OGOLA Albert Odhiambo (24200) – 2018/2019

Albert Ogola – Urbaniana University, Rome.

THE FOUR MISTAKEN ASSUMPTIONS THAT ARE SUBJECTED TO BODY-MIND

PROBLEM, ACCORDING TO JOHN R. SEARLE

INTRODUCTION

The word ‘assumption’ is used by many so much that one can be tempted to think that it is
synonymous to the word ‘obvious.’ In Mathematics, for example, assuming that X is 3Y, show
that 2X + 3 = 3(2Y + 1). We know very well that X can never be 3Y, yet we assume and go
ahead to work it out. To ‘assume’ is to ‘think’ or to ‘accept’ that something is true even without
having proof of it.1 This is applied too, by some philosophers as has been realized by John R.
Searle (an American philosopher, born in 1932 and ventures more in the Philosophy of the
Mind), who refer to them as ‘mistaken assumptions’. In this work, therefore, we will highlight
the four mistaken assumptions, showing how they are subjected to Body-Mind problem and the
suggested ways of overcoming them, according to Searle, bearing in mind the limited space.

1.0 THE FOUR MISTAKEN ASSUMPTIONS

1.1 The Distinction between Mental and Physical

The terms ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ are assumed to be mutually exclusive ontological categories,
that is, what is mental cannot be physical, and vise versa. Adherents to this assumption hold that
we can reduce the mental to the physical, since for them, the mental as mental does not exist, but
the physical.2

1.2 The Notion of Reduction

This is an assumption where one kind of phenomenon is brought down to another. It proceeds
from natural sciences that have shown that material objects are nothing, but collections of
particles. According to Searle, this would imply that thinking (or consciousness) is nothing, but
something else like computer program or neuron firings,3 however, the question is, what kind of
reduction is this?4

1.3 Causation and Events

In this assumption, it is mostly, if not universally, held that causation is always a relation
between discrete events ordered in time, in which the cause precedes effect. Consequently, it has

1
Cf. J. Pearsall (ed.), The New Oxford Dictionary of English, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998.
2
Cf. J. R. Searle, Mind: A Brief Introduction, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004,108.
3
Cf. Ibid., 109.
4
Cf. J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 1992, 45.
been assumed that the brain events (physical) cause mental events (mental), hence resulting to
dualism5.

1.4 The Transparency of Identity

Identity, whether of object or composition, is assumed to be unproblematic. For example, one

can say that Tsepo is identical with his twin brother (object identity) while water is identical with
H₂O molecules (composition identity). According to Searle, such comparison is identical with
that of a mental state and a neurophysiologic state of the brain, 6 and this seems to be confusing.
Perhaps, the suggestion on the solution and how to overcome it might clarify it better.

2.0 SOLUTIONS TO THE SUBJECTED ASSUMPTIONS TO THE BODY-MIND

PROBLEM

Searle says that ‘mind’ and ‘body’ are two different terminologies, however, they have a
subjective ontology and this calls for consciousness, that is, “a biological feature of human and
certain animal brains. It is caused by neurological processes and is as much a part of the natural
biological order as any other biological features such as photosynthesis, digestion or
mitosis.”7However, we have to note first, that “we cannot do any eliminative reduction by
consciousness, nor can we reduce consciousness to its neurobiological basis, because such a
third-person reduction would leave out the first-person ontology of consciousness”8

Secondly, conscious states caused by lower level of neurological processes in the brain, on the
one hand, are causally reducible to neurobiological processes. 9 On the other hand, conscious
states existing at a higher level than that of neurons and synapses are realized in the brain as
features of its system. Thus, “portions of this system that are composed of neurons are conscious
and functions causally,”10 unlike when they are individual neurons.

If I feel thirsty, for example, it is experienced by ‘I’ as the subject that is thirsty and my thirst is a
real phenomenon, caused entirely by neurobiological process in my brain at a higher level and
functions causally in my behavior. This means that conscious states are real phenomena in the
real world. For this reason, my conscious thirst causes me to take water and drink, a process that
is both mental and physical following the intentionality of my thirst feeling 11to satisfy my desire
for quenching the thirst.

5
Cf. J. R. Searle, Mind: A Brief Introduction, 110. See also J. Bennett, “Locke’s Philosophy of Mind” in V. Chappell,
The Cambridge Companion to Locke, Cambridge University Press, USA, 1994, 89-90.
6
Cf. Ibid., 110-111. See also 52-55.
7
J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, 37.
8
J. R. Searle, Mind: A Brief Introduction, 113.
9
Cf. Ibid.
10
Ibid., 114.
11
Cf. Ibid., 112. See also 164, 189-190.
3.0 OVERCOMING THE MISTAKEN ASSUMPTIONS

3.1 Assumption of the Distinction between the Mental and the Physical

According to Searle, we need to expand the notion of the terms ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ to
include qualitativeness, subjectivity and intentionality,12 for they fit well in both mental and
physical perception and cognitive systems. Hence, “mental states (like consciousness) are
located in the space of the brain and act causally.”13

3.2 Assumption of Reduction

Searle says that the distinction between causal and ontological reduction is the only way to come
out of this assumption. He admits that we can make a causal reduction in the case of
consciousness, especially to its neural states, but not its ontological reduction (first-person
ontology), otherwise we lose the point of the concept,14 since it will be a third-person.

3.3 Assumption of the Causation and Events

Here, Searle insists that when we see something caused by the other or an object being supported
by the other, it is the causal order of nature of microphenomena at work. This causally explains
the macrofeatures of systems, and not a matter of discrete events sequential in time.15

3.4 Assumption of Identity

Connecting this assumption with the above (3.3), Searle is in agreement with the criteria of
identity for material objects, but does not agree with that of events (mental events).
Consciousness, for example, is “identical with brain process, but by criteria which is
neurobiological and phenomenological,”16 contrary to the materialists.

12
Searle argues that consciousness is indeed consciousness of something, and the ‘of’ in ‘consciousness of’ is the
‘of’ of intentionality. See Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, 51. He also says that subjectivity refers to ontological
category, not epistematic mode. When I talk about pain, for example, it must be somebody’s pain, which is not
equally accessible to any observer and its existence is a first-person’s. This is true of conscious states. See ibid, 39.
13
Ibid., 117-118.
14
Cf. Ibid., 119,121-123. See also Searle, The Discovery of the Mind, 45.
15
Cf. Ibid., 124.
16
Ibid., 125. Searle gives an example of redefinition as a criterion of achieving a necessary identity, like water
composed of H₂O molecules. Once the truth-value of this has been discovered, then H₂O is included in the
definition of water.
CONCLUSION

We can confirm that, inasmuch as Searle brings to table this discussion and offering ways
forward, the body-mind problem still remains technical and needs more attention, especially on
the assumptions that are leading to this technicality. He has, however, shed some light on what
most people, if not all, consider obvious. It is indeed a mistake to assume some things, especially
in a serious work dealing with the mind like this. Consequently, key terms explained by Searle in
the entire work, like reduction (causal and ontological), intentionality, subjectivity, identity
criterion, among others should never be forgotten.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

CHAPPELL, Vere, The Cambridge Companion to Locke (ed.), Cambridge University Press,
USA, 1994.

SEARLE, John R., Mind: A Brief Introduction, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004.

_____________, The Rediscovery of Mind, MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts, London,

1992.

PEARSALL Judy (ed.), The New Oxford Dictionary of English, Oxford University Press, New
York, 1998.