G.R. No. 237489, August 27, 2020 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. DOMINGO ARCEGA Y SIGUENZA,

CONCURRING OPINION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Respondent was charged and convicted by the trial court with the crime, of attempted rape. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) modified respondent's conviction to acts of lasciviousness.
Petitioner People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed the
instant petition for review on certiorari assailing respondent's acquittal for the crime of attempted
rape.

The ponencia denies the petition ruling that a petition for review on certiorari is not the proper
procedure to assail the CA's Decision. The ponencia stressed that with the CA's modification of
respondent's conviction from attempted rape to acts of lasciviousness, respondent had already been
acquitted of attempted rape. Hence, the OSG may assail such acquittal only by a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and not herein petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45.1

I concur with the denial of the petition. The acquittal of respondent for the crime of attempted rape
generally may not be assailed without violating his right against double jeopardy. I submit this
Concurring Opinion to stress that the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65, as discussed by the
ponencia, is a very narrow exception, as held by existing jurisprudence, which does not arise in this
case.

In criminal cases, no rule is more settled than that "a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the
trial or the appellate court, is final unappealable, and immediately executory upon its
promulgation."2 This is referred to as the finality-of-acquittal rule.3 Such rule proceeds from the
constitutionally guaranteed right of the accused against double jeopardy,4 which safeguards that
accused from government oppression of being prosecuted twice for the same offense. In People v.
Velasco,5 the Court explained the rationale for the rule:

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled
to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy
underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount
importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful
conviction." (sic) The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not
guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's
liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that
the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury's leniency, will not be found guilty in a
subsequent proceeding.

Related to his right of repose is the defendant's interest in his right to have his trial completed by a
pat1icular tribunal.  This interest encompasses his right to have his guilt or innocence determined in
Ꮮαwρhi ৷

a single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to try him, for society's awareness of the heavy
personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the
willingness to limit Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in
enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal
finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. (sic) As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, "(t)he
fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to
oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal process." Because the innocence of the
accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a
second trial would be unfair.6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

This iron clad rule has, as its only exception, the grave abuse of discretion that is strictly limited to
the case where there is a violation of the prosecution's right to due process when it is denied the
opportunity to present evidence or where the trial is a sham, thus rendering the assailed judgment
void.7

The case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan8 (Galman) presents the foremost example of the exception
to the rule on double jeopardy. In Galman, the judgment of acquittal was remanded to the trial court
after the Court found that the trial conducted was a mockery - a sham. The Court found that the then
President had stage-managed in and from Malacañang Palace a scripted and predetermined
manner of handling and disposing of the case, and that the prosecution and the Justices who tried
and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond
their capacity to resist, and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and
to offer all the evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also predetermined the final
outcome of the case of total absolution of all the accused of all criminal and civil liability.9

Due to the influence that the Executive exerted over the independence o the court trying the case,
the Court ruled that the decision acquitting the accused issued in that case was issued in violation of
the prosecution's due process. The factors the Court considered in making this exception were (1)
suppression of evidence, (2) harassment of witnesses, (3) deviation from the regular raffle procedure
in the assignment of the case, (4) close monitoring and supervision of the Executive and its officials
over the case, and (5) secret meetings held between and among the President, the Presiding Justice
of the Sandiganbayan, and the Tanodbayan. From the foregoing, the Court saw the trial as a sham.

Thus, the Court ruled in Galman that the right against double jeopardy, absolute as it may appear,
may be invoked only when there was a valid judgment terminating the first jeopardy. The Court
explained that no right attaches from a void judgment, and hence the right against double jeopardy
may not be invoked when the decision that "terminated" the first jeopardy was invalid and issued
without jurisdiction.10

The facts of Galman constitute the very narrow exception to the application of the right against
double jeopardy. The unique fact surrounding Galman - and other similar scenarios where the denial
of due process on the part of the prosecution was so gross and palpable - is the limited area where
an acquittal may be revisited through a petition for certiorari.

Thus, in People v. Tria-Tirona,11 the Court held:

x x x In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the
Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial, as in Galman v.
Sandiganbayan. Only when there is a finding of a sham trial can the doctrine of double jeopardy be
not invoked because the people, as represented by the prosecution, were denied due process.

From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear in this jurisdiction that after trial on the merits, an
acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. The only
exception where double jeopardy cannot be involved is where there is a finding of mistrial resulting
in a denial of due process.12 (Emphasis supplied)

Further, in PeopLe v. Court of Appeals, Fourth Division,13 the Court explained that:

"Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. For the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham thus
rendering the assailed judgment void. The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate that the
trial court blatantlv abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice." (Citations omitted)

The petition is bereft of any allegation, much less, evidence that the prosecution's right to due
process was violated or the proceedings before the CA were a mockery such that Ando's acquittal
was a foregone conclusion. Accordingly, notwithstanding the alleged errors in the interpretation of
the applicable law or appreciation of evidence that the CA may have committed in ordering Ando's
acquittal, absent any showing that the CA acted with caprice or without regard to the rudiments of
due process, the CA's findings can no longer be reversed, disturbed and set aside without violating
the rule against double jeopardy. x x x14 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Verily, this means that not every error in the trial or evaluation of the evidence by the court in
question that led to the acquittal of the accused would be reviewable by certiorari. As the Court ruled
in Republic v. Ang Cho Kio,15 "[n]o error, however, flagrant, committed by the court against the
state, can be reserved by it for decision by the supreme court when the defendant has once been
placed in jeopardy and discharged, even though the discharge was the result of the error
committed."16

As applied in this case, it is immaterial whether the trial court was correct in convicting respondent
for attempted rape or whether the CA committed error, no matter how flagrant or grave, in its
appreciation of the evidence presented by the prosecution for the court to modify respondent's
conviction for a lesser offense. The fact remains that respondent's right against double jeopardy had
already attached when the CA acquitted respondent for the crime of attempted rape. Hence, no
amount of error of judgment will ripen into an error of jurisdiction such that the acquittal would be
reviewable by this Court through a petition for certiorari. It is only when the case falls within the
narrow confines of jurisprudential exception - like in Galman where the State was deprived of its day
in court - that a decision acquitting the accused may be revisited. This is clearly not obtaining in this
case.

Thus, in light of the foregoing considerations, I vote to DENY the petition.