PART II

1. WHO IS DOUBTING?

In the First Meditation, Descartes delivers a concise yet impactful critique of beliefs,

progressively casting doubt on a widening array of convictions until virtually none seem beyond

skepticism. Following preliminary remarks, he outlines reasons for doubt, commencing with sensory

perceptions and highlighting seemingly incontrovertible beliefs. However, even these foundational

beliefs, such as existence and mathematical truths, are subjected to doubt regarding potential

deception by an omnipotent Creator or an uncertain original cause. The meditation concludes with

Descartes committing to suspend judgment on anything doubted. Four radical grounds for doubt

emerge: the lunacy, dream, deceiving God, and "fate or chance" arguments. The chapter clarifies that

the lunacy argument is less detailed than the dream argument, and the deceiving God argument often

aligns with the "fate or chance" argument. The term "radical skepticism" refers to considerations

raised in these four arguments. The study will explore why Descartes starts with these radical

skeptical arguments, taking a detour into ancient skepticism to identify parallels with Cartesian

doubt. Subsequent chapters will revisit the First Meditation to address questions about reasons for

suspending judgment, reasons for doubt, and the role of common sense. The chapter concludes with

an exploration of who is raising the doubts in the First Meditation.

1.1 THE MEDITATOR AS ANYONE

The First Meditation resonates by inviting readers to connect with the meditator's encounter

with skepticism, suggesting universal applicability aligned with everyday belief standards. Despite

common interpretations, I argue that Descartes envisioned a distinct perspective for the meditator,

emphasizing progressive discovery over immediate acceptance of radical doubt. The 'I' in the

Meditations symbolizes a position accessible to any thoughtful person, guiding readers through a
 methodical and a priori inquiry. Descartes intends to instruct attentive readers, urging against

premature attributions of later-stage ideas to the meditator. The challenge lies in grasping how

progressive discovery applies to the early stages, particularly before grounds for doubt are raised.

The opening sentence, addressing childhood falsehoods, prompts questions about their nature, the

meditator's recognition, and the necessity for reconstruction. A deeper exploration of the meditator's

identity and perception is crucial, unveiling Descartes's method of progressively unfolding

foundational beliefs and their inherent doubts.

1.2 THE MEDITATOR’S PROBLEMATIC PERSONA

At the onset of the First Meditation, the meditator lacks a distinct identity, with Descartes

projecting his own beliefs about distorted childhood perceptions. Descartes contends that sensory

experiences in infancy lead to false beliefs, persisting into adulthood and complicating the

eradication of these ingrained errors. The meditator's motivation to engage in a radical demolition of

beliefs arises from recognizing the pervasive influence of childhood falsehoods. However, the

meditator, retroactively endowed with Descartes's views, lacks fully rational grounds for this

undertaking until the Sixth Meditation. Descartes introduces an internal flaw in the method of doubt,

as the meditator needs a rational reason for the wholesale overthrow of beliefs to justify suspending

judgment. The fictional meditator's persona, shaped by Descartes, raises doubts about the natural

extension of radical skepticism from ordinary belief standards, prompting further exploration in

subsequent chapters.

2. REASONS FOR DOUBT

The meditator initiates his quest to question his former beliefs, particularly focusing on the

reliability of his senses. Reflecting on instances where the senses can deceive, he revises his opinion,

now asserting that what the senses convey in favorable conditions is true. Examples, such as his
 current state and physical surroundings, support this modified viewpoint. Despite initially claiming

doubt to be impossible regarding these sensory perceptions, the meditator introduces two reasons for

skepticism—comparing himself to a lunatic and reflecting on dreams. Upon raising these

considerations, the meditator examines whether any of his prior convictions remain undoubted. He

identifies certain mathematical and geometric truths, like "Two plus three equals five," as resilient,

but acknowledges potential doubts, particularly concerning the existence of corporeal things. The

meditator introduces radical grounds for doubt involving God, fate, or chance, contending that these

uncertainties undermine even the seemingly unquestionable beliefs. These doubts, including lunacy,

dreaming, God, and chance, share a common structure that becomes the focus of the subsequent

exploration. Understanding this structure becomes pivotal in clarifying Descartes' perspective on the

artificial nature of radical doubt. Additionally, it serves as a foundation for explaining how Descartes

intended to employ doubt to unveil principles of First Philosophy in the later part of the book. The

meditator recognizes certain beliefs as "moral certainties," initially regarded as indisputable by

individuals of common sense but subject to doubt when applying the radical grounds for skepticism.

2.1 SKEPTICAL SCENARIOS AS EXPLANATIONS FOR FALSE BELIEFS

The First Meditation unveils a structured presentation of radical doubts, initially prominent in

the lunacy and deceiving God arguments but extending to the dream and "fate or chance" arguments.

Descartes constructs skeptical scenarios as narratives explaining false beliefs, such as the lunatic

who misinterprets sensory input due to a diseased brain. Skeptical scenarios challenge our ability to

rule out false beliefs, as demonstrated by the meditator's struggle to refute a story suggesting he

falsely believes in shoes due to brain damage. Descartes associate’s madness and dreams with

similar causal glitches in sensory perception, acknowledging their shared mechanistic explanation.

The deceiving God argument proposes a skeptical scenario for agnostics or atheists, suggesting the
 possibility of being inherently deceived due to fate, chance, or a continuous chain of events.

Descartes emphasizes the difficulty of dispelling such scenarios, challenging the meditator to find a

rational basis for doubt amid these intricate causal narratives.

2.1 RADICAL GROUNDS AND THE METHOD OF DOUBT

Descartes examines four skeptical arguments, identifying a shared structure presenting causal

scenarios questioning the validity of beliefs, where ruling out the correctness of these scenarios

becomes impossible. This structure differs from ancient skepticism, notably the Pyrrhonian approach

of conflicting impressions. Descartes emphasizes the causal or explanatory component and the

seeming impossibility of disproving these scenarios, suggesting a deep metaphysical commitment

required to overcome doubt. The importance of the causal element, as opposed to mere falsity, is

underscored, preventing the scenarios from resembling neurotic worries. Barbara Winters argues that

the deviance of the causal account is crucial, proposing that the skepticism's impact lies in presenting

a causal history incompatible with knowledge. Edwin Curley's perspective aligns with the necessity

for an explanatory component in doubting propositions, emphasizing its role in countering a

tendency to believe true propositions without considering potential errors. Descartes rejects the

Pyrrhonian modes and insists that conflicting impressions, such as "I see that I have shoes on" versus

"I am dreaming that I have shoes on," do not lead to suspension of judgment. He acknowledges the

legitimacy of preferring the impressions of waking life, further challenging Curley's interpretation.

Descartes contends that the meditator's inability to rule out skeptical scenarios doesn't necessitate

suspending judgment but rather sets the stage for choosing between skepticism and common sense

beliefs. Returning to the method of doubt, Descartes sees it not just as a means of establishing

principles but also as a tool for discovering fundamental truths in First Philosophy. The meditator's

strong maxim ("Withhold assent from opinions when you find any ground for doubting them")
suggests challenges in finding a basis for assent amid wide-ranging skeptical scenarios. The

method's efficacy, according to Descartes, lies in discovering relatively fundamental and inclusive

propositions that underlie a broad class of specific propositions. The meditator's confidence in

revealing fundamental truths stems from the skepticism's focus on the causal connections between

sensory experiences, the body, the world, and the creator of the intellectual constitution. Successfully

employing the method of doubt is expected to yield discoveries about God, mind, and body,

contributing to the principles of First Philosophy.