LRT vs.

NAVIDAD

G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003

FACTS:

Navidad was drunk when he entered the boarding platform of the LRT. He got into an altercation with
the SG Escartin. They had a fistfight and Navidad fell onto the tracks and was killed when a train came
and ran over him.

The Heirs of Navidad filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, the train driver, (Roman) the LRTA,
the Metro Transit Organization and Prudent Security Agency (Prudent). The trial court found Prudent
and Escartin jointly and severally liable for damages to the heirs. The CA exonerated Prudent and
instead held the LRTA and the train driver Romero jointly and severally liable as well as removing the
award for compensatory damages and replacing it with nominal damages.

The reasoning of the CA was that a contract of carriage already existed between Navidad and LRTA (by
virtue of his havA ing purchased train tickets and the liability was caused by the mere fact of Navidad's
death after being hit by the train being managed by the LRTA and operated by Roman. The CA also
blamed LRTA for not having presented expert evidence showing that the emergency brakes could not
have stopped the train on time.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not LRTA and/or Roman is liable for the death.

(2) Whether or not Escartin and/or Prudent are liable.

HELD:

(1) Yes. The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the
victim arising from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence
required of a common carrier.

(2) Fault was not established. Liability will be based on Tort under Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code.
(3) No.  It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.
RATIO:

Liability of LRTA – Read Arts. 1755,1756, 1759 and 1763 of the New Civil Code

A common carrier is required by these above statutory provisions to use utmost diligence in carrying
passengers with due regard for all circumstances. This obligation exists not only during the course of the
trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises where they ought to be in pursuance to
then contract of carriage.

Art. 1763 renders a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through
the  negligence or wilful acts of its employees or (b) on account of willful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees through theexercise of due diligence could
have prevented or stopped the act or omission. In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to
have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty
to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the
carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.

Liability of Security Agency – If Prudent is to be held liable, it would be for a tort under Art. 2176 in
conjunction with Art. 2180. Once the fault of the employee Escartin is established, the employer,
Prudent, would be held liable on the presumption that it did not exercise the diligence of a good father
of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees.

Relationship between contractual and non-contractual breach – How then must the liability of the
common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It
would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission
causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the
Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that
which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of ontract
would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between
the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to
apply.

Nominal Damages - The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal
damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by
the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff
for any loss suffered by him. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with
compensatory damages.  The award was deleted/\.
Phoenix Construction v. IAC

Facts:

At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home
from cocktails and dinner meeting with his boss. He was proceeding down General Lacuna Street when
he saw a Ford dump truck parked askew, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic, with no lights or
early warning reflector devices. The truck was driven earlier by Armando Carbonel, a regular driver of
the petitioner company. Dionisio tried to swerve his car to the left, but it was too late. He suffered some
physical injuries and nervous breakdown. Dionision filed an action for damages against Carbonel and
Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident to respondent’s own
negligence in driving at high speed without curfew pass and headlights, and while intoxicated. The trial
court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent.

Issue:

Whether the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked, or by respondent’s own
negligence

Held:

We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during
the night of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a
pass during that night. It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights
even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct
which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection. We believe that
the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that offered by private respondent Dionisio,
i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if
convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at
"bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck. We do not believe that this evidence is
sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a
motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence. The conclusion we draw from the factual
circumstances outlined above is that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the
accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he
extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and
thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.

Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the
legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent
manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The
collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck
driver's negligence.

The distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would have us adopt have
already been "almost entirely discredited. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition
which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of
causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in
producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations,
particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have
gone before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not
necessarily affect liability. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the
distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type
of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent
safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause"
and "condition" which is important but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.

We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition"
was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The improper parking of the dump truck created an
unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this
risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point
of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient
intervening or independent cause.

The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important
part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable
intervening forces are within the scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts
are quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the
defendant's responsibility. Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in
a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff
is run down by a car, even though the car is negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on the
highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into
it. We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate
and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.

Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The common law
notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent
provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so.
Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play
in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to
recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence
- the plaintiff's or the defendant's - was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. The relative location
in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of
the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of
the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act
or omission for the rest of the community. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and
burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the
petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.

We believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a
20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private
respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who
shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees
and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement
from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of damages made by
the respondent appellate court.
MERCEDES M. TEAGUE, petitioner, vs. ELENA FERNANDEZ, et al., respondent.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Subject: Torts and Damages

Doctrine: Violation of Rules and Statutes

FACTS:

The Realistic Institute situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building, a two-storey, semi-concrete
edifice located at the corner of Quezon Boulevard and Soler Street, Quiapo, Manila  was owned and
operated by Teague. The said second floor was unpartitioned, had a total area of about 400 square
meters, and although it had only one stairway, of about 1.50 meters in width, it had eight windows,
each of which was provided with two fire-escape ladders and the presence of each of said fire-exits was
indicated on the wall.

October 24, 1955, around 4pm, a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials located about ten meters
away from the institute (across the street). Upon seeing the fire, some of the students in the Realistic
Institute shouted ‘Fire! Fire!’ and thereafter, a panic ensued. Four instructresses and six assistant
instructress of the Institute were present and they, together with the registrar, tried to calm down the
students, who numbered about 180 at the time. The panic, however, could not be subdued and the
students, with the exception of the few who made use of fire-escapes kept on rushing and pushing their
way through the stairs, thereby causing stampede therein. No part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire.
But, after the panic was over, four students, including Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-
appellants, were found dead and several others injured on account of the stampede. The deceased’s five
brothers and sisters filed an action for damages against Mercedes M. Teague as owner and operator of
Realistic Institute. 

CFI found for the defendant and dismissed the case. This was however, reversed by the CA. The CA held
that petitioner was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes
Fernandez. This finding of negligence is based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491 Of
the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied with in connection with the
construction and use of the Gil-Armi building. The alleged violation of the ordinance consisted in the fact
that the second storey of the Gil-Armi building had only one stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of
at least 1.2 meters each, although at the time of the fire the owner of the building had a second stairway
under construction.

The petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted in the death of Lourdes Fernandez as follows: (1)
violation of ordinance; (2) fire at a neighboring place; (3) shouts of “Fire!, Fire!”; (4) panic in the
Institute; (5) stampede; and (6) injuries and death. As thus projected the violation of the ordinance, it is
argued, was only a remote cause, if at all, and cannot be the basis of liability since there intervened a
number of independent causes which produced the injury complained of. According to the petitioner
“the events of fire, panic and stampede were independent causes with no causal connection at all with
the violation of the ordinance.”

ISSUE: Whether a violation of a statute constitutes negligence

HELD:  
It is true that the petitioner’s non-compliance with the ordinance in question was ahead of and prior to
the other events in point of time, in the sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the building.
But the violation was a continuing one, since the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent
a specific situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of the building. That situation was
undue overcrowding in case it should become necessary to evacuate the building, which, it could be
reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under emergency conditions if there was only one stairway
available.

“The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause
of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in
which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent.” To
consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the injury does not portray the
situation in its true perspective; it would be more accurate to say that the overcrowding at the stairway
was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance intended to prevent by requiring
that there be two stairways instead of only one. Under the doctrine of the cases cited by the
respondents, the principle of proximate cause applies to such violation.

The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

PEOPLE'S BANK AND TRUST CO. vs. DAHICAN LUMBER COMPANY

Facts:

On September 8, 1948, Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company of Manila, a West Virginia corporation licensed
to do business in the Philippines sold and assigned all its rights in the Dahican Lumber concession to
Dahican Lumber Company - hereinafter referred to as DALCO - for the total sum of $500,000.00, of
which only the amount of $50,000.00 was paid. Thereafter, to develop the concession, DALCO obtained
various loans from the People's Bank & Trust Company amounting, as of July 13, 1950, to P200,000.00.
In addition, DALCO obtained, through the BANK, a loan of $250,000.00 from the Export-Import Bank of
Washington D.C., evidenced by five promissory notes of $50,000.00 each, maturing on different dates,
executed by both DALCO and the Dahican America Lumber Corporation, a foreign corporation and a
stockholder of DALCO,

As security for the payment of the abovementioned loans, on July 13, 1950 DALCO executed in favor of
the BANK a deed of mortgage covering five parcels of land situated in the province of Camarines Norte
together with all the buildings and other improvements existing thereon and all the personal properties
of the mortgagor located in its place of business in the municipalities of Mambulao and Capalonga,
Camarines Norte. On the same date, DALCO executed a second mortgage on the same properties in
favor of ATLANTIC to secure payment of the unpaid balance of the sale price of the lumber concession
amounting to the sum of $450,000.00. Both deeds contained a provision extending the mortgage lien to
properties to be subsequently acquired by the mortgagor.

Both mortgages were registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte. In addition
thereto DALCO and DAMCO pledged to the BANK 7,296 shares of stock of DALCO and 9,286 shares of
DAMCO to secure the same obligation.

Upon DALCO's and DAMCO's failure to pay the fifth promissory note upon its maturity, the BANK paid
the same to the Export-Import Bank of Washington D.C., and the latter assigned to the former its credit
and the first mortgage securing it. Subsequently, the BANK gave DALCO and DAMCO up to April 1, 1953
to pay the overdue promissory note.c

After July 13, 1950 - the date of execution of the mortgages mentioned above - DALCO purchased
various machineries, equipment, spare parts and supplies in addition to, or in replacement of some of
those already owned and used by it on the date aforesaid. Pursuant to the provision of the mortgage
deeds quoted theretofore regarding "after acquired properties," the BANK requested DALCO to submit
complete lists of said properties but the latter failed to do so. In connection with these purchases, there
appeared in the books of DALCO as due to Connell Bros. Company (Philippines) - a domestic corporation
who was acting as the general purchasing agent of DALCO -the sum of P452,860.55 and to DAMCO, the
sum of P2,151,678.34.chan
On December 16, 1952, the Board of Directors of DALCO, in a special meeting called for the purpose,
passed a resolution agreeing to rescind the alleged sales of equipment, spare parts and supplies by
CONNELL and DAMCO to it.

On January 13, 1953, the BANK, in its own behalf and that of ATLANTIC, demanded that said agreements
be cancelled but CONNELL and DAMCO refused to do so. As a result, on February 12, 1953; ATLANTIC
and the BANK, commenced foreclosure proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte
against DALCO and DAMCO.

Upon motion of the parties the Court, on September 30, 1953, issued an order transferring the venue of
the action to the Court of First Instance of Manila.

On August 30, 1958, upon motion of all the parties, the Court ordered the sale of all the machineries,
equipment and supplies of DALCO, and the same were subsequently sold for a total consideration of
P175,000.00 which was deposited in court pending final determination of the action. By a similar
agreement one-half (P87,500.00) of this amount was considered as representing the proceeds obtained
from the sale of the "undebated properties" (those not claimed by DAMCO and CONNELL), and the
other half as representing those obtained from the sale of the "after acquired properties".

ISSUE:

WON the "after acquired properties" were subject to the deeds of mortgage mentioned heretofore.
Assuming that they are subject thereto,
WON the mortgages are valid and binding on the properties aforesaid inspite of the fact that they were
not registered in accordance with the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law.

HELD:

Under the fourth paragraph of both deeds of mortgage, it is crystal clear that all property of every
nature and description taken in exchange or replacement, as well as all buildings, machineries, fixtures,
tools, equipments, and other property that the mortgagor may acquire, construct, install, attach; or use
in, to upon, or in connection with the premises - that is, its lumber concession - "shall immediately be
and become subject to the lien" of both mortgages in the same manner and to the same extent as if
already included therein at the time of their execution. Such stipulation is neither unlawful nor immoral,
its obvious purpose being to maintain, to the extent allowed by circumstances, the original value of the
properties given as security.

Article 415 does not define real property but enumerates what are considered as such, among them
being machinery, receptacles, instruments or replacements intended by owner of the tenement for an
industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and shall tend directly to
meet the needs of the said industry or works. On the strength of the above-quoted legal provisions, the
lower court held that inasmuch as "the chattels were placed in the real properties mortgaged to
plaintiffs, they came within the operation of Art. 415, paragraph 5 and Art. 2127 of the New Civil Code".
In the present case, the characterization of the "after acquired properties" as real property was made
not only by one but by both interested parties. There is, therefore, more reason to hold that such
consensus impresses upon the properties the character determined by the parties who must now be
held in estoppel to question it.
PENULLAR vs. PNB

No. L-32762. January 27, 1983.

TOPIC:  Torts, Negligence

FACTS:

There was a land registration case between Cristina Penullar and Florencio Felix for the declaration of
absolute nullity of judicial proceedings in a land registration case. While the case was pending, the land
was mortgaged to PNB for a loan by the defendants of the case for declaration of nullity of judicial
proceedings.

The CA in that case declared the judicial proceedings void and all Certificates of Title flowing from the
proceedings null and void, but at the same time declared the mortgage of PNB valid on the basis of
being a mortgagor in good faith.

Penullar claimed that PNB was negligent in allowing the void title to be mortgaged.

ISSUE: Whether or not PNB was negligent

HELD:

NO. PNB had a right to rely on the torrens titles presented to it, furthermore, Petitioner Penullar was
also found to have been negligent, to wit:

He whose negligence had enabled a third person to cause damages shall, as between two innocent
parties, bear the loss – “In the present case, [if herein petitioner] had appealed from the decision in the
registration case, no certificate of Title would have been issued just like that in the name of the
[petitioner] and no mortgage could have been constituted by them in favor of Bank but as it is, said
[petitioner] failed to do that, instead they let the decision in the registration case gain the status of
finality; allowed without prior protest, the certificate of title to be issued; did not even as early as
possible, annotate an adverse claim on the titles; and they filed this case only several months
afterwards, it was their negligence that permitted said adjudicatees in the said registration case to apply
for and secure mortgages from the Bank.