Remedial Law Digest

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Remedial Law Digest

2018 GOLDEN BEACON REMEDIAL LAW

By: Dean MANUEL R. BUSTAMANTE

1. J U R I S D I C T I O N
Jurisdiction is the power and authority of a court to hear, try
and decide a case. It is conferred by substantive law or by other
statutes.
Features of jurisdiction over the subject matter:
1. conferred by law

2. can be raised at anytime
3. to be determined by the allegations of the case
4. determined by the allegations in the pleadings, not the evidence
5. sometimes territorial
COURTS OF LAW vs. COURTS OF EQUITY
A court of law decides a case according to what promulgated
law is while a court of equity adjudicates a controversy according to
the common precept of what is and just without inquiring into the
terms of the statutes.
CONSTITUTIONAL and STATUTORY COURTS
Constitutional Courts are those created by the Constitution while

Statutory Courts are those created by law. The Supreme Court owes its
creation to the Constitution. It is therefore a Constitutional Court.
The Sandiganbayan is NOT a constitutionally created court

because it was not directly created by the Constitution but was
created by law pursuant to a constitutional mandate. All courts in
the Philippines other than the Supreme Court are statutory court.
The distinction is significant because Constitutional Courts cannot be

abolished by Congress without amending the Constitution whereas
Statutory Courts may be abolished by Congress by just simply
repealing the law which created those courts.
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
Under this doctrine, courts will not resolve a controversy involving
a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative
tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge and experience of
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said tribunal in determining technical and intricate matters of fact. (Villaflor vs.
Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 297).
WHEN JURISDICTION OVER THE RES BECOMES SIGNIFICANT
Jurisdiction over the res becomes relevant only in actions in rem
and quasi in rem but also in situations where jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant cannot be acquired in personam.
ACTIONS INCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION
In actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, the basic issue is
one other than the recovery of a sum of money. The money claim is
this type of action is merely incidental.
In determining whether an action is one in which the subject matter
is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the SC has adopted the
criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money,
the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the MTC or RTC would depend on the amount of
the claim. However, where the basic issue is something OTHER THAN
the right to recover a sum of money, then the action is
considered as one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Some Examples of Action Incapable of Pecuniary Estimations:
1. Specific Performance;
2. Rescission;
3. Support;
4. Foreclosure of Mortgage;
5. Injunction;
6. Annulment;
7. etc.
ZENAIDA LANTING vs. HON. OMBUDSMAN

458 SCRA 93, G.R. No. 141426, May 6, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a criminal complaint before the office of the
Ombudsman against city officials of Manila for violation of RA 3019.
The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit.
She appealed the decision of the Ombudsman to the Court of
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Appeals (CA), however, the CA dismissed the petition on the ground
that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA have jurisdiction to review cases decided by the
Ombudsman?
HELD: NO. Petitioner’s complaint before the Ombudsman is for violation
of the RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts) and it is not
an administrative complaint. Considering the complaint is criminal in
nature, the Supreme Court (SC) has the sole authority to review the
Ombudsman resolution on pure question of law.
ESTOPPEL

SPRINGSUN MANAGEMENT SYSTEM vs. OSCAR CAMERINO
449 SCRA, G.R. No. 161029, January 19, 2005
FACTS:
Respondents have been the farmers-tenants of Victoria Homes, cultivating

and planting rice and corn on the lots.
Victoria Homes without notifying the respondents, sold the lots to

petitioner Springsun.
Petitioner filed several complaints for forcible entry with the MTC
against the respondent farm tenants.
In their common answer to the complaint, the respondents averred
that they and their families have been in their possession of the lots
as tenants and they have been tilling and planting rice and other
agricultural crops thereon many years ago up to the present. MTC
dismissed the case.
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the dismissal. When appeal was brought
to the CA, the petitioner asserts that the lower court did not
have jurisdiction in the said case and it should have been filed
with the Department of Agrarian Reforms instead.
ISSUE:
Whether the question of jurisdiction be raised for the first time on
appeal?
HELD: NO.
It did not do so before the trial court and the Appellate Court.
The SC has consistently ruled that an issue proffered for the first
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time on appeal and not timely presented in the proceedings
before the lower court is barred by the principle of estoppel.
**** The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while
jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a litigant’s participation in
all stages of the case before the trial court, including the
invocation of its authority in asking affirmative relief, bars such
party from challenging the court’s jurisdiction. A party cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate
or question that same jurisdiction. The Court frowns upon the
undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and
submitting his case for decision and then accepting judgment only if
favorable and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED
RENATO M. DAVID vs. EDITHA AGBAY & PEOPLE

G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015
FACTS:
An information for Falsification of Public Document was filed

against David before the MTC and a warrant of arrest was
issued against David.
On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the information and
before his arrest, David filed an Urgent Motion for Re-
determination of Probable Cause.
The MTC denied David’s motion for re-determination of probable

cause and further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused David as the motion was filed prior to his arrest.
ISSUE:
Whether the jurisdiction over the person of the accused was
already acquired by the filing of the Urgent Motion for Re-
determination of Probable Cause.
HELD: YES.
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court

acquires the jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by
his pleading to the merits such as requiring the exercise of the
court’s jurisdiction thereafter, appearing for arraignment or by filing
of bail.
Distinction should be made between custody of the law and
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jurisdiction over the person.
Custody of the law required before the court can act upon
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of
other reliefs sought by the defendant when the mere application
therefore constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or
voluntary surrender while jurisdiction over the person of the accused
is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary surrender.
One can be under the custody of the law but not subject to
the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as, when a
person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before
arraignment to quash the warrant.
On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of
the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of
the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial
has commenced.
Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the
person, who is thereby deprived of his will and liberty, binding
him to become obedient to the will of the law.
Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the
accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading
seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the
special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over
his person.
Considering that David sought affirmative relief in filing his

motion for re-determination of probable cause, the MTC acquires
over his person.
VOID JUDGMENT DOES NOT ATTAIN FINALITY
HON. CESAR D. BUENAFLOR vs. JOSE M. RAMIREZ

G.R. No. 201607, February 15, 2017, 817 SCRA 623
FACTS: Chairman Domingo of the PAGC appointed Ramirez as Executive
Assistant III. A month later, Chairman Domingo resigned and was
replaced by Buenaflor.
Buenaflor terminated Ramirez as of the same date as Chairman
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Domingo’s resignation on the ground that his position was co-terminus
with that of the appointing authority.
Believing that his appointment had been contractual in nature,

Ramirez sued Buenaflor in the RTC. On the other hand, Buenaflor
filed his answer and contended that Ramirez should have instead
filed an administrative complaint in the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Buenaflor guilty of
unlawful termination because he had not discharged his burden of
proving that Ramirez’ employment was co-terminus with that of
Chairman Domingo.
Buenaflor seasonably filed his motion for reconsideration which the

RTC denied the same on September 30, 2008.
On September 22, 2011, Buenaflor filed a notice of appeal.
The RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal of Buenaflor,
and altogether dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of
time.
Buenaflor assailed the order of the RTC by petition for certiorari
in the CA, alleging that the RTC thereby gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The CA dismissed the petition on technical grounds. Buenaflor moved
for reconsideration, but the CA denied his motion for reconsideration
as Buenaflor’s Notice of Appeal was filed 1,125 days thereafter is
clearly out of time.
ISSUES
1) Whether RTC has jurisdiction over the termination of the
services of Ramirez.
2) Whether the decision of the RTC has not attained finality
despite the belated appeal.
RULINGS
1) NO. The RTC has no jurisdiction over a case involving
termination of employment of an employee of the Civil Service.
Ramirez’ complaint challenging the validity of his termination from

the service was outside of the RTC’s sphere of authority. His
appointment or separation from the service are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the CSC.
It is clarified that the CSC has jurisdiction over a case involving
a civil servant if it can be regarded as equivalent to a labor
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dispute under the Labor Code.
Conversely, the regular court has jurisdiction if the case can be
decided under the general laws, such as when the case is for the
recovery of private debts, or for the recovery of damages due to
slanderous remarks of the employee, or prosecution of the employees.
The mere fact that the parties are members of the Civil Service
should not remove the controversy from the general jurisdiction of
the courts of justice and place them under the special of the CSC.
Jurisdiction over the subject the subject matter is conferred only by
the Constitution or the law, it cannot be acquired through a
waiver, it cannot be acquired, it cannot be enlarged by the omission
of the parties; it cannot be conferred by the acquiescence of the
court.
BP 129 did not vest jurisdiction in the RTC over matters relating
to the Civil Service. Consequently, the RTC could not arrogate unto
itself the hearing and decision of a subject matter outside of its
jurisdiction.
2) YES, the void and ineffectual decision of the RTC did not attain
finality despite the supposedly belated appeal by Buenaflor.
When a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only
power it has is to dismiss the action. Upon the filing of the
complaint, the RTC could only have dismissed it for lack of
jurisdiction. Any further actions the RTC took, were void and
ineffectual.
A void judgment - being non-existent in legal contemplation -- does
not become final and executory even with the belated filing of an
appeal.
KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY

AVELINA ZAMORA vs. HEIRS OF CARMEN IZQUIERDO
443 SCRA 24, G.R. No. 146195, November 18, 2004
FACTS: Respondents filed with the MTC a complaint for unlawful
detainer against the petitioner.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that the controversy was not referred to the barangay for
conciliation. First, petitioner alleged that the barangay Certificate to
file action is fatally defective because it pertains to another
dispute i.e. the refusal by respondents to give consent to
petitioner’s request for installation of water facilities in the
premises. And second, when the parties failed to reach an amicable
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settlement before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, the Punong Barangay as

Lupon Chairman did not constitute the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo
before whom mediation or arbitration proceedings should have been
conducted.
ISSUE: Whether the case be dismissed for the alleged failure to
comply with the required barangay conciliation?
HELD: NO. While it is true that the “Sertifikasyon” is entitled “Ukol
sa Hindi Pagbibigay Ng Pahintulot Sa Pagpapakabit Ng Tubig,” this
title must not prevail over the actual issues discussed in the
proceedings. Hence, to require another confrontation at the barangay
level as sine qua non for the filing of the instant case
would not serve any useful purpose anymore since no issues
would be raised therein and the parties have proven so many
times in the past that they cannot get to settle their
differences amicably.
Furthermore, the SC cannot sustain petitioner’s contention that the

Lupon conciliation alone, without the proceeding before the Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo, contravenes the law on Katarungang Pambarangay.
Section 412 (a) of RA 7160 clearly provides that, as a precondition
to filing a complaint in court, the parties shall go through the
conciliation process either before the Lupon Chairman as what happened
in the present case, or the Pangkat. Here, while the Pangkat was
not constituted, however, the parties met nine times at the Office of
the Barangay Chairman for conciliation wherein not only the issue of
water installation was discussed but also petitioner’s violation of the
lease contract. It is thus manifest that there was substantial
compliance with the law which does not require strict adherence
thereto.
**** The court, agency or quasi-judicial agency which has possession or
physical custody over the res or subject property of the case has
jurisdiction over it and has the authority and jurisdiction to rule and
issue a decisions over the same. (Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. Nos. 111202-05, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 109).
**** The “Construction Industry Arbitration Law” provides that the CIAC
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising
from, or connected with, contracts entered into by parties involved.
These disputes may involve government and private contracts. For the
Board to acquire jurisdiction, the parties to the dispute must agree to
submit the same to voluntary arbitration. When a contract contains a
clause to the submission of a future controversy to arbitration, it is
not necessary for the parties to enter into a submission agreement
before the claimant may invoke the jurisdiction of CIAC. (Department
of Health vs. HTMC Engineers Company, G.R. No. 146120, January 27, 2006,
480 SCRA 299).
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**** Non-compliance with the condition precedent under PD 1508 does
not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its
power of jurisdiction over a case where the defendants fail to
object to such exercise of jurisdiction. But such objection should be
seasonably made before the court first taking cognizance of the
complaint, and must be raised in the Answer, or in such other
pleading allowed under the Rules of Court. (Espino vs. Legarda, G.R. No.
149266, March 17, 2006, 485 SCRA 74)
BARANGAY CONCILIATION

CRISANTA ALCARAZ MIGUEL vs. JERRY D. MONTAÑEZ
G.R. No. 191336, January 25, 2012, 664 SCRA 345
FACTS: There was a Contract of Loan between Crisanta and Jerry but
when the obligation became due and demandable, debtor Jerry failed
to pay despite demand. A complaint was filed before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa and a compromise was entered into where the debtor
agreed to pay P2,000 per month. However, the debtor failed to
pay, hence, a certificate to file an action was issued by the
Lupon. The creditor filed a complaint for sum of money before
the MeTC of Makati City.
ISSUE: Whether the complaint for sum of money is the proper
remedy.
HELD: YES. Because the debtor failed to comply with the terms of
the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, said agreement is deemed rescinded
pursuant to Article 2041 of the New Civil Code and the creditor
can insist on her original demand. Perforce, the complaint for
collection of sum of money is the proper remedy.
Q: What is a doctrine of hierarchy of courts?
A: Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to
the Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate
remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. The Supreme Court
is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution
and immemorial tradition. Thus, a petition for review on certiorari
assailing the decision involving both questions of fact and law
must first be brought before the Court of Appeals. (Lacson
Hermanas vs. Heirs of Cenon Ignacio, G.R. No. 165973, June 29, 2005, 462 SCRA
290).
Q: What is judicial courtesy?
A: It applies where “there is a strong probability that the issues
before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as
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a result of continuation of the proceedings in the lower court
or court of origin.” Thus, the lower court or court of origin
should suspend its proceedings. (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 492 SCRA
748, June 26, 2006)
ACQUISITION OF JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON

MA. IMELDA MANOTOC vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 130974, August 18, 2006, 499 SCRA 21
The court’s jurisdiction over a defendant is founded on a valid
service of summons. Without a valid service, the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction over the defendant, unless the defendant voluntarily
submits to it. The defendant must be properly apprised of a
pending action against him and assured of the opportunity to present
his defenses to the suit. Proper service of summons is used to
protect one’s right to due process.
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
FELICISIMO OPRIASA vs. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY

G.R. No. 149190, December 19, 2006, 511 SCRA 234
For the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the petition for
reconstitution, the occupants of the property should be notified of
the petition. However, there was no need to notify petitioners
as they were not occupants or persons in possession of the
property entitled to a notice of hearing. As petitioners were not
entitled to notice, they could not claim intrinsic fraud.
ACTION INCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION

FAR EAST BANK vs. SHEMBERG MARKETING CORPORATION
Where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, where the money claim is only incidental
or a consequence of the principal relief sought, the action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. An action questioning the validity of
a mortgage is one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
JURISDICTION NOT AFFECTED BY MERE DEFECT IN FORM

MR. & MRS. GEORGE TAN vs. G.V.T. ENGINEERING SERVICES
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G.R. No. 153057, August 7, 2006, 498 SCRA 93
It would be an unjustifiable abandonment of the principles laid
down in the jurisprudence if the Court would nullify the
proceedings had in the present case by the lower and appellate
courts on the simple ground that the complaint filed with
the trial court was not properly captioned for these are
matters of form and the Court finds the defect merely
technical which does not, in any way, affect its jurisdiction.
PRINCIPLE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS

MOLDEX REALTY, INC. vs. H L U R B
G.R. No. 149719, June 21, 2007, 525 SCRA 198
Petitions seeking the nullification of an administrative resolution which

do not involve circumstances and issues of transcendental
importance to the public must be filed with the Regional Trial
Court and not with the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals directly.
ARBITRATION

UNIWIDE SALES REALTY vs. TITAN – IKEDA CONSTRUCTION CORP.
As an arbitration body, the CIAC can only resolve issues brought
before it by the parties through the Term of Reference (TOR),
which functions similarly as a pre-trial brief. The Rules of Court
may not be used to contravene the spirit of the CIAC rules.
RULE 3 - PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

SECTION 6 – PERMISSIVE JOINDER OF PARTIES
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC. vs. STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY

453 SCRA 482, G.R. No. 140746, March 16, 2005
FACTS: Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger jeepney owned by
Martina. While driving, a Pantranco passenger bus was trailing
behind. The Pantranco bus overtook the jeepney, in so doing, the
Pantranco bus hit the left rear side of the jeepney and sped away.
Crispin reported the incident to the police station and respondent
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Standard Insurance Company, insurer of the jeepney. The total cost
of the repair was not paid in full by Standard, so Martina
shouldered the balance.
Thereafter, Standard and Martina demanded reimbursement from

petitioner Pantranco and its driver but they refused. This
prompted respondents to file with the RTC a complaint for sum of
money.
In their answer, both petitioners specifically denied the allegations

in the complaint and averred that there was a misjoinder of
parties. Petitioners insist that the trial court has no jurisdiction
over the case since the cause of action of each respondent did
not arise from the same transaction and that there are no
common questions of law and fact common to both parties.
For their part, respondents contend that their individual claims

arose out of the same vehicular accident and involve a common
question of fact and law.
ISSUE: Whether there was misjoinder of parties.
HELD: NO. There was no misjoinder of parties in the case at bar.
Pursuant to Rule 3, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, permissive
joinder of parties requires that: (1) the right to relief arises out of
the same transaction or series of transactions; (2) there is a
question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or
defendants; and (3) such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by
the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and venue.
In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is,
Pantranco’s bus hitting the rear side of the jeepney. There is
also a common question of fact, that is, whether petitioners are
negligent. There being a single transaction common to both
respondents, consequently, they have the same cause of action
against petitioners. To determine identity of cause of action, it
must be ascertained whether the same evidence which is necessary
to sustain the second cause of action would have been sufficient
to authorize a recovery in the first. Such joinder of parties avoids
multiplicity of suit and ensures the convenient, speedy and orderly
administration of justice.
SECTION 6 - MISJOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION

LILIA B. ADA vs. FLORANTE BAYLON
G.R. No. 182435, August 13, 2012, 678 SCRA 293
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FACTS: During the pendency of an action for partition, there was
a donation made by Rita to Florante without the consent of the
other parties or the Court. When the other parties learned of the
donation, they filed a Supplemental Pleading seeking the rescission
of the donation.
ISSUE: Can there be a joinder of these two (2) causes of action?
HELD: NO. There was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action
for partition could not be joined with action for the rescission of
the said donation inter vivos in favor of Florante. Lest it be
overlooked, an action for partition is a special civil action
governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court while an action for
rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the ordinary rules
of civil procedure. The variance in the procedure in the special
civil action of partition and in the ordinary civil action precludes
their joinder in one complaint or their being tried in a single
proceeding to avoid confusion in determining what rules shall
govern the conduct of the proceedings as well as in the
determination of the presence of requisite elements of each
particular cause of action.
Nevertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for
dismissal.
A misjoined cause of action, if not severed upon motion of a
party or by the Court sua sponte, may be adjudicated by the
court together with the other cause of action.
RULE 3 - PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

SECTION 16 - DEATH OF A PARTY, DUTY OF COUNSEL

CAPITOLINA NAPERE vs. AMANDO BARBARONA
543 SCRA 376, G.R. No. 160426, January 31, 2008
FACTS:
Amando filed a complaint for recovery possession, quieting of title
and damages against Spouses Juan and Capitolina.
During the pendency of the case, Juan died, and their counsel
informed the Court of Juan’s death and submitted the names and
addresses of Juan’s heirs.
The trial court failed to order the substitution of the heirs.
Despite this oversight, the proceedings were conducted and the
judgment was rendered by the trial court.
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ISSUE:
Whether the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
persons of the heirs for its failure to order their substitution.
HELD: NO. Formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they
themselves voluntarily appear. It is a fact that Capitolina is a co-
defendant of the deceased and actively participated in the case. The
records show that the counsel of Juan and Capitolina continued
to represent them even after Juan’s death.
The rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction,
but a requirement of due process. It was designed to ensure that
the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in
the suit through his heirs or the duly appointed legal
representative of his estate. Moreover, non-compliance with the
Rules results in the denial of the right to due process for the
heirs who, though not duly notified of the proceedings, would be
substantially affected by the decision rendered therein.
It is only when there is a denial of due process, as when the
deceased is not represented by any legal representatives, or heirs,
that the court nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting
judgment therein.
SPOUSES JULITA & FELIPE DELA CRUZ vs. PEDRO JOAQUIN

464 SCRA 576, G.R. No. 162788, July 28, 2005
FACTS: Pedro filed a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership,
cancellation of title and damages against Spouses Julita and Felipe
dela Cruz.
During the pendency of the case, Pedro died. The RTC rendered
judgment in favor of Pedro.
On appeal, the Motion for Substitution of Party Plaintiff was filed
before the Court of Appeals and the same was granted.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court had lost its jurisdiction over the
case upon the death of Pedro.
HELD: NO. Strictly speaking, the rule on the substitution by heirs
is not a matter of jurisdiction but a requirement of due process.
Thus, when due process is not violated, as when the right of the
representative or heir is recognized and protected, non-compliance
or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the
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validity of a promulgated decision.
Mere failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a
sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s decision. The alleging
party must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due
process.
Evidently, the heirs of Pedro voluntary appeared and participated in
the case. When the appellate court had ordered the legal
representatives to appear and substitute for him, the substitution
even on appeal had been ordered correctly.
CHITTICK vs. COURT OF APPEALS

166 SCRA 219, G.R. No. L-25350, October 4, 1988
The failure of the heirs to substitute for the original plaintiff
upon her death led to the nullification of the trial court’s
decision. The latter had sought to recover support in arrears
and her share in the conjugal partnership.
The children who allegedly substituted for her to continue the case
against their father had vehemently objected to their inclusion as
parties.
Moreover, because he died during the pendency of the case, they
were bound to substitute for the defendant also. The substitution
effectively merged the persons of the plaintiff and the
defendant and thus extinguishes the obligations being sued upon.
SECTION 17 – DEATH OR SEPARATION OF A PARTY

WHO IS A PUBLIC OFFICER
MAYOR RHUSTOM DAGADAG vs. MICHAEL TONGNAWA

450 SCRA 437, G.R. Nos. 161166-67, February 3, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner, while then the mayor of Tanudan, sent

respondents a memorandum ordering them to explain within 72
hours why they should not be administratively sanctioned for acts
unbecoming of public servants and failure to perform their duties.
After investigation, the Committee found respondents liable for
insubordination, non performance of duties, and absences without
official leaves. Petitioner issued an order suspending respondents
from their respective positions for two months.
Respondents appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) but the
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latter affirmed petitioner’s orders. Upon appeal to CA, the appellate
court reversed CSC’s decision and reinstated the respondents.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the SC.
However, at the time of filing of said petition, the petitioner was
no longer the mayor.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner may appeal the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
HELD: NO. Section 17 of Rule 3 provides, “When a public
officer is a party in an action in his official capacity and
during its pendency dies, resigns or otherwise ceases to hold office,
the action may be continued and maintained by or against his
successor if, within thirty (30) days after the successor takes
office or such time as may be granted by the court, it is
satisfactorily shown to the court by any party that there is a
substantial need for continuing or maintaining it and that the
successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue
the action of his predecessor. Before the substitution is made,
the party or officer to be affected, unless expressing thereto, shall
be given reasonable notice of the application therefore and
accorded an opportunity to be heard.
Where the petitioner ceases to be mayor, the appeal and/or
action be initiated may be discontinued and maintained by his
successor if there is substantial need to do so. If the
successor failed to pursue the appeal and/or action, the same
should be dismissed.
**** A party who was not properly impleaded as a party
defendant cannot be liable for the judgment against a defendant
without a trial. (2005 BQ # X)
PARTIES TO THE ACTION

ANTONIO BALTAZAR vs. HON. OMBUDSMAN
In private suits, standing is governed by the “real parties – in –
interest” rule found in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure which provides that “every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest.”
PERSON NOT PRIVY TO A CONTRACT MAY NOT BRING AN ACTION;
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EXCEPTION
CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORP.

G.R. No. 150711, August 10, 2006, 498 SCRA 400
Ordinarily, one who is not a privy to a contract may not
bring an action to enforce it. However, this case falls under the
exception. As an exception, parties who have not taken part in a
contract may show that they have a real interest affected by its
performance or annulment. In other words, those who are not
principally or subsidiarily obligated in a contract, in which they
had no intervention, may show their detriment that could result
from it.
RULE 7
PARTS OF A PLEADING

SEC. 5 - CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING

Q: What is forum shopping?
A: It is an act of a party which consists of filing multiple suits,
simultaneously or successively for the purpose of obtaining a
favorable judgment.
**** Failure to comply with the requirement of forum shopping is
not curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading, but shall cause for the dismissal of the
case without prejudice. However, the trial court in the exercise
of its sound discretion, may choose to be liberal and consider the
amendment as substantial compliance. (Great Southern Maritime Services
Corp. vs. Acuna, G.R. No. 140189, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 422).
**** Counsel cannot sign the anti-forum shopping certification because it
must be executed by the plaintiff or principal party. (2000 BQ
# II)
FERNANDO MARTIN O. PEÑA vs. ATTY. LOLITO APARICIO

A.C. No. 7298, June 25, 2007, 525 SCRA 444
The filing of multiple suits and the possibility of conflicting
decisions rarely happen in disbarment complaints considering that said
proceedings are either taken by the Supreme Court motu propio, or
by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified
complaint of any person. Thus, if the complaint in a disbarment
case fails to attach a certification against forum shopping, the
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pendency of another disciplinary action against the same respondent

may still be ascertained with ease.
PAUL LEE TAN vs. PAUL SYCIP

G.R. No. 153468, August 17, 2006, 499 SCRA 216
In the interest of substantial justice, a procedural lapse may be
excused especially when there appears to be no intention to
circumvent the need for proper verification and certification. The
substantial merits of petitioners’ case and the purely legal question
involved in the Petition should be considered special circumstances or
compelling reasons that justify an exception to the strict requirements
of the verification and the certification of non-forum shopping.
RULE 8
MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATION IN PLEADINGS

EQUITABLE CARDNETWORK, INC. vs. JOSEFA B. CAPISTRANO
FACTS: In a complaint for sum of money, Equitable Cardnetwork
alleged that the defendant, a woman at the age of 81 and
bedridden at that, applied for and used a credit card, but failed
to pay for her obligations. In her answer, she alleged that she
denied the allegations for lack of knowledge as to their truth and
denied having applied for membership with the card company and
that she never authorized anyone to get her alleged card thus not
being a member, she has no obligation, monetary or otherwise, to
the plaintiff. After trial, the RTC ruled that having failed to deny
under oath the genuineness and due execution of ECI’s actionable
document that were attached to the complaint, she impliedly
admitted the genuineness and due execution of the same.
ISSUE: Whether the defendant made an effective specific denial of
the genuineness and due execution of the actionable documents.
HELD: YES. Because the defendant effectively denied the genuineness

and due execution of the actionable documents. It is true that
she denied the documents merely for “lack of knowledge” which
denial, is inadequate since by their nature she ought to know the
truth of the allegations regarding those documents. But her
inadequacy was cured by her assertion that she was denying the
allegations regarding those actionable documents, stating that she never
applied for membership with the card company. These reasons
cannot be ignored and they form part of the answer. Hence,
when she denied the transactions for “lack of knowledge,”
it was her way of saying that such transactions took place
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without her knowing. Since the answer was verified, she in effect
denied under
oath the genuineness and due execution of the documents

supporting them. For this reason, she is not barred from
introducing evidence that those documents were forged.
SEC. 8 - HOW TO CONTEST SUCH DOCUMENTS
**** Respondents failed to deny specifically the execution of the
promissory note. This being the case, there was no need for
petitioner to present the original of the promissory note in question.
Their judicial admission with respect to the genuineness and
execution of the promissory note sufficiently established their liability
to petitioner regardless of the fact that petitioner failed to present
the original of said note. (Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. vs. Del
Monte Motor Works, Inc. G.R. No. 154684, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 117).
SEC. 10 - SPECIFIC DENIAL

AGRIFINA AQUINTEY vs. SPS. FELICIDAD & RICO TIBONG
A denial is not made specific simply because it is so qualified by
the defendant. A general denial not become specific by the use of
the word “specifically.” The answer should be so definite and
certain in its allegations that the pleader’s adversary should not be
left in doubt as to what is admitted, what is denied, and
what is covered by denials of knowledge as sufficient to form
a belief.
FAILURE OF DEFENDANT TO DISCLOSE THE MATTERS ALLEGED IN THE

COMPLAINT

FRILOU CONSTRUCTION, INC. vs.
AEGIS INTEGRATED STRUCTURE CORPORATION
G.R. No. 191088, August 17, 2016, 800 SCRA 611
FACTS: Respondent Aegis filed a complaint for a sum of money
against petitioner Frilou. Aegis averred that the sum of P6,024,306.00
has long been overdue in that respondent Aegis had long supplied,
fabricated, delivered and erected the structural steel requirements of
petitioner Frilou but the latter has paid respondent the sum of
P4,490,014.12 only thereby leaving an unpaid balance of P1,534,291.68.
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Petitioner denied this by stating “petitioner also DENIES paragraphs 4
and 5 for being contrary to the facts and circumstances surrounding
the case,” but did not state specifically the matters which it relies
on to support denial of liability of unpaid balance.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence

sustaining petitioner’s contention that respondent failed to show
evidence of Frilou’s supposed remaining liability for the balance
amount of P1,534,291.68.
On appeal, CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling on the sole
issue of whether respondent Aegis established its claim of the
balance amount of P1,534,219.68 even in the absent of presentation of
delivery receipts. The CA ruled that petitioner’s judicial admission of
the existence of the Purchase Orders worked to establish the
remaining balance amounting to P1.534 Million by preponderance of
evidence.
Moreover, in failing to specifically deny the allegation that

respondent Aegis supplied, delivered and erected the structural
requirements of Frilou in the amount of P6,014 Million, the latter is
deemed to have admitted the same.
ISSUES
1) What are the three (3) modes of specific denial?
2) What is the purpose of requiring defendant to make a specific
denial?
3) Whether petitioner Frilou failed to make a specific denial.
RULINGS
1) Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court on manner of making
allegations in pleading contemplates three (3) modes of specific denial:
a) by specifying such material allegation of the fact in the complaint,
the truth of which the defendant does not admit, and whatever
practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters which he will
rely upon to support his denial;
b) by specifying so much of an averment in the complaint as is
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true and material and denies only the remainder;
c) by stating that the defendant is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to truth of a material averment in
the complaint which has the effect of a denial.
2) The purpose of requiring the defendant to make a specific denial
is to make him disclose the matters alleged in the complaint with
the matter which he intends to disprove at the trial, together with
the matter which he relied upon to support the denial. The parties
are compelled to lay their cards on the table.
3) YES. Petitioner admitted and failed to specifically deny the
material averments in respondent’s complaint that Aegis complied with
the obligation under the Purchase Orders or the complete amount of
P6,024,305.00.
First, petitioner did not make a specific denial, but a general one
to the effect that it is no longer has any remaining liabilities to
the respondent.
Secondly, petitioner did not state “ the facts and circumstances

surrounding the case,” the matters which it relies on to support its
denial of its liability in the amount of P1,534,291.68.
Petitioner only asserted that respondent failed to show evidence of
its supposed remaining liability. This is not an assertion of the truth
and substance of the matter. It is merely a statement that as
far as petitioner is concerned, respondent does not have
evidence to prove its claim.
Petitioner is plainly splitting hairs. As a result of its failure to
make a specific denial, it was deemed to have admitted all the
material averment in the complaint.
Petitioner should have, and could have easily, specifically denied

each and every averment under the foregoing paragraph as required
by Section 10 of Rule 8 and the asserted the substance of the
matter which it relies on to support its denial.
Consequently, the judicial admission of petitioner’s remaining liability

need not be proved.
RULE 9
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD

Section 1 - Defenses and objections not pleaded.
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any
stage of the proceeding, even on appeal. The reason is that
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jurisdiction is conferred by law and lack of it affects the very
authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment
on the action. Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by the averments
of the complaint, not by the defenses contained in the answer.
(Francel Realty Corporation vs. Sycip, G.R. No. 154684, September 8, 2005,
469 SCRA 424).
Section 3 - Default: Declaration of
The mere fact that a defendant is declared in default does not
automatically result in the grant of prayers of the plaintiff. To win,
the latter must still present the same quantum of evidence that
would be required if the defendant were still present. A party that
defaults is not deprived of its right, except the right to be
heard and to present evidence to the trial court. If the evidence
presented does not support a judgment for the plaintiff, the
complaint should be dismissed, even if the defendant may not
have been heard or allowed to present any countervailing evidence.
(Gajudo vs. Traders Royal Bank, G.R. 151098, March 21, 2006, 485 SCRA 108).
RULE 10
AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS

ALPINE LENDING INVESTORS vs. CORPUZ
G.R. No. 157107, November 24, 2006, 508 SCRA 45

Amendment is a matter of right when a motion to dismiss was
filed.
Settled is the rule that a motion to dismiss is not a
responsive pleading for the purpose of Section 2, Rule 10. As no
responsive pleading had been filed, respondent could amend her
complaint as a matter of right. Following the ruling in Breslin vs.
Luzon Stevedoring Co. that respondent has the right to amend her
complaint, it is the correlative duty of the trial court to accept the
amended complaint, otherwise, mandamus would lie against it. In other
words, the trial court’s duty to admit the amended complaint was
purely ministerial. In fact, respondent should have not have filed a
motion to admit her amended complaint.
RULE 13
FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS, JUDGMENTS
AND OTHER PAPERS
LUCIANO ELLO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

460 SCRA 406, G.R. No. 141255, June 21, 2005
FACTS: Respondents filed with the MTCC a complaint against the
petitioners for forcible entry. The MTCC dismissed the complaint for
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failure of the respondents to establish that they have brought the
instant case within one year from entry of petitioners.
On appeal, the RTC reversed the MTCC decision and ordered the
petitioners to vacate the lots and deliver the same to the respondents.
Petitioners filed with the CA a petition for review. The petition was
dismissed outright on the ground that it does not contain the
affidavit of service required by Section 11 of Rule 13.
Petitioners promptly filed a motion for reconsideration attaching

therewith the affidavit of service executed by Gabriel M. Manasan. In
their motion for reconsideration, petitioners averred that they failed to
append to their petition the affidavit of service due to an
excusable oversight considering the time constraint in filing the petition
with voluminous annexes and that there would be a denial of
substantial justice if their petition would be dismissed merely by reason
of technicality. Still unconvinced, the CA denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether the petition be dismissed for failure to attach the
affidavit of service?
HELD: NO. Under Section 11 Rule 13, personal service and filing is
the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing,
the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is
practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place and
person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal
service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had,
which must then be accompanied by written explanation as to why
personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In
adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider
the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved
therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be
expunged for violation of Section 11.
In the present case, there is no question that petitioners violated
Section 11 of Rule 13 by failing to append the affidavit of service
to their petition for review filed with the CA. The SC note, though
that petitioners, upon receipt of the CA’s challenged Resolution dismissing
outright their petition due to such omission, promptly filed a motion
for reconsideration, readily acknowledging their procedural lapse and
attaching therewith the required affidavit of service. Significantly, the
affidavit of service shows that the petition for review was filed
with the CA thru Registered mail. This mode of filing is permitted
under Section 11 Rule 13 since it is obviously impractical for
petitioners and their counsel, who are all residents of Cagayan de Oro
City, to personally file their petition in Manila. Clearly, the affidavit of
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service is a substantive compliance with the requirement under Section 11.
SECTION 9
FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS, JUDGMENTS
& OTHER PAPERS

HEIRS OF WILFREDO DELOS SANTOS vs. DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. 139167, June 29, 2005, 462 SCRA 98
FACTS: On April 2, 1998, the postman attempted to deliver a copy of
an adverse decision of the lower court to the office of Atty.
Olaybal, counsel for petitioner. At that time, the office of Atty.
Olaybal was closed since he was then suffering from influenza. The
postman instead delivered the copy of the decision to Bernadeth Faye
Alamares, who was a clerk in an office adjacent to Atty. Olaybal.
Alamares received the Decision and signed the corresponding registry
return card.
ISSUE: Whether there is a valid service of decision.
HELD: NO. In this case, the postman served a copy of the trial court’s
decision on Alamares who was neither an associate nor employee of
Atty. Olaybal. The records show that Alamares was then an employee
of Asaphil Corporation whose office is adjacent to Atty. Olaybal. There
is nothing in the records showing Atty. Olaybal authorized either
Alamares or Ashapil Corporation to receive mails addressed to him or
his law office.
SEC. 8 - SUBSTITUTED SERVICE
REMELITA ROBINSON vs. CELITA MIRALLES

ISSUE: Whether a substituted service of summons upon petitioner has
been validly effected.
HELD: YES. We have ruled that the statutory requirements of
substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully, and fully and
any substituted service other than that authorized by the Rules is
considered ineffective. However, we frown upon an overly strict
application of the Rules. It is the spirit, rather than the letter of
the procedural rules that governs.
In his return, Sheriff Potente declared that he was refused entry by
the security guard in Alabang Hills twice. The latter informed him
that petitioner prohibits him from allowing anybody to proceed to
her residence whenever she is out. Obviously, it was impossible for
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the sheriff to effect personal or substituted service of summons
upon petitioner. We note that she failed to controvert the sheriff’s
declaration. Nor did she deny having received the summons through
the security guard. Considering her strict instruction to the security
guard, she must bear its consequences. Thus, we agree with the
trial court that summons has been properly served upon petitioner
and that it has acquired jurisdiction over her.
INVALID SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS

YUK LING ONG vs. BENJAMIN T. CO
FACTS: Ong, a British - Hong Kong national, and Co, a Filipino
citizen, were married on October 3, 1982 at Ellinwood Malate
Church.
Sometime in November 2008, Ong was subpoenaed by the BID to
appear before the said agency because her permanent residence visa
was subjected to cancellation proceedings reportedly her marriage
with Co was nullified by the court.
When Ong appeared before the BID, she was furnished copies of
petition for declaration of marriage and RTC decision declaring the
marriage between Ong and Co as void ab initio dated December 11,
2002.
Ong was perflexed that her marriage with Co had been declared
void ab initio.
Consequently, Ong filed a petition for annulment of judgment under
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court before the CA on November 24,
2008 claiming that she was never notified of the annulment case
filed against her. She prayed that the RTC decision dated December
11, 2002 be nullified on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.
Ong alleged that Co committed extrinsic fraud because he deliberately
indicated a wrong address to prevent her from participating in the
trial. Jurisdiction over her person was not acquired because of an
invalid substituted service of summons as no sufficient explanation
showing impossibility of personal service was stated before resorting to
substituted service was made on a security guard of their townhouse
and not a member of her household.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the annulment of judgment is the proper remedy to
invalidate the decision dated December 11, 2002 that has long
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lapsed into finality.
(2) Whether the substituted service of summons is valid.
RULINGS
(1) YES. Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in
character allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no
available or other adequate remedy.
Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs actions for
annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions and Section
2 thereof explicitly provides only two grounds for annulment of
judgment, that is, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Annulment of judgment is an equitable principle not because it
allows a party – litigant another opportunity to reopen a judgment
that has long lapsed into finality but because it enables him to be
discharged from the burden of being bound to a judgment that is
an absolute nullity to begin with.
Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the
judgment or final order is either lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant. The former is a matter of
substantive law because statutory law defines the jurisdiction of the
courts over the subject matter or nature of the action. The latter
is a matter of procedural law for it involves the service of
summons or other processes on the defendant.
(2) NO. There was lack of jurisdiction over her persons because
there was an invalid service of summons.
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid
service of summons or the defendant voluntary appearance in court.
If the defendant does not voluntarily appears in court, jurisdiction
can be acquired by personal or substituted service of summons as
laid down under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court.
In the case at bench, the summons was issued on July 29, 2002
and the process server resorted to substituted service of summons
on August 1, 2002 after only two (2) days from the issuance of
the summons. The server’s return utterly lacks sufficient detail of
the attempts undertaken by the process server to personally serve the
summons on defendant. The server simply made a general statement
that summons was effected after several futile attempts to serve the
same personally. The server did not state the specific number of
attempts made to perform the personal service of summons; the
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dates and the corresponding time the attempts were made; and the
underlying reasons for each unsuccessful service. He did not explain
either if there were inquiries made to locate the defendant. These
important acts to serve the summons on defendant, though futile,
must be specified in the return to justify substituted service.
SEC. 10 - PRIORITIES IN MODES OF SERVICE AND FILING
REY GARCESA vs. MARIETTA LAGUARDIA

G.R. No. 161234, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 559
On the issue of lack of explanation for non-personal service, Section
11, Rule 13 requires that resort to registered mail as a mode of
service must come with an explanation why personal service was not
practicable in the first place. However, while it is true that
procedural rules are necessary to secure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice, rigid application of Section 11, Rule 13 may
be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice.
RULE 16
MOTION TO DISMISS

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPS. WILFREDO GATAL
452 SCRA 697, G.R. No. 138567, March 4, 2005
FACTS: Respondent spouses obtained a loan from petitioner which

was secured by a real estate mortgage over a commercial lot.
For failure of respondents to pay their loan, petitioner foreclosed the
mortgage and thereafter, the title of the lot was consolidated in the
name of petitioner DBP. The property was then offered for sale at
public auction, but none of the bidders was able to meet the bid
price ceiling.
Afterwards, petitioner offered the property for negotiated sale. Respondents

submitted their bid but petitioner rejected it because another buyer,
Jimmy Torrefranca, was already declared the preferred bidder.
Aggrieved, respondents filed with the RTC a complaint for injunction
with prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction, seeking to declare the
sale of the property to Torrefranca void, to uphold respondents’ right
of pre-emption and to maintain the status quo.
Meantime, petitioner filed with the same RTC a petition for issuance of
a writ of possession, which the court issued.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition for issuance of a
writ of possession and to quash the writ of possession on the ground
that there is another case pending before the same court involving the
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same parties, the same subject matter and the same legal issues. The
RTC issued an Order dismissing the action and recalling its earlier
Order granting the writ of possession on the ground of litis pendentia.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which was
denied.
ISSUE: Whether the action be dismissed on the ground of litis
pendentia.
HELD: NO. Litis pendentia does not apply to the circumstances
obtaining in the case at bar. For litis pendentia to lie as a ground for
a motion to dismiss, the following requisites must be present: (1)
that the parties to the action are the same; (2) that there is
substantial identity in the causes of action and reliefs sought; and (3)
that the result of the first action is determinative of the second in
any event and regardless of which party is successful. It is undisputed
that both cases involve the same parties and the same property. The
first case filed is an action for injunction by respondents against
petitioner DBP, while upon the other hand, the latter action is a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by petitioner
DBP, being the purchaser of the lot at the public auction. Clearly, the
rights asserted and the reliefs sought by the parties in both cases
are not identical. Thus, respondents’ claim of litis pendentia is
unavailing.
Section 1 - Grounds time for filing
Section 1, Rule 16 of the said Rules specifically provides that the
Motion to Dismiss must be made “within the time for but before the
filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim. Thus,
a Motion to Dismiss may not, therefore, be made after an answer
had already filed. (Bonifactio Construction & Management vs. Perlas-Bernabe,
G.R. No. 161379, June 30, 2005, 462 SCRA 392)
Section 6 - Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses.
Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that the
defendant may reiterate any of the grounds for dismissal provided
under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court as affirmative defenses but that
a preliminary hearing no longer be had thereon if a motion to
dismiss had already been filed. The Section, however, does not
contemplate a situation, such as the one obtaining in this case where
there are several defendants but only one filed a motion to dismiss.
The Motion to Dismiss filed by the Laperal does not affect the right of
the other defendants, including petitioners herein, to plead their own
affirmative defenses and be preliminary heard thereon. The trial court is
likewise not proscribed from granting, in its discretion, such a motion
for preliminary hearing. The only caveat is that the ground of non-
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compliance with the condition precedent of resorting to arbitration,

which was raised in Laperal’s Motion to Dismiss, may no longer be
included in the preliminary hearing because it has already been heard
and finally resolved. (Abrajano vs. Heirs of Augusto Salas, G.R. No. 158895,
February 16, 2006, 482 SCRA 476).
MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 16 vs. DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE UNDER
RULE 33
ROSA PAMARAN vs. BANK OF COMMERCE

G.R. No. 205753, July 4, 2016, 795 SCRA 430
FACTS: In her complaint, Rosa alleged that she was the owner of a
residential house she had constructed in 1987 on the lots owned by
her children with their consent in Muntinlupa City.
Sometime in 1998, her children obtained loans from the Bank of
Commerce (Bankcom) and as a security, her children constituted Real
Estate Mortgage (REM) on their lots.
Rosa claimed that Bankcom neither included her house in determining
the loan amount nor obtained consent to the REM. She added that
Bankcom was aware of the existence of her house on these lots.
Eventually, these lots were foreclosed and their ownership was

consolidated in favor of Bankcom. Later, Bankcom filed a petition
for issuance of writs of possession, which was granted.
Rosa averred that because of these writs, she was dispossessed
of her house. Thus, she prayed that Bankcom be ordered to pay
her damages for the value of her house for its violation of her
right to due process before the RTC Olongapo City where she
resides.
Bankcom raised in its answers, the following affirmative defenses: 1)
Rosa has no cause of action because she is not the owner of
the subject lots and she was never a party to the REM; 2) the
complaint is a collateral attack on the title because the REM
and the certificate of sale also indicated the improvement thereon; 3)
an interference with the jurisdiction of RTC Muntinlupa where the
present complaint is a real action which should be filed also in
RTC Muntinlupa and not in RTC Olongapo.
Rosa contended that this is a personal action because she cited
real properties in Muntinlupa City, she is not asking to be the
owner or possessor thereof but is merely praying that Bankcom be
ordered to pay her damages corresponding to the value of her
house. She likewise affirmed that the venue is proper since she
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resides in Olongapo City.
On December 10, 2012, the RTC Olongapo issued an order granting
Bankcom’s motion to dismiss and accordingly, dismissing the complaint.
ISSUES
1) Whether the RTC Olongapo correctly dismissed the complaint based
on the motion to dismiss raised by Bankcom.
2) Whether Rosa’s complaint has a valid cause of action.
3) Whether Rosa’s complaint is personal action.
4) Whether Rosa’s action interferes with the jurisdiction of RTC
Muntinlupa.
5) Whether Rosa’s right to due process was violated.
RULINGS
1) NO. A Motion to dismiss under Section 1 (a) of Rule 16 is
based on preliminary objections made before the trial, while the
motion to dismiss under Rule 33 is a demurrer to evidence on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence and is made only after the
plaintiff rested his case.
In the first situation, the motion must be made before a responsive
pleading is filed, and it can be resolved only on the basis of the
allegations in the initiatory pleading.
On the other hand, in the instance, the motion to dismiss must be
filed after the plaintiff rested his case, and it can be determined
only on the basis of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff.
In the first case, it is immaterial if the allegations in the
complaint are true or false, however, in the second situation, the
judge must determine the truth or falsity of the allegations based
on the evidence presented.
Hence, Bankcom submitted its motion to dismiss by way of
affirmative defenses. Clearly, there had been no presentation of
evidence made and Rosa had not yet rested her case.
2) YES. In determining whether a complaint states or does not state
a cause of action, the court must hypothetically admit the truth of
the allegations and determine if it may grant the relief prayed for
based on them. The court cannot consider external factors in
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determining the presence or the absence of a cause of action other
than the allegations in the complaint.
In fine, the allegations in the complaint that: Rosa is the owner
of a residential house built on the lots owned by her children; by
reason of the foreclosure of these lots, Bankcom acquired the lots
and also appropriated Rosa’s house; thus, Rosa seeks recovery of
damages against Bankcom.
Hypothetically, admitting these allegations to be true, Rosa’s cause of
action against Bankcom involves a) her right over her house; b)
Bankcom’s obligation to respect Rosa’s right to enjoy her house; and
c) Bankcom’s violation of such right, which gave rise to this action
for damages.
Notably, the RTC Olongapo disregarded the allegations in the

Complaint but also, it failed to consider that the Bankcom’s
arguments necessitate the examination of the evidence that can
be done through a full-blown trial.
The determination of whether Rosa has a right over the subject
house and of whether Bankcom violated this right cannot be
addressed in a mere motion to dismiss. Such determination requires
the contravention of the allegations in the Complaint and the full
adjudication of the merits of the case based on all the evidence
adduced by the parties.
3) YES. The complaint is one for recovery of damages relating to
the injury committed by Bankcom for violating Rosa’s right to due
process and right to enjoy her house.
Rosa repeatedly averred that she does not seek recovery of the
possession or title. Her interest to the house is merely incidental to
the primary purpose which the action is filed, that is, her claim
for damages.
Clearly, this action involves Rosa’s interest in the value of the
house but only in so far as to determine her entitlement to
damages. She is not interested in the house itself. Indeed, the
primary objective of the Complaint is to recover damages and not
to regain ownership or possession of the subject property. Hence,
this case is a personal action properly filed in the RTC Olongapo,
where Rosa resides.
4) NO. The present action does not interfere with the jurisdiction of
the RTC Muntinlupa.
One, the nature of this action, which is damages, is different from
32
the petition before the RTC Muntinlupa, which is for issuance of
writs of possession.
Two, the laws relied upon in these actions vary, this damage suit
is based on Rosa’s reliance on her right emanating from Article 32
of the Civil Code, while Bankcom’s petition is pursuant to Act No.
3135, as amended.
5) YES. Bankcom’s motion to dismiss must be resolved with reference
to the allegations in the Complaint assuming them to be true.
The RTC Olongapo did not inquire on the truthfulness of the
allegations of the Complaint and declared them to be false and
dismissed the complaint.
On this regard, Rosa’s right to due process of law is gravely
violated.
EFFECT OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

SPS. ISIDRO & LEA CRUZ vs. SPS. FLORENCIO & AMPARO CARAOS
G.R. No. 138208, April 23, 2007, 521 SCRA 510
The dismissal of the case without prejudice indicates the absence of
a decision on the merits and leaves the parties free to litigate the
matter in a subsequent action as though the dismissed action had
not been commenced.
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER (PDI) vs. HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA

550 SCRA 199, G.R. No. 160604, March 28, 2008
FACTS: PDI published an article narrating the death of Bong Caldez
due to the alleged erroneous diagnosis of Dr. Babaran.
Based on this article, Dr. Babaran filed a complaint for damages
against PDI.
The Answer with Counterclaims was filed by PDI, raising, among
others, that the complaint states no cause of action.
Pre-trial was held and terminated.
Thereafter, PDI filed a Motion for a Preliminary Hearing on
Affirmative Defense raised in the answer (which is also a ground
for a motion to dismiss) based on failure to state cause of
action due to the failure of Dr. Babaran to specifically allege the
participation of PDI in the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether the complaint should be dismissed upon the motion
33
for a preliminary hearing on affirmative defense raised in the
answer on failure to state cause of action.
HELD: YES. This procedure is designed to prevent a tedious, if not
traumatic, trial in case the complaint falls short of sufficiently
alleging a cause of action.
When a defendant seeks the dismissal of the complaint through a
motion to dismiss, the sufficiency of the motion should be tested
on the strength of the allegations of facts contained in the
complaint and no other basis.
RELAXATION OF THE RULE ON RES JUDICATA

PABLO DE LEON vs. JOSEFINA BALINAG
G.R. No. 169996, August 11, 2006, 498 SCRA 569
The public policy underlying the principle of res judicata must be
considered together with the policy that a party shall not be
deprived of a fair adversary proceeding in which to present his case.
After all, rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than
defeat substantial justice, and should thus not be applied in a very
rigid and technical sense.
RULE 17
DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
Section 3 - Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff - nolle prosequi
Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Court of Civil
Procedure, there are three instances where the complaint may
be dismissed due to the plaintiff’s fault: (1) if he fails to
appear during a scheduled trial, especially on the date for the
presentation of his evidence in chief; (2) if he fails to prosecute
his action for an unreasonable length of time; and (3) if he fails
to comply with the rules or any order of the court.
There is failure to prosecute when the plaintiff, being present, is
not ready or is unwilling to proceed with the scheduled trial or
when postponements in the past are due to the plaintiff’s own
making, intended to be dilatory or to cause substantial prejudice
on the part of the defendant. (Belonio vs. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 161379,
August 11, 2005, 466 SCRA 557).
RULE 18
34
PRE – TRIAL

SECTION 3 - NOTICE OF PRE-TRIAL
Old rules concerning notice of resetting of pre-trial conferences
The Supreme Court noted the proceedings before the lower court
happened in the years 1994 to 1995, and thus governed by the
old Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the old rules, particularly Rule
20, Section 1, a notice of pre-trial must be served on the party
affected, separately from his counsel. Otherwise, the proceedings will
be null and void. The general rule that notice to counsel is
notice to parties has been insufficient and inadequate for purposes of
pre-trial, such that the trial courts uniformly serve such notice to
party through or care of his counsel at counsel’s address with
the express imposition upon counsel of the obligation of notifying
the party of the date, time and place of the pre-trial conference
and assuring that the party either appear thereat or deliver to
counsel a written authority to represent the party with power to
compromise the case, with the warning that a party who fails to
do so may be non-suited or declared in default. (Advance Textile
Mills vs. Tan, G.R. No. 154040, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 431).
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE

PANGASINAN FIVE STAR BUS CO. vs. SPS. LEON & LUISA BARREDO
G.R. No. 152714, August 10, 2006, 498 SCRA 418
A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-
suited or considered as in default. If the defendant is declared as
in default, the court may allow the plaintiff to present his
evidence ex parte before the Branch Clerk of Court and
thereafter, render judgment on the basis of the evidence of the
plaintiffs. On the other hand, if the defendant is absent during
the initial trial without any justifiable reason therefore, the
defendant cannot be declared as in default for such absence.
However, the court may allow the plaintiff to present his evidence
before the Branch Clerk of Court ex parte.
Effect of failure to file Pre-trial Brief

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (BPI) vs. DOMINGO R. DANDO
G.R. No. 177456, September 4, 2009, 598 SCRA 378
35
FACTS: BPI filed a complaint for Sum of Money and Damages
against Dando before the RTC. After Dando filed his Answer with
Counterclaim, BPI filed its Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial.
The trial court issued a Notice of Pre-trial Conference which
directed the parties to submit their respective pre-trial briefs at least
three days before the scheduled date of pre-trial on August 18,
2003. Dando submitted his Pre-trial Brief on August 11, 2003.
BPI, on the other hand, filed its Pre-trial Brief with the RTC,
and furnished Dando with a copy thereof, only on August 18,
2003, the very day of the scheduled Pre-trial Conference.
When the parties appeared before the RTC on August 18, 2003
for the schedule Pre-trial Conference, Dando orally moved for the
dismissal of the complaint citing Sections 5 and 6, Rule 18 of
the Rules of Court. The RTC granted the motion and thereby
dismissed the case with prejudice.
ISSUE: Should the case be dismissed on the ground of BPI’s
failure to file a pre-trial brief within the period prescribed.
HELD: YES. It is basic legal construction that where the words
of command such as “shall,” “must,” or “ought” are employed, they are
generally and ordinarily regarded as mandatory. Thus, where, as in
Rule 18, Sections 5 and 6 of the Rules of Court, the word
“shall” is used a mandatory duty is imposed, which the Court
ought to enforce.
The Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be
belittled or simply disregarded for these prescribed procedures
insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. However,
it is equally true that litigation is not merely a game of
technicalities. For, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of
contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not
to hinder but to promote the administration of justice.
Pre-trial Brief of Amended Complaint

EUFEMIA BALATICO AGATEP vs. ROBERTA RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 170540, October 28, 2009, 604 SCRA 634
FACTS: Natalia mortgaged a parcel of land to PNB to secure a
loan. For failure to pay the loan, PNB foreclosed the property.
After the expiration of the redemption period, PNB consolidated its
36
ownership over the parcel of land.
However, while the mortgage was still in existence, Natalia sold
the land to Agatep. Neither was the sale registered nor the title
was delivered to Agatep, nonetheless, Agatep took possession of the
land and fenced it with barbed wire.
PNB later sold the said property to Roberta, who is the daughter
of Natalia. A new title was issued in the name of Roberta.
Agatep filed a complaint for reconveyance against Roberta and

Natalia. After both parties had already filed their respective Pre-trial
Brief, Agatep filed an amended complaint impleading PNB. During the
pre-trial conference, the RTC dismissed the amended complaint because
Agatep failed to file its Pre-trial Brief.
ISSUE: Whether the Rules of Court requires that another pre-trial
brief when a complaint is amended to implead another defendant.
HELD: YES. The pre-trial brief serves as a guide during the pre-
trial conference so as to simplify, abbreviate and expedite the trial if
not to dispense with it. It is a devise essential to the speedy
disposition of disputes, and parties cannot brush it aside as a
mere technicality.
ADR MEDIATION PROCEEDINGS - Non - Appearance of Party

LINDA CHAN KENT vs. DIONISIO MICAREZ
G.R. No. 185758, March 9, 2011, 645 SCRA 176
FACTS: Linda Kent filed a complaint for recovery of real property
and annulment of title against her parents and brother. RTC
explored the possibility of an amicable settlement by ordering the
referral of the case to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC). Kent
and her counsel twice attended the mediation conference and were
made to sign the attendance sheet while waiting for the late arrival
of the defendants and their counsel. On the last scheduled
conference, Kent and her counsel failed to appear because they had
to attend some urgent matters caused by the sudden increase in
prices of commodities and on account of this absence, the RTC
dismissed the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not dismissal is proper on account of non-
appearance during the mediation proceedings.
HELD: NO. A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC PHILJA regards mediation as part of
pre-trial where parties are encouraged to personally attend the
proceedings. To ensure the attendance of the parties, it specifically
enumerates the sanctions that the court can impose upon a party
37
who fails to appear in the proceedings which includes censure,
reprimand, contempt and even dismissal of the action. However, the
Court finds dismissal too severe to be imposed where the record is
devoid of evidence of willful or flagrant disregard of the rules on
mediation proceedings. There is no clear demonstration that the
absence was intended to perpetuate delay in the litigation of the
case as lack of interest on the part of Kent to enter into a
possible amicable settlement of the case.
RULE 19
INTERVENTION

HEIRS OF GERONIMO RESTRIVERA vs. SALVADOR DE GUZMAN
434 SCRA 456, G.R. No. 146540, July 14, 2004
FACTS: Petitioners filed with the PARAB a complaint for maintenance of
peaceful possession against herein respondents.
The provincial adjudicator rendered a decision finding and declaring all
the petitioners are not bona fide tenants on the property in question.
Meantime during the pendency of petitioner’s appeal to the DARAB,
TRICOM filed a motion for intervention. TRICOM alleged that it has
legal interest in the subject landholding, having purchased the same
from respondents, as shown by a Deed of Assignment and a Deed of
Sale on Installments.
ISSUE: Whether TRICOM’s Motion for intervention is proper?
HELD: YES. TRICOM’s motion for intervention is proper. Fundamentally,

the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court. The permissive tenor of the
rules shows the intention to give to the court the full measure
of discretion in permitting or disallowing the intervention. The
discretion of the court, once exercised, cannot be reviewed by
certiorari nor controlled by mandamus save in instances where such
discretion has been so exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
38
Section 1 of Rule 19 provides: “A person who has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation or in the success of either of the parties,
or in interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court,
be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider
whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or
not the intervenor’s right may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.
Here, TRICOM’s legal interest in the subject property cannot be disputed.
As shown by the Deed of Assignment and the Deed of Sale on
Installments, respondents transferred and sold to TRICOM the subject
landholding. As a purchaser, respondent TRICOM acquired an interest
in the property, and thus, has standing to intervene to protect
such interest.
RULE 26
ADMISSION BY ADVERSE PARTY

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Irene Canadala obtained 2 loans from DBP secured by
mortgages on 3 parcels of land.
Later, DBP foreclosed the mortgages and sold it at public auction.
Canadala redeemed one of the lands and offered to redeem the other 2
properties but the bank denied it for being below the amount
of its claim.
Consequently, when respondent’s daughter, as the assignee, failed to

redeem, the bank consolidated its titles over the properties.
Respondent then filed a complaint for the exercise of her right to
redemption with damages. Before trial, respondent request for
admission by adverse party.
39
The bank filed its Comment which respondent objected because it was
not under oath as required under Rule 26 and it failed to state the
reasons for the admission or denial of matters. Both the trial court and
the CA ruled that the admission should be under oath in order
to be admitted.
ISSUE: Whether the admission of DBP should be admitted even it is
not under oath.
HELD: YES. The admissions of DBP were already alleged in the
supplemental complaint which were already denied or admitted. To
require it to be under oath would be pointless and superfluous.
DBP did not have to comment on respondent’s request for
admission which merely reproduced the allegations in her
complaint. That the Comment was not under oath is not a
substantive, but merely a formal defect which can be excused in
the interest of justice conformably to the well-entrenched doctrine
that all pleadings should be liberally construed in order to do
substantial justice. Thus, DBP substantially complied with Rule 26.
If the factual allegations in the complaint are the very same
allegations set forth in the request for admission and have already
been specifically denied or otherwise dealt with in the answer, a
response to the request is no longer required.
RULE 29
REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH MODES OF DISCOVERY
40
SECTION 1 - REFUSAL TO ANSWER

FELISA JARAVATA vs. MA. DIANA KAROLUS
G.R. No. 154988, June 21, 2007, 525 SCRA 239
No judgment by default maybe had, without first requiring an
application by the proponent to compel an answer. This is the requisite
procedure under Section 1 of Rule 29 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals cannot decide a case on the
merits, when the appealed judgment is a judgment by default
since there was as yet no trial or presentation of evidence in
the court a quo. Parties must at least have been a chance to
substantiate by evidence their respective claims at the trial court.
RULE 35
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ASIAN CONSTRUCTION & DEV. CORP. vs. PCI BANK
G.R. No. 153827, April 25, 2006, 488 SCRA 192
It must be borne in mind that the petitioner admitted in its “Answer”
the due execution and authenticity of the documents appended to
the complaint. Petitioner did not deny its liability for the principal
amount claimed by the respondent in its complaint. Petitioner merely
alleged, by way of defenses, that if failed to pay its account because
of the region-wide economic crisis that engulfed Asia in July 1997,
and the “Deeds of Assignment” executed by it in favor of the
respondents were contracts of adhesion. Petitioner elaborated on and
catalogued its defenses in its “Appellant’s Brief” what it believed, as
“genuine issues.” However, petitioner failed to append to its
“Opposition” to the “Motion for Summary Judgment,”
“Affidavits showing the factual basis for its defenses of “extraordinary
deflation,” including facts, figures and data showing its financial
conditions before and after the economic crisis and that the crisis
was the proximate cause of its financial distress.
The failure of the petitioner to append to its “Opposition” any
“Affidavits” showing that its defenses were not contrived or cosmetic
to delay judgment created a presumption that the defenses of the
41
petitioner were not offered in good faith and that the same
could not be sustained.
ESTATE OF LIM CHING vs. FLORENCIA BACALA

G.R. No. 149603, March 14, 2007, 518 SCRA 315

Summary judgment is sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section 1,
Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, as amended, when
there is no genuine factual issue to be resolved.
RULE 36
JUDGMENTS, FINAL ORDERS AND ENTRY THEREOF

HEIRS OF THE LATE FLOR TUNGPALAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
460 SCRA 392, G.R. No. 136207, June 21, 2005
FACTS: Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for Reformation,
Reconveyance and Nullification of titles against the respondents.
After the respondents filed their answer, the trial court set the case
for pre-trial conference on various dates but was postponed for five
times upon motion of the petitioners and the respondents. Thus,
they were twice warned that the postponement would be for the
last time.
During the pre-trial conference, the petitioners were declared non-suited

for their failure to appear despite notice. Their complaint was
dismissed.
One year and seven months later, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. The trial court granted the motion “in the interest
of justice.” However, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration
of the order on the ground that the trial court has no more
jurisdiction to issue the same. The trial court granted this
motion and reinstated the order declaring the petitioners non-
42
suited.
ISSUE: Whether the decision of the trial court, dismissing the complaint
for failure to prosecute, become final and executory.
HELD: YES. Failure to interpose an appeal within the reglementary
period renders an order or decision final and executory unless a
party files a motion for reconsideration within the 15-day reglementary
period. The law grants an aggrieved party a period of 15 days
from his receipt of the court’s decision or order disposing of the action
or proceeding to appeal or move to reconsider the same.
After the lapse of the 15-day period, an order becomes final and
executory and is beyond the power or jurisdiction of the court which
rendered it to further amend or revoke. The court loses jurisdiction
over the case and not even an appellate court would have the
power to review a judgment that has acquired finality. Otherwise,
there would be no end to litigation and would set to naught the
main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the
enforcement of the law and the maintenance of peace and order by
setting justiciable controversies with finality.
A motion for Clarification is not a Motion for Reconsideration
A Motion for Clarificatory Judgment not being in the character of a
motion for reconsideration does not toll the reglementary period for
filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Its filing will
not bar the judgment from attaining finality, nor will its resolution
amend the decision to be reviewed. (Commissioner on Higher Education
vs. Mercado, G.R. No. 157877, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 424)
RULE 37
NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION
Motion for Extension of Time does not toll/suspend the 15-day
43
reglementary period of filing a Motion for Reconsideration
The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for
reconsideration is non-extendible. Since then, the Court has
consistently and strictly adhered thereto.
Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate
court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is justified.
Precisely, it is because petitioner’s earlier motion for extension of time
did not suspend/toll the running of the 15-day reglementary period for
filing a motion for reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the CA
decision has already attained finality when
petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. (Apex Mining Co., Inc. vs.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 122472, October 20, 2005, 473 SCRA
490).
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF FERNANDO ALSUA
G.R. No. 167361, April 2, 2007, 520 SCRA 132
The period for filing a motion for reconsideration should be counted
from the date of receipt of the order or a person having
sufficient discretion to receive the same.
RULE 38
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, OR OTHER PROCEEDINGS
44
Section 3 - Time for filing petition
A petition for relief from judgment is the proper remedy of a
party seeking to set aside a judgment rendered against him by
a court of whenever he was unjustly deprived of a hearing or
was prevented from taking an appeal, in either case, because
of fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable neglect. The petition for relief should
be filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the
judgment or order, or other proceeding to be set aside and not
more than six months after such judgment. Both periods must
concur and are not extendible and never interrupted. Strict
compliance with these periods stems from the equitable character
and nature of the petition for adequate remedy. A petition for relief
is actually the “last chance” given by law to litigants to question a
final judgment or order. Failure to avail of such “last chance”
within the grace period fixed by the Rules of Court is fatal. (Datu
Eduardo Ampo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169091, February 16, 2006, 482
SCRA 562).
EFFECT OF VOID JUDGMENT ON PERIOD SET UNDER RULE 38

NARCISO GUIANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
When the judgment on its face is void ab initio, the limited
periods for relief from judgment under Rule 38 are inapplicable.
This is so because a void judgment is vulnerable to attack, in any
way and at anytime, even when no appeal has been taken.
RULE 39
EXECUTION, SATISFACTION AND EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS

AIDA LUGAYAN vs. SPOUSES ANTONIO TIZON
454 SCRA 488, G.R. No. 147958, March 31, 2005
FACTS: Travel 2000 International filed a civil case for a sum of
money against Aida Lugayan with the MeTC and the judgment was
rendered in favor of Travel.
45
The Sheriff then levied upon Aida’s house and lot. During the
auction sale, Spouses Tizon were declared the highest bidders
and were awarded the certificate of sale.
Thereupon, Aida Lugayan filed with the RTC a complaint for
annulment of the MeTC Decision in the civil case for sum of
money.
Meanwhile, Aida failed to redeem her house and lot within
one year. This prompted Spouses Tizon to file a complaint for
illegal detainer against Rona and Arturo Lugayan with the MeTC.
During the course of the proceedings, the Lugayans alleged among
others, that they were the real parties in interest and spouses
Tizon have no cause of action against them due to the pendency
of the civil case for annulment of judgment pending in the RTC
and that litis pendentia and forum shopping barred the institution
of the illegal detainer case.
ISSUE: Whether the case for unlawful detainer be dismissed on the
ground of res judicata
HELD: NO. The elements of res judicata, also known as “bar by
prior judgment,” are: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2)
the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits;
46
and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions,
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Here, the
fourth element is not present.
First, there is no identity of parties. In civil case for sum of
money, the parties are Travel 2000 International as plaintiff and
Aida Lugayan as defendant. In civil case for illegal detainer, the
parties are spouses Tizon as plaintiffs and Rona Lugayan and
Arturo Lugayan as defendants.
Second, the subject matter in the sum of money is non-payment of
debt, while in civil case for illegal detainer, it is unlawful possession
of the property.
Third, there is no identity in the cause of action. The first case
is for sum of money, while the second case is for illegal detainer.
Section 1 - Execution upon judgments or final orders
Once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled as a
matter of right to a writ of execution wherein the issuance of which
is the trial court’s ministerial duty.
There are instances, however, when an error may be committed in
the course of execution proceedings prejudicial to the rights of a
party. These instances call for correction by a superior court, as
where the writ of execution varies the judgment. (Greater Metropolitan
Manila Solid Waster Mgt. Commission vs. Jancom Environmental Corp., G.R. No.
163663, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 281).
Section 48 - Effect of Foreign Judgments or final orders
This foreign judgment is not yet binding on Philippine courts. It is
entrenched in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that a
47
foreign judgment on the mere strength of its promulgation is not
yet conclusive, as it can be annulled on the grounds of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. It is likewise recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence and internal law that a foreign judgment may be
barred from recognition if it runs counter to public policy. (Republic
vs. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429, February 1, 2006, 481 SCRA 457).
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL IN ELECTION CASES

DIEGO LIM vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 171952, March 8, 2007, 518 SCRA 1
Before granting an execution pending appeal in election cases, the
following requisites must concur: (1) there must be a motion by
the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (2) there must
be “good reasons” for the execution pending appeal; and (3) the
order granting execution pending appeal must state the good reasons.
SECTION 2 (a) - EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL

LAND BANK vs. SPS. PLACIDO & CLARY ORILLA
556 SCRA 102, G.R. No. 157206, June 27, 2008
FACTS: DARAB informed Spouses Orilla of the compulsory acquisition

of their landholding pursuant to CARP. The RTC acting as
Special Agrarian Court (SAC) fixed the just compensation of the
land at P1.47M.
Land Bank filed a Notice of Appeal, subsequently, Spouses Orilla
filed a Motion for Execution pending Appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the Spouses Orilla were entitled to execution pending
appeal of the compensation fixed by SAC based on the principle of
prompt payment of just compensation.
HELD: YES. Execution of the judgment or final order is
discretionary. The existence of good reasons is what confers
discretionary power on a court to issue a writ of execution pending
appeal. “Good reasons” consist of compelling or superior
48
circumstances demanding urgency which will
outweigh the injury or damages suffered should the losing party
secure a reversal of the judgment or final order.
In the case at bar, the prompt payment of just compensation is
consistent with principle of justice, fairness and equity, and that
suspending payment will prolong the agony of Spouses Orilla due to
the deprivation of their land. It must be noted that Spouses Orilla
are 71 years old and if payment would be delayed, it would not
be long that death would overtake them.
SECTION 6 - EXECUTION BY MOTION OR BY INDEPENDENT ACTION

CENTRAL SURETY & INSURANCE CO. vs. PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC.
G.R. No. 149053, March 7, 2007, 517 SCRA 651
Under Rule 39, Section 6, the rule is that a final judgment may
be executed by mere motion within five years from the date of entry
of judgment. However, the rule is not absolute and admits one
notable exception and, that is, when the delay in enforcing the
judgment is caused by the party assailing the filing of the motion.
ESTEBAN YAU vs. RICARDO SILVERIO, SR.

543 SCRA 520, G.R. No. 158848, February 4, 2008
FACTS: On March 28, 1984, Esteban Yau filed a complaint with
RTC for recovery of the value of the promissory note and for
damages against Philfinance and the members of its board of
directors.
On May 27, 1991, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of
49
Esteban Yau.
Philfinance interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The order
of dismissal became final and executory on December 26, 1991.
The trial court issued the writ of execution. The defendants’ bank
deposits were garnished by the sheriff. Also, the shares of Silverio
in the Manila Golf and Country Club were sold at public auction.
As the judgment was only partially satisfied, the writ of execution was
enforced against the other defendants, including Macapagal.
In 1999, the sheriff sent notices of garnishment to several banks
in Manila against any existing account of Macapagal. Thereupon,
Macapagal filed with the trial court a motion to quash the
writ of execution on the ground that its lifetime has expired.
ISSUE: Whether the decision rendered by the RTC may still be
enforced against Silverio and Macapagal even if more than five (5)
years have already lapsed from its finality.
HELD: YES. A judgment may be executed on motion within five (5)
years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final
and executory. However, there are instances where the Court allowed
execution by motion even after the lapse period upon meritorious
grounds. These grounds have one common denominator, and that is,
the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor
and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.
Here, the judgment of the trial court sought to be executed became
final and executory on December 26, 1991. The writ of execution
was issued and it could not be enforced for the full satisfaction of
the judgment within the five-year period because Macapagal and
Silverio filed petitions with the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court
challenging the trial court’s judgment and the writ of execution. Such
50
petitions suspended or interrupted the further enforcement of the writ.
MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENTS

REPUBLIC vs. UNIMEX MICRO-ELECTRONICS GMBH
G.R. Nos. 166309-10, March 9, 2007, 518 SCRA 19
Where facts or events transpire after a decision has become
executory, which facts constitute a supervening cause rendering the
final
judgment unenforceable, said judgment may be modified. Also, a final
judgment may be altered when its execution becomes impossible or
unjust. Final and executory judgment or order may be executed on
motion within five years from the date of its entry. After the lapse
of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitation,
a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may
also be enforced by motion within five years from the date of its
entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute
of limitation.
TERCERIA is a remedy available to a third-party claimant under
Sec. 17, Rule 39 and is filed by a third party claimant with
the officer making the levy by executing an affidavit of the
claimant’s title with a copy thereof served upon the officer
making the levy and the judgment creditor. With the filing of this
affidavit, the officer is not bound to keep the property unless
the judgment creditor indemnifies the officer against such claim by
an adequate bond. An action for damages may be brought against
the officer within 120 days from the date of the filing of
the bond.
SECTION 33, RULE 39 - DEED AND WRIT OF POSSESSION

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DOCTRINE: As a general rule, the issuance of a writ of possession
after the foreclosure sale and during the period of redemption is
ministerial.
As an exception, it ceases to be ministerial if there is a third
party holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor.
EMMANUEL VILLANUEVA vs. CHERDAN LENDING

INVESTORS CORPORATION
FACTS: Peñaredondo obtained from Cherdan Lending a loan amounting

to P2.2 million secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel
of land covered by TCT # T-129690.
Despite demand, Peñaredondo failed to pay the obligation. Hence,

Cherdan extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. At the auction sale,
Cherdan was declared as the highest bidder. Upon the expiration of
the redemption period, the title to the property was consolidated and
a new title was issued to Cherdan.
On September 28, 2001, Cherdan filed before the RTC an Ex Parte
Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession.
Accordingly, a writ of possession was issued and served to
Villanueva who moved for the reconsideration of the order and
setting aside of the writ of possession on the ground that he is
the owner and is in actual possession of the property. He notified
the court that he had filed criminal and civil case relative to
fraudulent transfer of ownership of the subject property from him to
Peñaredondo.
ISSUE: Whether the issuance of a writ of possession over the
subject property of the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage be
enforced against Villanueva.
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HELD: NO. Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides
that the possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded
to the purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure unless a third party
is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor.
In this case, Villanueva opposed the issuance of a writ of
possession on the ground that he is in actual possession of the
mortgaged property under a claim of ownership. His title to the
property was cancelled by virtue of a falsified deed of donation in
favor of Peñaredondo. Because of this falsification, he filed civil and
criminal cases against Peñaredondo to nullify the deed of donation
and to punish the party responsible for the falsified document.
To enforce the writ against Villanueva, an unwitting third party
possessor who took no part in the foreclosure proceedings, would
amount to the taking of real property without the benefit of
proper judicial intervention.

TEODORO DARCEN vs. V.R. GONZALES CREDIT ENTREPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 199747, April 3, 2013, 695 SCRA 207
FACTS: Sometime in January 2007, Gonzales appeared and claimed

that Teodoro’s late mother Flora had mortgaged their properties to
V.R. Gonzales Credit in 1995 and demanded payment of several loans
taken out by Flora.
Upon investigation, Teodoro found out that their properties had indeed
been mortgaged to Gonzales in 1995 and the purported signatures
of her mother to the mortgage contracts were allegedly forged by
his brothers Manuel and Arturo.
When Gonzales extrajudicially foreclosed the subject properties, Teodoro

53
filed an action for the annulment of mortgage against Gonzales and
his brothers Manuel and Arturo.
On December 8, 2009, Gonzales filed an ex parte petition for
issuance of a writ of possession. The order of court dated
February 26, 2010 was served to Teodoro.
Teodoro opposed the order of a writ of possession on the ground
that he is the adverse claimant who is a third party and stranger
to the real estate mortgage executed by his late mother Flora.
ISSUE: Whether Teodoro be considered a third party and stranger
who is actually holding the properties adversely to the judgment
obligor.
HELD: NO. Teodoro had consented to the extrajudicial settlement of
the estate of his father as well as waiver by them of their
shares in favor of their mother. For this very reason, he cannot
be permitted to interpose an adverse claim in the subject
mortgaged properties and defeat the writ of possession issued to
Gonzales.
RURAL BANK OF STA BARBARA vs. GERRY CENTENO

G.R. No. 200667, March 11, 2013, 693 SCRA 110
FACTS: Gregorio mortgaged his property as a security for a loan in
favor of Sta. Barbara Rural Bank.
Gregorio defaulted on the mortgage prompting Sta . Barbara to cause
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the said mortgage. Consequently, the
subject lots were sold to Sta. Barbara being the highest bidder at
the auction sale.
Gregorio failed to redeem the subject lots within one (1) year
redemption period. Nonetheless, Gregorio still continued with the
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possession and cultivation of the aforesaid properties.
Sometime in 1983, Gerry, the son of Gregorio, took over the
cultivation of the subject properties.
On March 14, 1988, Gerry purchased the said lots from Gregorio
and able to obtain the corresponding tax declaration in his name.
On March 19, 1998, Sta. Barbara filed a petition for the issuance
of a writ of possession.
Gerry opposed the petition asserting that he purchased the said
property and has in fact in actual, open and exclusively possession
of the same properties for at least 15 years. He further averred
that the foreclosure sale was null and void owing to the forged
signatures in the real estate mortgage and Sta. Barbara’s right
over the subject lots had already prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether Gerry be considered a third party who is holding
the properties adversely to the judgment obligor.
HELD: NO. Considering that Gerry acquired the subject lots from
his father Gregorio on March 14, 1988 after they were purchased
by Sta. Barbara in the foreclosure sale in 1971, it cannot be
therefore be disputed that Gerry is a mere successor-in-interest of
Gregorio.
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Consequently, he cannot be deemed as a “third party who is
actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor” under
the legal contemplation.
A P P E A L

Q: When may late appeals be entertained by the Court?
A: There have been exceptions, however, in which the Court dispensed
with technical infirmities and gave due course to tardy appeals. In
some of those instances, the presence of justifying circumstances
recognized by law -- such as fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence -- properly vested the judge with discretion to approve or
admit an appeal filed out time. In other instances, lapsed appeals
were allowed in order to serve substantial justice, upon consideration
of a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; b) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances; c) the merits of the case d)
causes not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party that would be favored by the suspension of the rules; e)
the failure to show that the review being sought was merely
frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the fact that the other party
would not be unjustly prejudiced. (Go vs. Yamane, G.R. No. 160762, May
3, 2006, 489 SCRA 107).
APPEAL IN NATURALIZATION CASES

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADMISSION AS CITIZENS,
SHEWAK KESWANI vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 153986, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 145
The applicable procedure with regard to appeals governing naturalization

cases is that provided under BP 129 and supplemented by the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which is through an ordinary
appeal to the Court of Appeals.
FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT MADE SUBJECT OF APPEAL

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DANILO L. PAREL vs. HEIRS OF SIMEON PRUDENCIO

G.R. No. 192217, March 2, 2011, 644 SCRA 496
FACTS: Simeon was the owner of a two-storey house, where he
allowed Danilo and his parents to live on the ground floor.
Later, Simeon needed the whole house back and informed
Danilo and his parents that they had to vacate the place.
Danilo, however, remained in the house with his family despite
repeated demands which drove Simeon to institute an action for
recovery of possession and damages. Danilo maintained that the
land on which Simeon’s house was constructed was in his
father’s name, making Simeon and his father co-owners of the
house of which Simeon claims sole ownership.
RTC ruled in favor of Danilo. The CA, on Simeon’s appeal,
rendered a Decision reversing the RTC Decision. SC on certiorari
affirmed the CA decision.
Thereafter, Simeon sought to enforce the final and executory

decision and thus filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution. Danilo prayed that the P2,000 monthly rental he was
ordered to pay be computed from April 1988 to March 1994
only since he had vacated the premises by April 1994.
ISSUE: Whether a decision which became final and executory can
be subject of appeal.
HELD: YES. Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment
sets at naught the role of courts in disposing justiciable
controversies with finality. Once a judgment becomes final and
executory, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved
and laid to rest, all that remains is the execution of the
decision which is the matter of right. However, there are
exceptional circumstances which considerations of justice and equity
dictate that there be some mode available to the
party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court. The
instant case falls under one of the exceptions, that is the fact
that Danilo has left the property under dispute is a change in
the situation of the parties that would make execution
57
inequitable or unjust.
RULE 41
APPEAL FROM THE RTC
M. A. SANTANDER CONSTRUCTION, INC. vs. ZENAIDA VILLANUEVA

ISSUE: Whether non-payment of the docket fees and other legal fees
within the prescribed period a valid ground to dismiss an appeal.
HELD: YES. The right to appeal is not a natural right or a
part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may
be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to
appeal must strictly comply with the requirements of the rules, and
failure to do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal. Failure
to pay the appellate court docket and other lawful fees on time is
a ground to dismiss the appeal.
The mere filing of the notice of appeal is not enough, for it must be
accompanied by the payment of the correct appellate docket fees.
Payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory. It is an essential requirement without which the decision
appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal
had been filed.
ANTONIO BORBON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

58
445 SCRA 617, G.R. No. 138495, December 9, 2004
ISSUE: Whether the appeal be dismissed for failure to file the
appellant’s brief within the period provided for by law.
HELD: YES. Section 3 of Rule 41 provides: “The appeal shall be
taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant
shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within 30
days from notice of the judgment or final order. The period of
appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be
allowed.” This provision should be read in consonance with Section 7
Rule 44 . Courts have the power and jurisdiction to grant an
extension of time to perfect the appeal with the filing of the
appellant’s brief but the motion seeking an extension of time to
file an appellant’s brief must be filed within the period to perfect
an appeal. Here, the Appellate court, upon petitioner’s timely motion,
allowed him to file the appellant’s brief up to September 7, 1998,
but he filed the same only February 2, 1999 or after a lapse
of 159 days.
Section 1 - Subject of appeal
The rule that no appeal lies from an order or writ directing
the execution of a final judgment, for otherwise a case will not
attain finality, is not absolute since a party aggrieved by an
improper or irregular execution of a judgment is not without a
remedy. Thus, the Court enumerated the exceptional circumstances
where a party may elevate the matter of an improper execution for
appeal, to wit: “when the writ of execution varies the judgment.”
(Banaga vs. Majaducon, G.R. No. 149051, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 153)
RULE 42
PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM RTC TO COURT OF APPEALS

GERTRUDES TEH vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
59
448 SCRA 25, G.R. No. 141180, January 11, 2005
FACTS: Petitioner was found guilty for estafa by the MTCC
beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the
MTCC’s decision.
Petitioner then elevated the matter to the CA by way of
petition for review. The latter, however, dismissed the petition
for being insufficient in form, not being accompanied by duplicate
original or certified true copies of the documents and material
parts of the record that would support the allegations.
Moreover, there was
no written explanation why service of the petition was not done
personally.
ISSUE: Whether the appeal be dismissed based on the aforementioned
grounds.
HELD: YES. Petitioner violated the provisions of Section 2 of Rule
42 and Section 11 of Rule 13 which warrants the dismissal of
her petition by the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner herself admitted that the only documents attached to
the petition were certified true copies of the Decisions of the RTC
and the MTCC. There were no copies of the pleadings filed below
or other materials portions of the record which would support the
allegations in the petition.
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Section 11 of Rule 13 reads: “Whenever practicable, the service
and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally.
Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a
resort to other
modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the
service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule
may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.”
Failure to pay the correct docket fees
The appellate court may extend the time for the payment of the
docket fees should there be a justifiable reason for the failure to
pay the correct amount of docket fees within the prescribed
period, such as fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence or a
similar supervening casualty, without fault on the part of the
appellant.
The payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is jurisdictional
and is necessary for the perfection of an appeal. The failure to pay
the appellate court docket fee within the reglementary period confers a
discretionary, and not a mandatory power to dismiss the proposed
appeal, and that such power should be used in the exercise of
the court’s sound judgment in accordance with the tenets of justice
and fair play and with a great deal of circumspection considering
all attendant circumstances. Said “discretion must be exercised wisely
and prudently, never capriciously, with a view to substantial justice. (De
Dios Carlos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134473, March 30, 2006, 485
SCRA 578).
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME

BERNARDO vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 166980, April 3, 2007, 520 SCRA 332
The extension should be tacked to the original period, to commence
immediately after the expiration of such period. The court has no
discretion to reckon the commencement of the extension from a date
later than the expiration of such original period, not even if the
61
expiry date is Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday.
RULE 45
APPEAL BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT

JOY TAN vs. JUDGE SALIC DUMARPA
438 SCRA 659, G.R. No. 138777, September 22, 2004
FACTS: Respondent filed a civil case for damages with prayer
for issuance of writ of attachment against petitioner.
Tan filed her answer with motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of failure to state cause of action. The trial court denied the
motion to dismiss and set the pre-trial conference.
But during the pre-trial, petitioner and counsel did not appear. Thus,
petitioner was declared in default and respondent was allowed to
present evidence ex parte. The trial court rendered judgment by
default.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the judgment by
default on the ground that her counsel did not receive the copy of
the order denying her motion to dismiss and setting the pre-trial
conference. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration and ruled that
the motion is pro forma and does not toll the running of the
period to appeal. Thus judgment by default has become final and
executory.
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Petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court under Rule 45.
ISSUE: Whether the SC may consider the petition for review as a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
HELD: YES. The petitioner should have, pursuant to the Rules, filed
with the trial court a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal
with the CA. Instead, she came directly to the SC via the instant
petition for review on certiorari. However, in the interest of justice,
the SC considered the instant petition, pro hac vice, a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. It appears prima facie from petitioner’s
allegations that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
rendering the Judgment by Default. If such allegations are true and the
trial court’s fatal error remains uncorrected, then petitioner will suffer
great injustice.
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage
of justice would result from the strict application of the Rules, the
SC will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial
justice. Verily, by denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on the
wrong ground that it is pro forma and by declaring her as in
default and allowing respondent to present his evidence ex parte, the
trial court deprived petitioner of her right to due process. Clearly, the
trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion.
LOSING PARTY TO SEEK RELIEF FROM THE COURT OF ORIGIN
MARY JANE G. DY CHIAO vs. SEBASTIAN BOLIVAR

G.R. No. 192491, August 17, 2016, 800 SCRA 611
FACTS: In a civil case, the CA declared petitioner Mary Dy Chiao
subsidiarily liable to pay the exact amount of P5,711,164, which was
ultimately affirmed by the Supreme Court.
The decision was forwarded to RTC Branch 19 of Naga City for
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execution. Following the execution proceedings, a writ of execution was
issued and directed the respondent sheriff to levy properties of
petitioner to satisfy the amount of P5,711,164.00.
To fend off the public auction of her properties, petitioner filed a
so-called Petition for Prohibition with application for TRO and
preliminary injunction and the case was raffled to RTC Branch 23.
The RTC Branch 23 dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction,
opining that the processes being undertaken by the respondent sheriff
were deemed proceeding in same civil case assigned to and still
pending before RTC Branch 19, and that the RTC Branch 19
continued to exercise general supervision and control over such
proceedings.
Petitioner then filed in the CA her Motion for Extension of Time
to file Verified Petition for Review on Certiorari indicating therein
that she would be raising a question of law.
As stated, the CA denied said petition on the ground that where
only questions of law are raised, the petition for review on
certiorari shall be filed with the Supreme Court and not with CA.
ISSUES
1) Whether CA has jurisdiction to resolve the Motion for Extension
of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari pursuant to the
principle of hierarchy of courts.
2) Whether the dismissal of the action by RTC Branch 23 is proper.
RULINGS
1) NO. CA has no jurisdiction to resolve the Motion for Extension
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of Time to File verified petition for review on certiorari.
The CA properly denied the petitioner’s Motion for Extension of
Time to File Verified Petition for Review on Certiorari and
justifiably considered the case close and terminated.
The petitioner was patently guilty of taking an erroneous appeal in
view of her manifest intention to limit her appeal to question of
law. Such an appeal would only be filed to the Supreme Court
pursuant Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, an appeal
raising only questions of law brought to the CA instead to the
Supreme Court, shall be dismissed.
2) YES. The dismissal of the case by RTC Branch 23 is proper
considering that the assailed action and processes undertaken by the
respondent sheriff to levy the properties of the petitioner were deemed
proceedings in the same civil action assigned to RTC Branch 19 as
the court that had issued the writ of execution.
Such proceedings, being incidents of the execution of the final and
executory decision of the RTC Branch 19 remained within its control.
To allow the petitioner’s action in the RTC Branch 23 would
disregard the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference, under
which no court has the power to interfere by injunction with
the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate
jurisdiction.
65
Courts and tribunals with the same or equal authority -- even those
exercising concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction - - are not permitted
to interfere with each other’s respective cases, much less their
orders or judgments therein.
That the respondent sheriff was the sole party sought to be
prevented from further acting in the execution proceedings or that
the RTC Branch 23 was not impleaded by the petitioner, did not
matter.
The respondent sheriff was under the direct control and supervision
of the RTC Branch 19 as the court that had issued the writ of
execution enforcing the final decision of the CA against the
petitioner.
The determination of whether or not the notice of levy was valid
and proper, rightfully fell within the exclusive prerogative of the RTC
Branch 19 to ascertain and pronounce.
If she doubted the authority of the respondent sheriff to issue the
notice of levy, she would have sought clarification of the matter
from RTC Branch 19, and should an outcome be adverse to her,
she could then have sought fitting redress from a superior court
vested with the authority to review and reverse the action of the
respondent sheriff instead of resorting to her action before the
RTC Branch 23.
RULE 47
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT OR FINAL ORDERS AND RESOLUTIONS

ALABAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for
relief of judgment are remedies available only to parties in the
66
proceedings where the assailed judgment is rendered. As parties to the
probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the
remedies of motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for
relief from judgment. In fact, petitioners filed a motion to reopen,
which is essentially a motion for new trial, with petitioners praying
for the reopening of the case and the setting of further proceedings.
However, the motion was denied for having been filed out of time,
long after the Decision became final and executory.
For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said
remedies available to petitioners, they could no longer resort to a
petition for annulment of judgment. Otherwise, they would benefit from
their own inaction or negligence.

SECTION 2 - GROUNDS FOR ANNULMENT

FELIX CAMITAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Annulment of judgment is allowed only in exceptional cases as
where there is no available or other adequate remedy. An action for
annulment of judgment is grounded only on two justifications: (1)
extrinsic fraud; and (2) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process.
RULE 50
DISMISSAL OF APPEAL

ESTATE OF TARCILA VDA. DE VILLEGAS vs. GABOYA
G.R. No. 143006, July 14, 2006, 495 SCRA 30
The right to appeal is a statutory right and a party who seeks to
avail of the right must faithfully comply with the rules. Petitioner’s
plea for liberal application of the rules would mean deviation from
the aforementioned rules, which cannot be tolerated. These rules are
designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed cases.
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Q: What is the “Law of the Case”?
A: It is an opinion on a former appeal. More specifically, it means
that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal
rule of decision between the same parties in the same case
continues to be the law of the case whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision
was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the
court. (Arriola vs. Philex Mining, G.R. No. 147756, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA
152).
RULE 52
“FRESH PERIOD RULE”
Fresh 15 day period after denial of motion for reconsideration

FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC. vs. HON. MARRIETA HOMEÑA – VALENCIA
555 SCRA 345, G.R. No. 173942, June 25, 2008
FACTS: In 1998, Naval filed a complaint against Fil-Estate seeking
the recovery of a parcel of land which the latter had allegedly
taken possession of by constructing a golf course within the vicinity
of her property.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Naval of which Fil-Estate
moved for reconsideration. On July 26, 2000, the RTC denied the
motion.
On August 11, 2000, Fil-Estate filed a Notice of Appeal alleging that
the order of denial of the motion for reconsideration was received
on August 9, 2000, but the filing fee was paid only on August
25, 2000, or beyond the reglementary period to perfect the appeal.
Consequently, the RTC denied the appeal and such denial was
sustained by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether the “fresh period rule” pronounced in Neypes could
retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had
lapsed prior to September 14, 2005 when Neypes was
promulgated.
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HELD: YES. Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or

remedial in character as they do not create new or remove vested
rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation
of rights already existing. They may be given retroactive effect on
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and
this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he
is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules
of procedure.
To deny herein petitioners the benefit of the “fresh period rule”
will amount to injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of
judgment and final order were issued two years later or in the
year 2000 as compared to the notice of judgment and final order
in Neypes which were issued in 1998.

RULE 57
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

Section 20 - Claim for damages on account of improper,
irregular or excessive attachment
The language used in the 1997 revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure
leaves no doubt that there is no longer need for a favorable judgment
in favor of the party against whom attachment was issued in order
that damages may be awarded. It is indubitable that even a party
who loses the action in main but is able to establish a right to
damages by reason of improper, irregular, or excessive attachment
may be entitled to damages. This bolster the notion that the claim
for damages arising from such wrongful attachment may arise and be
decided separately from the merits of the main action. (De Dios Carlos vs.
Sandoval, G.R. No. 135830, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 266)
RULE 58
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

69
Computation of the 20-day period for TRO
Non-working days (Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays) are excluded

from the counting of the period only when the last day of the period
falls on such days. The Rule does not provide for any other
circumstance in which non-working days would affect the counting of
a prescribed period. (BPI vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142731, June 8, 2006,
490 SCRA 168)
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AS ACTION IN PERSONAM

CONRADO PINEDA vs. HON. PEDRO T. SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 143482, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 47
A suit for injunction is an action in personam and, as such, the
respondent judge’s jurisdiction is, therefore, limited to the parties in
the injunction suit.
SECTION 5 - PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION NOT GRANTED WITHOUT

NOTICE; EXCEPTIONS

SPS. MANUEL & LUISA TAN LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 147191, March 20, 2007, 518 SCRA 546
No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior
notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined.
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF

Propriety of declaratory relief
The Court may entertain a suit for declaratory relief to finally
settle the doubt as to the proper interpretation of the conflicting
laws involved, notwithstanding a violation of the rights of the party
affected. (Executive Secretary vs. Southwing Heavy Industries, G.R. No. 164171,
February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 673).
EXECUTORY PROCESS AVAILABLE IN DECLARATORY RELIEF

70
DBM vs. MANILA’S FINEST RETIREES ASSOCIATION, INC.

G.R. No. 169466, May 9, 2007, 523 SCRA 90
The execution of judgments in a Petition in a Declaratory Relief is
not necessarily indefensible. A special civil action is after all not
essentially different from an ordinary civil action, which is generally
governed by Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules of Court, except that the
former deals with a special subject matter which makes some
necessary special regulation.
RTC HAS JURISDICTION OVER DECLARATORY RELIEF BUT HAS NO

JURISDICTION OVER TRO & INJUNCTION UNDER EPIRA

ENERGY REGULATION COMMISSION vs.
HON. GREGORIO L. VEGA, JR. & MERALCO
FACTS: Meralco filed petition for declaratory relief with prayer for
issuance of a TRO and/or a writ of preliminary injunction seeking to
declare as null and void selected issuances by the DOE and ERC
related to Retail Competition and Open Assess (RCOA) provision of
the EPIRA.
The RTC issued an order granting Meralco’s prayer and ordering the
issuance of a 20-day TRO in its favor.
The ERC then filed a petition assailing the RTC’s order as well
and praying for an injunction relief to enjoin the RTC from
continuing its proceeding in the present case.
ISSUES
1) Whether RTC has jurisdiction over petition for declaratory relief.
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2) Whether RTC has jurisdiction over the ancillary prayer for the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining EPIRA’s
implementation.
RULINGS
1) YES. The RTC’s exercise of jurisdiction over the petition for
declaratory relief is proper as this is a matter that expressly falls
under its jurisdiction.
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court furthermore is clear that
the RTC has jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.
2) NO. RTC does not have jurisdiction to issue any order or
enjoining the DOE/ERB issuances relating to EPIRA.
Under the clear terms of Section 78 of the EPIRA, only the
Supreme Court may issue an order enjoining the EPIRA’s
implementation.
This provision is similar to Section 3 of RA 8975 enacted in
relation with government infrastructure projects, where it was
established that if the RTC issues a writ of preliminary injunction
that will impede the process of national government projects, the
lower court commits grave abuse of discretion.
RULE 65
CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS

MAYOR EDGARDO FLORES vs. SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF PAMPANGA
ISSUE: Whether the petition prematurely filed as petitioner failed to first
exhaust all administrative remedies.
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HELD: YES. The administrative complaint against petitioner was filed with
respondent Sanggunian in accordance with Section 61 of RA 7160
(Local Government Code of 1991). After receiving the order of the
respondent Sanggunian preventively suspending him from office,
petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration in order to
give the latter the opportunity to correct itself if there was any
error on its part. Such motion is a condition sine qua non
before filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 Section 1 of
the same Rule requires that petitioner must not only show that
respondent Sanggunian, in issuing the questioned order, “acted without
or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,” but that “there is no
appeal, nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.” The “plain” and “adequate remedy”
referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for reconsideration
of the assailed order or resolution. To dispense with the
requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner must
show a concrete, compelling and valid reason for doing so. This,
petitioner failed to do.
PO3 WILLIAM MENDOZA vs. NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION

460 SCRA 399, G.R. No. 139658, June 21, 2005
FACTS: Petitioner police officer was administratively charged with

illegal arrest, illegal detention, physical injuries and robbery.
The PNP Regional Director rendered a decision dismissing petitioner from
service. Petitioner interposed an appeal to the Regional Appellate
Board (RAB) of the Napolcom. The RAB rendered a resolution
affirming the decision of the PNP Regional Director. Consequently,
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petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by
the RAB.
Thereafter, petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari on
the ground that he was not accorded due process. The RAB, through
the Solicitor General, filed a motion to dismiss contending that
petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative e remedies.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s failure to exhaust all administrative

remedies fatal.
HELD: YES. Petitioner’s failure to exhaust all administrative remedies

is fatal to his cause. It is elementary that where, as here, a
remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should
be resorted to. Under the provisions of the DILG Act of 1990,
the Decision of the PNP Regional Director imposing upon a PNP
member the administrative penalty of dismissal from the service is
appealable to the RAB. From the RAB Decision, the aggrieved
party may then appeal to the Secretary of the DILG. Here,
petitioner did not interpose an appeal to the DILG Secretary. It bears
emphasis that in the event the Secretary renders an unfavorable decision,
petitioner may still elevate his case to the Civil Service Commission.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN & ILUSORIO

460 SCRA 146, G.R. No. 141796, June 15, 2005
ISSUE: Whether a petition for certiorari be filed with the SC
without first filing a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
decision.
HELD: NO. As a rule, the special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65 lies only when the lower court has been given the
opportunity to correct the error imputed to it through a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed order or resolution. The rationale of the
rule rests upon the presumption that the court or administrative
body which issued the assailed order or resolution may amend the
same, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error. The
motion for reconsideration, therefore, is a condition sine qua non
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before filing a petition for certiorari.
EAST ASIA TRADERS, INC. vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

433 SCRA 716, G.R. No. 152947, July 7, 2004
Doctrine: Certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial

interlocutory ruling.
HELD: Interlocutory order does not terminate nor finally dispose of the
case, but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is
finally decided on the merits. It is always under the control of the
court and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds
shown at any time before final judgment. A writ of certiorari is not
intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling; it is resorted
only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of
judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Its function is limited to
keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieve
persons from arbitrary acts – acts which courts or judges have no
power or authority in law to perform. It is not designed to
correct erroneous findings and conclusions made by the courts.”
MANILA MIDTOWN HOTEL vs. REY BORROMEO

Doctrine: A petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed
appeal.
HELD: Upon receipt of a copy of the Voluntary Arbitrator’s Decision,
petitioner should have been filed with the Court of Appeals,
within
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the 15-day reglementary period, a petition for review, not a petition
for certiorari, which is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal. And
without an appeal (petition for review) seasonably filed, as in this case,
the questioned Decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator became final and
executory after ten (10) calendar days from notice.
MOBILIA PRODUCTS, INC. vs. HAJIME UMEZAWA

G.R. No. 149357, March 4, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FERNANDEZ & UMEZAWA
452 SCRA 736, G.R. 14903, March 4, 2005
Doctrine: Recognized EXCEPTIONS to rule that certiorari cannot be

availed of when the period has lapsed.
ISSUE: Whether the State is barred from assailing the order of the
RTC for not filing a motion for reconsideration.
HELD: While ordinarily, certiorari is unavailing where the appeal

period has lapsed, there are exceptions. Among them are:
(1) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates;
(2) when the broader interest of justice so requires;
(3) when the writs issued are null and void; or
(4) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of
judicial authority.
DOMINGO MANALO vs. PAIC SAVINGS BANK & TERESE VARGAS

453 SCRA 747, G.R. No. 146531, March 18, 2005
ISSUE: Whether mandamus is the proper recourse to enforce

petitioner’s alleged right of redemption.
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HELD: NO. Mandamus is a writ issued in order to compel
the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being
its main objective, it does not lie to require anyone to fulfill
a contractual obligation or to compel a course of conduct, nor
to control or review the exercise of discretion.
The SC held that mandamus is not the proper recourse to enforce
petitioner’s alleged right of redemption. To begin with, mandamus applies
as a remedy only where petitioner’s right is founded clearly in law
and not when it is doubtful.
RULE 66
QUO WARRANTO
QUO WARRANTO CASE AGAINST CJ SERENO
REPUBLIC vs. MARIA LOURDES SERENO

G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor
General Calida, filed a Petition for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of Quo Warranto to declare void respondent
Sereno’s appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and to
oust and altogether exclude her therefrom for her failure to submit
SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and required by law.
ISSUES
1) Whether the Supreme Court can assume jurisdiction and give due
course to the instant petition for quo warranto against respondent
Sereno who is an impeachable officer and against whom an
impeachment complaint has already filed with the House of
Representatives.
2) Whether respondent Sereno is an impeachable officer and such
that quo warranto petition cannot prosper.
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3) Whether there is a forum shopping.
4) Whether impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an
impeachable official may be removed from office.
5) Whether the petition is dismissible outright on the ground of
prescription.
6) Whether respondent’s failure to file her SALNs as mandated by
the Constitution and required by law voids the nomination and
appointment of respondent Sereno as Chief Justice.
7) Whether respondent Sereno is a de jure or de facto officer.
RULINGS
1) YES, SC has original jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto.
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution states that the SC has
original jurisdiction over petitions for quo warranto. This jurisdiction
is concurrent with the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial
Court (RTC).
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Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that the venue
for an action for quo warranto is in the RTC of Manila, CA, or
SC when commenced by the Solicitor General.
While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of
the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs, a
direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction in this case is
justified considering that the qualification of a member of the Court
is in question, and the issue is of public concern.
2) NO. The Court held that the origin, nature and purpose of
impeachment and quo warranto are materially different.
While both impeachment and quo warranto may result in the
ouster of the public official, the two proceedings materially differ.
At its most basic, impeachment proceedings are political in nature
while an action for quo warranto is judicial or a proceeding
traditionally lodged in the courts.
3) There is NO forum shopping because quo warranto and
impeachment can proceed independently and simultaneously as they
differ as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds (3) applicable rules pertaining
to institution, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations.
The causes of action in the two proceedings are unequivocably
different. In quo warranto, the cause of action lies on the
usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or exercising a public
office, while in impeachment, it is the commission of an
impeachable offense.
Likewise, the reliefs sought in the two proceedings are different.
Respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be ordered to cease
holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. On the
other hand, in impeachment, a conviction shall result in the removal
of the respondent from the public office that he/she is legally
79
holding.
4) YES. Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an
invalidly appointee or invariably elected impeachable official may be
removed from office.
Even the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) rules expressly provide

for the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto to question the eligibility of the President and the Vice
President, both of whom are impeachable officers.
In fact, this would not be the first time the Court shall take
cognizance of a quo warranto petition on impeachable officer. In
the case of Estrada vs. Macapagal Arroyo where the SC took
cognizance of quo warranto petition against former President
Macapagal Arroyo whether the former President Estrada’s act of
resignation ended his official status as President.
5) NO. Prescription does not lie against the State.
The one-year limitation is not applicable when the Petition is not
mere private individual pursuing a private interest, but the
government itself seeking a relief for a public wrong and suing
for public interest.
In the three instances enumerated by Rules of Court, the
Solicitor General is mandated under the Rules to commence the
necessary quo warranto petition, as seen in the use of the
word “must”
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As a general principle it may be stated that ordinary statutes of
limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto
proceeding brought to enforce a public right. In effect, when the
government is the real party and is proceeding mainly to assert
its right, there can be no defense on the grounds of laches or
prescription.
6) YES. Compliance with the Constitutional and statutory requirement

of filing of SALN intimately relates to a person’s integrity.
Contrary to respondent Sereno’s postulation that the filing of
SALN bears no relation to the requirement of integrity, the
filing of SALN itself is a Constitutional and statutory requirement.
7) DE FACTO OFFICER. The effect of a finding that person
appointed to an office is ineligible therefore is that his presumably
valid appointment will give him color of title that confers to him
the status of a de facto officer.
For lack of a Constitutional qualification, Respondent is ineligible

to hold the position of Chief Justice and merely holding a
colorable right or title thereto. As such, respondent Sereno has
never attained the status of an impeachable official and her
removal from office other than by impeachment, is justified. The
remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the
State is proper to oust respondent from the appointive position
of Chief Justice.
RULE 70
FORCIBLE ENTRY & UNLAWFUL DETAINER

RUBEN SANTOS vs. SPOUSES TONY and MERCY AYON
458 SCRA 83, G.R. No. 137013, May 6, 2005
ISSUE: Whether accion publiciana is the proper remedy upon a person
who occupies a property by tolerance or permission.
HELD: NO. The correct remedy is unlawful detainer. The jurisdiction of
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a court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations
of the complaint and cannot be made to defend upon the defenses
set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant.
Possession by tolerance is lawful but such possession becomes

unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon
demand made by the owner. Petitioner’s cause of action for unlawful
detainer springs from respondent’s failure to vacate the questioned
premises upon his demand sometime in 1996. Within one (1) year
therefrom, or on November 6, 1996, petitioner filed the instant
complaint.
MTC HAS JURISDICTION OVER EJECTMENT CASES

DESPITE ASSERTION OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE PROPERTY
AMELIA ROBERTS vs. MARTIN PAPIO

The summary nature of the action is not changed by the claim of
ownership of the property of the dependant. The MeTC is not
divested of its jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer action simply
because the defendant asserts ownership over the property
LENGTH OF TIME OF DISPOSSESSION ESSENTIAL IN

DETERMINING ACTION TO BE FILED FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION
VICTORIANO ENCARNACION vs. NIEVES AMIGO

The material element that determines the proper action to be filed
for the recovery of the possession of the property is the length of
time of dispossession. If the dispossession has not lasted for more
than one year, an ejectment is proper and the inferior court
acquires jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the dispossession lasted
for more than one year,
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the proper action to be filed is an accion publiciana, which should
be brought to the proper RTC.
RULE 71
CONTEMPT

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 190529, March 22, 2011, 646 SCRA 63
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC may be cited for Contempt for
its refusal to reinstate in the list of Party-List Candidates,
Philippine Guardian Brotherhood, Inc.
HELD: YES, the COMELEC Chair and Members are found guilty of
Contempt of Court for their disobedience to the lawful directive
of the Supreme Court specifically the Status Quo order dated
February 2, 2010.
It is a judicial notice of Comelec Chairperson Jose A.R. Melo’s
resignation effective January 15, 2011 and Commissioners Nicodemo
T. Ferrer and Gregorio Y. Larrazabal’s retirement on February 2,
2011. However, their departure from government service, however,
do not render moot and academic their liability for indirect
contempt, since “contempt of court applies to all persons, whether
in or out of government. Thus, it covers government officials or
employees who retired during the pendency of the petition for
contempt. Otherwise, a civil servant may strategize to avail himself
of an early retirement to escape the sanctions from a contempt
citation, if he perceives that he would be made responsible for a
contumacious act. The higher interest of effective and efficient
administration of justice dictates that a petition for contempt must
proceed to its final conclusion despite the retirement of the
government official or employees, more so if is involves a former
member of the bench. (Curata vs. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No.
83
154211-12, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 214).
VERIFIED PETITION NEEDED FOR INDIRECT CONTEMPT

IF COURT DID NOT INITIATE THE CHARGE
MA. CONCEPCION REGALADO vs. ANTONIO GO

In cases where the court did not initiate the contempt charge, the
Rules prescribe that a verified petition which has complied with the
requirements of initiatory pleadings as outlined in the heretofore
quoted provision of second paragraph, Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court, must be filed.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

RULE 74
SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ
Doctrine: Partition among the heirs is not allowed until the will has
been probated.
HELD: In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among
the heirs until after the will has been probated. The law enjoins
the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless
a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world,
the right of a person to dispose of his property by will, may
be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other
question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and
the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of the will. This of course, presupposes that
the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in
the will.
APOLONIA BANAYAD FRIANELA vs. SERVILLANO BANAYAD, JR.

G.R. No. 169700, July 30, 2009, 594 SCRA 380
84
FACTS: Apolonia filed with RTC a petition for probate of the
holographic will of the late Moises Banayad. She alleged that she
was named as devisee of the will and the decedent died
without an issue and left her a parcel of land in Pasay City,
image of Oracion del Huerto and Pieta including the crown and
all personal property.
ISSUE: Does the RTC have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the instant
case.
HELD: NO. Nowhere in the petition is there a statement of the
gross value of Moises’ estate. Thus, from the reading of the original
petition filed, it cannot be determined which court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings.
The RTC should have, at the outset, dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction. Settled is the doctrine that the issue of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal, and is, not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Since the
RTC has no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings
therein, including the decision rendered, are null and void.
EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT/PARTITION;
EFFECT TO A PERSON WHO HAS NOT PARTICIPATED
IN THE PROCEEDINGS

MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ vs. EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL
G.R. No. 140422, August 7, 2006, 498 SCRA 37
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, which states: The fact
of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in
a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the
85
next succeeding section, but no extrajudicial settlement shall be

binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had
no notice thereof. Under the said provision, without the participation
of all persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement
is not binding on said persons.
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE THROUGH PUBLICATION

JOSEPH CUA vs. GLORIA VARGAS
FACTS: Five heirs of one Paulina Vargas executed a notarized Extra-
judicial Settlement of Estate with Sale over a parcel of land left by
the latter in favor of herein petitioner Joseph Cua.
However, Gloria Vargas and her co-heirs did not sign the document
evidencing the said settlement which was duly published in the
newspaper.
ISSUE: Whether the heirs are deemed constructively notified regardless

of their failure to participate therein by an extrajudicial settlement of
estate and partition which was duly published.
HELD: NO. Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court,
constructive notice to interested parties may suffice through publication
but the same should be done before the execution of the settlement
and sale, unlike in the case at bar, in which, Gloria was totally
unaware of the transaction.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive

notice to the heirs after the facts of execution. The requirement of
publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never
intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the
decedent’s estate.
RULE 73
VENUE AND PROCESSES

86
EDGAR SAN LUIS vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS

Even where the statute uses the word “domicile” under Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. In other
words, “resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode.
Under Section 2, Rule 79, an “interested person” has been defined
as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or
one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The
interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or
contingent.
RULE 99
ADOPTION AND CUSTODY OF MINOR

CONSENT TO ADOPTION

ROSARIO MATA CASTRO vs. JOSE MARIA GREGORIO
FACTS: Atty. Castro is the estranged husband of Rosario and the
father of Joane. He filed a petition for adoption of his alleged
illegitimate children, Jed and Regina, with Lilibeth.
The trial court approved the adoption, having ruled out that no
opposition from any person including the OSG representing the
government had been received by the court.
A year after the decree of adoption was issued, Rosario and Joane
87
filed a petition to annul the judgment of the trial court on the
ground that they should have been given notice by the trial court
of the adoption proceedings as adoption laws require their consent
as a requisite in the petition.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the consents of the wife and legitimate children of the
adopter are required as requisite for adoption.
(2) Whether publication is a sufficient notice to the spouse and
legitimate children.
(3) Whether the petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47
is the proper action to annul the decree of adoption.
RULINGS
(1) YES. Under Article III, Section 7 of RA 8552, the husband
must first obtain the consent of his wife if he seeks to adopt his
own children born out of wedlock.
The provision is mandatory. The spouse seeking to adopt must first
obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment,
Atty. Castro and Rosario remained legally married despite their de
facto separation.
RA 8552 also requires the consent of the adopter’s children if
they are 10 years old or older. It is undisputed that Joane was
Atty. Castro and Rosario’s legitimate child and that she was over 10
88
years old at the time of adoption proceedings.
The consent of the adopter’s other children is necessary as it
ensures harmony among the prospective siblings. Her written consent,
therefore, was necessary for the adoption to be valid.
(2) NO. For the adoption to be valid, the consent of the spouse
and legitimate children is required by RA 8552.
Personal service of summons should have effected on the spouse and
all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are
protected.
It is not enough to rely on constructive notice by publication as
in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be
privileged over substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario
and Joane of the adoption proceedings, it never validly acquired
jurisdiction.
(3) YES. The annulment of judgment is a remedy which disregards
the time-honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final
judgment, a solid corner stone in the dispensation of justice by the
courts.
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The doctrine of immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold

purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice
and thus, procedullary, to make orderly the discharge of judicial
business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the
risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the court exist.
As to the first, a judgment that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable and is no longer to be modified in any
respect even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous
conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification is made
by the court that rendered the decision or by the highest court of
the land.
As to the second controversies cannot drag on indefinitely because
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice demand
that the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in
suspense for an indefinite period of time.
Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are
only two grounds by which annulment of judgment may be availed
of: extrinsic fraud, which must be brought four years from
discovery, and lack of jurisdiction, which must be brought before it
is barred by estoppel or laches.
The grant of adoption should be annulled as the trial court did
not validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings and the favorable
decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud by employing tactics by
Atty. Castro not only to induce the trial court in approving the
petition but also to prevent Rosario and Joane from participating
in the proceedings or opposing the petition.
RULE 102
HABEAS CORPUS

IN RE: APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS vs. BUCOR DIRECTOR
The writ of Habeas Corpus may also be issued where, as a
consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a
90
person; (b) the court has no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or
(c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void
as to such excess.
MARTIN GIBBS FLETCHER vs. DIRECTOR OF BUCOR

UDK – 14071, July 17, 2009, 593 SCRA 265
FACTS: Martin seeks his release from prison in his petition for
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. He claims that his
prison sentence of 12 to 17 years was commuted by then
President Fidel V. Ramos to 9 to 12 years. Since he had
already served 14 years, three months and 12 days including
his good conduct allowance, his continued imprisonment is illegal.
OSG opposed the petition because it was neither signed or
verified by Martin or a person on his behalf or by his
purported counsel. The OSG further opposed the petition on the
ground that Martin’s prison sentence was never commuted by
then Pres. Ramos as he had not been granted the status of a
colonist and there were other pending cases against him
warranting his continued detention and he was put under custody
of a judicial process or a valid judgment.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus is meritorious.
HELD: NO. So far as the failure to comply with Section 3,
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court is concerned, the strict
compliance with the technical requirements for a habeas corpus
petition as claimed by the OSG may be dispensed with where
the allegations in the application are sufficient to make out
a case for habeas corpus.
91
The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
relieve a person from unlawful restraint. The writ, however,
should not be issued when the custody over the person is by
virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.
HABEAS CORPUS JURISDICTION

MA. HAZELINA TUJAN – MILITANTE vs. RAQUEL CADA – DEAPERA
G.R. No. 210636, July 28, 2014, 731 SCRA 144
FACTS: Raquel, the biological mother of minor Criselda, filed before
the Family Court of Caloocan City, a verified petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, demanding that custody over the child be
returned to her by Militante.
Despite diligent efforts and several attempts, however, the Sheriff

was unsuccessful in personally serving Militante copies of the
habeas corpus and of the writ.
Raquel then filed a criminal case for kidnapping against Militante.
During the preliminary investigation, the sheriff was able to serve
the alias writ upon Militante at the prosecutor’s office of
Quezon City.
Following this development, Militante, by way of special appearances,

moved for the quashal of the writ and prayed before the RTC of
Caloocan City for the dismissal of the habeas corpus, claiming,
among others, That she was not personally served with summons
and the present petition should be filed in the Family Court in
Quezon City since the minor resides in Quezon City.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the writ of habeas corpus issued by the Family
Court of Caloocan City is enforceable in Quezon City.
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(2) Whether summons is required in Petition for Habeas Corpus.
RULINGS
(1) YES. A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving
custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court and
shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family
Court belongs.
It is undisputed that Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong
to the same National Capital Judicial Region.
(2) NO. Service of summons to begin with is not required in
habeas corpus petition. A writ of habeas corpus plays a role
somewhat comparable to a summons in ordinary civil actions.
By service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of Militante.
RULE 103
CHANGE OF NAME

REPUBLIC vs. TRINIDAD CAPOTE
A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given
legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an
opportunity to contest it. The fact that no one opposed the petition
had not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same
nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature.
RULE 108 - CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

REPUBLIC vs. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR
93
FACTS: Merlinda requested from the NSO a Certificate of No
Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage
with her boyfriend of five years.
Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to
a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean national, on June 24, 2002 at
the office of the MTCC Palace of Justice.
She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she
did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the
solemnizing officer; and that the signature appearing in the marriage
certificate is not hers. She, thus, filed before the RTC a Petition for
Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries
in the wife portion.
The RTC granted the petition and directed the Local Civil Registrar
to cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged
marriage contract of Melinda and Ye Son Sune.
The OSG, however, filed an appeal assailing the Decision on the
ground that (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and
innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the
cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged
contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract, in
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effect, nullifies the contract.
(2) Whether Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the appropriate
remedy for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.
RULINGS
(1) NO. Melinda indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as
there was no marriage to speak about, but the correction of the
record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the
evidence presented.
Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate

of marriage by canceling the entries in the wife portion thereof,
the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as
there was no marriage to speak of.
(2) YES. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.
The proceeding may either be summary or adversary. If the

correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary.
If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of
a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is
adversary.
An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial
court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been
fully and properly developed whereas opposing counsel have been
given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where
the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the
certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal circumstances of
Melinda. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged
and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the
95
purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such

marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one
who entered into such marriage.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

RULE 111 - PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION

WHEN CIVIL ACTION MAY PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY

CRISTINA B. CASTILLO vs. PHILIP R. SALVADOR
G.R. No. 191240, July 30, 2014, 731 SCRA 329
FACTS: Cristina Castillo charged Philip Salvador with estafa for

allegedly enticed her to invest $100,000 in May 2002 into the
remittance business
in the name of Philip Salvador and the said amount was allegedly
misappropriated by the latter.
However, Philip vehemently denied the receipt of $100,000 from

Cristina.
On April 26, 2006, RTC has found Philip Salvador guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa.
On appeal, the CA has reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC and acquitted Philip Salvador of the crime of estafa.
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ISSUES
(1) What are the effects on the civil liability of the accused on
his acquittal?
(2) Whether the judgment of acquittal of the accused by the CA
should at least have retained the award of damages to complainant.
RULINGS
(1) Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects
on the civil liability of the accused.
First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the
author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes
the door to civil liability, for a person who has been to be
not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never
be held liable for such an act or omission. There being no delict,
civil liability ex delicto is out of the question and the civil
action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds
other than the delict complaint of.
The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on
the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the
accused has been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from
civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
(2) NO. Philip Salvador was acquitted because the prosecution failed
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The evidence of the prosecution being insufficient to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the crime as charged had been committed by
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Philip, the general presumption, “that a person is innocent of the
crime or wrong, stands in his favor.”
The prosecution failed to prove that all the elements of estafa are
present. For in fact, Cristina herself could not even establish clearly
and precisely her allegation that she gave Philip $100,000 in May
2002 and how Philip committed fraud.
EFFECT OF DEATH OF THE ACCUSED

ON CIVIL LIABILITY

DR. CLENIO YNZON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 165805, July 30, 2015, 731 SCRA 214
FACTS: Dr. Ynzon performed a surgical operation upon a 10 – year -
old patient, JR, of acute appendicitis and due to his negligence,
carelessness and imprudence, JR died due to cardio-respiratory arrest.
On February 28, 2003, the RTC convicted Dr. Ynzon of the crime
of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide.
On June 4, 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of
Dr. Ynzon.
While pending appeal to the Supreme Court, Dr. Ynzon died on
December 23, 2011 due to “multi-organ failures.”
ISSUES
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(1) Whether the death of the accused pending appeal of his appeal
survives the claim for civil liability.
(2) Whether the recovery of civil liability may be enforced in the
same action.
RULINGS
(1) YES. The death of the accused Dr. Ynzon pending appeal of
his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability. However, the
recovery of civil liability survives or subsists as the same is not
based on delicts but by contract and the reckless imprudence he
was guilty of under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
(2) NO. A separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator of the estate, depending on the sources of
obligation upon which the same is based and in accordance with
Section 4, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

RULE 112 - PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

SEC. 6 - DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE

ALFREDO C. MENDOZA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 197293, April 21, 2014, 722 SCRA 647
FACTS: Juno Cars hired Mendoza as Trade-In/Used Car Supervisor.

Upon partial audit, it was discovered that five cars had been
sold and released by Alfredo without permission and without
remitting the payment to Juno Cars.
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Juno Cars filed a criminal complaint against Mendoza for qualified
theft and estafa. Mendoza contends that Juno Cars failed to prove
ownership over the five (5) cars or its right to possess them with
the purported unremitted payments, hence, it could not have suffered
damage.
Prosecutor Rey Delgado issued a resolution finding probable cause

and filed the two (2) informations before the RTC against Mendoza
for qualified theft and estafa.
Mendoza moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied. He
filed before the RTC a motion for determination of probable cause.
After conducting an independent assessment of the evidence on

record, Judge Rizalina Capco – Umali dismissed the complaint for lack
of probable cause.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the trial court may dismiss an information filed by
the prosecutor on the basis of its own independent finding of lack
of probable cause.
(2) What is the difference between executive determination of

probable cause from judicial determination of probable cause?
(3) What are the three (3) options given to the trial court upon
the filing of the criminal information under Section 6, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court?
RULINGS
100
(1) YES. Once the information has been filed in court, the judge
shall then “personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and
its supporting evidence to determine whether there is probable
cause to issue a warrant of arrest.
Under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court mandates the judge to
“immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
fails to establish probable cause.”
(2) The executive determination of probable cause is one made
during the preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly
pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to
determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those he
believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus
should be held for trial.
Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to

determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court.
Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the
public prosecutor is a matter that the trial court itself does not
and may not be competent to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is
one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy
himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for
placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge
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cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.
The difference is clear. The executive determination of probable cause
concerns itself with whether there is enough evidence to support an
information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause,
on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should
be issued.
(3) Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court
three (3) options upon the filing of the criminal information:
(a) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to
establish probable cause;
(b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and
(c) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5)
days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable
cause.
Rule 114 - Conduct of Hearing in Granting Bail

CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR ZUÑO vs. JUDGE ALEJANDRO CABEBE
444 SCRA 382, A.M. OCA No. 03-1800 RTJ, November 26, 2004
ISSUE: Whether respondent judge’s grant of bail without the benefit
of hearing justified.
HELD: NO. Under the present Rules of Court, a hearing is
mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or
discretion. It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of
bail in cases where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on
the issue of whether or not the evidence is strong is a
matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In
order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must
first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of
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guilt is strong. In fact, even in cases where there is no
petition for bail, a hearing should still be held.
PEOPLE vs. LUIS BUCALON PLAZA

FACTS: Luis was indicted for Murder. After the prosecution rested
its case, Luis, with leave of court, filed a Demurrer to
Evidence. The Court denied the Demurrer.
The Defense while in the course of the presentation of its
evidence filed a Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond based on
the findings of the trial court in the Demurrer that prosecution
evidence is sufficient to prove only Homicide, so he could be
released on bail.
The prosecution vehemently opposed the said motion contending

that the case being Murder, a non-bailable offense, it is public
prosecutor who has exclusive jurisdiction to determine what crime
the accused should be charged.
Luis was subsequently released after he posted a P40,000 bond.
ISSUE: Whether the hearing conducted satisfies the requirement of

due process and that Luis is entitled to bail.
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HELD: YES. Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction
by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment be admitted to bail
as a matter of right. The exercise by the trial court of its
discretionary power to grant bail to an accused with a capital
offense thus depends on whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
When the trial judge denied the Demurrer and with his
corresponding statement that the evidence was sufficient to
convict Luis of Homicide only, a holding of a summary hearing
merely to determine whether Luis was entitled to bail would
have been unnecessary as the evidence in chief was already
presented by the prosecution.
ANITA ESTEBAN vs. JUDGE REYNALDO ALHAMBRA

FACTS: Petitioner Anita Esteban posted cash bail of P20,000 in each four
criminal cases of her brother Gerardo Esteban for the latter’s
temporary liberty.
While out on bail, Gerardo was again charged with another
crime for which he was arrested and detained. Fed up with
Gerardo’s actuation, petitioner refused to post another bail, instead
she filed an application for the cancellation of the cash bonds
she posted in the four criminal cases. Respondent judge denied
petitioner’s application for cancellation of cash bonds.
ISSUE: Whether respondent judge committed grave abuse of

discretion in denying petitioner’s application for cancellation of the
accused’s cash bail.
HELD: NO. We hold that the cash bail cannot be cancelled.
Petitioner did not surrender the accused charged in the four
criminal cases to the trial court. The accused was arrested and
detained because he was charged in a subsequent criminal
case. Moreover, the bail bond posted for the accused was in
the form of cash deposits which shall be applied to the
payment of fine and cost and the excess, if any, shall be
returned to the accused or to any person who made the
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deposit.
The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of
the accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment
of conviction.
RIGHT TO BAIL

PEOPLE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN & JINGGOY ESTRADA
G.R. No. 158754, August 10, 2007, 529 SCRA 764
Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the
weakness of the evidence of guilt, the right to bail may
justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is great.
RULE 119 - T R I A L
SEC. 17 - DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED TO BE STATE
WITNESS
MANUEL J. JIMENES, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: On June 11, 2009, Montero executed sworn statement

confessing his participation in the killing of Ruby Rose by providing
the steel box where the drum containing the victim’s body was
placed, welding the steel box to seal the cadaver inside, operating
the ship or tug boat and together with his co-conspirators,
dropping the steel box containing the
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cadaver into the seal. He named Jimenes, Lope, Lennard, Robert and
Eric as his co-conspirators.
On August 20, 2009, an information was filed before the RTC
charging Jimenes, Lope, Lennard, Robert, Eric and Montero of
Murder for the killing of Ruby Rose.
Montero thereafter filed a motion for his discharge as a state
witness. The state filed a motion to discharge Montero as a state
witness for the prosecution, however, Jimenes opposed both motions.
ISSUES
(1) What are the conditions for the discharge of an accused as
state witness.
(2) Whether there is an absolute necessity for the testimony of
accused Montero whose discharge is requested.
(3) Whether the testimony of said accused be substantially

corroborated in its material points.
(4) Whether said accused does not appear to be most
guilty despite being a principal by participation.
RULINGS
106
(1) Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that in discharge of an accused in order that
he may be a state witness, the following conditions must be
present, namely:
(a) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission
of an offense;
(b) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it
rests its case;
(c) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of
the discharge;
(d) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(e) The trial court is satisfied that:
(1) there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused
whose discharge is requested;
(2) there is no other direct evidence available for the prosecution of
the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(3) the testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated
in its material points;
(4) said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
107
(5) said accused has not at any time been convicted of any
offense involving moral turpitude.
(2) YES. Absolute necessity exists for the testimony of an accused
sought to be discharged when he alone has knowledge of the
crimes. In more concrete term, necessity is not there when the
testimony would simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the
prosecution evidence.
In the present case, not one of the accused - conspirators, except
Montero, was willing to testify on the alleged murder of Ruby
Rose and their participation in her killing.
Hence, there is an absolute necessity for the testimony of Montero
which he alone is available to provide direct evidence of the crime.
(3) YES. Montero’s testimony can be substantially corroborated in its
material points.
The evidence consisting of the steel casing where the cadaver was
found, the drum containing the cadaver of Ruby Rose, the spot in
the sea where the cadaver was retrieved, the apparel worn by the
victim when she was killed as well as her burnt personal effects,
these all partly corroborate some of the material points in the
sworn statements of Montero.
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
only requires that the testimony of the accused sought to be
108
discharged be substantially corroborated in its material points, not on
all points.
(4) YES. By jurisprudence, “most guilty” refers to the highest
degree of culpability in terms of participation in the commission of
the offense and does not necessarily mean the severity of the
penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the same
penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered to
have lesser or the least guilty taking into account his degree of
participation in the commission of the offense.
What the rule avoids is the possibility that the most guilty would
be set free while his co-accused who are less guilty in terms of
participation would be penalized.
It appears that while Montero was part of the planning,
preparation, and execution stage as most of his co-accused had
been, he had no direct participation in the actual killing of Ruby
Rose. Montero’s participation was limited to providing the steel box
where the drum containing the victim’s body was placed, welding the
steel box to seal the cadaver inside, operating the skip or tug
boat, and together with his co-accused dropping the steel box
containing the cadaver into the sea.
The discharge of an accused to be utilized as a state witness
because he does not appear to be the most guilty is highly factual
in nature as it largely depends on the appreciation of who had
the most participation in the commission of the crime.
Demurrer to Evidence
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

447 SCRA 291, G.R. No. 137707-11, December 17, 2004
FACTS: Herein private respondents were charged of several criminal

complaints with the Sandiganbayan. When arraigned, they pleaded not
109
guilty to all charges. Two of the respondents were never arraigned.
After the prosecution had rested its case, the defense filed with
leave of court a demurrer to evidence on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the respondents beyond
reasonable doubt.
Sandiganbayan rendered decision granting respondents’ demurrer to

evidence and acquitting all the respondents for insufficiency of
evidence.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan in granting respondents demurrer to

evidence acted without jurisdiction.
HELD: Records show that two of the respondents were never
arraigned before the Sandiganbayan nor were they ever arrested.
Hence, the Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction over them.
Basic is the rule that before a court can act upon the case of an
accused, it must first acquire jurisdiction over his person. Jurisdiction
over the accused is acquired (1) his arrest, or (2) his voluntary
submission. If the accused is a fugitive from justice, the court
cannot even proceed with a trial in absentia unless he has been
previously arraigned.
With respect to the rest of the respondents, we rule that the
Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion in granting their
demurrer to evidence.
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE GRANT TANTAMOUNT TO ACQUITTAL
PEOPLE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN & MANUEL BARCENAS

G.R. No. 174504, March 21, 2011, 645 SCRA 726
FACTS: Barcenas was the vice mayor who obtained cash advances
110
and
failed to liquidate the same. After the prosecution presented the
COA auditor to be its last witness, Barcenas filed a Demurrer to
Evidence which the Sandiganbayan granted. At the time the case
was filed in Sandiganbayan, Barcenas had already liquidated his
cash advances. The prosecution claimed that the settlement of the
cash advances would not exonerate Barcenas but only mitigate his
criminal liability.
ISSUE: Whether the granting of demurrer to evidence by the
Sandiganbayan tantamount to acquittal.
HELD: YES. In criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer is
tantamount to an acquittal and this would place the accused in
double jeopardy. This may be reviewable through certiorari and the
writ may only be issued if it could be proved that the trial
court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion. In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan granted the
demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to
prove that the government suffered any damage from Barcenas’
non-liquidation of the subject cash advances because it was later
shown, as admitted by the prosecution’s witness that Barcenas
liquidated the same albeit belatedly.
EXCEPTION TO DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE C. GO, et. al.
G.R. No. 191015, August 6, 2014, 732 SCRA 216
FACTS: Orient Bank was placed under the receivership of PDIC.
As a result, PDIC began collecting on Orient Bank’s past due
loans available. Among these borrowers of Orient Bank are Timmy’s
111
Inc. and Asia Textile Mills. Both denied having applied, much less,
being granted a loan by Orient Bank.
After conducting an investigation, a finding came out that loans
purportedly for the said two firms were released in the form of
manager’s checks and then deposited to the savings account of
Jose C. Go of Orient Bank.
A complaint for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents

were filed against respondents Jose C. Go, Aida C. Dela Rosa and
Felecitas D. Necomedes. The private respondents pleaded not guilty
during the arraignment and pre-trial was conducted. Thereafter, the
trial of the case ensued.
After the presentation of prosecution’s evidence, the private

respondents filed Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence. The
RTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case, acquitting all the
private respondents.
The prosecution, thru the OSG, filed petition for certiorari with CA
assailing the order of the trial court. CA affirmed the RTC
decision and double jeopardy was attached.
ISSUE: Whether there is an exception to the granting of demurrer
to evidence which would tantamount to an acquittal.
HELD: YES. As a general rule, an order granting the accused’s
demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal. There are certain
exceptions, however, as when the grant thereof would not violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.
When there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court dismissing a criminal case by
granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence, its judgment is
considered void.
112
In this case, the evidence shows that respondents had a direct
hand in the falsification and creation of fictitious loans. By
disregarding what is evidence in the record, the trial court
committed substantial wrong that frustrates the ends of justice and
adversely affects the public interest. The trial court’s act was so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
Therefore, the grant of demurrer to evidence to the accused does
not amount to acquittal since the order itself is null and void,
being tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY FROM VOID JUDGMENT

JOSEPH CEREZO vs. PEOPLE, YANEZA, ABUNDA & AFULUGENCIA
G.R. No. 185230, June 1, 2011, 650 SCRA 222
FACTS: Joseph filed a complaint of libel against respondents Yaneza,
Abunda & Afulugencia. Finding probable cause against the
respondents, the Prosecutor’s Office filed the information in the
RTC. Respondents sought for reconsideration of the Prosecutor’s
resolution. During the intervening period, respondents were arraigned and
pleaded not guilty. The Prosecutor’s Office rendered a decision
reversing its earlier ruling and filed a withdrawal of
information. RTC dismissed the libel case based on prosecutor’s new
resolution. Aggrieved by the order, Cerezo filed an appeal to the
DOJ.
Later, the Secretary of Justice rendered a decision reversing the
prosecutor’s ruling and ordered the refilling of the information. The
RTC granted the ruling of the DOJ Secretary.
ISSUE: Whether or not double jeopardy exists in the present case.
113
HELD: NO. One of the requisites in order for double jeopardy to
be present is the acquittal, conviction, dismissal or otherwise
termination of the case without the offender’s express consent. The
same is not present in the case.
The order of the RTC based on prosecutor’s resolution as well as
the order conforming with the DOJ’s decision were made with
grave abuse of discretion. In rendering such rulings, the RTC blindly
followed the decision of the prosecutor and DOJ without making an
independent assessment and evaluation of the merits of the case. By
relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor and the
resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the trial court abdicated its judicial
power and refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law.
Thus, the assailed orders were rendered with grave abuse of
discretion and are now void and without legal effect.
Since the orders are void and do not have a legal effect, the
respondents were never acquitted nor was there a valid and legal
dismissal or termination of the case. With the fifth requisite
missing, there can be no double jeopardy.
NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY WHEN ORDER

OF DISMISSAL WAS RECALLED

CESAR T. QUIAMBAO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: Cesar was charged for violation of Section 74 of BP 68
before the MTC of Pasig City, Branch 69.
Before the issuance of the warrant of arrest, Cesar filed an
Urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause.
On May 8, 2006, the MTC denied the motion and set his
arraignment on October 9, 2006.
114
Cesar filed a Petition for Certiorari before RTC, Branch 154 of
Pasig City.
Accused Cesar was arraigned on January 29, 2007.
On June 4, 2007, RTC, Branch 154, granted the Petition holding
that no probable cause to hold Cesar for trial. Consequently, it
directed the MTC to dismiss the criminal case for want of
probable cause.
Private complainants Aderico & Bonifacio brought a direct appeal to
the Supreme Court raising purely question of law.
While the petition for certiorari remains pending before the

Supreme Court, the MTC on June 18, 2007 ordered the dismissal
of the criminal case pursuant to the RTC - Branch 154’s order
dated June 4, 2007.
Upon learning that a petition for certiorari had been filed with
the Supreme Court, the MTC issued an order dated September
17, 2007 recalling the Order of Dismissal and ordered the
suspension of the proceeding to await the final outcome the
pending case.
115
ISSUES
(1) Whether the dismissal of the criminal case operates as an
acquittal of the accused for the crime charged.
(2) Whether the revival of the criminal case placed the accused in
double jeopardy.
RULINGS
(1) NO. MTC acted without jurisdiction when it issued the Order
of Dismissal dated June 18, 2007 because the petition for review
remains pending before the Supreme Court.
The issue of probable cause had already been acquired by the
Supreme Court. From the moment the case had been elevated to
the SC, the MTC has no longer authority to further act on the
issue which was pending review.
Thus, the dismissal neither terminated the action on the merit, nor
amounted to an acquittal.
(2) NO. The MTC had no longer authority to dismiss the criminal
case because the jurisdiction to act on and entertain the case had
already acquired by SC. Hence, it naturally follows that all the
issuances and/or order by the lower court relative to the issue
pending review with SC will become null and void.
There is no double jeopardy because the MTC which ordered the
dismissal of the criminal case, is not a court of competent
jurisdiction.
116
Hence, the dismissal and the subsequent revival or reinstatement of
the criminal case did not effectively place the accused in double
jeopardy.
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE PREMATURELY FILED

ESTHER P. MAGLEO vs. JUDGE ROWENA QUINAG-ORAN
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2336, November 12, 2014, 739 SCRA 628
FACTS: Before the prosecution rested its case, accused Esther filed
a Demurrer to Evidence and the Court granted the same.
ISSUE: Whether the granting of Demurrer to Evidence is proper.
HELD: NO. The granting of the Demurrer to Evidence is not
proper considering that it was filed prematurely before the
prosecution rested its case.
The RTC had not yet ruled on the admissibility of the formal
offer of evidence of the prosecution when the accused Esther
filed her demurrer to evidence. Hence, there was no proper
acquittal.
The RTC having failed to do so, there is nary a doubt that no
double jeopardy attached.
RULE 120 - J U D G M E N T
PROMULGATION - Presence of Counsel

MARINO ICDANG vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: Marino was charged with Malversation of Public Funds and
117
violation of Sec. 3 (a) RA 3019, before the Sandiganbayan. The
trial went on and both parties rested its case. When the
Sandiganbayan promulgated its judgment of conviction, Marino and his
counsel were not present.
ISSUE: Whether the presence of counsel during the promulgation of
judgment is indispensable.
HELD: NO. There is nothing in the rules that requires the
presence of counsel for the promulgation of judgment of conviction
to be valid. While notice must be served on both accused and his
counsel, the latter’s absence during the promulgation of judgment
would not affect the validity of the promulgation. Indeed, no
substantial right of the accused was prejudiced by such absence of
his counsel when the sentence was pronounced.
FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT

REYNALDO H. JAYLO, et. al. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 183152-54, January 21, 2015, 746 SCRA 452
FACTS: On September 8, 1992, an information was filed before the
Sandiganbayan against Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona and Habalo for the
murder of De Guzman, Calanog and Manguera.
On April 17, 2007, the Sandiganbayan found Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona
and Habalo guilty of homicide, however, during that promulgation,
none of the accused appeared despite notice. The court promulgated
the Decision in absentia, and the judgment was entered in the
criminal docket. The bailbonds of the accused were cancelled and
issued warrants for their arrest.
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On April 30, 2007, the counsel of the accused filed a Motion
for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision.
On November 29, 2007, the Sandiganbayan took no action on the
motion for reconsideration and ordered the implementation for the
arrest of the convicted accused.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the Sandiganbayan was correct in not taking cognizance
of the Motion for Reconsideration by the accused.
(2) What are the effects of non-appearance of the accused
without justifiable cause in the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction?
(3) Whether the right to file motion for reconsideration is a
statutory right and not merely a remedy under Section 6, Rule
120 of the Rules of Court.
(4) Whether Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court diminishes
or modifies the substantive rights of the accused.
RULINGS
(1) YES. The Sandiganbayan was correct in not taking cognizance
of the Motion for Reconsideration by the accused. While the
motion was filed on April 30, 2007, it did not operate to
regain the standing of the accused in court. For one, it is
not an act of surrender that is contemplated by Section 6,
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, nowhere in the
motion was indicated that accused were asking for leave to avail of
the remedies against the judgment of conviction, or that there were
119
valid reason for their absence at the promulgation.
For the failure of the accused to regain their standing in court
and avail of the remedies against the judgment of conviction, the
decision of the Sandiganbayan attained finality, 15 days reckoned
from 17 April 2007.
(2) If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear
was without justifiable cause, the accused shall lose the following
remedies:
(a) filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121);
and
(b) an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122).
(3) YES. Like an appeal, the right to file a motion for
reconsideration is a statutory grant or privilege.
As a statutory right, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is
to be exercised in accordance with and in the manner provided by
law.
Thus, a party filing a motion for reconsideration strictly comply
120
with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.
(4) NO. It only works in pursuance of the power of the
Supreme Court to provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases. This provision protects the courts
from delay in the speedy disposition of criminal cases - delay arising
from the simple expediency of non-appearance of the accused on the
scheduled promulgation of the judgment of conviction.
In this case, the accused have just shown their lack of faith in
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by not appearing before it for
the promulgation of the judgment on their cases. Surely, they cannot
later on expect to be allowed to invoke the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction to grant them relief from its judgment of conviction.
VARIANCE DOCTRINE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNABE PAREJA
FACTS: Pareja was charged with two counts of rape and one
count of attempted rape of a minor AAA.
The first charge was allegedly committed by Pareja of Rape thru
sexual assault by inserting his finger in the vagina of the minor
while other charge alleged that Pareja committed rape by carnal
knowledge.
On trial, the victim narrated that in the first charge, Pareja
inserted his penis in her annus while the second charge, AAA was
not able to narrate if indeed, Pareja inserted his finger in her
vagina.
The trial court convicted Pareja for rape and acts of
lasciviousness upon its reliance on the testimony of AAA.
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ISSUES
(1) Whether the accused be convicted of the crime of rape by
carnal knowledge when what was proved in the trial court was
rape thru sexual assault.
(2) What is the crime committed by the accused?
(3) What are two modes of committing rape?
(4) What is the primary duty of a lawyer in public prosecution?
RULINGS
(1) NO. Since the charge in the information is rape through carnal
knowledge, the accused cannot be convicted of rape by sexual
assault even it was proven during trial. This is due to the
material differences and substantial distinctions between the two
modes of rape.
The first mode is not necessarily included in the second and vice
- versa. Consequently, to convict Pareja of rape by sexual assault
when what was charged with was with was rape through carnal
knowledge, would be to violate his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
(2) Nevertheless, Pareja may be convicted of the lesser crime of
acts of lasciviousness under the variance doctrine embodied in
Section 4, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
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The elements of Acts of Lasciviousness was present in the first
charge incident. Thus, even though the crime charged against
Pareja was for rape through carnal knowledge, he can be convicted
of the crime of acts of lasciviousness without violating any of his
constitutional rights because said crime is included in the crime of
rape.
(3) Rape can be committed in two ways:
(a) Article 266-A paragraph 1 refers to Rape through sexual
intercourse, also known as “organ rape” or “penile rape.” The
central element in rape through sexual intercourse is carnal
knowledge which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
(b) Article 266-A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault, also
called “instrument or object rape, or “gender free rape.” It must
be attended by any of the circumstances enumerated in subparagraphs
(a) to (d) of paragraph 1.”
The two modes of committing rape can be differentiated in the
following manner:
(1) In the first mode, the offender is always a man, while in
the second, the offender may be a man or a woman.
(2) In the first mode, the offended party is always a woman,
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while in the second, the offended party may be a man or a
woman.
(3) In the first mode, rape is committed through penile penetration
of the vagina, while the second is committed by inserting the
penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another
person, and
(4) The penalty for rape under the first mode is higher than that
under the second.
(4) The primary duty of a lawyer in public prosecution is to see
that justice is done - to the State, that its penal laws are not
broken and order maintained; to the victim, that his or her rights
are vindicated; and to the offender, that he is justly punished for
his crime.
A faulty and defective information, such as that of the instant
case, does not render full justice to the State, the offended party,
and even the offender. Thus, the public prosecutor should always see
to it that the information is accurate and appropriate.
RULE 122 - A P P E A L
PERSONALITY TO APPEAL
PEOPLE & MALAYAN INSURANCE vs. PHILIP PICCIO

G.R. No. 193681, August 6, 2014, 732 SCRA 254
FACTS: Yuchengco family and Yuchengco Group of Companies thru

Malayan Insurance Company filed a criminal complaint of Libel
against a group called PEPCI for posting an article in a certain
website which was highly defamatory and libelous against the
Yuchengo family & Group of Companies.
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The RTC quashed the information and dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction holding that the criminal information failed to
allege where the article was printed and first published or where
the offended parties reside.
The People of the Philippines, through the private prosecutors, and
with the conformity of public prosecutor, filed a Notice of Appeal.
The PEPCI group filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal, citing the
fact that the Brief for the Private Complainants – Appellants did
not carry the conformity of the OSG and that ordinary appeal
was not the appropriate remedy.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the private complainants may appeal an order of
dismissal in a criminal case by the trial court without the
conformity of the OSG.
(2) Whether the offended party may appeal the civil liability of the
accused without the intervention of the OSG.
RULINGS
125
(1) NO. It is well-settled that the authority to represent the
State in appeals of criminal cases before the SC and the CA is
vested solely in the OSG, which is the law office of the
Government.
The rationale therefore is rooted in the principle that the party
affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the People and
not the private complainants who are mere complaining witnesses.
The private complainants have no personality or legal standing to
interpose an appeal in a criminal proceeding. Since the OSG had
expressly withheld its conformity and endorsement in the
instant case, the CA, therefore, correctly dismissed the appeal.
(2) YES. The private complainant or the offended party may,
however, file an appeal without the intervention of the OSG but
only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concern. He
may also file a special civil action for certiorari even without
the intervention of the OSG, but only to the end of preserving
his interest in the civil aspect of the case.
APPEAL to Different Appellate Jurisdiction
PEOPLE vs. ROSARIO “ROSE” OCHOA

G.R. No. 173792, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 382
FACTS: Rose was charged with Illegal Recruitment in a Large Scale
and three counts of Estafa. She recruited several individuals and
took their placement fees but did not have the necessary license.
The RTC found the accused guilty of Illegal Recruitment
sentencing her to life
imprisonment. She was also found guilty of Estafa with the penalty
of prision correctional minimum up to prision mayor maximum. The
accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the
conviction but then declared their decision null and void later
because they do not have appellate jurisdiction of criminal cases
when the penalty involves reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
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ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court has exclusive appellate

jurisdiction even though some of the consolidated crimes does not
have the penalty of life imprisonment.
HELD: YES. An appeal of a single decision cannot be split
between two courts. The splitting of appeals is not conclusive to
the orderly administration of justice and invites possible conflict of
disposition between the reviewing courts. Specifically, the Court of
Appeals has no jurisdiction to review an appeal of a judgment
imposing an indeterminate sentence. If the same ruling imposes
reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment and death for crimes arising
out of the same facts. In other words, the Supreme Court has
exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of criminal cases in which the
penalty imposed below is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or
death, even if the same decision orders, in addition, a lesser
penalty of penalties for crimes arising out of the same
occurrence or facts.
EFFECT OF AN APPEAL

EDIGARDO GEROCHE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: Geroche, Garde and Marfil were charged with the crime of
violation of domicile under Article 128 of the RPC committed on
May 14, 1989.
On November 15, 2001, the trial court found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Less Serious Physical
Injuries under Article 265 of the RPC. According to the RTC, the
prosecution failed to prove that Geroche, Garde and Marfil are public
officers, which is an essential element of Article 128 of the RPC.
127
Accused elevated the case to the CA, which on November 18,
2005, the CA set aside the trial court’s judgment and ruled that
the accused are guilty of violation of domicile considering their
judicial admissions that Geroche was a Barangay captain while Garde
and Marfil were CAFGU members.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the CA is limited the review of their conviction for
the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries.
(2) Whether there is a double jeopardy since the trial court had
already acquitted them of Violation of Domicile which is already final
and executory.
RULINGS
(1) NO. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for
review on any question including one not raised by the parties.
An appeal confers upon the appellate court jurisdiction to examine
the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase or reduce
the penalty and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
The appellate court may and generally does look into the entire
records to ensure that no fact of weight or substance has been
overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied by the trial court.
(2) NONE. When an accused appeals from sentence of the trial
court, he or she waives the constitutional safeguard against double
128
jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the
appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment
as law and justice dictate.
When the herein accused appealed the trial court’s judgment of
conviction for Less Serious Physical Injuries, they are deemed to
have abandoned their right to invoke the prohibition on double
jeopardy since it becomes the duty of the appellate court to
correct errors as may be found in the assailed judgment.
EVIDENCE
Electronic Evidence

ZALDY NUEZ vs. ELVIRA CRUZ – APAO
455 SCRA 288, A.M. No. CA-05-18-P, April 12, 2005
Doctrine: Ephemeral electronic communication refers to telephone

conversations, text messages and other electronic forms of
communication the evidence which is not recorded or retained.
HELD: Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence, “Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by
the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or
who has personal knowledge thereof.
IMPEACHING REPUTATION
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. ALLYSON BELAGAN

440 SCRA 578, G.R. No. 132164, October 19, 2004
Doctrine: When the credibility of a witness is sought to be
impeached by proof of his reputation, it is necessary that the
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reputation shown should be that which existed before the

occurrence of the circumstances out of which the litigation
arose, or at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at
a period remote from the commencement of the suit. This is
because a person of derogatory character or reputation can still
change or reform himself.
REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR NOT AUTHORIZED

TO APPROVE FILING OR DISMISSAL OF INFORMATION

STATE PROSECUTOR vs. HON. PABLO M. PAQUEO
G.R. No. 150606, June 7, 2007, 523 SCRA 377
Since the Regional State Prosecutor is not included among the law
officers authorized to approve the filing or dismissal of the
information of the investigating prosecutor, the information filed by
petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino did not comply with the
requirement of Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Consequently, the non-compliance was a ground to
quash the information under Sec. 3 (d) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
ACCUSED’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS

PEOPLE vs. SPO4 EMILIANO ANONAS
The inordinate delay of several years in terminating the preliminary
investigation of an accused violates his constitutional right to due
process.

WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

BERNADETTE ADASA vs. CECILLE ABALOS
G.R. No. 168617, February 19, 2007. 516 SCRA 261
130
The settled rule is that when an accused pleads to the charge,
he is deemed to have waived the right to preliminary
investigation and the right to question any irregularity that
surrounds it.
JUDICIAL NOTICE

LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES VINCENT BANAL
434 SCRA 543, G.R. No. 143276, July 20, 2004
Doctrine: Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the record of other cases even when said cases have
been tried or are pending in the same court or before the
same judge.
RULE 130, SECTION 9

PAROL EVIDENCE

SPS. WILFREDO & ANGELA AMONCIO vs. AARON GO BENEDICTO
560 SCRA 219, G.R. No. 171707, July 28, 2008
FACTS: In 1997, Aaron and Garcia entered into a contract of
lease with Spouses Amoncio over 240 sq. m. and 120 sq. m.
property of the petitioners, respectively. In July 1999, Garcia pre-
terminated his contract with Amoncios, while Aaron stayed on until
June 8, 2000. Spouses Amoncio claimed they discovered Aaron
was putting up improvements on another 120 sq. m. portion of
their property which was never leased to him nor to Garcia. They
added he had also occupied Garcia’s portion immediately after the
latter left. Petitioner spouses asked Aaron to pay his arrears and
desist from continuing with his construction.
Aaron denied the said claims and accusations and alleged that it
was Spouses Amoncio who owed him money. According to him,
he and Amoncio agreed to construct five commercial buildings on
the latter’s property. One of the buildings was to go to
Garcia, two to Aaron and the last two to Amoncio. They also
agreed that Aaron would finance the construction and Spouses
Amoncio were to pay him for the two buildings assigned to
them. Aaron added he was to pay the rentals for five years
and surrender the building on his leased portion to petitioners
after the lapse of said period. However, in June 2000, he
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vacated the premises after he and Spouses Amoncio could no
longer settle things amicably.
ISSUE: Whether the parol evidence rule is applicable to the
existence of separate oral agreements aside from those established
by the lease contract.
HELD. NO. The so-called “parol evidence” forbids any addition to or
contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony
purporting to show that, at or before the signing of the
document, other terms were orally agreed on by the parties.
Under the aforecited rule, the terms of the written contract are
conclusive upon the parties and evidence aliunde is inadmissible to
vary an enforceable agreement embodied in the document.
Petitioners failed to make a timely objection and to dispute the
fact that Aaron undertook the construction of the buildings.
Evidence further disclosed that the building permit I ssued by the
Building Official bore the signature of petitioner Wilfredo Amoncio.
Where a party entitled to the benefit of the parol evidence rule allows such
evidence to be received without objection, he cannot, after the trial has
closed and the case has been decided against him, invoke the rule in order
to secure a reversal of the judgment. Hence, by failing to object to
respondent’s testimony in the trial court, petitioners waived the protection
of the parol evidence rule.
DYING DECLARATION ADMISSIBLE AS PART OF RES GESTAE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SONNY GATARIN
132
G.R. No. 198022, April 7, 2014, 721 SCRA 16
FACTS: One night, SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel were on
board their patrol vehicle performing their routine duty when they
met two men, later identified as the accused, who were running
at a fast speed. The policemen, however, were unsuccessful in
catching them and they continued patrolling the area.
There they saw Januario lying on the street. As he was severely
injured, the policemen immediately loaded Januario to the patrol
vehicle and brought him to the Zigzag Hospital.
While inside the vehicle, SPO3 Mendoza asked Januario who hurt
him. He answered that it was “Jay-R and his uncle” who
stabbed him. Subsequently, Januario died due to the fatal wounds
he has sustained.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the victim’s statement to SPO3 Mendoza is a dying
declaration.
(2) Whether the test of admissibility to SPO3 Mendoza as a
part of res gestae is applicable in the case.
(3) What is corpus delicti?
RULINGS
(1) NO. A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as

evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted
when the following requisites occur, namely: (a) the declaration
133
concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the

declarant’s death; (b) it is made when death appears to be
imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending
death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had
he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in
a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant’s
death.
In the case at bar, it appears that not all the requisites of a
dying declaration are present. From the records, no questions
relative to the second requisite was propounded to Januario. It
does not appear that the declarant was under the consciousness of
his impending death when he made the statements.
The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration
admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be
entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and
not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders a
dying declaration admissible. The test is whether the declarant has
abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certain
impending. Thus, the utterances made by Januario could not be
considered as a dying declaration.
(2) YES. Even if Januario’s utterance could not be appreciated as
a dying declaration, his statements may still be appreciated as
part of the res gestae.
Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declaration that
grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character
and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as
to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.
134
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res
gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is
so interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that
it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction
itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or
purpose to manufacture testimony.
When Januario gave the identity of the assailants to SPO3
Mendoza, he was referring to a startling occurrence which is the
stabbing by accused and his co-accused. At that time, Januario
and the witness were in the vehicle that would bring him to
the hospital, and thus, had no time to contrive his identification of the
assailant. His utterance about assailant and his co-accused having
stabbed him, in answer to the question of SPO3 Mendoza, was
made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence.
Definitely, the statement is relevant because it identified the

accused as the authors of the crime. Verily, the killing of
Januario perpetrated by accused, is adequately proven by the
prosecution.
(3) Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or substance of
the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a
crime is actually been committed.
As applied to a particular offense, it means the actual commission
by someone of the particular crime charged.
In this case, the element of taking, as well as the existence of
the money alleged to have been lost by assailant was not to the
alleged robbery.
Exception to the hearsay rule: Entries in the course of business.
BERNARDO B. JOSE, JR. vs. MICHAELMAR PHILIPPINES, INC.

135
FACTS: Bernardo’s services was engaged by the Michaelmar Phil.,

Inc. as an oiler of M/T Limar. While on board, Dr. Heath
conducted a random test of the crews of M/T Limar and
found Bernardo to be positive of marijuana. However, the test
result does not contain the signature of Dr. Heath over his
printed name therein.
When M/T Limar reached the next port, Bernardo was

repatriated to the Philippines. Upon his arrival in Manila,
Bernardo procured drug tests from Manila Doctors Hospital, S. M.
Lazo Medical Clinic and Maritime Clinic, Inc. He was found
negative for marijuana.
ISSUE: Whether the drug test results of Dr. Heath are
admissible being an entry made in the course of business.
HELD: YES. The requisites for admission of entries in the
course of business: (1) the person who made the entry is
dead, outside the country, or unable to testify; (2) the entries
were made at or near the time of the transactions to which
they refer: (3) the person who made the entry was in a position
to know the facts stated in the entries; (4) the entries were made
in a professional capacity or in the performance of a duty; and (5)
the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business
or duty.
Here, all the requisites are present (1) Dr. Heath is outside the
country; (2) the entries were made near the time the random
drug test was conducted; (3) Dr. Heath was in a position to
know the facts made in the entries; (4) Dr. Heath made the
entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of
business or duty; and (5) the entries were made in the
ordinary or regular course of business or duty. The fact that
the drug test result is unsigned does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that Jose, Jr. was not found positive for
marijuana.

136

Affidavit of Recantation

RAYMUND MADALI vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 180380, August 4, 2009, 595 SCRA 274
FACTS: Raymund, Rodel, Bernardino, Jovencio and AAA climbed the

stairs to the reservoir. As soon as they reached the reservoir,
Bernardino blindfolded AAA with the handkerchief. Bernardino at
once blurted out, “Join the rugby boys.” AAA replied, “That’s enough.”
Bernardino then struck AAA thrice with a fresh and hard coconut
frond. Raymund took his turn clobbering AAA at the back of his
thighs with the same coconut frond. Before AAA could recover,
he received punches to his head and body from Rodel, who was
wearing brass knuckles. The punishment proved to much, as AAA lost
consciousness.
Not satisfied, Raymund placed his handkerchief around the neck of
AAA, with its ends tied to a dog chain. With the contraption,
the malefactors pulled the body up a tree.
Stunned at the sight of his cousin being ill-treated, Jovencio could
only muster a faint voice saying “Enough” every single-time AAA
received the painful blows. Before leaving the scene, the three
assailants warned Jovencio not to reveal to anyone, or he would
be next.
Three days later, policemen found the dead body of AAA
emitting a foul odor, hanging from a tree with handkerchief tied
around the neck and a dog chain fastened to the handkerchief.
Upon investigation, Jovencio executed his first affidavit narrating the

incident and pointing to Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino as the
perpetrators of the crime. Because of threat made by the uncle
of the assailants, Jovencio executed a second affidavit repudiating
his first affidavit. However, when he testified in Court, he made
third sworn statement substantially reverting to his first affidavit.
ISSUE: Whether the affidavit of recantation executed by Jovencio

137
should prevail over his testimony in open court identifying the
perpetrators of the crime.
HELD: NO. The affidavit of recantation executed by a witness prior
to the trial cannot prevail over the testimony made during the
trial. Jovencio effectively repudiated the contents of the affidavit of
recantation. The recantation would hardly suffice to overturn the
trial court’s finding of guilt which was based on a clear and
convincing testimony given during a full-blown trial.
An affidavit of recantation, being usually taken ex-parte, would be
considered inferior to the testimony given in open court.
RULE 132, SECTION 40

TENDER OF EXCLUDED EVIDENCE

PHILIP S. YU vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Viveca brought against her husband, Philip, an action for
legal separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership on the
grounds of marital infidelity and physical abuse. During trial, Viveca
moved for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and subpoena
ad testificandum to certain officers of Insular Life Company to
compel production of the insurance policy and application of a
person suspected to be Philip’s illegitimate child.
The court denied the motion and it ruled that the insurance
contract is inadmissible evidence in view of Circular Letter No.
II-2000 issued by the Insurance Commission preventing insurance
companies from divulging confidential and privileged information
pertaining to insurance policies.
When the trial court made its pronouncement that the production
of insurance policy and application are inadmissible in evidence,
Viveca had no choice but to make a tender of excluded evidence
considering that she was left to speculate on what the insurance
application and policy ruled out by the trial court would contain.
138
ISSUE: Whether Viveca had made a valid tender of excluded evidence as
contemplated by the Rule 132, Section 40.
HELD: NO. The insurance application and insurance policy were yet to
be presented in court, much less formally offered before it. In
fact, Viveca was merely asking for the issuance of subpoena
duces tecum and subpoena ad testificandum when the trial court
issued the assail order.
Before a tender of excluded evidence is made, the evidence must
have been formally offered before the court. And before formal
offer of evidence is made, the evidence must have been
identified and presented before the court.
While Viveca made a “Tender of Excluded Evidence,” such is not
the tender contemplated by Section 40, Rule 132, for obviously, the
insurance policy and insurance application were not formally offered
much less presented before the trial court. At most, said “Tender
of Excluded Evidence” was a manifestation of an undisputed fact that
the subject documents were declared inadmissible by the trial
court even before these were presented during trial.
The Doctrine of Adoptive Admission
An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or
action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the
party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or implied
by the other person. (Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, April 3,
2001, 356 SCRA 108)
The “Sexual Abuse Shield” rule

139
Under the Rules on Examination of a Child Witness, the
following evidence is NOT ADMISSIBLE in any criminal proceeding
involving alleged child sexual abuse:
1. Evidence offered to prove 2 that the alleged victim engaged in
other sexual behavior; and
2. Evidence offered to prove the sexual predisposition of the alleged
victim.
EXCEPTION: Evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by

the alleged victim to prove that a person other the accused
was the source of the semen, injury or other evidence.
CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE

CORPUS DELICTI

PEOPLE vs. JOSELITO BERAN
FACTS: Joselito Beran was allegedly caught in a buy-bust operation
and was convicted by the RTC for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs.
On appeal, the CA ruled that Beran was caught in flagrante
delicto as a result of a valid and legitimate buy - bust operation.
To sustain Beran’s conviction, CA held that the prosecution was
able to establish the following facts:
a) the identities of the poseur-buyer, PO3 Sia and the seller, Beran;
b) the object of the sale, shabu contained in a heat-sealed
140
plastic sachet handed by Beran to PO3 Sia; and
c) consideration which PO3 Sia paid the staged purchase, a
marked P100 bill confiscated in the possession of Beran.
According to the CA, a complete narrative was built by an
illegal sale of shabu leading to the arrest of Beran by PO3
Sia.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution was able to establish the corpus
delicti.
HELD: NO. The prosecution failed to establish the very corpus delicti
of the crime charged. Beran must be set free.
It is well-settled that in the prosecution of cases involving the
illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the evidence of the corpus
delicti which is the dangerous drugs itself, must be independently
established beyond reasonable doubt.
Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be
established, and the chain of custody requirement under RA 9165
performs the function in buy-bust operation as it ensures that
any doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
“Chain of Custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements

and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant
sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
Such record of movements and custody of seized items shall
include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary
custody of the seized items, the date and time when such transfer
of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and the use
in court as evidence and the final disposition.
APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT, WHERE FILED

RET. SPO4 BIENVENIDO LAUD vs. PEOPLE
FACTS: PNP applied with RTC of Manila, Branch 50 for a warrant
to search three (3) caves located inside the Laud Compound in
Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the alleged remains of
the victims summarily executed by the so-called “Davao Death Squad”
141
may be found.
In support of the application, a certain Avasola was presented to
the RTC and there testified that he personally witnessed the killing
of six (6) persons in December 2005, and was, in fact part of
the group that buried the victims.
The RTC Judge found probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant and the search of the Laud Compound caves yielded positive
results for the presence of human remains.
Retired SPO4 Laud filed an Urgent Motion to Quash and to
Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the Manila RTC has jurisdiction to issue search
warrant which was to be enforced in Davao City.
(2) Whether the human remains sought to be seized are proper
subject of a search warrant.
(3) Whether the rule against forum shopping was violated as the
PNP previously applied for search warrant with the RTC Davao
which had been denied.
RULINGS
(1) YES. Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC explicitly
mentioned that the rule on search warrant application before the
Manila and Quezon City RTC’s for “special criminal cases” shall be
an exception to Sec. 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
(2) YES. “Personal property” actually refers to the thing’s mobility,
and not to its capacity to be owned or alienated by a particular
person.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things
to be seized when the description therein is as specific as to
circumstances will ordinarily allow.
The “human remains” description points to no other than the things
that bear a direct relation to the offense committed of murder.
(3) NO. Forum shopping cannot be said to have committed in this
case considering the various points of divergence attending the
search warrant application before the Manila - RTC and that before
Davao – RTC.
142
For one, the witnesses presented in each application were different.
Likewise, the application filed in Manila was in connection with
Murder, while the one in Davao did not specify any crime.
Finally, and more importantly, the places to be searched were
different - that in Manila sought the search of the Laud Compound
caves, while in Davao was for a particular area in the Laud Gold
Cup Firing Range.
There being no identity of facts and circumstances between the two
applications, the rule against forum shopping was therefore not
violated.

I HAVE FOUGHT THE GOOD FIGHT
I HAVE FINISHED THE RACE
I HAVE KEPT MY FAITH
- 2 Timothy 4:7

GOD SPEED
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1

Remedial Law Digest

Features of jurisdiction over the subject matter:

1. conferred by law

COURTS OF LAW vs. COURTS OF EQUITY

CONSTITUTIONAL and STATUTORY COURTS

Constitutional Courts are those created by the Constitution while

The Sandiganbayan is NOT a constitutionally created court

The distinction is significant because Constitutional Courts cannot be

DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

WHEN JURISDICTION OVER THE RES BECOMES SIGNIFICANT

ACTIONS INCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION

Some Examples of Action Incapable of Pecuniary Estimations:

ZENAIDA LANTING vs. HON. OMBUDSMAN

Respondents have been the farmers-tenants of Victoria Homes, cultivating

Victoria Homes without notifying the respondents, sold the lots to

JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED

RENATO M. DAVID vs. EDITHA AGBAY & PEOPLE

An information for Falsification of Public Document was filed

The MTC denied David’s motion for re-determination of probable

The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court

jurisdiction over the person.

Considering that David sought affirmative relief in filing his

VOID JUDGMENT DOES NOT ATTAIN FINALITY

HON. CESAR D. BUENAFLOR vs. JOSE M. RAMIREZ

Believing that his appointment had been contractual in nature,

Buenaflor seasonably filed his motion for reconsideration which the

Ramirez’ complaint challenging the validity of his termination from

dispute under the Labor Code.

settlement before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, the Punong Barangay as

Furthermore, the SC cannot sustain petitioner’s contention that the

Q: What is a doctrine of hierarchy of courts?

Q: What is judicial courtesy?

ACQUISITION OF JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON

JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER

FELICISIMO OPRIASA vs. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY

ACTION INCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION

JURISDICTION NOT AFFECTED BY MERE DEFECT IN FORM

G.R. No. 153057, August 7, 2006, 498 SCRA 93

PRINCIPLE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS

Petitions seeking the nullification of an administrative resolution which

RULE 3 - PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC. vs. STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY

Thereafter, Standard and Martina demanded reimbursement from

In their answer, both petitioners specifically denied the allegations

For their part, respondents contend that their individual claims

ISSUE: Whether there was misjoinder of parties.

SECTION 6 - MISJOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION

RULE 3 - PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

SPOUSES JULITA & FELIPE DELA CRUZ vs. PEDRO JOAQUIN

validity of a promulgated decision.

CHITTICK vs. COURT OF APPEALS

SECTION 17 – DEATH OR SEPARATION OF A PARTY

MAYOR RHUSTOM DAGADAG vs. MICHAEL TONGNAWA

Petitioner, while then the mayor of Tanudan, sent

PARTIES TO THE ACTION

CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORP.

FERNANDO MARTIN O. PEÑA vs. ATTY. LOLITO APARICIO

pendency of another disciplinary action against the same respondent

PAUL LEE TAN vs. PAUL SYCIP