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Copy from:
Glenn, Paul J.:
Ethics
A Class Manual in Moral Philosophy
National book Store. Philippine. Copyright 1968

INTRODUCTION

1. Definition 2. Object 3. Importance 4. Division

1. DEFINITION
Ethics is the practical science of the morality of human conduct.
a) Ethics is a science. A science is a relatively complete and systematically arranged body of
connected data together with the causes or reasons by which these data are known to be true.
Ethics squares with this definition, for it is a complete and systematically arranged body of
data which relate to morality of human conduct; and it presents the reasons which show these
data to be true. Ethics is therefore a science.
b) Ethics is a practical science. If the data of a science directly imply rules or directions for
thought or action, the science is called practical. If the data of a science enrich the mind
without directly implying rules or directions, the science is called speculative. A speculative
science presents truths that are to be known; a practical science presents truths that are to be
acted upon. A speculative science enlarges our knowledge and enhances our cultural
equipment; a practical science gives us knowledge with definite guidance. Now the science of
Ethics presents data which directly imply and indicate directions for human conduct. Ethics is
therefore a practical science.
 c) Ethics is a science of human conduct. By human conduct we mean only such human activity
as is deliberate and free. A deliberate and free act, an act performed with advertence and
motive, an act determined (i.e., chosen and given existence) by the free will, is called a
human act. Acts performed by human beings without advertence, or without the exercise of
free choice, are called acts of man, but they are not human acts in the technical sense of that
expression which is here employed. Ethics treats of human acts; human acts make human
conduct: Ethics is therefore a science of human conduct.
d) Ethics is the science of morality of human conduct. Human conduct is free, knowing,
deliberate human activity. Such activity is either in agreement or disagreement with the
dictates of reason. Now the relation (agreement or disagreement) of human activity with the
dictates of reason is called morality. Ethics studies human activity to determine what it must
be to stand in harmony with the dictates of reason. Hence, Ethics deals with the morality of
human conduct.
e) The name Ethics is derived from the Greek word ethos, which means “a characteristic way of
acting.” Now the characteristic mark of human conduct is found in the free and deliberate use
of the will: in a word, this characteristic is found in human acts. Thus, we perceive that the
name Ethics is suitably employed to designate the science of human acts, of human conduct. -
The Latin word mos (stem: mor-) is the equivalent of the Greek ethos. Hence, we understand
why Ethics is sometimes called Moral Science or Moral Philosophy.

2. OBJECT
Every science has a Material Object and a Formal Object.
The Material Object is the subject-matter of the science: the thing, or things, with which the
science deals. The Material Object of Ethics is human acts, that is to say, human conduct.
The Formal Object of a science is the special way, aim, or point of view that the science employs
in studying or dealing with its Material Object. Now Ethics studies human acts (its Material
Object) to discover what these must be in order to agree with the dictates of reason. Hence the
special aim and point of view in Ethics is the right morality, or rectitude, of human acts. We
assert, then that the Formal Object of Ethics is the rectitude if human acts.
3. IMPORTANCE
Ethics employs the marvelous faculty of human reason upon the supremely important question of
what an upright life is and must be. It is therefore a noble and important science.
Ethics furnishes the norm by which relations among men (juridical, political, professional, social)
are regulated. It shows what such relations must be, and indicates the reasons that require them to
be so. Thus, Ethics is fundamental to the sciences of Law, Medicine, Political Economy,
Sociology, etc. It is, in consequence of this fact, a very important science.
The principles of Ethics are in perfect harmony with the morality of Christianity, and this fact
appeals to many minds when employed as a means of approach to the demonstration of the truth
of the Catholic Religion. Hence, Ethics has a large significance for the Catholic apologist-that is
to say, for every educated Catholic.
Faulty ethical theories, as well as the lack of definite ethical principles, have been and are still the
cause of great disorders in the political and social world. This fact is apparent in such things as
Bolshevism, Nihilism, Socialism, Birth control, Eugenics, Companionate Marriage. Sound Ethics
 supplies the scientific knowledge which evidences the unworthiness and unreason of such things.
Ethics is therefore a science deserving of careful study.
4. DIVISION
Ethics has two major parts, viz., General ethics and Special Ethics.
General ethics presents truths about human acts, and from these truths deduces the general
principles of morality.
Special ethics is applied Ethics. It applies the principles of General ethics in different departments
if human activity, individual and social.
The following scheme presents the plan upon which the present study of Ethics is developed:
I. GENERAL ETHICS
II. SPECIAL ETHICS

as regards God

Individual
as regards self
Ethics

as regards
fellowmen
II. SPECIAL
ETHICS
in the family

Social Ethics in the state

in the world
(International
Ethics)
Following the scheme, we divide the present treatise into two Parts (viz., General ethics, and
Special Ethics). Part First is divided into Chapters. Part Second is divided into two Books (which
deal respectively with Individual Ethics and Social Ethics), and the Books are divided into
Chapters. The Chapters are divided into convenient Articles.
 Chapter I.
HUMAN ACTS

This chapter studies the human act itself, defines it, classifies its varieties, discerns its essential
elements, and discusses the things that may modify the human act and make it less human.
The Chapter is conveniently divided into the following Articles:
Article 1. The Human Act in Itself
Article 2. The Voluntariness of Human Acts
Article 3. The Modifiers of Human Acts

ARTICLE I. THE HUMAN ACT IN ITSELF

a) Definition b) Classification c) Constituents

a) DEFINITION OF THE HUMAN ACT

A human act is an act which proceeds from the deliberate free will of man.
In a wide sense, the term human act means any sort of activity, internal or external, bodily or
spiritual, performed by a human being. Ethics, however, employs the term in a stricter sense,
and calls human only those acts that are proper to a man as man. Now man is an animal, and
he has many activities in common with brutes. Thus, man feels, hears, sees, employs the
senses of taste and smell, is influenced by bodily tendencies or appetites. But man is more
than an animal; he is rational, that is to say, he has understanding and free will. Hence it is
only the act that proceeds from the knowing and free willing human being that has the full
character of a human act. Such an act alone is proper to man as man. And therefore, Ethics
understand by human acts only those acts that proceed from a deliberate (i.e., advertent,
knowing) and free willing human being.
Man’s animal acts of sensation (i.e., use of the senses) and appetition (i.e., bodily tendencies),
as well as acts that man performs indeliberately or without advertence and the exercise of free
choice, are called acts of man. Thus, such acts as are affected in sleep, in delirium, in the state
of unconsciousness; acts done abstractedly or with complete inadvertence; acts performed in
infancy; acts due to infirmity of mind or the weakness of senility-all these are acts of man,
but they are not human acts.
It is to be noticed that acts which are in themselves acts of man may sometimes become
human acts by the advertence and consent of the human agent (and by agent is meant the one
who does or performs and act). Thus, if I hear words of blasphemy as I walk along the street,
my act of hearing is an act of man; but the act becomes a human act if I deliberately pay
attention and lister. Again, my eyes may fall upon an indecent sight, or upon a page of
obscene reading material. The act of seeing, and even reading and understanding the words is
an act of man; but it becomes a human act the moment I deliberately consent to look or to
read.
Ethics is not concerned with acts of man, but only with human acts. Human acts are moral
acts, as we shall see later on. For human acts, man is responsible, and they are imputed to
him as worthy of praise or blame, of reward or punishment. Human acts tend to repeat
 themselves and to form habits. Habits coalesce into what we call a man’s character. Thus, we
find verified the dictum of Ethics: “a man is what his human acts make him.”

b) CLASSIFICATION OF HUMAN ACTS

Human acts may be classified under the following heads: i. Their complete or adequate cause;
and ii. Their relation to the dictates of reason.

The Adequate Cause of Human Acts-While all human acts have their source in man’s
free rational nature, there are some acts that begin and are perfected in the will itself,
and the rest begin in the will and are perfected by other faculties under control of the
will. Thus, some human acts find their adequate cause in the will alone (always
remembering that we speak of the will of advertent, knowing man, i.e. of the deliberate
will): and these are called elicited acts. Other human acts do not find their adequate
cases in the simple will-act, but are perfected by the actions of mental or bodily powers
under the control of the will, or, so to speak, under orders from the will; and these acts
are called commanded acts. To illustrate: I intend to go to my room and study. My
intention Is a simple will-act, begun and completed in the will. It is therefore an
elicited act. But to carry out the intention, commanded acts, of body and mind, must be
exercised. Thus, I walk to my room, turn on the light, sit at my desk, take down a book,
turn to the lesson, bend my eyes upon the page. All these bodily acts are (if done
advertently) humans acts, commanded, so to speak, by the will of carrying out its
intention. Now I start to study: I control the imagination, keeping out distracting
fancies; I focus my mind upon the matter to be understood. These internal mental acts
are also acts commanded by the will.
Under the head of “Adequate Cause” we therefore consider:
(A) Elicited Acts
(B) Commanded Acts

(A) Elicited Acts are the following:

(a) Wish: the simple love of anything; the first tendency of the will towards a thing, whether this
thing be realizable or not. Every human act begins with the wish to act. Wish is exemplified
in the will-act which enables one truthfully to say: “I wish it would rain;” “I do so long to see
you:” “I should like to go to Europe next summer.”

(b) Intention: the purposive tendency of the will towards a thing regarded as realizable, whether
the thing is actually done or not. We find intention expressed in the following sentences: “I
am going to Europe next summer;” “The cause is in my will; I will not come: that is enough
to satisfy the Senate.” — Intention is distinguished as actual, virtual, habitual, and
interpretative intention. We shall study these degrees of intention in the Article on the
Voluntariness of Human Acts.

(c) Consent: the acceptance by the will of the means necessary to carry out intention. Consent is
a further intention of doing what is necessary to realize the first or main intention. Thus, if I
 intend to go to Europe, I consent to the necessary preparation for the journey, I cannot really
intend a thing honestly unless I consent to the means of carrying it out or realizing it. If I
make an Act of Contrition, I make an intention (usually called a resolution of amendment).
Now I am not honest in my act, if I do not consent to avoid the near occasions of sin; for
these are necessarily to be avoided if the intention is to be realized. Here we see justified the
ancient saying: “He that wills (intends) a thing, wills (consents to) the means required to
accomplish it.”
(d) Election: the selection by the will of the predicted means to be employed (consented to) in
carrying on an intention. Thus, while I may go to Europe either by ship or by airplane, I
cannot go by both simultaneously, but must elect or select one of the means. By election I
choose to sail on a certain day, form a certain port, etc.

(e) Use: the employment by the will of powers (of body, mind, or both) to carry out its intention
by the means elected. Thus, if I intend to go to a neighboring town, and elect to walk thither, I
exercise the will-act of use by the putting my body in motion. True, the movement itself is a
commanded act, but the commanding, the putting to employment of bodily action is the
elicited will-act of use.

(f) Fruition: the enjoyment of a thing willed and done; the will’s act of satisfaction in intention
fulfilled.

Of the elicited acts listed, three appertain to the objective thing willed, and three to the
means of accomplishing it. Suppose the thing willed is a trip to Europe. Then:

(B) Commanded Acts are:

(a) Internal: acts done by internal mental powers under command of the will. Examples: effort to
remember; conscious reasoning; nerving oneself to meet an issue; effort to control anger;
deliberate use of the imagination in visualizing a scene.
(b) External: acts effected by bodily powers under command of the will. Examples:
deliberate walking, eating, writing, speaking. Such acts as walking and eating are very
often acts of man, but they become human acts when done with advertence and
intention.
(c) Mixed: acts that involve the employment of bodily powers and mental powers.
Example: study, which involves us of intellect, and use of eyes in reading the lesson.
Of course, all human acts are internal inasmuch as all originate in the will which elicits
or commands them. Again, all eternal acts are mixed inasmuch as the outer activity
which perfects them is but the expression and fulfillment of the interior act of will. But,
for sake of simplicity, we call those human acts external which are perfected or
completed by the exterior powers of body; and we call mixed only those acts which
involve the use of bodily powers as well as internal powers distinct from the will.
ii. The Relation of Human Acts to Reason--- Human acts are either in agreement or in
disagreement with the dictates of reason, and this relation (agreement or disagreement)
 with reason constitutes their morality. The subject of the Morality of Human Acts is to
be dealt with in detail in a later Chapter, but passing mention of the matter is required
here for the proper classification of human acts. On the score of their morality, or
relation to reason, human acts are:
(a) Good, when they are in harmony with the dictates of right reason;
(b) Evil, when they are in opposite to these dictates;
(c) Indifferent, when they stand in no positive relation to the dictates of reason. Indifferent
human acts exist in theory, but not as a matter of practical experience. A human act that is
indifferent in itself becomes good or evil according to the circumstances which affect its
performance, especially the end in view (or motive or purpose) of the agent.

c) CONSTITUENTS OF THE HUMAN ACT

In order that an act be human, it must possess three essential qualities: it must be
knowing, free, and voluntary. Hence, we list the essential elements or constituents, of
the human acts as: i. Knowledge; ii. Freedom; iii. Voluntariness.
i. Knowledge--- A human act proceeds from the deliberate will; it requires deliberation. Now
“deliberation” does not mean quiet, slow, painstaking action. It means merely advertence, or
knowledge in intellect of what one is about and what this means. An act may be done in the
twinkling of an eye, and still be deliberate. Consider an illustration: A hunter flushes game;
the birds rise; the hunter whips up his gun and fires. The act of firing is the work of a split
second, and yet it is a deliberate act. The hunter adverts to what he is doing, and, so
adverting, wills and does it. IN a word, the hunter knows what he is doing. His knowledge
makes the act deliberate. For the purpose of Ethics, then, deliberation means knowledge. Now
a human act is by definition a deliberate act; that is, it is a knowing act. No human act is
possible without knowledge.

The will cannot act in the dark, for the will is a “blind” faculty in itself. It cannot
choose unless it “see” to choose, and the light, the power to see, is afforded by
intellectual knowledge. I cannot will to go to the island of Mauritius unless I know that
there is such an island. I cannot choose to eat oranges or not to eat oranges, if I have
never seen nor heard of oranges. I cannot will to play the sacbut if I know of no such
musical instrument. I cannot will to love and serve God if I do not know God.
Knowledge, then, is an essential element of the human act.
ii. Freedom--- A human act is an act determined (elicited or commanded) by the will and by
nothing else. It is an act therefore, that is under control of the will, an act that the will can do
or leave undone. Such an act is called a free act. Thus, every human act must be free. In other
words, freedom is an essential element of human act.

iii. Voluntariness. — The Latin word for will is voluntas, and from this word we derive the
English terms, voluntary and voluntariness. To say, therefore, that a human act must be
voluntary, or must have voluntariness, is simply to say that it must be a will act. This we
already know but the very definition of the human act. Voluntariness is the formal essential
quality of the human act, and for it to be present, there must ordinarily be both knowledge
 and freedom in the agent. Hence the term voluntary act is synonymous with human act. In the
next Article, we treat the voluntariness of human acts in some detail.

To illustrate the place of the constituents just considered in a particular human

act, the following example is proposed: a Catholic is aware that today is Sunday and
that he has obligation of hearing Mass (knowledge). He is free to attend Mass or stay
away-not, indeed, free, from duty in the matter, but physically free to perform the duty
or leave it unperformed (freedom). He wills to do his duty and to hear mass
(voluntariness). Manded acts and have viewed them in their moral aspects as good,
evil, and indifferent acts.
We have seen that the human act is essentially the product of the will
(voluntary act) acting with native freedom in the light of intellectual knowledge.
ARTICLE 2. THE VOLUNTARINESS OF HUMAN ACTS
a) Kinds or Degrees of Voluntariness
b) Indirect Voluntariness
a) Kinds or degrees of Voluntariness
i. Perfect and Imperfect - Perfect voluntariness is present in the human act when the agent (i.e.,)
the doer, performer, actor) fully knows and fully intends the act. Imperfect voluntariness is
present when there is some defect in the agent’s knowledge, intention, or in both. Thus, a
deliberate lie is a perfectly voluntary act; while a lie of exaggeration in a lively narrative, in
which the narrator, full of the story, adverts only party, or in passing, to the fact that he may be
stretching matters a little, is a human act imperfectly voluntary.

ii. Simple and Conditional – Simple voluntariness is present in a human act performed, whether
the agent likes or dislikes doing it. Conditional voluntariness is present in the agent’s wish to
do something other that which he is actually doing, but doing with repugnance or dislike.
Example: The commander of a distressed vessel lightens cargo by throwing valuable
merchandise overboard. He wills to do it, and does it, and the act is simply voluntary. Still, he
dislikes doing it and would not do it if there were any other way of escaping shipwreck. He
wishes to keep the goods, but the wish is inefficacious will-act, for, as a matter of fact, he does
not keep the goods, but throws them away. In this inefficacious will-act, there is conditional
voluntariness. Inasmuch as the inefficacious will-act influences the efficacious act, the latter is
said to be involuntary. Hence the act of throwing away valuable goods is simply voluntary and
conditionally voluntary

iii. Direct and indirect- Direct voluntariness is present in a human act willed in itself. Indirect
voluntariness is present in that human act which is the foreseen result (or a result that could
and should have been foreseen) of another act directly willed. Example: a man kills a rabbit
for dinner. He directly wills the act of killing as a means to an end to be achieved, viz, the
dinner. He also directly will that the dinner as the end to be achieved by this means. We have
direct voluntariness in each aspect of the act. Now suppose that rabbit was a tame animal that
had played about the man’s grounds and had given its children pleasure. The man knows that
by killing the rabbit he will deprive his children of pleasure and cause them sorrow. This,
indeed, he does not directly will, but inasmuch as this is the foreseen consequences of his
 directly willed act, he wills it indirectly or in its cause. In other words, he directly wills the
cause of his children’s sorrow, and thus wills the sorrow itself. A human act that is directly
willed is called voluntary in se (i.e., in itself), while a human is called a voluntary in causa
(i.e., in its cause).
Indirect voluntaries is a subject of the first importance, and we shall study it in detail in
the second section of this present Article.

iv. Positive and Negative – Positive voluntariness is present in a human act of doing, performing.
Negative voluntariness is present in a human act of omitting, refraining from doing. Examples:
a Catholic goes to Mass on Sunday (positive voluntariness). A Catholic deliberately misses
Mass on Sunday (negative voluntariness). — Of course, when a person omits an act, he must
really be doing something positive. But the special positive thing that he does is not the
essence of the omission as such. Thus, the man who remains away from Mass, he must really
be doing something—lying abed, reading the morning paper, walking about, playing a game,
eating his breakfast, or doing any one of an indefinite number of possible things. But the point
is that special and particular positive act, or series of acts enters into the essence of the
omission, for this consists simply in willing not to do an act.
v. Actual, Virtual, Habitual, and Interpretative. —
Actual voluntariness (or actual intention) is present in human act willed here and now.
Virtual voluntariness (or virtual intention) is present in a human act done as a result of (or
in virtue of) a formerly elicited actual intention, even if that intention be here and now
forgotten. Habitual voluntariness (or habitual intention) is present in a human act done in
harmony with, but not as a result of, a formerly elicited and unprovoked actual intention.
Interpretative voluntariness (or interpretative intuition) is that voluntariness which, in the
judgment of prudence and common-sense, would be actually present if opportunity or
ability for it were given. Examples:

(a) A man makes the morning offering. He actually, here and now, intends to live for God,
and to serve Him in all the thoughts, words, and deeds of the day. The act of offering is
an actual intention; it is a will-act in which there is actual voluntariness.

(b) A man makes the morning offering, but during the day he completely forgets it.
Nevertheless, his day is without sin which would contradict his pious intention, and we
say that the power or virtue of the intention endures, and that, as a result of the intention,
all the thoughts, words, and deeds of the day are really done for God. The man takes
breakfast, goes to work, attends to business duties, spends time in recreation, etc. In all
these acts he has no actual (“here and now”) intention of doing them for God, but he has
the virtual intention of doing them. Hence all the acts that the man performs throughout
the day—even those that are in themselves acts of man—are human acts of service by
reason of their virtual voluntariness

(c) A man makes the actual intention of becoming a Catholic. Years pass, and he does not
carry out the intention; neither does he revoke it. He is taken suddenly ill, and lies
unconscious at death’s door. A priest administers Baptism. Here the act of receiving the
 sacrament is in agreement with the actual intention once made and unprovoked, and the
man is said to have a habitual intention for the act. The act, however, is not the result of
the original actual intention, for the virtue or power of that intention cannot reasonably
be presumed to endure throughout a long period of neglect and unfulfillment. For, if one
makes an invention of doing a thing, and fails to do it throughout years of continuous
opportunity for its accomplishment, it is obvious that the virtue or power of the original
intention is null. Still, as long as the original intention is not revoked, it remains with its
author, and is worn, so to speak, like a forgotten portion of his dress or habit, powerless
actively to produce a result, but remaining as the mark or symbol of an attitude of mind.
It is a mark of habitual voluntariness

(d) A person known to be unbaptized is unconscious and in danger of death. No knowledge

is available of his habitual inclination or disinclination for the act of receiving the
sacrament of Baptism. The sacrament is nevertheless administered. Here the act of
receiving the sacrament is prudently presumed to be in line with the will of the recipient,
so that, if he could but know its great value, he would certainly wish to receive it. Thus,
is his will interpreted by sound common-sense. In the act of receiving he sacrament the
man is said to have an interpretative intention. Such an intention that may be prudently
presumed, not indeed as present, but as an intention that would be present if proper
knowledge and freedom were available to him in whom it is presumed. - Similarly,
infants are baptized, and the receiving of the sacrament is in them a human act, by
reason of interpretative voluntariness. - Again, the small boy who has literally to be
carried to school and kept there against his will, has an interpretative intention of going
to school. For his parents and the teachers know that, if the lad could but realize the
value of going to schooling, he would certainly will to attend.

B. Indirect Voluntariness
Indirect voluntariness, or voluntariness in cause, is present in that human act
which is an effect, foreseen or foreseeable, of another act directly willed.
We have not yet made a detailed study of the moral character of human acts nor of
their consequent imputability. But we have seen that human acts are acts under the free
control of the will. It is clear that, since the will controls such acts, the will is
responsible for them. In other words, human acts are imputable (as worthy of praise or
blame, reward or punishment) to their author.
Now the moment we bring together the matters of indirect voluntariness and
imputability, two supremely important ethical questions present themselves. The
questions are:

I. When is the agent (doer, actor, performer) responsible for the evil effect of a cause
directly willed?
II. When my one performs an act, not evil in itself, which has two effects, one good, one evil?
 i. The First Question: When is an agent responsible for the evil effect of a cause directly
willed? -The agent is responsible for such an effect where three conditions are fulfilled, viz.: (1)
The agent must be able to foresee the evil effect, at least in a general way. (2) The agent must be
free to refrain from doing that which is the cause of the evil effect. (3) The agent must be morally
bound not to do that which is the cause of the evil effect.
This is an ethical principle of great moment. Let the student apply it in the
following cases:
(a) Michael knows that if he drinks liquor, he will drink to excess, and will use blasphemous
language, which will scandalize those that hear it. He declares, and truly enough, that he hates
intemperance, and that he dreads the evils of blasphemy and scandal. Nevertheless, he drinks
liquor, and the foreseen evil occurs. How far is Michael responsible for these evil effects? When
does he incur their guilt?
(b) If John says, “If I go to the meeting and hear Jones sharp things about our party, I know
I’ll lose my head and reveal some very damaging facts about Jones’ career that I alone know.”
John goes to the meeting; the evil of detraction follows. Determine John’s responsibility, and the
moment at which his guilt is imputed to him.
(c) Mary knows that by persistent company-keeping with a non-Catholic she will encourage
the weak-willed Jane to a similar course and to the consequent danger of an invalid marriage; for
Jane idolizes Mary and imitates her in every way. Mary believes, foolishly but sincerely, that she
herself is in no danger, but she is keenly aware of the danger in which Jane is placed through her
example. Nevertheless, she persists. Jane imitates, and eventually commits the sin of an
attempted marriage outside the Church. How far is Mary to blame? Why?
(d) Thomas has been repeatedly warned by prudent persons against attendance at a secular
university, and he has been shown that he will there encounter grave dangers to his faith. He
declares, in foolish pride, that nothing can shake his faith. He attends university, gradually loses
his fervor, and becomes but a nominal Catholic. At what time does his lapse become imputable
to him? Why?
(e) Timothy goes to bed on Saturday night, forgetting to set the alarm. Before falling asleep
he recalls the omission, bit he does not rise to adjust the clock. He knows that he is a heavy
sleeper, and that he will not probably awake in time for Mass on Sunday. This is precisely what
happens. When does Timothy incur the guilt of missing Mass? Why?
(f) The same Timothy deliberately neglects the clock on another Saturday night. But
contrary to al his experiences, he awakes in time for Mass on Sunday morning, and he attends
very devoutly. Does Timothy have any fault in the matter? Why?
(g) Again, timothy deliberately neglects the clock on Saturday night. Again, b an almost
miraculous repetition of the unexpected, he awakes in time or Mass on Sunday. But he reasons,
since he as already missed Mass in cause, there is now no obligation to incumbent upon him of
attending. He stays at home and does not hear Mass.— Here timothy was altogether wrong. He
willed an evil in cause and his will-act stopped there. Through no merit of his own, the cause
failed to function as a cause, and he awoke in time for mass. Now by a new and direct will-act he
wills to miss Mass. Here is a new evil, directly willed.

In the foregoing cases we see that the agent is bound to avoid the cause of the evil effect,
and his obligation arises from the very fact that the effect is evil. Why then, did we list
three condition for the imputability of evil willed in cause? Why not simply say that the
two conditions are requisite for such imputability, viz., that the agent he able to foresee
the evil effect, and that he be free to avoid the cause? is not the fact that the evil effect is
evil always a prohibition obliging the agent to refrain from the cause of evil? Not
always. Sometimes there is a good effect as well as an evil effect proceeding from a
single cause. this brings us to the Second Question.

ii. The Second Question: When may one perform an act, not evil in itself, from which flow two
effects, one good, one evil? — One may perform such an act when three conditions are fulfilled, viz., (1)
The evil effect must not precede the good effect. (2) There must be a reason sufficiently grave calling the
for the act in its good effect. (3) The intention of the agent must be honest, that is the agent must directly
intend the good effect and merely permit the evil effect as a regrettable incident or “side issue.” To
explain these conditions in detail:
The evil effect must not precede the good effect. If the evil effect comes ahead of the
good effect, then it is a means of achieving the good effect, and is directly willed as
such a means. Not it is a fundamental principle of Ethics— a clear dictate of sound
reason— that evil may never be willed directly, whether it be a means or an end to be
achieved. The end does not justify the means. There is no good, however great, that can
justify the direct willing of evil, however slight. If a lie- even a “harmless” lie – will
save a life- even in innocent life- that lie may not be told. Notice will that the principle
here discussed requires that the evil effect do not precede the good effect; we do not
say that the good effect must precede the evil, but that the good effect must either
precede the evil or occur simultaneously with it.
There must be a reason sufficiently grave calling for the act in its good effect. If this
condition be not fulfilled, there is no adequate reason for the act at all, and that act is
prohibited in view of its evil effect. The sufficiency of the season must be determined
by the nature, circumstances, and importance of the act in question. and by the
proportion this reason bears to the gravity of the evil effect.
The intention of the agent must be honest. If the agent really will the evil effect, there is no
possibility of the act being permissible. Direct willing of evil, as we have seen, is always
against reason, and hence against the principles of Ethics. Bit unless the agent directly wills
the good effect, he is really willing the evil effect—else he has no adequate motive for
performing the act at all. Let the student consider the following cases in the light of the
principle just explained:

(a) The general of an army storms an enemy city. He foresees that many non-combatants will be
killed. Yet to take the city will be a big step towards winning a just war. Is the general’s act
allowable? Notice the two effects here: that taking of the city as a step towards ending the war
with victory for the just cause -a good effect; and the killing of non-combatants an evil effect.
(b) The general of an army knows that by laying waste the farms of the enemy's
country, he will seriously inconvenience the enemy by cutting off the source of
supplies. At the present time the enemy is well supplied, but destruction of the crops
will destroy future supplies. Such destruction will mean present starvation to many
a farmer and his family, but ul- timely it with help win a just war. May the general
lay waste the farm-lands?
(c) In view of your answer to the foregoing question, would you justify or condemn
the havoc wrought by Sherman in his march to the sea
(d) A doctor can save a mother's life by destroying that of her child. May he do SO?
Why not?
(e) A child's life can be saved by destroying the ice of the mother. May this be
done? Why not
(f) A patient is dying in awful agony. Medical life there is none. Life cannot last
beyond a few hours at most. May a drug be administered to bring death quietly and
quickly? Why not?
(g) A student of very frail health sed a lucrative position upon graduation. He needs
the situation to support his aged and impoverished parents. He knows he must study
hard, else he will fail in his examinations, lose his degree, and, in consequence, will
not secure the promised position. Still, he is aware that earnest study may seriously
impair his health. May he study hard and run the risk of permanent infirmity?

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have studied the subject of voluntariness in human acts. We
have distinguished voluntariness as perfect and imperfect; simple and conditional;
direct and indirect; positive and negative; actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative.
We gave special study to the subject of indirect voluntariness, stating and
exemplifying two important ethical principles, viz., I. the Principle of Immutability
of Evil Indirectly Willed, and 2. the Principle of Immutability of a Twofold
Effect. (Double effort)

ARTICLE 3. The MODIFIERS OF HUMAN ACTS

a) Ignorance b) Concupiscence c) Fear d) Violence e) Habit

 By the modifiers of human acts, we mean the things that may affect human acts
in the essential qualities of knowledge, freedom, voluntariness, and so make them less
perfectly human. Such modifiers lessen the moral character of the human act,
and consequently diminish the responsibility of the agent. There are five modifiers
of human acts that call for detailed study, viz., ignorance, concupiscence, fear,
violence, habit.

a) IGNORANCE
Ignorance is the absence of knowledge and for our purpose here, it may be defined as
the absence of intellectual knowledge in man. Ignorance is thus a negation of
knowledge; it is a negative thing. But when it is absence of knowledge that ought to
be present, the ignorance I snot merely negative, but privative. Thus, ignorance of the
higher mathematics in a structural-steel worker is merely negative; but such ignorance
is privative in the architect or engineer who designs steel structures such as bridges
and the frame work of buildings. Again, ignorance of Catholic belief and practice is
negative in a Hottentot, but privative in a Catholic collegian. Ignorance has, indeed, a
positive aspect when it consists not merely in the absence of knowledge, but in the
presence of what is falsely supposed to be knowledge. Thus, if I see a stranger in the
street, and realize that I do not know him, my ignorance of his identity is merely
negative. But if I misled by my poor eyesight or by a resemblance in the stranger,
and judge him to be a well-known acquaintance, my state of mind is positive
knowledge him: I have what I judge to be positive knowledge of his identity.
Such positive ignorance is called mistake or error. We are to consider ignorance in its
effect upon human acts. Before stating the ethical principles which our study will
justify, we shall make a preliminary study of ignorance itself, considering it in three
ways, vir., i. in its object, i.e., in the thing of which a person may be ignorant; ii. in its
subject, i. e., in the person in whom ignorance exists; iii. in its result, i. e., with
reference to the acts that are performed in ignorance.
i. Ignorance in its Object. —The thing of which a person may be ignorant is a matter of
law, fact, or penalty.
(a) Ignorance of Law is the ignorance of the existence of a duty, rule, or regulation.
Examples: A motorist drives at the rate of forty miles an hour, not knowing that the local
speed-limit is twenty miles an hour. A hunter shoots game in early October, unaware that the
game-laws forbid such an act. A young Freshman leaves the campus during noon-recess, not
knowing that his action is a violation of the college rules.
(b) Ignorance of Fact is ignorance of the nature or circumstances of an act as forbidden.
Examples: A motorist knows the speed-limit, but unknowingly violates it because of an
inaccurate speedometer. A hunter knows the game-laws, but reads his calendar amiss, and kills
game one day before the season opens. A freshman knows the he must not leave the campus,
but goes out of bound through misinformation about the extent of the college property. Thus,
ignorance of fact is lack of knowledge that what one is actually doing comes under the
prohibition of a known law.

(c) Ignorance of Penalty is lack of knowledge of the precise sanction (i. e., an
inducement sufficient to make reasonable men obey the law) affixed to the law. Examples: A
motorist knowingly violates the speed-law, not knowing that, in that particular locality, the set
punishment for such an offense is a short prison term, in lieu of which no amount of money
will be accepted. A hunter violates that game- laws, believing that if apprehended, he will be
merely fined, whereas the established penalty for his offense is the revocation of the license to
hunt. A freshman willfully leaves the campus, thinking that he will escape with an admonition
not to do so again, whereas the fixed penalty for his offense is the suspension of all student-
privileges for a period two weeks.

ii. Ignorance in its Subject. —In the person in whom it exists, ignorance (of law, fact, or
penalty) is either
vincible or invincible
(a) Vincible Ignorance (i. e., conquerable ignorance; ignorance that can and should be
supplanted by knowledge) is ignorance that can be dispelled by the use of ordinary
diligence. Such ignorance is therefore, due to lack of proper diligence on the part of the
ignorant person, and is his fault. Vincible ignorance is, in consequence, culpable ignorance.
There are degrees of vincible ignorance: If it be the result of total, or nearly total, lack of
effort to dispel it, it is called crass (or supine) ignorance. If some effort worthies the name,
but not persevering and whole hearted effort, be unsuccessfully employed to dispel it, the
ignorance is simple vincible. If positive effort is made to retain it, the ignorance is called
affected. To illustrate: A freshman who has been in college a month and does not know the
college rules to order, is in the state of vincible ignorance in the matter. If he has made no
effort, or scarcely any, to know the rules, his ignorance is crass or supine. If he has
positively avoided learning the rules so that he may have a ready excuse for faults, and may
be able to say when taken in violation of order, “I did not know the rule,” his ignorance is
affected. If he has made some inquiries about the rules, or has tried once or twice, without
success, to procure a copy of the rule-book, his ignorance is simple vincible.

(b) Invincible ignorance is ignorance that ordinary and proper diligence cannot dispel.
This sort of ignorance is attributable to one of two causes, viz.: either the person in whom the
ignorance exists has no realization whatever of his lack of knowledge, of the person who
realizes his ignorance finds ineffective his effort to dispel it. Hence, invincible ignorance is
never the fault of the person in whom it exists, and it is rightly called inculpable ignorance.
Invincible ignorance has two degrees, viz.: If no human effort can dispel it, it is physically
invincible. If such effort as good and prudent men would expend to dispel it— taking into
account the character and importance of the matter about which ignorance exists— is found to
be ineffective, the ignorance is called morally invincible. To illustrate: A Catholic gets meat,
 wholly unaware that the day is Friday. Here is his ignorance is invincible—even though in
itself it could be easily dispelled by asking the nearest person for the day of the week—and
even physically invincible, because no effort can be used with effect where there is no
realization whatever that effort is needed. A further illustration: A man is seeking for a
seventeenth century pamphlet to which he finds himself constantly referred in learned books
on the subject of economics. After months and months of searching through libraries and
following elusive clues, the man discovers that there is only one copy of the pamphlet in
existence ; that this copy is in the library of a recluse who resides in a foreign country, far
across the sea ; and that, although one may be permitted to read it, the pamphlet may neither be
borrowed nor copied. The man is in the state of invincible ignorance with regard to the
contents of the pamphlet. His ignorance is not physical invincible, for he could make a voyage
to the land of the recluse, and study the pamphlet in the later’s library. Still, this course would
involve difficulties and inconveniences out of all proportion of the

1
1 The word morally has no direct relation in the present use of morality, but to characteristic action of
men. Thus, ignorance is morally invincible when such effort as would be truly characteristic of good
and prudent men in the circumstances, is found powerless to dispel it. In common language, ignorance
is morally invincible when it would be extremely difficult to dispel it.

importance of the matter about which ignorance exists. We say, therefore, that the
man's ignorance of the contents of the pamphlet is morally invincible.
iii. Ignorance in its Result. Here we consider ignorance (of fact, law, or penalty)
with reference to acts performed while ignorance exists.
(a) Antecedent Ignorance is that which precedes all consent of the will. A man,
wholly unaware that to-day is a holyday of obligation, misses Mass. He would
certainly not miss Mass if he were conscious of his obligation. His ignorance is
antecedent to his act of missing Mass, and we say that the act is done through or in
consequence of ignorance. Antecedent ignorance does not differ from invincible
ignorance.
(b) Concomitant Ignorance is that ignorance which, so to speak, accompanies an act
that would have been performed even if the ignorance did not exist. A nominal
Catholic misses Mass, not aware that the day is a holyday. Yet, even had he known, he
would have missed Mass. His act of missing Mass does not come from ignorance, but
happens in company with his ignorance, and we call the ignorance concomitant. An act
done in concomitant ignorance is non-voluntary.
(c) Consequent ignorance is that which follows upon an act of the will. The will
may directly affect it, or supinely neglect to dispel it. Thus, consequent ignorance does
not differ from vincible ignorance. A careless Catholic suspects that the day is a
holyday but deliberately refrains from making sure, and does not attend Mass. If he
positively avoids knowledge in the matter, his (affected) ignorance is directly willed; if
he fails to acquire knowledge through sheer carelessness, his (crass or supine)
ignorance is indirectly willed. We may sum up the classification of ignorance in the
1
following scheme:
of law

in its object of fact

of penalty

simply vincible
vincible crass or supine
affected

IGNORANCE in its subject

morally
invincible
physically

antecedent
in its results concomitant
directly willed
consequent
indirectly willed

The ethical principles which emerge from our study of ignorance as a modifier of
human acts are the following:

FIRST PRINCIPLE: Invincible ignorance destroys the voluntariness of an act.

Voluntariness, as we have seen, depends upon knowledge and freedom. Freedom, in
its turn, depends upon knowledge of the field of free choice. Ultimately, then,
voluntariness depends upon knowledge, and is impossible without it. Now, invincible
ignorance is an inevitable absence of knowledge. Therefore, an act, in so far as it
proceeds from invincible ignorance, lacks voluntariness, is not a human act, and is not
imputable to the agent. —To illustrate: A good Catholic, wholly inadvertent to the fact
that the day is Friday, eats meat. In so far as the act is an act of eating meat, it may be
both voluntary and free; but in so far as the act is an act of violation of the law of
abstinence, comes from invincible ignorance, and is therefore not a human act for
which the agent is responsible.—A further illustration: A Catholic child uses very evil
language, totally unaware that such language is sinful. Later in life, the child realizes
the sinfulness of foul speech, and carefully avoids it. The child also begins to worry
about the past. Yet such worry is unjustified, for the past evil was committed in
 invincible ignorance, and therefore it lacked voluntariness, was not a human act, and is
not imputable to the child.

SECOND PRINCIPLE: Vincible ignorance does not destroy the voluntariness of an act.
Vincible ignorance is not an inevitable lack of knowledge. On the contrary, it supposed
knowledge in the agent of his own lack of knowledge and of his duty of dispelling ignorance.
Hence, the agent has knowledge which bears indirectly upon the act which he performs in
ignorance, and the act has, in consequence, at least indirect voluntariness, and is a human act
imputable to the agent.—To illustrate: A careless Catholic suspects that the day is Friday, but
fails, through sheer negligence, to make certain : and he eats meat. Now, while the agent does
lack knowledge that the day is Friday, he has knowledge of his own ignorant state of mind and
of his obligation to acquire knowledge. Failing to make proper effort
to dispel his ignorance, he will to keep his ignorance. But his ignorance is, in some sense, the
cause of his violation of the law of abstinence. Hence, he will this violation in cause. His act
has indirect voluntariness, and is a human act for which he is responsible

THIRD PRINCIPLE: Vincible ignorance lessens the voluntariness of an act.

While vincible ignorance does not destroy the voluntariness of an act, it lessens
voluntariness, makes the act less human, and diminishes the responsibility of the agent. The
agent knows that he Isi n ignorance, and ought to dispel it, but, nonetheless, he lacks direct
and perfect knowledge of the act itself which is done in ignorance. Hence, his act, while
possessing voluntariness, does not possess direct and perfect voluntariness. Voluntariness is,
therefore, impaired or lessened.

FOURTH PRINCIPLE: Affected ignorance in one way lessens and, in another way,
increases voluntariness.
Affected ignorance is that vincible ignorance which is directly willed and positively
fostered. Yet, in spite of the bad will which it implies, it is still a lack of knowledge,
direct and perfect, and, in so far, it lessens the voluntariness of the act that proceeds
from it. On the other hand, affected ignorance, being deliberately fostered to serve as
an excuse for sin against a law, shows the strength of the will’s determination to persist
in such sins. It is thus said to increase the voluntariness of an act, or, more accurately,
to indicate an increased voluntariness in the act that comes from it.

b.) CONCUPISCENCE
The term concupiscence is often used to signify the frailty, or proneness to evil, which
is consequent in human nature upon original sin. Ethics does not employ the term in
this sense. Here concupiscence means those bodily appetites or tendencies which are
called the passions, and which are enumerated as follows: love, hatred; joy, grief;
desire, aversion or horror; hope, despair; courage or daring, fear; and anger. We treat
here of the passions in general. In the next section of the present Article we shall study
in particular the passion of fear.

The passions are called antecedent when they spring into action unstimulated
by any act of the will; that is, when they arise antecedently to the will- act. They are
called consequent when they will, directly or indirectly, stirs them up or fosters them.
To illustrate; the feeling of joy that arises upon the suddenly revealed view of a
splendid landscape; the anger that surges in resentment of unjust and offensive
treatment; the first feeling of the attractiveness of a suddenly presented fancy or
thought, good or evil; the leaping desire for revenge for an unexpected act of cruelty;
the first feeling of hatred that comes with the thought or sight of a bitter enemy; the
shrinking in aversion from an unpleasant task; the urge to “give up” in despair in the
face of crowding difficulties- all these are examples of antecedent concupiscence or
passion. These movements or bodily appetites become consequent when they receive
the approval of the rational will. Thus, the passion or anger that arises antecedently
when one is liberately retained. Thus, the first movement of pleasure (love, joy) in an
unwholesome thought or fancy, becomes consequent when the will consents to retain
that thought or fancy.
Antecedent concupiscence is an act of man, and not a human act. It is therefore
a non- voluntarily act, and the agent is not responsible for it. Consequent
concupiscence, however, is the fault of the agent, for it is willed, either directly or
indirectly, that is either in itself or in cause. The agent is, in consequence, responsible
for it.
But what of the acts that come from concupiscence?
We state the ethical principles in the matter:

FIRST PRINCIPLE: Antecedent concupiscence lessens

the voluntariness of an act.
Some ethicians use "voluntariness" to mean will-force, vehemence or intensity of
will-act. These assert that concupiscence increases the voluntariness of an act, and they
are right, for concupiscence gives a strong urge to action, and the act that comes from
it is more vehement and intense by reason of the concupiscence. But we do not use the
word voluntariness in the sense of will-force, or will-intensity; we use the
term to indicate the human character of an act, the essence of a human act. We keep
human act and voluntary act as synonyms.
We say that antecedent concupiscence lessens the voluntariness of an act that
comes from it. Voluntariness depends upon knowledge and freedom. Antecedent
concupiscence disturbs the mind and thwarts, more or less completely, the calm
judgment of the mind upon the moral qualities of an act; hence it impairs the
 knowledge necessary for perfect voluntariness. Again, antecedent concupiscence is a
strong and sudden urge to action, and thus it lessens the full and prompt control which
the will must exercise in every perfectly voluntary act; hence it impairs freedom
Therefore, on the score of both knowledge freedom, antecedent concupiscence lessens
the voluntariness of an act, and, in consequence, diminish the responsibility of the
agent.

SECOND PRINCIPLE: Antecedent concupiscence does not destroy the voluntariness

of an act.
Although knowledge and freedom are lessened by antecedent concupiscence, they
are not destroyed; and the agent's responsibility, while diminished, in not canceled. A
man may sin, and sin gravely, even though strongly influenced by antecedent passion.
Still, his sin is less grave than it would be if committed dispassionately and, so to
speak, "in cold blood." To illustrate: Jones, under the influence of antecedent anger,
strikes Smith and injures him seriously. While the voluntariness of this act is lessened
by antecedent concupiscence, and while Jones is less responsible than he would be if
he struck the blow in cold deliberation, still the act is truly voluntary, and ones is
responsible for it. The reason is that Jones, while upset and disturbed by strong passion
is still master of his acts; he knows what he is doing, and does it freely. Passion may
make the control of his acts more or less difficult, but it does not make such control
impossible, If the antecedent passion is so great as to make control of the agent's acts
impossible, then the agent is temporarily insane and his acts are not human acts, but
acts of man. Here, however, we speak only of human acts as influenced by antecedent
concupiscence.
THIRD PRINCIPLE: Consequent concupiscence, however great, does not lessen the
voluntariness of an act.
Consequent concupiscence is willed, directly or indirectly. Hence the acts that proceed
from it have their proper voluntariness, direct or indirect. To illustrate: Jones wishes to be
revenged on Morris. He plans the act of revenge. He broods upon his wrongs in order to stir
himself up, to nerve himself to action. He attacks Morris and injures him seriously. Here we
have direct voluntariness throughout. Jones directly wills the act of revenge, and directly wills
the anger as a means to the accomplishment of that act. Now, even if he be insane with rage at
the moment of performing the act, he is nonetheless doing what he directly willed to do, and
his concupiscence cannot affect the full voluntariness of that act. Again: Smith broods upon
wrongs suffered at the hands of Jenkins. He foresees (or can and should foresee) that if he
continues to nurse his anger, he will probably be stirred to acts of violence against the person
of Jenkins. Nevertheless, he continues to brood. He becomes wild with passion, seeks out
Jenkins, and seriously
injured him. Here the anger was directly willed, and the act of violence was willed in cause
with the anger
, and in itself at the moment of attack. Even if Smith’s passions was so vehement as to
overwhelm his rational control of his acts,—even if that is to say, the attack itself did not
proceed from Smith as a human act,—it was nevertheless willed in cause, and has its proper
voluntariness as such : an indirect voluntariness which is Nevertheless, no wise diminished by
concupiscence.
c) FEAR
Fear is one of the passions, and is included under the general denotation of the term
concupiscence, but it is usual to give it special mentions in Ethics, because it is a very
common passion and we should know in detail its relation to the morality of acts, and
because it has a characteristic distinctive among the passions, viz., that it usually (when it is
the cause of an act( induces the will to do what it would not do otherwise. We may, however,
present the ethical doctrine on the subject of fear in very short pace.
Fear is the shrinking back of the mind from danger. More accurately, it is the
agitation of mind
(ranging from slight disturbance to actual panic) brought about the apprehension of
impending evil.
Actions may proceed from fear as their cause, or may be done with fear as an
accompanying circumstance. Thus, a soldier who runs to shelter from a dangerous
position acts from fear, while his bolder companion who stays at his post may be affected
with fear, but it is obviously not this fear that keeps him in the position; on the contrary,
he remains in spite of fear.
The ethical principle in this matter is:
PRINCIPLE: An act done from fear, however great, is simply voluntary, although it is
regularly also conditionally involuntary.
The principle speaks of an act performed from a motive of fear, an act proceeding from
fear, not an act performed with or in fear. A person may have full and unconditioned
voluntariness in that which
is performed with fear, as, for example, a thief, full bent upon taking valuables from a
house at night,
proceeds with fear that he may be apprehended; but he does not commit burglary
through or from fear.
An act performed from fear, however great, is simply voluntary. Of course, we
speak of a human
act done from or through fear. If fear is so great as to make the agent momentarily
insane, the act done
from fear is not voluntary at all, for it is an act of man and not a human act. But as long
as the agent has the use of reason, his acts performed from learn are simply voluntary.
For the agent effectively chooses to perform such an act rather than undergo that of
which he is afraid: he chooses the act as a lesser evil, and effectively chooses it. But
the act is regularly involuntary inasmuch as the agent would not perform it in other
circumstances were it not for the presence of an evil feared, the act would not be
performed. To illustrate: A man denies his faith to escape torture and death. His denial
comes from fear. Hence, according to our principle, the act is simply voluntary, and the
man is responsible for the sin of apostasy. Still, since the man would not have denied
his faith except for the influence of fear, we discern a conditional involuntariness in his
act which renders it less sinful (though it still remains a very grave sin) than it would
be where it done in cold deliberation, apart from the influence of fear.
The practical conclusion is this: Fear does not excuse an evil act which spring
from it. Fear does present a difficulty, but human acts are not necessarily easy acts.
Still, the influence of fear makes an act less perfectly human in character, although
never to such an extent that the agent is enabled to act humanly and still escape
responsibility for his act.
The positive ("statute") law of Church and State usually provides that an act
done from grave fear, unjustly suffered, and excited directly in order to force the agent
to perform an act that is against his will, is an invalid act or one that may be
invalidated. Even though such an act is simply voluntary, it
would not be for the common good to allow an act extorted by fear to stand as valid
and binding. Thus, a man who is required to sign a contract at the point of a gun, or
under threat of blackmail, would not be bound, in positive law, to fulfil the contract.

d.) VIOLENCE
Violence or coaction is external force applied by a free cause (i. e., by a cause with
free will; by man) for the purpose of compelling a person to perform an act which is
against his will. Thus, the martyrs suffered violence when they were dragged to the
altars of idols in the effort to make them offer sacrifice to false gods.
Violence cannot reach the will directly. It may force bodily action, but the will is not
controlled by the body. Still, the will has the command of bodily action, and since this
command is limited or destroyed for the moment by violence, the will is said to be
indirectly affected by violence. Hence, if the will does not exert its command to make
the bodily members offer due resistance to violence, it concurs, in so far as such
resistance is lacking, in the act done under violence.

PRINCIPLE: Acts elicited by the will are not subject to violence; external acts caused
by violence, to which due resistance is offered, are in no wise imputable to the agent.

e.) HABIT
By habit Ethics understands operative habit, which is a lasting readiness and facility,
born of frequently repeated acts, for acting in a certain manner. Thus, a man who has
 always endeavored to speak the truth, has a habit of truthfulness, and it goes against his
habit- “against the grain” -to lie. Such a man finds it necessary to make a distinct effort
in order to utter a deliberate falsehood. Again, a man who has the habit of lying, finds
it very easy to falsify or evade the truth, and it is difficult for him to tell the truth when
a lie would prove convenient. Again, a man who has the habit of cursing finds profane
words slipping from him with great ease and readiness, while it requires a special
watchfulness on his part to avoid uttering them.

PRINCIPLE: Habit does not destroy voluntariness; and acts from habit are always
voluntary, at least in cause, as long as the habit is allowed to endure.

Habit does not destroy voluntariness. The agent is fully responsible for human acts
done from what is called force of habit. Even if such acts be in themselves acts of man,
the habit itself, so long as it is not disowned, and a positive and enduring effort made to
overcome it, is willed as a human act, and its effects are voluntary in cause, and hence
are human acts. To illustrate: John has the bad habit of using profane language. He is
conscious of this fault. Being conscious of it, he has knowledge of it; and he is free to
determine upon overcoming it, or to allow it to endure. Hence, both knowledge and
freedom are present, and there is nothing to balk Voluntariness. John is therefore
responsible for the bad habit as such, and, since it is the cause of the profane words---
many of which are uttered without advertence---he is responsible in cause or indirectly
for each profane utterance. Now, if John determines to overcome his evil habit, he
disowns it; he wills not to utter profane speech: But “He that wills the end wills the
means to that end.” Hence, John, to be honest in his will to reform, must consent to
ceaseless watchfulness over his tongue. While his good intention endures, and while
his watchfulness continues, the profane utterances that “slip out” are acts of man and
not human acts, since their cause is no longer willed; and hence they are not imputable
to John. But the moment John ceases to be watchful, that moment he consents
indirectly to let the habit continue, and his evil words become again imputable even if
they slip from him unnoticed.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this lengthy Article we have studied the modifiers of human acts, and have
endeavored to determine their general influence upon human acts. We have studied the
following principles, learning how and why each is valid:
1. Regarding ignorance
I. Invincible ignorance destroys the voluntariness of an act.
 CHAPTER II

THE ENDS OF HUMAN ACTS

A human act is always performed for an end. This Chapter discusses ends in
general, and the ultimate and of human acts in particular. The Chapter is accordingly
divided in the following Articles:

Article 1. Ends in General

Article 2. The Ultimate End of Human Acts

ARTICLE I. Ends in General

A. Definition B. Classification

b) DEFINITION OF END

An end is both a termination and a goal. In other words, an end is that which
complete or finishes a thing, and it is that for which the thing is finished. A sculptor has
reached the end of his work on a statue when the last bit of marble has been chipped
away; and he has reached the end in another sense, inasmuch as the finished statue is
the goal he set out to attain when he started the work. By an end we mean the end of an
activity. We do not speak of end in the sense of boundary, or edge, or rim, or side of a
bodily object, but as the termination and goal of activity. In the example given, the work of
the sculptor, the activity of making the statue (both in itself, and as coming from interior
plan and purpose) is the activity considered.

Every activity tends toward an end. A tree tends to grow to full stature, maturity, and
fruitfulness: and this is the end of its activity of growth. A hungry dog seizing a bit of beef
evinces an activity of instinct for the meat as a good thing to have, as an end to be
achieved. Even lifeless things have activities proper to their nature, and these tend
toward ends by reason of what we call lows. Thus, fire tends to burn, bodies tend to fall
toward the center of the earth, bodies at rest tend to remain at rest, bodies in motion
tend to remain in motion of the same direction and velocity.
 Every activity tends toward and end; and thus every activity is a tendency. Now, every
tendency may be called an appetite, or more properly, appetency. When appetency exists
without any sort of knowledge—as in plants and lifeless things—it is called natural
appetency, in a special limited, and technical sense of the term “natural”. When
appetency comes of knowledge, it is two kinds, just as knowledge itself is of two kinds.
Appetency which is stirred into action by sensation (i.e., by knowledge acquired by the
senses) is called sense-appetency or sensual appetite. We have an example of such
appetency in the hungry dog seizing meat. Appetency which is stirred into action by
intellectual knowledge is called the will or rational appetency. We have an example of such
appetency in the at of the sculptor described above. The sculptor knows the statue to
be desirable (for one or many reasons: it may bring fame, or money; it may express
devotion to art; it may express love of the personage represented, and so on), and he
wills to make it. We have already learned in our study of Human Acts that the will
springs into action when only intellectual knowledge presents something desirable,
satisfactory, or simply good, to be achieved by, action. Every will-act, that is, every
human act, is the expression of rational appetency or will: it is an act directed to an end
known as desirable, that is to say, as good to attain.
In Ethics we speak of the ends of human acts. Here, then, the end is that which is
apprehended as good, as desirable, and which attracts the human agent to the
performance of the act. It is the agent’s motive and reason for acting. It causes the agent
to act, and in so far, the end is the final cause of a human act-a cause called final, from
the Latin word finis, which means end. The agent is the efficient cause of his acts, for it is
he that effects or performs them; but he would not affect them were he not attracted by
the end or final cause. No human act can exist, therefore, without a final cause, that is
to say, without an end apprehended by the agent as desirable or good enough to attract
the agent to action and to serve as his motive in the act.
The end or final cause of human acts must be apprehended as good. Evil cannot be
willed as much or for its own sake. Evil is done only when it assumes the aspect of
good, as something that will bring satisfaction or will lead to it. his does not mean that a
sinner thinks he is acting virtuously when he commits a sin. On the contrary, he knows
that the sin is morally evil and that he is responsible for it. But the point is that the sin to
which he consents is apprehended as something that will bring present satisfaction, or
will lead to it, and this is judged by the agent as a greater good than that which is
required by the moral law which forbids the sin. Notice that it is as a greater good that
the sin is chosen. Of course, the agent’s judgement in the matter is not sound: his sin
will not lead to ultimate happiness or satisfaction, but inasmuch as it is a judgement of
the sin as good, it explains what is meant by the statement that evil is not chosen as
such, nor for its own sake, but only when it assumes the aspect of good. In our sense,
good is that which answers tendency or desire
To define end: An end is termination and goal of activity. In a human act the end is
final cause, viz., that on account of which, or to attain which, the act is performed, and
which is, in consequence, apprehended as a good sufficiently desirable to motivate the
agent in performing the act.
b) CLASSIFICATION OF ENDS
Here we distinguished:
i. The end of the act, and the end of

the agent; ii. Proximate and remote ends;

iii. Intermediate and ultimate ends.

i. The end of the act is the end toward which the act of its own nature tends. Thus,
the act of giving food and shelter to destitute persons tends of its nature toward the
relief of distress, and we say that the relief of distress is the end of the act. The end of
the agent is the end which the agent intends to achieve by his act. Thus, the act of
giving food and shelter to destitute persons may be performed by the agent to increase
his merit before God, or as an act of impetration to obtain a grace or favor, or as an act
of penance for sins committed. Again the agent may perform the act in order to have it
noticed by others, so that he may gain the reputation of a beneficent person. Again the
act may be performed by an agent who merely wishes to relieve distress. In the last
case, the end of the agent coincides with the end of the act. In the other cases, the end
of the agent is different from the end of the act. When we speak of the end in Ethics, we
usually mean the end of the agent.
ii. The proximate end is the end intended as the immediate outcome of an act. The
remote end is that which the agent wishes to achieve later on, and toward the attainment
of which he employs the present act as a means. Thus a politician who gives money to
the poor, wishes his good deed to be recorded in the newspapers: his proximate end is
favorable publicity. However, he does not desire publicity for its own sake, but for the
votes it will gain him in the coming elections; and he wishes for votes as a means to
office. Thus, while publicity is his proximate end, votes and election to office are remote
ends.

iii. An end, whether proximate or remote, is willed either for its own sake or as a
means to an end more remote. If it is willed for its own sake, it is a last or ultimate end,
and if it is willed as a means to a further end, it is an intermediate end. To illustrate: a
man gives money to the poor. He gives the money to gain favorable notice in the
newspapers (proximate and intermediate end) ; he wills publicity as a means to votes
(remote and intermediate end) ; he wills election for the prominence, power, and wealth
which the office will give him (remote and ultimate end). This example shows us a chain
or series of ends; and, since the ultimate end of the series is not the general or
unconditioned end of the man’s whole life and all its human acts, but ultimate only in
relation to the present series of ends, the ultimate end of the series is called an end
relatively ultimate. Now, there must also be an end which is unconditionally and
unlimitedly the ultimate end of all human acts; and this we call the absolutely ultimate end.
We shall discuss this end in the next Article. We notice here that it is the ultimate end
which gives meaning to the intermediate ends that lead to it. The intermediate end are
subordinated to the ultimate end, just as the steps of a stairway are subordinated to the
top step. And as a man who wishes to reach the top of a stairway must take many
intermediate steps before reaching the top, but would not take any of them except to
reach the top, so in a series of ends, the agent must attain intermediate ends before
achieving the ultimate end, but he would not try to attain any of them except on account
of the ultimate end. Thus, we repeat, the ultimate end of a series of ends gives meaning
and motive to the whole series.
An ultimate end is both objective and subjective. The objective ultimate end is that thing,
that object which, in last analysis, motivates a human act. The subjective last end is the
possession of the objective end and the satisfaction or happiness that is apprehended as
belonging to that possession. Thus, the politician's last end (in the series of ends which
we studied above) is a political office with its power, prominence, and good wages. This
is the objective ultimate end. The subjective ultimate end which the agent seeks to
achieve is the possession of the office and what it will bring. In other words, the object
sought is office; and the subjective desire of the agent (the acting subject) is satisfaction
in the possession of the office.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this article we have discussed the meaning of end, and have described it and defined
it. We have seen that an end is always the object of appetency, and we have
discovered that the rational appetency of man is his will. Since the will is necessarily
exercised in every human act, it follows that every human act comes from appetency, or
tendency toward an end: and thus every human act is performed on account of an end.
We have called the end of human acts their final cause. We have seen that the end of
human acts is always sought because it is desirable, satisfactory, or good; and that evil
as such is never the end of human acts. We have classified the ends of human acts,
distinguishing the end of the act and the end of the agent, the proximate and remote ends of
human acts, and the intermediate and ultimate ends of such acts. We have indicated the
fact that there is one absolutely ultimate end of human action. We have distinguished the
ultimate end as objective and subjective.
Article 2. THE ULTIMATE END OF HUMAN ACTS
a) The Objective Ultimate End

b) The Subjective Ultimate End

The Ultimate end of human acts is that which in the last analysis, serves as a
sufficient reason and motive for the acts. This end, considered as an objective thing
toward the attainment of which the acts are directed, is the objective ultimate end of
human acts. The possession of this objective end and the happiness which the agent
seeks in that possession, is the subjective ultimate end of human acts.
 We have seen that a human act is always done on account of an end, and an
ultimate end. We now assert that all human acts are performed for a single absolutely
ultimate end.
a) THE OBJECTIVE ULTIMATE END OF HUMAN ACTS
A human act is deliberate and knowing act; it is an act performed by the knowing
agent who wills to perform it. And why does he will to perform it? Because he has a
motive, a reason, a final cause sufficiently attractive to induce him to perform it. And this
reason, motive, or final cause amounts to this: it appears good to the agent to perform
the act and attain its end. Even when the human act is difficult or undesirable in itself, it
becomes desirable in view of a further end to which it is directed as a means. Thus, a
man freely consenting to a serious operation, wills the operation, and his will-act is a
human act. But the operation is not willed for itself, but in view of relief form affliction or
in the hope of prolonging life, and in this aspect it is desirable and good, no matter how
dangerous and fearsome it may be in itself. Now, it may be that the man who submits to
the dangerous operation is a poor man; it may be that the prospect of prolonged life
which the operation affords is also the prospect of a hard and even destitute life; it may
be that the life to which the patient looks forward is a life inevitably filled with woes and
miseries. And yet he wants it, he wills it as an end. Why? Because he apprehends life
with all its hardships as a greater good than the loss of life. Again, the suicide (supposing
him same when he performs his horrible act) destroys life by a human act. He does so
because he apprehends the cessation of life as greater good than the continuance of
life with its miseries. Thus it clearly appears that human acts are always done for an end
apprehended as good, and as the greater good when there is question of sacrificing one
thing in view of another.
More: the driving power back of human acts viewed all together-or, more
accurately, the power of attraction that calls human acts into being- in not only the good,
or the greater good, but the greatest good, the absolutely illimitable, all inclusive, and all
perfect good. , This is the summum bonum, which, considered in itself, we call the
absolutely ultimate objective end of human acts. It will not be difficult to prove this
assertion.
Man seeks happiness. Whether he seeks it in riches, in pleasure, in power, in
prominence, in honors attained, or even in license and sin, the fact remains that what he
is seeking is that which will pleasure him, that which will satisfy his wants and desires,
that, in one word, which will make him happy. This quest of happiness is a tendency of
man’s very nature of which he finds it utterly impossible to free himself. Man is free in
his choice of objects in which he hopes to find happiness, and we call this the freedom
of the will, or the freedom of choice; but man is not free to seek unhappiness for its own
sake. Even the “cantankerous” individual who does mean things in a mean way, and
hurts himself in doing them, and, so to speak, cuts off his nose to spite his face, is
nevertheless doing what he wants to do, and in the achievement of that want he
apprehends some satisfaction; otherwise, there could be no conceivable motive for the
acts, and motive there must be, for the acts exist.
Now, there is an object towards which the whole tendency of human action is
ever directed; an object that will satisfy all tendency, fill up all capacity for desire, leave
nothing further that can be the end of human acts. And this we call the absolutely
ultimate objective end of human acts. We may define this end as that object, the
possession of which will give perfect happiness to man by completely filling up his capacity for
desire, and leaving nothing unpossessed toward which man could, by any possibility, continue to
tend as towards an end.
This absolutely ultimate objective end must be on, must be a single object. For
consider: this end is so perfect a good that nothing beyond it can be desired. Therefore,
it must be the infinite good. Nothing finite could meet the requirements of such an end.
The greatest happiness thinkable, shot of the possession of the infinite good, is
imperfect and fleeting. The largest fortune might still be larger; the serenest peace of life
must quickly give place to care or be lost in death; the highest honors man may achieve
leave other honors still unwon. And over all human achievements, over the bliss of
abounding health and the rapture of the presence of loved ones, over fame attained and
glory worthily won, over ambition fulfilled and high hope realized-over all that is finite
hangs a cloud, a menace, a threat that is certainly to be fulfilled: all must pass-and soon!
Hence all finite good is imperfect, if only that it will not last always. But it is imperfect, if
only that it will not last always. But it is imperfect also in scope, in extent. A finite thing
is, by its very definition, a thing with limits. Can any limited thing satisfy in fullest
measure of perfection the unlimited desires of man? No, for these pass all bounds;
there is no lime that can be drawn to mark the limit of the possibility of desire. Only the
infinite good can be the absolutely ultimate objective end of human acts. And there can
be but one infinite object. For an infinite object contains all possible perfection, and there
is, so to speak, no perfection left over for another object to possess. Hence we rightly
maintain that the absolutely ultimate objective end of human acts is one.
Now the infinite good is God. Ethics must leave to the philosophical science of
Theodicy (i.e., Natural Theology) the proof of the existence of the one God, infinitely
perfect, creator, conserver, and ruler of the universe, the efficient and final cause of all.
Ethics assumes the existence and attributes of God as proved. We assert that the
infinite good is God; that God is the only object, the possession of which will give perfect
happiness to many by completely filling up his capacity for desire, and leaving nothing
unpossessed toward which man could, by any possibility, continue to send as towards
and end. Hence we see that St. Augustine enunciated a solid philosophical truth, and
not a mere pious sentiment, when he wrote: “O God, Thou hast made us for Thyself,
and our heart is not at rest until it rests in Thee.”
But, you object, there is such a thing as sin, and such a thing as sinful desire.
Does the sinner tend in his human act of sin toward God? Is sinful desire to find the
perfect fulfillment in the possession of the All-Perfect? Of course, the sinner does not
tend towards God, nor if sinful desire as such satisfied with possession of the All-Perfect
—to say so would be foulest blasphemy. Yet the sinner, in his human act of sin, does
not exhibit a tendency away from what is apprehended as good; on the contrary, the very
sin is a tendency toward that which is, through perversion of reason, adjudged as good,
as satisfying. The sinner knows that his act is evil; but passion invites, immediate
satisfaction is promised, the fleeting pleasure of his act is ready at hand; the true good
is not perceived as ready, prompt, present; it is farther off; it presents certain difficulties,
not only in the matter of waiting longer for its satisfaction, but also in the effort required
to put down the present allurement which draws to sin. And so the matter is put to the
judgement of the agent; and, judging freely that the present satisfaction outweighs the
remote real satisfaction, he sins. Of course the judgement is perverse; but the point
here is that the sinner does not tend away from the good—and the ultimate good—as
such, but wrongly judges that the present object is good. And he is responsible for this
judgement, and so sin is no mere mistake. Remember that the tendency of the human
agent is towards the good, and the infinite good, in general; but the agent may make
perverse judgements about what is good in particular. Psychology clears up this matter
in its thesis that “Man is capable of objectively indifferent judgements,” i.e., man can
view what is really evil under the aspect of good, and can view what is truly good under
the aspect of evil. Thus sin which is foul promises a present pleasure, and in so far may
be Judged as good; while virtue inasmuch as it is difficult to acquire, may be adjudged
as evil.
An example will help to clarify the whole matter: Esau, returning hungry from the
hunt, and finding himself a long way from home, was able to judge present dinner as
most desirable and good, even though the eating involved the loss of a great and
valuable patrimony. He knew the value of his inheritance ; he knew that the present dish
of paltry food was not to be compared in real value to the smallest part of that
inheritance; and still he gave up the patrimony for the food. Why? Because the food was
ready, present, alluring, promising satisfaction. By perverse judgment he was able to
focus his consideration upon the desirability of that which was present to satisfy bodily
appetite, and to turn his mind away from the consideration of the surpassing value of
the inheritance that would be his if he denied that appetite. His judgment was wrong,
was perverse; yet it was his own fault. And so it was no mere mistake for which he was
not responsible. He was fully responsible, as all will admit. While following the inevitable
human tendency towards what is good in general, he perversely allowed his attention to
dwell upon the attractiveness of what was offered to please and flatter a bodily appetite,
and kept his mind from the consideration of the true attractiveness of what was really
good, and thus a perverse and culpable judgment fixed upon that as good which was
relatively evil, and upon that as evil which was really worth while.
Men may set various ends as ultimate by perverse judgment. Some look for the
ultimate good in wealth, some in honor, some in pleasure, some in the mere adapting of
oneself to one's environment; and thus there are many objects set up by personal
preference (and by wrong judgment ) as the really ultimate end towards which all
human action tends or should tend. But in all these objects we perceive that it is their
good which is attractive, viz., that which is adjudged as good, as satisfying, as ultimately
desirable. And hence, while there may be many philosophies of life, many theories
about what is the best thing towards which man should bend his efforts, there is,
nonetheless, no disagreement in point of fact: man inevitably tends towards the
illimitable good. And in itself, as we have seen, this object is God. When men do not live
in accordance with reason, they are perverse; and perversely they set up false gods.
Scripture is philosophical and scientific when it declares that those who live for the
pleasure of freshly appetites have made a god of their belly.
To sum up: The objective ultimate end of human acts is that which really in itself is
the crowning and perfect fulfillment of rational desire; it is the limitless good; it is God.
Towards good in general all human action, even sinful human action, tends. But action
is sinful by reason of man's abuse of free will ; and sinful action is possible because
man may freely focus his attention upon the desirability of that which satisfies minor or
inordinate appetites, to the exclusion of that which is supremely desirable and infinitely
good in itself.
b) THE SUBJECTIVE ULTIMATE END OF HUMAN ACTS
We have learned that the subjective end of an act consists in the possession of the
objective end. The name subjective is given to this end to indicate its possession by a
subject, that is, by the person who has it or strives to have it.
The absolutely ultimate end of human acts, considered in itself or objectively, is the
limitless good. The absolutely ultimate end of human acts, considered with reference to
the person who strives to possess it (that is, considered with reference to its subject), is
the perfect happiness which consists in the possession of the limitless good. In a word,
the absolutely ultimate subjective end of human acts is happiness.
In considering the objective end of human acts we found it necessary to speak much
of happiness. We saw that man acts for happiness in acting for the limitless good which
is the objective ultimate end of human action. Here we are to consider happiness more
directly, and to discuss the kinds of happiness, the nature of desire for happiness, and
the manner in which happiness is to be possessed. But first we must face an obvious
difficulty.
The difficulty is this : man, acting in a human manner, is seldom conscious of the
fact that he is acting for happiness. The upright man acts virtuously, the sinner acts
viciously, the ordinary man lives his ordinary life, without thinking directly of happiness
as an end to be attained. How is it possible then to say that man always acts for
happiness? We must recall our distinction , made in an earlier chapter, between an
actual and a virtual intention elicited here and now with direction consciousness of that
which is intended. Happiness is seldom, if ever, says to himself: “In this action I intend
to achieve happiness.” But a man always acts for happiness, at least by a virtual
intention. A virtual intention is an intention which exists in an act performed in virtue of a
formerly elicited actual intention. We have seen that man always tends towards the
good in general; and his connatural bent of will for the good involves a virtual intention
for that good. And as the possession of good means happiness, we conclude that man
acts for happiness by a virtual intention. But, it may be said, this sort of virtual intention
does not exist by reason of an actual intention formerly elicited. It does, if we consider
that an actual intention may be implicit as well as explicit. A man who shoots at a rabbit,
does not, in order to have an actual intention, require a moment’s pause in which to
elicit the will-act of actual intention; he may not be aware of his intention as an intention;
he simply does what he wants to do; he simply raises his gun and fires; but we say, and
rightly, that his actual intention is implied in his action. And similarly we declare that a
man, in his more serious and deliberate actions in life, makes up his mind to do what he
adverts to as best, and here, at least implicitly, we have an actual intention to act for
good (objective end) and for the possession of the good (subjective end, i.e., happiness).
Then, in the less thoughtful acts of life, the virtue of this implicit actual intention endures,
and a man’s acts are, in consequence, performed for happiness.
Now we must consider: i. Kinds of happiness; ii. The nature of man’s desire for
happiness; iii. The manner in which happiness is to be possessed.
 i. Kinds of Happiness. – Happiness is natural when it comes of man’s possession of
that which he finds achievable by his unaided natural powers, or which is not
beyond the reach of his nature. Thus, a man’s happiness in the possession of
sound health is natural happiness. Happiness is supernatural when it consists in
the possession of that which is of a value surpassing all that natural powers
can achieve unaided. Thus, man’s happiness in possessing the grace of God
is supernatural. Now, man tends toward the limitless good, and since this is
infinite, – and hence beyond man’s finite powers, – man tends toward
something which is beyond the reach of unaided nature. Man tends towards
supernatural, eternal happiness. The appetite of man’s very nature is for the
supernatural. Still, this tendency and appetite for the supernatural is only
indicated in Ethics. As a purely rational science, independent of divine
revelation, Ethics cannot investigate the matter of supernatural happiness,
nor describe the manner in which it is to be attained. But this science can and
does show that man’s tendency is to the limitless good, the infinite good, and
we know that natural powers can achieve only limited things. Yet, to confine
our study within its proper limits, we must consider the limitless good, and
happiness in its possession only in so far as this is achievable by natural
powers, that is, by the perfect natural life, by a life which fully agrees with the
dictates of the right reason
ii, The Nature of Man’s Desire for Happiness, --- Man’s desire for limitless good, and
consequently
for perfect happiness, is not illusory; it is not a deceitful and vain desire. It is a desire
capable of fulfillment; it is a realizable. We may, with St. Thomas, reason to this
conclusion in the following manner: Nature does nothing in vain. Now, nature has
implanted in man the desire for perfect happiness. Therefore, this desire is not vain; in
other words, this desire is realizable. ---Again, Ethics may prove the same truth by
assuming as demonstrated the facts which are scientifically evidenced in the science of
Theodicy. Now Theodicy proves that there is one God, the Creator, who is all-wise, and
all-good. But an all-wise Creator could not implant in His rational creature a fine and
worthy desire that cannot be realized; else the all-wise God would be the author of a
futility. Nor could the all-good God mock man by causing him inevitably to desire the
unattainable. Hence, we conclude that man’s desire for perfect happiness is not illusory,
but is realizable in very fact. We cannot assert that each man will actually attain to
perfect happiness; we only declare the scientific truth that each man may attain that
happiness. Certainly, this perfect happiness is not attainable in this world here and now;
then---since its attainment has been shown possible---it must be attainable in another
world hereafter.
iii. The Manner in which Happiness is to be Possessed---Man’s absolutely ultimate subjective
end is
the act of perfect happiness. Powers or faculties are that y which action is
accompanied; the act is the crowning fact, the perfection of the faculty. Now, how is the
act of happiness to be exercised? Man has the following faculties: the senses, intellect,
will. The senses are not man’s highest faculties, but serve the intellect during bodily life.
All knowledge begins somehow in sensation (i. e, in the act of the senses) for man in
bodily life; but sensation is not, in itself, essential to intellectual knowledge as such.
Obviously, perfect happiness, as an act, is the act of man’s highest and best faculties.
Hence, the essential act of happiness (which, of course, will eventually and in proper
measure include the satisfaction of the senses) is not an act of sensation. Nor is it an
act of will ; for the will either tends towards an end (and then the end is not yet attained)
or, by fruition, delights in the end (and then the end is already attained). The act of
attainment, the act of happiness, is, in consequence, neither a sense-act nor a will act.
It remains that it must be an act of intellect. But here again we must consider a twofold
act of intellect : the intellect either knows a thing to do (practical intellect) and this must
be knowledge that leads to an end to be achieved ; or the intellect knows a thing to hold
contemplation. (speculative intellect)). This latter act is the crowning perfection of man’s
highest faculty of knowledge. We assert, then, that the ultimate act of perfect happiness
is an act of speculative intellect, it is an act of contemplation of the limitless good ; and
this act of the intellect will be accompanied by the delight of the will, and by the perfect
satisfaction of the senses according to their proper place, order and capacity.
SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE
We have seen in this article that man acts for the attainment of an absolutely
ultimate end, and that this end is, objectively, the infinite good or God, and, subjectively
the possession of the limitless good, the Possession of God, and that the act of
possession is an act of perfect happiness. We have established the truth that man, in
every human act, acts for perfect happiness, by at least a virtual intention.
We have defined two kinds of happiness, have seen that man’s desire for perfect
happiness is not a futile, vain, illusory desire, but is realizable in fact by an act of the
speculative intellect accompanied by the act of full fruition on the part of the will, and by
fullness of sense-satisfaction in so far as the senses can have a part in the attainment
of a man’s end.
 CHAPTER III
THE NORMS OF HUMAN ACT

Let us view man as a traveler standing at a point where many roads converge. The
traveler wishes to reach the City of Limitless Good. This city is the goal toward which
the traveler tends by a connatural and inevitable bent of his will. Now, the tendency of
the traveler will remain the same, even if he should choose a wrong road. In other
words, man, the traveler, will choose a road for the purpose of reaching the City of
Limitless Good, even if, as a fact, the chosen road leads away from his goal. It is
obvious, then, that the traveler needs guidance; he needs direction, lest perverse and
mistaken judgment thwart his purpose and render impossible the attainment of his goal.
In a word, the traveler needs a map. More: he requires ability to read the map, and to
interpret it rightly where the road seems to fork or byways open invitingly. Now, the
map, the guiding direction, is supplied to man, the traveler, by low; and the application
of law in individual acts—the reading and interpreting of the map at particular curves
and concerns—is achieved by conscience. Human acts are directed to their true end by
law, and law is applied by conscience. Hence law and conscience are the directives or
norms of human acts. The present Chapter treats of these matters in two Article, as
follows:

Article 1. Law
Article 2. Conscience
Article 1. Law
a.) Definition b.) Classification C.) Important Classes
a.) DEFINITION OF LAW
St. Thomas Defines law as an ordinance of reason, promulgated for the common
good by one who has charge of a society. To explain this definition in detail:
i. A law is an ordinance, i.e., an active and authoritative ordering or directing
of human acts in
reference to an end to be attained by them.
ii. A law is an ordinance of reason, and not an arbitrary or whimsical
decree of the legislator’s
will. A law does, of course, come from the will of the lawgiver, but from his reasonable
will, that is, from his will illumined by understanding of an end necessary or useful to be
attained, toward which the law serves as a proper direction. Hence, law must be
reasonable, and this means that it must be just, honest (not contravening a higher law),
possible of fulfillment (not exacting undue or extraordinary effort on the part of those
bound by it), useful, and in some degree permanent (not a fleeting or whimsical decree).
To be reasonable, to be a true law, a law must have all the qualities here enumerated.
Besides it must be promulgated, that is, made known to those who are bound by it.
Hence, the essential qualities of a true law are these: it must be just, honest, possible,
useful, relatively permanent, and promulgated.
iii. A law is promulgated, i.e., made known to those bound by it, and
these are called its subjects. This is a requirement of law as reasonable, as already
explained. By promulgation a law is put in application as an authoritative
ordinance.
iv. A law is promulgated for the common good. This is the purpose of
law. In this point, a law is
distinguished from a precept, which is an ordinance issued by public or private authority
for the particular or private good of one or several persons. A law also differs from a
precept in the fact that a law is territorial and applies to subjects only while they are in a
certain place; while a precept is personal and binds it subjects wherever they may be.
Again, a law is always enacted by public authority, while a precept may be issued by
either public or private authority. Finally, a law endures in force until it is repealed by the
authority that enacted it, even though the actual persons who framed it be dead or
removed from office; but a precept ceases to bind with the preceptor’s death or removal
from office. To illustrate all this: A mother forbids her little child to accept money from
adults. Here we have a precept, not a law. It is personal not territorial, and binds the
child wherever he may be. It is private, since it is for the individual good of the child and
a part of his individual training. It is blinding, unless revoked by the mother, as long as
the child remains under the mother’s direction in such matters, or until the mother’s
death, in case she dies before the child comes of age. Now, on the other hand, the civil
ordinance forbidding the hunting of game at certain seasons is a law, and not a precept
in the strict technical sense of the word. It is territorial, not personal, and binds its
subjects only while they are in the place in which the law applies, and not when they go
into another territory where a different law in the matter prevails. Further, the law in
question is for the common good; it is public, not private, and is meant to ensure the
opportunity of finding game to all citizens, and to maintain a supply of game as common
property. Finally, the law binds its subjects until it is repealed by the public authority that
enacted it, even though the actual legislators who passed the law be dead or have
passed from office.
A law, then, is for the common or public good. This is the purpose of law. Law is
not meant to impose hardship or needless restriction Upon its subjects, but to promote
their good, and hence to protect and promote true Liberty among them. When a law is
truly a law, that is to say, when he has all the requisite qualities of law, and is just,
honest, Possible, useful, relatively permanent, and duly promulgated dash then it
inevitably acts as a liberating agency and not as an in slaving one true Lord tends to
make men good, and thence to liberate them from the pre verse mistaken judgments
that would lead them astray in the quest for their ultimate end. To them at the man who
accepts the direction of true law is the man who is free to attain his goal, just as the man
who accepts direction when seeking the road to a city which wishes to reach is the man
who is really free to go to that city. He who refuses direction - Although he refuses, as
he thinks, in the name of freedom - Is enslaved by his own ability to error. Such a man
is like a traveler who says, “I wish to go to a certain city, but you must not tell me how to
get there; I refuse to be enslaved by map; I maintain my freedom to try all the roads in
the world. “We should not consider such a traveler reasonable. We should not regard as
very favorable his prospect of reaching the desired city. We should not esteem his idea
of Liberty as anything short of an absurdity, the purpose of law, therefore, is to protect
and promote true freedom among members of our society in common, by ensuring the
unhampered and unthwarted exercises of free acts which will carry man forward to his
proper end.
v. A law is promulgated in society period this is evident from the fact
that law is for the common
good comma and hence opposes a commonality or community of subjects; and a
community is a society, Law in the fullest sense can exist only in a perfect society, for
such a society alone has the full and perfect right to legislate (i,e., full jurisdiction) for all
subjects. Now, the supreme and perfect society in the natural order is called the State
(that is, a body of people politically united under one government), and the supreme
and perfect society in the supernatural order is the true Church. In the fullest sense,
therefore, human laws can come only from Church or State.
vi. A law is promulgated by one who has charge of a society. By “one” is
meant a person,
whether this be a single human being (physical person) or a body of men united to form
the governing power (more person). Here we have indicated the author of law, that is,
the lawgiver or legislative. A legislator has jurisdiction, which means, literally, “the saying
of what is right.” One who has the just authority of
“saying what is right” in the community is empowered to enact and promulgate true
laws. Almighty God is the Supreme Lawgiver, and properly constituted human
legislation has its power and authority, directly on indirectly, from God.- The author of
law enacts laws as ordinances of reason, and hence he must have a direct care and
concern about their observance. To insure observance the author of the law establishes
sanctions for law, i. e., inducements (rewards and punishments) sufficiently strong to
lead reasonable men to follow the prescriptions of the law.
b) CLASSIFICATION OF LAWS
i. According to their immediate author, laws are distinguished as divine laws,
which come directly from God (such as the Ten Commandments), and human laws,
which are the enactments of Church or State. Human laws enacted by the Church
are called ecclesiastical laws, while human laws enacted by the State are called
civil laws.
ii. According to their duration, laws are temporal or eternal. The Eternal
Law is God's plan and
providence for the universe. We shall speak of this law in detail in the next section of
this Article. All human laws are in themselves temporal, although some of them give
expression to requirements of the Eternal Law.
ii. According to the manner of their promulgation, laws are distinguished as the natural
law and positive laws. The natural law, in widest sense, is that which directs creatures to
their end in accordance with their nature, and, so understood, it coincides with the
Eternal Law. Usually, however, the laws that govern irrational creatures in their being
and activities are called physical laws, while the moral law which is apprehended by
sound and matured human reason is called the natural law. In this restricted sense we
shall understand the term, the natural law; and we shall define it as the Eternal Law as
apprehended by human reason. Positive laws are laws enacted by positive act of a
legislator, and these fall under the classification already made as divine and human.
Thus, the Ten Commandments are divine positive laws, and the laws of Church and
State are human positive laws.
iv. According as they prescribe an act or forbid it, laws are affirmative
or negative. Negative laws are also called prohibitory law. Affirmative laws bind
always, but not at every moment. Thus, the Commandment of hearing Mass on
certain days binds only on those days, and the requirement of this law may be
satisfied at any hour at which Mass is offered. The law binds always (that is, it
remains constantly in effect) but not at every moment (that is, its subjects are not
required to perform continuously and without intermission the act which it
prescribes). On the other hand, negative laws of the natural order bind always and
at every moment. Thus, the law “Thou shalt not kill,” remains continuously in force,
and must be obeyed at every moment without exception and in all circumstances.
v. According to the effect of their violation, laws are distinguished as
moral (violation of which is
fault or sin), penal (violation of which renders the violator liable to an established
penalty, but does not infect him with sin) , and mixed (violation of which involves both
fault and penalty).
C.) IMPORTANT CLASSES OF LAWS

Here we are to consider: 1. The Eternal Law; The Natural Law; iii. Human Positive
Law. The discussion of Divine Positive Law belongs to Theology and not to Ethics.

i. The Eternal Law is God’s eternal plan and providence for the universe. God,
decreeing from
eternity to create the world for an end (which is Himself) , eternally plans and directs all
things toward that end. Thus there is from eternity a “plan of Divine Wisdom as director
of all acts and movements”— and this is The Eternal Law. St. Augustine defines the
Eternal Law as the Divine Reason and Will commanding that the natural order of things be
preserved and forbidding that it be disturbed. The Eternal Law extends to all acts and
movements in the universe. Thus, bodies obey the tendencies of their nature and follow
the laws of cohesion, gravity, inertia, etc. ; plants grow ; animals follow the guidance of
instinct ; the earth turns upon its axis ; the heavenly spheres swing through their mighty
orbits ; all in accordance with the Eternal Law, powerless to reject its influence or to
disobey. Of all bodily creation, man alone may refuse the direction of the Eternal Law in
matters of free choice. For the Eternal Law applies to all creatures and directs them in a
manner consonant with their nature ; and man’s nature, in its rational part, is free. As a
bodily being man acts in accordance with physical laws; so he does also in those
animal and vegetal functions which are proper to his nature but not under the control of
his will.
But in matter that lie under man’s free control—in a word, in human acts—man may
be perverse and disobedient, refusing the direction of the Eternal Law as known to
him by his reason. Thus, the Eternal Law governs all things except human acts by
necessity, that is, allowing the things governed no choice in the matter; the same
Eternal Law directs human acts by suasion.

THE NORMS OF HUMAN ACTS

ii. The Natural Law is the Eternal Law as known to man by his reason. It is, in some
sense, man’s participation in the Eternal Law. Man knows naturally, by the light of his
understanding, that there are some things evil in themselves, and some things which
are necessarily good. Thus, man knows that lies and murder are evil; and he knows
that truthfulness and respect for life and property are good. In a word, man inevitably
recognizes an order in things. That which is in line with this order is good, and that
which is out of line with it is evil. But man has more than an unconditioned knowledge
of good as a thing to be done, and of evil as a thing to be avoided; for man’s reason
shows him the natural order as a thing to be conserved and not disturbed. Tense by
his rational nature, man is aware of the general law; ”Conserve the natural order,” or,
in other words, “Do good and avoid evil.” This is the fundamental expression of the
natural law. Now, the natural order of things is the order established by the Eternal
Law, Hence, the natural law, which commands the conserving of the natural order, is
a law unchanging and unchangeable.
Even in its subjective aspect (i.e., viewed from the standpoint of its subject), the natural
law presents itself to our understanding as unchangeable, for it is a direction to guide
men to their proper ultimate end, and all men at all times and in all circumstances have
the same nature and the same ultimate end; therefore, the direction toward that end
must be constant and unchanging. No man of sound and mature reason can be
invincibly ignorant of the natural law in its general principles and obvious applications:
that is, every sane adult must know that good is to be done and evil avoided, and must
recognize the obviously good things as good and evident evils as evil. However, the
exact nature of certain duties, and the manner in which certain duties are to be
performed, is sometimes derived from the nature law by an involved process of
reasoning; such duties are remote derivations of the natural law; it is therefore possible
that untaught or savage men may be ignorant of them, and invincibly ignorant.— The
natural law has its proper sanction. To deny this fact would be to deny the wisdom of the
lawgiver; for surely the legislator who frames a law wants the law fulfilled, else it is an
absurdity; and a sanction fitted to the nature of the law and to its subjects is the one
means of giving the law force. The author Of the natural law is God, the All-Wise.
Hence, a priori, we conclude that the natural law has its sanction. This sanction consists
in the peace and happiness consequent upon the observance of the natural law, and in
the remorse and unhappiness which follow its violation. Though the sanction of the
natural law is necessarily imperfect in this life, it is perfect in the life to come, and
consists primarily in the final achievement or loss of man’s ultimate end----God, the
Summum Bonum and endless happiness.
iii. Human Positive Law is law enacted by Church or State. When such a law is truly law
—that is
to say, when it is just, honest, possible, useful, and duly promulgated---it derives its
binding force from the natural law, and so ultimately from the Eternal Law, from God.
We may define a human positive law as an ordinance of reason, derives from the natural
law, or making a concrete and determinate application of the natural law, promulgated for the
common good by a human agency in charge of a society. That such a law derives from the
natural law is easy to see, for the natural law requires the observance of the natural
order; and the obviously requisite order for life in society is the observance, bye all
members of society, of just laws. Hence, the natural order itself requires the observance
of laws. But what of unjust laws? What of laws that contravene laws of a higher order?
What of civil laws that conflict with ecclesiastical laws? Where there is injustice, there is
no law : justice is an essential quality of true law. Again, laws which contravene other
laws of a higher order are not honest; and honesty is an essential quality of true law,
and without it the so-called law is no law at all. Finally, where laws of Church and State
clash, there is in justice on the one side or the other ; and, in case of dispute,
presumption favors the higher, the supernatural community, i. e, the Church. Human
positive law, when it is truly law, binds the conscience of its subjects, for it is rooted in
the natural law, and remotely in the Eternal Law of God Himself.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have defined law, and have explained every word of the
definition. Thus we have learned much of the nature of law, its essential qualities, its
points of distinction from precept, its purpose, its relation to liberty, its author, the field of its
application, or society, and its sanction.
We have classified laws, and have given special study to the Eternal Law, the
Natural Law, and Human Positive Law.

ARTICLE 2. CONSCIENCE
a) Definition b) States of Conscience
b) Forming One’s Conscience
 a.) Definition of Conscience
Conscience is the practical judgment of reason upon an individual act as good and to be
performed, or as evil and to be avoided.
i. It is a judgment of reason, that is, it is a reasoned conclusion. Although the term
conscience is also used to designate the act of reasoning out of the right and wrong of a
situation before choosing what to do, it is more properly employed, as in our definition, to
signify the judgment which is the conclusion of that act of reasoning. Now, an act of
reasoning requires a principle, or set of principles, from which the process of reasoning
proceeds. By principles we mean things known with certainly with which we may compare
new facts or proposed actions and so discover new truths – new applications of the
principles. Thus, before we can reason out the truth that the angles of a triangle are
equal to 180 degrees, we must have a grasp of certain mathematical principle; we must
know, for instance, that when parallels are cut by a transversal, the alternate interior
angles are equal, and that opposite angle are equal. Knowing these facts, we can
proceed to the proof of the theorem is question. These facts are principles, that is,
starting points whence one may reason to further truths or to individual application of
the original known data. Similarly, in matters of right and wrong, we must have morals
principles to start with. We acquire these principles – many of them, – in early life and
when we have a workable grasp of them, we become responsible for our conduct, we
cease to be infants and
THE NORMS OF HUMAN ACTS
We are said to have "come to the use of reason." Now, this acquired equipment
of moral principles is called synteresis. Synteresis is the starting point of the reasoning
process which ends in the judgment of conscience. This reasoning process may proceed
so smoothly and swiftly that we are not aware of it as a reasoning process at all; indeed,
this is ordinarily the case. Still, the process is always a fact, if only an implicit fact. Thus,
when we are confronted with a possible course of action, we compare it mentally with
our moral principles, and conclude that it is good and hence to be done (or at least
permitted), or evil and hence to be avoided. For example, suppose I am face to face
with a difficulty form which I might extricate myself by a clever and fictitious explanation
of my conduct. My moral reasoning goes on as follows:
Lies are never allowed (principle from synteresis);
The explanation which suggests itself to me is a lie;
Therefore, this explanation is not allowed (judgement of conscience).
ii. Conscience is a practical judgment. This means that it has reference to something to
be done, i.
e., either the performance or the omission of an act. The reasoning process always in a
practical judgment. When, for instance, one concludes the proof of the theorem which
states that the angles of a triangle equal 180 degrees, one expresses that conclusion in
a judgment; this judgment, however, does not indicate a source of action (practical
judgment), but enriches knowledge by the addition of a newly recognized truth
(speculative judgment). It is obvious that conscience is a practical judgment. It is a
judgment that commands, forbids, allows, or advises, according as it declares an
individual act obligatory, prohibited, permissible, or prudent. It is a judgment which says:
“Do this!” “Avoid that!” “You may do this!” “It would be well to do that!” In a word,
conscience is a dictate.
iii. Conscience is a judgment upon an individual act, here and now, in these present
circumstances, tobe performed or omitted. It is also a judgment upon an individual act
after it has been performed or omitted. But it is always an individual judgment upon
an individual act; it is not a general moral judgment or principle (for such judgments
belong to synteresis), but it is the reasoned judgment, drawn from a general principle
and an individual act; it applies the general moral principle in individual action. Before
action, conscience judges an act as good and to be performed (i.e., as something
obligatory, advisable, or permissible), or as evil and to be omitted. After action,
conscience is a judgment of approval or disapproval.
b) STATES OF CONSCIENCE

i. When conscience is a judgment in accordance with fact, that is, when it

judges as good as that which is really good, and as evil that which is really evil,
then it is correct or true. Strictly speaking, there is a distinction between correct
conscience and true conscience, but for practical purposes the terms may be
regarded as synonymous. Conscience that is not true is erroneous. Conscience
that is erroneous without the knowledge or fault of the agent, is called invincibly
erroneous or inculpably erroneous, while conscience that is erroneous through
the agent’s fault is culpably erroneous.
ii. When conscience is an altogether firm and assured judgment, in which
the agent has no fear whatever of being in error, it is called certain conscience.
Conscience, when certain, must be obeyed, whether it be correct or invincibly
erroneous. For reason demands that we obey law as manifested with certainty
by the intellect, and the dictate of certain conscience is such a manifestation,
even though the conscience be invincibly erroneous. —Conscience that is not
certain, i.e., that is hesitant, that is a judgment in which the agent is aware of the
possibility of error, is called doubtful or dubious conscience. The agent whose
conscience is dubious is said to be in doubt. If the doubt concerns the existence
or applicability of a law or moral principle, it is called speculative; but if the doubt
concerns the lawfulness of an individual act to be performed or omitted, it is a
practical doubt. Now, it is never permissible to act while in the state of practical
doubt. Such doubt must be resolved, must be dispelled and replaced by
certitude, before action can be good. To act while in the state of practical doubt
about the good or evil of an action is to “take a chance” of the action being evil,
and in no far to approve of the action even as evil: but reason requires that evil
be positively avoided. When conscience is doubtful, but grounded upon solid
reasons, it is called probable conscience, and the agent is said to have a probable
opinion. We shall discuss the matter of probability (the doctrine of which is called
probabilism) in the next section of the present Article.
c) FORMING ONE’S CONSCIENCE

To “form” one’s conscience is to get rid of doubt and achieve certainty; it is to

make up one’s mind clearly and definitely on what is required in a given individual
instance: it is to reason out the right and wrong of a given situation.
Now, it is not always possible to have absolute certitude (i.e., certitude so perfect
as to exclude even the possibility of error) in matters of conscience. But it is always
possible, directly or indirectly, to achieve moral certitude, i.e., such certitudes as
excludes all prudent doubt. Moral certitude is sufficient and requisite for the guidance of
the conscience-judgment when there is question of the lawfulness or the unlawfulness
of an act here and now to be determined upon . One may never act in a practical
doubt, but must banish the doubt and achieve moral certitude. How is this to be done?
Either directly, by studying the act itself and its moral determinants and so gaining a
clear knowledge of its moral quality as good or evil, or, when such study is not feasible
or is found fruitless, indirectly, by applying the reflex moral principle: A doubtful law does
not bind. To illustrate:
i. John finds among the effects of his deceased father a vulnerable
set of books which, on thetestimony of various receipts of payment, were
bought upon the installment plan from publishing company which is no longer
existence. From records available to John it appears that his father died
owing the publishing company one hundred dollars. John asks himself: “May I
keep the books and do nothing about the matter of payment, or must I give
one hundred dollars to pious causes so that I shall not remain in unjust
possession of that which does not belong to me?”
Here is the situation, the doubt. John attempts to solve the matter directly by
investigation. He knows that his father is strictly honest man, that he paid his bills
promptly as they fell due. Could he have paid the bill, and mislaid the receipts? Hardly,
for he was as careful to preserve receipts as to pay his bills. Could the bill have been
paid an no receipt rendered by the publishing company? Not likely, for John’s father
was not the man to make continued remittances and receive no official recognition of
payment. John makes inquiries about the publishing company, and learns that it failed
through mismanagement; that much money was paid into its offices and left
unaccounted for, and that many of its outstanding dues were not received. The doubt
remains. On the one hand, John has the incomplete record which seems to indicate his
father’s indebtedness. On the other hand, the character of John’s father, and the fact
that he never made mention of this indebtedness, seem to indicate that the bill was
paid. Evidently, then, the matter is not to be composed by direct study and investigation.
Then, and only then, is John free to apply the reflex principle: A doubtful law does not
bind. Notice that the law here is found by diligent inquiry to be doubtful- not, indeed, in
itself, but in application. Thus, John may say : “I have made due inquiry, and my doubt
remains. The law which requires me to give to give to every man his due is here of
doubtful
law. Now, a doubtful law does not bind . Hence, I am not bound to pay
out one hundred dollars, but may remain in justified possession of the books.” Thus
does John banish doubt and achieve moral certitude.
ii. Jones has a valuable hunting-dog which so annoys the neighbors
by baying at night that several
of them have threatened to poison it. Smith, a neighbor of Jones, is annoyed by the
dog, but has no intention whatever of killing it. Smith puts poisoned food about his
stables for the purpose of killing rats. Later, Jones found his fog dead, accuses Smith of
poisoning it, and demands payment. In a law-suit. Smith is vindicated, but he is an
altogether upright man and wishes to do no injustice by taking advantage of a court
decision. He is in a state of doubt. On the one hand, it is altogether possible that the
dog came to grief by eating the poisoned food which he had placed for rats. On the
other hand, it is quite as possible that some other distraught neighbor directly poisoned
the animal. Studying over the question brings Smith no nearer to its solution; and, of
course, it would be futile to inquire among the neighbors about the real cause of the
dog’s death, since none of them offered any real evidence when Smith was under trial.
The doubt remaining insoluble or invincible, it becomes permissible for smith to apply
the reflex principle: a doubtful law does not bind, and so, with moral certitude, to decide
that he is free from obligation towards Jones.
It is possible, then, to achieve moral certitude in one of two ways:
i. By direct study and investigation which clears away doubt and gives
certain knowledge, or, this failing;
ii. By application of the reflex principle: a doubtful law does not bind.
Now, it may be asked, when is a law doubtful? A law is doubtful when there is a
solid and prudent reason for uncertainty as to its existence or applicability in a given
case. And such reasonable uncertainty may arise from either from the fact that there is
no discoverable reason for the existence or applicability of a law, or from the fact that
there is an actual and positive reason against the existence or applicability of a law.
When a law is doubtful, then its dubious state is due to the existence of a solidly
probable reason, which, negatively or positively, makes for uncertainty in the matter of
the law’s existence or applicability. Now a solidly probable reason is a reason that would
be regarded as sound and sufficient by a good and prudent man; in complex matters,
we should require such a reason as would meet the approval of a good, prudent, and
learned man. One who relies upon such a reason is said to have a probable opinion.
Out of this situation emerges a doctrine for forming one’s conscience—a doctrine called
Probabilism. Probabilism teaches that when there is mere question of the lawfulness or
unlawfulness of an act, a solidly probable reason favoring its lawfulness suffices for
moral certainty and renders the act permissible. The reasoning upon which Probabilism
is based may be set forth as follows:
 A doubtful law does not blind;
But a law against which a solidly probable reason militates is a doubtful law:
Therefore, a law against which a solidly probable reason militates does not blind.

Probabilism is of great use in dispelling doubt and forming one’s conscience, but
its use is best limited to matters of business and to the field of human positive law. In
the more abstract questions of morals there is a grave danger of applying Probabilism
too quickly and without proper justification. It must always be remembered that
Probabilism is deduced from a reflex moral principle which has no place in the
legitimate formation of conscience unless the direct method (of positive study and
investigation of the actual situation) proves impossible or fruitless in the matter of
dispelling doubt.
There is one case in which Probabilism cannot be made to serve at all, viz., in
the case of a certain end absolutely to be achieved. Thus, even when there is a solidly
probable reason that a convert to the Catholic faith has been validly baptized, the
sacrament will be administered conditionally upon his reception into the Church. For
Baptism is absolutely necessary to salvation and probability has no service to render in
the matter, since certainty is directly achievable.
Let the student consider the following cases and judge where Probabilism may
serve:
i. A physician has a sure remedy for a certain disease. He has also a
second remedy which, he has very strong reasons for believing, will effect
a cure more rapidly, and with less discomfort to the patient, than the first.
May he use the second remedy?
ii. Pasteur found his ant-toxin for hydrophobia most effective when used on
animals. No other remedy for the dread disease was known. A child that
had been bitten by a mad dog was brought to Pasteur. Could he
administer the anti-toxin, although it had never before been used in the
treatment of a human being ?
iii. A nurse knows that a certain physician ー a skillful and capable man ー has once,
through hurry and the mistake of a lay attendant, caused the death of a patient
by administering a lethal drug. She doubts whether she is obliged to declare the
matter and have the physician dismissed from the hospital staff. She realizes that
the death of the patient was a most unfortunate accident, and that the physician
will most probably be very careful to avoid such accidents in future. Still, the
man destroyed a human life, and perhaps the persons who employ him should
be made aware of the fact. How is the doubt to be resolved ?
iv. A tenant doubts whether he has paid his rent for a certain month. His
landlord, a careless man in his accounts, is also in doubt. Must the tenant
pay the rent ? If he decides to do so, may the landlord accept it ?
v. A hunter sights an animal far off among the trees. He feels sure that it is a
deer ; still he realizes that it is possible that the animal may be a horse or
 cow belonging to a farmer of the neighborhood. May he fire? May he fire
even if he is willing to pay handsomely in case of error?

Application of Ends and Property of Imputability of Human Acts

Scenario:
(Inspired by the online love team vloggers called “Jamill” of Jayzam Manabat
and Camille Trinidad)
Cams and James are in a relationship for more than 7 years. With those
memories together, James cheated on Cams with another girl named Ica. He
knows that it will hurt Cams and destroy the life of the two girls, but he still
continued and think that it is just okay if he will not get caught. James finds the
act of cheating with Ica gratifying and willingly engages into it. One day, Ica
was deceived by James. James opened up to Ica that he doesn't see his future
with Cams and assured Ica that their conversation and their relationship would
be kept in private. But, one day, Cho exposed their closeness to his sister
Cams. Then, everything messed up. Ica and James' affair ended almost
immediately after it became public. For James, being discovered in his
wrongdoings with Ica means the end of another target. Since all activities have
to come to an end. It was supposed to stop, just like their romance, because
James is still committed to Cams, even though he's cheating with Ica.In the
end, whether James chooses one of the girls or the other, there will always be
a breakup.
 In the above scenario, cheating is the human act. Cheating is a free act
wherein the will is under the control of the doer. Wherein James action which is
cheating emerges from his will act and accompanied with the knowledge that
by doing such act his girlfriend as well as Ica will get hurt in the process.
Nevertheless, he still execute it regardless of knowing the ahead
consequences that it will hurt and destroy the life of the two girls. Voluntarism
in order to be present must have both the free will and knowledge of the doer
which is very evident in the act done by James . Therefore, cheating is the
human act which emerges from the free will, knowledge and voluntarism of the
doer which is James. In correlation of end of human act, James is the agent
who was willed to act upon his desires. He was also aware how wrongful his
actions are yet he was willing to do it anyway. His actions were motivated by
his desire to cheat, in which in return, gave him satisfaction. But all of this has
to end since James desires were met, therefore an end of an activity. In any
angle, this activity tends to end because of the fact that in any other way
around what he was doing was morally wrong. So, in the scenario, when the
affair was uncovered, it immediately ended. Thus, the goal was accomplished
and termination of the activity was established. In terms of the property of
imputability, the doer is liable for such acts or effects when the three conditions
are fulfilled: (1) the agent must be able to foresee the evil effect, (2) the agent
must be free to refrain from doing that which is the cause of the evil effect, and
(3) the agent must be morally bound not to do that which is the cause of the
evil effect. In this case, James knew that the act of cheating would definitely
torment Cams, but he still eagerly performed this act. However, James was
able to foresee the evil effect of his action. The act that he performed torment
the people he cares about including his own family and their supporters. The
moment he foresees the effects of his action, he admitted everything to Cams
and to their family. The doer conceded everything not to inflict more
disappointment and pain on those people who were involved and to those
people who got affected by their issue, but because of his guilt. In this manner,
the doer of this such act is imputed to the action that he incited towards those
individuals who were victims of his deed and voluntarily endure the blames and
the hurtful words that his supporters say about him.

Sources:

Encyclopedia.com. (2021, May 22). ." New Catholic Encyclopedia.

Encyclopedia.com. 15 Apr. 2021 . Encyclopedia.com.
https://www.encyclopedia.com/religion/encyclopediasalmanacs-transcripts-
and-maps/human-act.

Kent Matienzo Follow. (2013, February 23).

Ethics(final). SlideShare. https://www.slideshare.net/kentmatienzo/ethicsfinal.
 Monde, J. (2021, April 17). Jamill Issue: Jayzam Speaks About "Cheating"
Issue, Here's Statement. Philippine News.
https://philnews.ph/2021/04/17/jamill-issue-jayzam-speaksabout-cheating-
issue-heres-statement/.

ENCODED BY: BSPT-2B

Page 1

THE MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTS

This chapter deals with the good and evil (i.e., the morality) of human acts, explains
the nature of morality, and studies the criterion or norm by which the morality of acts
is known. It then establishes the determinants of morality, i.e., the points of contact
which human acts have with their measure or norm and according to which the acts are
known as good or evil.

The chapter is accordingly divided into two articles, as follows:

Article 1. Morality and its Norm
Article 2. The Determinants of Morality

ARTICLE 1. MORALITY AND ITS NORM

a) Description b) Norm c) Definition d) Division

a) DESCRIPTION OF MORALITY
Morality is that quality of human acts which leads us to call some of them good
and some evil.
Now why do we call anything good or evil? We have already seen the answer
to this question, but we must here recall and enlarge our knowledge of the matter.
A thing is good inasmuch as it can answer a tendency, appetite, desire. In other
words, it is good…

Inasmuch as it serves as an end of such tendency. Thus, I call my coat a good “good
coat” if it furnishes me what I want in a coat, viz, warmth, style, fit, good cloth, good
tailoring, etc. I call my automobile good if it does what can be reasonably expected of
it in the way of speed, comfortable riding, rich appearance, etc. What I expect of my
coat and automobile are the ends I wish to achieve by means of garment or motor car.
Inasmuch as the cot or the car serves any or all of these ends, I say it is not good.

Now in the matter of human acts---where moral good or evil is the point in question---
there is always a last end towards which the action tends. Objectively, this is the
Summum Bonum, the Limitless Good, God. Subjectively, the last end of human acts is
perfect happiness in the possession of Summum Bonum. Such being the end of human
action, it follows that human acts are good inasmuch as they serve to carry the agent
on towards the attainment of this end, and not good, or evil, inasmuch as they fail to
lead towards the last end, or even lead away from it.
B., THE NORM OF MORALITY
In the Article of Law we learned that there is an eternal plan for the ordering or
government of all acts and movements in the universe, and that this plan directs things
towards their fast end. But, as we also learned, man is free and rational, he is not
concerned
(in the field of free choice) by the plan, but is meant to recognize it by his reason and
freely follow it in all his free or human acts. Human acts which are in harmony with
the eternal plan are good; those not in harmony with it are evil. Now, the eternal plan is
the Eternal Law, which is the Divine reason (and Will) expressing itself in the ordering
of the universe. Thus human acts are good or evil inasmuch as they agree or conflict
with the Divine Reason. Now how is the Divine Reason recognized by man?
Obviously by human reason, which pronounces on individual human acts-in a word, by
Conscience. Hence, the Eternal Law (Divine Reason) on the other hand, and
conscience (human reason) on the other, constitute the Norm of Morality. From this it
will be seen that we were right when we said that human acts are good or evil
inasmuch as they agree or conflict with the dictates of reason (divine and human).
The Divine Reason, or the Eternal Law, is the ultimate Norm of Morality. But that
which serves man immediately in action, that which is available to his proximate use,
is human reason pronouncing upon the good or evil of individual human acts: in other
words, conscience is the proximate Norm of Morality.
Summing the matter up, we say that the Norm of Morality is, remotely and ultimately
(but primarily), the Eternal Law; while approximately (but secondarily) it is
conscience. In reality, then, there are not two norms but only one; for conscience is the
judgement
of human reason recognizing and applying the Eternal Law in individual acts.

c) DEFINITION OF MORALITY
Morality is the relation of human acts to the ir norm
Morality is the quality (or property) or a human act whereby it measures up to what it
should be as a step towards the objective last end of human action, or fails so to
measure up. It consists therefore in the relation existing between human acts and the
norm of morality.
The morality of an act, its character as good or evil, is not a mere external
denomination or classification, it is not a mere label pasted on arbitrarily. It is
something that belongs inevitably to the human act as such, either to the act considered
objectively as a deed performed, or to the act considered as characterized by its
circumstances, particularly the circumstance called the end of the agent.

Some ethicians have placed the essence of the morality of human acts in freedom. This
doctrine is false. It is true that a human acct is a free act; and, in a true sense,, it is a
moral act (i.e., has morality, is right or wrong, good or evil) because it is free. But
freedom does not constitute morality. Morality is the property of a free act, that is, it is
an inevitably present characteristic of a free act. But it consists formally, as we have
said, not in the freedom itself, but in the relation which the act bears towards the norm
or measure of what it should be-towards the Norm of Morality.

D) DIVISION OF MORALITY
I. Material and Formal - A human act considered in itself as a deed performed stands in
relation to the Norm of Morality as materially good or evil. A human act considered as
conditioned by the agent’s understanding and will, stands in relation to the Norm of
Morality as formally good or evil. Sometimes the terms objective and subjective are
used respectively for material and formal in this connection. Thus, a lie is objectively
or materially evil: it is a thing that is evil in itself, as a deed done, for it conflicts with
the Norm of Morality. But a lie which a person mistakenly deems to be permitted and
justified in certain circumstances, is, while materially evil, not subjectively or formally
so.

II. Intrinsic and Extrinsic. - Material or objective morality is intrinsic when the
human act, as a deed performed, stands by reason of its very nature in relation to the
Norm of Morality as good or evil. Material or objective morality is extrinsic when the
stand or relation of an act to the Norm of Morality is determined, not by the nature of
the act itself, but by the prescription of positive law. Thus, murder is intrinsically evil.
Eating meat on Friday is extrinsically evil

Stances, one circumstance stands out as most important, and we give it special
consideration apart from all other circumstances of the act: this is the circumstance
called the end of the agent. Thus we list three determinants of morality, viz., (a) the act
itself (i. E, object) ; (b) the end of the agent; (c) the circumstances other than the end of
the agent.

A human act, to be a morally good act, must be found in agreement with the Norm of
Morality on all three points, i. E, it must be good in itself or objectively, in its end, and
in its circumstances. A human act is evil if it fails to conform with the Norm of
Morality in any one of the points or determinants. This is expressed in the ancient
axiom: “Bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocumque defectu,” i.e,. “A thing to be
good must be entirely good; it is vitiated by any defect.” We may see the justice of the
axiom by a rough analogy: A man to be a healthy man must have all organs
functioning properly; while he is unwell even if only one organ (the heart, for example,
or the stomach, or the liver) is diseased or deranged. Similarly, in human acts we find
goodness dependent upon the agreement of the avts with the Norm of Morality on the
score of all determinants; it is not good enough that an act be good in itself; it must
also be good in its end and in the circumstances that affect it as a moral act. But it is
evil if it conflict with the moral law on any of the three points.
Note-no p104
A.)THE OBJECT. By the object is mean the human act performed, the deed done. If
an act as object is good or evil, we say-as we have learned-that it has objective
morality. If an act, considered abstractly, is indifferent (good or bad), its morality is
determined by the end for which it is performed and by circumstances which affect it.
Now certain actions are in the
themselves, or objectively, good, and certain others are objectively evil: and this
morality is intrinsic, i. e, resides in the act independently of positive law prescribing or
forbidding the act. This assertion recommends itself at once to the normal mind as a
true statement; yet some moralists have denied it. It is therefore necessary to prove
briefly that some acts are intrinsically good, and some intrinsically evil.
Now those that deny the intrinsic morality of any human act must admit, as all other
men do, that there are certain acts which have always and everywhere been regarded as
good, and others which have been universally considered as evil. The acceptance of
these acts as respectively good and evil is a fact to be explained. We explain it by
stating the doctrine of intrinsic morality: men have always regarded certain acts as
good in themselves because, as a matter of fact, they are good; and they have regarded
others as intrinsically evil, because they are evil. Our opponents declare that what we
call intrinsic morality is merely the result of long established custom among men, or of
special human legislation, or of the arbitrary decision of God’s will that some acts are
good and some evil. In the inadequacy of these explanations we find the negative proof
of our own position. Let us consider the matter in detail.
i. Custom cannot account for the universal acceptance of some acts as good in
themselves and of other acts as intrinsically evil. How did the custom come into being?
If as a dictate of right reason, because all people saw that certain things were in line
with their rational desires and certain other things opposed to these, then the argument
falls to nothing, and is merely an indefinite restatement of the true doctrine that certain
acts are perceived by right reason as good and other acts as evil— in a word, that
certain acts are perceived as intrinsically good or evil. If the custom did not arise as a
dictate of right reason among men, then it arose out of circumstances. Since
circumstances can be artificially arranged, it would be possible to get current a
movement to change the present moral views of men. It would be possible, for
example, to form a society, and to spread its influence generally throughout the human
race, for the furtherance of murder and theft as virtuous acts! It would be possible to
train men to the state of mind in which they could behold themselves robbed of their
possessions not only without resentment, but with positive approval of the theft, and
with veneration for the thieves as saintly men! It would be possible to have parents
generally (always excepting a very few reactionaries) delighted with the ingratitude of
their children. It would be possible to have those in authority reward disobedience and
punish obedience; to throw the honest man in jail, and to elevate the malefactor as the
model citizen. Then we should see men and women standing trial for murders they
impiously failed to commit, for degradations to which they failed to sink, for slanders
they fail to utter. But, you say, these things are utterly impossible. Then it is utterly
impossible that the universal conviction of men concerning the intrinsic good and evil
of human acts is a mere outgrowth of custom.
ii. Human legislation cannot account for the universal acceptance of some acts as
good in themselves and of other acts as intrinsically evil. If human legislation means
law in the true sense, then we are back in our own position, for true human law is an
ordinance of reason in line with the Eternal Law, and it exists because there really are
acts good in themselves to be prescribed, and acts evil in themselves to be forbidden.
Acts are not good because true law prescribes them; they are prescribed by law
because they are good. Nor are acts evil because true law forbids them; the law forbids
them because they are evil. Certainly there are some acts (such as hunting out of
season, driving at a certain rate of speed, etc.) which are not good or evil in
themselves, and which fall under penal law; but our question does not concern these.
We are merely proving that some acts are intrinsically good, and others intrinsically
evil; while our opponents deny all intrinsic morality of any and every act. Now, if
legislation be taken to mean, not a reasonable ordinance, but the whimsical and
arbitrary decree of a ruler or ruling body, then legislation may change the whole
scheme of morality. A “law” may be passed tomorrow making it imperative for sons to
kill their fathers, for servants to rob their masters, for men to curse God, for spouses to
be unfaithful; and such a “law” would not only make these crimes imperative, but
virtuous. Then men, in time, would come to regard these acts of virtue in their true
light, and we should find that murder would be everywhere regarded as noble. Fathers
would embrace the slayers of their little children; mothers would rejoice in the shame
of their daughters; employers would thank Heaven for the favor of dishonest
employees! Such an impossible topsy-turvydom could not be created by legislation.
Then neither could the existent moral scheme have been so created. If legislation be
not guided by reason - which does not make, but only recognizes good and evil in
human acts - then it might just as well and as easily produce the topsy-turvy morality
described as the morality we actually acknowledge.
iii. The arbitrary decision of God’s will cannot account for the universal acceptance of
some acts as good in themselves and of other acts as intrinsically evil. God is infinitely
perfect ; His acts are therefore infinitely right and reasonable. Hence an arbitrary
decisions of the Divine Will without reference to the Divine Reason is so impossible as
to be absolutely unthinkable. We have learned that God directs all acts and movements
in the universe to their last end by the Eternal Law. Now, the Eternal Law is an
ordinance of Divine Reason, and is put in effect by the Divine Will, not arbitrarily or
gratuitously, but precisely because the Divine Reason recognizes it as right and
reasonable. We speak of God in weak and inadequate human language, of course, and
thus seem to separate the Divine reason and Will; but as a matter of fact these are not
separated, but are identical with Divine Essence. Thus it follows that all the acts of
God are infinitely reasonable ; no divine act can be severed from Divine Reason. Thus
to assert that God has unreasonably decided that certain things shall be good and other
things evil, is to enunciate an absurdity.
In view of the truth established---viz, that there is such a thing as intrinsic morality---
we are forced to reject many moral theories as false. Among those so rejected we find:

I. The Theory of Moral Instincts or Moral Sense (called Moral Intuitionism or

Moral Sensualism), which asserts that we discern good and evil by a blind instinct or a
sense faculty, and not by our understanding. We have seen that we know good and evil
by the conscience-judgment, by reason. When we do good or evil as a human act, we
know, we understand, that we are doing good or evil. Therefore, we do not act by blind
 instinct. Nor is our conscience a sense-judgment. For the relation of acts to the Norm
of Morality is an abstract relation, not a material or bodily thing such as the senses
require for their object.

ii. The Theory of Usefulness (called Utilitarianism), which asserts that what is
discerned as useful (to individual men or to human society) is good, and what is found
harmful is evil. It is true that good is ultimately useful, and evil harmful; but the
usefulness comes from goodness, not goodness from usefulness; and harmfulness
comes from evil, not evil from harmfulness. Certain human acts are, as we have
proved, intrinsically good or evil; and hence their usefulness or uselessness can have
nothing to do with their nature. Further, the theory of utilitarianism would make the
code of morals as changeable as the stockmarket rates; for what is useful (in a merely
temporal and material sense) is variable and differs from times and persons: but the
Norm of Morality, to be a norm or law, must be a stable thing. Again, how would the
test of usefulness be established? Act would have to be “tried out” first without any
rule at all to discover which acts might be listed as useful, and hence good, and which
are harmful, and hence forbidden as evil.

To sum up: The object of a human act, the act itself as a deed done or to be done, that
is, the act considered as fact, has often its own intrinsic morality. Even if the act be in
itself indifferent, it may have extrinsic morality, which is still objective, that is, as an
object, the act may stand in harmony or in disagreement with the prescriptions of
positive moral law. Hence in determining whether any human act is good or evil, we
look first to the object. The object is the primary determinant of morality. If the object
be evil, our quest ends there; the act is definitely evil and forbidden; nothing can make
it good. But if the act is good as an object, it may still be vitiated by its circumstances ,
particularly by that circumstance called “the end of the agent.” Hence, if we find an act
good in itself as an object, we have still to look to the end of the agent and to the other
circumstances before pronouncing it good and permissible as an individual act.

b) THE END OF THE AGENT

By the end of the agent we mean that which the agent (doer, performer of an act)
intends or wishes to achieve by his act. It is the end he has in view, his purpose, his
motive in performing the act.
A human act which is good in itself (i.e, as object) may still be evil by reason of the
end (of the agent) of which it is performed. But a human act which Is evil in itself
cannot be made good by reason of the end for which it is performed. In other words,
the influence of the end of the agent can be strong enough to swerve an act out of line
with reason, but it cannot be strong enough to bring a bad act into line with reason. A
daub of black paint will ruin a good picture, but a daub of white paint will not improve
a bad picture. Thus, a man who spends money for the relief of poverty, but with the
intention of fostering political corruption among his beneficiaries, performs an act
which is objectively good - that is, an act good in itself, or good as an object; but the
act is inasmuch as it is influenced by the end of the agent.
Now the question arises: How far does the influence of the end of the agent extend?
Is a good act ruined entirely by a bad end? Is a bad act made worse by a bad end? What
if there are several ends, or many, some good, some evil? The answer to these
questions may be easily discerned in the following principles:

i. An objectively good act performed for a good purpose (i.e, a good end of the
agent) takes on a new goodness from the good end; and if it have several good ends, it
takes on a new goodness from each. Thus, a man who gives alms to relieve distress, to
honor God, and to do penance, performs an act which has threefold goodness:
objectively it is an act of mercy; and in its end it is an act of religion, and an act of the
virtue of penance.

ii. An objectively evil act performed for an evil purpose(i. e. An evil end of
agent) takes on a new malice or evil from the evil end; and if it have several evil ends,
it takes on a new malice from each. Thus, a man who steals money in order to buy
liquor with which to get another intoxicated and have him sign an unjust contract,
performs an act in which there is a threefold malice or evil objectively, it is an act of
injustice; and by reason of the evil ends it is an act of intemperance in cause and an act
of injustice to the signer of the contract.
iii. An act which is objectively good, but done for an evil end, is entirely evil
if the evil end is the whole motive of the act; likewise the act is entirely evil if the evil
end is gravely evil (i. e. Mortally sinful) even though it is not the whole motive of the
act; but the act is only partially evil if the evil end is neither gravely evil (i. e. Is not
morally sinful) nor the whole motive of the act. Thus, to give money to a poor man in
order to wean him away from the true faith, is an act entirely evil. Likewise, to assist in
extinguishing a destructive fire with the purpose of stealing valuable property from the
burning building, is an entirely evil act. But to give alms to the poor for the purpose of
relieving distress and with the added intention of gaining a little prominence as a
beneficent person, is an act partially good and partially (but not gravely) evil.

iv. An objectively evil act can never become good by reason of a good end. The
primary determinant of morality is the object, the act itself. If an act itself is evil, it is
and remains evil in spite of every circumstance. The end does not justify the means.
The end does specify the means : that is, supposing a choice of different means all of
which are good, the nature of the end in view will determine which of the available
good means is to be chosen as most suitable or practicable. But there is no end,
however good, that can justify an evil means, however slightly evil. Thus we see that
there is nothing but folly in expressions like the following that too often fall from the
lips of thinking men (perhaps even from the lops of graduates of Catholic colleges) :
“It’s all in one’s intention ;” “I do not look at the matter as you do ; I do not consider it
wrong ; therefore it is not wrong for me ;” “There is nothing either good or bad, but
thinking makes it so”

v. An act which is indifferent objectively becomes good if done for a good end, and
evil if done for an evil end. Thus, to sing in order to praise God, or to please one’s
guests, or even to charm one’s own ears, who desires quiet is an evil act, being an
offense against charity.
c) THE CIRCUMSTANCES
Circumstances are conditions that affect an act- and may affect it morally- although
they do not belong to the essence of the act as such. In other words, circumstances are
conditions without which the act could exist, but which happen to affect or qualify it an
its concrete performance. Examples of circumstances are place, time, company, etc.. in
which an act is performed.
We enumerate seven circumstances. These are usually set forth in mnemonic Latin
line: Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo. quando. Which may be freely
translated as follows:
Who, what, where, with what ally,
In what condition, when, and why?

To explain these circumstances in detail:

WHO? Circumstance of person. Who is the agent? To whom is the action done?
John strikes a man;the act is evil; but it takes on an added evil, and here a new evil, for
the person struck is John’s father.
WHAT? Circumstances of quantity or quality of the object (i.e., the act). What is
the extent of the act? Was the injury infected serious or slight? Was the amount stolen
large or small?
WHERE? Circumstance of place. A theft committed in the presence of Blessed
Sacrament is theft plus sacrilege, the latter evil coming from the circumstances of
place.
WITH WHAT ALLY? Circumstance of means or instrument. (This ally does not
mean “companion,” for the latter circumstance is that of person.) A sin of drunkenness
committed through the expenditure of stolen money takes on an added evil from the
circumstance of means, i.e.., stolen money.
IN WHAT CONDITION? How? Circumstance of a manner. Was the agent in
good faith or bad? Was the agent’s evil disposition intensely malicious or only slightly
so?
WHEN? Circumstance of time. Did the agent miss Mass on Sunday, or on a
day when he was not obliged to attend? How long the agent retain an evil thought or
intention, for a long period or momentarily?
WHY? Circumstance of end of the agent. This circumstance has already been
discussed in detail.

Some circumstances merely increase or diminish the good or evil object (i.e., act as
such). Other circumstances add to the act a new good or evil, differing in nature, or
species from that of the act. Thus, the circumstance of time in the case of an evil
intention long entertained merely increases the evil, merely makes the act worse, but
leaves it unaltered, or rather, with no new kind of evil added. Robbing a church,
however, adds to the evil of theft the new of sacrilege, thus changing the nature of the
evil act from a simple to a complex one. The circumstances which merely increase or
diminish the moral quality of an act, leaving it in the same species or nature, are called
circumstances which make the act better or worse. The circumstances that add a
specifically new moral character to the act are called circumstances that change the
nature of the act.
The ethical principles involved in the matter of circumstances as determinants of
morality are the following :
i. An indifferent act becomes good or evil by reason of its circumstances. That
is to say, an act which is indifferent in itself as object, takes its moral quality from its
circumstances. Thus, to eat meat is an act in itself indifferent. But to eat meat on a day
of abstinence is evil; and the evil comes from the circumstance of time.
ii. A good act may become evil by reason of circumstances. Thus, to pray to
God is a good act objectively. But to pray to God for misfortune to befall an enemy is
an evil act by reason of the end of the agent―a circumstance already fully considered.
Further it involves evil from the circumstance of person, for such a prayer is an insult
to the All-Perfect God.
iii. A good or evil act (objectively) may become better or worse by reason of
circumstances, and may even take on specifically new goodness or malice from its
circumstances. This matter has been treated in the paragraph on circumstances which
make the act better or worse, and circumstances that change the nature of the act.
iv. An evil act can never be made good by circumstances.
v. A circumstance which is gravely evil (mortally sinful) destroys the entire goodness
of an objectively good act. Thus, to do charity with stolen money is evil by reason of
the circumstances of means or instrument.
vi. A circumstance which is evil, but not gravely so(not mortally sinful), does
not entirely destroy the goodness of an objectively good act. Thus, to pray carelessly
and lazily does not entirely destroy the goodness of the act of prayer, although the full
goodness of the act is injured by the circumstance of manners.

THE PROPERTIES AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTS

A property or attribute of a thing is a quality characteristic, or capacity, which belongs

by natural necessity to the thing, yet forms no essential part, no constituent element, of
the thing as such. Thus, the Church has the property or attribute of infallibility. The
Church being what it is by nature—an institution divinely commissioned to teach all
men of all times the truth that led to salvation—must of necessity be infallible must be
free from the possibility of teaching men error in the truths that pertain to salvation.
Else the Church would be an anomaly and a contradiction in itself; it would be face to
face with the possibility of destroying itself and of falsifying its nature. Hence, while
 infallibility is not a constituent element of the Church, it is something necessarily
consequent upon its nature; and thus we call infallibility a property or attribute of the
Church.
This Chapter deals with the attributes or properties of human acts, that is, with the
things that belong by natural necessity to human acts without forming an essential part
or constituent element of the acts as such. We enumerate as such properties:
imputability, merit, and demerit.
Further, the Chapter considers the human act in its consequences as touching the doer
of the act, that is, in its effect upon the agent. For a human act once performed “lends a
kind of easiness” to a repetition of itself. In other words, human acts tend to form
habits of acting in the agent.

ARTICLE I. THE PROPERTIES OF HUMAN ACTS

a) Imputability b) Merit and Demerit

a) THE IMPUTABILITY OF HUMAN ACTS

A human act is, by definition, both knowing and free. It proceeds entirely from a
knowing and free agent, from a rational being. Thus it belongs to the agent; it is his act.
This is what is meant by saying that a human act is imputable to its agent, or that a
human act has the property of imputability.
Now, as we have seen, every human act has its morality; every human act, either
objectively or in its end or circumstances, is, as an individual deed done, a good or an
evil act. Hence it follows that, when an act is imputed to the agent, it is imputed to him
as good or evil. Thus imputability involves the notion of praiseworthiness or
culpability .
Human acts are imputable, and hence the agent is responsible, accountable,
answerable for them. He is answerable for them as good or evil, that is, he is
answerable for them on the score of their morality,

..and logically, his answer must be made to Him who imposes the Norm of Morality.
Imputability, therefore, means the accountability that man must bear for his human acts
before the Almighty God.
God has established an Eternal Law for his creatures, an eternal ordinance of the
Divine Reason to direct and guide all things to their proper last end, which is Himself,
His own external glory. All bodily creatures except man are necessitated by this law;
but within the field of application of the Eternal Law there is a special place for God’s
free creatures; and here man, while obligated by the Law, is not forced or necessitated.
Now man has reason, and very early in life, he acquires an equipment of reasoned
moral principles which are really recognitions of the Eternal Law, and these his
conscience applies in individual acts, so that he knows his obligation in evident moral
matters even when he disregards it. By these acts, then, man must stand; he cannot
disclaim them; they are his. And so we say that for every human act man stands liable
to answer at the bar of Reason--of human reason (conscience) here, and of Divine
Reason (God) hereafter. This, in fine, is the doctrine of the imputability of human acts.
 The extent of human imputability has, of necessity, been treated as a matter
pertinent to the very nature of human acts. The student is referred in particular to
Chapter I, Article 2, b.

b.) THE MERIT AND DEMERIT OF HUMAN ACTS

The dictionary defines merit as the quality, state or fact of deserving well or il. We may
divide this definition, and describe merit as the quality, state or fact of deserving well;
and we may describe demerit as the quality, state or fact of deserving ill.

Nor is merit (or demerit) only a “quality, state or fact” of human acts. It is a property of
such acts, since it belongs to them by natural necessity. For human acts being what
they are- free, knowing, imputable-it follows that good human acts “deserve well,”
while evil human acts “deserve ill” at the hands of the Ruler of the human acts. The
Ruler of the human acts is God. In the field of free choice God rules men by suasion,
not by force; and His rule is the Norm of Morality, that is Divine Reason (the Eternal
Law) and human reason (conscience). Thus, as the obedient subject of a true law
deserves well of the lawgiver, and as the disobedient subject deserves punishment, so
the agent of good human acts deserves well of God, the Divine Lawgiver, while the
agent of evil human acts deserves punishment. Thus we see that merit and demerit are
really extensions of the property of imputability in human acts: for such acts are
imputed to their agent as worthy of praise or blame, of reward or punishment. Still,
while a man “deserves well” for his good acts, he has in that fact no strict title to
reward: nor does the subject of human law look for a premium from the State for being
a good citizen. Something more is required to establish a claim to reward. The human
act which is good, and which confers a benefit upon him from whom reward is looked
for, a benefit not already due and a benefit for the conferring of which it is some such
is the human act which establishes a claim to reward.

Now, God has established his External Law. He has made sanctions for it, i.e.,
inducements to lead reasonable men to obey its prescriptions, and punishments to deter
men from violating them. By this very fact He has given promise of reward and threat
if punishment. Man cannot, indeed, confer a benefit, strictly so-called, upon God, for
man cannot give to God anything that is not already His ; the most loving and devoted
service man can render throughout his life is already owed to God. Still, by our good
acts we can honor God, although it were possible, by abuse of free will, to dishonor
Him ; and thus, in some sense, we can do what it is due Him, we render ourselves
liable in strict justice to punishment at His hands. But the real foundation of human
merit before God is the perfection of God Himself. God is necessarily true to His
promises ; and He who has implanted in the heart of man a quenchless thirst for
happiness, will not allow that thirst to exist in vain; that thirst will be satisfied unless
man, by evil human acts, rejects God who alone can satisfy it.

ARTICLE 2. THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTS

a.) Virtues b.)
Vices

A man does more easily that which he has done before, and the more frequent
the repetition of an act, the easier becomes its performance. In a word, human acts tend
to form habits. Since human acts have morality, the habit of performing any human act
will be a moral habit. If it is a good moral habit, it is a virtue. If it is an evil moral
habit, it is a vice. Vice and virtue are not matters of a single human act, nor of an act
once or twice repeated, but of an act frequently repeated. Frequent repetition of an act,
and in this strong inclination lies the active or operative habit of so acting.

Now the word “habit” is the only past participle of the Latin verb habere, “to
have.” Literally, it is “thing had,” a thing possessed. It also involves the notion of some
permanence in the possession. A habit is something that is not close to one, that is, so
to speak, carried about with one ordinarily, like a uniform dress - and, indeed, a
uniform dress is called “a habit.” Habits may affect a thing in its substance (entitative
habit) or in its active powers (operative habit). Thus, beauty or fatness is an entitative
habit; painting or typewriting is an operative habit. Virtues and vices are operative
moral habits.

a.) VIRTUES

The word virtue comes from the Latin word virtus. This Latin word was military and
meant the courage, the bravery of the soldier. The word is itself derived from the noun
vir, a man. Hence, virtue is, quite literally, manliness; it is the mark and characteristic
of the true and upright man. In Ethics, virtue signifies that habitual manliness and
power for good acts which arises from the frequent performance of such acts. It has a
special signification, too, and while we speak of virtue in general, as when we mention
“a virtuous person”, we also speak of virtues, using the plural advisedly, and referring
to different habits of acting well the special name of different virtues. Thus we speak
of the virtues of prudence, justice, etc. Thus, too, we speak of this or that virtue, or of a
virtue.

A virtue may be natural or supernatural; it may be infused into the soul by God, or
acquired by repeated acts; it may be physical virtue, and intellectual virtue, a
theological virtue, or a moral virtue. Thus, the native disposition one may have for
study is a natural virtue; divine Faith is a supernatural virtue; fortitude is an acquired
virtue; bodily strength or perfection is physical virtue; wisdom is an intellectual virtue;
faith is a theological virtue; fortitude is a moral virtue. In Ethics we deal only with
acquired moral virtues.

An acquired moral virtue is a morally good operative habit. It is a moral habit of acting
in accordance with the dictates of reason.
 The chief moral virtues are: prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance. These are
called cardinal virtues, and the name derives from the Latin cardo, a hinge; for as a
door depends for its proper action in opening and closing upon its hinges, so do all
moral virtues depend upon the “hinges” of the cardinal virtues. We shall say a word of
each of these four virtues.
i. Prudence is that virtue of the understanding which enables one quickly
and clearly to know, in concrete circumstances, the best means to an end,
and it further inclines one to take these means promptly and accurately.
Strictly, then, prudence is an intellectual virtue, not a moral (or “will”
virtue), but we list it with the moral virtues because it has an immediate
connection with the actual willing of the means to an end which this virtue
enables the understanding to grasp. The marks of prudence, as we may
learn from its definition, are a certain watchfulness and clear sightedness,
on the one hand, and cautious promptitude and precision on the other. A
prudent man is never precipitate or headlong; he does not embroil or
entangle a situation; he is nor cock-sure, headstrong, or self-confident.
Nor, on the other hand, is he weak, hesitant, or over cautious. For the
Christian, prudence, raised to the supernatural plane by grace, is a
thoroughly fundamental virtue. The ancients counselled prudence in their
axiom, “Virtue stands in the middle,” that is, virtue does not run to
extremes; prudence preserves the “meson” or sane balance of Aristotle,
and makes human action avoid the human action avoid the evil of falling
too short or of overreacting its object; it makes human action fall just right
according to the norm of right reason.
ii. Justice is the virtue which inclines one with constancy always to render to everyone his
own. Man has, by his rational nature, a clear knowledge of something owed to God, to
his country, and to his fellowmen, Justice is the virtue which steadily inclines man to
recognize and pay this debt. A just man, therefore, is a religious man, an obedient,
peace-loving, kind, grateful and truthful man.
iii. Fortitude is the virtue which inclines one to face dangers with intrepidity, especially
with such dangers as threaten life. Fortitude, like all virtues, observes the “meson”or
balance. It is not rashness, over-boldness, or presumptuous love of danger for its own
sake or for ostentation; nor, on the other hand, is it supineness or dead submission. It
involves a largeness of mind and soul, and combines with these the power of fadeless
endurance.
iv. Temperance is the virtue which controls one in the pursuit and use of pleasure of life,
especially of those pleasure that attract most strongly, and in while there is a
consequent danger of excess and disorder. Temperance keeps the desire and use of
sense-pleasures particularly, within the bounds of right and
reasonable action. Temperance, therefore, is not insensibility nor the extinction of
natural tendencies. It is the regulation of tendencies, the sane self-mastery which
reason (conscience) dictates.

B. VICES
A vice is a morally evil operative habit. A single evil human act is a sin. Vice is a habit
of sin. We distinguish different vices inasmuch as different habits if sin stand opposed
to virtues. For vice is a habitual lack of virtue; and it stands opposed to virtue either by
defect or by excess. Virtue stands in the middle, being neither defective nor excessive
when measured by the requirements of right reason; while vice lies upon either hand.
To give but a few examples of vice as opposed to the cardinal moral virtues:
Opposed to prudence by defect we find, among other vices, imprudence,
precipitateness, lack of docility, carelessness, improvidence, etc. Opposed to prudence
by excess, we find the vices of over-solicitude, smartness, trickery, fraud, etc.
Opposed to justice we find the vices of injustice, irreligion, impiety, irreverence,
mendacity, ingratitude, cruelty, etc.
Opposed to fortitude we find weak spiritedness, inconsistency, impatience, etc., as
vices by defect; while we find the following as vices by excess: presumptuous
boldness, stubbornness, insensibility, etc.

Opposed to temperance by defect we find pride, lust, anger, gluttony, etc.; while we
find opposed by excess the vices of fanatical rigorousness, too great self-effacement of
self-abjection, affectation, morose and gloomy conduct, etc.

Application of Ends and Property of Imputability of Human Acts

Scenario:
(Inspired by the online love team vloggers called “Jamill” of Jayzam Manabat
and Camille Trinidad)
Cams and James are in a relationship for more than 7 years. With those
memories together, James cheated on Cams with another girl named Ica. He
knows that it will hurt Cams and destroy the life of the two girls, but he still
continued and think that it is just okay if he will not get caught. James finds the
act of cheating with Ica gratifying and willingly engages into it. One day, Ica
was deceived by James. James opened up to Ica that he doesn't see his future
with Cams and assured Ica that their conversation and their relationship would
be kept in private. But, one day, Cho exposed their closeness to his sister
Cams. Then, everything messed up. Ica and James' affair ended almost
immediately after it became public. For James, being discovered in his
wrongdoings with Ica means the end of another target. Since all activities have
to come to an end. It was supposed to stop, just like their romance, because
James is still committed to Cams, even though he's cheating with Ica.In the
end, whether James chooses one of the girls or the other, there will always be
a breakup.

In the above scenario, cheating is the human act. Cheating is a free act
wherein the will is under the control of the doer. Wherein James action which is
cheating emerges from his will act and accompanied with the knowledge that
by doing such act his girlfriend as well as Ica will get hurt in the process.
Nevertheless, he still execute it regardless of knowing the ahead
consequences that it will hurt and destroy the life of the two girls. Voluntarism
in order to be present must have both the free will and knowledge of the doer
which is very evident in the act done by James . Therefore, cheating is the
human act which emerges from the free will, knowledge and voluntarism of the
doer which is James. In correlation of end of human act, James is the agent
who was willed to act upon his desires. He was also aware how wrongful his
actions are yet he was willing to do it anyway. His actions were motivated by
his desire to cheat, in which in return, gave him satisfaction. But all of this has
to end since James desires were met, therefore an end of an activity. In any
angle, this activity tends to end because of the fact that in any other way
around what he was doing was morally wrong. So, in the scenario, when the
affair was uncovered, it immediately ended. Thus, the goal was accomplished
and termination of the activity was established. In terms of the property of
imputability, the doer is liable for such acts or effects when the three conditions
are fulfilled: (1) the agent must be able to foresee the evil effect, (2) the agent
must be free to refrain from doing that which is the cause of the evil effect, and
(3) the agent must be morally bound not to do that which is the cause of the
evil effect. In this case, James knew that the act of cheating would definitely
torment Cams, but he still eagerly performed this act. However, James was
able to foresee the evil effect of his action. The act that he performed torment
the people he cares about including his own family and their supporters. The
moment he foresees the effects of his action, he admitted everything to Cams
and to their family. The doer conceded everything not to inflict more
disappointment and pain on those people who were involved and to those
people who got affected by their issue, but because of his guilt. In this manner,
the doer of this such act is imputed to the action that he incited towards those
individuals who were victims of his deed and voluntarily endure the blames and
the hurtful words that his supporters say about him.
Sources:

Encyclopedia.com. (2021, May 22). ." New Catholic Encyclopedia.

Encyclopedia.com. 15 Apr. 2021 . Encyclopedia.com.
https://www.encyclopedia.com/religion/encyclopediasalmanacs-transcripts-
and-maps/human-act.

Kent Matienzo Follow. (2013, February 23).

Ethics(final). SlideShare. https://www.slideshare.net/kentmatienzo/ethicsfinal.

Monde, J. (2021, April 17). Jamill Issue: Jayzam Speaks About "Cheating"
Issue, Here's Statement. Philippine News.
https://philnews.ph/2021/04/17/jamill-issue-jayzam-speaksabout-cheating-
issue-heres-statement/.

ENCODED BY: BSPT-2B

Page 1
CHAPTER 1

THE ETHICAL DIMENSION OF

HUMAN EXISTENCE
Chapter Objectives
After reading this chapter, you should be able to:
1. Identify the ethical aspect of human life and the scope of ethical
thinking;
2. Define and explain the terms that are relevant to ethical thinking; and
3. Evaluate the difficulties that are involved in maintaining certain
commonly-held notions on ethics.

INTRODUCTION
In August 2007, newspapers reported what seemed to be yet another
sad incident of fraternity violence. Cris Anthony Mendez, a twenty-year-old
student of the University of the Philippines (UP), was rushed to the hospital in
the early morning hours, unconscious, with large bruises on his chest, back,
and legs. He passed away that morning, and the subsequent autopsy report
strongly suggests that his physical injuries were most probably the result of
“hazing” (“the term colloquially used to refer to initiation rites in which
neophytes may be subjected to various forms of physical abuse). What exactly
happened remains an open question, as none of those who were with him that
night came forward to shed light on what had transpired. Needless to say, none
of them came forward to assume responsibility for the death of Cris.

Even as the leaders of Sigma Rho fraternity publicly denounced the

death of Cris, those members of theirs who had been with him that night
vanished, avoiding and refusing to cooperate with legal authorities. Meanwhile,
UP students and the general public clamored for justice. In a move that
surprised the student body, the UP chancellor called on all fraternities to justify
their continued existence. Meanwhile, the case of the tragic death of Cris
Anthony Mendez was left unresolved. It remains that way up to this day.

No one knows just what exactly happened. No charges have been filed,
no definitive testimony has been forthcoming. But there is more to this for us
than just a criminal mystery. Pondering on the death of Cris, we may find
ourselves asking questions such as “What is the value of one’s life?” “What
exactly were the wrongs done to Cris by his so-called fraternity brothers?” or
perhaps even “Is there any good to fraternities?” These questions that concern
good and bad, right or wrong -- and these are questions concerning value --
are the kind of questions that we deal with in ethics.

VALUE

Ethics, generally speaking, is about matters such as the good thing that we
should pursue and the bad thing that we should avoid; the right ways in which
we could or should act and the wrong ways of acting. It is about what is
accepted and unacceptable in human behavior. It may involve obligations that
we are expected to fulfill, prohibitions that we are required to respect, or ideals
that we are encouraged to meet. Ethics as a subject for us to study is about
determining the grounds for the values with particular and special significance
to human life.

CLARIFICATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY

Recognizing the notions of good and bad, and right and wrong, are the
primary concern of ethics. In order to start, it would be useful for us to clarify
the following points.

Kinds of Valuation

Our first point of clarification is to recognize that there are instances

when we make value judgments that are not considered to be part of ethics.
For instance, I could say that this new movie I had just seen was a “good” one
because I enjoyed it, or asong I had just heard on the radio was a “bad” one
because it had an unpleasant tone, but these are not part of a discussion of
ethics. I may have an option as to what is the “right” dip (sawsawan) for my
chicken barbecue, or I may maintain that it is “wrong” to wear a leather vest
over a Barong Tagalog, and these are not concerns of ethics. These are
valuations that fall under the domain of aesthetics. The word “aesthetics” is
derived from the Greek word aesthesis (“sense” or “feeling”) and refers to the
judgments of personal approval or disapproval that we make about what we
see, hear, smell, or taste. In fact, we often use the word “taste” to refer to the
personal aesthetic preferences that we have on these matters, such as “his
taste in music” or “her taste in clothes”.

Similarly, we have a sense of approval or disapproval concerning certain

actions, which can be considered relatively more trivial in nature. Thus, for
instance, I may think that it is “right” to knock politely at someone's door while it
is “wrong” to barge into one’s office. Perhaps I may approve of a child who
knows how to ask for something properly by saying, “please” and otherwise,
disapprove of woman that I see picking her nose in public. These and other
similar examples belong to the category of etiquette, which is concerned with
right and wrong actions, but those which might be considered not quite grave
enough to belong to a discussion on ethics. To clarify this point, we can
differentiate how I may be displeased seeing a young man refuse to offer his
seat on the bus to an elderly lady but my indignation and shock would be much
greater if I were to see a man deliberately pushed another one out of a moving
bus.

We can also consider how a notion of right and wrong actions can easily
appear in a context that is not a matter of ethics. This could also be when
learning how to bake, for instance. lam told that the right thing to do would be
to mix the dry ingredients first, such as flour or sugar before bringing in any
liquids, like milk or cream this is the right thing to do in baking, but not one that
belongs to a discussion of ethics. This could also be when learning how to play
basketball. lam instructed that it is against the rules to walk more than two
steps without dribbling the ball; again, obeying this rule to not travel is
something that makes sense only in the context of the game and is not an
ethical prohibition. We derive from the Greek word techne the English words
“technique" and "technical" which are often used to refer to a proper way (or
right way) of doing things, but a technical valuation (or right and wrong
technique of doing things) may not necessarily be an ethical one as these
examples show.

Recognizing the characteristics of aesthetic and technical valuation

allows us to have a rough guide as to what belongs to a discussion of ethics.
They involve valuations that we make in a sphere of human actions,
characterized by certain gravity and concern the human well-being or human
life itself. Therefore, matters that concern life and death such as war, capital
punishment, or abortion and matters that concern human well-being such as
poverty, inequality, or sexual identity are often included in discussions of
ethics. However, this general description is only a starting point and will require
further elaboration.

One complication that can be noted is that the distinction between what
belongs to ethics and what does not is not always so clearly defined. At times,
the question of what is grave or trivial is debatable, and sometimes some of the
most heated discussions in ethics could be on the fundamental question of
whether a certain sphere of human activities belongs to this discussion. Are
clothes always just a matter of taste or would provocative clothing call for some
kind of moral judgment? Can we say that a man who verbally abuses his
girlfriend is simply showing bad manners or does this behavior deserve
stronger moral condemnation?

Ethics and Morals

Our second point of clarification is on the use of the words 'ethics" and
"morals: This discussion of ethics and morals would include cognates such as
ethical, unethical, immoral, amoral, morality, and so on. As we proceed, we
should be careful particularly on the use of the word "not" when applied to the
words "moral" or “ethical" as this can be ambiguous. One might say that
cooking is not ethical, that is, the act of cooking does not belong to a
discussion of ethics; on the other hand, one might say that lying is not ethical,
but the meaning here is that the act of lying would be an unethical act.

Let us consider those two words further. The term “morals” may be used
to refer to specific beliefs or attitudes that people have or to describe acts that
people perform. Thus, it is sometimes said that an individual's personal
conduct is referred to as his morals, and if he falls short of behaving properly,
this can be described as immoral. However, we also have terms such as “moral
judgment” or “moral reasoning”, which suggests a more rational aspect. The
term “ethics” can be spoken of as the discipline of studying and understanding
ideal human and ideal ways of thinking. Thus, ethics is acknowledged as an
intellectual discipline belonging to philosophy. However, acceptable and
unacceptable behaviors are also generally described as ethical and unethical
respectively. In addition, with regard to the acceptable and unacceptable ways
of behaving in a given field, we have the term “professional ethics” (e.g. legal
ethics for the proper comportment of lawyers and other people in the legal
profession; medical ethics for doctors and nurses; and media ethics for writers
and reporters).

Therefore, various thinkers and writers posit a distinction between the

terms “moral” and “ethics” and they may have good reasons for doing so, but
there is no consensus as to how to make that distinction. Ordinary
conversations presents a much less rigid distinction between terms, and in this
book, we will learn in that direction as we do not need to occupy ourselves here
with the question of how different thinkers and writers construe that distinction.
So, in this book, we will be using the terms “ethical” and
“moral” (likewise, “ethics” and “morality”) interchangeably.

Philosophy is commonly thought of today as a particular discipline in a

college curriculum, perhaps a subject that one could take, or a course in which
one could get a degree. The word “philosophy” is rooted in the Greek words
that translate to “love of wisdom” (philia is the noun often translated into
English as some form of “friendship” or “love”. While Sophia is the noun often
translated into English as “wisdom”). More specifically, the word “philosophy”
had been first used by thinkers to refer to their striving to better understand
reality in a maintained and systematic manner. Historically speaking, it can be
said that philosophy started among the ancient Greeks around two and a half
thousand years ago, when certain people in the Mediterranean made the
mental effort trying to make sense of the world and of human life in a unique
way. As time passed, asking certain specific questions would develop into
specific methods; these particular topics and the ways of addressing them
established themselves as disciplines in that asks significant questions that
other fields are unable to address. The different branches or areas of
philosophy correspond to some of these questions, generally stated as follows:
metaphysics wonders as to what constitutes the whole of reality; epistemology
asks what is our basis for determining what we know; axiology refers broadly to
the study of value and is often divided into aesthetics, which concerns itself
with the value of beauty, and ethics, which concerns itself with the value of
human actions.

Descriptive and normative study

Descriptive study of ethics is on how people make their moral stand

points without having any judgement. this type usually work for social scientist.
on the other hand, a normative study of ethics engages the question: “what
could or should be considered as the right way of acting?” A normative
discussion directs what we want to maintain as bases or standards for moral
valuation. Always remember that a philosophical discussion of ethics engages
in a critical consideration of strengths and weaknesses of these theories.

Issue, Decision, Judgement, and Dilemma

A moral issue is a situation that calls for moral valuation. the term issue
is often used to refer to situations that can cause a debate. To make a moral
decision, it is when we are placed in a situation and confronted by the choice of
what to do. but when one is observing to make an assessment on the chosen
behavior, the person is making a moral judgement. lastly, when we are on the
matter of choosing right over wrong, or good over bad, and considering the
complicated situation wherein we feel torn on deciding, this is called moral
dilemma.

From a number of possible actions, and there are compelling ethical reasons
for the various choices. A mother may be conflicted between wanting to feed
her hungry child, but then recognizing that it would be wrong for her to steal is
an example of moral dilemma.

REASONING

Why do we suppose that a certain way of acting is right and its opposite
wrong? The study of ethics is interested in questions like these: Why do we
decide to consider this way of acting as acceptable while that way of acting, its
opposite, is unacceptable? To put it in another way, what reasons do we give
to decide or to judge that a certain way of acting is either right or wrong?

A person’s fear of punishment or desire for reward can provide him a reason
for acting in a certain way. It is common to hear someone say: “I did not cheat
on the exam because I was afraid that I might get caught.” Or “I looked after
my father in the hospital because I wanted to get a higher allowance.” In a
certain sense, fear of punishment and desire for reward can be spoken of as
giving someone a “reason” for acting in a certain way. But the question then
would be: Is this reason good enough? That is to say, this way of thinking
seems to be a shallow way of understanding reason because it does not show
any true understanding of why cheating on an exam is wrong or why looking
after a member of my family is in itself a good thing. The promise of rewards
and the fear of punishments can certainly motivate us to act, but are not in
themselves a determinant of the rightness or wrongness of a certain way of
acting or of the good or the bad in a particular pursuit. Is it possible to find
better reasons for finding a certain way of acting either acceptable or
unacceptable?

I am in a situation wherein I could obtain a higher grade for myself by

cheating. I make the decision not to do so. Or I know that my firend was in a
position to get a better grade for herself by cheating. She refuses to do so; I
then make the judgment of praising her for this. In making this kind of moral
decision or moral judgment, the question can be asked: Why?

Asking the question “why” might bring us to no more than a superficial

discussion of rewards and punishments, as seen above, but it could also bring
us to another level of thinking. Perhaps one can rise above the particulars of a
specific situation, going beyond whatever motivation or incentive is present in
this instance of cheating (or not doing so). In other words, our thinking may
 take on a level of abstraction, that is, detaching itself from the particular
situation and arriving at a statement like, “Cheating is wrong.” by recognizing
proper reasons for not acting in this way. Beyond rewards and punishments, it
is possible for our moral valuation—our decisions and judgments—to based on
a principle. Thus, one may conclude that cheating is wrong based on a sense
of fair play or a respect for the importance and validity of testing. From this, we
can define principles as rationally established grounds by which one justifies
and maintains her moral decisions and judgements.

But why do we maintain one particular principle rather than another? Why should
I maintain that I should care for fair play and that cheating is, therefore, wrong?
Returning to the case of fraternity hazing where we started this chapter, why is
it wrong to cause another person physical injury or to take another’s life? We
can maintain principles, but we can also ask what good reasons for doing so.
Such reasons may differ. So, for example what makes the death of Cris such a
tragedy? One person may say that life is sacred and God – given. Another
person may declare that human life has a priceless dignity. Still another may
put forward the idea that taking another’s life does not contribute to human
happiness but to turn to theory. A moral theory is a systematic attempt to
establish the validity of maintaining certain moral principles. Insofar as a theory
is a system of thought or of ideas, it can also be ideas, and at the same time, a
structure though which we can evaluate our reasons for valuing a certain
decision or judgement.

There are different frameworks that can make us reflect on the principles
that we maintain and thus, the decisions an judgements we make. By studying
these, we can reconsider, clarify, modify and ultimately strengthen our
principles, thereby informing better both our moral judgements and moral
decisions.

The next chapters of this book will explore different ethical frameworks
that have come down from the history of philosophy. This is not an exhaustive
list, and many worthwhile theories and thinkers have been set aside. But the
choice had been made to discuss more deeply and at greater length just a few
of the more significant and influential thinkers and ideas that have contributed
to ethical discernment.

Plato (427-347 BCE)

The Greek thinker Plato is credited as one of the pioneers of

philosophy as his various writings bring up and discuss carefully and
creatively some of the questions that later thinkers will find to be of
lasting significance to humankind, such as “Can virtue be taught?”
“What is beauty?” and “What is love?” He started a school in Athens
which would be known as the Academy and is believed to be the first
institution of higher learning in the Western world.

In the Apology of Socrates written by Plato, Socrates makes the claim

that it is the greatest good for a person to spend time thinking about and
discussing with others these questions on goodness and virtue. Hopefully as
we pursue these topics, you will come to agree with Socrates that this effort is
indeed a good thing. We will be returning To Plato later in this chapter, as he
guides us though some further difficulties.
--
PAGE 8 ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN EXISTENCE

Before turning to the ethical theories, we will spend the rest of this
chapter exploring certain notions of ethics that are commonly maintained, but
further thought on these notions will reveal that these are quite problematic.
This involve either an appeal, a particular form of authority or to a particular
way of understanding the self.

SOURCES OF AUTHORITY

Several common ways of thinking about ethics are based on the idea
that the standards of valuation are imposed by a higher authority that
commands our obedience in the following section, we will explore 3 of such
ideas: the authority of the law, the authority of one's religion and the authority
of one's culture

LAW

It is supposed that law is one's guide to ethical behavior. In the

Philippines, Filipinos are constrained to obey the laws of the land as stated in
the country's criminal and civil codes. Making this even more particular, in
Cebu, residents are constrained to follow any provincial laws or city
ordinances. One can easily imagine this becoming even more localized to the
barangay or village level, where the local or municipal layers of obligation are
their for residents to follow. The term positive law refers to the different rules
and regulations that are posited or are put forward by an authority that figure
require compliance.

At first glance, this seems to make a lot of sense. We recognize that

there are many acts that we immediately consider unethical (e.g. Murder or
theft). Which we also know are forbidden by law. Furthermore, the law is
enforced by way of a system of sanctions administered through persons and
institutions, which all help in compelling us to obey. Taking the law to be the
basis of ethics has the benefits with providing us with an objective standard
that is obligatory and applicable to all. So we would not be surprised if we were
to hear someone say, "Ethics? It is simple... Just follow whatever the law says."

However, there are some problems with this. Of course, we do maintain

that, generally speaking, one should obey the law. However, the idea that we
are examining here is a more controversial one: the more radical claim that one
can look to the law itself in order to determine what is right or wrong. But the
question is: can one simply identify ethics with the law?

One point to be raised is the prohibited nature of law. The law does not
tell us what we should do; it works by constraining us from performing acts that
we should not do. To put it slightly differently, the law cannot tell us what to
pursue, only what to avoid. Would we be satisfied thinking about ethics solely
from the negative perspective of that which we may not do, disregarding the
important aspect of a good which we could and maybe even should do, even if
it were not required of us by the law?
---
Page 9

in line with this, we might find that there are certain ways of acting which are
not forbidden by the law, but are ethically questionable to us. For instance, a
company that pads its profits by refusing to give its employees benefits may do
so within the parameters of the law. The company can do so by refusing to hire
people on a permanent basis, but offering them six-month contracts.
Constrained to work under this contractual system the employees are thus
deprived not only of benefits, but also of job security. Here, no law is violated,
yet one can wonder whether there is something ethically questionable to this
business practice. The fact that one can make such a negative value judgment
of the practice where there is no violation of the law is already a hint that one
can look to something beyond the law when making our ethical valuations.

To make this point concrete, recall the story of a toddler who had been
run over by a couple of vehicles. While there were many passers-by who
witnessed what had happened, for quite a long while, no one did anything to
help. The child later died in the hospital The law does not oblige people to help
others in need, so none of these passers-by were guilty of breaking any law.
However, many people reacting to this sad news report share a sense that
those passers-by were somewhat ethically culpable in their negligence. In view
of all this, perhaps one should think of ethics in a way that does not simply
identify it with obedience to the law. Later, we shall see how the concept of law
is creatively utilized in the Deontology of Immanuel Kant in a more ethically
significant way.

RELIGION
 "Love the Lord, Your God, therefore, and always heed his charge: his
statutes. decrees, and commandments." (New American Bible) This verse is
the first line of Chapter 11 of the book of Deuteronomy. It expresses a claim
that many people of a religious sensibility find appealing and immediately valid:
the idea that one is obliged to obey her God in all things. As a foundation for
ethical values, this is referred to as the divine command theory. The divinity
called God. Allah, or Supreme Being commands and one is obliged to obey her
Creator. There are persons and texts that one believes are linked to the Divine.
By listening to these figures and reading these writings, an individual discovers
how the Divine wants her to act. Further, someone maintaining a more radical
form of this theory might go beyond these instruments of divine revelation and
claim that God "spoke to her directly to instruct her what to do.

At first glance, this seems to make a lot of sense. Many of us had been
brought up with one form of religious upbringing or another so it is very
possible that there is a strong inclination in us to refer to our religious
background to back up our moral valuations. We are presented with a more-or-
less clear code of prohibitions and many of these prohibitions given by religion-
Thou shall not kill" "Thou shall not steal" and "Thou shall not commit adultery"
seem to intuitively coincide with our sense of what ethics should nightly
demand In addition, there is an advance here over the law because religion is
not simply prohibitive but it also provides Ideals to pursue. For instance, one
may be called to forgive those who
--
Page 10

sinned against him or be charitable to those who have less. Further, taking
religion as basis of ethics has the advantages of providing us with not only a
set of commands but also a Supreme Authority that can inspire and compel our
obedience in a way that nothing else can. The Divine can command absolute
obedience on one’s part as the implications of her actions involve her ultimate
destiny. Thus, we would not be surprised if we were to hear someone say,
“Ethics? It is simple. Just follow whatever your religion says.”

However, there are some problems with this. First, on the practical level,
we realize the presence of a multiplicity of religions. Each faith demands
differently from its adherents, which would apparently result in conflicting
ethical standards. For instance, certain religions have prohibitions concerning
what food may be consumed, while others do not share the same constraints.
Are we then compelled to judge others negatively given their different morality?
Are we called upon to convert them toward our own faith? How about the
problem of realizing that not everyone is devout or maintains a religious faith?
Would we be compelled to admit then that if religion is the basis of morality,
some people would simply have no moral code? Differences, however, are not
confined to being problematic of varying religious traditions. Experience
teaches us that sometimes even within one and the same faith, difference can
be a real problem. For instance, we easily imagine a number of Christians
agreeing that they should read and find their inspiration from the Bible; but we
could also easily imagine them disagreeing on which particular lines they need
to focus on. Which of the passages from the sacred Scriptures are they
supposed to follow? All of them or only some? If so, which ones? Which pastor
am I supposed to obey if I find them debating over how to interpret the
scriptures, not to mention ethical issues? The problem of difference thus
remains.

Second, on what may be called a more conceptual level, we can see a

further problem where one requires the believer to clarify her understanding of
the connection between ethics and the Divine. This problem was first
elucidated in the history of thought by Plato in his dialogue titled Euthyphro.
--

In the exchange between Socrates and Euthyphro, the question is

raised as to how one is supposed to define “holiness.” Euthyphro puts forward
the idea that what is holy is loved by the gods. Socrates calls this into question
by asking for the following clarification: Is it holy only because it is loved by the
gods, or it is holy in itself and that is why it is loved by the gods? The relevance
of these questions to our discussion becomes clear of rephrased this way. Is it
the case that something is right only becauseGod commanded it, or is it the
case that something is right in itself and that is why God commanded it?

If we presume that taking another’s life is wrong, we can ask the

question: Is it the cause that this is so only because God commanded it, or that
killing is in itself wrong, and that is the reason why God commanded it? If we
were to accept that it is wrong to take another’s life because God commanded
it, we are left with the difficult conclusion that there is nothing inherently wrong
with killing. It is only because God said so- “Thou shall not kill”- that we
consider such an act wrong. It would seem than that there is something
arbitrary about it all, in the sense that God could will whatever He wants. On
that basis and nothing further, we gave the distinction between right from
wrong. As a further disturbing thought, we may find an occasion wherein we
could believe that God is suddenly commanding us to do otherwise- that killing
might now become acceptable. History reveals many sad instances of people
believing that God so wills it, allowing them to kill their fellow human beings in
His name. The Crusades of the Middle Ages are a tragic case in point. Can we
be satisfied with this idea that the divine will could be arbitrary?

If, on the other hand, we were to accept that killing is in itself wrong,
then we acknowledge that perhaps there are standards of right and wrong that
we can refer to independently of God. But if this is the case, then we actually
do not obey a command because God commanded it, but we are looking for
those objective standards of right and wrong, to which God simply concurs.
One would not even have to think in terms of obeying God- or even believing in
Him- in order to abide by such ethical standards.

Having said this, we maintain that, generally speaking, it is a good thing

for a person of = faith to abide by the teachings of her particular religion. But
the divine command theory demands more that this as it requires us to identify
the entire sense of right and wrong with what religion dictates. The conceptual
problem we have seen and the practical difficulties of simply basing ethics on
the divine command are reasons enough for us to wonder whether we have to
set this way of thinking aside. Now, let us clarify this point: Our calling into
question of the divine command theory is not a calling into question of one’s
belief in God; it is not intended to be challenge to one’s faith, instead it is an
invitation to consider whether there may be more creative and less problematic
ways of seeing the connection between faith and ethics, rather than simply
equating what is ethical with whatever one takes to be commanded by God.

Later, we shall see one way that we can have a more subtle and yet
powerful presentation of how one’s faith may contribute to ethical thought when
we look at the Natural Law theory of Thomas Aquinas.

CULTURE

Our exposure to different societies and their cultures makes us aware

that there are ways of thinking and valuing that are different from our own, that
there is in fact a wide diversity of how different people believe it is proper to act.
There are aesthetic differences (Japanese art vs. Indian art), religious
differences (Buddhism vs. Christianity), and etiquette differences, (conflicting
behaviors regarding dining practices). In this basis, it may become easy to
conclude that this case in ethics as well. There are also various examples that
seem to bear these out nudity can be more taboo in one culture than in
another. Another example would be how relations between men and women
can show a wide variety across different cultures, ranging from greater liberality
and equality on one hand to greater inequality and a relation of dominance
versus submission on the other. From the reality of diversity, it is possible for
someone to jump to the further claim that the sheer variety at work in the
different ways of valuation means there is no single universal standard for such
valuations, and that this holds true as well in the realm of ethics. Therefore,
what is ethically acceptable or unacceptable is relative to, or that is to say,
dependent on one’s culture. This position is referred to as cultural relativism.
 There is something appealing to this way of thinking because cultural
relativism seems to conform to what we experience, which is the reality of the
differences in how cultures make their ethical valuations. Second, by taking
one’s culture as the standard, we are provided a basis for our valuations. Third,
this teaches us to be tolerant of the others from different cultures as we realize
that we are in no position to judge whether the ethical thought or practice of
another culture is acceptable or unacceptable. In turn, our own culture’s moral
code is neither superior too nor inferior to any other, but they would provide us
the standards that are appropriate and applicable to us. So, we would not be
surprised if we were to hear someone say, “Ethics? It is simple. Just follow
whatever your culture says.”

The discussion would not be complete if we were to ignore the topic of Filipino values. Early in
our upbringing, we were taught about certain valuable traits that we say are characteristics of
Filipinos, such as respect for the elderly, close family ties, a sense of hospitality, and also o
solidarity with others at times of distress. We proudly say that we value these qualities of
Filipinos. These are indeed laudable qualities, but could we simply identify ethics with the
positive valuations that we make of these qualities? We will be discussing these related
questions more thoroughly in the last chapter.

Tempting as this idea is, there are problems. In a classic exposition of

this topic by James Rachels, he presents some of these difficulties. The first
three points in the following paragraphs are a brief restatement of some of his
criticisms of cultural relativism; these are followed by an additional fourth point
of criticism based on more recent and more contextualized observations.

-
-

First, the argument of cultural relativism is premised on the reality of

difference because different cultures have different moral codes, we cannot
say that any one moral code is the right one. But is it a case of the presence of
disagreement means there are no right or wrong answers? Isn't it a common
experience to be confronted by a disagreement between persons and then to
have the conflict clarified later as to who is right or wrong In other words,
disagreement may mean that the question of who is right or wrong is not
immediately evident, but it does not necessarily mean that there is no one
correct resolution

Second, under cultural relativism, we realize that we are in no position to

render any kind of judgment on the practices of another culture. This seems to
be a generous and an open-minded way of respecting others. But what if the
practice seems to call for comment? What if a particular African tribe thought it
is advantageous and therefore right for them to wipe out a neighboring people
through a terrible practice of genocide? What if some Middle Eastern country
was highly repressive toward women reaching to the point of violence? What
about the traditional practice of head-hunting that is still maintained by certain
societies in the Cordilleras? Are we in no position to judge any of this as
wrong? Would we be satisfied with concluding that we cannot judge another
culture? But this is one of the implications of cultural relativism.

Third, under cultural relativism, we realize that we are in no position to

render judgment on the practices of even our own culture. If our culture was
the basis for determining right and wrong, we would be unable to say that
something within our cultural practice was problematic, precisely because we
take our culture to be the standard for making such judgments. If we came from
a particular society wherein there is a tradition of arranged marriage, we would
simply have to accept that this is how we do things. But what if we are not
satisfied by this conclusion? We may be proud and glad about identifying
certain traits, values, and practices of our culture, but we may not necessarily
laud or wish to conform to all of them. It is possible that we may not be satisfied
with the thought of not being able to call our own culture into question,

Fourth, perhaps the most evident contemporary difficulty with cultural

relativism is that we can maintain it only by following the presumption of culture
as a single, clearly defined substance or as something fixed and already
determined. Now, it is always possible to find examples of a certain culture
having a unique practice or way of life and to distinguish it from other cultures'
practices, but it is also becoming increasingly difficult to determine what exactly
defines one's culture.

Is my culture "Filipino"? What if I identify more with a smaller subset

within this group, if, for example, I am Igorot? Is this then my culture? Why not
go further and define my culture as being Kankana-ey rather than Ibaloi? Is this
then my culture? The point he precisely is the question: What am I supposed to
take as "my culture"? We can think of many other examples that reflect the
same problem. Let us say that my father is from Pampanga and my mother is
from Leyte, and I was brought up in Metro
-

Manila: What is my culture? On one hand, let us say that my father is American
and my mother is Filipina, and I was brought up in San Diego, California, but I
am currently studying in a university in the Philippines. What am I supposed to
take as “my culture”? In an increasingly globalized world, the notion of a static
and well-defined culture gives way to greater flexibility and integration. One
result of this is to call into question an idea like cultural relativism, which only
makes sense if one could imagine a clear-cut notion of what can be defined as
my culture.

We can conclude this criticism of cultural relativism by pointing out how it is a

problem in our study of ethics because it tends to deprive us of our use of
critical thought. On the positive side, cultural relativism promotes a sense of
humility, that is urging us not to imagine that our own culture is superior to
another. Such humility, however, should go hand in hand with a capacity for a
rational, critical discernment that is truly appreciative of human values.
Unfortunately, what happens in cultural relativism is that it basically renders us
incapable of discerning about the values we may wish to maintain as we are
forced to simply accept whatever our culture gives us. It keeps us from
exploring whether there are values that are shared between cultures; it keeps
us from comparing and judging — either positively or negatively— the
valuations that are made by different cultures. As previously mentioned, this
presumes that we can determine culture in the first place, which becomes
increasingly questionable in a transcultural world. As with our earlier discussion
on the law and religion, this is not to set aside culture entirely as if it were
irrelevant. Instead, we are urged to think more carefully about how one’s
understanding of her belonging to a certain culture could be more fruitful and
meaningful for her ethical discernment. We will explore this further in the last
chapter

SENSES OF THE SELF

It is sometimes thought that one should not rely on any external authority to tell
oneself what the standards of moral valuation are, but should instead turn
inwards. In this section, we will look into three theories about ethics that center
on the self: subjectivism, psychological egoism, and ethical egoism.

SUBJECTIVISM

The starting point of subjectivism is the recognition that the individual

thinking person (the subject)is at the heart of all moral valuations. She is the
one who is confronted.
--

With the situation and is burdened with the need to make a decision or
judgment. From this point, subjectivism leaps to the more radical claim that the
individual is the sole determinant of what is morally good or bad, right or wrong.
A number of clichés familiar to us would echo this idea:
“No one can tell me what is right and wrong.”

“No one knows my situation better than myself.”

 “I am entitled to my own opinion.”

“It is good if I say that it is good.”

There is something appealing about these statements because they

may seem to express a cherished sense of personal independence. But a
close look at these statements may reveal problems and in seeing these, we
see the problem of subjectivism.

“No one can tell me what is right and wrong.” In a sense, there is some
validity to this. No one can compel another to accept a certain value of
judgment if she herself does not concur with it. However, we know that this
statement cannot be taken as absolute. We realize, in many instances, that we
had maintained an idea or an opinion that further discussion reveals it as
actually erroneous. We realize that we can be mistaken and that we can be
corrected by other. Why is this not also possible applicable when we are
speaking of ethics?

“No one knows my situation better than myself.” Once again, in a sense,
there is some validity to this. This particular person who is put in a certain
situation, which calls for a decision, has knowledge of the factors that affect her
situation and decision. But to take this fact as a ground for not listening to
others is to have a mentality that imagines that one’s own situation or concern
is so personal and unique that there is no way another person can possibly
understand her and give her any meaningful advice. But does not it make
greater sense to recognize the reality that many human experiences are
common and that others may have something useful to suggest?

“I am entitled to my own opinion.” Here, once again, is a valid point that

is often misused. Certainly, each person has the right to believe what she
believes and has the right to express this. But this right is often stubbornly
misconstrued as some kind of immunity from criticism and correction. A bigoted
racist has an opinion against anyone who is dark-skinned, an anti-Semite has
an opinion against Jews, and a misogynist has an opinion against women. We
realize that these opinions are highly problematic because there is no basis for
considering any of these groups of people as inferior. We would rightly be
indignant about an employer who pays his female employees less than the
male employees, simply because he is of the opinion that women are inferior to
men. But isn’t he entitled to his own opinion? To insist on one’s right in having
opinions whatever these happens to be is to exhibit a closed-mindedness that
rightly invites censure from someone trying to think more critically about values.

--
 “It is good if I say that it is good.” With this line, we get to the heart of the
problem with subjectivism. The statement implies: “It is my personal
consideration of X as good that makes X good. X good on the basis of my
saying so.” The problem now becomes: “What is my basis for saying X is
good?” This renders subjectivism an untenable view for someone who is
interested in ethics. It takes the fact that I am the subject making the valuation
and uses this fact as the very basis for that valuation. But when “I,” as subject,
am asking what is right or wrong, good or bad, with subjectivism, there is no
other basis that I can look toward.

PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM

Let us consider another cliché. It would go like this: “Human beings are
naturally self-centered, so all our actions are always already motivated by self-
interest.”

This is the stance taken by, psychological egoism, which is a theory that
describes the underlying dynamic behind all human actions. As a descriptive
theory, it does not direct one to act in any particular way. Instead, it points out
that there is already an underlying basis for how one acts. The ego or self has
its desires and interests, an all our actions are geared toward satisfying these
interests.

This may not seem particularly problematic when we consider many of

the actions that we do on a day-to-day basis. I watch a movie or read a book
because I want to, or go for a walk and do some window shopping in the mall
because I enjoy that. I take a certain course in college because I think it will
benefit me, or I join an organization because I will get some good out of it. We
do things in pursuit of our own self-interest all the time.

But what about other types of behavior that we would commonly say are
directed toward the other? Consider, for example, an act of generosity, in
which someone helps a friend with her thesis rather than play videogames, or
someone makes use of her free Saturday helping build houses for Gawad
Kalinga? The psychological egoist would maintain that underlying such
apparently other-directed behavior is a self-serving desire, even if one does not
acknowledge it or is even conscious of it. Perhaps he only helped his friend
with her thesis because he is trying to impress her. Perhaps she helps out with
Gawad Kalinga because this is how she relieves her sense of guilt at being
well-off compared to others. The idea is that whether or not the person admits
it, one’s actions are ultimately always motivated by self-serving desire.

This theory has a couple of strong points. The first is that of simplicity.
When an idea is marked by simplicity, it has a unique appeal to it; a theory that
conveniently identifies a single basis that will somehow account for all actions
is a good example of this. The second is that of plausibility. It is plausible that
self-interest is behind a person’s actions. It is clearly the motivation behind
many of the actions one performs which are obviously self-serving: it could very
well also be the motivation behind an individual’s seemingly other-directed
actions. It is not only plausible, but also irrefutable.
--

Psychological egoism is an irrefutable theory because there is no way to

try to answer it without being confronted by the challenge that, whatever one
might say, there is the self-serving motive at the root of everything. The
psychological egoist can and will insist on his stand no matter how one might
try to object. This opens up two questions: first, "Because we cannot refute it,
shall we accept it as true" and “Do we accept the consequences of this
theory?"

The first question asks whether we have to accept the theory because it
happens to be irrefutable. Let us consider this analogy: A post that B has an
Oedipal complex and according to A, this translates into a desire in B to get rid
of the father figure. Then, A insists that everything about B and what he does—
his choice in music, course, favorite food—is all ultimately rooted in this
complex. Therefore, no matter what B says, A would be able to insist that even
without his acknowledging it deep down, it is this complex that drives him to act
the way he does. In this scenario, A's claim is irrefutable. But does B have to
accept it? Similarly, one could maintain, if he really wanted to, thathuman
nature is intrinsically self-interested and that human beings could not possibly
be benevolent. When they seem to be so, it is only a matter of pretense. One
could maintain that but does one have to?

The second point has to do with the problematic consequences of this

theory. Consider this scenario: One woman spends her money on expensive
clothes, and another woman donates to charity. In terms of psychological
egoism, they are both simply and equally doing what is self-serving for
themselves. Because they both are simply fulfilling what would serve them,
they are of equal moral worth. In judging these persons and these actions, we
can ask ourselves: Do we want to give up on our moral intuition concerning the
goodness and value of generosity versus the wrongness of selfishness just for
the sake of this theory? Most significantly, turning to the next consequence
when we move from moral judgment to moral decision, the question is: How
then are we supposed to decide? Given psychological egoism it does not
matter. We only think that we have a choice but actually whatever way that we
end up acting, our minds have actually already determined what serves our
interests best.

So psychological egoism, when we look at its consequences, leads us to

a cynical view of humanity, to a gloomy description of human nature, and finally
to a useless theory for someone who is concerned with asking herself what is
the right thing to do. This is because it ends up nullifying the possibility of any
normative ethics in its view of the already-determined human being.

ETHICAL EGOISM

Ethical egoism differs from psychological egoism in that it does not suppose all
our actions are already inevitably self-serving. Instead, ethical egoism
prescribes that we should make our own ends, our own interests, as the single
overriding concern. We may act in a way that is beneficial to others, but we
should do that only if it ultimately benefits us. This theory
--
Page 18

acknowledges that it is a dog-eat-dog world out there and given that, everyone
ought to put herself at the center. One should consider herself as the priority
and not allow any other concerns, such as the welfare of other people, to
detract from this pursuit. It is clear that we have our interests and desires and
would want them satisfied. Thus, this question can be asked: Why should I
have any concern about the interests of others? In a sense, this question
challenges in a fundamental way the idea of not just a study of ethics, but also
the effort of being ethical: Why not just look after one’s own self? To examine
ethical egoism, we will take a look into Plato’s Republic, which is Plato’s
response to the assertion that one should only care about one’s own interests.
The Myth of Gyges Plato's Republic (359c-360d) Now, that those who practice
justice do so involuntarily and because they not the power to be unjust will best
appear if we imagine something of this kind: having given both to the just and
the unjust power to do what they will, let us watch and see whither desire will
lead them; then we shall discover in the very act the just and unjust man to be
proceeding along the same road, following their interest, which all natures
deem to be their good, and are only diverted into the path of justice by the
force of law. The liberty which we are supposing may be most completely given
to them in the form of such a power as is said to have been possessed by
Gyges, the ancestor of Croesus the Lydian. According to the tradition, Gyees
was a shepherd in the service of the king of Lydia, there was a great storm,
and an earthquake made an opening in the earth at the place where he was
feeding his flock. Amazed at the sight, he descended into the opening, where,
among other marvels, he beheld a hollow brazen horse, having doors, at which
he stooping and looking in saw a dead body of stature, as appeared to him,
more than human and having nothing on but a gold ring this he took from the
finger of the dead and reascended. Now the shepherds met together,
according to custom, that they might send their monthly report about the flocks
to the king; into the assembly he came having the ring on his finger, and as he
was sitting among them he chanced to turn the collet of the ring inside his
hand, when instantly he became invisible to the rest of the company and they
began to speak of him as if he were no longer present. He was astonished at
this, and again touching the ring the turned the collet outwards and
reappeared, he made several trials of the ring, and always with the same result
— when he turned the collet inwards he became invisible, when outwards he
reappeared. Whereupon he contrived to be chosen one of the messengers
who were sent to the court; whereas as soon as he arrived, he seduced the
queen, and with her help conspired against the king and slowed him, and took
the kingdom. Suppose now that there were two such magic rings, and just put
on one of them and the unjust the other, no man can be imagined to be of such
--

an iron nature that he would stand fast injustice. No man would keep his hands
off what was not his own when he could safely take what he liked out of the
market or go into houses and lie with any one at his pleasure, or kill or release
from prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a God among men.
Then the actions of the just would be as the actions of the unjust; they would
both come at last to the same point. And this we may truly affirm to be a great
proof that a man is just not willingly or because he thinks that justice is any
good to him individually, but of necessity, for wherever anyone thinks that he
can safely be unjust, there he is unjust. For all men believe in their hearts that
injustice is far more profitable to the individual than justice, and he who argues
as I have been supposing will say! that they are right. If you could imagine any
one obtaining this power of becoming Invisible, and never doing any wrong or
touching what was another's, he would be thought by the lookers-on to be a
most wretched idiot, although they would praise him to one another's faces,
and keep up appearances with one another from a fear that they too might
suffer injustice."

In the Republic, the characters are engaged in a discussion about

justice. Socrates gets his companions to first consider the question. "What is
justice?" and later. "Why should one be just? In Book 2 of the text, the
character named Glaucon provides a powerful restatement of the case for
egoism by way of a myth. The myth describes a man, a figure named Gyges,
who obtains the power to make himself invisible at will and how he quickly
learns how to use this power for his own desires rather than for any notion of
Justice Glaucon then asks plaintively, would not we ourselves act with impunity
if we had this power to be invisible? To put it simply, if we would never be
called in order to account for our actions, perhaps we, too, would just choose to
do whatever we want. It seems, Glaucon concludes that if we are to be honest
with ourselves, we would admit that what we really care for is our own self-
interest rather than some notion of justice or moral goodness.

It will take Socrates the rest of the ten books of the Republic to try to
answer this most important question on whether the pursuit of ethics is
worthwhile. Does it make sense to be ethical? The beginning of Socrates's
answer can be found in Book 4, in which Socrates presents how the good
human life stems from a proper harmony of the parts of the soul Harmony
requires a certain ordering, a hierarchical system in which reason as the
highest part is in charge dutifully followed by the lower parts of the soul of will
and appetite. The presence of such an internal ordering that one consciously
strives to accomplish is what it means for justice to be present in the individual.
On the other hand, the absence of order or the lack of harmony, with desires
and appetites running rampant, results in acts of injustice This point is
developed in Book 9 with the portrayal of the tyrant. The presence of internal
disorder in a person placed in power turns the seemingly pleasant prospect of
doing whatever one wants-of acting with impunity--into a terrifying portrait of a
character without self-control or self-possession. Being nothing more than a
disordered and nervous jumble of cravings, such a person would be so
obsessed with these longings than to bother
--

caring about how this might affect others. Situating this story into a larger social
and political context, the connection can be made between one’s pursuit of
one’s own interest with abuse of power that may easily result in the misery of
millions. The question then that we can ask is: Do we still want to say, in the
face of what history has shown us of tyrants and dictators, that to act with
impunity is desirable?

This is what ethical egoism ultimately translates into -- not just some
pleasant pursuit of one’s own desires, but the imposition of a will to power that
is potentially destructive of both the self and of others. One can take on this
view, if one wishes, but it is also possible to wonder whether there is a way of
recognizing our being in the world with others, of thinking of our own well-being
concomitantly with the well-being of others. Perhaps this is what the study of
ethics is all about.

Returning to the Case of Cris:

Do you think it is acceptable that those responsible for the death
of Cris got away with murder? Do you think it is right for someone to look
after his or her own welfare over any other concern such as justice?
Later, we shall see more nuanced ways of thinking about happiness --
our own and that of others -- in both Utilitarianism and in the Virtue Ethics of
Aristotle.

SUMMARY (AND NEXT STEPS)

In this chapter, we have established the scope and the rationale for a
discussion of ethics. We explored various of valuation in order to distinguish
what makes a particularly grave type of valuation a moral or ethical one. We
clarified some of the terms that will be used in the study of ethics; some give a
too simplistic answer to the question of our grounds or foundations for moral
valuation, while others seem to dismiss the possibility of ethics altogether.

In the following chapters, we will explore a number of different moral theories

that have been handed down to us by the history of philosophy. These are
various approaches from thinkers who have presented to us their own unique
way of thinking on how to determine the moral principles that should be
maintained. We will first explore Utilitarianism, which establishes that the best
consequences or everyone concerned might be our measure for determining
what is right. We then turn to a different notion in the Natural Law Theory,
which puts forward the idea that we can base our notion of good and bad on
something more intrinsic than the consequences of our actions – that is our
human nature itself. We will then turn to Deontology, which will argue that it is
unreliable to base ethics on consequences or on supposed intrinsic nature;
however, reason is able to determine through its own exploration of itself what
our moral duty is. We then round out our discussion of theories with one often
referred to as Virtue Ethics, which require us to think of our concept of reason
within the larger context of the development of a moral character.

In the final chapter, we will see how these diverse theories - which at
first glance may seem to simply be contradicting each other – can inform our
own attempts to think of our own grounds for determining moral value.

#2. Note: this topic is not given as a topic to be reported but for readings:

SOME ETHICAL SCHOOLS

OF
 THOUGHT
SITUATION ETHICS
I. Definition
Situation ethics, also called situational ethics, in ethics and theology,
the position that moral decision making is contextual or dependent
on a set of circumstances. Situation ethics holds that moral
judgments must be made within the context of the entirety of a
situation and that all normative features of a situation must be
viewed as a whole. The guiding framework for moral decision
making is stated variously as that of acting in the most loving way, to
maximize harmony and reduce discord, or to enrich human
existence.

There are no universal moral rules or rights - each case is unique

and deserves a unique solution.

Situation ethics rejects 'prefabricated decisions and prescriptive

rules'. It teaches that ethical decisions should follow flexible
guidelines rather than absolute rules, and be taken on a case-by-
case basis.

“...reflective morality demands observation of particular situations,

rather than fixed adherence to a priori principles” John Dewey and
James H. Tufts, Ethics, 1922

So, a person who practices situation ethics approaches ethical

problems with some general moral principles rather than a rigorous
set of ethical laws and is prepared to give up even those principles if
doing so will lead to a greater good.

Since 'circumstances alter cases', situationism holds that in practice

what in some times and places we call right is in other times and
places wrong...

For example, lying is ordinarily not in the best interest of

interpersonal communication and social integrity, but is justifiable
nevertheless in certain situations.

Joseph Fletcher, Naturalism, situation ethics and value theory, in

Ethics at the Crossroads, 1995
 Situation ethics was originally devised in a Christian context, but it
can easily be applied in a non-religious way.

II. History
Situation ethics was developed by American Anglican theologian
Joseph F. Fletcher, whose book Situation Ethics: The New Morality
(1966) arose from his objections to both moral absolutism (the view
that there are fixed universal moral principles that
have binding authority in all circumstances) and moral relativism (the
view that there are no fixed moral principles at all). Fletcher based
situation ethics on the general Christian norm of brotherly love,
which is expressed in different ways in different situations. He
applied this to issues of doctrine. For example, if one holds to the
absolute wrongness of abortion, then one will never allow for
abortion, no matter what the circumstances within which the
pregnancy occurs. Fletcher held that such an absolute position pays
no attention to the complexity and uniqueness of each situation and
can result in a callous and inhumane way of dealing with the
problem. On the other hand, if there are no principles at all, then the
decision is reduced to nothing more than what one decides to do in
the moment, with no real moral implications involved. Rather,
Fletcher held, within the context of the complexities of the situation,
one should come to the most loving or right decision as to what to
do.

Fletcher’s view was influential in Christian communities both in

America and Europe for decades, reaching its peak in the 1980s,
after which it began to wane. His ethical framework bore strong
affinities with the version of pragmatism proposed by the American
philosopher, social reformer, and educator John Dewey, who
characterized his position as “instrumentalism.” In Dewey’s
framework, moral principles are tools or instruments that are used
because they work in resolving the conflicts within complex
situations in the most harmonious way for all those involved. These
principles are experimental hypotheses that are constantly subject to
ongoing verification or revision by the demands of the unique
conditions of experience. This view is opposed to the absolutist
understanding of fixed rules as inherently valid and universally
applicable to all situations, there being no exceptions. It also is
opposed to the relativist understanding that there are no normative
guidelines but only individual judgments concerning particular cases
and that there is no moral justification for evaluating one moral claim
as being actually superior to another.
Situational ethics or situation ethics takes into account the particular
context of an act when evaluating it ethically, rather than judging it
according to absolute moral standards. With the intent to have a fair
basis for judgments or action, one looks to personal ideals of what is
appropriate to guide them, rather than an unchanging universal code
of conduct, such as Biblical law under divine command theory or the
Kantian categorical imperative. Proponents of situational approaches
to ethics include existentialist philosophers Sartre, de Beauvoir,
Jaspers, and Heidegger.

Specifically, Christian forms of situational ethics placing love above

all particular principles or rules were proposed in the first half of the
twentieth century by liberal theologians Rudolf Bultmann, John A. T.
Robinson, and Joseph Fletcher. These theologians point specifically
to agapē, or unconditional love, as the highest end. Other
theologians who advocated situational ethics include Josef Fuchs,
Reinhold Niebuhr, Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, and Paul Tillich. Tillich,
for example, declared that "Love is the ultimate law."

Fletcher, who became prominently associated with this approach in

the English-speaking world due to his book (Situation Ethics), stated
that "all laws and rules and principles and ideals and norms, are only
contingent, only valid if they happen to serve love" in the particular
situation, and thus may be broken or ignored if another course of
action would achieve a more loving outcome. Fletcher has
sometimes been identified as the founder of situation ethics, but he
himself refers his readers to the active debate over the theme that
preceded his own work.

Situational ethics is a form of that focuses on creating the greatest

amount of love. Situational ethics can also be classed under the
ethical theory genre of "proportionalism" which says that "It is never
right to go against a principle unless there is a proportionate reason
which would justify it."
J. A. T. Robinson, a situational ethicist, considered the approach to
be a form of ethical relativism.

There was an active debate in the mid-twentieth century around

situational ethics, which was being promoted by a number of
primarily Protestant theologians. The English term "situation ethics"
was taken from the German Situationsethik. It is unclear who first
coined the term either in German or in its English variant.
III. Overall Framework
Fletcher says there are two unattractive views in ethics: “Legalism”
and “Antinomianism”, and one attractive view which sits in between
them:
“Situationism”.

1. Legalism Someone who is following the system of Legalism is someone

who “blindly” observes moral rules without being sensitive to the
situation. Fletcher has in mind a simple-minded deontologist who holds
that actions are right and wrong irrespective of the consequences. For
example, we ought to tell the truth in all situations, even if this means
that, say, millions of people die.

Various Christian sects are legalistic; for instance, some might refuse
medical help — such as blood transfusions — when someone in
their community is ill because they think it is against God’s
commands.

2. Antinomianism The other extreme is Antinomianism (“anti” meaning

against; “nominalism” meaning law). This is the view that says that an
agent can do whatever he or she wants in a situation. Fletcher calls this
an “existential” view because it is one that says that people are always
free to choose what they want. Any supposed laws and rules limiting the
actions of people are simply a way of trying to comfort them because
they are scared of absolute freedom. If Antinomianism is right and if
an agent believes that something is right, then it is.

3. A Middle Ethics: Situationism

We might think that Legalism and Antinomianism exhaust the
possibilities. If we reject moral laws then are we not forced into
lawless moral anarchy? Fletcher thinks not.

Fletcher says that there is a moral law, and hence he rejects

Antinomianism.
But there is only one moral law, so he rejects Legalism. Fletcher’s
one moral law is that we ought to always act so as to bring about the
most love for the most people (“Agápē Calculus”). Fletcher’s
Situationism is then a teleological theory. It is directed at the
consequences that will determine whether an action is right or
wrong.

Of course, any teleological theory will ask us to look at the details of

the situation; consider Chapter 1 where we talk about Bentham and
 Mill’s Utilitarianism. So, Fletcher’s view is not unique. What makes
his view different is the centrality of “love”, or as he calls it agape

IV. Four Working Principles

1. Pragmatism
Pragmatism is generally considered to be the first and only
philosophical school of thought or tradition to have emerged in North
America. The term was originated by
C.S. Peirce, who would later term his form of the new movement
"pragmaticism" in order to distinguish his ideas from those of the
most famous exponents: William James and John Dewey. G.H.
Mead and F.S.C. Schiller were lesser-known members of this
tradition in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when it
flourished.

The original formulation of pragmatism by Peirce applied to

epistemology (the idea that knowledge must be tested by its
usefulness), but the concept was quickly extended by James.
Pragmatism in ethics is a form of consequentialism as presented in
this work. The focus of pragmatism is on the resultant actions while
utilitarianism emphasizes usefulness. Pragmatism, according to
William James, is derived from the Greek word pragma, which
means action and serves as the basis of our English words practical
and practice. (Greek pragma = "action" while Latin utilis = "use").
Pragmatism established human needs and the practical interests of
humans as the basis for judgment and evaluation. Pragmatism
rejects any form of absolutism and universality of thought.
Pragmatism fosters a form of relativism. Pragmatism in ethics
rejects the idea that there is any universal ethical principle or
universal value. It holds for ethical principles being social constructs
to be evaluated in terms of their usefulness.
For pragmatists the matter of ethics is approached practically. Our
practices are our habits. In pragmatic ethics there is the Primacy of
Habits, which empower and restrict. They explore the Social nature
of habits and the relation of habit to will. For them Morality Is a Habit
and being fallibilists, pragmatists know that no habits are flawless.
They also hold that Morality is social and that Changing habits for
moral reasons is necessary.

Features of Pragmatic Ethics:

● Employs criteria, but is not criterial
● Gleaning insights from other ethical theories
● Relative without being relativistic
● Tolerant without being irresolute
 ● Theory and Practice

A pragmatic ethic is not based on principles, but it is not unprincipled.

Deliberation plays a significant role, albeit a different role than that
given it on most accounts. Morality does not seek final absolute
answers, yet it is not perniciously relativistic. It does recognize that
circumstances can be different, and that in different circumstances,
different actions may be appropriate. So it does not demand moral
uniformity between people and across cultures. Moreover, it
understands moral advance as emerging from the crucible of
experience, not through the proclamations of something or someone
outside us. Just as ideas only prove their superiority in dialogue and
in conflict with other ideas, moral insight can likewise prove its
superiority in dialogue and conflict with other ideas and experiences.
Hence, some range of moral disagreement and some amount of
different action will be not be, for the pragmatist, something to
bemoan. It will be integral to moral advancement, and thus should be
permitted and even praised, not lamented. Only someone who
thought theory could provide final answers, and answers without the
messy task of doing battle on the marketplace of ideas and of life,
would find this regrettable”

2. Relativism
Situation Ethics is a moral relativist theory. It mustn’t be confused
with Cultural Relativism, which says that there is no objective
morality, and moral values vary from one society to another. What is
right is relative to the situation. Some textbooks claim that there is
therefore an absolute principle in Situation Ethics
– to always love. However, Fletcher himself said that love “relativizes
the absolute, it does not absolutize the relative”. St Augustine said,
“Love, and do what you will.” Situationists believe that all things are
possible in love. One example Fletcher gives is of a married woman
in a prison camp who has an affair and gets pregnant in order to get
home to her family.
• Fletcher calls his theory ‘principled relativism’, because ‘it relativises the
absolute, it doesn’t absolutise the relative”.
• By this he means that the absolute principle of agape must be made relative
to every contingent situation in order to discover what is right.
• It is a form of relativism in application, not in the principle itself (agape) which
never changes is meaning.

3. Positivism
Positivism — using the principles of Christian love, a value
judgement has to be made. The whole of situation ethics relies upon
 the fact that the person freely chooses to believe in agape love as
described by Christianity. His use of “positivism” is not the
philosophical idea with the same name but rather is where:

“Any moral or value judgment in ethics, like a theologian’s faith

propositions, is a decision — not a conclusion. It is a choice, not a
result reached by force of logic…”

Faith claims cannot be proven to be true rationalistically. They can

only be "posited" and affirmed by the person who chooses to believe
their accuracy. Thus, situationism does not seek to prove that an
ethical conclusion is true. It only seeks to provide justification
(support) for the ethical decision. Positivism recognizes that love is
the most important criterion of all expressed in the teaching of 1 John
4: 7-12 'Beloved, let us love one another, because love is from God;
everyone who loves is born of God and knows God'.

4. Personalism
Personalism under-covers the centrality of a person. It is any
philosophy that considers personality as the supreme value and the
key to measure reality.

Personalism posits ultimate reality and value in personhood —

human as well as (at least for most personalists) divine. It
emphasizes the significance, uniqueness and inviolability of the
person, as well as the person’s essentially relational or social
dimension.Personalism has for the most part not been primarily a
theoretical philosophy of the person. Although it does defend a
unique theoretical understanding of the person, this understanding is
in itself such as to support the prioritization of practical or moral
philosophy, while at the same time the moral experience of the
person is such as to decisively determine the theoretical
understanding.

Personalists regard personhood (or “personality”) as the

fundamental notion, as that which gives meaning to all of reality and
constitutes its supreme value. Personhood carries with it an
inviolable dignity that merits unconditional respect.

For personalists, a person combines subjectivity and objectivity,

causal activity and receptivity, unicity and relation, identity and
creativity. Stressing the moral nature of
the person, or the person as the subject and object of free activity,
personalism tends to focus on practical, moral action and ethical
questions.
 Personalism in the broader sense does not consider the person as
the object of an original intuition, nor does it conceive of
philosophical research as beginning with an analysis of immediate
personal experience and its context. Rather, in the scope of a
general metaphysics the person manifests his singular value and
essential role. Thus, the person occupies the central place in
philosophical discourse, but this discourse is not reduced to an
explicitation or development of an original intuition of the person.

V. Six Fundamental Principles (propositions)

Joseph Fletcher approaches every situation with only one norm – “The
agape of the commandment to love God and neighbor.” If any rule is
valid, love is behind that rule. For example, the 10 Commandments are
valid only if they are love oriented. Thus, the situationist does reject
certain rules because the rules are not based upon love. Situationism
goes from its one law – love, to the general principles of the church and
culture to the moment of decision. Fletcher then sets forth six
propositions which show support for his love ethics.
1. Love is the only absolute
It is intrinsically good which means that the rightness and wrongness of
an action depends on the amount of love that it brings about.

Echoing Bentham’s Hedonic Calculus Fletcher defends what he calls

the:

“agapeic calculus, the greatest amount of neighbor

welfare for the largest number of neighbors possible.”
In this phrase, Fletcher talks about “welfare” rather than “love”. Fletcher
does this because of how he understands love which, importantly, is not
about having feelings and desires. In this context, love is seen as
desiring and acting for the wellbeing of others. Nothing is inherently
good or evil, except love (personal concern) and its opposite,
indifference or actual malice. Nothing is good or bad except as it helps
or hurts a person. The highest good is human welfare and happiness,
but not necessarily pleasure. Applied ethics devises love's tactics, and
moral theology seeks to work out love's strategy.
2. Christian decision making is based on love
The ruling norm of Christian decision is love, nothing else
The only way to decide what we ought to do (the ruling norm) is to bring
about love. We need to be careful though because for Fletcher “love”
has a technical meaning.
 By love Fletcher means “agápē” — from ancient Greek. Agápē has a
very
particular meaning. Initially it is easier to see what it is not. It is not the
feeling we might have
towards friends or family member which is better described as brotherly
love (philēo). Nor is it the erotic desire we might feel towards others
(érōs).
Rather agápē is an attitude and not a feeling at all, one which does not
expect anything in return and does not give any special considerations
to anyone. Agápē regards the enemy in the same way as the friend,
brother, spouse, lover. Given our modern context and how people
typically talk of “love” it is probably unhelpful to even call it “love”.
Typically, people write and think about love as experiencing an intense
feeling. In cartoons when a character is in love their hearts jump out of
their chest, or people
“in love” are portrayed as not being able to concentrate on things
because they “cannot stop thinking” about someone.
This is not what love means for Fletcher. In the Christian context agápē
is the type of love which is manifest in how God relates to us. Consider
Christ’s love in saying that he forgave those carrying out his execution
or consider a more modern example. In February 1993, Mrs Johnson’s
son, Laramiun Byrd, 20, was shot in the head by 16-year-old Oshea
Israel after an argument at a party in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Mrs
Johnson subsequently forgave her son’s killer and after he had served a
17-year sentence for the crime, asked him to move in next door to her.
She was not condoning his actions, nor will she ever forget the horror of
those actions, but she does love her son’s killer. That love is agápē.
3. Love and justice are the same

“Love and justice are the same, for justice is love distributed, nothing
else.”
There can be no love without justice. Consider any injustice – a child
starving, a man arrested without charge etc. These are examples of a
lack of love. If love was properly shared out, there would be no injustice.
4. Love is not liking

“Love wills the neighbor’s good whether we like him or not.”

Love is discerning and critical, not sentimental. Martin Luther King
described Agape love as a ‘creative, redemptive goodwill to all men’. He
said it would be nonsense to ask people to like their violent oppressors.
Christian love is a nonselfish love of all people.
5. Only the end justifies the means
Only the ends justify the means, nothing else
In direct rejection of the deontological approaches Fletcher says that
any action we take, as considered as an action independent of its
consequences is literally, “meaningless and pointless”. An action, such
as telling the truth, only acquires its status as a means by virtue of an
end beyond itself.
6. Love's decisions are made situationally and not prescriptively.
Within life's experiences, the individual contacts certain gray areas of
decision, and in fact all decisions are gray depending upon their
circumstances. Thus, an act may be completely wrong in one case and
completely right in another case. The decision has to be made by the
individual faced with the situation. He will be held accountable for the
way he made his decision according to the situation and how love was
carried out in the situation.

VI. Advantages and Disadvantages

Advantages:
□ It’s simple.
□ It’s flexible.
□ Focuses on humans and concern for others (agape).
□ Allows people to take responsibility for their own decisions and
make up their own minds about what is right and wrong.
Bishop J.A.T Robinson called it ‘an ethic for humanity come of
age’.
□ Presents a Christian ethical message that is consistent with the
gospel message. It shows Christians that it is possible to be a
situationist and that biblical laws do not have to be rigidly
adhered to.
□ Situation ethics provides a proportionate reason to break ethical
principles: there are some situations where this may be
necessary. □ The whole system is guided by a desirable
principle: that of love.
□ It is a teleological system and is not tied to the observance of
rules unlike deontological ethics. This makes it flexible and
allows adaptation to different circumstances.
□ It allows us to consider a greater good.
□ The fundamental principles do a good job of defining love and
explaining what it means to be loving in practice.
 Disadvantages:
□ It is hard to recognize the standard value and define situation.
There are times when it is acceptable to disobey God. If the
situation demands it, nearly every demand of God can be
reserve. Relating to Jesus state that success is important than
keeping the God Law. We must value what's most important
among our life style.

□ Demands for love. Can everyone love sacrificially all the time
knowing that people have the tendency to be selfish at
times?
□ Depends on individual’s appraisal of the situation. A person,
even with the finest of intentions, cannot foresee every
consequence of an action, nor realize the number likely to
be affected by it.

□ Examples fletcher uses are too extreme. His examples account

for only a very few instances in life.

□ Fletcher’s views do not accurately reflect New Testament

views. In the new testament, there are clear moral views
on issues like theft and adultery which suggest absolutes
and could infer a legalistic point of view that Fletcher
rejects.

□ Laws are necessary. the law and absolutes are there for
protection of society. This is the reason they exist.

□ It deconstructs itself. We need a specific or definitive idea of

what outcome is the most valued, right before we can decide
upon which acts are needed to bring about the right thing.

□ It may approve of “evil” acts. Situation ethics teaches that

particular types of action don't have an inherent moral value -
whether they are good or bad depends on the eventual result.
This then permits a person to carry out acts
that are generally regarded as bad, such as killing and
lying, if those acts lead to a sufficiently good result.

VII. References
i. Rosenthal, S. B. (2017, May 26). Situation ethics. Encyclopedia
Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/situation-
ethics ii. British Broadcasting Corporation. (2014). Ethics -
Introduction to ethics: Situation ethics. BBC.
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/introduction/situation_1.shtml
iii. Dimmock, M., & Fisher, A. (2017). Chapter 5. Fletcher’s Situation
Ethics.
Open Book Publishers.
http://books.openedition.org/obp/4423 iv. Situational ethics.
(n.d.). In Wikipedia.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Situational_eth ics
v. Advantages and Disadvantages of Situational Ethics. (2018).
Retrieved from testmyprep.com:
https://testmyprep.com/subject/philosophy/advantages -and-
disadvantages-of-s ituational-
ethics#:~:text=situations%20are%20extreme%20that%20the,is
%20 most%20beneficial%20lustrate%20it.
vi. Bailey, S. (2015, April). Strengths and weaknesses of
situational ethics. Retrieved from Cram.com:
https://www.cram.com/flashcards/strengths-and-
weaknesses-ofsituation-ethic s-5755792
vii. Julia. (2016, April 11). Situation Ethics Strengths and
Weaknesses.
Retrieved from getrevising.co.uk:
https://getrevising.co.uk/grids/situation-ethics-strengths-
andweaknesses
viii. Katie. (2013, May 3). Strengths and weaknesses of situation
ethics.
Retrieved from getrevising.co.uk:
https://getrevising.co.uk/grids/the_strengths_and_weaknesse
s_of_situ ation_et hics
ix. McHugh, P. J. (2006). Situation Ethics. Retrieved from
tere.org:
https://www.tere.org/assets/downloads/secondary/
pdf_downloads/ALev el/SitE thics.pdf
x. Goffs School AS and A2 Religious Studies. (n.d.). RS –
Philosophy &
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 PRAGMATISM

ETHICS
ASSIGNMENT #
7
GROUP 2

Submitted by:

Castillo, Cianne Kaira

Constantino, Mary Ialy
Covero, Allen Paul
Dinaguit, Mary
Rose Gono,
Kathleen
Lim, Kateleen
Nicole Limbo,
Anne Julia
Llanto, Jemimah May
Macauba, Lara Audrey
Chelzea Madaje, Clyde
Dawn Madeloso,
Kheslien Mahinay,
Danielle Ann
 I. History
Pragmatism is an American philosophy that originated in the 1870s but
became popular in the early 20th century. According to pragmatism, the truth
or meaning of an idea or a proposition lies in its observable practical
consequences rather than in any metaphysical attributes. Pragmatism can be
summarized by the phrase “whatever works, is likely true.” Because reality
changes, “whatever works” will also change—thus, truth must also be regarded
as changeable, which means that no one can claim to possess any final or
ultimate truth. Pragmatists believe that all philosophical concepts should be
judged according to their practical uses and successes, not on the basis of
abstractions.
There were two main influences on the early formation of pragmatism.
One was the tradition of British empiricism in the work of John Stuart Mill,
Alexander Bain, and John Venn, which stressed the role of experience in the
genesis of knowledge—and particularly their analyses of belief as being
intimately tied in with action and, indeed, as definable in terms of one’s
disposition and motive to act. The work of the 18th-century empirical idealist,
George Berkeley, which presented a theory of the practical and inferential
nature of knowledge and of sensations as signs (and thus predictive) of future
experience, led Peirce to refer to him as “the introducer of pragmatism.” The
other major influence came from modern German philosophy: from Kant’s
analysis of the purposive character of belief and of the roles of will and desire
in forming belief and his doctrine of “regulative ideas,” such as God or the soul,
which guide the understanding in achieving systematic completeness and unity
of knowledge. In sum, Peirce was profoundly impressed by Kant and by the
Scottish philosophy of common sense.
More generally, pragmatists from Peirce to Rorty have been suspicious
of foundationalist theories of justification according to which empirical
knowledge ultimately rests on an epistemically privileged basis—that is, on a
class of foundational beliefs which justify or support all other beliefs but which
depend on no other beliefs for their justification. Their objections to such
theories are many: that so-called “immediate” (or non-inferential) knowledge is
a confused fiction; that knowledge is more like a coherent web than a
hierarchically structured building; that there are no certain foundations for
knowledge (since fallibilism is true); that foundational beliefs cannot be justified
by appealing to perceptual experience (since the “Given” is a myth); and that
knowledge has no overall or non-contextual structure whatsoever.
C.S. Peirce, who coined the term pragmatism, saw it as more a
technique to help us find solutions than a philosophy or an actual solution to
problems. Peirce used it as a means for developing linguistic and conceptual
clarity (and thereby facilitating communication) with intellectual problems.
William James is the most famous philosopher of pragmatism and the
scholar who made pragmatism itself famous. For James, pragmatism was
about value and morality: The purpose of philosophy was to understand what
had value to us and why. James argued that ideas and beliefs have value to us
only when they work.
In a philosophy he called instrumentalism, John Dewey attempted to
combine both Peirce's and James’ philosophies of pragmatism.
Instrumentalism was thus both about logical
concepts as well as ethical analysis. Instrumentalism describes Dewey’s ideas
on the conditions under which reasoning and inquiry occurs. On the one hand,
it should be controlled by logical constraints; on the other hand, it is directed at
producing goods and valued satisfactions.
Pragmatism became popular with American philosophers and even the
American public in the early 20th century because of its close association with
modern natural and social sciences. The scientific worldview was growing in
both influence and authority. Pragmatism, in turn, was regarded as
philosophically relative and was believed to be capable of producing the same
progress through inquiry into subjects like morals and the meaning of life.

II. Nature

A. The Pragmatic Theory of Truth

Pragmatic theories of truth are usually associated either with C.S.

Peirce’s proposal that true beliefs will be accepted “at the end of inquiry”
or with William James’ proposal that truth be defined in terms of utility.
More broadly, however, pragmatic theories of truth focus on the
connection between truth and epistemic practices, notably practices of
inquiry and assertion. Depending on the particular pragmatic theory,
true statements might be those that are useful to believe, that are the
result of inquiry, that have withstood ongoing examination, that meet a
standard of warranted assertibility, or that represent norms of assertoric
discourse. Like other theories of truth (e.g., coherence and deflationary
theories) pragmatic theories of truth are often put forward as an
alternative to correspondence theories of truth. Unlike correspondence
theories, which tend to see truth as a static relation between a truth-
bearer and a truth-maker, pragmatic theories of truth tend to view truth
as a function of the practices people engage in, and the commitments
people make, when they solve problems, make assertions, or conduct
scientific inquiry. More broadly, pragmatic theories tend to emphasize
the significant role the concept of truth plays across a range of
disciplines and discourses: not just scientific and fact-stating discourse
but also ethical, legal, and political discourse as well.

Pragmatic theories of truth have the effect of shifting attention

away from what makes a statement true and toward what people mean
or do in describing a statement as true. While sharing many of the
impulses behind deflationary theories of truth (in particular, the idea that
truth is not a substantial property), pragmatic theories also tend to view
truth as more than just a useful tool for making generalizations.
Pragmatic theories of truth thus emphasize the broader practical and
performative dimensions of truth-talk, stressing the role truth plays in
shaping certain kinds of discourse. These practical dimensions,
according to pragmatic theories, are essential to understanding the
concept of truth.

B. Nature and Characteristics of Pragmatism

1. Faith in Democracy. Pragmatism has deep faith in

democracy as it believes that only through democracy can realization of
the maximum personality development have occurred in an individual.
This development is possible only in a social context. Individual
development also leads to the development of society. Thus a
democratic social order is considered essential for the healthy growth of
individuals. In such a society, there is maximum sharing of experiences
among the individual members.

2. Principle of Utility. Pragmatism is a utilitarian

philosophy that holds that the reality of a principle lies in its utility. Any
idea or thing which is useful to us is proper and right. In case it is of no
use. It is improper, wrong, and untrue. In other words, only those ideas
and things are true which have a utility for man’. In the words of Willian
James, “It is true because it is useful.”

3. Thought in Subordinate to Action. In Pragmatism

every thought or belief is subordinated to action. Intellect is subordinate
to practical ends. Philosophy is a means to an end. It is the guiding
principle to fulfill the ends of practical life. Pragmatism teaches that
which is useful — what works in a practical situation — is true; what
does not work is false. Truth is thus not fixed, eternal, absolute, and
unchangeable. It is purely changeable, purposive, and practical. What is
true today may be false tomorrow. Pragmatism sees thought as
intrinsically connected with action. It gives a supreme position to act.

4. Metaphysics. Pragmatism regards the material world as

true. It regards the human being as the supreme person. He is a social
being and his development is possible only in society. To it, this world is
the combination of different elements. It considers truth as changeable.
Truth is man-made. There is a change in its form and concept.
Pragmatism believes in the power of God if the existence of God is
helpful in the growth of human beings otherwise not. It lays stress on the
action and its consequences. It considers reality as a process of the
completion of a task.

5. Axiology. Pragmatism does not believe in eternal

values. Man himself creates values. Values are not predetermined.
Pragmatists consider consequences as the basis of the selection of all
types of values. If the values are useful their selection is appropriate
otherwise not. In the context of religion, Dewey has said, ‘God is an
active relation between Ideal and Reality; they consider the use of
intelligence in the solution of problems.
C. Principles of Pragmatism

1. No Ultimate Values. The main principle of pragmatic

philosophy is that man creates his own values during the course of
activity. There are no fixed values for all times to come. Even truths are
man-made products. There is nothing like absolute truth.

According to pragmatism,

“Whatever fulfils man’s purpose and desires and develops his

life, is true. Truth is that which gives satisfactory results when put into
practice.”

2. Emphasis on Experimentation. The value of

experimentation is given a special emphasis on the theory of
Pragmatism. In here, every statement is being tested to find its practical
implications. A statement is accepted if its implications are desirable,
otherwise rejected. Man is continuously carrying out different tests in his
life.

But no judgment is possible before an experiment is tested by

experience. Only that thing is good and beautiful which emerges useful
after experimentation. As John Dewey says, “I affirm that the term
‘pragmatic’ means only the rule of referring all thinking, all reflective
consideration, to consequences for final meaning and test.”

3. Belief in Practical Philosophy. Pragmatism believes

that philosophy is not simply wisdom of the past but an essential factor
in solving practical problems in life. John Dewey says, “Philosophy in
order to be philosophy should have meaning and utility in the solution of
human problems. It should be practical and useful in the solution of
human problems and in influencing the conduct of life and not a passive
enquiry or contemplation.” According to pragmatism, “Philosophy is
thinking what to do in a life situation and it is brought into existence
when problems occur.”
 4. Human Development according to Environment.
Pragmatism believes that interaction with the environment leads to
growth of human personality. Man tries to adjust himself to his
environment and this results in his growth. During the process of
adjustment man not only adopts himself to his environment but he also
tries to mould the environment according to his needs, purpose and
desires.

5. Revolt against Traditionalism. Pragmatism believes

that reality is in the making. Truth is that which works in practical
situations. Whatever fulfils one’s purpose and develops his life, is true.
So it is a revolt against traditionalism and absolutism.

6. Emphasis on the Principle of Utility. Pragmatism is an

utilitarian philosophy which holds that the reality of a principle lies in its
utility. Any idea or thing which is useful to us is proper and right. In case
it is of no use. It is improper, wrong and untrue. In
other words only those ideas and things are true which have a utility
for man’. In the words of Willian James, “It is true because it is useful.”

7. Importance of Man Power. Pragmatism emphasises on

the power of man to a great extent. By virtue of this power, a man can
create an environment useful, beneficial and conducive to his own
development and welfare of society.

8. Faith in Flexibility. Pragmatism believes that nothing is

fixed and final in this world. Everything grows, changes and develops. In
other words, the world is changing and everything is under the process
of change. Human life is also changing.

9. Reality still in the Making:To Pragmatists' future is

more helpful and bright in comparison with the present. The world is still
in the process of formation and development. Man is to aid this process
of formation to such an extent that all the needs and requirements of
human beings are fully satisfied. In this sense, a pragmatic attitude is
optimistic, developing and progressive.

10. Importance of Activity:Pragmatism lays great emphasis

on activity rather than on ideas. Pragmatists hold the view that ideas are
born out of activities. Man is an active being. Thus the greatest
contribution of pragmatism to education is the principle of “Learning by
doing “.
III. Types

A. Biological Pragmatism
A human being's power or capacity is valuable and
important when he or she can adapt well to any environment
based on his or her needs and requirements. John Dewey's
experimentalism is established on biological pragmatism, which
holds that the ultimate goal of all knowledge is to bring man into
harmony with his environment. Education fosters social skills that
improve one's quality of life. The school is a reflection of the
society that prepares children for future life.

B. Nominalistic Pragmatism
When we experiment, we pay close attention to the
outcome or the result. Our goal is to examine the material. Every
experiment is preceded by a hypothesis about the results. The
results of an experiment, according to nominalistic pragmatism,
are always specific and concrete, never general and abstract.
C. Humanistic Pragmatism
This type of pragmatism is particularly found in social
sciences. According to it, the satisfaction of human nature is the
criterion of utility. In philosophy, in religion, and even in science
man is the aim of all thinking and everything else is a means to
achieve human satisfaction. Humanist pragmatism is centered on
the idea that we live in a world that we shape and create, a world
in the making.

D. Experimental Pragmatism
Modern science is based upon the experimental method.
The fact that can be ascertained by experiment is true. No truth is
final, truth is known only to the extent it is useful in practice. The
pragmatists use this criterion of truth in every field of life. Human
problems can be solved only through experiments.

IV. Definition

The American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce founded

pragmatism, which was further developed by William James and John Dewey.
By its very nature, pragmatism is epistemological, but it can also be applied to
ethics. Pragmatism is an epistemological philosophy that holds the belief that
the true and meaningful form of knowledge is one that is practical, workable,
beneficial, and useful. Pragmatism is a philosophical movement that holds that
an ideology or proposition is true if it performs satisfactorily, that the essence of
 a proposition lies in the practical consequences of accepting it, and that
unpractical ideas should be rejected. Thus, in pragmatism, an idea is valid and
meaningful whether it works or produces positive outcomes. If it doesn't, the
idea is useless, which means it has no value. If an idea is practical and
efficient, it is true.
Pragmatism is a philosophical tradition that centers around the
understanding of knowing that the world is inseparable from agency within it.
This general idea has attracted a remarkably rich and at times contrary range
of interpretations, including: that all philosophical concepts should be tested via
scientific experimentation, that a claim is true if and only if it is useful. It is the
view that considers practical consequences or real effects to be vital
components of both meaning and truth. More simply, something is true only
insofar as it works. It argues that the meaning of any concept can be equated
with the conceivable operational or practical consequences of whatever the
concept portrays. Pragmatism asserts that any theory that proves itself more
successful in predicting and controlling our world than its rivals can be
considered to be nearer the truth.
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Honnacker A. (2018) Approaching Pragmatic Humanism. In: Pragmatic Humanism

Revisited.

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Cham.

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Implications of Pragmatism in Educational System. (2017). Retrieved 10 May

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pragmaticethics/
 BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN RAWL

Born: February
21, 1921
Baltimore,
Maryland
Died: November 24, 2002 (aged
81) Lexington, Massachusetts
Rawls was the second of five children of William Lee Rawls and Anna Abell
Stump. After attending an Episcopalian preparatory school, Kent School, in
Connecticut, he entered Princeton University, where he earned a bachelor’s
degree in 1943. He enlisted in the army later that year and served with the
infantry in the South Pacific until his discharge in 1945. He returned to
Princeton in 1946 and earned a Ph.D. in moral philosophy in 1950. He taught
at Princeton (1950–52), Cornell University (1953–59), the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (1960–62), and finally Harvard University, where he
was appointed James Bryant Conant University Professor in 1979.
THEORY OF JUSTICE: THE ORIGINAL POSITION

Rawls is a member of the social contract movement, though his

perspective differs from that of previous thinkers. Rawls establishes what he
says are justice principles through the use of an artificial device he calls the
Original position, in which everybody decides on justice principles from behind
a veil of ignorance.
When he formulated the Principles of Justice theory, Rawls introduced
the "Original Position" as an artificial device. The device provided a
hypothetical scenario in which members of the community would reach a
negotiated agreement on resource sharing without one party appearing to be
better off than the other. The original position is a hypothetical scenario in
which he questions what social norms and institutions people would agree to if
they were in an equal situation with no one knowing if they are disadvantaged
by chance. It is based on the "thin theory of the good," which he claims
"explains the rationality behind the Original Position's
choice of values." A full theory of the good follows after we derive principles
from the original position.
Rawls claims that the parties in the original position would adopt two
such principles, which would then govern the assignment of rights and duties
and regulate the distribution of social and economic advantages across
society. The difference principle allows for differences in the distribution of
goods only if they favor society's poorest members. For the following reasons,
Rawls argues that this principle will be a fair option for the members in the
original position: Each member of society has an equal claim on their society's
goods.
Rawls created the original position in order to represent the values of
justice that would prevail in a society based on free and equal interactions
between people. Certain people, such as the privileged and skilled, will place
pressure on the poor, powerless, and disabled in the state of nature and in the
absence of a veil of ignorance, since the former are in a better position in the
state of nature.
The original position's agreement is both hypothetical and ahistorical.
The concepts to be extracted are hypothetical in the sense that they are what
the parties will adhere to under such legitimizing circumstances, rather than
what they have agreed to. Rawls argues that the ideals of justice are what
people would agree on if they were in the hypothetical situation of the original
position, and that as a result, those principles have moral weight.
A.) VEIL OF IGNORANCE

The use of a simplification mechanism known as the veil of ignorance, which

covers the self-knowledge of the individuals who meet in the original position to
select ideals for a society in which they would like to be members,
distinguishes Rawls' theory from other contract theories. The veil of ignorance
is a conceptual device that could never be implemented as part of contract-
making conditions, but it has a lot of fascinating and significant justifications
and consequences.

The veil of ignorance acts as a leavening agent. It conceals anything that might
differentiate one person from another. It removes one's personality and
awareness of their circumstances, but not egoistic interests. All is eliminated
except the parties' shared disinterest and reasonable self-interest, and it is
from this situation of sharply diminished personhood, where the person is
reduced to ego and reasoning ability, that justice concepts emerge, embodying
the values of empathy, community, and human dignity. The reader may think
this is an example of irony or paradox, since it is certainly not what one might
predict from such a situation at first glance.
Another consequence of the erasure of personality in the veil of ignorance is
that people become similar to one another, right down to their thought process
and assumptions. Since Rawls' theory requires a unanimous contract as a
starting point, this similarity is part of the point of the veil. In the original
location, there are no conflicts of interest, and unanimity is unavoidable. As a
result,
they might as well be one person rather than a group of people who are all the
same. "Each is convinced by the same arguments," Rawls writes, and, as a
result, each participant in the original position inevitably has the opinion of all
the others.

B.) PRIMACY OF LIBERTY

Personal freedom in the context of a comprehensive and equitable set of rights

for all citizens is the bedrock of a just society. This is the topic of Rawls' first
concept of justice, which serves as a constraint on all subsequent principles.
Justice does not exist if fair liberty is not upheld. Reduced liberty cannot be
compensated for by other benefits, such as increased wealth, nor can the
liberty of some be limited in order to benefit the many. In Rawls' words, each
person is inviolable in the sense that nothing, not even the claims of an entire
society, can infringe on their liberty.
Liberty refers to particular rights, such as freedom of expression, but it also
refers to the right to select and carry out one's life plan in relatively favorable
circumstances. This capacity is linked to one of Rawls' central ideas about
personhood: "a person may be regarded as a life lived according to a plan." As
a result, liberty is central to who we are as humans, and to limit freedom is to
limit humanity. Furthermore, because of another element of their personhood:
their status as moral beings, each person has an equal claim to liberty. Moral
personhood is the ability to get a sense of what is right and what is wrong.
Liberty is the process by which this power is awakened or actualized, and
liberty is the justification for liberty for all.

C.) DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE

The difference principle is the second principle in Rawls' philosophy of justice

as fairness, and it only applies after the first principle of equal individual liberty
has been met. It addresses the reality of economic inequality and aims to
reduce such inequalities in a way that is consistent with the concept of equal
worth for all people regardless of situation, as enshrined in the first principle.
Economic inequalities are only acceptable if they favor all members of society,
especially the poorest. This is conceptually decided against the backdrop of the
idea of a fair distribution of goods in society. It is just and permissible for
injustice to lift chances for all people above the level that occurs at equality.
It is particularly humane to use the difference principle instead of another
principle, such as quality, to order the economic system in justice and fairness.
The free market is stifled, and the government aids ensure that differences are
controlled and compensated for by fair access to opportunity. And features like
the social minimum help to alleviate the pressure of such inequalities. The
difference principle ensures that the economic system of justice as fairness,
rather than the other way around, serves the citizens.
PRINCIPLES OF RAWL’S THEORY OF JUSTICE

1. Principle of Equal Liberty

“Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty
compatible with a similar liberty for others” (Rawls, 2006, p.63).
The principle of equal liberty is the first principle of justice to be derived
from the original position. It notes that all people have an equal right to
fundamental freedoms, which include freedom of conscience, religion, speech,
affiliation, and democratic rights.
In addition, Rawls stated that the right to personal property is considered
one of the basic liberties that individuals should have, and that the government
cannot infringe or amend such properties. However, he did not include an
absolute right to unrestricted personal property as one of the liberties that
people can enjoy.
Rawls takes a step forward by enabling each person to partake in
activities as long as they do not infringe the rights of others.

2. Principle of Equality

“Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are

both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage (b) attached to
positions and offices open to all…” (Rawls, 2006, p.63).
According to the principle of equality, economic values should be
organized in such a manner that they satisfy two conditions (1) the poorest
members of society should be given more benefits; and (2) economic
inequalities should be regulated so that no individual, regardless of race,
gender, or social status, is barred from holding any position or office.
Similarly, everyone should share the society’s wealth and everyone
should receive benefits from the allocation of wealth. Rawls does not insist that
everyone should be paid equally, rather that everyone should be able to benefit
from a fair wage and get the same access to higher-paying jobs.
Rawls believed that everyone in society should be afforded the same
benefits and chances as everyone else of comparable natural ability.
 As exemplified by Rawls, the aforementioned principles must be
followed to ensure that inequalities are eliminated and that everyone
experiences the same benefits of justice.
These principles: respect for peoples’ freedom and independence; the
duty to observe undertakings; equality of peoples; a right of self-defense and
no right to instigate war except in self-defense; a duty to honor human rights; a
duty to observe restrictions on the conduct of wars;
and the duty to assist people under unfavorable conditions that prevent their
having rights or decent political and social regime. Decent people (non-liberal)
would also agree these principles are the same in an original position. They are
non-democratic and hierarchical but they still respect human rights; to liberty,
freedom from servitude, conscience, and religion; right to own property and to
formal equality. Liberal peoples committed to observe the Law of Peoples in
relation with decent peoples, although they are not democratic, they are just in
a liberal sense with their internal organization and members. But the Law of
Peoples, as well as the duty of non-intervention, does not totally apply in
interactions with “outlaw regimes,” such as those who do not respect the
human rights, do good of their own people and non-members. Both liberal and
decent societies may step in with their internal affairs in order to protect the
human rights of their people.
Rawls’ Law of Peoples becomes extensively criticized because it does
not allow for an original position agreement among all the world's members but
only among their societies’ representatives. A related criticism does visualize
Rawls’ agreement beyond a global principle of distributive justice- global
difference principle, more global tax on advantaged societies’ wealth or
resources, to be redistributed to less advantaged societies (Beitz and Charles,
1999). Generally, Rawls’ positions about these issues are disabled of the
assumption of the political and institutional bases of distributive justice, basic
role of society and social institutions for the progress of natural and moral
capacities in determining our characters, aims, and future prospects.
“The Law of Peoples” expands the idea of a social contract to the
Society of Peoples and gives the general principles that can and should be
accepted by both liberal and non-liberal societies as the standard for regulating
their behavior toward one another. Specifically, it draws a crucial distinction
between basic human rights and the rights of each citizen of a liberal
constitutional democracy.
THE CONCEPTION OF JUSTIFYING JUSTICE

The fundamental rights and responsibilities, as well as how the rewards

of work and collaboration are distributed. They define a single end or aim
toward which individual morality is guided, such as enjoyment, happiness, or
the greater glory of God. They then develop a philosophy of justice by figuring
out the rights, responsibilities, values, and laws that are required to apply the
individual good to society, arguing that justice is the maximization of this goal
for society as a whole. Utilitarianism is a teleological ideology that has
dominated the thought of philosophers and influenced the behavior of officials
for nearly a century. Happiness or happiness is the dominant individual good,
and as Rawls puts it, "the main principle is that society is rightly ordered, and
therefore just, when its major institutions are structured to achieve the greatest
net balance of satisfaction summed over all of its members."
To think of the parties in the initial situation as rational and mutually
disinterested is one aspect of justice as fairness. This does not imply that the
parties are egoists, or individuals who are only interested in certain types of
interests, such as money, reputation, or dominance. However, they are
portrayed as being uninterested in one another's well-being.
The rationale of a conception of justice cannot be derived from self-
evident premises or conditions on principles; rather, it must be based on the
collective help of several factors, with all fitting together into one coherent view.
One of the most important aspects of this situation is that no one knows his
place in society, his social class or social status, or his fortune in terms of
natural assets and skill, such as intellect, power, and so on. This may also be
assumed that the parties are unaware of their respective conceptions of the
good or psychological proclivities.
Just as each person must decide what constitutes his good, that is, the
scheme of ends that is rational for him to follow, so too must a group of people
decide once and for all what counts as just and unjust among them. The
concepts of justice are determined by the choice that reasonable men will
make in this hypothetical situation of equal liberty, assuming for the time being
that this choice dilemma has a solution. As a result, we can imagine that those
who participate in social cooperation select the rules for assigning basic rights
and duties and dividing social benefits together in a single act. Men must
determine ahead of time how they will control their claims against one another
and what their society's foundation charter will be.

TWO GUIDING IDEAS OF JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS

Social cooperation in some form is necessary for citizens to be able to

lead decent lives. Yet citizens are not indifferent to how the benefits and
burdens of cooperation will be divided amongst them. Rawls’s principles of
justice as fairness articulate the central liberal ideas that cooperation should be
fair to all citizens regarded as free and as equals. The distinctive interpretation
that Rawls gives to these concepts can be seen as combining a negative and a
positive thesis.

Rawls’s negative thesis starts with the idea that citizens do not deserve
to be born into a rich or a poor family, to be born naturally more or less gifted
than others, to be born female or male, to be born a member of a particular
racial group, and so on. Since these features of persons are morally arbitrary in
this sense, citizens are not entitled to more of the benefits of social cooperation
simply because of them. For example, the fact that a citizen was born rich,
white, and male provides no reason in itself for this citizen to be favored by
social institutions.
This negative thesis does not say how social goods should be
distributed; it merely clears the decks. Rawls’s positive distributive thesis is
equality-based reciprocity. All social goods are to be distributed equally, unless
an unequal distribution would be to everyone’s advantage. The guiding idea is
that since citizens are fundamentally equal, reasoning about justice should
begin from a presumption that cooperatively-produced goods should be equally
divided. Justice then requires that any inequalities must benefit all citizens, and
particularly must benefit those who will have the least. Equality sets the
baseline; from there any inequalities must improve everyone’s situation, and
especially the situation of the worst-off. These strong requirements of equality
and reciprocal advantage are hallmarks of Rawls’s theory of justice.

JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS

Justice as fairness is Rawls’s theory of justice for a liberal society. As a

member of the family of liberal political conceptions of justice it provides a
framework for the legitimate use of political power. Yet legitimacy is only the
minimal standard of moral acceptability; a political order can be legitimate
without being just. Justice sets the maximal standard: the arrangement of
social institutions that is morally best.
Rawls constructs justice as fairness around specific interpretations of
the ideas that citizens are free and equal, and that society should be fair. He
sees it as resolving the tensions between the ideas of freedom and equality,
which have been highlighted both by the socialist critique of liberal democracy
and by the conservative critique of the modern welfare state. Rawls also
argues that justice as fairness is superior to the dominant tradition in modern
political thought: utilitarianism.
In Rawls’s egalitarian liberalism, citizens relate to each other as equals
within a social order defined by reciprocity, instead of within the unjust status
hierarchies familiar from today.

Significant political and economic inequalities are often associated with

inequalities of social status that encourage those of lower status to be
viewed both by themselves and by others as inferior. This may arouse
widespread attitudes of deference and servility, on one side, and a will
to dominate and arrogance on the other. These effects of social and
 economic inequalities can be serious evils and the attitudes they
engender great vices... Fixed status ascribed by birth, or by gender or
race, is particularly odious (JF, 131).
In opposing the utilitarian arguments, Rawls attempted to establish an
unbiased version of social justice based on the social contract approach. The
social contract approach holds that society is in a form of agreement with all
those within the society. The approach originated from an 18th-century
philosophical and intellectual movement called the Age of Enlightenment.
The movement assumes that members of a society have consented to
surrender some of their freedoms and submit to the authority of the ruler in
exchange for the maintenance of social rights and the protection of their
remaining rights. Rawls opines the idea of justice as fairness, and he identifies
social justice as the first characteristic of social institutions.

Rawls's theory of justice revolves around the adaptation of two

fundamental principles of justice which would, in turn, guarantee a just and
morally acceptable society. The first principle guarantees the right of each
person to have the most extensive basic liberty compatible with the liberty of
others. The second principle states that social and economic positions are to
be (a) to everyone's advantage and (b) open to all.

A key problem for Rawls is to show how such principles would be

universally adopted, and here the work borders on general ethical issues. He
introduces a theoretical "veil of ignorance" in which all the "players" in the
social game would be placed in a situation which is called the "original
position." Having only a general knowledge about the facts of "life and society,"
each player is to make a "rationally prudential choice" concerning the kind of
social institution they would enter into contract with. By denying the players any
specific information about themselves it forces them to adopt a generalized
point of view that bears a strong resemblance to the moral point of view. "Moral
conclusions can be reached without abandoning the prudential standpoint and
positing a moral outlook merely by pursuing one's own prudential reasoning
under certain procedural bargaining and knowledge constraints."

References:

1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. (2020, June

29). John
Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice.’ Retrieved
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of-justice/
Corporate Finance Institute. (2020, April 27). A Theory of
Justice.
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https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/other/a-
theory-ofjustice/
Course Hero. (2018, May 7). A Theory of Justice Study Guide.
In Course Hero.
Retrieved May 3, 2021, from https://www.coursehero.com/lit/A-Theory-
ofJustice/

Meritt, G. (1973). Justice as Fairness: A Commentary on

Rawls's New Theory of Justice. Symposium on Race Relation.
Retrieved from
https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
3263&context=vlr
Harvard University Press. (n.d.) Retrieved
from https://web.csulb.edu/~cwallis/382/readings/160/The
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McCartney, S. & Parent, R. (2015). Ethics in law enforcement.
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Contemporary Moral Problems (pp. 60-66). Belmont CA., Thomas
Wadworth.
Duignan, B. (2021, February 17). John Rawls. Encyclopedia
Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-Rawls
Beitz, Charles, 1999, Political Theory and International
Relations (revised edition), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691009155/political-
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https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/#OriPosLawPeo.
Rawls, J. (2001). The Law of Peoples. Harvard University Press.

BSMT 1E GROUP 3 : RAWL’S THEORY OF JUSTICE

Mamon, Lecxery Girl Pirante,

Lady Fatima Poblacion,
Arianne Shannice Pongasi,
Jenny Marie Portes, Lyka
Potot, Chauncey Mei
Pureza, Jessica Quimat,
Yaney Grace Rallos,
Marie Danica
Villarmino, Mariae Gabrielle
Villaruel, Bless Angelie
Yapcoy, Shanny Zelena