

son drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions o

f legal and political thought." It is not a narrow or "technical conception with

fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions based on s

uch a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principl

es of our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or p

edantically in slavery to form or phrases.

Considering the foregoing principles and rules of law, it would thus be an affro

nt to reason to stigmatize the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Mani

la precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather

serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. It would

seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdicat

ion of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration

of the state of public morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the C

ity of Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It provided it with the enac

tment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case must be found in the records, a

nd, as has been set forth, none is even attempted here to attach to an ordinance

of such character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due p

rocess requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance even of deceptive plausibilit

y to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to sin

gle out such features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailme

nt of the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged

vagueness. Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees pr

ovided for by the challenged ordinance for hotels and motels but these fees clea
rly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld ins

pite rarely been declared unreasonable. Moreover, the fixing amount of the lic

ense fees by the municipal corporations is allowed in a much wider discretion in

this class of cases and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that

municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, court

s have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. Nor does

the restriction on the freedom to contract on the ground that there appears a co

rrespondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and th

e legislative attempt at correction.

STATE PROSECUTORS vs.JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO

September 19, 1994

A.M. No. RTJ-92-876. 236 SCRA 505

PER CURIAM

Nature of the Case: Administrative matter in the Supreme Court. Ignorance of the

Law, Grave Misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01, 3.02 of the Code of J

udicial Conduct.

FACTS

In a letter-complaint dated August 19, 1992, respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro of

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was charged by State Prosec

utors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno V. Tac-an with ignorance of the

law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code o
f Judicial Conduct, committed as follows:

1. That the respondent judge issued an Order dismissing eleven (11) cases o

n the basis of a Central Bank Circular or Monetary Board Resolution which as of

date hereof, has not even been officially issued, and basing his Order/decision

on a mere newspaper account of the advance announcement made by the President of

the said fact of lifting or liberalizing foreign exchange controls, respondent

judge acted prematurely and in indecent haste, as he had no way of determining t

he full intent of the new CB Circular or Monetary Board resolution, and whether

the same provided for exception, as in the case of persons who had pending crimi

nal cases before the courts for violations of Central Bank Circulars and/or regu

lations previously issued on the matter;

2. That respondent Judge did not even have the prudence of requiring first

the comment of the prosecution on the effect of aforesaid Central Bank Circular/

Monetary Board resolution on the pending cases before dismissing the same, there
by denying the Government of its right to due process; and

3. That the lightning speed with which respondent Judge acted to dismiss th

e cases may be gleaned from the fact that such precipitate action was undertaken

despite already scheduled continuation of trial dates set in the order of the c

ourt (the prosecution having started presenting its evidence . . .) dated August

11, 1992 to wit: August 31, September 3, 10, 21, & 23 and October 1, 1992, all

at 9:30 o'clock in the morning, in brazen disregard of all notions of fair play,

thereby depriving the Government of its right to be heard, and clearly exposing

his bias and partiality;

The respondent judge s order was subsequently assailed in a petition for certiorar

i filed with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision set

ting aside the order of Judge Muro, and reinstating Criminal Cases Nos. 92-10195

9 to 92-101969 on the ground that respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdicti

on and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of dismissal.

ISSUE

I. Whether or not judicial notice exists.

II. Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of ignorance of the law, grave

misconduct and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

RULING

I.

The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts

. To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way

of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of

the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the

matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is no

t judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judici

al knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowl

edge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action.

Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known.

Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of a me

re newspaper account which is sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twi

ce removed, took judicial notice of the supposed lifting of foreign exchange con

trols, a matter which was not and cannot be considered of common knowledge or of

general notoriety. Worse, he took cognizance of an administrative regulation wh

ich was not yet in force when the order of dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence d

ictates that judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effe

ctive. The reason is simple. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still i

n existent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable de

monstration, which is one of the requirements before a court can take judicial n

otice of a fact.

Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was definitely not pro

per for him, to have taken cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the same was

not yet in force at the time the improvident order of dismissal was issued.

II.

This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the

law. The very act of respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the e

leven criminal cases without even a motion to quash having been filed by the acc

used, and without at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to be he

ard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument, is not only a

blatant denial of elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indi
cative of bad faith and partiality.

The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily dispose of the cases as early

as possible is no license for abuse of judicial power and discretion, nor does s

uch professed objective, even if true, justify a deprivation of the prosecution'

s right to be heard and a violation of its

right to due process of law.

To hold a judge liable for rendering a manifestly unjust order through inexcusab

le negligence or ignorance, it must be clearly shown that although he has acted

without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his duty that diligen

ce, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of any

public service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manife

st injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation, and even

though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied, it nevertheless

results logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable manner, i

n the notorious violation of the legal precept.

In the present case, a cursory perusal of the comment filed by respondent judge

reveals that no substantial argument has been advanced in plausible justificatio

n of his act. He utterly failed to show any legal, factual, or even equitable ju

stification for the dismissal of the eleven criminal cases. The explanation give

n is no explanation at all. The strained and fallacious submissions therein do n

ot speak well of respondent and cannot but further depreciate his probity as a j

udge.

On the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court finds respondent Judge M

anuel T. Muro guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

September 26, 1996

G.R. No. 118882. 262 SCRA 452

MELO,J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court

of Appeals.

FACTS

Petition for review with an urgent prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction a

nd/or restraining order is filed before the Supreme Court, seeking to: (a) annul

and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 31733 enti

tled "People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Pedro S. Espina et al.", insofar as it

denied the People's prayer to inhibit respondent Judge Pedro S. Espina of the Re

gional Trial Court of Tacloban City from hearing Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 & 9

3-01-39, respectively, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Cristeta Reyes, e

t al." and "People of the Philippines vs. Jane C. Go"; and b) enjoin respondent

judge from conducting further proceedings in the aforesaid criminal cases. All t

he respondents have not yet filed their comments after several notices were sent

to them, for verily, delay in the submission of the same would appear to benefi

t respondents, and sanction against them may not really amount to much, consider
ing that most of them are under detention. Thus, so as not to unduly delay the d

isposition of Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 and 93-01-39, we now resolve to dispen

se with respondent's comments and to proceed with the disposition of the petitio

n.

ISSUE

Whether or not the cold neutrality of an impartial judge is an indispensable imp

erative of due process

RULING

Yes.

One of the essential requirements of procedural due process in a judicial procee

ding is that there must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial

power to hear and determine the matter before it. In Javier vs. Commission on E

lections (144 SCRA 194 [1986]), this Court has repeatedly and consistently deman

ded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative

of due process. Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring

compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair

play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor appro

aches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already m

ade and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone t

he charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings ar

e not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions a

nd reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to fo

reordain the ending. The Judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evi

dence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established fac

ts and the pertinent law.

In the case at bar, Judge Espina's decision in favor of respondent Jane Go serve

s as sufficient and reasonable basis for the prosecution to seriously doubt his

impartiality in handling the criminal cases. Verily, it would have been more pru

dent for Judge Espina to have voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the cri

minal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. No. 31733 is hereby SET ASIDE and The Honorable Pedro Espina, Presidi

ng Judge of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of the 8th Judicial Region stat

ioned in Tacloban is hereby declared disqualified from taking cognizance of Crim

inal Cases No. 93-01-38 and 93-01-39. It is further ordered that these criminal

cases be re-raffled to another branch of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban Ci

ty.
MANGUBAT vs. DE CASTRO

July 27, 1988

G.R. No. L-33892.

J. Paras, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Police

Commission.

FACTS

On January 11, 1963, a case against Detective Florencio Mangubat, Cebu C

ity Police Department for misconduct, dishonesty and/or violation of law was ins

tituted by Mayor Carlos J. Quizon of Cebu City with the former Municipal Board o

f the city pursuant to RA 557. He was thereafter, temporarily suspended by the M

ayor pending the outcome of the investigation and was reinstated 60 days thereaf

ter. However, before the case could be decided, the name Municipal Board was cha

nged to City Council of the City of Cebu, pursuant to the approval of Charter of

Cebu City (R.A. 3857) on June 10, 1964, providing under Section 30 thereof that

the Fiscal of the City shall investigate and report to the mayor whenever it is

brought to his knowledge that any city officer or employee is guilty of neglect

or misconduct in office.

€€€

€€€ The case was forwarded to the Cebu City Fiscal for reinvestigation. On the b

asis of the records and testimonies before the Municipal Board (now City Council

) and finding no prima facie evidence, the Assistant City Fiscal, in a resolutio

n, recommended the dismissal of the administrative case, affirmed by the City Fi

scal and transmitted to the City Mayor on December 14, 1965. Records show that n

o appropriate resolution was submitted by the City Fiscal and no such administra
tive order was issued by the Mayor.

€€€€€ €On February 5, 1968, invoking Section 26 of R.A. 4864, the Mayor forwarded the

ecords of the case to Jesus E. Zabate, Acting City Treasurer and chairman, Cebu

City Board of Investigators requesting that he take cognizance of this case. The

case was thereafter forwarded to the Police Commission. Apparently the Chairman

of the Board of Investigators, found a formal investigation no longer necessary

since the City Fiscal's Office had recommended dismissal of the aforementioned

administrative case. On the other hand, the Commission found Mangubat of the Ceb

u City Police Department guilty of Grave Misconduct and Violation of Law and was

dismissed from the service with prejudice.

ISSUE

Whether or not the respondent commission violated Petitioner s constitutio

nal right to due process.

HELD:

€ NO. Petitioner insists that the action of the Police Commission was highly irreg

ular when it took over the case and thereafter made its own findings, contrary t

o the findings of the City Fiscal acquitting petitioner of the charges, apart fr

om the fact that its decision was based on the records which were forwarded by t

he Board of Investigators without the latter making its own investigation, and i

ts own findings and recommendation.

€ This argument misconceives the meaning of due process. The proceeding provided f

or is merely administrative and summary in character, in line with the principle

that "administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally in order

to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and

inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses." Otherwise st

ated, where due process is present, the administrative decision is generally sus

tained.

€ The records show that the case at bar was exhaustively heard both in the Municip

al Board and in the Fiscal's Office, with both parties afforded ample opportunit

y to adduce their evidence and argue their causes. But as earlier stated, the fi

ndings of the Fiscal that there was no prima facie case were not finalized with

the requested brief statement of materials and relevant facts on which a conclus

ion could be based. Without the requested resolution, the City Mayor was unable

to issue the corresponding administrative order. Verily, the respondent Commissi

on can not be bound by the findings of the City Fiscal, much less was it prohibi

ted from making findings of its own on the basis of the records which both the C

ommission and the Board of Investigators considered sufficient for purposes of r

endering a decision. Neither was the Board's discretion not to conduct a new inv

estigation foreclosed by such findings.

€ €Furthermore, apart from the fact that the uniform requirements of due process wer

e all complied with under Republic Act No. 557, Republic Act No, 3857 (the Revis

ed Charter of Cebu City) and Republic Act No. 4864 by the investigating official

s, there is nothing in the records indicative of any act on the part of subject

administrative bodies amounting to a deprivation of petitioner's right to admini

strative process.

€ At this juncture, the oft-repeated rule that findings of administrative agencies

are generally accorded not only respect but also finality where the decision an

d the order of execution issued by public respondents are not tainted with unfai
rness or arbitrariness that would amount to abuse of discretion or lack of juris

diction deserves reiteration. The findings of fact must be respected, so long as

they are supported by substantial evidence even if not overwhelming or preponde

rant.

€€ Indeed, if the Police Commission were to accede to the suggestion of petitioner

that the Board of Investigators be directed to conduct its own investigation and

give the parties a chance to present their evidence and not merely rely on the

result of the investigation conducted by the Municipal Board and by the City Fis

cal's Office, this would be favoring technicalities over substantial justice.

€€ Clearly, petitioner was given his "day in court" and there is no occasion to imp

ute deprivation of due process. On the contrary, the rendition of the questioned

decision by the Police Commission actually promoted and served the interests of

justice. In addition, there is no denial of due process if the decision was ren

dered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the rec

ord and disclosed to the parties affected.

EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION vs. NLRC

€June 13, 1997

G.R. No. 102467.

J. Vitug, J.:

Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action for Certiorari.

FACTS

€Private respondent Ricardo Sadac was appointed, effective 01 August 1981, Vice-Pr

esident for the Legal Department of Equitable Banking Corporation. However, on€Jun

e 26, 1989, nine lawyers of the bank's Legal Department, who were all under priv

ate respondent, addressed a "letter-petition" to the Chairman of the Board of Di

rectors, accusing private respondent of abusive conduct, inefficiency, mismanage

ment, ineffectiveness and indecisiveness. The individual written complaints of e

ach of the nine lawyers were attached to the "letter-petition." Private responde

nt was furnished with a copy of the letter.

Private respondent promptly responded and manifested an intention to file crimin

al, civil and administrative charges against the nine lawyers. Various alternati

ves and avenues to solve the crisis, nothing positive, however, came out of thei

r meeting, Convinced that reconciliation was out of the question, A report submi

tted a report to the Board of Directors with the findings that abusive conduct,

mismanagement and inefficiency, ineffectiveness and indecisiveness are proven an

d/or established by the same nature of the evidence.

On August 10, 1989, a memorandum was issued to private respondent Sadac informin

g him that no formal hearing would there be instituted just to terminate his ser

vices, consonant with the due process requirements of the Constitution, the Labo

r Code, the Implementing Regulations thereof and other pertinent laws, it has ch
osen the more compassionate option of€voluntary resignation. Private respondent re

quested for a full hearing by the Board of Directors. It was stressed by petitio

ners that private respondent's services were not terminated by the Board which,

instead, was merely exercising its managerial prerogative. Likewise, in order to

adhere to the Bank s compassionate policy, a hearing would not anymore be resorte

d to. Private then instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal against Petition

ers. The Board of Directors after learning of the filing of the complaint adopte

d Resolution No. 5803 terminating the services of private respondent "in view of

his belligerence" and the Board's "honest belief that the relationship" between

private respondent and petitioner bank was one of "client and lawyer." Labor Ar

biter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, convinced that the relationship

between petitioner bank and private respondent was one of lawyer-client. On app

eal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. NLRC ruled that privat

e respondent was denied the right to due process with the bank's failure to obse

rve the twin requirements of notice and hearing.

ISSUE

Whether or not the dismissal of private respondent is illegal for failure of pe

titioner to comply with the procedural requirements of due process.

HELD:

€ €YES. Failure to comply with the procedural requirements for terminating one's emp

loyment taints the dismissal with illegality. This procedure is mandatory, any j

udgment reached by management without that compliance can be considered void and

inexistent. While it is true that the essence of due process is simply an oppor

tunity to be heard or, as applied in administrative proceedings, an opportunity

to explain one's side, meetings in the nature of consultation and conferences su

ch as the case here, however, may not be valid substitutes for the proper observ

ance of notice and hearing. For having violated private respondent's right to du

e process private respondent shall, considering the attendant circumstances part

icularly his repeated, but unheeded, request for a hearing, be entitled to an am

ount of P5,000.

PALMERA vs. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

August 4, 1994

G.R. No. 110168.€

J. Cruz

Nature of the Case: Petition for review of a resolution of the Civil Service Com

mission.

FACTS

€ €Rodolfo Palmera started working in the government in 1953 and has held various po

sitions in the Ministry of Public Works. On October 1, 1982, upon the merger of
the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministy of Public Highways, he was appointe

d Assistant Regional Director of the National Capital Region (NCR). Palmera then

turned over his office to Pacifico Mendoza as directed by DPWH Minister Rogacia

no Mercado.

€ On June 26, 1987, Palmera was charged along with several others, with grave misc

onduct and dishonesty in two administrative cases and were placed under 90-day p

reventive suspension, which was lifted on November 16, 1987. On December 1, 1987

, he was again charged with grave misconduct and dishonesty. Palmera was again p

laced under preventive suspension. All such administrative cases were based on t

he recommendation of the DPWH Fact-Finding Committee in an investigation of anom

alies in the flood control and related projects in Metro Manila. Its findings we

re embodied in a number of separate complaints and information filed with the Of

fice of the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) and the Sandiganbayan, for malversation, esta
fa, falsification and violations of R.A. No. 3019 and P.D. 1759. On May 19, 1988

, Palmera's second preventive suspension was lifted but he was no longer ordered

reinstated.

The petitioner alleged that it was while he was still under preventive suspensio

n that he learned of Pacifico Mendoza's appointment to his position. Palmera sai

d he was repeatedly assured he would be appointed to another position but no suc

h appointment was ever extended him. Instead, Palmera was hired on a contractual

basis for the period from January 1 to December 31, 1987, to provide a legal ba

sis for the payment of his salaries. After December 31, 1987, the contract was n

ever renewed. On November 21, 1991, Palmera filed with respondent Civil Service

Commission a letter-appeal for his reinstatement with full back wages and withou

t loss of seniority rights. He also prayed for the nullification of the appointm

ent of Mendoza as Assistant Regional Director.

€ The Commission found the contract of employment issued to Palmera to be violativ

e of the Civil Service Law and Rules. Nevertheless, it dismissed the appeal main

ly on the ground of laches mainly because of failure to contest the issuance of

the contract and his non-reinstatement within a reasonable period, thus renderin

g the appeal moot and academic.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petitioner s constitutional right to security of tenure was vio

lated when he was held guilty of laches.

HELD:

YES. It is not disputed that the petitioner has the constitutional right to secu

rity of tenure P.D. 807 specifically includes the position of Assistant Regional

Director in the Career Executive Service. The career service is characterized b

y (1)entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable

by competitive examination, or based on highly technical qualifications;(2) oppo

rtunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure.

€ €Security of tenure means that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall b

e suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due proce

ss. In the case at bar, the circumstances surrounding the herein petitioner's ac

ceptance of the temporary appointment evidences that Palmera had no intention to

abandon his permanent position and his security of tenure therein. The petition

er had been working in the government for about 34 years. It cannot be reasonabl

y supposed that by signing the contract, he was knowingly relinquishing his perm

anent post and all big concomitant rights, including his accrued leave benefits.

Furthermore, the petitioner was already getting on in years and could not affor

d to face an uncertain future without a regular and steady income. It can be inf

erred that Palmera did not seek to be appointed as Technical Assistant to the Se

cretary. He was not informed of the real objective of contract. He was made to u

nderstand that the contract was merely for the sake of formality, to give some l

egal basis for his compensation for 1987.

€ Furthermore, a public office may become vacant by abandonment, In order to const

itute abandonment of office, it must be total and under such circumstances as cl

early to indicate an absolute relinquishment. Temporary absence is not sufficien

t. There must be an intention, actual or imputed to abandon the office. The Comm

ission itself has held that the contract of service entered into by the petition

er and DPWH officials was null and void for being contrary to law and public pol

icy, A void or inexistent contract is one which has no force and effect from the

very beginning, as if it had never been entered into, and which cannot be valid
ated either by time or by ratification. Hence, the subject contract cannot be us

ed as basis for the claim that the petitioner abandoned his post as Assistant Re

gional Director.
€ In addition, the doctrine of laches is an equitable principle applied to promote

but never to defeat justice. Thus, where laches is invoked against a plaintiff

by reason of the latter's failure to come to court within the statutory period p

rovided in the law, the doctrine of laches will not be taken against him where t

he defendant is shown to have promised from time to time to grant the relief sou

ght for. Section 24 (d) of P.D. 807 provides:

Any person who has been permanently appointed to a position in the career servic

e and who has, through no delinquency or misconduct, been separated therefrom ma

y be reinstated to a position in the same level for which he is qualified. It fo

llows that the petitioner should be immediately reinstated to his former positio

n or appointed to another position of equivalent rank and compensation.

LUMANTA vs. NLRC

February 8, 1989

G.R.No. 82819

J. FELICIANO

Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the NLRC

FACTS

€ On March 20, 1987, Luz Lumanta, joined by 54 other retrenched employees, filed a

n original complaint for unpaid retrenchment or separation pay against private r

espondent Food Terminal, Inc. (FTI) with the Department of Labor and Employment.

Private respondent FTI argued that being a government-owned and controlled corp
oration, its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law not by the Labor Co

de, and that claims arising from employment fall within the jurisdiction of the

Civil Service Commission and not the Department of Labor and Employment. The pet

itioners, on the other hand, contended that although FTI is a corporation owned

and controlled by the government, it has still the marks of a private corporatio
n - it directly hires its employees without seeking approval from the Civil Serv

ice Commission and its personnel are covered by the Social Security System and n

ot the Government Service Insurance System. Petitioners also argued that being a

government owned and controlled corporation without original charter, private r

espondent FTI clearly falls outside the scope of the civil service as marked out

in Section 2 (1), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution.

€ The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. NLRC affirme

d.

ISSUE

Whether or not a labor law claim against a government-owned and controlled corpo

ration, such as private respondent FTI, falls within the jurisdiction of the Dep

artment of Labor and Employment.

HELD:

€ NO. The pleadings show that FTI was previously a privately owned enterprise, cre

ated and organized under the general incorporation law, with the corporate name

"Greater Manila Food Terminal Market, Inc." The record does not indicate the pre

cise amount of the capital stock of FTI that is owned by the government; the pet

itioners' claim, and this has not been disputed, that FTI is not hundred percent

(100%) government-owned and that it has some private shareholders.

As provided under Article IX-B, Section 2 [1]) of the 1987 Constitution which to

ok effect on February 2, 1987 - The civil service embraces all branches, subdivi

sions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-o

wned or controlled corporations with original charter. It is concluded that beca

use respondent FTI is government-owned and controlled corporation without origin

al charter, it is the Department of Labor and Employment, and not the Civil Serv
ice Commission, which has jurisdiction over the dispute arising from employment

of the petitioners with private respondent FTI, and that consequently, the terms

and conditions of such employment are governed by the Labor Code and not by the

Civil Service Rules and Regulations.

€ Public respondent NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in dismiss

ing petitioners' complaint. Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the De

cision of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC are hereby SET ASIDE. The case is remanded

to the Labor Arbiter for further appropriate proceedings.

BENGZON vs. DRILON

April 15, 1992.

G.R.No. 103524.

Guttierez Jr., J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition to review the constitutionality of the veto by the

President of certain provisions of the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal

Year 1999.

FACTS

€ On June 20, 1953, Republic Act No. 910 was enacted to provide the retirement pen

sions of Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals, who have ren

dered at least twenty (20) years service either in the Judiciary or in any other

branch of the Government or in both, having attained the age of seventy (70) ye

ars or who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office.

The retired Justice shall receive during the residue of his natural life the sa

lary which he was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation.

€ President Marcos issued PD 644 on January 25, 1975 repealing Section 3-A of Repu

blic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595 (amending Republic Act No. 1568 and

Presidential Decree No. 578) which authorized the adjustment of the pension of t

he retired Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Chairman and members

of the Constitutional Commissions and the officers and enlisted members of the

Armed Forces to the prevailing rates of salaries. PD 1909 was also issued provid

ing for the automatic readjustment of the pensions of members of the Armed Force

s who have retired prior to September 10, 1979. While the adjustment of the reti

rement passions for the Armed Forces who€number in the tens of thousands was resto

red, that of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who
are only a handful and fairly advanced in years, was not.

Congress approved in 1990 a bill for the reenactment of the repealed provisions

of RA 1797 and RA 3595. Congress was under the impression that PD 644 became law

after it was published in the Official Gazette on April 7, 1977. In the explana

tory note of HB 16297 and SB 740, the legislature saw the need to reenact RA 179

7 and 3595 to restore said retirement pensions and privileges of the retired Jus

tices and members of the Constitutional Commissions in order to assure those ser

ving in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Constitutional Commissions adequ

ate old age pensions even during the time when the purchasing power of the peso

has been diminished substantially by worldwide recession or inflation.

President Aquino, however vetoed HB 16297 on July 11, 1990 on the ground that it

would erode the very foundation of the Government's collective effort to adhere

faithfully to and enforce strictly the policy on standardization of compensatio

n as articulated in RA 6758 known as Compensation and Position Classification Ac

t of 1989. Further, the Government should not grant distinct privileges to selec

t group of officials whose retirement benefits under existing laws already enjoy

preferential treatment over those of the vast majority of our civil service ser

vants.

ISSUE

Whether or not the veto by the Executive is violative of the doctrine of separat

ion of powers.
HELD:

Yes. Under the principle of separation of powers, neither Congress, the Presiden

t, nor the Judiciary may encroach on fields allocated to the other branches of g

overnment. The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the ex

ecutive to the enforcement of laws and the judiciary to their interpretation and

application to cases and controversies.

€ The Constitution expressly confers on the judiciary the power to maintain inviol

ate what it decrees. As the guardian of the Constitution we cannot shirk the dut

y of seeing to it that the officers in each branch of government do not go beyon

d their constitutionally allocated boundaries and that the entire Government its

elf or any of its branches does not violate the basic liberties of the people. T

he act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a

constitutionally vested power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, i

t also provides limitations to its exercise. The veto power is not absolute.

In the exercise of the veto power, it is generally all or nothing. However, when

it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the Administration needs th

e money to run the machinery of government and it can not veto the entire bill e

ven if it may contain objectionable features. The President is, therefore, compe

lled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts. It is

for this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the "item veto power"

to avoid inexpedient riders being attached to an indispensable appropriation or

revenue measure. The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items

may be vetoed. The power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriate bill
 does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remai

ning portion of the same item.

In the case at bar, it turns out, however, that P.D. No. 644 never became valid

law. If P.D. No. 644 was not law, it follows that Rep. Act No. 1797 was not repe

aled and continues to be effective up to the present. In the same way that it wa

s enforced from 1957 to 1975, so should it be enforced today. House Bill No. 162

97 was superfluous as it tried to restore benefits which were never taken away v

alidly. The veto of House Bill No. 16297 in 1990 did not also produce any effect

. Both were based on erroneous and non-existent premises. It can be seen that wh

en the President vetoed certain provisions of the 1992 General Appropriations Ac

t, she was actually vetoing Republic Act No. 1797 which, of course, is beyond he

r power to accomplish. Presidential Decree No. 644 which purportedly repealed Re

public Act No. 1797 never achieved that purpose because it was not properly publ

ished. It never became a law.

The challenged veto has far-reaching implications which the Court can not counte

nance as they undermine the principle of separation of powers. The Executive has

no authority to set aside and overrule a decision of the Supreme Court. We must

emphasize that the Supreme Court did not enact Rep. Act No. 1797. It is not wit

hin its powers to pass laws in the first place. Its duty is confined to interpre

ting or defining what the law is and whether or not it violates a provision of t

he Constitution.

As early as 1953, Congress passed a law providing for retirement pensions to ret

ired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. This law was amende

d by Republic Act 1797 in 1957. Funds necessary to pay the retirement pensions u
nder these statutes are deemed automatically appropriated every Thus, Congress i

ncluded in the General Appropriations Act of 1992, provisions identifying funds

and savings which may be used to pay the adjusted pensions pursuant to the SC Re

solution. As long as retirement law remains in the statute book, there is an exi

sting obligation on the part of the government to pay the adjusted pension rate

pursuant to RA 1797 and AM-91-8-225-CA. Neither may the veto power of the Presid

ent be exercised as a means of repealing RA 1797. This is arrogating unto the Pr

esidency legislative powers which are beyond its authority. The President has no

power to amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to repeal exi

sting laws. The President's power is merely to execute the laws as passed by Con

gress. There is a matter of greater consequence arising from this petition. The

attempt to use the veto power to set aside a Resolution of this Court and to dep

rive retirees of benefits given them by Rep. Act No. 1797 trenches upon the cons

titutional grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.

Accordingly, Section 3 Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the Judi

ciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be r

educed by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year an

d, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released. The importance

of and the need for an independent judiciary cannot be overstressed. It is an a

dded guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any

fear of reprisal or untoward consequence.

As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary,

the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Electi

ons and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility

to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their

needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collec

t fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by

law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse s

uch sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the di

scharge of their functions. Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control.

If the Supreme Court says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10
 typewriters and sends its recommendations to Congress without even informing us

, the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the i

ndependence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duti

es. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent

constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their op

erations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express ma

ndate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the in

dependence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitu

tional system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme C

ourt, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their ob

jections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that:

"Requirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree becaus

e their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort,

when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood. After devo

ting the best years of his life to the public service, he deserves the appreciat

ion of a grateful government as best concretely expressed in a generous retireme

nt gratuity commensurate with the value and length of his services. That generos

ity is the least he should expect now that his work is done and his youth is gon

e. Even as he feels the weariness in his bones and glimpses the approach of the

lengthening shadows, he should be able to luxuriate in the thought that he did h

is task well, and was rewarded for it." For as long as these retired Justices ar

e entitled under laws which continue to be effective, the government can not dep

rive them of their vested right to the payment of their pension.

€€€

€€ The vetoed provisions of the 1992 Appropriations Act are declared valid and subs

isting. The respondents are ordered to automatically and regularly release pursu

ant to the grant of fiscal autonomy the funds appropriated for the subject pensi

ons as well as the other appropriations for the Judiciary.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM

February 3, 1997

G.R. No. 122156. 267 SCRA 408.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Nature of the Case: Special Civil action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition and M

andamus.

FACTS

The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i. e., in the gra

nt of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and pa

trimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, is invoked by

petitioner in its bid to acquire 5 1% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporat

ion (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain t

hat the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation

for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of

the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Const

itution

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)

, pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Procl

amation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30%

to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC The winning bidde

r. or the eventual "strategic partner." is to provide management expertise and/o

r an international marketing, reservation system, and financial support to stren

gthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel, In a close bidding

held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila

Prince Hotel Corporation. a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51 % of t

he MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian

firm, with ITTSheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of s

hares at P44.00 per share. or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partne

r and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respon

dent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tend

ered by Renong Berhad 4 In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner

sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (

P33-000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs.

Renong Berhad x x x 5which respondent GSIS refused to accept.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded th

e tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened

by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad. petitioner came to this

Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a tempora

ry restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the

sale to the Malaysian firm.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is a self

-executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into

effect;

(2) Assuming Section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII is selfexecuting, whether th

e controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony

as a nation;

(3) Whether GSIS is included in the term "State," hence, mandated to implement S

ection 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution;

(4) Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed to give preference to

'petitioner, a qualified Filipino corporation, over and above Renong Berhad, a f

oreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Co

rporation;

(5) Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the sale of the shares to Re

nong Berhad, a foreign corporation.

RULING

Anent the first issue, it is now familiar learning that a Constitution provides

the guiding policies and principles upon which is built the substantial foundati

on and general framework of the law and government.5 As a rule, its provisions a

re deemed selfexecuting and can be enforced without further legislative action.6

Some of its provisions, however, can be implemented only through appropriate la

ws enacted by the Legislature, hence not self-executing.

To determine whether a particular provision of a Constitution is selfexecuting i

s a hard row to hoe. The key lies on the intent of the framers of the fundamenta

l law oftentimes submerged in its language. A searching inquiry should be made t

o find out if the provision is intended as a present enactment, complete in itse

lf as a definitive law, or if it needs future legislation for completion and enf

orcement. The inquiry demands a micro-analysis of the text and the context of th

e provision in question.
Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as selfexecuting, r

ather than as requiring future legislation for their enforcement.10 The reason i

s not difficult to discern. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the m
andate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign people can be easily ign

ored and nullified by Congress. Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the unyieldi

ng rule that legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but co

ngressional inaction should not suffocate them.

Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on

arrests, searches and seizures, the rights of a person under custodial investiga

tion, the rights of an accused, and the privilege against self-incrimination. It

is recognized that legislation is unnecessary to enable courts to effectuate co

nstitutional provisions guaranteeing the fundamental rights of life, liberty and

the protection of property. The same treatment is accorded to constitutional pr

ovisions forbidding the taking or damaging of property for public use without ju

st compensation.

Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is not

self-executing where it merely announces a policy and its language empowers the

Legislature to prescribe the means by which the policy shall be carried into ef

fect.19 Accordingly, we have held that the provisions in Article II of our Const

itution entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" should generally

be construed as mere statements of principles of the State.20 We have also rule

d that some provisions of Article XIII on "Social Justice and Human Rights," and

Article XIV on "Education Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports''can

not be the basis of judicially enforceable rights. Their enforcement is addresse

d to the discretion of Congress though they provide the framework for legislatio

n23 to effectuate their policy content.

Guided by this map of settled Jurisprudence, we now consider whether Section 10,

Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is selfexecuting or not. It reads:

"Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning a

gency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippin

es or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital

is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe,

certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encou

rage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by

Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy

and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within

its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and prioriti

es."

The first paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain areas of investments in

the country25 to Filipino citizens or to corporations sixty per cent26 of whose

capital stock is owned by Filipinos. It further commands Congress to enact laws

that will encourage the formation and operation of one hundred percent Filipino-

owned enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second paragraph orders the entire

State to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights and priv

ileges covering the national economy and patrimony. The third paragraph also dir

ects the State to regulate foreign investments in line with our national goals a

nd well-set priorities.

The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express text, th

ere is a categorical command for Congress to enact laws restricting.foreign owne

rship in certain areas of investments in the country and to encourage the format

ion and operation of wholly-owned Filipino enterprises. The right granted by the
provision is clearly still in esse. Congress has to breathe life to the right b

y means of legislation. Parenthetically. this paragraph was plucked from Section

3, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.27 The provision in the 1973 Constituti

on affirmed our ruling in the landmark case of Lao Ichong v. Hernandez,28 where

we upheld the discretionary authority of Congress to Filipinize certain areas of

investments.29 By reenacting the 1973 provision. the first paragraph of Sectio

n 10 affirmed the power of Congress to nationalize certain areas of investments

in favor of Filipinos.

The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are directed t

o the State and not to Congress alone which is but one of the three great branch

es of our government. Their coverage is also broader for they cover "the nationa

l economy and patrimony" and "foreign investments within [the] national jurisdic

tion" and not merely "certain areas of investments." Beyond debate, they cannot

be read as granting Congress the exclusive power to implement by law the policy

of giving preference to qualified Filipinos in the conferral of rights and privi

leges covering our national economy and patrimony. Their language does not sugge

st that any of the State agency or instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or

to refuse its implementation for any reason whatsoever. Their duty to implement

is unconditional and it is now.

This submission is strengthened by Article II of the Constitution entitled "Decl

aration of Principles and State Policies." Its Section 19 provides that ''[T]he

State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively

controlled by Filipinos.'' It engrafts the all-important Filipino First policy i

n our fundamental law and by the use of the mandatory word "shall," directs its

enforcement by the whole State without any pause or a half-pause in time.

The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila H

otel Corporation involves the disposition of part of our national patrimony. The

records of the Constitutional Commission show that the Commissioners entertaine

d the same view as to its meaning. According to Commissioner Nolledo, "patrimony

" refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritag
e of our race.By this yardstick, the sale of Manila Hotel falls within the cover

age of the constitutional provision giving preferential treatment to qualified F

ilipinos in the grant of rights involving our national patrimony. The unique val

ue of the Manila Hotel to our history and culture cannot be viewed with a myopic

eye. The value of the hotel goes beyond pesos and centavos. As chronicled by Be

th Day Romulo,31 the hotel first opened on July 4, 1912 as a first-class hotel b

uilt by the American Insular Government for Americans living in, or passing thro

ugh, Manila while travelling to the Orient. Indigenous materials and Filipino cr

aftsmanship were utilized in its construction. For sometime, it was exclusively

used by American and Caucasian travelers and served as the "official guesthouse"

of the American Insular Government for visiting foreign dignitaries. Filipinos

began coming to the Hotel as guests during the Commonwealth period. When the Jap

anese occupied Manila, it served as military headquarters and lodging for the hi

ghest-ranking officers from Tokyo. It was at the Hotel and the Intramuros that t

he Japanese made their last stand during the Liberation of Manila. After the war

, the Hotel again served foreign guests and Filipinos alike. Presidents and king

s, premiers and potentates, as well as glamorous international film and sports c

elebrities were housed in the Hotel. It was also the situs of international conv

entions and conferences. In the local scene, it was the venue of historic meetin

gs, parties and conventions of political parties. The Hotel has reaped and conti

nues reaping numerous recognitions and awards from international hotel and trave

l award-giving bodies, a fitting acknowledgment of Filipino talent and ingenuity

. These are judicially cognizable facts which cannot be bent by a biased mind.

The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a national cultural treasure pursu

ant to Republic Act No. 4846 but that does not exclude it from our national patr
imony. Republic Act No. 486, 'The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protectio

n Act," merely provides a procedure whereby a particular cultural property may b

e classified a "national cultural treasure" or an "important cultural property."

32 Approved on June 18, 1966 and amended by P.D. 3 74 in 1974, the law is limite

d in its reach and cannot be read as the exclusive law implementing Section 10,

Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. To be sure, the law does not equate cultur
al treasure and cultural property as synonymous to the phrase "patrimony of the

nation."

The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State includes the

respondent GSIS. A look at its charter will reveal that GSIS is a government-own

ed and controlled corporation that administers funds that come from the monthly

contributions of government employees and the government.33 The funds are held i

n trust for a distinct purpose which cannot be disposed of indifferently.34 They

are to be used to finance the retirement, disability and life insurance benefit

s of the employees and the administrative and operational expenses of the GSIS.3

5 Excess funds, however, are allowed to be invested in business and other ventur

es for the benefit of the employees.36 It is thus contended that the GSIS' inves

tment in the Manila Hotel Corporation is a simple business venture, hence, an ac

t beyond the contemplation of Section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Cons

titution.

The submission is unimpressive. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It i

s essentially a public corporation created by Congress and granted an original c

harter to serve a public purpose. It is subject to the jurisdictions of the Civi

l Service Commission37and the Commission on Audit.38 As a state-owned and contr

olled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies spelled out in the

Constitution especially those designed to promote the general welfare of the pe

ople. One of these policies is the Filipino First policy which the people elevat

ed as a constitutional command.

The fourth issue demands that we look at the content of the phrase "qualified Fi

lipinos" and their "preferential right." The Constitution desisted from defining

their contents. This is as it ought to be for a Constitution only lays down fle
xible policies and principles which can be bent to meet today's manifest needs a

nd tomorrow's unmanifested demands. Only a constitution strung with elasticity c

an grow as a living constitution.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELIX S. IMPERIAL JR.

February 11, 1999

GRN 130906. 96 PHIL 770

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Nature of the Case: Original action in the Supreme Court. Quo Warranto.

FACTS

On September 12, 1917, the late Elias Imperial was issued Original Certificate o

f Title (OCT) 408 (500) pursuant to Decree No. 55173 of the then Court of First

Instance of Albay, covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 1113 of the C

adastral Survey of Legazpi, G.L. Cad. Rec. No. 88, containing an area of fifty e

ight thousand and twenty six square meters (58,026), more or less, situated in L

egazpi City.
The plaintiff seeks to judicially declare the transfer certificate of titles des

cribed in the preceding paragraphs null and void; to order the said defendants t

o surrender the owner's duplicate of their aforesaid titles to the Register of D

eeds of Legazpi City and directing [sic] the latter to cancel them as well as th

e originals thereof and to declare the reversion of the lots covered by the afor

esaid titles to the mass of the public domain.

In support of its stand, the plaintiff contends among others that on letter requ

est addressed to the Honorable Solicitor General dated March 20, 1994, residents

of Purok No. 1 and Bgy. 24 Legazpi City, represented by Antonio F. Aguilar, req

uested that Original Certificate of Title No. 408 (500) in the name of Elias Imp

erial be cancelled and the land covered thereby reverted back to the State on th

e ground that the land subject thereof is a foreshore land. Subsequent investiga

tion conducted by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Re

gion V, Legazpi City, upon the request of the Office of the Solicitor General (O

SG) disclosed that OCT No. 408 (500), from whence the transfer certificate of ti

tles of the defendants were derived it null and void, and was, thus, acquired to

the prejudice of the State, considering that:

a. the parcel of land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) has the features of a foresh

ore land;

b. natural ground plants such as mangroves and nipas thrive on certain portions

of the land in question;

c. some portions of the same land are permanently submerged in seawater even at

low tide;

d. some portions of the same land are not anymore inundated by seawater due to

the considerable amount of improvements built thereon and the placing of boulder
s and other land-filling materials by the actual residents therein.

The plaintiff alleged that consequently on the basis of said findings, the Direc

tor, Lands Management Bureau recommended to the Director, Lands services, DENR,

the cancellation of OCT No. 406 [sic] (500) as well as its derivative titles thr

ough appropriate proceedings.

The plaintiff contended that since the land in question is foreshore land, the s

ame cannot be registered under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, now F.D.

No. 1529) in the name of private persons since it is non-alienable and belongs t

o the public domain, administered and managed by the State for the benefit of th

e general public.

The plaintiff further contended that under Public Land Act No. 141, as amended,

such land shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwis

e as soon as the President upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture

and Natural Resources, now DENR, shall declare that the same are not necessary f

or public services and are open to disposition.

Within the time for pleading, defendants EANCRA Corporation, Lolita Alcazar and

Salvador Alcazar filed their answer with cross-claim, while the rest of the defe

ndants, namely, Felix S. Imperial, Jr., Feliza S. Imperial, Elias S. Imperial an

d Miriam S. Imperial filed a motion to dismiss.

The aforesaid motion to dismiss was anchored on the following grounds: (a) the l

ands covered by the defendants' transfer certificate of titles which were derive

d from OCT No. 408 (500) was already the subject of the cadastral proceedings in

1917 and which has been implemented by the issuance of OCT No. 408 (500) under

the Torrens system.

The adjudication by the cadastral court is binding against the whole world inclu
ding the plaintiff since cadastral proceedings are in rem and the government its

elf through the Director of Lands instituted the proceedings and is a direct and
active participant. OCT No. 408 (500) issued under the Torrens system has long

become incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from the entry of decree of

registration; (b) OCT No. 408 (500) was judicially reconstituted in 1953 in acco

rdance with Republic Act [No.] 26 in the then Court of First Instance of Albay,

by Jose R. Imperial Samson in Court Case No. RT-305, entitled. The Director of L

ands vs. Jose R. Imperial Samson. The proceedings in the judicial reconstitution

in said case No. RT-305 is one in rem and has long become final and gave rise t

o res judicata and therefore can no longer legally be assailed; (c) the findings

of the Director of Lands dated February 22, 1983 [sic] from which no appeal was

taken in said administrative investigation that Lot No. 1113, Cd. 27 and a port

ion of it covered by Lot No. 1113-M-5 in the name of Jose Baritua cannot be cons

idered as part of the shore or foreshore of Albay Gulf. This finding of the Dire

ctor of Lands has become final and thus constitute res judicata, and finally mov

ing defendants contended that several interrelated cases have been decided relat

ed to OCT No. 408 (500), specifically Civil Cases Nos. 6556, 6885, 6999 and 7104

, all of the Regional Trial Court, Legazpi City which have been brought by sever

al squatters [sic] family against Jose Baritua attacking the latter's title over

Lot No. 1113-M-5 which was derived from OCT No. 408 (500) which cases were all

decided in favor of Jose Baritua, hence, the decisions rendered therein have bec

ome final and executory and constitute res judicata.

The plaintiff through the Office of the Solicitor General filed an objection to

the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds: (1) the purported decision

issued by the Court of First Instance of Albay in G.R. Cad. Rec. No. 88 suppose

dly resulting in the issuance of OCT No. 408 (500) pursuant to Decree No. 55173

does not constitute res judicata to the present case; (2) the incontestable and
indisputable character of a Torrens certificate of title does not apply when the

land thus covered, like foreshore land, is not capable of registration; (3) a c

ertificate of title judicially reconstituted from a void certificate of title is

, likewise, void; (4) administrative investigation conducted by the Director of

Lands is not a bar to the filing of reversion suits; and (5) the filing of the m

otion to dismiss carries with it the admission of the truth of all material fac

ts of the complaint.

After hearing the motion to dismiss, or on 9 August 1996, the trial court dismis

sed the complaint on the ground that the judgment rendered by the cadastral cour

t in G.R. Cad. Rec. No. 88 and our resolution in the petition to quiet title, G

.R. No. 85770, both decreed that the parcel of land covered by OCT No. 408 (500)

was not foreshore. The 1917 cadastral proceeding was binding upon the governmen

t, which had initiated the same and had been an active and direct participant th

ereon. Likewise, the 1982 petition to cancel OCT No. 408 (500) filed by the clai

mants of Lot No. 1113, Cad-47, and resolved by the Director of Lands in his 22 F

ebruary 1984 letter5 to the effect that "Original Certificate of Title No. 408 (

500) 2113 in the name of Elias Imperial and its derivative title[s] were legall

y issued" was res judicata to the instant case. Petitioner's contention that the

judicially reconstituted certificate of title was void since the land covered b

y OCT No. 408 (500) was foreshore land was a mere assumption contrary to existin

g physical facts. The court further considered as forum shopping petitioner's at

tempt to seek a favorable opinion after it was declared in related cases questio

ning the title of a certain Jose Baritua, which was also derived from OCT No. 40

8(500), that the land in question was foreshore.

On 28 October 1996, petitioner filed a notice of appeal.

On 18 April 1997, the Court of Appeals required petitioner to file its appellant

's brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt of the notice. Petitioner rece

ived said notice ten (10) days later, or on 28 April 1997.

Due to the alleged heavy workload of the solicitor assigned to the case, petiti

oner moved for an extension of thirty (30) days from 12 June 1997, or until 12 J
uly 1997, within which to file the appellant's brief. The Court of Appeals grant

ed petitioner's motion for extension in a resolution dated 26 June 1997.

On the same ground of continuing heavy pressure of work, petitioner filed, on

12 July 1997, its second motion for extension of thirty (30) days or until 11 Au

gust 1997 within which to file the appellant's brief.

On 11 August 1997, petitioner asked for a third extension of thirty (30) days, o

r until 10 September 1997, within which to file appellant's brief citing the sam

e ground of heavy pressure of work.

Meanwhile, on 30 July 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution, the full t

ext of which reads:

The Office of the Solicitor General is GRANTED a LAST EXTENSION of thirty (30) d

ays from July 12, 1997, or until August 11, 1997, within which to file the oppos

itor-appellant's brief. Failure to file said brief within the said period will m

ean dismissal of the appeal.6

On 12 August 1997, petitioner received a copy of the aforesaid resolution.

On 26 August 1997, petitioner moved to reconsider the 30 July 1997 resolution an

d, despite the appellate court's warning, reiterated its third motion for extens

ion of another thirty (30) days to file the appellant's brief.

On 10 September 1997, petitioner filed a manifestation and motion requesting ano

ther extension of five (5) days, or until 15 September 1997, within which to fil

e appellant's brief, reasoning that the brief, although finalized, was yet to be

signed by the Solicitor General.

On 15 September 1997, petitioner filed the required appellant's brief.

On 29 September 1997, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for recons

ideration for lack of merit and sustained its Resolution of 30 July 1997 dismiss
ing the case for failure to file the appellant's brief within the extended perio

d.

ISSUE

Whether or not the lands subject of petitioner's reversion efforts are foreshore

lands which constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing procedural rule

s and granting the third and fourth motions for extension to file appellant's br

ief.

RULING

The rules of court governing practice and procedure were formulated in order to

promote just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding

without sacrificing substantial justice and equity considerations.

The filing of appellant's brief in appeals is not a jurisdictional requirement.

Nevertheless, an appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals on its own moti

on or on that of the appellee upon failure of the appellant to serve and file th

e required number of copies of the brief within the time provided.

If the appeal brief cannot be filed on time, extension of time may be allowed pr

ovided (1) there is good and sufficient cause, and (2) the motion for extension

is filed before the expiration of the time sought to be extended.9 The court's l

iberality on extensions notwithstanding, lawyers should never presume that their

motions for extension would be granted as a matter of course or for the length

of time sought; their concession lies in the sound discretion of the Court exerc

ised in accordance with the attendant circumstances.

What constitutes good and sufficient cause that will merit suspension of the rul

es is discretionary upon the court. The court has the power to relax or suspend
the rules or to except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so wa

rrant or when the purpose of justice requires it. Among the reasons which the co

urt allowed in suspending application of the rules on filing an appeal brief wer

e the following: (1) the cause for the delay was not entirely attributable to th

e fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (2) t

here was no objection from the State, and the brief was filed within the period

requested; (3) no material injury was suffered by the appellee by reason of the

delay in filing the brief; (4) the fake lawyer failed to file the brief; (5) ap

pellant was represented by counsel de oficio; (6) petitioner's original counsel

died; and (7) the preparation of the consolidated brief involved a comparative s

tudy of many exhibits.

At the core of the controversy is whether the parcels of land in question are fo

reshore lands. Foreshore land is a part of the alienable land of the public doma

in and may be disposed of only by lease and not otherwise. It was defined as "th

at part (of the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the fl

ux and reflux of the tides."19 It is also known as "a strip of land that lies be

tween the high and low water marks and is alternatively wet and dry according to

the flow of the tide."

The classification of public lands is a function of the executive branch of gove

rnment, specifically the director of lands (now the director of the Lands Manage

ment Bureau). The decision of the director of lands when approved by the Secreta

ry of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as to question

s of fact is conclusive upon the court. The principle behind this ruling is tha

t the subject has been exhaustively weighed and discussed and must therefore be

given credit. This doctrine finds no application, however, when the decision of
the director of lands is revoked by, or in conflict with that of, the DENR Secre

tary.

There is allegedly a conflict between the findings of the Director of Lands and

the DENR, Region V, in the present case. Respondents contend that the Director o

f Lands found Jose Baritua's land covered by TCT No. 18655, which stemmed from O

CT 408(500), to be "definitely outside of the foreshore area."23 Petitioner, on

the other hand, claims that subsequent investigation of the DENR, Region V, Lega

zpi City, disclosed that the land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) from whence the t

itles were derived "has the features of a foreshore land."24 The contradictory v

iews of the Director of Lands and the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City, on the true

nature of the land, which contradiction was neither discussed nor resolved by th

e RTC, cannot be the premise of any conclusive classification of the land involv

ed.

The need, therefore, to determine once and for all whether the lands subject of

petitioner's reversion efforts are foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficie

nt cause for relaxing procedural rules and granting the third and fourth motions

for extension to file appellant's brief. Petitioner's appeal presents an. excep

tional circumstance impressed with public interest and must then be given due c

ourse.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED; the Resolutions of 30 July 1

997 and 29 September 1997 of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE; petitioner's ap

peal is reinstated; and the instant case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for

further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

U.S. vs. Ruiz

Supra at 95.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE AMANTE P. PURISIMA

August 31, 1977

GRN L-36084. 78 SCRA 470

FERNANDO, Acting C.J.:

Nature of the Case: Original action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibi

tion.

FACTS

The jurisdictional issued raised by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza on beh

alf of the Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition procee

ding arose from the failure of respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court

of First Instance of Manila to apply the well-known and of reiterated doctrine o

f the non-suability of a State, including its offices and agencies, from suit wi

thout its consent.

It was so alleged in a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Rice and Corn Admini
stration in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collect

ion of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff b

eing private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.1 Such a motion to dismis

s was filed on September 7, 1972. At that time, the leading ease of Mobil Philip

pines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Servicewere Justice Bengzon stressed

the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of a claim against an

y office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government un

less consent be shown, had been applied in 53 other decisions. There is thus mor

e than sufficient basis for an allegation of jurisdictional infirmity against th

e order of respondent Judge denying the motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972.

4 What is more, the position of the Republic has been fortified with the explici

t affirmation found in this provision of the present Constitution: "The State ma

y not be sued without its consent."

ISSUE

Whether or not the State may be sued without its consent.

RULING

The doctrine of nonsuability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the e

ffectivity of the [19351 Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist c

oncept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal r

ight as against the state, in itself the source of the law on which such a right

may be predicated. Nor is this all. Even if such a principle does give rise to

problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government enabling it to enga

ge in business pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to t

he analytical school of thought alone that calls for its continued applicability

. Why it must continue to be so, even if the matter be viewed sociologically, wa

s set forth in Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic thus: 'Nonetheles

s, a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored

for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of

governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance-of its multifarious

functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and th

e availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well-known

propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, t

he loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence

of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could ver

y well be imagined.'"It only remains to be added that under the present Constitu

tion which, as noted, expressly reaffirmed such a doctrine, the following decisi

ons had been rendered: Del Mar v. The Philippine Veterans Administration;8 Repub

lic v. Villasor;9 Sayson v. Singson; and Director of the Bureau of Printing v. F

rancisco.

Apparently respondent Judge was misled by the terms of the contract between the

private respondent, plaintiff in his sala, and defendant Rice and Corn Administ

ration which, according to him, anticipated the case of a breach of contract wit

hin the parties and the suits that may thereafter arise.13 The consent. to be ef

fective though, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute a

s pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant

Rice and Corn Administration Weed to had no binding force on the government. Tha

t was clearly beyond the scope of his authority At any rate, Justice Sanchez, in

Ramos v. Court of Industrial Relations,14 was quite categories] as to its "not

[being] possessed of a separate and distinct corporate existence. On the contrar

y, by the law of its creation, it is an office directly 'under the Office of the
President of the Philippines/'"

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted and the resolution of October

4. 1972 denying the motion to dismiss filed by the Rice and Corn Administration

nullified and set aside and the petition for prohibition is likewise granted res

training respondent Judge from acting on Civil Case No. 79082 pending in his sal
a except for the purpose of ordering its dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The

temporary restraining order issued on February 8, 1973 by this Court is made pe

rmanent except for the above-mentioned purpose of definitely terminating this ca

se. Costs against Yellow Bill Freight Lines, Inc.

THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL vs. UNG SIU SI TEMPLE

May 21, 1955

GRN L-6776. 97 PHIL 58

REYES J. B. L., J.:

Nature of the Case: Appeal from resolution of the CFI of Manila, Ibanez, J.

FACTS

The Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal refused to accept for record a d

eed of donation executed in due form on January 22, 1953, by Jesus Dy, a Filipin

o citizen, conveying a parcel of residential land, in Caloocan, Rizal, known as

lot No. 2, block 48-D, PSD-4212, G.L.R.O. Record No. 11267, in favor of the unre

gistered religious organization "Ung Siu Si Temple", operating through three tru

stees all of Chinese nationality. The donation was duly accepted by Yu Juan, of

Chinese nationality, founder and deaconess of the Temple, acting in representati

on and in behalf of the latter and its trustees.

The refusal of the Registrar was elevated en Consulta to the IVth Branch of the

Court of First Instance of Manila. On March 14, 1953, the Court upheld the actio

n of the Rizal Register of Deeds.

ISSUE

Whether or not the transcribed consulta of a deed of donation of a parcel of la

nd executed in favor of a religious organization whose founder, trustees and adm

inistrator are Chinese citizens should be registered

RULING

It appearing from the record of the Consulta that UNG SIU SI TEMPLE is a religio

us organization whose deaconess, founder, trustees and administrator are all Chi

nese citizens, this Court is of the opinion and so hold that in view of the prov

isions of the sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the Philip

pines limiting the acquisition of land in the Philippines to its citizens, or to

corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital stock of

which is owned by such citizens adopted after the enactment of said Act No. 271,

and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Krivenko vs. the Register

of Deeds of Manila, the deed of donation in question should not be admitted for

registration.".

Not satisfied with the ruling of the Court of First Instance, counsel for the do

nee Uy Siu Si Temple has appealed to this Court, claiming: (1) that the acquisit

ion of the land in question, for religious purposes, is authorized and permitted

by Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission, providing as follows:

"SECTION 1. It shall be lawful for all religious associations, of whatever sort

or denomination, whether incorporated in the Philippine Islands or in the name o

f other country, or not incorporated at all, to hold land in the Philippine Isla

nds upon which to build churches, parsonages, or educational or charitable insti

tutions.

"SEC. 2. Such religious institutions, if not incorporated, shall hold the land i

n the name of three Trustees for the use of such associations; * * *". (Printed

Rec. App. p. 5.)

and (2) that the refusal of the Register of Deeds violates the freedom of religi
on clause of our Constitution [Art. III, Sec. 1(7)].

We are of the opinion that the Court below has correctly held that in view of th

e absolute terms of section 5, Title XIII, of the Constitution, the provisions o

f Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission must be deemed repealed since the

Constitution was enacted, in so far as incompatible therewith. In providing tha

t,"Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be

transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations qua

lified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines",the Con

stitution makes no exception in favor of religious associations. Neither is ther

e any such saving found in sections 1 and 2 of Article XIII, restricting the acq

uisition of public agricultural lands and other natural resources to "corporatio

ns or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by

such citizens" (of the Philippines).

The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not

suffice to escape the Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its

members are of foreign nationality. The purpose of the sixty per centum requirem

ent is obviously to ensure that corporations or associations allowed to acquire

agricultural land or to exploit natural resources shall be controlled by Filipin

os; and the spirit of the Constitution demands that in the absence of capital st

ock, the controlling membership should be composed of Filipino citizens.

To permit religious associations controlled by non-Filipinos to acquire agricult

ural lands would be to drive the opening wedge to revive alien religious land ho

ldings in this country. We can not ignore the historical fact that complaints ag

ainst land holdings of that kind were among the factors that sparked the revolut

ion of 1896.
As to the complaint that the disqualification under article XIII is violative of

the freedom of religion guaranteed by Article III of the Constitution, we are b

y no means convinced (nor has it been shown) that land tenure is indispensable

to the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession or worship; or that o

ne may not worship the Deity according to the dictates of his own conscience unl

ess upon land held in fee simple.The resolution appealed from is affirmed, with

costs against appellant.

Resolution appealed from, affirmed.

CARMELO F. LAZATIN vs. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

December 8, 1988

G.R. No. 84297

CORTES, J.:

Nature of the Action: Special Civil action for certiorari, and prohibition to r

eview the resolutions of House Electoral Tribunal.

FACTS

Petitioner and private respondent are candidates for Representative of the first

district of Pampanga. Despite Private respondent s objections and suspension of p

roclamation of winner, petitioner was proclaimed winner. Private respondent the

n filed for petition to declare petitioner s proclamation as void ab initio and to

prohibit him from assuming office which was granted by COMELEC. Petitioner the

n challenged the said Resolution in the Supreme Court which was granted in his f

avor. Private respondent filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribuna

l (hereinafter referred to as HRET an election protest, docketed as Case No. 46.

Petitioner moved to dismiss private respondent's protest on the ground that it

had been filed late, citing Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881

). However, the HRET filed that the protest had been filed on time in accordance

with Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also

denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the election protest had been seasonably filed.

RULING
 The Court is of the view that the protest had been filed on time and, hence,

the HRET acquired jurisdiction over it. The power of the HRET, as the sole judge

of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Mem

bers of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relati

ve to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election

protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily flows f

rom the general power granted it by the Constitution. Petition is hereby DISMISS

ED.
EVANGELISTA vs. JARENCIO

November 27, 1975

G.R. No. L-29274

MARTIN, J.:

Nature of the Case: This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition wi

th preliminary injunction

FACTS

The President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and

Government Operations (PARGO) and vested in the Agency all the powers of an inve

stigating committee including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpo

ena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the in

vestigation. Petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, is

sued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer

of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witne

ss at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

... then and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending th

erein. Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed with

the Court of First Instance of Manila an Amended Petition for prohibition, cert

iorari and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order an

d assailed its legality. Manalastas petition was granted by the judge. Petitioner

s then elevated this matter directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to is

sue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.

RULING
 An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only

in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings who

se sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislati

ve or judicial nature may be taken and may require the attendance of witnesses i

n proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries

into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies

and make recommendations for actions. Nothing then appears conclusive than that

the disputed subpoena issued by petitioner Quirico Evangelista to respondent Fe

rnando Manalastas is well within the legal competence of the Agency to issue. Th

e order of respondent Judge, is hereby set aside and declared of no force and ef

fect.
TEODORO CHAVEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

January 31,1987

G.R.Nos.L-49167-70

SANCHEZ, J.:

Nature of the Case: Original and Supplementary Petition in Supreme Court. Mandam

us and Habeas Corpus.

FACTS

Carlos Teodoro was hired by Teodoro Chavez as security guard in his fish pond

and later was asked to find workers to construct salt beds. Teodoro and his br

others then constructed salt beds in the said fishpond and were the ones who mai

ntained it for several years. They were however forcibly ejected one day from t

heir work and not allowed to return. They then filed a case against Teodoro Chav

ez to restore them to possession, maintenance and cultivation of the said salt b

eds as they are tenants of Chavez which was granted by the court. Defendants app

ealed to the court of Appeals but were denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Private Respondents are tenants.

HELD:

Participation of the private respondents in an the phases of farm work in the sa

lt bed cultivation of the questioned landholdings leaves no doubt that the tenan

cy relationship existing between petitioners and respondents is fully substantia

ted by the records. The findings of facts of the trial court which heard, saw an

d observed the witnesses testify in Court should not be disturbed on appeal in t

he absence of any showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood or otherwise mis

interpreted some facts or circumstances which when properly weighed and interpre
ted, would justify a reversal of the appealed decision- In the same manner, the

findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are generally binding upon the Supreme

Court. Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

MUNICIPALITY OF PAOAY, ET AL. vs. TEODORO MANAOIS, ET AL.

June 30, 1950

G.R. No. L-3485. 86 PHIL 629

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Nature of the Case: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari with Prelim

inary Injunction.

FACTS

The municipal waters of the town of Paoay were divided by the municipality and l

eased out to private persons for fishing. One of the lots was leased to Francis

co Duque but was later confiscated for his failure to comply with the lease agre

ements. The said lot was later leased to Teodoro Manaois. When Manaois tried to

enter said lot he was refused entrance by Duque as the latter still assumes own

ership over the said lot. Manaois then brought an action against the municipali

ty for the recovery of the sum paid by him plus dmages which was decided in his

favor. A levy of attachment was then executed. The municipality then filed a p

etition for dissolution alleging that the said lots are not subject to levy as t

hey are properties for public use, which was denied. Their motion for reconside
ration was also denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the properties for public use can be levied.

RULING

The fishery or municipal waters of the town of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, are

clearly not subject to execution. In the first place, they do not belong to the

municipality. They may well be regarded as property of State. section 2321 of th

e Revised Administrative Code reads:

1. SEC. 2321. Grant of fishery. A municipal council shall have authority, for pu

rposes of profit, to grant the exclusive privileges of fishery or right to condu

ct a fish-breeding ground within any definite portion, or area, of the municipal

waters.

"Municipal waters", as herein used, include not only streams, lakes, and tidal w

aters, include within the municipality, not being the subject of private ownersh

ip, but also marine waters include between two lines drawn perpendicular to the

general coast line from points where the boundary lines of the municipality touc

h the sea at high tide, and third line parallel with the general coast line and

distant from it three marine leagues.

Where two municipalities are so situated on opposite shores that there is less t

han six marine leagues of marine waters between them the third line shall be a l

ine equally distant from the opposite shores of the respective municipalities.
The order of the respondent Judge is reversed insofar as it failed to dissolve t

he attachment of the fishery lots. In all other respect, said order is hereby af

firmed.

MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI vs. COURT OF APPEALS

October 1, 1990

G.R. NOS. 89898. 190 SCRA 206

CORTES, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS

Petitioner Municipality of Makati initiated to expropriate the land own

ed by private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium Inc., et. al, atta

ched to the action it filed is the petitioner s certification that it opened an ac

count at PNB Buendia Branch, however, after the writ of execution filed by the p

rivate respondent was granted by the RTC, petitioner refused to pay on the groun

d that the manner of payment should be installment which was opposed by private

respondent.

Pending resolution of the above motions petitioner filed a Manifestation

informing the court that private respondent was no longer the true and lawful o

wner of the subject property because a new title for the property has been regis

tered in the name of Philippine Savings Bank

 Petitioner later admitted that it has two accounts with the PNB Buendia

, one was exclusively opened for the payment of said land and the other for sta

tutory obligations and other purposes of the municipal government which it conte

nded as exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under

the law.

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioner municipality can refuse to effect payment considering

that the orders assailed of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount, the fu

nds garnished by respondent sheriff in excess, which are public funds earmarked

for the municipal government s other statutory obligations, are exempted from exec

ution without the proper appropriation required under the law?

RULING

Well settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and e

xecution, unless otherwise provided by a statute. However, this does not to say

that private respondent and PSB are left with no other recourse. They may avail

of the remedy of mandamus to compel the enacment and and approval of the necessa

ry appropriation ordinance anddisbursement of municipal funds therefore.

Within the context of the State s inherent power of eminent domain, just compensa

tion means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the ow

ner but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. W

ithout prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just for the property o

wner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land

while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amo

unt necessary to cope with his loss.

The State s power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds
of fair play and justice. In this case, considering that valuable property has b

een taken, the compensation to be paid is fixed and the Municipality is in full

possession and utilizing the property for public purpose, for three years, the

Court finds the municipality has had more than reasonable time to pay full compe

nsation.

Petitioner should immediately pay Phillippine Savings Bank and private responden

t the corresponding amount and to submit to the Court a report of its compliance

with this Court s order.

LORENZO vs. THE DIRECTOR OF HEALTH

September 1, 1927

G.R. NO. 27484. 50 PHIL. 595

MALCOLM, J.:

Nature of the Case: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila.

FACTS

Petitioner who is a counsel for the leper confined at the San Lazaro Hos

pital contends that the law authorizing the segregation of lepers found in Artic

le XV of Chapter 37 of the Administrative Code Section 1058 is unconstitutional.

ISSUE

Whether the law authorizing the segregation of the lepers is unconstitut

ional.

RULING

All questions relating to the determination of matters of fact are for t

he legislature. If there is probable basis for sustaining the conclusion reached

, its findings are not subject to judicial review. Debatable questions are for t

he legislature to decide.

Petitioner should reopen the question to the local legislature who has r

egarded leprosy as a contagious disease and has authorized measures to control t

he dread scourge.

IN RE: GONZALES
April 15, 1988

GRN 8845433, 160 SCRA 771

PER CURIAM

Nature of the Case: Review of an Administrative Matter. Resolution.

FACTS
€€€€€€ The Court CONSIDERED the 1st Indorsement dated 16 March 1988 from Mr. Raul M. Go

nzalez, "Tanodbayan/Special Prosecutor" forwarding to Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fer

nan a "letter-complaint, dated 14 December 1987 with enclosure of the Concerned

Employees of the Supreme Court," together with a telegram of Miguel Cuenco, for

"comment within ten (10) days from receipt hereof." Mr. Justice Fernan had broug

ht this 1st Indorsement to the attention of the Court en banc in view of the imp

ortant implications of policy raised by said 1st Indorsement.

The mentioned 1st Indorsement has two (2) attachments. First, an anonymo

us letter by "Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court" addressed to Hon. Raul M

. Gonzalez referring to charges for disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco agai

nst Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan and asking Mr. Gonzalez "to do something about

this." The second attachment is a copy of a telegram from Mr. Miguel Cuenco add

ressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco refers to pleadings he apparen

tly filed on 29 February 1988 with the Supreme Court in Administrative Case No.

3135, which, in the opinion of Mr. Cuenco, made improper any "intervention" by M

r. Raul Gonzalez. Mr. Cuenco, nonetheless, encourages Mr. Gonzalez "to file resp

onsive pleading Supreme Court en banc to comply with Petition Concerned Employee

s Supreme Court asking Tanodbayan's intervention.

The Court DIRECTED the Clerk of Court to furnish Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez a

copy of the per curiam Resolution, dated 17 February 1988 of the Court in Admini

strative Case No. 3135 entitled "Miguel Cuenco v. Honorable Marcelo B. Fernan" i

n which Resolution, the Court Resolved to dismiss the charges made by complainan

t Cuenco against Mr. Justice Fernan for utter lack of merit. In the same Resolut

ion, the Court Resolved to require complainant Cuenco to show cause why he shoul

d not be administratively dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations ag

ainst Mr. Justice Fernan. Upon request of Mr. Cuenco, the Court had granted him

an extension of up to 30 March 1988 within which to file his Motion for Reconsid

eration of the Resolution of this Court of 17 February 1988. On 28 March 1988, M

r. Cuenco filed a pleading which appears to be an omnibus pleading relating to,

inter alia, Administrative Case No. 3135. Insofar as Administrative Case No. 313

5 is concerned, the Court treated this pleading as a Motion for Reconsideration.

By a per curiam Resolution dated 15 April 1988, the Court denied with finality

Mr. Cuenco's Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE

Whether or not removal of a member of the Supreme Court is valid,

RULING

It is important to underscore the rule of constitutional law here involv

ed. This principle may be succinctly formulated in the following terms: A public

officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine

Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from o

ffice only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumben

cy of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency,

cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with an

y offense which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penal

ty service of which would amount to removal from office.

The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988:

"There is another reason why the complaint for disbarment here must be d

ismissed. Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the C

onstitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from office onl

y by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbar

ment of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency, would in effect be

to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members

of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction

of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution. Precisely the

same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [

8] in relation to Article XI [2], id.), a majority of the members of the Commiss

ion on Elections (Article XI [C] [1] [1] in relation to Article XI [2], id. and

the members of the Commission on Audit who are not certified public accountants

(Article XI [D] [1] [1], id.), all of whom are constitutionally required to be m

embers of the Philippine Bar."

It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that its Members

or the other constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immun

ity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Ca

nons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What the Court is saying

is that there is a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed befo

re such liability may be determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court

must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment un

der Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure o

f the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be he

ld to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) f

or any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate procee

dings.

The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independe

nce and separation of powers. The rule is important because judicial independenc

e is important. Without the protection of this rule, Members of the Supreme Cour

t would be vulnerable to all manner of charges which might be brought against th

em by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any n

umber of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the

Court.
Republic vs. Go Bon Lee
1961

1 SCRA 1166

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WILLIAM LI YAO

1992

G.R. No. L-35947. 214 SCRA 748

ROMERO, J.:

Nature of the Case: Appeal from the order of the CFI of Manila, Br.5

FACTS

William Li Yao, a Chinese national, filed a petition for naturalization

on June 3, 1949 with the then Court of First Instance of Manila, which petition

was docketed as Case No. 8225. After several hearings on the petition were held

wherein the Office of the Solicitor General, in the representation of the Republ

ic of the Philippines appeared, the lower court rendered a decision in his favor

.
 About fifteen years later, the Republic of the Philippines, through the

Solicitor General, filed a motion to cancel William Li Yao's certificate of natu

ralization on the ground that it was fraudulently and illegally obtained. That h

e was not a person of good moral character, having had illicit amorous relations

hips with several women other than his lawfully wedded wife, by whom he fathered

illegitimate children. In contracting marriage, he used the name Fransisco Li Y

ao without prior judicial authority to use the aforesaid first name Francisco, t

he same not appearing to be his baptismal name. He was also known and had used t

he name and/or alias LI CHAY TOO, JR. before the last World War, and under which

name, a trust fund was created for him. He evaded the payment of lawful taxes d

ue to the government by under declaration of income as reflected in his income t

ax returns for the years 1946-1951. He committed violations of the Constitution

and Anti-Dummy laws prohibiting aliens from acquiring real properties by employi

ng dummies in the formation of a private domestic corporation, which acquired th

e real properties. He made it appear, falsely, in the baptismal certificate of a

n illegitimate son he fathered, named William Jose Antonio, that the latter's mo

ther is Juanita Tan Ho Ti, his law-mother is another woman.

William Li Yao opposed the forgoing motion on July 22, 1971. The lower c

ourt, however, without touching on all the grounds upon which the said motion wa

s based, relied solely on ground that William Li Yao evaded the payment of lawfu

l taxes due the government by under declaration of income as reflected in his in

come tax returns for the years 1946-1951. William Li Yao filed a motion for reco

nsideration on December 29, 1971, which the lower court denied. William LI Yao f

iled a notice of appeal to this Court, manifesting that he was appealing from th

e order of the lower court dated July 22, 1971, and from the order dated Decembe
r 29, 1971. After the parties had filed their respective briefs, petitioner-appe

llant Li Yao died. The case has not, however, become moot and academic since its

disposition, either way, will have grave implications for the late petitioner-a

ppellant's wife and children.

ISSUE

The issue in this case is whether or not the cancellation of the certifi

cate of naturalization of the deceased petitioner-appellant William Li Yao made

by the government through the Office of the Solicitor General is valid.

RULING

The appeal is without merit. It is indisputable that a certificate of na

turalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applican

t therefore obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and

jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization

upon grounds had conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the certifica

te. Moreover, a naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding

, the decision rendered therein, not constituting res judicata as to any matter

that would support a judgment canceling a certificate of naturalization on the g

round of illegal or fraudulent procurement thereof.

The lower court based its order of cancellation of citizenship on the fi

nding of evasion of payment of lawful taxes which is sufficient ground, under Se

c. 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law requiring, among others, that applicant c

onduct himself "in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period o

f his residence in the Philippines in his relation with constituted government a

s well as with the community in which he is living," to strip him of his citizen
ship without going into the other grounds for cancellation presented by the Soli

citor General. Finally, taking into account the fact that naturalization laws sh

ould be rigidly enforced in favor of the Government and against the applicant, t

his Court has repeatedly maintained the view that where the applicant failed to
meet the qualifications required for naturalization, the latter is not entitled

to Filipino citizenship.

Philippine Constitution Commission vs. Enriquez

1994

G.R. No. 113105. 235 SCRA 506

QUIASON, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition for review of orders or resolutions of the Executiv

e Secretary, Secretary of Budget and Management, National Treasurer, and the Com

mission on Audit.

FACTS

House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was

passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed,

it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the

proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized member

s of Congress to propose and identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to

them and to realign their respective operating budgets. The President signed th

e bill into law. The Philippine Constitution Association, Exequiel B. Garcia and

Ramon A. Gonzales as taxpayers, prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare as

unconstitutional and void: (a) Article XLI on the Countrywide Development Fund,

the special provision in Article I entitled Realignment of Allocation for Operat

ional Expenses, and Article XLVIII on the Appropriation for Debt Service or the
amount appropriated under said Article XLVIII in excess of the P37.9 Billion all

ocated for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports; and (b) the veto of

the President of the Special Provision of €

Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994. Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 sets up a Coun

trywide Development Fund of P2,977,000,000.00 to "be used for infrastructure, pu

rchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities an

d credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries."

Petitioners claim that the power given to the members of Congress to propose and

identify the projects and activities to be funded by the Countrywide Developmen

t Fund is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said powe

r in an appropriation act in implementation of a law. They argue that the propos

al and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the r

epeal and amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Cons

titution.

Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realig

n his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category, claimin

g that this practice is prohibited by Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitut

ion.

Petitioners argue that the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Repr

esentatives, but not the individual members of Congress are the ones authorized

to realign the savings as appropriated.

While Congress appropriated P86,323,438,000.00 for debt service (Article XLVII o

f the GAA of 1994), it appropriated only P37,780,450,000.00 for the Department o

f Education Culture and Sports. Petitioners urged that Congress cannot give debt

service the highest priority in the GAA of 1994 because under the Constitution

it should be education that is entitled to the highest funding.

The President vetoed the first Special Provision, without vetoing the P86,323,43

8,000.00 appropriation for debt service in said Article. Petitioners claim that

the President cannot veto the Special Provision on the appropriation for debt se

rvice without vetoing the entire amount of P86,323,438.00 for said purpose. The

Solicitor General counterposed that the Special Provision did not relate to the

item of appropriation for debt service and could therefore be the subject of an

item veto.

Petitioners contend that granting arguendo that the veto of the Special Provisio

n on the ceiling for debt payment is valid, the President cannot automatically a

ppropriate funds for debt payment without complying with the conditions for auto

matic appropriation under the provisions of R.A. No. 4860 as amended by P.D. No.

81 and the provisions of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by the Administrative Code of

1987 and P.D. No. 1967.

ISSUE

The validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appr

opriation bill.

RULING

Under the Constitution, the spending power belongs to Congress, subject only to

the veto power of the President. The President may propose the budget, but still

the final say on the matter of appropriations is lodged in the Congress.

The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or a

ctivity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as b

road as Congress wants it to be.

The Countrywide Development Fund is explicit that it shall be used "for infrastr

ucture, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and act

ivities and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries . . ." It was Congress

itself that determined the purposes for the appropriation.

Executive function under the Countrywide Development Fund involves implementatio

n of the priority projects specified in the law.

The authority given to the members of Congress is only to propose and identify p

rojects to be implemented by the President. Under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994

, the President must perforce examine whether the proposals submitted by the mem

bers of Congress fall within the specific items of expenditures for which the Fu

nd was set up, and if qualified, he next determines whether they are in line wit

h other projects planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the proposed projects

qualify for funding under the Funds, it is the President who shall implement the

m. In short, the proposals and identifications made by the members of Congress a

re merely recommendatory.

The procedure of proposing and identifying by members of Congress of particular

projects or activities under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 is imaginative as it

is innovative.

The Constitution is a framework of a workable government and its interpretation

must take into account the complexities, realities and politics attendant to the

operation of the political branches of government. Prior to the GAA of 1991, th

ere was an uneven allocation of appropriations for the constituents of the membe
rs of Congress, with the members close to the Congressional leadership or who ho

ld cards for "horse-trading," getting more than their less favored colleagues. T

he members of Congress also had to reckon with an unsympathetic President, who c

ould exercise his veto power to cancel from the appropriation bill a pet project

of a Representative or Senator.

The Countrywide Development Fund attempts to make equal the unequal. It is also

a recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the President a

nd their congressional colleagues are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs

of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project.

Under the Special Provisions applicable to the Congress of the Philippin

es, the members of Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of t

he savings in the allotments for their operating expenses. They are in the best

position to do so because they are the ones who know whether there are savings a

vailable in some items and whether there are deficiencies in other items of thei

r operating expenses that need augmentation. However, it is the Senate President

and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall

approve the realignment.

As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education h

as tripled to upgrade and improve the facility of the public school system. The

compensation of teachers has been doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.00 set

aside for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the General Appr

opriations Act (R.A. No. 6381), is the highest budgetary allocation among all de

partment budgets.

This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate according h

ighest priority to education.

Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not without

any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that c

an reasonably service our enormous debt, the greater portion of which was inheri
ted from the previous administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to pr

otect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of

our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount

for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds

and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutio

nal.

The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President m

ay not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the

basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject

of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provis

ion in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particu

lar appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be limited in its op

eration to the appropriation to which it relates (1987 Constitution, Article VI,

Section 25 [2]). In other words, in the true sense of the term, a provision in

an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriat

ion to which it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill.

It is readily apparent that the Special Provision applicable to the appr

opriation for debt service insofar as it refers to funds in excess of the amount

appropriated in the bill, is an "inappropriate" provision referring to funds ot

her than the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriated in the General Appropriations Act o

f 1991.

Likewise the vetoed provision is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31

of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the d

ebt payment policy. As held by the Court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws s

hould be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.

 The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part o

f the legislative process. That is why it is found in Article VI on the Legislat

ive Department rather than in Article VII on the Executive Department in the Con

stitution. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of val

idity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to

show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.

Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the entire bill,

not merely parts thereof. The exception to the general veto power is the power

given to the President to veto any particular item or items in a general appropr

iations bill. In so doing, the President must veto the entire item.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is

limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separat

e fiscal unit.

Petitioners cannot anticipate that the President will not faithfully exe

cute the laws. The writ of prohibition will not issue on the fear that official

actions will be done in contravention of the laws. We reiterate, in order to obv

iate any misunderstanding, that we are sustaining the veto of the Special Provis

ion of the item on debt service only with respect to the proviso therein requiri

ng that "any payment in excess of the amount herein, appropriated shall be subje

ct to the approval of the President of the Philippines with the concurrence of t

he Congress of the Philippines .

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, except with respect to G.R. No. 113105 onl

y insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the special provision on

debt service specifying that the fund therein appropriated "shall be used for p

ayment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" prohi

biting the use of the said funds "to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank

Board of Liquidators"), which is GRANTED.

IGLESIA NI CRISTO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

July 26, 1996, 259 SCRA 529

Nature of the Case: Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS: The subject programs were barred from public viewing by the board for at

tacking certain doctrines and practices of the Catholic and Protestant religions

, but were sustained by the regional trial court, which also prohibited the Boar

d from requiring the petitioner to submit its programs to it for previous cleara
nce. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, prompting the INC to go to t

he Supreme Court for relief.

ISSUES: Two basic issues were raised, to wit, whether the Movies and Television

Review and Classification Board had the power to review the petitioner s programs

and clear them for showing on television and, assuming it had, whether it gravel

y abused its discretion in prohibiting their exhibition as x-rated material.

RULING: The majority of the Court held for the Board on the first issue

but found that it should not have banned the telecast of the programs because th

ey did not attack but merely criticized the other religions in the exercise by t

he INC of its freedom of _expression and religion. The criticisms did not create

a clear and present danger requiring the prior restraint of the state, accordin

g to Justice Puno, who was joined by Justices Regalado, Davide, Romero, Francisc

o and Torres, with Chief Justice Narvasa concurring in the result. Justices Padi

lla, Melo and Kapunan, while agreeing that the Board had indeed committed grave

abuse of discretion, filed strong dissents impugning its censorship powers as vi

olative of the Bill of Rights.

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, vs. JUAN C. TUVERA

December 29, 1986, G.R. No. L-63915. 146 SCRA 446

Nature of the Case: Resolution

FACTS: Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure o

f a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as

required by law. In the decision of this case, the Court affirmed the necessity

for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive port

ion as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazett

e all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and u

nless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

The petitioners move for reconsideration/ clarification of that decision by aski

the making of temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety. To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative need
for an appointment, during the period of the ban, not only in the executive but also in the Supreme
Court. This may be the case should the membership of the court be so reduced that it will have no
quorum or should the voting on a particularly important question requiring expeditious resolution be
evenly divided. Such a case, however, is covered by neither Section 15 of Article VII nor Section 4 (1) and
9 of Article VIII. The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, 1998 (transmitted to the
Office of the Chief Justice on May 14, 1998) were unquestionably made during the period of the ban.
Consequently, they come within the operation of the first prohibition relating to appointments which
are considered to be for the purpose of buying votes or influencing the election. While the filling of
vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any
compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban. On the other
hand, as already discussed, there is a strong public policy for the prohibition against appointments made
within the period of the ban. ARTURO M. DE CASTRO v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO G. R. NO. 191002, MARCH 17, 2010, J. BERSAMIN In reversing
the Valenzuela ruling, the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII is now deemed inapplicable to the
appointments in the judiciary. Facts: I. Short Title: In Re: Valenzuela and Vallarta II. Full Title: In Re
Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges
of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively. III.
TOPIC: Presidency IV.

Statement of Facts:

I. THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF THE LAW (CASES)

CASE 1: Secretary of Justice v. Lantion G.R. No. 139465

EN BANC

G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B.
JIMENEZ, respondents.
MELO, J.:

The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis-à-vis the vast and overwhelming powers
of government. His only guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his fundamental liberties under
the Bill of Rights which shield him in times of need. The Court is now called to decide whether to uphold
a citizen's basic due process rights, or the government's ironclad duties under a treaty. The bugle sounds
and this Court must once again act as the faithful guardian of the fundamental writ.

The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069
"Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign
Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual
concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where the
criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of
the Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for rules to
guide the executive department and the courts in the proper implementation of said treaties.

On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter referred
to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence
in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting
Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition
request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident
in the Requesting State).

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note
Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the
United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest
issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said
extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United
States with violation of the following provisions of the United States Code (USC):

A) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; two [2] counts;
Maximum Penalty — 5 years on each count);

B) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty — 5 years on
each count);

C) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty — 5 years
on each count);

D) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts; Maximum Penalty — 5 years on each
count);

E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33] counts; Maximum
Penalty — less than one year).

(p. 14, Rollo.)

On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of
attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No.
1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the "technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition
request and the documents in support thereof. The panel found that the "official English translation of
some documents in Spanish were not attached to the request and that there are some other matters
that needed to be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo).
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, through counsel,
wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition
request from the U.S. Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith; and that
he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested
papers. Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in
the meantime.

Later, private respondent requested that preliminary, he be given at least a copy of, or access to, the
request of the United States Government, and after receiving a copy of the Diplomatic Note, a period of
time to amplify on his request.

In response to private respondent's July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter dated July 13, 1999
(but received by private respondent only on August 4, 1999), denied the foregoing requests for the
following reasons:

1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request and supporting
documents from the United States Government, pending evaluation by this Department of the
sufficiency of the extradition documents submitted in accordance with the provisions of the
extradition treaty and our extradition law. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the
Philippines and the United States enumerates the documentary requirements and establishes
the procedures under which the documents submitted shall be received and admitted as
evidence. Evidentiary requirements under our domestic law are also set forth in Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1069.

Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not a preliminary

investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. We merely determine
whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law and treaty have been
complied with by the Requesting Government. The constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not available.

It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited
will be furnished by the court with copies of the petition, request and extradition documents
and this Department will not pose any objection to a request for ample time to evaluate said
documents.

2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury information and
documents obtained through grand jury process covered by strict secrecy rules under United
States law. The United States had to secure orders from the concerned District Courts
authorizing the United States to disclose certain grand jury information to Philippine
government and law enforcement personnel for the purpose of extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any
further disclosure of the said information is not authorized by the United States District Courts.
In this particular extradition request the United States Government requested the Philippine
Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject information. This Department's
denial of your request is consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which provides
that the Philippine Government must represent the interests of the United States in any
proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. The Department of Justice under P.D. No.
1069 is the counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition requests.
 3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an
extradition request. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are
a party provides that "[E]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to be
effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or convicted persons must be
processed expeditiously.

(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)

Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel
herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto,
and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to
evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari(to set aside herein petitioner's letter
dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering the extradition request and
from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director
of the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the United
States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction (pp. 104-105, Rollo).

The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and thereafter raffled to Branch
25 of said regional trial court stationed in Manila which is presided over by the Honorable Ralph C.
Lantion.

After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who appeared in his
own behalf, moved that he be given ample time to file a memorandum, but the same was denied.

On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous day, disposing:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely: the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, their
agents and/or representatives to maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts
complained of; from conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of the
United States Government for the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the corresponding
Petition with a Regional Trial court; and from performing any act directed to the extradition of
the petitioner to the United States, for a period of twenty (20) days from service on respondents
of this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the preliminary injunction, as agreed
upon by the counsels for the parties herein, is set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00 o'clock in the
morning. The respondents are, likewise, ordered to file their written comment and/or
opposition to the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction on or before said date.

SO ORDERED.

(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)

Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE

OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE:

I.

BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROM COMMITTING THE ACTS COMPLAINED

OF, I.E., TO DESIST FROM REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THE OFFICIAL
EXTRADITION REQUEST AND DOCUMENTS AND FROM DENYING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN
OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT ON, OR OPPOSITION TO, THE REQUEST, THE MAIN PRAYER
FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IN THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION
WAS, IN EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF
THE MANDAMUS ISSUES;

II.

PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE
EXTRADITION TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW;

III.

THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS FACE, FORMALLY
AND SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND

IV.

PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT NEEDS PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT,
AND WILL NOT SUFFER ANY IRREPARABLE INJURY.

(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)

On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his comment. Also issued, as prayed
for, was a temporary restraining order (TRO) providing:

NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court,
You, Respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion, your agents, representatives or any person or persons
acting in your place or stead are hereby ORDERED to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing the
assailed order dated August 9, 1999 issued by public respondent in Civil Case No. 99-94684.

GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines,
this 17th day of August 1999.

(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)

The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the parties, as directed, filed their
respective memoranda.

From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive issues are patent.
However, a review of these issues as well as the extensive arguments of both parties, compel us to
delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings: During the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing? An
affirmative answer would necessarily render the proceedings at the trial court, moot and academic (the
issues of which are substantially the same as those before us now), while a negative resolution would
call for the immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated August 24, 1999, thus allowing
petitioner to fast-track the process leading to the filing of the extradition petition with the proper
regional trial court. Corollarily, in the event that private respondent is adjudged entitled to basic due
process rights at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, would this entitlement constitute a
breach of the legal commitments and obligations of the Philippine Government under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a breach, is there any conflict
between private respondent's basic due process rights and the provisions of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty?

The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go directly into the substantive
merits of the case, brushing aside peripheral procedural matters which concern the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 99-94684, particularly the propriety of the filing of the petition therein, and of the issuance of
the TRO of August 17, 1999 by the trial court.

To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-US Extradition Treaty which
was executed only on November 13, 1994, ushered into force the implementing provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof defines
extradition as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the
disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection
with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under
the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government." The portions of the Decree relevant to
the instant case which involves a charged and not convicted individual, are abstracted as follows:

The Extradition Request

The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, and shall be accompanied by:

1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest issued by
the authority of the Requesting State having jurisdiction over the matter, or some other
instruments having equivalent legal force;

2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest particulars as to the
name and identity of the accused, his whereabouts in the Philippines, if known, the acts or
omissions complained of, and the time and place of the commission of these acts;

3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and the designation
or description of the offense by the law, sufficient for evaluation of the request; and
 4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.

(Sec. 4. Presidential Decree No. 1069.)

Sec. 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
pertinently provides

. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet the
requirements of this law and the relevant treaty or convention, he shall forward the request
together with the related documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately
designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case.

The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the task of evaluating the
sufficiency of the request and the supporting documents is the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What then is
the coverage of this task?

In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the executive authority
must ascertain whether or not the request is supported by:

1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which describe the identity and
probable location of the person sought;

2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case;

3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential elements of the offense for
which extradition is requested;

4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for the offense;

5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit on the prosecution or the
execution of punishment for the offense;

6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in paragraph 3 or paragraph 4

of said Article, as applicable.

(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)

7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would provide probable cause
for his arrest and committal for trial if the offense had been committed there;

8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other competent authority; and

9. A copy of the charging document.

(Paragraph 3, ibid.)
The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that the accompanying
documents received in support of the request had been certified by the principal diplomatic or consular
officer of the Requested State resident in the Requesting State (Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S.
Embassy; Embassy Note No. 951309 from the Department of Foreign Affairs).

In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition shall not be granted if the
executive authority of the Requested State determines that the request is politically motivated, or that
the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation."

The Extradition Petition

Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition request and its supporting
documents are sufficient and complete in form and substance, he shall deliver the same to the Secretary
of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the
case (Paragraph [1], Section 5, P.D. No. 1069). The lawyer designated shall then file a written petition
with the proper regional trial court of the province or city, with a prayer that the court take the
extradition request under consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.).

The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the petition for extradition, shall, as soon
as practicable, issue an order summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and to answer the
petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that
the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice
(Paragraph [1], Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the flight of the prospective extraditee.

The Extradition Hearing

The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding is criminal, civil, or
a special proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof provides that in the hearing of the
extradition petition, the provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with
the summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree
provides that the attorney having charge of the case may, upon application by the Requesting State,
represent the latter throughout the proceedings.

Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the extradition and giving the
reasons therefor upon a showing of the existence of a prima facie case, or dismiss the petition (Section
10, ibid.). Said decision is appealable to the Court of Appeals, whose decision shall be final and
immediately executory (Section 12, ibid.). The provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in
criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in the aforementioned appeal, except for the required
15-day period to file brief (Section 13, ibid.).

The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the petition is extraditable based on
the application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty. The trial court also determines whether or not the offense for which extradition is
requested is a political one (Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).1âwphi1.nêt
With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the following query presents
itself: What is the nature of the role of the Department of Justice at the evaluation stage of the
extradition proceedings?

A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to file
the extradition petition after the request and all the supporting papers are forwarded to him by the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers,
to assure their sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or not
the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable
under non-military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the
Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers.

However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that there was failure to
abide by the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is true that the extradition request
was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24
hours later, the Department of Justice received the request, apparently without the Department of
Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same and its accompanying documents.
The statement of an assistant secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs that his Department, in this
regard, is merely acting as a post office, for which reason he simply forwarded the request to the
Department of Justice, indicates the magnitude of the error of the Department of Foreign Affairs in
taking lightly its responsibilities. Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it upon itself to determine
the completeness of the documents and to evaluate the same to find out whether they comply with the
requirements laid down in the Extradition Law and the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Petitioner ratiocinates
in this connection that although the Department of Justice had no obligation to evaluate the extradition
documents, the Department also had to go over them so as to be able to prepare an extradition petition
(tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at this stage where private respondent insisted on
the following; (1) the right to be furnished the request and the supporting papers; (2) the right to be
heard which consists in having a reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and to present
evidence in support of the opposition; and (3) that the evaluation proceedings be held in abeyance
pending the filing of private respondent's opposition to the request.

The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority, one abdicating its
powers and the other enlarging its commission. The Department of Foreign Affairs, moreover, has,
through the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation that it is adopting the instant petition as its own,
indirectly conveying the message that if it were to evaluate the extradition request, it would not allow
private respondent to participate in the process of evaluation.

Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the Department of Foreign
Affairs thoroughly reviewed the extradition request and supporting documents and that it arrived at a
well-founded judgment that the request and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law.
The Secretary of Justice, eminent as he is in the field of law, could not privately review the papers all by
himself. He had to officially constitute a panel of attorneys. How then could the DFA Secretary or his
undersecretary, in less than one day, make the more authoritative determination?

The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui
generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of
ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive authority has the power: (a) to make a technical
assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the
request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are not
extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that
the offense is a military one which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation (tsn, August 31,
1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process
may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in
the exercise of an administrative body's quasi-judicial power.

In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b)
determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported
by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs.
United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or investigatory power,
is one or the determinative powers of an administrative body which better enables it to exercise its
quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the
administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or
entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of information by means or
accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op.
cit., p. 64).

The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a useful
aid or tool in an administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions.
Notably, investigation is indispensable to prosecution.

In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to rule on the functions
of an investigatory body with the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial functions and
its power is limited to investigating the facts and making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down
the test of determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely
investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon
the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to
evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the
agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence
of judicial discretion and judgment.

The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition
documents. The body has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the
Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether the papers
comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an
extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has no power to
determine whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court. The body's
power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court.

It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation procedure is

characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of the extradition process.
Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee. This deprivation can
be effected at two stages: First, the provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the
submission of the request. This is so because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a contracting
party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the request
(Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), but he shall be automatically discharged after 60
days if no request is submitted (Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a shorter period
of 20 days after which the arrested person could be discharged (Section 20[d]). Logically, although the
Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the provisions only mean that once a request is forwarded to
the Requested State, the prospective extraditee may be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently
rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be discharged if no
request is submitted. Practically, the purpose of this detention is to prevent his possible flight from the
Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the
extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1069).

Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as during the
evaluation stage. It is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one.

Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an
administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are
essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for, and
ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this
is a "tool" for criminal law enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In essence, therefore, the evaluation process
partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to make
available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation certain constitutional rights that are
ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions. Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during
the oral arguments, there are rights formerly available only at the trial stage that had been advanced to
an earlier stage in the proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination
(tsn, August 31, 1999, p. 135; Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478; Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335;
Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).

In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that the right against self-
incrimination under Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which is ordinarily available only in
criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect,
such as an administrative investigation of a licensed physician who is charged with immorality, which
could result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if found guilty. The Court, citing the earlier
case of Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the revocation of one's license as a
medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation than forfeiture of property.

Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of unexplained wealth against a respondent
which was filed under Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft Law. Again, we therein ruled that since
the investigation may result in forfeiture of property, the administrative proceedings are deemed
criminal or penal, and such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. There is also the earlier case
of Almeda, Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing American jurisprudence, laid down
the test to determine whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the proceeding is under a statute such
that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in the criminal case, such proceeding is
criminal in nature, although it may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that
the action is meant to be criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the
proceeding does not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged, the proceeding is
civil in nature.

The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of one's property or property
right. No less is this true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible
deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed
second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited property can be
returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.

By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to

a foreign country, thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or penal aspect of the process. In this sense, the
evaluation procedure is akin to a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same
result — the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent or the person charged. Similar to the
evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing of
an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his
liberty.

Petitioner's reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8, petitioner's
Memorandum) that the extradition treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal
procedural statute is not well-taken. Wright is not authority for petitioner's conclusion that his
preliminary processing is not akin to a preliminary investigation. The characterization of a treaty
in Wright was in reference to the applicability of the prohibition against an ex post factolaw. It had
nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing.

As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal proceeding enforced by public
authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative
power, in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserved these principles of liberty
and justice, must be held to be due process of law" (Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516). Compliance
with due process requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with treaty commitments.

The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of
crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due process
protection to their respective citizens.

The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only worded in exactly
identical language and terminology, but more importantly, they are alike in what their respective
Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with which the provisions are informed and impressed,
the elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and resilient character which make them capable of
meeting every modern problem, and their having been designed from earliest time to the present to
meet the exigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The requirements of due process are
interpreted in both the United States and the Philippines as not denying to the law the capacity for
progress and improvement. Toward this effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket,
the courts instead prefer to have the meaning of the due process clause "gradually ascertained by the
process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise" (Twining vs. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play" (Ermita-
Malate Hotel and Motel Owner's Association vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to
certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government (Holden vs.
Hardy, 169 U.S. 366).

Due process is comprised of two components — substantive due process which requires the intrinsic
validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and
procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the
guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed.,
pp. 102-106).
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in
criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights
will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their
interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right to appear therein and present their side and to
refute the position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).

In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of

the Rules of Court guarantees the respondent's basic due process rights, granting him the right to be
furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to
submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within ten days from receipt thereof.
Moreover, the respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the
complainant.

These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such as:

1. In proceeding where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary
abatement of a nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive suspension of a public
servant facing administrative charges (Section 63, Local Government Code, B.P. Blg. 337), the
padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies or like establishments
which are immediate threats to public health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of
a person sought for criminal prosecution;

2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is not
precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the
person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent
taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary appointee; and

3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had not
been claimed.

Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does the evaluation stage of
the extradition proceedings fall under any of the described situations mentioned above?

Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition proceedings which are quite noteworthy
considering that the subject treaty involves the U.S. Government.

American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or extradition which is based on the
Extradition Clause in the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, §2 cl 2), and international extradition proceedings. In
interstate rendition or extradition, the governor of the asylum state has the duty to deliver the fugitive
to the demanding state. The Extradition Clause and the implementing statute are given a liberal
construction to carry out their manifest purpose, which is to effect the return as swiftly as possible of
persons for trial to the state in which they have been charged with crime (31A Am Jur 2d 754-755). In
order to achieve extradition of an alleged fugitive, the requisition papers or the demand must be in
proper form, and all the elements or jurisdictional facts essential to the extradition must appear on the
face of the papers, such as the allegation that the person demanded was in the demanding state at the
time the offense charged was committed, and that the person demanded is charged with the
commission of the crime or that prosecution has been begun in the demanding state before some court
or magistrate (35 C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition documents are then filed with the governor of the
asylum state, and must contain such papers and documents prescribed by statute, which essentially
include a copy of the instrument charging the person demanded with a crime, such as an indictment or
an affidavit made before a magistrate. Statutory requirements with respect to said charging instrument
or papers are mandatory since said papers are necessary in order to confer jurisdiction on the
government of the asylum state to effect extradition (35 C.J.S. 408-410). A statutory provision requiring
duplicate copies of the indictment, information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction or sentence and
other instruments accompanying the demand or requisitions be furnished and delivered to the fugitive or
his attorney is directory. However, the right being such a basic one has been held to be a right
mandatory on demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex parte Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 and Ex
parte Tucker, Cr., 324, S.W.2d 853).

In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the presentation to the executive
authority of the Requested State of a requisition or demand for the return of the alleged offender, and
the designation of the particular officer having authority to act in behalf of the demanding nation
(31A Am Jur 2d 815).

In petitioner's memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto a letter dated
September 13, 1999 from the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, summarizing the U.S.
extradition procedures and principles, which are basically governed by a combination of treaties (with
special reference to the RP-US Extradition Treaty), federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit:

1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic channel. In urgent cases,
requests for the provincial arrest of an individual may be made directly by the Philippine
Department of Justice to the U.S. Department of Justice, and vice-versa. In the event of a
provisional arrest, a formal request for extradition is transmitted subsequently through the
diplomatic channel.

2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine extradition request to the
Department of Justice. Before doing so, the Department of State prepares a declaration
confirming that a formal request has been made, that the treaty is in full force and effect, that
under Article 17 thereof the parties provide reciprocal legal representation in extradition
proceedings, that the offenses are covered as extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof, and
that the documents have been authenticated in accordance with the federal statute that
ensures admissibility at any subsequent extradition hearing.

3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the arrest of the prospective
extraditee (18 U.S.C. §3184). Said judge or magistrate is authorized to hold a hearing to consider
the evidence offered in support of the extradition request (Ibid.)

4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person arrested is extraditable to the
foreign country. The court must also determine that (a) it has jurisdiction over the defendant
and jurisdiction to conduct the hearing; (b) the defendant is being sought for offenses for which
the applicable treaty permits extradition; and (c) there is probable cause to believe that the
defendant is the person sought and that he committed the offenses charged (Ibid.)
 5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify extraditability after having
received a "complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction" with
having committed any of the crimes provided for by the governing treaty in the country
requesting extradition (Ibid.) [In this regard, it is noted that a long line of American decisions
pronounce that international extradition proceedings partake of the character of a preliminary
examination before a committing magistrate, rather than a trial of the guilt or innocence of the
alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]

6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are present, it incorporates its
determinations in factual findings and conclusions of law and certifies the person's
extraditability. The court then forwards this certification of extraditability to the Department of
State for disposition by the Secretary of State. The ultimate decision whether to surrender an
individual rests with the Secretary of State (18 U.S.C. §3186).

7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions concerning the motives of the
requesting government in seeking his extradition. However, a person facing extradition may
present whatever information he deems relevant to the Secretary of State, who makes the final
determination whether to surrender an individual to the foreign government concerned.

From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States, extradition begins and ends with one
entity — the Department of State — which has the power to evaluate the request and the extradition
documents in the beginning, and, in the person of the Secretary of State, the power to act or not to act
on the court's determination of extraditability. In the Philippine setting, it is the Department of Foreign
Affairs which should make the initial evaluation of the request, and having satisfied itself on the points
earlier mentioned (see pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the Department of Justice for the
preparation and filing of the petition for extradition. Sadly, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs,
in the instant case, perfunctorily turned over the request to the Department of Justice which has taken
over the task of evaluating the request as well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing, and
prosecuting the petition for extradition.

Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S. Government should the person sought
to be extradited be given due process rights by the Philippines in the evaluation stage. He emphasizes
that petitioner's primary concern is the possible delay in the evaluation process.

We agree with private respondent's citation of an American Supreme Court ruling:

The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper
state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution
recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of
Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause, in particular, that they were designed to protect
the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and
efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more,
than mediocre ones.

(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)

The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the Philippine Government that no right — that
of liberty — secured not only by the Bills of Rights of the Philippines Constitution but of the United
States as well, is sacrificed at the altar of expediency.

(pp. 40-41, Private Respondent's Memorandum.)

In the Philippine context, this Court's ruling is invoked:

One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual
are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid
objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the
Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question
that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a
few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration
to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority
of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right (Association of
Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-
376 [1989]).

There can be no dispute over petitioner's argument that extradition is a tool of criminal law
enforcement. To be effective, requests for extradition or the surrender of accused or convicted persons
must be processed expeditiously. Nevertheless, accelerated or fast-tracked proceedings and adherence
to fair procedures are, however, not always incompatible. They do not always clash in discord. Summary
does not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a disregard of the basic principles inherent in
"ordered liberty."

Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At that point, there is no
extraditee yet in the strict sense of the word. Extradition may or may not occur. In interstate extradition,
the governor of the asylum state may not, in the absence of mandatory statute, be compelled to act
favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since after a close evaluation of the extradition papers, he may hold that federal
and statutory requirements, which are significantly jurisdictional, have not been met (31 Am Jur 2d 819).
Similarly, under an extradition treaty, the executive authority of the requested state has the power to
deny the behest from the requesting state. Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the extradition
documents the Secretary of Foreign Affairs finds that the request fails to meet the requirements of the
law and the treaty, he shall not forward the request to the Department of Justice for the filing of the
extradition petition since non-compliance with the aforesaid requirements will not vest our government
with jurisdiction to effect the extradition.

In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice exerted notable efforts in assuring
compliance with the requirements of the law and the treaty since it even informed the U.S. Government
of certain problems in the extradition papers (such as those that are in Spanish and without the official
English translation, and those that are not properly authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits that
consultation meetings are still supposed to take place between the lawyers in his Department and those
from the U.S. Justice Department. With the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which cannot just be
completed in an abbreviated period of time due to its intricacies, how then can we say that it is a
proceeding that urgently necessitates immediate and prompt action where notice and hearing can be
dispensed with?
Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of administrative action. Is private
respondent precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to
him? Here lies the peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On one hand there
is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the other, it results in an administrative if adverse to the person
involved, may cause his immediate incarceration. The grant of the request shall lead to the filing of the
extradition petition in court. The "accused" (as Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him),
faces the threat of arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the
evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the
implementing law. The prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and manifest.

Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with
and shelved aside.

Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent likewise invokes Section 7 of
Article III which reads:

Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the Philippines, namely:
(1) the right to information on matters of public concern, and (2) the corollary right of access to official
records documents. The general right guaranteed by said provision is the right to information on
matters of public concern. In its implementation, the right of access to official records is likewise
conferred. These cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law"
(Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely on the premise that
ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of democratic
government (Ibid.).

Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondent's letter-request dated July 1, 1999 do
not fall under the guarantee of the foregoing provision since the matters contained in the documents
requested are not of public concern. On the other hand, private respondent argues that the distinction
between matters vested with public interest and matters which are of purely private interest only
becomes material when a third person, who is not directly affected by the matters requested, invokes
the right to information. However, if the person invoking the right is the one directly affected thereby,
his right to information becomes absolute.

The concept of matters of public concerns escapes exact definition. Strictly speaking, every act of a
public officer in the conduct of the governmental process is a matter of public concern (Bernas, The
1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives
or simply because such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the people and any citizen has
"standing".
When the individual himself is involved in official government action because said action has a direct
bearing on his life, and may either cause him some kind of deprivation or injury, he actually invokes the
basic right to be notified under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights and not exactly the right to information on
matters of public concern. As to an accused in a criminal proceeding, he invokes Section 14, particularly
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within the control of the
government (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such
information may be contained in official records, and in documents and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions.

In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to official government action
from the U.S. Government. No official action from our country has yet been taken. Moreover, the
papers have some relation to matters of foreign relations with the U.S. Government. Consequently, if a
third party invokes this constitutional provision, stating that the extradition papers are matters of public
concern since they may result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that the balance must be
tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for the proper functioning of the
government. During the evaluation procedure, no official governmental action of our own government
has as yet been done; hence the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of
the extradition hearing would already fall under matters of public concern, because our government by
then shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition request. The extradition of a
fellow Filipino would be forthcoming.

We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instant controversy: Would
private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings
constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty?
Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and the due
process clause in the Constitution?

First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the
constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law implementing
the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to
private respondent on foreign relations.

The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law,
requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our
country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which
provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with nations." Under the doctrine of
incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the and land no further legislative action
is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law,
1992 ed., p. 12).

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted
with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize
them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper
regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the observance of the
Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed.,
p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between
a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be
upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9
SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of
municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The
fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the
primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of
incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal
standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex
posterior derogat priori takes effect — a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In
states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both
statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.).

In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or national law? En
contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not pined against each other. There is no
occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the
RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due
process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the
procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial
determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the
prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S.
extradition procedures also manifests this silence.

Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he describes the
evaluation procedure as an "ex parte technical assessment" of the sufficiency of the extradition request
and the supporting documents.

We disagree.

In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the
basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing
law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee.
Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in
interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for
copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to
be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).

Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the action of the
Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by
petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be obtainable
during trial. The Department of Justice states that the U.S. District Court concerned has authorized the
disclosure of certain grand jury information. If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy
cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. Not even during trial.

A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.

One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as American
jurisprudence and procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against the conferment of the two
basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings. We have to consider similar situations in jurisprudence for an application by analogy.

Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation process and a preliminary
investigation since both procedures may result in the arrest of the respondent or the prospective
extraditee. In the evaluation process, a provisional arrest is even allowed by the Treaty and the
Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Following
petitioner's theory, because there is no provision of its availability, does this imply that for a period of
time, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, despite Section 15, Article III of the
Constitution which states that "[t]he privilege of the writ or habeas corpus shall not be suspended
except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it"? Petitioner's theory would
also infer that bail is not available during the arrest of the prospective extraditee when the extradition
petition has already been filed in court since Presidential Decree No. 1069 does not provide therefor,
notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the Constitution which provides that "[a]ll persons, except
those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. . ." Can petitioner validly argue that since these contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and
hence affecting foreign relations, the aforestated guarantees in the Bill of Rights could thus be
subservient thereto?

The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process in administrative
proceeding is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the
actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457
[1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School
vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In essence, procedural due
process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots
Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of
constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioner's fears that the Requesting
State may have valid objections to the Requested State's non-performance of its commitments under
the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given paramount consideration.

How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to the four corners of
Presidential Decree No. 1069?

Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of
Appeals (201 SCRA 661 [1991]) and Go vs. National Police Commission (271 SCRA 447 [1997]) where we
ruled that in summary proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807 (Providing for the Organization of
the Civil Service Commission in Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its Powers
and Functions and for Other Purposes), and Presidential Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal Assistance for
Members of the Integrated National Police who may be charged for Service-Connected Offenses and
Improving the Disciplinary System in the Integrated National Police, Appropriating Funds Therefor and
for other purposes), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707, although summary dismissals may be
effected without the necessity of a formal investigation, the minimum requirements of due process still
operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals:
 . . . [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an employee
may be removed or dismissed even without formal investigation, in certain instances. It is
equally clear to us that an employee must be informed of the charges preferred against him,
and that the normal way by which the employee is so informed is by furnishing him with a copy
of the charges against him. This is a basic procedural requirement that a statute cannot dispense
with and still remain consistent with the constitutional provision on due process. The second
minimum requirement is that the employee charged with some misfeasance or malfeasance
must have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is to say, his defenses
against the charges levelled against him and to present evidence in support of his defenses. . . .

(at p. 671)

Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld the due process
rights of the respondent.

In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property
or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign
land. The convergence of petitioner's favorable action on the extradition request and the deprivation of
private respondent's liberty is easily comprehensible.

We have ruled time and again that this Court's equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice
outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial
pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court
of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for
"justice outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by
statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic
law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That
would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.

Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of liberty and
government authority, he must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and
wayward course be laid.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and academic
by this decision, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Purisima, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., I join Mr. Justice Puno in his dissent.
Puno, J., please see dissent.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Kapunan, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Panganiban, J., please see my dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., I join the dissents of Puno and Panganiban, JJ.
Quisumbing, J., with concurring opinion.
Pardo, J., I join J. Puno & J. Panganiban.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., I join the dissent of Justices Puno & Panganiban.
Ynares-Santiago, J., please see separate concurring opinion.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., separate opinion;

The only real issue before the Court, I would take it, is whether or not private respondent can validly ask
for copies of pertinent documents while the application for extradition against him is still undergoing
process by the Executive Department.

There is, I agree with the majority, a right of access to such extradition documents conformably with the
provisions of Article III, Section 7, of the Philippine Constitution.1 The constitutional right to free access
to information of public concern is circumscribed only by the fact that the desired information is not
among the species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guaranty and that the
exercise of the right conforms with such reasonable conditions as may be prescribed by law.

There is no hornbook rule to determine whether or not an information is of public concern. The term
"public concern" eludes exactitude, and it can easily embrace a broad spectrum of matters which the
public may want to know either because the subject thereof can affect their lives or simply because it
arouses concern.2

I am not convinced that there is something so viciously wrong with, as to deny, the request of private
respondent to be furnished with copies of the extradition documents.

I add. The constitutional right to due process secures to everyone an opportunity to be heard,
presupposing foreknowledge of what he may be up against, and to submit any evidence that he may
wish to proffer in an effort to clear himself. This right is two-pronged — substantive and procedural due
process — founded, in the first instance, on Constitutional or statutory provisions, and in the second
instance, on accepted rules of procedure.3 Substantive due process looks into the extrinsic and intrinsic
validity of the law that figures to interfere with the right of a person to his life, liberty and property.
Procedural due process — the more litigated of the two — focuses on the rules that are established in
order to ensure meaningful adjudication in the enforcement and implementation of the law. Like "public
concern," the term due process does not admit of any restrictive definition. Justice Frankfurter has
viewed this flexible concept, aptly I believe, as being ". . . compounded by history, reason, the past
course of decisions, and stout confidence in the democratic faith."4 The framers of our own Constitution,
it would seem, have deliberately intended, to make it malleable to the ever-changing milieu of society.
Hitherto, it is dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application that makes it
appropriate to accept an enlarged concept of the term as and when there is a possibility that the right of
an individual to life, liberty and property might be diffused.5 Verily, whenever there is an imminent
threat to the life, liberty or property of any person in any proceeding conducted by or under the auspices
of the State, his right to due process of law, when demanded, must not be ignored.

A danger to the liberty of the extraditee, the private respondent, is real. Article 9 of the Extradition
Treaty between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United
States of America provides that in case of urgency, a Contracting Party may request the provisional
arrest of the person prior to the presentation of the request for extradition. I see implicit in this provision
that even after the request for extradition is made and before a petition for extradition is filed with the
courts, the possibility of an arrest being made on the basis of a mere evaluation by the Executive on the
request for extradition by the foreign State cannot totally be discounted.

The conclusion reached by the majority, I hasten to add, does not mean that the Executive Department
should be impeded in its evaluation of the extradition request. The right of the extraditee to be
furnished, upon request, with a copy of the relevant documents and to file his comment thereon is not
necessarily anathema to the proceedings duly mandated by the treaty to be made.

I vote to deny the petition.

KAPUNAN, J., separate concurring opinion;

I vote to dismiss the petition, both on technical and substantial grounds.

The petition in the case at bar raises one and only issue, which is the validity of the Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) issued by respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion on August 9, 1999 in Civil Case No.
99-94684. The TRO directed respondents in said case to:

. . . maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts complained of; from
conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of the United States Government
for the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition with the Regional
Trial Court; and from performing any act directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the
United States, for a period of twenty days from the service on respondents of this Order,
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court.1 (Emphasis ours.)

The petition itself categorically states that "(t)he issue sought to be presented and litigated here is
solely-the validity of the TRO."2

Notably, there is no allegation in the petition that respondent Judge is without jurisdiction to hear the
case below or that he has exceeded his jurisdiction in hearing the same. Nor is there any other act,
ruling, order, or decision, apart from the TRO already mentioned, of respondent Judge that is being
challenged in the petition before us.

Since, as alleged in the petition, a copy of the TRO was served on respondents below on August 10,
1999, the TRO ceased to be effective on August 30, 1999; consequently, the instant petition has become
moot and academic. This Court does not exercise jurisdiction over cases which are moot and
academic or those not ripe for judicial consideration.3

Assuming that the present case has not become moot and academic, still, it should be dismissed for lack
of merit.

The substantive issues raised in this case are: (a) whether a person whose extradition is sought by a
foreign state has due process rights under Section 2, Article III of the 1997 Constitution before the
Department of Justice as the request for extradition is being evaluated, or whether due process rights
maybe invoked only upon the filing of a petition for extradition before a regional trial court; and (b)
whether or not private respondent has a right of access to extradition documents under Section 7,
Article III of the 1997 Constitution.

Petitioner contends that due process rights such as the right to be informed of the basis of the request
for extradition and to have an opportunity to controvert are not provided in the extradition treaty or in
P.D. 1069 and therefore does not exist in this stage of the proceedings. Further, he argues that the
documents sought to be furnished to private respondent only involve private concerns, and not matters
of public concern to which the people have a constitutional right to access.

While the evaluation process conducted by the Department of Justice is not exactly a preliminary
investigation of criminal cases, it is akin to a preliminary investigation because it involves the basic
constitutional rights of the person sought to be extradited. A person ordered extradited is arrested,
forcibly taken from his house, separated from his family and delivered to a foreign state. His rights of
abode, to privacy, liberty and pursuit of happiness are taken away from him — a fate as harsh and cruel
as a conviction of a criminal offense. For this reason, he is entitled to have access to the evidence
against him and the right to controvert them.

While the extradition treaty and P.D. 1069 do not provide for a preliminary investigation, neither does
either prohibit it. The right to due process is a universal basic right which is deemed written into our
laws and treaties with foreign countries.

Like a preliminary investigation, the evaluation by the Department of Justice of the extradition request
and its accompanying documents is to establish probable cause and to secure the innocent against
hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution.

In this connection, it should be stressed that the evaluation procedure of the extradition request and its
accompanying documents by the Department of Justice cannot be characterized as a mere "ex-
parte technical assessment of the sufficiency" thereof. The function and responsibilities of the
Department of Justice in evaluating the extradition papers involve the exercise of judgment. They
involve a determination whether the request for extradition conforms fully to the requirements of the
extradition treaty and whether the offense is extraditable. These include, among others, whether the
offense for which extradition is requested is a political or military offense (Article 3); whether the
documents and other informations required under Article 7(2) have been provided (Article 7); and
whether the extraditable offense is punishable under the laws of both contracting parties by deprivation
of liberty for a period of more than one year (Article 2). Consequently, to arrive at a correct judgment,
the parties involved are entitled to be heard if the requirements of due process and equal protection are
to be observed.
With respect to petitioner's claim that private respondent has no right to demand access to the
documents relating to the request for extradition, suffice it to say, that any document used in a
proceeding that would jeopardize a person's constitutional rights is matter of public concern. As Martin
Luther King said, "injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere," so any violation of one's rights
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights is everybody's concern because they, one way or another, directly or
indirectly, affect the rights of life and liberty of all the citizens as a whole.

Due process rights in a preliminary investigation is now an established principle. The respondent has a
right of access to all of the evidence. He has the right to submit controverting evidence. The prosecuting
official who conducts the preliminary investigation is required to be neutral, objective, and impartial in
resolving the issue of probable cause. I see no reason why the same rights may not be accorded a
person sought to be extradited at the stage where the Department of Justice evaluates whether a
petition for extradition would be filed before a regional trial court. If denied such rights, not only denial
of due process rights but of equal protection may be raised.

It is suggested that after a petition for extradition is filed with a regional trial court, the person sought to
be extradited may exercise all due process rights. He may then have access to all the records on the
basis of which the request for extradition has been made. He may controvert that evidence and raise all
defenses he may consider appropriate. That, it is urged, meets the due process requirement.

But why must he wait until the petition for extradition is filed? As succinctly expressed, if the right to
notice and hearing is to serve its full purpose, then, it is clear that it must be granted at a time when the
deprivation can still be prevented.4 Like the filing of an information in a criminal case, the mere filing of a
petition for extradition causes immediate impairment of the liberty of the person sought to be
extradited and a substantial curtailment of other rights. His arrest may be immediately ordered by the
regional trial court. He would be compelled to face an open and public trial. He will be constrained to
seek the assistance of counsel and incur other expenses of litigation. The public eye would be directed at
him with all the concomitant intrusions to his right to privacy. Where the liberty of a person is at risk,
and extradition strikes at the very core of liberty, invocation of due process rights can never be too
early.

QUISUMBING, J., concurring opinion;

As I concur in the result reached by the ponencia of Justice Melo, may I just add my modest
observations.

The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien, and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our
Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. Stated otherwise,
the constitutionally mandated duties of our government to the individual deserve preferential
consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so
although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of
international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

For this primordial reason, I vote to DENY the petition.

Moreover, considering that the Extradition Treaty between the USA and Philippines appears mute on
the specific issue before us, the Court — in the exercise of its judicial power to find and state what the
law is — has this rare opportunity of setting a precedent that enhances respect for human rights and
strengthens due process of law.

As both majority and dissenting colleagues in the Court will recognize, American authorities follow two
tracks in extradition proceedings: (1) the interstate practice where, pursuant to statute, the state
Executive upon demand furnishes the would be extraditee or counsel copies of pertinent documents as
well as the request for extradition; and (2) the international practice where the Executive department
need not initially grant notice and hearing at all. Rules of reciprocity and comity, however, should not
bar us from applying internationally now what appears the more reasonable and humane procedure,
that is, the interstate practice among Americans themselves. For in this case the American people
should be among the most interested parties.

Truly, what private respondent is asking our Executive department (notice, copies of documents, and
the opportunity to protect himself at the earliest time against probable peril) does not, in my view,
violate our Extradition Treaty with the USA. His request if granted augurs well for transparency in
interstate or intergovernmental relations rather than secrecy which smacks of medieval diplomacy and
the inquisition discredited long ago.

That private respondent is a Filipino citizen is not decisive of the issue here, although it is obviously
pertinent. Even if he were a resident alien (other than American perhaps), he is, in my view, entitled to
our full protection against the hazards of extradition (or deportation, similarly) from the very start. More
so because, looking at the facts adduced at the hearing and on the record of this case, the charges
against him involve or are co-mingled with, if not rooted in, certain offenses of a political nature or
motivation such as the ones involving alleged financial contributions to a major American political party.
If so, long established is the principle that extradition could not be utilized for political offenses or
politically motivated charges.

There may, of course, be other charges against private respondent in the USA. But then they are, in my
view, already tainted there with political color due to the highly charged partisan campaign atmosphere
now prevailing. That private respondent's cases will be exploited as political fodder there is not far-
fetched, hence the need here for cautious but comprehensive deliberation on the matter at bar. For,
above all, it is not only a Treaty provision we are construing; it is about constitutional and human rights
we are most concerned.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., concurring opinion;

I concur in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Jose A.R. Melo with its conceptive analysis of a citizen's right to
be given what is due to him. I join in his exposition of this Court's constitutional duty to strike the correct
balance between overwhelming Government power and the protection of individual rights where only
one person is involved.
However, I am constrained to write this short concurrence if only to pose the question of why there
should be any debate at all on a plea for protection of one's liberty which, if granted, will not result in
any meaningful impediment of thwarting any state policy and objectives.

I see no reason why respondent Mark Jimenez, or other citizens not as controversial or talked about,
should first be exposed to the indignity, expense, and anxiety of a public denunciation in court before he
may be informed of what the contracting states in an extradition treaty have against him. There is no
question that everything which respondent Jimenez now requests will be given to him during trial. Mr.
Jimenez is only petitioning that, at this stage, he should be informed why he may be deported from
his own country.

I see no ill effects which would arise if the extradition request and supporting documents are shown to
him now, instead of later.

Petitioner Secretary of Justice states that his action on the extradition request and its supporting
documents will merely determine whether or not the Philippines is complying with its treaty obligations.
He adds that, therefore, the constitutional rights of an accused in all criminal prosecutions are not
available to the private respondent.

The July 13, 1999 reply-letter from petitioner states the reasons why he is denying respondent Jimenez's
requests. In short, the reasons are:

1. In evaluating the documents, the Department merely determines whether the procedures
and requirements under the relevant law and treaty have been complied with by the Requesting
Government. The constitutional rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are, therefore,
not available.

2. The United States Government has requested the Philippine Government to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of certain grand jury information.

3. The petitioner cannot hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition

request. For extradition to be an effective tool of criminal law enforcement, requests for
surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.

I respectfully submit that any apprehensions in the Court arising from a denial of the petition — "breach
of an international obligation, rupture of states relations, forfeiture of confidence, national
embarrassment, and a plethora of other equally undesirable consequences" — are more illusory than
real. Our country is not denying the extradition of a person who must be extradited. Not one provision
of the extradition treaty is violated. I cannot imagine the United States taking issue over what, to it,
would be a minor concession, perhaps a slight delay, accorded in the name of human rights. On the
other hand, the issue is fundamental in the Philippines. A citizen is invoking the protection, in the
context of a treaty obligation, of rights expressly guaranteed by the Philippine Constitution.

Until proved to be a valid subject for extradition, a person is presumed innocent or not covered by the
sanctions of either criminal law or international treaty. At any stage where a still prospective extraditee
only seeks to know so that he can prepare and prove that he should not be extradited, there should be
no conflict over the extension to him of constitutional protections guaranteed to aliens and citizens
alike.

Petitioner cites as a reason for the denial of respondent's requests, Article 7 of the Treaty. Article 7
enumerates the required documents and establishes the procedures under which the documents shall
be submitted and admitted as evidence. There is no specific provision on how that Secretary of Foreign
Affairs should conduct his evaluation. The Secretary of Justice is not even in the picture at this stage.
Under petitioner's theory, silence in the treaty over a citizen's rights during the evaluation stage is
interpreted as deliberate exclusion by the contracting states of the right to know. Silence is interpreted
as the exclusion of the right to a preliminary examination or preliminary investigation provided by the
laws of either one of the two states.

The right to be informed of charges which may lead to court proceedings and result in a deprivation of
liberty is ordinarily routine. It is readily available to one against whom the state's coercive power has
already been focused. I fail to see how silence can be interpreted as exclusion. The treaty is silent
because at this stage, the preliminary procedure is still an internal matter. And when a law or treaty is
silent, it means a right or privilege may be granted. It is not the other way around.

The second reason alleging the need for secrecy and confidentiality is even less convincing. The
explanation of petitioner is self-contradictory. On one hand, petitioner asserts that the United States
Government requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of certain
information. On the other hand, petitioner declares that the United States has already secured orders
from concerned District Courts authorizing the disclosure of the same grand jury information to the
Philippine Government and its law enforcement personnel.

Official permission has been given. The United States has no cause to complain about the disclosure of
information furnished to the Philippines.

Moreover, how can grand jury information and documents be considered confidential if they are going
to be introduced as evidence in adversely proceedings before a trial court? The only issue is whether or
not Mr. Jimenez should be extradited. His innocence or guilt of any crime will be determined in an
American court. It is there where prosecution strategies will be essential. If the Contracting States
believed in a total non-divulging of information prior to court hearings, they would have so provided in
the extradition treaty. A positive provision making certain rights unavailable cannot be implied from
silence.

I cannot believe that the United States and the Philippines with identical constitutional provisions on
due process and basic rights should sustain such a myopic view in a situation where the grant of a right
would not result in any serious setbacks to criminal law enforcement.

It is obvious that any prospective extraditee wants to know if his identity as the person indicated has
been established. Considering the penchant of Asians to adopt American names when in America, the
issue of whether or not the prospective extraditee truly is the person charged in the United States
becomes a valid question. It is not only identity of the person which is involved. The crimes must also be
unmistakably identified and their essential elements clearly stated.
There are other preliminary matters in which respondent is interested. I see nothing in our laws or in the
Treaty which prohibits the prospective extraditee from knowing until after the start of trial whether or
not the extradition treaty applies to him.

Paraphrasing Hasmin vs. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216; Trocio vs. Manta, 118 SCRA 241 (1941); and Salonga vs.
Hon. Paño, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), the purpose of a preliminary evaluation is to secure an innocent
person against hasty, faulty and, therefore, oppressive proceedings; to protect him from an open and
extensively publicized accusation of crimes; to spare him the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public
trial; and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trails. Even if the purpose is only to
determine whether or not the respondent is a proper subject for extradition, he is nonetheless entitled
to the guarantees of fairness and freedom accorded to those charged with ordinary crimes in the
Philippines.

The third reason given by petitioner is the avoidance of delay. Petitioner views the request to be
informed as part of undesirable delaying tactics. This is most unfortunate. Any request for extradition
must be viewed objectively and impartially without any predisposition to granting it and, therefore,
hastening the extradition process.

In the first place, any assistance which the evaluating official may get from the participation of
respondent may well point out deficiencies and insufficiencies in the extradition documents. It would
incur greater delays if these are discovered only during court trial. On the other hand, if, from
respondent's participation, the evaluating official discovers a case of mistaken identity, insufficient
pleadings, inadequate complaints, or any ruinous shortcoming, there would be no delays during trial. An
unnecessary trial with all its complications would be avoided.

The right to be informed is related to the constitutional right to a speedy trial. The constitutional
guarantee extends to the speedy disposition of cases before all quasi-judicial and administrative bodies
(Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 16). Speedy disposition, however, does not mean the deliberate exclusion of
the defendant or respondent from the proceedings. As this Court rules in Acebedo vs. Sarmiento, 36
SCRA 247 (1970), "the right to a speedy trial, means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and
expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt (in this case, his being extradited)
determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of
whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose."

The right to be informed and the right to a preliminary hearing are not merely for respondent. They also
serve the interests of the State.1âwphi1.nêt

In closing, I maintain that the paramount consideration of guaranteeing the constitutional rights of
individual respondent override the concerns of petitioner. There should be no hurried or indifferent
effort to routinely comply with all requests for extradition. I understand that this is truer in the United
States than in other countries. Proposed extraditees are given every legal protection available from the
American justice system before they are extradited. We serve under a government of limited powers
and inalienable rights. Hence, this concurrence.
PUNO, J., dissenting opinion;

If the case at bar was strictly a criminal case which involves alone the right of an accused to due process,
I would have co-signed the ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Jose A.R. Melo, without
taking half a pause. But the case at bar does not involve the guilt or innocence of an accused but the
interpretation of an extradition treaty where at stake is our government's international obligation to
surrender to a foreign state a citizen of its own so he can be tried for an alleged offense committed
within that jurisdiction. The issues are of first impression and the majority opinion dangerously takes us
to unknown shoals in constitutional and international laws, hence this dissenting opinion.

Extradition is a well-defined concept and is more a problem in international law. It is the "process by
which persons charged with or convicted of crime against the law of a State and found in a foreign State
are returned by the latter to the former for trial or punishment. It applies to those who are merely
charged with an offense but have not been brought to trial; to those who have been tried and convicted
and have subsequently escaped from custody; and those who have been convicted in absentia. It does
not apply to persons merely suspected of having committed an offense but against who no charge has
been laid or to a person whose presence is desired as a witness or for obtaining or enforcing a civil
judgment."1 The definition covers the private respondent who is charged with two (2) counts of
conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States, four (4) counts of attempt to evade or
defeat tax, two (2) counts of fraud by wire, radio or television, six (6) counts of false statements or
entries and thirty-three (33) counts of election contributions in the name of another. There is an
outstanding warrant of arrest against the private respondent issued by the US District Court, Southern
District of Florida.

A brief review of the history of extradition law will illumine our labor. Possibly the most authoritative
commentator on extradition today, M. Cherif Bassiouni, divides the history of extradition into four (4)
periods: "(1) ancient times to seventeenth century — a period revealing almost exclusive concern for
political and religious offenders; (2) the eighteenth century and half of the nineteenth century — a
period of treaty-making chiefly concerned with military offenders characterizing the condition of Europe
during that period; (3) from 1833 to 1948 — a period of collective concern in suppressing common
criminality; and (4) post-1948 developments which ushered in a greater concern for protecting the
human rights of persons and revealed an awareness of the need to have international due process of
law regulate international relations."2

It is also rewarding to have a good grip on the changing slopes in the landscape of extradition during
these different periods. Extradition was first practiced by the Egyptians, Chinese, Chaldeans and Assyro-
Babylonians but their basis for allowing extradition was unclear. Sometimes, it was granted due to pacts;
at other times, due to plain good will.3 The classical commentators on international law thus focused
their early views on the nature of the duty to surrender an extraditee — whether the duty is legal or
moral in character. Grotius and de Vattel led the school of thought that international law imposed
a legal duty called civitas maxima to extradite criminals.4 In sharp contrast, Puffendorf and Billot led the
school of thought that the so-called duty was but an "imperfect obligation which could
become enforceable only by a contract or agreement between states.5

Modern nations tilted towards the view of Puffendorf and Billot that under international law there is no
duty to extradite in the absence of treaty, whether bilateral or multilateral. Thus, the US Supreme Court
in US v. Rauscher,6held: ". . . . it is only in modern times that the nations of the earth have imposed upon
themselves the obligation of delivering up these fugitives from justice to the states where their crimes
were committed, for trial and punishment. This has been done generally by treaties . . . Prior to these
treaties, and apart from them there was no well-defined obligation on one country to deliver up such
fugitives to another; and though such delivery was often made it was upon the principle of comity . . ."

Then came the long and still ongoing debate on what should be the subject of international law. The
20th century saw the dramatic rise and fall of different types and hues of authoritarianism — the
fascism of Italy's Mussolini and Germany's Hitler, the militarism of Japan's Hirohito and the communism
of Russia's Stalin, etc. The sinking of these isms led to the elevation of the rights of the individual against
the state. Indeed, some species of human rights have already been accorded universal
recognition.7 Today, the drive to internationalize rights of women and children is also on high gear.8 The
higher rating given to human rights in the hierarchy of values necessarily led to the re-examination of
rightful place of the individual in international law. Given the harshest eye is the moss-covered doctrine
that international law deals only with States and that individuals are not its subject. For its undesirable
corrally is the sub-doctrine that an individual's right in international law is a near cipher. Translated in
extradition law, the view that once commanded a consensus is that since a fugitive is a mere object and
not a subject of international law, he is bereft of rights. An extraditee, so it was held, is a mere "object
transported from one state to the other as an exercise of the sovereign will of the two states
involved."9 The re-examination consigned this pernicious doctrine to the museum of ideas.10 The new
thinkers of international law then gave a significant shape to the role and rights of the individual in
state-concluded treaties and other international agreements. So it was declared by then US Ambassador
Philip C. Jessup in audible italics: "A very large part of international affairs and, thus, of the process of
international accommodation, concerns the relations between legal persons known as states. This is
necessarily so. But it is no longer novel for the particular interest of the human being to break through
the mass of interstate relationship."11 The clarion call to re-engineer a new world order whose dominant
interest would transcend the parochial confines of national states was not unheeded. Among the world
class scholars who joined the search for the elusive ideological underpinnings of a new world order were
Yale Professor Myres McDougal and Mr. Justice Florentino Feliciano. In their seminal work. Law and
Minimum World Public Order, they suggested that the object of the new world should be "to obtain in
particular situations and in the aggregate flow of situations the outcome of a higher degree of
conformity with the security goals of preservation, deterrence, restoration, rehabilitation and
reconstruction of all societies comprising the world community."12 Needless to stress, all these prescient
theses accelerated the move to recognize certain rights of the individual in international law.

We have yet to see the final and irrevocable place of individual rights, especially the rights of an
extraditee, in the realm of international law. In careful language, Bassiouni observes that today,
"institutionalized conflicts between states are still rationalized in terms of sovereignty, national interest,
and national security, while human interests continue to have limited, though growing impact on the
decision-making processes which translate national values and goals into specific national and
international policy."13

I belabor the international law aspect of extradition as the majority opinion hardly gives it a sideglance.
It is my humble submission that the first consideration that should guide us in the case at bar is that a
bilateral treaty — the RP-US Extradition Treaty — is the subject matter of the litigation. In our
constitutional scheme, the making of a treaty belongs to the executive and legislative departments of
our government. Between these two departments, the executive has a greater say in the making of a
treaty. Under Section 21, Article VII of our Constitution, the President has the sole power to negotiate
treaties and international agreements although to be effective, they must be concurred in by at least
two thirds of all the members of the Senate. Section 20 of the same Article empowers the President to
contract or guarantee foreign loans with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. Section 16 of the
same Article gives the President the power to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. In addition, the President has the power
to deport undesirable aliens. The concentration of these powers in the person of the President is not
without a compelling consideration. The conduct of foreign relations is full of complexities and
consequences, sometimes with life and death significance to the nation especially in times of war. It can
only be entrusted to that department of government which can act on the basis of the best available
information and can decide with decisiveness. Beyond debate, the President is the single most powerful
official in our land for Section 1 of Article VII provides that "the executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines," whereas Section 1 of Article VI states that "the legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives
. . . except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum," while
Section 1 of Article VIII provides that "judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law." Thus, we can see that executive power is vested in the
President alone whereas legislative and judicial powers are shared and scattered. It is also the President
who possesses the most comprehensive and the most confidential information about foreign countries
for our diplomatic and consular officials regularly brief him on meaningful events all over the world. He
has also unlimited access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data.14 In fine, the presidential role in
foreign affairs is dominant and the President is traditionally accorded a wider degree of discretion in the
conduct of foreign affairs. The regularity, nay, validity of his actions are adjudged under less stringent
standards, lest their judicial repudiation lead to breach of an international obligation, rupture of state
relations, forfeiture of confidence, national embarrassment and a plethora of other problems with
equally undesirable consequences.

These are some of the dominant policy considerations in international law that the Court must balance
against the claim of the private respondent that he has a right to be given the extradition documents
against him and to comment thereon even while they are still at the evaluation stage by the
petitioner Secretary of Justice, an alter ego of the President. The delicate questions of what
constitutional rights and to what degree they can be claimed by an extraditee do not admit of easy
answers and have resulted in discrete approaches the world over.15 On one end of the pole is the
more liberal European approach. The European Court of Human Rights embraces the view that an
extraditee is entitled to the benefit of all relevant provisions of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It has held that ". . . in so far as a measure of
the extradition has consequences adversely affecting the enjoyment of a convention right, it may,
assuming that the consequences are not too remote, attract the obligations of a Contracting State under
the relevant convention guarantee."16 At the other end of the pole is the more cautious approach of the
various Courts of Appeal in the United States. These courts have been more conservative in light of the
principle of separation of powers and their faith in the presumptive validity of executive decisions. By
and large, they adhere to the rule of non-inquiry under which the extraditing court refuses to examine
the requesting country's criminal justice system or consider allegations that the extraditee will be
mistreated or denied a fair trial in that country.17

The case at bar, I respectfully submit, does not involve an irreconcilable conflict between the RP-US
Extradition Treaty and our Constitution where we have to choose one over the other. Rather, it calls for
a harmonization between said treaty and our Constitution. To achieve this desirable objective, the
Court should consider whether the constitutional rights invoked by the private respondent have truly
been violated and even assuming so, whether he will be denied fundamental fairness. It is only when
their violation will destroy the respondent's right to fundamental fairness that his constitutional claims
should be given primacy.

Given this balancing approach, it is my humble submission that considering all the facts and facets of the
case, the private respondent has not proved entitlement to the right he is claiming. The majority
holds that the Constitution, the RP-US extradition and P.D. No. 1069 do not prohibit respondent's
claims, hence, it should be allowed. This is too simplistic an approach. Rights do not necessarily arise
from a vacuum. Silence of the law can even mean an implied denial of a right. Also, constitutional
litigations do not always involve a clear cut choice between right and wrong. Sometimes, they involve a
difficult choice between right against right. In these situations, there is need to balance the contending
rights and primacy is given to the right that will serve the interest of the nation at that particular time. In
such instances, the less compelling right is subjected to soft restraint but without smothering its essence.
Proceeding from this premise of relativism of rights, I venture the view that even
assuming arguendorespondent's weak claim, still, the degree of denial of private respondent's rights to
due process and to information is too slight to warrant the interposition of judicial power. As admitted in
the ponencia itself, an extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is, thus, futile to determine what it
is. What is certain is that it is not a criminal proceeding where there is an accused who claim the entire
array of rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Let it be stressed that in an extradition proceeding, there
is no accused and the guilt or innocence of the extraditee will not be passed upon by our executive
officials nor by the extradition judge. Hence, constitutional rights that are only relevant do determine
the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee. Indeed, an extradition
proceeding is summary in nature which is untrue of criminal proceedings.18 Even the rules of evidence
are different in an extradition proceeding. Admission of evidence is less stringent, again because the
guilt of the extraditee is not under litigation.19 It is not only the quality but even the quantum of evidence
in extradition proceeding is different. In a criminal case, an accused can only be convicted by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.20 In an extradition proceeding, an extraditee can be ordered extradited "upon
showing of the existed of a prima facie case."21 If more need be said, the nature of an extradition
decision is different from a judicial decision whose finality cannot be changed by executive fiat. Our
courts22 may hold an individual extraditable but the ultimate decision to extradite the individual lies in
the hands of the Executive. Section 3, Article 3 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty specifically provides that
"extradition shall not be granted if the executive authority of the Requested State determined that the
request was politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under
non-military penal legislation." In the United States, the Secretary of State exercises this ultimate power
and is conceded considerable discretion. He balances the equities of the case and the demands of the
nation's foreign relations.23 In sum, he is not straitjacketed by strict legal considerations like an ordinary
court.

The type of issue litigated in extradition proceedings which does not touch on the guilt or innocence of
the extraditee, the limited nature of the extradition proceeding, the availability of adequate remedies in
favor of the extraditee, and the traditional leeway given to the Executive in the conduct of foreign affairs
have compelled courts to put a high threshold before considering claims of individuals that enforcement
of an extradition treaty will violate their constitutional rights. Exemplifying such approach is
the Supreme Court of Canada which has adopted a highly deferential standard that emphasizes
international comity and the executive's experience in international matters.24 It continues to deny
Canada's charter protection to extraditees unless the violation can be considered shocking to the
conscience.
In the case, at bar and with due respect, the ponencia inflates with too much significance the threat to
liberty of the private respondent to prop us its thesis that his constitutional rights to due process and
access to information must immediately be vindicated. Allegedly, respondent Jimenez stands in danger
of provisional arrest, hence, the need for him to be immediately furnished copies of documents
accompanying the request for his extradition. Respondent's fear of provisional arrest is not real. It is a
self-imagined fear for the realities on the ground show that the United States authorities have not
manifested any desire to request for his arrest. On the contrary, they filed the extradition request
through the regular channel and, even with the pendency of the case at bar, they have not moved for
respondent's arrest on the ground of probable delay in the proceedings. To be sure, the issue of whether
respondent Jimenez will be provisionally arrested is now moot. Under Section 1 of Article 9 of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty, in relation to Section 20(a) of PD No. 1069, the general principle is enunciated that a
request for provisional arrest must be made pending receipt of the request for extradition. By filing the
request for extradition, the US authorities have implicitly decided not to move for respondent's
provisional arrest. But more important, a request for respondent's arrest does not mean he will be the
victim of an arbitrary arrest. He will be given due process before he can be arrested. Article 9 of the
treaty provides:

PROVISIONAL ARREST

1. In case of urgency, a Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest of the person
sought pending presentation of the request for extradition. A request for provisional arrest may
be transmitted through the diplomatic channel or directly between the Philippine Department
of Justice and the United States Department of Justice.

2. The application for provisional arrest shall contain:

a) a description of the person sought;

b) the location of the person sought, if known;

c) a brief statements of the facts of the case, including, if possible, the time and location
of the offense;

d) a description of the laws violated;

e) a statement of the existence of a warrant of a warrant of arrest or finding of guilt or

judgment of conviction against the person sought; and

f) a statement that a request for extradition for the person sought will follow.

3. The Requesting State shall be notified without delay of the disposition of its application and
the reasons for any denial.

4. A person who is provisionally arrested may be discharged from custody upon the expiration of
sixty (60) days from the date of arrest pursuant to this Treaty if the executive authority of the
Requested State has not received the formal request for extradition and the supporting
documents required in Article 7.
In relation to the above, Section 20 of P.D. No. 1069 provides:

Sec. 20. Provisional Arrest. — (a) In case of urgency, the requesting state may, pursuant to the
relevant treaty or convention and while the same remains in force, request for the provisional
arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition made in accordance with
Section 4 of this Decree.

(b) A request for provisional arrest shall be sent to the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Manila, either through the diplomatic channels or direct by post or telegraph.

(c) The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation or any official acting on his behalf shall
upon receipt of the request immediately secure a warrant for the provisional arrest of the
accused from the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of the province or city having
jurisdiction of the place, who shall issue the warrant for the provisional arrest of the accused.
The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation through the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
shall inform the requesting state of the result of its request.

(d) If within a period of 20 days after the provisional arrest, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs has
not received the request for extradition and the documents mentioned in Section 4 of this
Decree, the accused shall be released from custody.

The due process protection of the private-respondent against arbitrary arrest is written in cyrillic letters
in these two (2) related provisions. It is self-evident under these provisions that a request for provisional
arrest does not mean it will be granted ipso facto. The request must comply with certain requirements.
It must be based on an "urgent" factor. This is subject to verification and evaluation by our executive
authorities. The request can be denied if not based on a real exigency of if the supporting documents
are insufficient. The protection of the respondent against arbitrary provisional arrest does not stop on
the administrative level. For even if the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation agrees with the
request for the provisional arrest of the respondent, still he has to apply for a judicial warrant from the
"presiding judge of the Court of First Instance (now RTC) of the province of city having jurisdiction of the
place. . . . ." It is a judge who will issue a warrant for the provisional arrest of the respondent. The judge
has comply with Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which provides that "no . . . warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the . . . persons or things to be seized." The message that leaps to the eye is that compliance
with this requirements precludes any arbitrary arrest.

In light of all these considerations, I respectfully submit that denying respondent's constitutional claim
to be furnished all documents relating to the request for his extradition by the US authorities during
their evaluation stage will not subvert his right to fundamental fairness. It should be stressed that this is
not a case where the respondent will not be given an opportunity to know the basis of the request for his
extradition. In truth, and contrary to the impression of the majority, P.D. No. 1069 fixes the specific
time when he will be given the papers constituting the basis for his extradition. The time is when he is
summoned by the extradition court and required to answer the petition for extradition. Thus, Section 6
of P.D. No. 1069 provides:
 Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices. — (1) Immediately
upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable,
summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the
order. He may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served
anywhere within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest
and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the
answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for the
hearing thereof.

(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly
served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case.

Upon receipt of the summons and the petition, respondent is free to foist all defense available to
him. Such an opportunity does not deny him fairness which is the essence of due process of law.

Thus, with due respect, I submit that the ponencia failed to accord due importance to the international
law aspect of an extradition treaty as it unduly stressed its constitutional law dimension. This goes
against the familiar learning that in balancing the clashing interests involved in extradition
treaty, national interest is more equal than the others. While lately, humanitarian considerations are
being factored in the equation, still the concept of extradition as a national act is the guiding idea.
Requesting and granting extradition remains a power and prerogative of the national government of a
State. The process still involves relations between international personalities.25 Needless to state, a more
deferential treatment should be given to national interest than to individual interest. Our national
interest in extraditing persons who have committed crimes in a foreign country are succinctly expressed
in the whereas clauses of P.D. No. 1069, viz:

WHEREAS, the Constitution of the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations;

WHEREAS, the suppression of crime is the concern not only of the state where it is committed
but also of any other state to which the criminal may have escaped, because it saps the
foundation of social life and is an outrage upon humanity at large, and it is in the interest of
civilized communities that crimes should not go unpunished. . . . .

The increasing incidence of international and transnational crimes, the development of new technologies
of death, and the speed and scale of improvement of communication are factors which have virtually
annihilated time and distance. They make more compelling the vindication of national interest to insure
that the punishment of criminals should not be frustrated by the frontiers of territorial sovereignty. This
overriding national interest must be upheld as against respondent's weak constitutional claims which in
no way amount to denial of fundamental fairness.

At bottom, this case involves the respect that courts should accord to the Executive that concluded the
RP-US Extradition Treaty in the conduct of our foreign affairs. As early as 1800, the legendary John
Marshall, then a congressman, has opined that the power to extradite pursuant to a treaty rests in the
executive branch as part of its power to conduct foreign affairs.26 Courts have validated this forward-
looking opinion in a catena of unbroken cases. They defer to the judgment of the Executive on the
necessities of our foreign affairs and on its view of the requirements of international comity.
The deferential attitude is dictated by the robust reality that of the three great branches of our
government, it is the Executive that is most qualified to guide the ship of the state on the known and
unknown continents of foreign relations. It is also compelled by considerations of the principle
of separation of powers for the Constitution has clearly allocated the power to conduct our foreign
affairs to the Executive. I respectfully submit that the majority decision has weakened the Executive by
allowing nothing less than an unconstitutional headbutt on the power of the Executive to conduct our
foreign affairs. The majority should be cautions in involving this Court in the conduct of the nation's
foreign relations where the inviolable rule dictated by necessity is that the nation should speak with one
voice. We should not overlook the reality that courts by their nature, are ill-equipped to fully comprehend
the foreign policy dimension of a treaty, some of which are hidden in shadows and silhouettes.

I vote to grant the petition.

PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting opinion;

With due respect, I dissent.

The main issue before us is whether Private Respondent Mark B. Jimenez is entitled to the due process
rights of notice and hearing during the preliminary or evaluation stage of the extradition proceeding
against him.

Two Staged in Extradition

There are essentially two stages in extradition proceedings: (1) the preliminary or evaluation stage,
whereby the executive authority of the requested state ascertains whether the extradition request is
supported by the documents and information required under the Extradition Treaty; and (2) the
extradition hearing, whereby the petition for extradition is heard before a court of justice, which
determines whether the accused should be extradited.

The instant petition refers only to the first stage. Private respondent claims that he has a right to be
notified and to be heard at this early stage. However, even the ponencia admits that neither the RP-US
Extradition Treaty nor PD 1069 (the Philippine Extradition Law) expressly requires the Philippine
government, upon receipt of the request for extradition, to give copies thereof and its supporting
documents to the prospective extraditee, much less to give him an opportunity to be heard prior to the
filing of the petition in court.

Notably, international extradition proceedings in the United States do not include the grant by the
executive authority of notice and hearing to the prospective extraditee at this initial stage. It is the judge
or magistrate who is authorized to issue a warrant of arrest and to hold a hearing to consider the
evidence submitted in support of the extradition request. In contrast, in interstate rendition, the
governor must, upon demand, furnish the fugitive or his attorney copies of the request and its
accompanying documents, pursuant to statutory provisions.1 In the Philippines, there is no similar
statutory provision.
Evaluation Stage Essentially Ministerial

The evaluation stage simply involves the ascertainment by the foreign affairs secretary of whether the
extradition request is accompanied by the documents stated in paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the
Treaty, relating to the identity and the probable location of the fugitive; the facts of the offense and the
procedural history of the case; provisions of the law describing the essential elements of the offense
charged and the punishment therefor; its prescriptive period; such evidence as would provide probable
cause for the arrest and the committal for trial of the fugitive; and copies of the warrant or order of
arrest and charging document. The foreign affairs secretary also sees to it that these accompanying
documents have been certified by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippines in the
United States, and that they are in English language or have English translations. Pursuant to Article 3 of
the Treaty, he also determines whether the request is politically motivated, and whether the offense
charged is a military offense not punishable under non-military penal legislation.2

Upon a finding of the secretary of foreign affairs that the extradition request and its supporting
documents are sufficient and complete in form and substance, he shall deliver the same to the justice
secretary, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the
case. The lawyer designated shall then file a written petition with the proper regional trial court, with a
prayer that the court take the extradition request under consideration.3

When the Right to Notice and Hearing Becomes Available

According to private Respondent Jimenez, his right to due process during the preliminary stage
emanates from our Constitution, particularly Section 1, Article III thereof, which provides:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

He claims that this right arises immediately, because of the possibility that he may be provisionally
arrested pursuant to Article 9 of the RP-US Treaty, which reads:

In case of urgency, a Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought
pending presentation of the request for extradition. A request for provisional arrest may be
transmitted through the diplomatic channel or directly between the Philippine Department of
Justice and the United States Department of Justice.

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Melo's ponencia supports private respondent's contention. It states that there are two occasions
wherein the prospective extraditee may be deprived of liberty: (1) in case of a provisional arrest pending
the submission of the extradition request and (2) his temporary arrest during the pendency of the
extradition petition in court.4 The second instance is not in issue here, because no petition has yet been
filed in court.

However, the above-quoted Article 9 on provisional arrest is not automatically operative at all times,
and in enforcement does not depend solely on the discretion of the requested state. From the wordings
of the provision itself, there are at least three requisites: (1) there must be an urgency, and (2) there is a
corresponding request (3) which must be made prior to the presentation of the request for extradition.
In the instant case, there appears to be no urgency characterizing the nature of the extradition of
private respondent. Petitioner does not claim any such urgency. There is no request from the United
States for the provisional arrest of Mark Jimenez either. And the secretary of justice states during the
Oral Argument that he had no intention of applying for the provisional arrest of private
respondent.5 Finally, the formal request for extradition has already been made; therefore, provisional
arrest is not likely, as it should really come before the extradition request.6

Mark Jimenez Not in Jeopardy of Arrest

Under the outlined facts of this case, there is no open door for the application of Article 9, contrary to
the apprehension of private respondent. In other words, there is no actual danger that Jimenez will be
provisionally arrested or deprived of his liberty. There is as yet no threat that his rights would be
trampled upon, pending the filing in court of the petition for his extradition. Hence, there is no
substantial gain to be achieved in requiring the foreign affairs (or justice) secretary to notify and hear
him during the preliminary stage, which basically involves only the exercise of the ministerial power of
checking the sufficiency of the documents attached to the extradition request.

It must be borne in mind that during the preliminary stage, the foreign affairs secretary's determination
of whether the offense charged is extraditable or politically motivated is merely preliminary. The same
issue will be resolved by the trial court.7 Moreover, it is also the power and the duty of the court, not the
executive authority, to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that
the extraditee committed the crimes charged.8The sufficiency of the evidence of criminality is to be
determined based on the laws of the requested state.9 Private Respondent Jimenez will, therefore,
definitely have his full opportunity before the court, in case an extradition petition will indeed be filed,
to be heard on all issues including the sufficiency of the documents supporting the extradition request.10

Private respondent insists that the United States may still request his provisional arrest at any time. That
is purely speculative. It is elementary that this Court does not declare judgments or grant reliefs based
on speculations, surmises or conjectures.

In any event, even granting that the arrest of Jimenez is sought at any time despite the assurance of the
justice secretary that no such measure will be undertaken, our local laws and rules of procedure
respecting the issuance of a warrant of arrest will govern, there being no specific provision under the
Extradition Treaty by which such warrant should issue. Therefore, Jimenez will be entitled to all the
rights accorded by the Constitution and the laws to any person whose arrest is being
sought.1âwphi1.nêt

The right of one state to demand from another the return of an alleged fugitive from justice and the
correlative duty to surrender the fugitive to the demanding country exist only when created by a treaty
between the two countries. International law does not require the voluntary surrender of a fugitive to a
foreign government, absent any treaty stipulation requiring it.11 When such a treaty does exist, as
between the Philippines and the United States, it must be presumed that the contracting states perform
their obligations under it with uberrimae fidei, treaty obligations being essentially characterized
internationally by comity and mutual respect.

The Need for Respondent Jimenez to Face Charges in the US

One final point. Private respondent also claims that from the time the secretary of foreign affairs gave
due course to the request for his extradition, incalculable prejudice has been brought upon him. And
because of the moral injury caused, he should be given the opportunity at the earliest possible time to
stop his extradition. I believe that any moral injury suffered by private respondent had not been caused
by the mere processing of the extradition request. And it will not cease merely by granting him the
opportunity to be heard by the executive authority. The concrete charges that he has allegedly
committed certain offenses already exist. These charges have been filed in the United States and are
part of public and official records there. Assuming the existence of moral injury, the only means by
which he can restore his good reputation is to prove before the proper judicial authorities in the US that
the charges against him are unfounded. Such restoration cannot be accomplished by simply contending
that the documents supporting the request for his extradition are insufficient.

Conclusion

In the context of the factual milieu of private respondent, there is really no threat of any deprivation of
his liberty at the present stage of the extradition process. Hence, the constitutional right to due process
— particularly the right to be heard — finds no application. To grant private respondent's request for
copies of the extradition documents and for an opportunity to comment thereon will constitute "over-
due process" and unnecessarily delay the proceedings.

WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the Petition.

Footnotes

VITUG, J., separate opinion;

1
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers a pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

2
Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530; Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256.

3
Aniag, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 237 SCRA 424; Tupas vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA
597.

4
Abraham, Henry J., Some Basic Guidelines of "Due Process of Law." The Lawyers Review, Vol. IX,
30 April 1995, p. 1.

5
Cruz, Isagani A. Constitutional Law. 1995 Ed. pp. 94-95.

KAPUNAN, J., separate concurring opinion;

1
Annex "L," petition.

2
Petition, p. 4.

3
Edillon vs. Fernandos, 114 SCRA 153 (1982); Pangilinan vs. Zapata, 69 SCRA 334 (1976).

4
Stanley v. Illinois, 1405 U.S. 645, 647.

PUNO, J., dissenting opinion;

1
Weston, Falk, D'Amato, International Law and World Order, 2nd ed., p. 630 (1990).

2
International Extradition, United States Law and Practice, 2nd ed., p. 7 (1987).

3
The Practice of Extradition from Antiquity to Modern France and the United States: A Brief
History, 4 B.C. Int'l. & Comp. L. Rev. 39 (1981).

4
They were supported by scholars like Heineccuis, Burlamaqui, Rutherford, Schmelzing and
Kent. See Sheareer, Extradition in Internal Law, p. 24 (1971).

5
They were supported by scholars like Voet, Martons, Kuber, Leyser, Lint, Seafied, Schmaltz,
Mittermaier and Heffter. See Shearer, supra, p. 24.

6
119 US 407, 411, 7 S. Ct. 234, 236, 30 L. ed. 425 (1886).

7
See Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), The International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (1966) and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(1966).

8
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
otherwise known as "Bill of Rights for Women" was adopted by the UN General Assembly in
December 1979. As of November 1999, one hundred sixty seven (167) states including the
Philippines have ratified or acceded to it. See Statement of Angela King, Special Adviser to the
Secretary General of the UN on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, Judicial Colloquium
on the Application of International Human Rights Law at the Domestic Level, Vienna, Austria,
October 27, 1999.

9
Blakesley and Lagodny, Finding armony Amidst Disagreement Over Extradition, Jurisdiction,
The Role of Human Rights and Issues of Extraterritoriality Under International Criminal Law,
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 44 (1991).

10
See generally Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 2nd ed., (1966); Korowicz, The Problem
of the International Personality of Individuals, 50 Am. J., Int'l. Law 553 (1966).
11
The Conquering March of an Idea, Speech before the 72nd Annual Meeting of the American
Bar Association, St. Louis, Mo., September 6, 1949.

12
See also R. Falk and S. Mendlovitz, Strategy of World Order, etc. (1996); G. Clark and L. Sohn,
World Peace Through World Law (1966); Bassiouni, International Extradition in American
Practice and World Public Order, 36 Tenn. L. Rev. 1 (1968).

13
Bassiouni, supra, p. 625.

14
US v. Curtiss-Wright Expert Corp., 299 US 304, 57 S Ct. 216, 81 L. ed. 255 (1936).

15
Spencer, The Role of the Charter in Extradition Cases, University of Toronto L. Rev., vol. 51, pp.
62-63, (Winter, 1993).

16
Spencer, op cit., citing the decision in Soering, 11 E.H.R.R. 439 (1989).

17
Semmelman, Federal Courts, The Constitution and the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International
Extradition Proceedings, Cornell Law Rev., vol. 76, No. 5, p. 1198 (July 1991).

18
Sec. 9, P.D. No. 1069.

19
Ibid.

20
Sec. 2, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Court.

21
Sec. 10, P.D. No. 1069.

22
Referring to the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals whose decisions are deemed
final and executory. See Section 12, P.D. No. 1069.

23
Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 Col. Law Rev., pp. 1314-1329.

24
Spencer, op cit., citing decided cases.

25
Weston, Falk and Amato, International Law and World Order, 2nd ed., p. 630 (1990).

26
Semmelman. op cit., p. 1206.

PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting opinion;

1
35 CJS § 14(1) Extradition 410. See also ponencia, p. 25.

2
See ponencia, pp. 11-12.

3
Ibid., Section 5, pars. (1) & (2), PD 1069.
 4
Ponencia, p. 18.

5
TSN, p. 76.

6
See also TSN, p. 30.

7
§ 5 (2) & (3) in rel. to § 10, PD 1069. See also last par., p. 13 of ponencia.

8
18 USCS § 3184, n 58 Criminal Procedure 456; 31A Am Jur 2d § 109 Extradition 828.

9
18 USCS § 3184, n 64 Criminal Procedure 458.

10
See Wright v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 341, August 15, 1994.

11
31A Am Jur 2d Extradition § 14.

CASE 2: International School Alliance of Educators v. Hon, Quisimbing, G.R. No. 128845

G.R. No. 128845 June 1, 2000

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner,

vs.
HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON.
CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR.
BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the Superintendent of International School-Manila; and
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent
School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than their
colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the point. The point is that employees should be given
equal pay for work of equal value. That is a principle long honored in this jurisdiction. That is a principle
that rests on fundamental notions of justice. That is the principle we uphold today.1âwphi1.nêt

Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree
732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic
personnel and other temporary residents.1 To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational
program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School
to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from
Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and
regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the
protection of employees.

Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the
same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests to determine whether
a faculty member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire:
 a. What is one's domicile?

b. Where is one's home economy?

c. To which country does one owe economic allegiance?

d. Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School
responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines?2

Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is classified as a
local hire; otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreign-hire.

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires.1avvphi1 These include
housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also
paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on
two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation
factor" and (b) limited tenure. The School explains:

A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot himself from his home country, leave his family
and friends, and take the risk of deviating from a promising career path — all for the purpose of
pursuing his profession as an educator, but this time in a foreign land. The new foreign hire is
faced with economic realities: decent abode for oneself and/or for one's family, effective means
of transportation, allowance for the education of one's children, adequate insurance against
illness and death, and of course the primary benefit of a basic salary/retirement compensation.

Because of a limited tenure, the foreign hire is confronted again with the same economic reality
after his term: that he will eventually and inevitably return to his home country where he will
have to confront the uncertainty of obtaining suitable employment after along period in a
foreign land.

The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on an
international level in terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of international
education.3

When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner
International School Alliance of Educators, "a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining
representative of all faculty members"4 of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between
foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in
the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.

On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board to bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On June 10, 1996, the DOLE Acting
Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in
favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration in an Order dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court.
Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to
Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.

The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty members, numbering 38 in all,
with nationalities other than Filipino, who have been hired locally and classified as local hires.5 The
Acting Secretary of Labor found that these non-Filipino local-hires received the same benefits as the
Filipino local-hires.

The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to all, regardless of
race. Truth to tell, there are foreigners who have been hired locally and who are paid equally as
Filipino local hires.6

The Acting secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction in salary rates:

The Principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find applications in the present case. The
international character of the School requires the hiring of foreign personnel to deal with
different nationalities and different cultures, among the student population.

We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of salaries and benefits accorded to
foreign hired personnel which system is universally recognized. We agree that certain amenities
have to be provided to these people in order to entice them to render their services in the
Philippines and in the process remain competitive in the international market.

Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign hires have limited contract of employment
unlike the local hires who enjoy security of tenure. To apply parity therefore, in wages and other
benefits would also require parity in other terms and conditions of employment which include
the employment which include the employment contract.

A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to the conditions and provisions for salary and
professional compensation wherein the parties agree as follows:

All members of the bargaining unit shall be compensated only in accordance with
Appendix C hereof provided that the Superintendent of the School has the discretion to
recruit and hire expatriate teachers from abroad, under terms and conditions that are
consistent with accepted international practice.

Appendix C of said CBA further provides:

The new salary schedule is deemed at equity with the Overseas Recruited Staff (OSRS)
salary schedule. The 25% differential is reflective of the agreed value of system
displacement and contracted status of the OSRS as differentiated from the tenured
status of Locally Recruited Staff (LRS).

To our mind, these provisions demonstrate the parties' recognition of the difference in the
status of two types of employees, hence, the difference in their salaries.
 The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an
established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is
not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification. A
classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of
the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the
former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and
have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching
faculty of the School.7

We cannot agree.

That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws
reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution8 in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights
exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the
right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad
Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

International law, which springs from general principles of law,9 likewise proscribes discrimination.
General principles of law include principles of equity, 10 i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice,
based on the test of what is reasonable. 11 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 12 the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 13 the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 14 the Convention against Discrimination in
Education, 15 the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation 16 — all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness
and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its
national laws.

In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital,
inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.

The Constitution 17 specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These
conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace — the factory, the office or the field — but
include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.

The Constitution 18 also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all."
Similarly, the Labor Code 19 provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of
sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in
spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes
to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment. 20

Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for
example, prohibits and penalizes 21 the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as against
a male employee for work of equal value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer
to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization.
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra, in Article 7 thereof,
provides:

The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of
just and favourable conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:

a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:

(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without
distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of
work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of
"equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. 22 This rule applies to the School,
its "international character" notwithstanding.

The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to
that of foreign-hires. 23 The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees
the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This
presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the
rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That
would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the
employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.

The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-
hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions
and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.

The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the
distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay.

"Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a reward or recompense for services
performed." Similarly, the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the "[c]onsideration paid
at regular intervals for the rendering of services." In Songco v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 24 we said that:

"salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or industry in
another man's business. Whether it be derived from "salarium," or more fancifully from "sal,"
the pay of the Roman soldier, it carries with it the fundamental idea of compensation for
services rendered. (Emphasis supplied.)

While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an
enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and
they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and
the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The
dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain
benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.

The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," 25 "to
afford labor full protection." 26 The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations
between labor and capital. 27These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public
interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common
good. 28 Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not
hesitate to strike down these stipulations.

In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no
reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of
the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not
deserve the sympathy of this Court.1avvphi1

We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.

A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the
entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve
the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the
law." 29 The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the
employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial
similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual
Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. 30 The
basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the
combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights. 31

It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-
hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows
that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy
security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions
as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires. These benefits,
such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance, are reasonably
related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include
foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their
respective collective bargaining rights.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The Orders
of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent School of according foreign-
hires higher salaries than local-hires.

SO ORDERED.
Puno and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., on official leave.
Ynares-Santiago, J., is on leave.

CASE 3: Oposa v. Factoran G.R. No. 101083

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented
by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her
parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES,
minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor,
represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all
surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN
V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T.
CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA,
minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA,
JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by
their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and
DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING,
DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their
parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors,
represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all
surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA,
ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents
RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed
QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO,
CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents
FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of
the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology
which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility"
and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have
a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest
the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro
Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein,
now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-
stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action
geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala,
was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally
concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring
them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well
as generations yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to —

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has
a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests
in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a
genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous
Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific
evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area
should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per
cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as
the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of
the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of
Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil
fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion
(1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes,
(d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the
disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's
indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and
other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of
drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds
which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains
arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the
lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for
domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes
such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation
are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as
documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of
rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million
hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth
rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and
about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license
agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million
hectares for commercial logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as
Annex "A".

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25
hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the
Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not
earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage
of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to
generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the
environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt,
experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs —
especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never see, use, benefit from
and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural

resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On
March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging
permits in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing
serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative
of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that
is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous
cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the
public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part,
states that it is the policy of the State —

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature
can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of

dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is

contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to —
 a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make
full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14,
Article XIV, id.);

d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural
law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant
action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue
raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that
(1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the
action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In
the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action
against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that
the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by
the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent
Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors
not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the
respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains
sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of
the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section
3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the
1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept
of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation
and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative
obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in
granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available
involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners
maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit
that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be
revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific
legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing
in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which
supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such
allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that
the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should
be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert
that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the
passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by
the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time
— usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled
unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the
agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due
process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil
Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue
with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject
matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the
Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally
impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all
the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are
present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the
former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and
harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal
and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and
other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right
for the generations to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of
the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of
the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners
and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but
agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of
all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal
right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking
to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the
Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified
data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein
defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with
political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by
this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of
the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is
replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint
itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
 Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of
the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of
the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of
rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless
the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too
far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come —
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido
Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:

MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all
forms of pollution — air, water and noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment

necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same
and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests.

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as
well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and
utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10
June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources,
specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed
areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as
may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for
the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following
statement of policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the
sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the
protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of
the different segments of the population to the development and the use of the
country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future
generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value
system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino
people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral,
land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent
with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and
enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration,
development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the
different segments of the present as well as future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into
account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand,
specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the
agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:

Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be
primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the
bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes
already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6
June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment
Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain
and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony
with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive
to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as
trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other
hand, gave flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as
clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No.
192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or
protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which
they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other;
and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to
state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of
the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of
falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted.
The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court
render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs.
Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and
circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of
action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed
hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there
is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory
affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they
may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as
the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the
grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation
or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue.
What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and
expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no
longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that
protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of
section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a
distinguished member of this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power,
involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the
authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to
review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court,
the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the
legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave
abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract
according to the disposition of the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before
us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts
clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in
his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost
infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the
timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said
licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of
public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every
timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend,
modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form
of privilege granted herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.
In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber
license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license
or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or
public welfare as in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is

not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the
person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create
a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights
(People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by
which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end
that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence
a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts
within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres.
Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548,
October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

 cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not
involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber
licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further
that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose,
such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose
of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and
enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute.
The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the
promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general
welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life
Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are
normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall
be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are
absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the
detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally
fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common
interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with
respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of
yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a
matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged
Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The
petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of
the questioned timber license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to
my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal
principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the
protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the
natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to
myself, what the Court appears to be saying.

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and,
maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that
their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which
a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of
"class" here involved — membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country
whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action
petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The
Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of
environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the
private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such
beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to
act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for
future determination in an appropriate case.

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental
legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that
"the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that
it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very
difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to
"a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic
appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers,
inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of
organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after
strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs
and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals;
contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The
other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987;
Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all
appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic
policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to
health").

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other
hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment
quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has
identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give
rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine
Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the
formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-
headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to
contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of
Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The
implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and
far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a
right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution —
that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by
petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for.
To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or
rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the
Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have
given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a
motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a
specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons.
One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in
operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in
other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation
is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial
power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:

Section 1. . . .

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
(Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and
"the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully
submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At
least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have
no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where
no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making
departments — the legislative and executive departments — must be given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them
before the courts should intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the
proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded
is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms
and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those
companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the
specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between
petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent
administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies
demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest
cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's
decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.

# Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to
my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal
principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the
protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the
natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to
myself, what the Court appears to be saying.

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and,
maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that
their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which
a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of
"class" here involved — membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country
whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action
petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The
Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of
environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the
private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such
beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to
act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for
future determination in an appropriate case.

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental
legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that
"the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that
it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very
difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to
"a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic
appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers,
inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of
organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after
strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs
and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals;
contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The
other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987;
Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all
appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic
policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to
health").

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other
hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment
quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has
identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give
rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine
Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the
formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-
headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to
contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of
Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The
implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and
far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a
right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution —
that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by
petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for.
To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or
rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the
Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have
given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a
motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a
specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons.
One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in
operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in
other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation
is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial
power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:

Section 1. . . .

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
(Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and
"the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully
submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At
least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have
no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where
no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making
departments — the legislative and executive departments — must be given a real and effective
 opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them
before the courts should intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the
proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded
is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms
and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those
companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the
specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between
petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent
administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies
demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest
cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's
decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.

# Footnotes

1 Rollo, 164; 186.

2 Id., 62-65, exclusive of annexes.

3 Under Section 12, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court.

4 Rollo, 67.

5 Id., 74.

6 Rollo, 70-73.

7 Annex "B" of Petitions; Id., 43-44.

8 Paragraph 7, Petition, 6; Rollo, 20.

9 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, unabridged, 1986, 1508.

10 Title XIV (Environment and Natural Resources), Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987, E.O. No. 292.

11 Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 43-44.

12 Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 4, 913.

13 For instance, the Preamble and Article XII on the National Economy and Patrimony.
14 The Reorganization Act of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.

15 E.O. No. 292.

16 Section 1.

17 Section 2.

18 Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666 [1947]; Community Investment and
Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88 Phil. 215 [1951]; Remitere vs. Vda. de Yulo, 16 SCRA 251
[1966]; Caseñas vs. Rosales, 19 SCRA 462 [1967]; Virata vs. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA
680 [1991]; Madrona vs. Rosal, 204 SCRA 1 [1991].

19 Section 1(q), Rule 16, Revised Rules of Court.

20 Adamos vs. J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. 25 SCRA 529 [1968]; Virata vs.
Sandiganbayn, supra; Madrona vs. Rosal, supra.

21 39 SCRA 473, 479 [1971].

22 1991 ed., 226-227.

23 180 SCRA 496, 501-502 [1989]. See also, Coseteng vs. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377 [1990];
Gonzales vs. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 [1990]; Llamas vs. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 [1991];
Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767 [1991].

24 Rollo, 44.

25 125 SCRA 302, 325 [1983].

26 190 SCRA 673, 684 [1990].

27 Article III, 1987 Constitution.

28 110 Phil. 198, 203 [1960]; footnotes omitted.

29 291 U.S. 502, 523, 78 L. ed. 940, 947-949.

30 22 SCRA 135, 146-147 [1968].

31 Ongsiako vs. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 [1950]; Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp. supra.; Phil.
American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, supra.; Alalayan vs. NPC, 24 SCRA
172[1968]; Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54 [1974]; Kabiling vs.
National Housing Authority, 156 SCRA 623 [1987].
Case 4: League of Cities v. COMELEC G.R. No. 1769951

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 176951 June 28, 2011

League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treñas; City of
Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treñas, in his personal capacity
as Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
Commission on Elections; Municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte; Municipality of Bogo, Province of
Cebu; Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Western Samar; Municipality of Tandag, Province of
Surigao del Sur; Municipality of Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar; and Municipality of Tayabas,
Province of Quezon, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 177499

League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treñas; City of
Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treñas, in his personal capacity
as Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
Commission on Elections; Municipality of Lamitan, Province of Basilan; Municipality of Tabuk,
Province of Kalinga; Municipality of Bayugan, Province of Agusan del Sur; Municipality of Batac,
Province of Ilocos Norte; Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao Oriental; and Municipality of
Guihulngan, Province of Negros Oriental, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 178056

League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treñas; City of
Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treñas, in his personal capacity
as Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
Commission on Elections; Municipality of Cabadbaran, Province of Agusan del Norte; Municipality of
Carcar, Province of Cebu; Municipality of El Salvador, Province of Misamis Oriental; Municipality of
Naga, Cebu; and Department of Budget and Management, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

We hereby consider and resolve:– (a) the petitioners’ Motion for Leave to File Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of 12 April 2011, attached to which is a Motion for Reconsideration of
the Resolution dated 12 April 2011 dated April 29, 2011 (Motion For Reconsideration), praying that the
resolution of April 12, 2011 be reconsidered and set aside; and (b) the respondents’ Motion for Entry of

15 February 2011) is of no consequence, for the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9009 is neither relevant nor
decisive in this case, the reference to said legislative enactment being only for purposes of discussion.
The Motion for Reconsideration, being a second motion for reconsideration, cannot be entertained. As
to that, Section 24 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court is unqualified. The Court has firmly held that a second
motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading,5 and only for extraordinarily persuasive reasons and
only after an express leave has been first obtained may a second motion for reconsideration be
entertained.6 The restrictive policy against a second motion for reconsideration has been re-emphasized
in the recently promulgated Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, whose Section 3, Rule 15 states:

Section 3. Second motion for reconsideration. – The Court shall not entertain a second motion for
reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by
the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration
"in the higher interest of justice" when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise
patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to
the parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to
be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Court’s declaration.

In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate a second motion for
reconsideration to the Court En Banc.

We observe, too, that the prescription that a second motion for reconsideration "can only be
entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the
Court’s declaration" even renders the denial of the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration more
compelling. As the resolution of April 12, 2011 bears out,7the ruling sought to be reconsidered became
final by the Court’s express declaration. Consequently, the denial ofthe Motion for Reconsideration is
immediately warranted.

Still, the petitioners seem to contend that the Court had earlier entertained and granted the
respondents’ own second motion for reconsideration. There is no similarity between then and now,
however, for the Court en banc itself unanimously declared in the resolution of June 2, 2009 that the
respondents’ second motion for reconsideration was "no longer a prohibited pleading."8 No similar
declaration favors the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.

Finally, considering that the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration merely rehashes the issues
previously put forward, particularly in the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision
dated 15 February 2011), the Court, having already passed upon such issues with finality, finds no need
to discuss the issues again to avoid repetition and redundancy.

Accordingly, the finality of the resolutions upholding the constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws now
absolutely warrants the granting of respondents’ Motion for Entry of Judgment.

WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petitioners’ Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration of
the Resolution of 12 April 2011 and the attached Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 12
April 2011; grants the respondents’ Motion for Entry of Judgment dated May 9, 2011; and directs the
Clerk of Court to forthwith issue the Entry of Judgment in this case.

No further pleadings or submissions by any party shall be entertained.

SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
The prayer for relief of the Motion for Reconsideration states:

WHEREFORE, Petitioners most respectfully pray that the Resolution dated 12 April 2011
be forthwith RECONSIDERED, REVERSED or SET ASIDE.
 2
The dispositive portion of the resolution of April 12, 2011 reads:

WHEREFORE, the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15
February 2011) is denied with finality.

SO ORDERED.

3
The dispositive portion of the resolution of February 15, 2011 says:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of the "Resolution" dated August 24,
2010, dated and filed on September 14, 2010 by respondents Municipality of Baybay, et
al. is GRANTED. The Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Cityhood Laws—Republic Acts Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404,
9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491—are declared CONSTITUTIONAL.

SO ORDERED.

4
Section 2. Second motion for reconsideration. – No second motion for reconsideration of a
judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.

5
Securities and Exchange Commission v. PICOP Resources, Inc., 566 SCRA 451 (2008); APO Fruits
corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164195, April 5, 2011; Ortigas and
Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, 254 SCRA 234.

6
Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, supra.

7
Supra, note 2.

8
The resolution of June 2, 2009 pertinently declared:

xxx

In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for reconsideration filed by
the respondent cities. In effect, the Court allowed the filing of the second motion for
reconsideration. Thus, the second motion for reconsideration was no longer a
prohibited pleading. However, for lack of the required number of votes to overturn the
18 November 2009 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, the Court denied the
second motion for reconsideration in its 28 April 2009 Resolution.

xxx

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:

The majority decision upheld the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws because (1) of the pendency of
the conversion bills during the 11th Congress; and (2) compliance with the requirements of the Local
Government Code prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 9009.

I reiterate my dissent.

I.
The Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected. (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in
the Local Government Code itself and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government
Code.1 To avoid discrimination and ensure uniformity and equality, the Constitution expressly requires
Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code itself all the criteria necessary for the creation of a
city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any
other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

Notably, each Cityhood Law provides in its Separability Clause that if any of its provisions is
"inconsistent with the Local Government Code," the other consistent provisions "shall continue to be
in full force and effect." The clear and inescapable implication is that any provision in each Cityhood
Law that is "inconsistent with the Local Government Code" has no force and effect – in short, void and
ineffective. Each Cityhood Law expressly and unequivocally acknowledges the superiority of the Local
Government Code, and that in case of conflict, the Local Government Code shall prevail over the
Cityhood Law. The clear intent and express language of the Cityhood Laws is for these laws to conform
to the Local Government Code and not the other way around.

Moreover, Congress, in providing in the Separability Clause that the Local Government Code shall prevail
over the Cityhood Laws, treats the Cityhood Laws as separate and distinct from the Local Government
Code. In other words, the Cityhood Laws do not form integral parts of the Local Government Code but
are separate and distinct laws. There is therefore no question that the Cityhood Laws are
laws other than the Local Government Code. As such, the Cityhood Laws cannot stipulate an exception
from the requirements for the creation of cities, prescribed in the Local Government Code, without
running afoul of the explicit mandate of Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.

Contrary to the faulty conclusion of the majority, the Cityhood Laws do not amend the Local
Government Code. The Legislature never intended the Cityhood Laws to amend the Local Government
Code. Nowhere in the plain language of the Cityhood Laws can this interpretation be discerned. Neither
the title nor the body of the Cityhood Laws sustains such conclusion. Simply put, there is absolutely
nothing in the Cityhood Laws to support the majority decision that the Cityhood Laws amended the
Local Government Code.

II.
The Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th
Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the
11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose
of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or
determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th
Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood
bills. In short, the classification criterion − mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not
rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from
converting into cities.

The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition
existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates
the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only.

In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique
advantage based on an arbitrary date − the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th
Congress – as against all other municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA
9009.

Further, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the
classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16
respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can.
Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, is unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection
clause.

III.
Respondent municipalities must comply with the
₱100 million income requirement under the prevailing LGC.

RA No. 9009 amended the Local Government Code precisely because the criteria in the old Local
Government Code were no longer sufficient. In short, RA No. 9009 repealed the old income requirement
of ₱20 million, a requirement that no longer exists in our statute books. Compliance with the old income
requirement is compliance with a repealed, dead, and non-existent law – a totally useless, futile, and
empty act. Worse, compliance with the old requirement is an outright violation of the Constitution
which expressly commands that "no x x x city x x x shall be created x x x except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code." Therefore, respondent municipalities in order to
validly convert into cities must comply with the ₱100 million income requirement under the prevailing
Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, and not with the old ₱20 million income requirement.
Otherwise, such compliance with the old ₱20 million income requirement is void for being
unconstitutional.
There must be strict compliance with the express command of the Constitution that "no city x x x shall
be created x x x except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code."
Substantial compliance is insufficient because it will discriminate against all other cities that were
created before and after the enactmentof the Cityhood Laws in strict compliance with the criteria in the
Local Government Code, as amended by RA No. 9009. The conversion of municipalities into new cities
means an increase in the Internal Revenue Allotment of the former municipalities and a corresponding
decrease in the Internal Revenue Allotment of all other existing cities. There must be strict, not only
substantial, compliance with the constitutional requirement because the economic lifeline of existing
cities may be seriously affected.

IV.
The increased income requirement of ₱100 million
is neither arbitrary nor difficult to comply.

According to the majority, "the imposition of the income requirement of ₱100 million from local sources
under R.A. No. 9009 was arbitrary. x x x no research or empirical data buttressed the figure. Nor was
there proof that the proposal took into account the after-effects that were likely to arise."

This is glaring error.

The Legislature, in enacting RA No. 9009, is not required by the Constitution to show the courts data like
inflation figures to support the increased income requirement. As long as the increased income
requirement is not impossible to comply, such increase is a policy determination involving the wisdom
of the law, which exclusively lies within the province of the Legislature. When the Legislature enacts
laws increasing taxes, tax rates, or capital requirements for businesses, the Court cannot refuse to apply
such laws on the ground that there is no economic justification for such increases. Economic, political or
social justifications for the enactment of laws go into the wisdom of the law, outside the purview of
judicial review. This Court cannot refuse to apply the law unless the law violates a specific provision of
the Constitution. There is plainly nothing unconstitutional in increasing the income requirement from
₱20 million to ₱100 million because such increase does not violate any express or implied provision of
the Constitution.

V.
Failure of 59 existing cities to post ₱100 million annual income
does not render the ₱100 million income requirement
difficult to comply.

Suffice it to state that there is no Constitutional or statutory requirement for the 59 existing cities to
comply with the ₱100 million income requirement. Obviously, these cities were already cities prior to
the amendment of the Local Government Code providing for the increased income requirement of
₱100 million. In other words, at the time of their creation, these cities have complied with the criteria
prescribed under the old Local Government Code for the creation of cities, and thus are not required to
comply with the ₱100 million income requirement of the prevailing Local Government Code. It is utterly
misplaced and grossly erroneous to cite the "non-compliance" by the 59 existing cities with the
increased income requirement of ₱100 million to conclude that the ₱100 million income requirement is
arbitrary and difficult to comply.
Moreover, as stated, the increased income requirement of ₱100 million is neither unconstitutional nor
unlawful. Unless the ₱100 million income requirement violates a provision of the Constitution or a law,
such requirement for the creation of a city must be strictly complied with. Any local government unit
applying for cityhood, whether located in or outside the metropolis and whether within the National
Capital Region or not, must meet the ₱100 million income requirement prescribed by the prevailing
Local Government Code. There is absolutely nothing unconstitutional or unlawful if the ₱100 million
income requirement is easily complied with by local government units within or near the National
Capital Region. The majority’s groundless and unfair discrimination against these metropolis-located
local government units must necessarily fail.

VI.
The Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution.

Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code are essential to
implement a fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to all local government units. Section 6,
Article X of the Constitution provides:

Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall
be automatically released to them. (Emphasis supplied)

If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there can be no fair
and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

A city with an annual income of only ₱20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not receive the
same share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of ₱100 million or more. The criteria of land
area, population and income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, must be
strictly followed because such criteria, prescribed by law, are material in determining the "just share" of
local government units in national taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, they prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal
Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution.

As pointed out by petitioners, "respondent municipalities have a total population equivalent to that of
Davao City only, or around 1.3 million people. Yet, the IRA that pertains to the 16 municipalities
(₱4,019,776,072) is more than double that for Davao City (₱1,874,175,271). x x x As a result, the per
capita IRA alloted for the individual denizen of Davao is even less than half of the average per capita IRA
of the inhabitants of the sixteen (16) municipalities (₱1,374.70 divided by ₱3,117.24)."

This indisputable fact vividly reveals the economic inequity that will inevitably result from the unjust
allocation of the IRA as a consequence of the conversion of respondent municipalities into cities. Clearly,
if the existing cities’ share in the Internal Revenue Allotment is unreasonably reduced, it is possible,
even expected, that these cities may have to lay-off workers and abandon projects, greatly hampering,
or worse paralyzing, the delivery of much needed public services in their respective territorial
jurisdictions.

VII.

Conclusion
The Constitution expressly requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code itself all the
criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. To
avoid discrimination and ensure uniformity and equality, such criteria cannot be embodied in any other
law except the Local Government Code. In this case, the Cityhood Laws, which are unmistakably laws
other than the Local Government Code, provide an exemption from the increased income requirement
for the creation of cities under Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA No. 9009.
Clearly, the Cityhood Laws contravene the letter and intent of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
In addition, the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause and Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution on the fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to all local government units.
Without any doubt, the Cityhood Laws must be striken down for being unconstitutional.

Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the motion for reconsideration of the League of Cities of the Philippines.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Footnote

1
Republic Act No. 7160, as amended.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION

SERENO, J.:

"If changing judges changes laws, it is not even clear what law is."

- Richard A. Posner1

I maintain my dissent that the sixteen Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional. In questioning the Court’s
latest Resolution,2 petitioners have raised concerns over the "highly irregular and unprecedented" acts
of entertaining several motions for reconsideration.3 In response to these concerns, I wish to expound
on the effects of the "flip-flopping" decisions on the Court’s role in our democratic system and its
decision-making process, in order that it may "serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly
government of laws."4

Our system of democracy is committed irrevocably to a government of laws,5 and not of men.6 Laws give
witness to society’s moral values7 and are the depositories of what the sovereign as a whole has agreed
to uphold as the minimum standards of conduct that will govern relationships and transactions within
that society. In a representative democracy, the Filipino people, through their elected representatives,
deliberate, distill and make moral judgments, which are crystallized into written laws that are made
public, accessible and binding to all.8 Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is
more fundamental than its erection and enforcement of a system of rules defining the various rights and
duties of its members, enabling them to govern their affairs and definitively settle their differences in an
orderly, predictable manner.9

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice.10 Once the sovereign people’s
"soft" moral choices are hardened through the constitutionally mandated legislative process,11 statutory
laws perform an equalizing function of imposing a knowable standard of conduct or behavior to which
all members of society must conform to – a social contract which everyone regardless of class, sex or
religion is bound.12 Legislative enactments are ordinarily prospective and general in character insofar as
they prescribe limitations on an individual’s future conduct. Under the rule of law,13 ordinary people can
reasonably assume that another person’s future conduct will be in observance of the laws and can
conceivably expect that any deviation therefrom will be punished accordingly by responsible authorities.
Thus, written constitutions and statutory laws allow citizens a minimum confidence in a world of
uncertainty:

Through constitutionalism we placed limits on both our political institutions and ourselves, hoping that
democracies, historically always turbulent, chaotic, and even despotic, might now become restrained,
principled, thoughtful and just. So we bound ourselves over to a law that we made and promised to
keep. And though a government of laws did not displace governance by men, it did mean that now men,
democratic men, would try to live by their word.14

As man-made creations, however, laws are not always entirely encompassing, as future conditions may
change – conditions that could not have been perceived or accounted for by the legislators. Actual
situations may arise between two conflicting claims by specific parties with differing interpretations of
the law. In those instances in which a gray area or an unintended gap exists in the implementation or
execution of laws, the judicial department is charged with the duty of determining the limitations that
the law places upon all actions of individuals.15 Hence, the court’s primary adjudicatory function is to
mark the metes and bounds of the law in specific areas of application, as well as to pass judgment on
the competing positions in a case properly brought before it.

The Court not only functions to adjudicate rights among the parties, but also serves the purpose of a
supreme tribunal of last resort that establishes uniform rules of civil justice.16 Jurisprudence "narrows
the field of uncertainty"17 in the application of an unclear area of the law. The certainty of judicial
pronouncement lends respect for and adherence to the rule of law – "the idea that all citizens and all
organs of government are bound by rules fixed in advance, which make it possible to foresee how the
coercive powers of government will be used, whether in its own interests or in aid of citizens who call on
them, in particular circumstances."18 The Court’s historic role of pronouncing what the law is between
the parties19 is the cornerstone of a government of laws, and not of men.20Justice Antonin Scalia of the
United States Supreme Court expounded on the objectives of uniformity and predictability of judicial
decisions, to wit:

This last point suggests another obvious advantage of establishing as soon as possible a clear, general
principle of decision: predictability. Even in simpler times uncertainty has been regarded as incompatible
with the Rule of Law. Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law must have the means of
knowing what it prescribes. It is said that one of emperor Nero's nasty practices was to post his edicts
high on the columns so that they would be harder to read and easier to transgress. As laws have become
more numerous, and as people have become increasingly ready to punish their adversaries in the
courts, we can less and less afford protracted uncertainty regarding what the law may mean.
Predictability, or as Llewellyn put it, "reckonability," is a needful characteristic of any law worthy of the
name. There are times when even a bad rule is better than no rule at all.21 (Emphasis supplied)

Certainty and "reckonability" in the law are the major objectives of the legal system, and judicial
decisions serve the important purpose of providing stability to the law and to the society governed by
that law.22 If we are to subscribe to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ theory of a bad man,23 then law
provides reasonable predictability in the consequences of one’s actions relative to the law, if performed
in a just and orderly society. As judicial decisions form part of the law of the land,24 there is a strong
public interest in stability and in the orderly conduct of our affairs, an end served by a consistent course
of adjudication.25 Thus, once a court has decided upon a rule of law, "that decision should continue to
govern the same issues in subsequent stages" of the same case26 and thus offers to the people some
measure of conviction about the legal effects of their actions. In the absence of extraordinary
circumstances, courts should be loathe to revisit prior decisions.27

In the instant case, the public confusion, sown by the pendulum swing of the Court’s decisions, has
yielded unpredictability in the judicial decision-making process and has spawned untold consequences
upon the public’s confidence in the enduring stability of the rule of law in our jurisdiction.

The Court has been entrusted by the sovereign with the duty of voicing out and sharpening with finality
society’s collective ideals in its written decisions. Yet, if cases are litigated in perpetuity, and judgments
are clouded with continuous uncertainty, the public’s confidence in the stability of judicial precedents
promulgated by the Court would be greatly diminished. In this case, the Court has reviewed and
reconsidered, no less than five times already,28 the constitutionality of the sixteen Cityhood
Laws.29 During this time, the public has been made to endure an inordinate degree of indecision that has
disturbed the conduct of local government affairs with respect not only to the municipalities asking to
become cities, but also with respect to cities genuinely fearful of the destruction of the standards for the
creation of cities and the correlative diminution of the internal revenue allotments of existing cities. The
Court’s commitment to provide constant and steadfast rules on the creation of cities has been inevitably
weakened by the "flip-flopping" in the case that has opened the doors to rabid criticisms of the Court’s
failure to abide by its own internal rules and, thus, diminishing reliance on the certainty of its decisions.

To be sure, the Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn
adherence to the doctrine of immutability30 would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality.31 The
Court has previously provided for exceptions to the rule on immutability of final judgments, as follows:
(1) the correction of clerical errors;32 (2) nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party;33 (3) void judgments;34 and (4) supervening events.35As exceptions to the general rule, their
application to instances wherein a review of a final and executory decision is called are to be strictly
construed.36 No convincing argument or extraordinary circumstance has been raised to justify and
support the application of any of these exceptions to warrant a reversal of the Court’s First Decision.
Reversing previous, final, and executory decisions are to be done only under severely limited
circumstances. Although new and unforeseen circumstances may arise in the future to justify a review
of an established legal principle in a separate and distinct case, the extension of a principle must be
dealt with exceptionally and cautiously.
Undeniably, the Court in the past has overturned prior decisions even on a second or third motion for
reconsideration and recalled entries of judgment on the ground of substantial interest of justice and
special and compelling reasons.37 The Court bows to "the lessons of experience and the force of better
reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is
appropriate also in the judicial function."38Notable reversals in recent memory include the cases
involving the request for extradition of Mark Jimenez,39 the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Act
of 1995,40 the land title covering the Piedad Estate in Quezon City,41the just compensation due to Apo
Fruits Corporation,42 and the "deemed resigned" provision for public appointive officials in the recent
May 2010 election.43 Although no prohibition exists that would prevent this Court from changing its
mind in the light of compelling reasons and in the interest of substantial justice as abovedemonstrated,
extreme retrospect and caution must accompany such review.

In the instant case, there is no substantial interest of justice or compelling reason that would warrant
the reversal of the First Decision declaring the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional. There is no injustice in
preventing the conversion of the sixteen municipalities into cities at this point in time. In fact, justice is
more equitably dispensed by the stringent application of the current legislative criteria under the Local
Government Code (LGC),44 as amended by Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), for creating cities without
distinction or exception. It must be remembered that the declaration of unconstitutionality is not an
absolute ban on these municipalities prohibiting them from pursuing cityhood in the future once they
are able to achieve the PhP100,000,000 income requirement under RA 9009.45Alternatively, their
congressional representatives can also press for another amendatory law of the LGC that would include
an explicit exception to the income requirement for municipalities with pending cityhood bills prior to
the enactment of RA 9009. The route purportedly chosen by Congress to indirectly amend the LGC
through the exemption of annual income requirements in the Cityhood Laws is improper. If Congress
believes that the minority’s construction of its intention in increasing the annual income requirement is
erroneous, then the legislature can show its disapproval by directly enacting amendatory legislation of
the LGC. In both cases, the remedy available to the sixteen municipalities is not with the Court, but with
the legislature, which is constitutionally empowered to determine the standards for the creation of a
local government unit. The reasoning and substantial justice arguments expounded to reverse the initial
finding of the Court that the Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional are poorly founded.

The LGC is a distinctly normative law that regulates the legislative power to create cities and establishes
the standards by which the power is exercised. Unlike other statutes that prohibit undesirable conduct
of ordinary citizens and are ends by themselves, the LGC prescribes the means by which congressional
power is to be exercised and local government units are brought into legal existence. Its purpose is to
avoid the arbitrary and random creation of provinces, cities and municipalities. By encapsulating the
criteria for cityhood in the LGC, Congress provided objective, equally applicable and fairly ascertainable
standards and reduced the emphasis on currying political favor from its members to approvingly act on
the proposed cityhood law. Otherwise, cities chartered under a previous Congress can be unmade, at a
whim, by a subsequent Congress, regardless of its compliance with the LGC’s requirements. Fairness and
equity demand that the criteria established by the LGC be faithfully and strictly enforced, most
especially by Congress whose power is the actual subject of legislative delimitation.

In granting it the power to fix the criteria for the creation of a city, the Constitution, of course, did not
preclude Congress from revising the standards imposed under the LGC. Congress shall enjoy the
freedom to reconsider the minimum standards under the LGC, if future circumstances call for it.
However, the method of revising the criteria must be directly done through an amendatory law of the
LGC (such as RA 9009), and not through the indirect route of creating cities and exempting their
compliance with the established and prevailing standards. By indiscriminately carving out exemptions in
the charter laws themselves, Congress enfeebled the normative function of the LGC on the legislative
power to create cities. Taking the argument to the extreme, a single barangay now has the chance of
being chartered as a component city without compliance with the income, territorial or population
requirements under the LGC, for as long as enough Congressional support is mustered to push for its
exemption – not in a general amendatory law, but through its own specific legislative charter. The
selective disregard of the norms under the LGC in favor of some municipalities cannot be sanctioned in a
system where the rule of law remains dominant. Unless prevented by the Court, Congress will now be
emboldened to charter new cities wholesale and arbitrarily relax the stringent standards under the LGC,
which it imposed on itself.

It must be emphasized that no inconsistency arises from the present minority’s continued participation
in the disposition of the second or subsequent motions for reconsideration of the parties with the
avowed purpose of predictability of judicial pronouncements. The reiteration of the minority’s position
that the Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional is an expression that none of the "new" or rehashed
arguments in the subsequent motions have merited a change in their stand and appreciation of the facts
and the law. For the minority to abandon their involvement from the proceedings in a mechanical
adherence to the rule that the second and subsequent motions for reconsideration are prohibited
pleadings that do not warrant the Court’s attention is to capitulate to the sixteen municipalities’
abhorrent strategy of insistent prayer for review of re-hashed arguments, already passed on, repeatedly.

If stability in the Court’s decisions46 is to be maintained, then parties should not be encouraged to
tirelessly seek reexamination of determined principles and speculate on the fluctuation of the law with
every change of its expounders.47 In Clavano v. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, the Court
explained that:

"The tendency of the law," observes Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "must always be to narrow the field
of uncertainty." And so was the judicial process conceived to bring about the just termination of legal
disputes. The mechanisms for this objective are manifold but the essential precept underlying them is
the immutability of final and executory judgments.

This fundamental principle in part affirms our recognition of instances when disputes are inadequately
presented before the courts and addresses situations when parties fail to unravel what they truly desire
and thus fail to set forth all the claims which they want the courts to resolve. It is only when judgments
have become final and executory, or even when already deemed satisfied, that our negligent litigants
belatedly come forth to pray for more relief. The distilled wisdom and genius of the ages would tell us to
reject their pleas, for the loss to litigants in particular and to society in general would in the long run be
greater than the gain if courts and judges were clothed with power to revise their final decisions at
will.48 (Emphasis supplied)

Unlike that of the other two political branches whose mandates are regularly renewed through direct
election, the Court’s legitimacy must be painstakingly earned with every decision that puts voice to the
cherished value judgments of the sovereign. The judicial function in an organized and cohesive society
governed by the rule of law is placed in serious peril if the people cannot rely on the finality of court
decisions to regulate their affairs. There is no reason for the Court to bend over backwards to
accommodate the parties’ requests for reconsideration, yet again, of the unconstitutionality of the
sixteen Cityhood Laws as borne by the First Decision, especially if the result would lead to the fracturing
of central tenets of the justice system. The people’s sense of an orderly government will find it
unacceptable if the Supreme Court, which is tasked to express enduring values through its judicial
pronouncements, is founded on sand, easily shifting with the changing tides.

The legal process of creating cities – as enacted and later amended by the legislature, implemented by
the executive, and interpreted by the judiciary –serves as the people’s North Star: certain, stable and
predictable. Absent the three branches’ adherence to the rule of law, our society would denigrate into
uncertainty, instability and even anarchy. Indeed, the law is the only supreme power in our system of
government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more
strongly bound to submit to that supremacy and to observe the limitations it imposes upon the exercise
of the authority that it gives.49 No public officer is held to these highest of normative standards than
those whose duties are to adjudicate the rights of the people and to articulate on enduring principles of
law applicable to all.

As Justice Robert Jackson eloquently expressed,50 the Supreme Court is not final because it is infallible; it
is infallible because it is final. And because its decisions are final, even if faulty, there must be every
energy expended to ensure that the faulty decisions are few and far between. The integrity of the
judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice, but also upon the perception
and confidence of the community that the people who run the system have done justice.51

The determination of the correctness of a judicial decision turns on far more than its outcome.52 Rather,
it turns on whether its outcome evolved from principles of judicial methodology, since the judiciary’s
function is not to bring about some desired state of affairs, but to find objectively the right decision by
adhering to the established general system of rules.53

What we are dealing with in this case is no longer limited to the question of constitutionality of Cityhood
Laws; we are also confronted with the question of certainty and predictability in the decisions of the
Court under a democratic system governed by law and rules and its ability to uphold the Constitution
and normative legislation such as the LGC.

The public has unduly suffered from the repeated "flip-flopping" in this case, especially since it comes
from the branch of government tasked to embody in a clear form enduring rules of civil justice that are
to govern them. In expressing these truths, I echo the sentiment of a judicial colleague from a foreign
jurisdiction who once said, "I write these words, not as a jeremiad,54 but in the belief that unless the
courts adhere to the guidance of fixed principles, we will soon bring objective law to its sepulcher."55

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
Posner, Richard A., How Judges Think (2008), at 1.

2
Resolution dated 12 April 2011.
3
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration dated 29 April 2011, para. 1.6, at 7.

4
"In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the
hope that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws
and to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachment." (Villavicencio v. Lukban, G. R. No.
14639, 25 March 1919, 39 Phil. 778; emphasis supplied)

5
Dissenting Opinion, Justice Paras, Austria v. Amante, G. R. No. L-959, 09 January 1948, 79 Phil.
780.

6
"The Government of the Philippine Islands is essentially a Government of laws and not of
men." (In Re: Mulloch Dick, G. R. No. 13862, 16 April 1918, 38 Phil. 41)

7
"The laws enacted become expressions of public morality. As Justice Holmes put it, ‘(t)he law is
the witness and deposit of our moral life.’ ‘In a liberal democracy, the law reflects social morality
over a period of time.’ Occasionally though, a disproportionate political influence might cause a
law to be enacted at odds with public morality or legislature might fail to repeal laws embodying
outdated traditional moral views. Law has also been defined as ‘something men create in their
best moments to protect themselves in their worst moments.’ … Law deals with the minimum
standards of human conduct while morality is concerned with the maximum. … Law also serves
as ‘a helpful starting point for thinking about a proper or ideal public morality for a society’ in
pursuit of moral progress." (Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, 04 August 2003, 408 SCRA
1)

8
"In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public
square. Where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every
moral discernment has access to the public square where people deliberate the order of their
life together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing
religious belief, and these citizens have equal access to the public square. In this representative
democracy, the state is prohibited from determining which convictions and moral judgments
may be proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed process, the
people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in this democratic
governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral judgments is finally crystallized into law,
the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or
median groups." (Estrada v. Escritor, id.)

9
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971).

10
People v. Veneracion, G. R. No. 119987-88, 12 October 1995, 319 Phil. 364.

11
Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 26 and 27.

12
"For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a community,
they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one body, which is
only by the will and determination of the majority: for that which acts any community, being
only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary to that which is one body to
move one way; it is necessary the body should move that way whither the greater force carries
it, which is the consent of the majority: or else it is impossible it should act or continue one
body, one community, which the consent of every individual that united into it, agreed that it
should; and so every one is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority. And
therefore we see, that in assemblies, empowered to act by positive laws, where no number is
set by that positive law which empowers them, the act of the majority passes for the act of the
whole, and of course determines, as having, by the law of nature and reason, the power of the
whole." (Locke, John. Second Treatise on Civil Government, cited in footnote no. 47 of Chief
Justice Reynato Puno’s Concurring Opinion in Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel on
Ancestral Domain, 568 SCRA 402)

13
The rule of law has likewise been described as "a defeasible entitlement of persons to have
their behavior governed by laws that are publicly fixed in advance." (Stephen R. Munzer, A
Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 425 [1982] at 438)

14
Separate Opinion, Justice Santiago Kapunan, Estrada v. Desierto, G. R. No. 146710-15 &
146738, 02 March 2001, 356 SCRA 108.

15
Separate Opinion, Justice Reynato Puno in IBP v. Zamora, G. R. No. 141284, 15 August 2000,
338 SCRA 81.

16
"… Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning and
operation. … Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must, like all other laws, be
ascertained by judicial determinations. To produce uniformity in these determinations, they
ought to be submitted, in the last resort, to one supreme tribunal. … There are endless
diversities in the opinions of men. We often see not only different courts but the judges of the
same court differing from each other. To avoid the confusion which would unavoidably result
from the contradictory decisions of a number of independent judicatories, all nations have
found it necessary to establish one court paramount to the rest, possessing a general
superintendence, and authorized to settle and declare in the last resort a uniform rule of civil
justice." (Alexander Hamilton, Federalist Paper No. 22; emphasis supplied)

17
"Still, the tendency of the law must always be to narrow the field of uncertainty." (Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law at 53)

18
J. D. Heydon, Limits to the Powers of Ultimate Appellate Courts, L.Q.R. 2006, 122(JUL), 399-
425, 404, citing Planned Parenthood of South Eastern Pennsylvania v Casey,505 U.S. 833, 854
(1992).

19
Abueva v. Wood, G. R. No. 21327, 14 January 1924, 45 Phil. 612.

20
Separate Opinion, Justice Reynato Puno in IBP v. Zamora, supra. Note 12.

21
Justice Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1989) at
1179.

22
Dissenting Opinion, Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales, La Bugal B’laan Tribal Association, et al.,
v. Ramos, G. R. No. 127882, 01 February 2005.
23
"If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares
only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good
one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer
sanctions of conscience." (Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. R.
457 [1897])

24
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines. (Civil Code, Art. 8; Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation, G. R.
No. L-30642, 30 April 1985, 136 SCRA 141)

25
Concurring Opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens, Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 780-781, 106 S.Ct. 2169 (1986)

26
Jano Justice Systems, Inc., v. Burton, F.Supp.2d, 2010 WL 2012941 (C.D.Ill.) (2010),
citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d
811 (1988).

27
Jano Justice Systems, Inc., v. Burton, id.

28
In a little over three years, the Court’s decisions in the instant case have swung like a
pendulum from unconstitutionality to validity. Beginning with the First Decision dated 18
November 2008, the Court initially found the subject sixteen Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional,
but reversed itself in the Second Decision dated 21 December 2009, where the laws were
declared valid. However, the Court had a change of heart and reinstated its earlier finding of
unconstitutionality in the Third Decision (SC Resolution dated 24 August 2010, penned by Justice
Antonio Carpio), but less than a year later, it overturned the last ruling by again declaring the
Cityhood Laws constitutional in the Fourth Decision (SC Resolution dated 15 February 2011,
penned by Justice Lucas Bersamin). The Fifth Decision and latest Resolution of the Court denied
with finality the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration and reiterated that the Cityhood Laws
were constitutional (SC Resolution dated 12 April 2011 penned again by Justice Bersamin)

29
The sixteen Cityhood Laws consist of Republic Acts Nos. 9389-94, 9398, 9404-05, 9407-09,
9434-36 and 9491.

30
"A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer
be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions
of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court
of the land." (Labao v. Flores, G. R. No. 187984, 15 November 2010, 634 SCRA 723, citing Peña v.
Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 159520, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 383,
404)

31
Republic v. Ballocanag, G. R. No. 163794, 28 November 2008, 572 SCRA 436, citing Heirs of
Maura So v. Obliosca, G. R. No. 147082, 28 January 2008, 542 SCRA 406, 421-422.

32
FGU Insurance Corporation v. RTC of Makati, G. R. No. 161282, 23 February 2011, citing Villa
v. GSIS, G. R. No. 174642, 31 October 2009.
33
"The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new judgment and the
ascertainment and determination of new rights, but is one placing in proper form on the record,
the judgment that had been previously rendered, to make it speak the truth, so as to make it
show what the judicial action really was, not to correct judicial errors, such as to render a
judgment which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the one it did erroneously render,
nor to supply nonaction by the court, however erroneous the judgment may have been."
(Mocorro v. Ramirez, G. R. No. 178366, 28 July 2008, 560 SCRA 362, citing Briones-Vasquez v.
Court of Appeals, 450 SCRA 482, 492 [2005])

34
"Void judgments may be classified into two groups: those rendered by a court without
jurisdiction to do so and those obtained by fraud or collusion." (Legarda v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 94457, 16 October 1997, 280 SCRA 642)

35
"One of the exceptions to the principle of immutability of final judgments is the existence of
supervening events. Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment has
become final and executory or to new circumstances which developed after the judgment has
acquired finality, including matters which the parties were not aware of prior to or during the
trial as they were not yet in existence at that time." (Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.
R. No. 126462, 12 November 2002, 391 SCRA 370)

36
"Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly but
reasonably construed." (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. CA, G. R. No. 107135, 23 February
1999, 303 SCRA 508)

37
"… In the past, however, we have recognized exceptions to this rule by reversing judgments
and recalling their entries in the interest of substantial justice and where special and compelling
reasons called for such actions."

"Notably, in San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, Galman v.

Sandiganbayan, Philippine Consumers Foundation v. National Telecommunications
Commission, andRepublic v. de los Angeles, we reversed our judgment on the second
motion for reconsideration, while in Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services v. National
Labor Relations Commission, we did so on a third motion for reconsideration. In Cathay
Pacific v. Romillo and Cosio v. de Rama, we modified or amended our ruling on the
second motion for reconsideration. More recently, in the cases of Muñoz v. Court of
Appeals, Tan Tiac Chiong v. Hon. Cosico, Manotok IV v. Barque, and Barnes v. Padilla, we
recalled entries of judgment after finding that doing so was in the interest of substantial
justice." (Apo Fruits Corporation v. Landbank of the Philippines, G. R. No. 164195, 12
October 2010, 632 SCRA 727)

38
Dissenting Opinion, Justice Louis Brandeis, Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas, Co., 285 U.S. 393,
407-408 (1932).

39
In Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G. R. No. 139645, the Court first ordered the Secretary of
Justice to furnish private respondent Mark Jimenez, copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers, and to give him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence. (Decision dated 18 January 2000) The Court subsequently reversed itself
and declared that private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the extradition process. (Decision 17 October 2000)

40
In La Bugal B’laan Tribal Association v. Ramos, G. R. No. 127882, the Court first declared some
of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995) unconstitutional and
void (Decision dated 27 January 2004); but on a motion for reconsideration the ruling was later
reversed and the mining law was declared constitutional (Resolution dated 01 December 2004).

41
In Heirs of Manotok v. Barque, G. R. No. 162335 & 162605, the Court’s First Division initially
affirmed the cancellation of the Manotok title over the friar land and ordered that the title be
reconstituted in favor of the Homer L. Barque, Sr. (Decision dated 12 December 2005) After the
Decision was recalled and the case remanded to the Court of Appeals for reception of evidence
(Resolution dated 18 December 2008), the Court en banc nullified the titles of Manotok and
Barque and declared the land as legally belonging to the national government. (Decision dated
24 August 2010)

42
In Apo Fruits Corporation v. Landbank of the Philippines, G. R. No. 164105, the Court’s Third
Division ordered Landbank to pay Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation to pay
P1,383,179,000 with 12% legal interest as just compensation for the two companies’
expropriated lands. (Decision dated 06 February 2007) Landbank’s motion for reconsideration
was partially granted and the award of legal interest was deleted (Decision dated 19 December
2007 and 30 April 2008), which was affirmed by the Court en banc. (Decision dated 04
December 2009) However, the award of legal interest was reinstated later on. (Decision dated
12 October 2010)

43
In Quinto v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 189698, the Court first declared unconstitutional the
provision in the Omnibus Election Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, considering
public appointive officials as ipso facto resigned from the filing of their certificate of candidacy.
(Decision 01 December 2009) The Court again reversed itself and declared the same provision as
"not unconstitutional." (Resolution dated 22 February 2010)

44
Republic Act No. 7160, Sec. 450.

45
"Requisites for Creation. — (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into
a component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two
(2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following
requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by
the Land Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as
certified by the National Statistics Office.

xxx xxx xxx

 (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income." (RA 9009, Sec. 1,
amending Sec. 450 of the LGC; emphasis supplied)

46
Concurring Opinion, Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr., Lambino v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 174153, 25
October 2006, 505 SCRA 160, citing London Street Tramways Co., Ltd. v. London County Council,
[1898] A.C. 375, in COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 117-118.

47
Concurring Opinion, Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr., Lambino v. COMELEC, supra.

48
G.R. No. 143781, 27 February 2002, 378 SCRA 172.

49
U. S. v. Lee, 106 US 196, 261 (1882)

50
"Rightly or wrongly, the belief is widely held by the practicing profession that this Court no
longer respects impersonal rules of law but is guided in these matters by personal impressions
which from time to time may be shared by a majority of Justices. Whatever has been intended,
this Court also has generated an impression in much of the judiciary that regard for precedents
and authorities is obsolete, that words no longer mean what they have always meant to the
profession, that the law knows no fixed principles. …"

"… Whenever decisions of one court are reviewed by another, a percentage of them are
reversed. That reflects a difference in outlook normally found between personnel
comprising different courts. However, reversal by a higher court is not proof that justice
is thereby better done. There is no doubt that if there were a super-Supreme Court, a
substantial proportion of our reversals of state courts would also be reversed. We are
not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final."
(Concurring Opinion of Justice Robert Jackson, Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 [1953];
emphasis supplied).

51
Spouses Sadik v. Casar, A. M. No. MTJ-95-1053, 02 January 1997, 266 SCRA 1, citing Talens-
Dabon v. Arceo, Administrative Matter No. RTJ-96-1336, 25 July 1996.

52
Dissenting Opinion, Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales, La Bugal B’laan Tribal Association, et al.,
v. Ramos, G. R. No. 127882, 01 February 2005.

53
Dissenting Opinion, Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales, La Bugal B’laan Tribal Association, et al.,
v. Ramos, id.

54
A lamenting and denunciatory complaint; a doleful story; or a dolorous tirade. (Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary [Merriam Webster 1993] at 1213)

55
Dissenting Opinion, Circuit Judge Tam, In Re: Estate of Burrogh, 475 F.2d 370, 154
U.S.App.D.C. 259 (1973).
Case 5: Holy See v. Del Rosario Jr., 238 SCRA 524

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994

THE HOLY SEE, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.

Padilla Law Office for petitioner.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to reverse and set aside the
Orders dated June 20, 1991 and September 19, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati,
Metro Manila in Civil Case No. 90-183.

The Order dated June 20, 1991 denied the motion of petitioner to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No.
90-183, while the Order dated September 19, 1991 denied the motion for reconsideration of the June
20,1991 Order.

Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is
represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio.

Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real
estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters (Lot 5-A,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 390440) located in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila and
registered in the name of petitioner.

Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D which are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
271108 and 265388 respectively and registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).

The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the
sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.

In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to
who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the
relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development
Corporation (Tropicana).

On January 23, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61,
Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance
and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely,
Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana (Civil Case No.
90-183).

The complaint alleged that: (1) on April 17, 1988, Msgr. Cirilos, Jr., on behalf of petitioner and the PRC,
agreed to sell to Ramon Licup Lots 5-A, 5-B and 5-D at the price of P1,240.00 per square meters; (2) the
agreement to sell was made on the condition that earnest money of P100,000.00 be paid by Licup to the
sellers, and that the sellers clear the said lots of squatters who were then occupying the same; (3) Licup
paid the earnest money to Msgr. Cirilos; (4) in the same month, Licup assigned his rights over the
property to private respondent and informed the sellers of the said assignment; (5) thereafter, private
respondent demanded from Msgr. Cirilos that the sellers fulfill their undertaking and clear the property
of squatters; however, Msgr. Cirilos informed private respondent of the squatters' refusal to vacate the
lots, proposing instead either that private respondent undertake the eviction or that the earnest money
be returned to the latter; (6) private respondent counterproposed that if it would undertake the eviction
of the squatters, the purchase price of the lots should be reduced from P1,240.00 to P1,150.00 per
square meter; (7) Msgr. Cirilos returned the earnest money of P100,000.00 and wrote private
respondent giving it seven days from receipt of the letter to pay the original purchase price in cash; (8)
private respondent sent the earnest money back to the sellers, but later discovered that on March 30,
1989, petitioner and the PRC, without notice to private respondent, sold the lots to Tropicana, as
evidenced by two separate Deeds of Sale, one over Lot 5-A, and another over Lots 5-B and 5-D; and that
the sellers' transfer certificate of title over the lots were cancelled, transferred and registered in the
name of Tropicana; (9) Tropicana induced petitioner and the PRC to sell the lots to it and thus enriched
itself at the expense of private respondent; (10) private respondent demanded the rescission of the sale
to Tropicana and the reconveyance of the lots, to no avail; and (11) private respondent is willing and
able to comply with the terms of the contract to sell and has actually made plans to develop the lots into
a townhouse project, but in view of the sellers' breach, it lost profits of not less than P30,000.000.00.
Private respondent thus prayed for: (1) the annulment of the Deeds of Sale between petitioner and the
PRC on the one hand, and Tropicana on the other; (2) the reconveyance of the lots in question; (3)
specific performance of the agreement to sell between it and the owners of the lots; and (4) damages.

On June 8, 1990, petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint — petitioner for
lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party.
An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent.

On June 20, 1991, the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner's motion to dismiss
after finding that petitioner "shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in
question" (Rollo, pp. 20-21).

On July 12, 1991, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order. On August 30, 1991, petitioner filed
a "Motion for a Hearing for the Sole Purpose of Establishing Factual Allegation for claim of Immunity as a
Jurisdictional Defense." So as to facilitate the determination of its defense of sovereign immunity,
petitioner prayed that a hearing be conducted to allow it to establish certain facts upon which the said
defense is based. Private respondent opposed this motion as well as the motion for reconsideration.

On October 1, 1991, the trial court issued an order deferring the resolution on the motion for
reconsideration until after trial on the merits and directing petitioner to file its answer (Rollo, p. 22).

Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of
sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.

On December 9, 1991, a Motion for Intervention was filed before us by the Department of Foreign
Affairs, claiming that it has a legal interest in the outcome of the case as regards the diplomatic
immunity of petitioner, and that it "adopts by reference, the allegations contained in the petition of the
Holy See insofar as they refer to arguments relative to its claim of sovereign immunity from suit" (Rollo,
p. 87).

Private respondent opposed the intervention of the Department of Foreign Affairs. In compliance with
the resolution of this Court, both parties and the Department of Foreign Affairs submitted their
respective memoranda.

II

A preliminary matter to be threshed out is the procedural issue of whether the petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court can be availed of to question the order denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss. The general rule is that an order denying a motion to dismiss is not
reviewable by the appellate courts, the remedy of the movant being to file his answer and to proceed
with the hearing before the trial court. But the general rule admits of exceptions, and one of these is
when it is very clear in the records that the trial court has no alternative but to dismiss the complaint
(Philippine National Bank v. Florendo, 206 SCRA 582 [1992]; Zagada v. Civil Service Commission, 216
SCRA 114 [1992]. In such a case, it would be a sheer waste of time and energy to require the parties to
undergo the rigors of a trial.
The other procedural question raised by private respondent is the personality or legal interest of the
Department of Foreign Affairs to intervene in the case in behalf of the Holy See (Rollo, pp. 186-190).

In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic
immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the
court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.

In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion," where the foreign state or
the international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to make a
determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant
is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a "suggestion" that
the defendant is entitled to immunity. In England, a similar procedure is followed, only the Foreign
Office issues a certification to that effect instead of submitting a "suggestion" (O'Connell, I International
Law 130 [1965]; Note: Immunity from Suit of Foreign Sovereign Instrumentalities and Obligations, 50
Yale Law Journal 1088 [1941]).

In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first
secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the
Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic
Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter
directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer
could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48
SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v.
Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor
General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City,
Zambales, a "suggestion" to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the "suggestion" in a
Manifestation and Memorandum as amicus curiae.

In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs moved with
this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department
to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.

In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts by the
respondents through their private counsels (Raquiza v. Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 [1945]; Miquiabas v.
Philippine-Ryukyus Command, 80 Phil. 262 [1948]; United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644
[1990] and companion cases). In cases where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can
inquire into the facts and make their own determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions
involved.

III

The burden of the petition is that respondent trial court has no jurisdiction over petitioner, being a
foreign state enjoying sovereign immunity. On the other hand, private respondent insists that the
doctrine of non-suability is not anymore absolute and that petitioner has divested itself of such a cloak
when, of its own free will, it entered into a commercial transaction for the sale of a parcel of land
located in the Philippines.
A. The Holy See

Before we determine the issue of petitioner's non-suability, a brief look into its status as a sovereign
state is in order.

Before the annexation of the Papal States by Italy in 1870, the Pope was the monarch and he, as the
Holy See, was considered a subject of International Law. With the loss of the Papal States and the
limitation of the territory under the Holy See to an area of 108.7 acres, the position of the Holy See in
International Law became controversial (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law 36-37 [1992]).

In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered into the Lateran Treaty, where Italy recognized the exclusive
dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican City. It also recognized the right of
the Holy See to receive foreign diplomats, to send its own diplomats to foreign countries, and to enter
into treaties according to International Law (Garcia, Questions and Problems In International Law, Public
and Private 81 [1948]).

The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City "for the purpose of assuring to the Holy
See absolute and visible independence and of guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty also in the
field of international relations" (O'Connell, I International Law 311 [1965]).

In view of the wordings of the Lateran Treaty, it is difficult to determine whether the statehood is vested
in the Holy See or in the Vatican City. Some writers even suggested that the treaty created two
international persons — the Holy See and Vatican City (Salonga and Yap, supra, 37).

The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of states, and the attribution to it of
"sovereignty" must be made in a sense different from that in which it is applied to other states (Fenwick,
International Law 124-125 [1948]; Cruz, International Law 37 [1991]). In a community of national states,
the Vatican City represents an entity organized not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes and
international objects. Despite its size and object, the Vatican City has an independent government of its
own, with the Pope, who is also head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of State, in
conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its mission in the world. Indeed, the world-wide
interests and activities of the Vatican City are such as to make it in a sense an "international state"
(Fenwick, supra., 125; Kelsen, Principles of International Law 160 [1956]).

One authority wrote that the recognition of the Vatican City as a state has significant implication — that
it is possible for any entity pursuing objects essentially different from those pursued by states to be
invested with international personality (Kunz, The Status of the Holy See in International Law, 46 The
American Journal of International Law 308 [1952]).

Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and enter into transactions as the Holy See
and not in the name of the Vatican City, one can conclude that in the Pope's own view, it is the Holy See
that is the international person.

The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy
See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine
government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.
B. Sovereign Immunity

As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the generally accepted
principles of International Law. Even without this affirmation, such principles of International Law are
deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in
the society of nations (United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]).

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established.
According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but
not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
(United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 [1987]; Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public
International Law 194 [1984]).

Some states passed legislation to serve as guidelines for the executive or judicial determination when an
act may be considered as jure gestionis. The United States passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976, which defines a commercial activity as "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a
particular commercial transaction or act." Furthermore, the law declared that the "commercial
character of the activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or
particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." The Canadian Parliament enacted
in 1982 an Act to Provide For State Immunity in Canadian Courts. The Act defines a "commercial activity"
as any particular transaction, act or conduct or any regular course of conduct that by reason of its
nature, is of a "commercial character."

The restrictive theory, which is intended to be a solution to the host of problems involving the issue of
sovereign immunity, has created problems of its own. Legal treatises and the decisions in countries
which follow the restrictive theory have difficulty in characterizing whether a contract of a sovereign
state with a private party is an act jure gestionis or an act jure imperii.

The restrictive theory came about because of the entry of sovereign states into purely commercial
activities remotely connected with the discharge of governmental functions. This is particularly true with
respect to the Communist states which took control of nationalized business activities and international
trading.

This Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private parties as acts jure
imperii: (1) the lease by a foreign government of apartment buildings for use of its military officers
(Syquia v. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 [1949]; (2) the conduct of public bidding for the repair of a wharf at a
United States Naval Station (United States of America v. Ruiz, supra.); and (3) the change of employment
status of base employees (Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88 [1988]).

On the other hand, this Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private
parties as acts jure gestionis: (1) the hiring of a cook in the recreation center, consisting of three
restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a store, and a coffee and pastry shop at the John Hay Air Station in
Baguio City, to cater to American servicemen and the general public (United States of America v.
Rodrigo, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]); and (2) the bidding for the operation of barber shops in Clark Air Base in
Angeles City (United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]). The operation of the restaurants
and other facilities open to the general public is undoubtedly for profit as a commercial and not a
governmental activity. By entering into the employment contract with the cook in the discharge of its
proprietary function, the United States government impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity
from suit.

In the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be considered "commercial"
and as constituting acts jure gestionis, we have to come out with our own guidelines, tentative they may
be.

Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the
ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign
state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged
regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the
act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially
when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.

As held in United States of America v. Guinto, (supra):

There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be
deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its
proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or
governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied.

In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate
business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has
denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it
acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private
respondent failed to dispute said claim.

Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was
made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of
residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a
receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in
the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the
Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.

In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and
administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable
property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending
state for the purposes of the mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the
more reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in this case is the
Holy See.

The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a
governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot
5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon
made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that
squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the
premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint (Rollo, pp. 26, 27).

The issue of petitioner's non-suability can be determined by the trial court without going to trial in the
light of the pleadings, particularly the admission of private respondent. Besides, the privilege of
sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the Memorandum and Certification of
the Department of Foreign Affairs. As the department tasked with the conduct of the Philippines'
foreign relations (Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Title I, Sec. 3), the Department of Foreign Affairs
has formally intervened in this case and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly
accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and
entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country
(Rollo, pp. 156-157). The determination of the executive arm of government that a state or
instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a political question that is conclusive
upon the courts (International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]). Where
the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to
accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting the
country's foreign relations (World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 [1972]). As
in International Catholic Migration Commission and in World Health Organization, we abide by the
certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Ordinarily, the procedure would be to remand the case and order the trial court to conduct a hearing to
establish the facts alleged by petitioner in its motion. In view of said certification, such procedure would
however be pointless and unduly circuitous (Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Tirso Velasco, G.R.
No. 109645, July 25, 1994).

IV

Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both
Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign
sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.

Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims
against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See
the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of
its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of
Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign
Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter
ceases to be a private cause.

According to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the forerunner of the International Court of
Justice:

By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by reporting to diplomatic action or
international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own
rights — its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of
international law (The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1 Hudson, World Court
Reports 293, 302 [1924]).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against
petitioner is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., took no part.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Case 6: American Insurance Association, et al. v, Garamendi, US Supreme Court, No. 02-722, June 23,
2004

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

 AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION et al. v.
GARAMENDI, INSURANCE COMMISSIONER,
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 02—722. Argued April 23, 2003–Decided June 23, 2003

The Nazi Government of Germany confiscated the value or proceeds of

many Jewish life insurance policies issued before and during the Second
World War. After the war, even a policy that had escaped confiscation was
likely to be dishonored, whether because insurers denied its existence or
claimed it had lapsed from unpaid premiums, or because the German
Government would not provide heirs with documentation of the
policyholder’s death. Responsibility as between the government and
insurance companies is disputed, but the fact is that the proceeds of many
insurance policies issued to Jews before and during the war were paid to
the Third Reich or never paid at all. These confiscations and frustrations of
claims fell within the subject of reparations, which became a principal
object of Allied diplomacy after the war. Ultimately, the western allies
placed the obligation to provide restitution to victims of Nazi persecution
on the new West German Government, which enacted restitution laws and
signed agreements with other countries for the compensation of their
nationals. Despite a payout of more than 100 billion deutsch marks as of
2000, however, these measures left out many claimants and certain types
of claims. After German reunification, class actions for restitution poured
into United States courts against companies doing business in Germany
during the Nazi era. Protests by defendant companies and their
governments prompted the United States Government to take action to try
to resolve the matter. Negotiations at the national level produced the
German Foundation Agreement, in which Germany agreed to establish a
foundation funded with 10 billion deutsch marks contributed equally by the
German Government and German companies to compensate the
companies’ victims during the Nazi era. The President agreed that
whenever a German company was sued on a Holocaust-era claim in an
American court, the Government would (1) submit a statement that it
would be in this country’s foreign policy interests for the foundation to be
the exclusive forum and remedy for such claims, and (2) try to get state and
local governments to respect the foundation as the exclusive mechanism.
As for insurance claims in particular, both countries agreed that the German
Foundation would work with the International Commission on Holocaust
Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC), a voluntary organization whose mission is to
negotiate with European insurers to provide information about and
settlement of unpaid insurance policies, and which has set up procedures to
that end. The German agreement has served as a model for similar
agreements with Austria and France.
Meanwhile, California began its own enquiry into the issue, prompting
state legislation designed to force payment by defaulting insurers. Among
other laws, California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999
(HVIRA) requires any insurer doing business in the State to disclose
information about all policies sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945 by the
company or any one “related” to it upon penalty of loss of its state business
license. After HVIRA was enacted, the State issued administrative
subpoenas against several subsidiaries of European insurance companies
participating in the ICHEIC. Immediately, the Federal Government informed
California officials that HVIRA would damage the ICHEIC, the only effective
means to process quickly and completely unpaid Holocaust era insurance
claims, and that HVIRA would possibly derail the German Foundation
Agreement. Nevertheless, the state insurance commissioner announced
that he would enforce HVIRA to its fullest. Petitioner insurance entities then
filed this suit challenging HVIRA’s constitutionality. The District Court issued
a preliminary injunction against enforcing HVIRA and later granted
petitioners summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding, inter
alia, that HVIRA did not violate the federal foreign affairs power.
Held: California’s HVIRA interferes with the President’s conduct of the
Nation’s foreign policy and is therefore preempted. Pp. 14—31.
(a) There is no question that at some point an exercise of state power
that touches on foreign relations must yield to the National Government’s
policy or that generally there is executive authority to decide what that
policy should be. In foreign policymaking, the President, not Congress, has
the “lead role.” First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S.
759, 767. Specifically, the President has authority to make “executive
agreements” with other countries, requiring no ratification by the Senate or
approval by Congress. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,
679, 682—683. Making such agreements to settle claims of American
nationals against foreign governments is a particularly longstanding
practice. Although the executive agreements with Germany, Austria, and
France at issue differ from past agreements in that they address claims
associated with formerly belligerent states, but against corporations, not
the foreign governments, the distinction does not matter. Insisting on a
sharp line between public and private acts in defining the legitimate scope
of the Executive’s international negotiations would hamstring the President
in settling international controversies. Generally, then, valid executive
agreements are fit to preempt state law, and if the agreements here had
expressly preempted laws like HVIRA, the issue would be straightforward.
But since these agreements include no preemption clause, petitioners’
preemption claim rests on the asserted interference with Presidential
foreign policy that the agreements embody. The principal support for this
claim of preemption is Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429. In invalidating an
Oregon statute, the Zschernig majority relied on statements in previous
cases that are open to the reading that state action with more than
incidental effect on foreign affairs is preempted, even absent any
affirmative federal activity in the subject area of the state law, and hence
without any showing of conflict. See, e.g., id., at 432. Justice Harlan,
concurring in the result, disagreed on this point, arguing that its implication
of preemption of the entire foreign affairs field was at odds with other
cases suggesting that, absent positive federal action, States may legislate in
areas of their traditional competence even though their statutes may have
an incidental effect on foreign relations. Id., at 459. Whether respect for the
executive foreign relations power requires a categorical choice between the
contrasting theories of field and conflict preemption evident
in Zschernig requires no answer here, for even on Justice Harlan’s view,
shared by the majority, the likelihood that state legislation will produce
something more than incidental effect in conflict with the National
Government’s express foreign policy would require preemption of the state
law. See also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230—231. And since on his
view it is legislation within “areas of … traditional competence” that gives a
State any claim to prevail, 389 U.S., at 459, it is reasonable to consider the
strength of the state interest, judged by standards of traditional practice,
when deciding how serious a conflict must be shown before declaring the
state law preempted. Pp. 14—21.
(b) There is a sufficiently clear conflict between HVIRA and the President’s
foreign policy, as expressed both in the executive agreements with
Germany, Austria, and France, and in statements by high-level Executive
Branch officials, to require preemption here even without any consideration
of the State’s interest. The account of negotiations toward those
agreements shows that the consistent Presidential foreign policy has been
to encourage European governments and companies to volunteer
settlement funds and disclosure of policy information, in preference to
litigation or coercive sanctions. California has taken a different tack:
HVIRA’s economic compulsion to make public disclosure, of far more
information about far more policies than ICHEIC rules require, employs “a
different, state system of economic pressure,” and in doing so undercuts
the President’s diplomatic discretion and the choice he has made exercising
it. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 376. Whereas the
President’s authority to provide for settling claims in winding up
international hostilities requires flexibility in wielding “the coercive power
of the national economy” as a tool of diplomacy, id., at 377, HVIRA denies
this, by making exclusion from a large sector of the American insurance
market the automatic sanction for noncompliance with the State’s own
disclosure policies. HVIRA thus compromises the President’s very capacity
to speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other governments to
resolve claims arising out of World War II. Although the HVIRA disclosure
requirement’s goal of obtaining compensation for Holocaust victims is also
espoused by the National Government, the fact of a common end hardly
neutralizes conflicting means. The express federal policy and the clear
conflict raised by the state statute are alone enough to require state law to
yield. Pp. 21—26.
(c) If any doubt about the clarity of the conflict remained, it would have
to be resolved in the National Government’s favor, given the weakness of
the State’s interest, when evaluated in terms of traditional state legislative
subject matter, in regulating disclosure of European Holocaust-era
insurance policies in the manner of HVIRA. Even if California’s underlying
concern for its several thousand Holocaust survivors is recognized as a
powerful one, the same objective dignifies the National Government’s
interest in devising its chosen mechanism for voluntary settlements, there
being approximately 100,000 survivors in the country, only a small fraction
of them in California. As against the federal responsibility, the humanity
underlying the state statute could not give the State the benefit of any
doubt in resolving the conflict with national policy. Pp. 27—28.
(d) California seeks to use an iron fist where the President has
consistently chosen kid gloves. The efficacy of the one approach versus the
other is beside the point, since preemption turns not on the wisdom of the
National Government’s policy but on the evidence of conflict. Here, the
evidence is more than sufficient to demonstrate that HVIRA stands in the
way of the President’s diplomatic objectives. P. 28.
(e) The Court rejects the State’s submission that even if HVIRA does
interfere with Executive Branch foreign policy, Congress authorized state
law of this sort in the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the U.S. Holocaust Assets
Commission Act of 1998. To begin with, the effect of any congressional
authorization on the preemption enquiry is far from clear, but in any event
neither statute does the job the State ascribes to it. McCarran-Ferguson’s
purpose was to limit congressional preemption of state insurance laws
under the commerce power, whether dormant or exercised,
see, e.g., Department of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 499—500, and it
cannot plausibly be read to address preemption by executive conduct in
foreign affairs. Nor is HVIRA authorized by the Holocaust Commission Act,
which set up a Presidential Commission to study Holocaust-era assets that
came into the Government’s control, §3(a)(1), and directed the Commission
to encourage state insurance commissioners to prepare a report on the
Holocaust-related claims practices of all insurance companies doing
business in this country after January 30, 1933, §3(a)(4)(A). The
Commission’s focus was limited to assets held by the Government, and the
Act’s reference to the state insurance commissioners’ report was expressly
limited “to the degree the information is available,” §3(a)(4)(B), which can
hardly be read to condone state sanctions interfering with federal efforts to
resolve claims. Finally, Congress has done nothing to express disapproval of
the President’s policy. Given the President’s considerable independent
authority in this area, Congress’s silence cannot be equated with
disapproval. Pp. 29—31.
296 F.3d 832, reversed.
 Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., joined.

Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President dated March 30, 1998 of
Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan
City,respectively. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15,
Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision prohibits the President from making any
appointments two months immed iately before the next presidentia l elections and up to the end of his
term, therein will prejudice public service or endanger except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies public safety. V. Statement of the Case: In compliance with the
foregoing Resolution, the following pleadings and other documents were filed, to wit: 1) the
manifestation dated May 28, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Velenzuela in compliance with the Resolution of
May 14, 1998; 2) the letter dated June 1, 1998 of Hon. Placido B. Vallarta in compliance with the same
Resolution; 3) the "Comments" of Hon. Valenzuela dated May 25, 1998; 4) his "Addendum to
Comments" dated June 8, 1998; 5) his "Explanation" dated June 8, 1998; 6) the letter of Hon. Vallarta
dated June 8, 1998; 7) his letter dated June 16, 1998; 8) the "Explanation" of Hon. Valenzuela dated July
17, 1998; and 9) the "Comment" of the Office of the Solicitor General dated August 5, 1998. A.
Valenzuela's Assumption of Duty as Judge on May 14, 1998 In his Manifestation dated May 28, 1998,
Judge Valenzuela alleged inter alia: "***that on May 14, 1998, he took his Oath of Office as Judge, RTC
Branch 62, Bago City, before Hon. Anastacio C. Rufon, Judge RTC, Branch 52, Bacolod City, pursuant to
Appointment dated March 30, 1998, (and) he also reported for duty as such before said RTC Branch 62,
Bago City *** (and that he did so) "faultlessly," *** without knowledge of the on-going deliberations on
the matter." At that time, the originals of the appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta, dated
March 30, 1998 - addressed to them "Thru: the Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines, Manila."
and which had been sent to and received by the Chief Justice on May 12, 1998 -- were still in the latter's
Office, and had not been transmitted to them precisely because of the serious issue concerning the
validity of their appointments. Indeed, one of the directives in the Resolution of May 14, 1998 was that
"pending *** deliberation by the Court on the matter, and until further orders, no action be taken on
the appointments *** which in the meantime shall be held in abeyance and not given any effect ***."
For this reason, by Resolution dated June 23, 1998, the Court required Valenzuela to explain by what
authority he had taken his oath on May 14, 1998 as Judge of Branch 62 of the RTC at Bago City. In his
"Explanation" dated July 17, 1998. Valenzuela stated that he did so because on May 7, 1998 he
"received from Malacaang copy of his appointment ***" which contained the following direction: "By
virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office***." The
Court then deliberated on the pleadings and documents above mentioned, in relation to the facts and
circumstances on record, and thereafter Resolved to promulgate the following opinion. VI. Issue:
Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Secs. 4(1)
and 9 of Art. VIII. VII. Ruling: During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the President is
neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of
Art. VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames
provided therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into
effect once every 6 years. The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made
during the period of the ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to
appointments. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is
no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the
period of the ban VIII. Dispositive Portion: Wherefore, In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court
Resolved to DECLARE VOID the appointments signed by His Excellency the President under date of
March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial
Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, and to order them,
forthwith on being served with notice of this decision, to forthwith CEASE AND DESIST from discharging
the office of Judge of the Courts to which they were respectively appointed on March 30, 1998. This,
without prejudice to their being considered anew by the Judicial and Bar Council for re-nomination to
the same positions. IT IS SO ORDERED.

and registered in the name of petitioner) and lots 5-B and 5-D registered under

PRC with the following conditions: earnest money of P100,000.00 be paid by Licup

to the sellers and that the sellers clear the said lots of squatters. In the sa

me month, Licup assigned his rights over the property to private respondent, Sta

rbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. and informed them of the assignment. Thereafter,

private respondent demanded from Msgr. Cirilos the fulfillment of the assignmen

t; however, Msgr. Cirilos informed private respondent of the squatters' refusal

to vacate the lots, proposing instead either that private respondent undertake t

he eviction or that the earnest money be returned to the latter. Private respond

ent counter-proposed that if it would undertake the eviction of the squatters, t

he purchase price of the lots should be reduced from P1,240.00 to P1,150.00 per

square meter. Msgr. Cirilos returned the earnest money of P100,000.00 and wrote
private respondent giving it seven days from receipt of the letter to pay the or

iginal purchase price in cash. Private respondent sent the earnest money back to

the sellers, but later discovered that on March 30, 1989, petitioner and the PR

C, without notice to private respondent, sold the lots to Tropicana Properties a

nd Development Corporation (Tropicana), as evidenced by two separate Deeds of Sa

le, one over Lot 5-A, and another over Lots 5-B and 5-D; and that the sellers' t

ransfer certificate of title over the lots were cancelled, transferred and regis

tered in the name of Tropicana. Tropicana induced petitioner and the PRC to sell

the lots to it and thus enriched itself at the expense of private respondent. P

rivate respondent demanded the rescission of the sale to Tropicana and the recon

veyance of the lots, to no avail and private respondent is willing and able to c

omply with the terms of the contract to sell and has actually made plans to deve

lop the lots into a townhouse project, but in view of the sellers' breach, it lo

st profits of not less than P30,000,000.00.

ISSUE

W/n tHE HOLY SEE HAS SOVEREiGN IMMUNITY in the sale of the parcel of land (lot 5

-a).

HELD

YES. The Holy See has sovereign immunity in the sale of the parcel of land (lot

5-A).

Claim to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is stated in the Public International

Law. When state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomati

c immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where

it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.

The Department of Foreign Affairs was allowed by the Court to intervene on the s

ide of petitioner by filing a memorandum of support for the petitioner s claim of

sovereign immunity.

The Holy See exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is

represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio. The petitioner is, therefore

, a foreign state enjoying sovereign immunity.

The immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or a

cts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure ge

stionis. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereo

f, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain

or profit. The petitioner s sale of the land is a commercial transaction that is

an act jure imperii. The petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary co

urse of a real estate business, the said transaction can be categorized as an ac

t jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subseq

uent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said

property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippi

nes.

The petition for certiorari was granted and the complaint against petitioner was

dismissed.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. LANTION€

GR No. 139465€ January 18, 2000.

FACTS

Petitioner is the secretary of justice who has in his possession the extradition

papers to be filed against private respondent Mark Jimenez. Private respondent

requested the petitioner for copies of such documents against him and asks for a

mple time for him to submit a response to it. Petitioner declined to grant such

a request in line with article 7 of the RP-US Extradition treaty. Private respon

dent filed a petition against the petitioner at the RTC of the National Capital

Judicial Region for mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition, with an application f

or the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction. His defense is th

at the petitioner's actions violate his basic due process rights upheld by the C

onstitution's due process clause. Respondent judge issued an order on August 10,

1999 favoring the side of the private respondent. Thus, the petitioner elevated

its case to the Supreme Court for certiorari.

ISSUE

W/N UPHOLD A CITIZEN'S BASIC DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OR THE GOVERNMENTS IRONCLAD DUTI

ES UNDER A TREATY

HELD

THE PETITION IS DISMISSED for lack of merit. The court grants that the right to

information is implemented by the right of access to information within the cont

rol of the government. But in the case at hand, the invocation of this right by

the petitioner is premature since no official action of our own government has y

et been done. Only when such formal action is present that the court will favor

the interests necessary for the proper functioning of government The court also

argues that there is no conflict between the RP-US treaty and the Constitution.

All they see is a void in the provisions of the treaty as regards to the basic d

ue process rights of the extraditee. The court disagrees with such provisions of

the treaty.

The court also rejects the petitioner's confidentiality argument as it is overtu

rned by the petitioner's repower to revoke after the appointee has qualified is the latter's equitable
rights. Yet it is doubtful if such equity might be successfully set up in the present situation, considering
the rush conditional appointments, hurried maneuvers and other happenings detracting from that
degree of good faith, morality and propriety which form the basic foundation of claims to equitable
relief. The appointees, it might be argued, wittingly or unwittingly cooperated with the stratagem to
beat the deadline, whatever the resultant consequences to the dignity and efficiency of the public
service. Of course, the Court is aware of many precedents to the effect that once an appointment has
been issued, it cannot be reconsidered, especially where the appointee has qualified. But none of them
refer to mass ad interim appointments (three-hundred and fifty), issued in the last hours of an outgoing
Chief Executive, in a setting similar to that outlined herein. On the other hand, the authorities admit of
exceptional circumstances justifying revocation and if any circumstances justify revocation, those
described herein should fit the exception. IN RE APPOINTMENTS DATED MARCH 30, 1998 of HON.
MATEO A. VALENZUELA AND HON. PLACIDO B. VALLARTA A.M. NO. 98-5-01-SC., NOVEMBER9, 1998, CJ.
NARVASA The prohibited appointments contemplated by Article VII section 15 not only applies to the
executive department but also to appointments by the president to the members of the judiciary.
Nonetheless, as an exception appointments to the judiciary can be made during the period of the ban in
the interest of public service.

Facts: The Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta and others were appointed by the president as RTC judges
and to other judicial positions during the prohibited period contemplated by Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the
Constitution in light of the upcoming elections. The President expressed the view that "the election-ban
provision Article VII, Sec. 15 applies only to executive appointments or appointments in the executive
branch of government," the whole article being "entitled 'EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.'" He also observed
that further proof of his theory "is the fact that appointments to the judiciary have special, specific
provisions applicable to them" citing Article VIII, Sec. 4 [1] and Article VIII, Section 9. In view thereof, he
"firmly and respectfully reiterate his request for the Judicial and Bar Council to transmit the final list of
nominees for the lone Supreme Court vacancy in order to complete the appointments. On the contrary,
Chief Justice Narvasa is of the contrary view, CJ Narvasa claims that the election ban provision also
applies to appointments in the judiciary. Faced by an important and ripe constitutional question, hence,
the Court En banc was called to decide on the instant Administrative matter. Issues: 1. Whether during
the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution, the
President is required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII. 2.
Whether the President can make appointments to the judiciary during the period of the ban in the
interest of public service. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DEAN’S CIRCLE 2016 86 | Page Ruling: 1. NO. The
Court's view is that during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution "two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term" - the President is
neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9
of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time
frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. It is noteworthy that the
prohibition on appointments comes into effect only once every six years. In view of the general
prohibition in Art. VII, sec.15, One interpretation that immediately suggests itself is that Section 4(1),
Article VIII is a general provision while Section 15, Article VII is a particular one; that is to say, normally,
when there are no presidential elections - which after all occur only every six years - Section 4(1), Article
VIII shall apply: vacancies in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days; but when (as now) there
are presidential elections, the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII comes into play: the President shall
not make any appointments. The reason for said prohibition, according to Fr. J. Bernas, S.J., an authority
on Constitutional Law and himself a member of the Constitutional Commission, is "In order not to tie the
hands of the incoming President through midnight appointments." In the ultimate analysis of the
provision, it appears that Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those
made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those
appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those
which are declared election offenses in the Omnibus Election Code. The second type of appointments
prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of the so-called "midnight" appointments. In Aytona v.
Castillo, it was held that after the proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal as duly elected President,
President Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated in his bid for reelection, became no more than a
"caretaker" administrator whose duty was to "prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the
incoming President. Therefore, the appointments by Hon. Valenzuela and Vallarta by the President
during the prohibited period is deemed void. 2. YES. The exception allows only the making of temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety. To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative need for an appointment, during
the period of the ban, not only in the executive but also in the Supreme Court. This may be the case
should the membership of the court be so reduced that it will have no quorum or should the voting on a
particularly important question requiring expeditious resolution be evenly divided. Such a case,
however, is covered by neither Section 15 of Article VII nor Section 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII. The
appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, 1998 (transmitted to the Office of the Chief
Justice on May 14, 1998) were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. Consequently, they
come within the operation of the first prohibition relating to appointments which are considered to be
for the purpose of buying votes or influencing the election. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary
is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify
the making of the appointments during the period of the ban. On the other hand, as already discussed,
there is a strong public policy for the prohivelation that everything it refuses to make available

at that time will be obtainable in trial.

The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that the essence of due p

rocess in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one side or to