Power System Protection 25
Power System Protection 25
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION _________________________________________
CHAPTER 10: AIS & GIS SUBSTATION MAINTENANCE & OPERATION ___________________ 1
APPENDIX 2: STANDARD DISTURBANCE RECORDER(DR) SIGNAL & SOE SIGNAL FOR SAS __
BIBILOGRAPHY
Assam Electricity Grid Corporation Limited inherited 3862 circuit kms. of EHV lines above 66 kV voltage class
and 38 numbers of EHV sub-stations having a total transformation capacity of 1636.50 MVA at its birth in
2003. Since its inception, it has added 1584 circuit kms of EHV lines and has added 4125 MVA transformation
capacity by way of commissioning 17 new EHV sub-stations and augmenting existing sub-stations. It has also
added Reactive Power Compensation at 33 kV bus to the tune of 285 MVAR.
Assam Electricity Grid Corporation Limted had also added one 400/220 kV Grid Substation and One 220/33 kV
GIS Sub Station during the preceding years. As on 21.07.2018, AEGCL has 65 nos. of EHV Grid Substations
(400 kV-1 no., 220 kV- 11 nos. and 132 kV - 53 nos.) with total Transformation capacity of 6158 MVA.
Assam Electricity Grid Corporation Limited is playing a strategic role as it is the largest ‘STU’ in NE region. It
also understands its responsibility towards the entire North East India and is always extending a helping hand by
way of transporting a fair share of power to the other sister states of the region.
Assam Electricity Grid Corporation Limited has consistently maintained the transmission system availability
over 99% which is at par with other National Transmission Utilities.
...........................................................................................................TOWARD EXCELENCE
The main objective of power system protection is to isolate a faulty section of electrical power system from rest
of the live system so that the rest portion can function satisfactorily without any severe damage due to fault
current. The circuit breaker isolates the faulty system from rest of the healthy system and these circuit breakers
automatically open during fault condition due to its trip signal which comes from protection relay Figure 1(a).
The main philosophy about protection is that no protection of power system can prevent the flow of fault current
through the system, it only can prevent the continuation of flowing of fault current by quickly disconnect the
short circuit path from the system.
The purpose of an electrical power system is to generate and supply electrical energy to consumers. The system
should be designed and managed to deliver this energy to the utilisation points with both reliability and
economy. Severe disruption to the normal routine of modern society is likely if power outages are frequent or
prolonged, placing an increasing emphasis on reliability and security of supply. As the requirements of
reliability and economy are largely opposed, power system protection is inevitably a compromise.
The role of protective relaying in electric-power-system design and operation is to assure normal operation,
prevention of electrical failure and mitigation of the effects of electrical failure. The protection is needed to
remove as speedily as possible any element of the power system in which a fault has developed. So long as the
fault remains connected, the whole system may be in danger from three main effects of the fault, namely:
it is likely to cause the individual generators in a power station or groups of generators in different stations,
to lose synchronism and fall out of step with a consequent splitting of the system
a risk of damage to the affected plant
a risk of damage to the healthy plant.
There is another effect, not necessarily dangerous to the system, but important from the consumer's viewpoint,
namely, a risk of synchronous motors in large industrial premises falling out of step and tripping out; with the
serious consequences that entails loss of production and interruption of vital processes. It is the function of the
protective equipment, in association with the Circuit Breaker, to avert these effects.
It is also very important that the protective relay isolate the faulty section as fast as it could without disturbing
the healthy section.
In the above diagram (Figure 1.b) for a fault in the 132kV Narengi-Sonapur circuit, the Circuit Breaker at
location 1 and 2 should get tripped by their respective relay and isolate the fault (assuming the power flow
from both Sonapur and kahilipara end). The relay at location 4 should not operate for a fault in other section.
However the relay at location 4 would detect the fault and would trip only if the circuit breaker at location 1
failed to operate. In this way selecting and isolating the faulty section is very important for grid stability as
well as maintaining the power flow in the healthy section to provide uninterrupted power supply.
The ultimate goal of protective relaying is to disconnect a faulty system element as quickly as possible.
Sensitivity and selectivity are essential to assure that the proper circuit breakers will be tripped.
In case of transmission line the fault are generally line-line (L-L), line to ground (L-G) and double line to
ground (L-L-G) or three phase fault. The L-G fault is most common and 65-70 % of the faults are of this type
whereas 15-20% faults are of L-L-G type. The L-L fault is of 5-10% and the three phase faults are very rare in
nature.
In case of Transformers the type of faults are as mentioned below:
Phase-ground faults - from winding to core or winding to tank
Phase-phase faults - between windings
Interturn faults - between single turns or adjacent layers of the same winding
Arcing contacts
Local hotspots caused by shorted laminations
External faults causing thermal or mechanical damage
Overloads
Low level internal partial discharges (moisture ingress or design problems)
Bushing faults (internal to the tank)
Tap changer faults (often housed in a separate tank)
Terminal faults (external to the tank, but inside the transformer zone)
iii. Selectivity
Like sensitivity, selectivity also implies an ability to discriminate. A relay should not confuse some
peculiarities of an apparatus with a fault. For example, transformer when energized can draw up to 20
times rated current (inrush current) which can confuse, both overcurrent and transformer differential
protection. Typically, inrush currents are characterized by large second harmonic content.
iv. Reliability
A relaying system has to be reliable. Reliability can be achieved by redundancy i.e. duplicating the
relaying system. Obviously redundancy can be a costly proposition. Another way to improve reliability
is to ask an existing relay say, protecting an apparatus A to backup protection of apparatus B. Both the
approaches are used (simultaneously) in practice. However, it is important to realize that back-up
protection must be provided for safe operation of relaying system. Redundancy in protection also
depends upon the criticality of the power apparatus.
v. Speed
To maximize safety, and minimize equipment damage and system instability, a fault should be cleared
as quickly as possible. This implies that relay should quickly arrive at a decision and circuit breaker
operation should be fast enough.
The AEGCL have one (1) 400kV, eleven numbers (11) of 220kV and fifty three (53) of 132kV substations. All
the substations have numerical relays as primary and backup protection with few exceptional where backup
protection is electromechanical relay. However it will be replaced by numerical relay in the upcoming
augmentation project. The numerical relay of different manufacturer like ABB, Siemens, ERL, GE, Schneider
Micom, Alstom Micom, Toshiba etc are being used in AEGCL.
In 400kV and 220kV transmission lines two independent High Speed Main protection schemes called Main-I
and Main-II with at least one of them being carrier aided four zone distance protection are used. The other
protection may be a phase segregated current differential (this may require digital communication), phase
comparison, directional comparison type or a carrier aided non-switched distance protection. If Main-I and
Main-II are both distance protection schemes, then they should be preferably of different types (eg. REL670 &
REL650). They need not necessarily of different make.
The numerical relays referred as IED (Intelligent electronic device) contain apart from main protection functions
several other protection & supervision functions which may or may not be used for a particular application. List
of Protection used in transmission lines at different voltage level is shown below.
The basic principle of distance protection involves the division of the voltage at the relaying point by the
measured current. The apparent impedance so calculated is compared with the reach (set) point impedance. If
the measured impedance is less than the reach point impedance, it is assumed that a fault exists on the line
between the relay and the reach point.
There is one voltage element from potential transformer and a current element fed from current transformer of
the system. The deflecting torque is produced by secondary current of CT and restoring torque is produced by
voltage of potential transformer. In normal operating condition, restoring torque is more than deflecting torque.
Hence relay will not operate. But in faulty condition, the current becomes quite large whereas voltage becomes
less. Consequently, deflecting torque becomes more than restoring torque and dynamic parts of the relay starts
moving which ultimately close the “NO” contact of relay. Hence clearly operation or working principle of
distance relay depends upon the ratio of system voltage and current (V/I). As the ratio of voltage to current is
nothing but impedance (Z=V/I) so a distance relay is also known as impedance relay. In present day numerical
relay the operation of the relay depend on the distance relay inbuilt logical algorithm, but the basic concept
remains the same.
Distance relays are one of the most important protection elements in a transmission line. These relays are set
as percentages of the line impedances. Distance relays characteristic may be Mho, Quadrilateral, offset Mho
etc. In the case of the quadrilateral characteristic or long reaching mho reaching, additional care may be
required to remain secure to remain secure during heavy load. For heavily loaded transmission line load
encroachment are used so that the locus of value of Z do not enter into the zone of protection.
Any fault in the transmission line should be immediately cleared by the respective circuit breaker and in doing
so the Distance Protection Relay plays its vital role. The distance characteristic mostly used is quadrilateral with
four (4) numbers of Zones. Out of the four (4) zones three (3) are used in forward direction (i.e toward line) and
one (1) is used in reverse direction (i.e toward bus). The directionality and quadrilateral characteristic is shown
below.
CT Ratio: 800/1
PT Ratio: 220000/110= 2000; CT/PT Ratio= 0.4.
Considering REL670 distance protection relay, the following calculation are carried out. Unlike Siemens
distance relay (7SA522) the setting inputs in REL670 is in primary value.
Arc resistance, Rarc = 28707* L/(I1.4), where L is the arc length = 15 meters.
and I is the fault current = 1500A (considering the minimum phase to
phase fault current)
= 28707* 15 / (15001.4)
= 15.4 ≈ 15 Ω.
Tower footing resistance (maximum) = 10 Ω
Remote end infeed effect for zone 1 (considering equal fault feed from both end) = 25 Ω
Therefore the fault resistive reach phase to earth, RFPE= (10+25+15) = 50 Ω
And the fault resistive reach phase to phase, RFPP = 15X2= 30 Ω (considering the arc resistance in loop)
Setting Range
Parameter Recommended Unit Description
Min Max Step
ZMCPDIS1 Zone 1 Setting (PDIS, 21)
Operation On/Off On Operation Off / On
IBase 1 99999 1 800 A Base current i.e rated current
Ubase 0.05 2000.00 0.05 220 kV Base voltage i.e.rated voltage
OperationDir Forward Operation mode of directionality
Operation PP On/Off On Operation mode Off/On of Ph-Ph loops
X1FwPP 0.50 3000.00 0.01 37.17 ohm/p Positive sequence reactance reach
R1PP 0.10 1000.00 0.01 6.55 ohm/p Positive sequence resistance reach
RFFwPP 1.00 3000.00 0.01 30.000 ohm/l Fault resistance reach in ohm/loop , Ph-Ph
X1RvPP 0.50 3000.00 0.01 37.17 ohm/p Positive sequence reactance reach
RFRvPP 1.00 3000.00 0.01 30.000 ohm/l Fault resistance reach in ohm/loop , Ph-Ph
Operation mode Off/On of Zone timer, Ph-
Timer tPP Off,On On
Ph
tPP 0.000 60.000 0.001 0.000 s Time delay of trip,Ph-Ph
Operation PE On,Off On Operation mode Off/On of Ph-E loops
X1FwPE 0.50 3000.00 0.01 37.17 ohm/p Positive sequence reactance reach
R1PE 0.10 1000.00 0.01 6.55 ohm/p Positive sequence resistance reach
X0PE 0.5 9000.00 0.01 127.92 ohm/p Zero sequence reactance reach
Zero sequence resistance for zone
R0PE 0.5 3000.00 0.01 27.18 ohm/p
characteristic angle
RFFwPE 1.00 3000.00 0.01 50.000 ohm/l Fault resistance reach in ohm/loop , Ph-E
X1RvPE 0.10 3000.00 0.01 37.17 ohm/p Positive sequence reactance reach
RFRv)PE 1.00 9000.00 0.01 50.000 ohm/l Fault resistance reach in ohm/loop , Ph-E
Timer tPE Off,On On Operation mode Off/On of Zone timer, Ph-E
The fault resistance reach in Zone 1 for phase to earth and phase to phase should follow the criteria
RFPE≤4.5*X1 and RFPP≤3*X1
Setting Range
Parameter Recommended Unit Description
Min Max Step
ZMCAPDIS2 Zone 2 Setting (PDIS, 21)
Operation On/Off On Operation Off / On
IBase 1 99999 1 800 A Base current i.e rated current
Ubase 0.05 2000.00 0.05 220 kV Base voltage i.e.rated voltage
OperationDir Forward Operation mode of directionality
Operation PP On/Off On Operation mode Off/On of Ph-Ph loops
X1FwPP 0.50 3000.00 0.01 60.76 ohm/p Positive sequence reactance reach
R1PP 0.10 1000.00 0.01 10.71 ohm/p Positive sequence resistance reach
RFFwPP 1.00 3000.00 0.01 60.000 ohm/l Fault resistance reach in ohm/loop , Ph-Ph
X1RvPP 0.50 3000.00 0.01 60.76 ohm/p Positive sequence reactance reach
RFFwPP 1.00 3000.00 0.01 60.000 ohm/l Fault resistance reach in ohm/loop , Ph-Ph
Operation mode Off/On of Zone timer, Ph-
Timer tPP Off,On On
Ph
tPP 0.000 60.000 0.001 0.500 s Time delay of trip,Ph-Ph
Operation PE On,Off On Operation mode Off/On of Ph-E loops
X1FwPE 0.50 3000.00 0.01 60.76 ohm/p Positive sequence reactance reach
R1PE 0.10 1000.00 0.01 10.71 ohm/p Positive sequence resistance reach
X0PE 0.5 9000.00 0.01 209.11 ohm/p Zero sequence reactance reach
Zero sequence resistance for zone
R0PE 0.5 3000.00 0.01 44.43 ohm/p
characteristic angle
Setting Range
Parameter Recommended Unit Description
Min Max Step
ZMCAPDIS3 Zone 3 Setting (PDIS, 21)
Operation On/Off On Operation Off / On
IBase 1 99999 1 800 A Base current i.e rated current
Ubase 0.05 2000.00 0.05 220 kV Base voltage i.e.rated voltage
OperationDir Forward Operation mode of directionality
Operation PP On/Off On Operation mode Off/On of Ph-Ph loops
X1FwPP 0.50 3000.00 0.01 135.80 ohm/p Positive sequence reactance reach
R1PP 0.10 1000.00 0.01 23.93 ohm/p Positive sequence resistance reach
RFFwPP 1.00 3000.00 0.01 75.000 ohm/l Fault resistance reach in ohm/loop , Ph-Ph
X1RvPP 0.50 3000.00 0.01 135.80 ohm/p Positive sequence reactance reach
RFRvPP 1.00 3000.00 0.01 75.000 ohm/l Fault resistance reach in ohm/loop , Ph-Ph
Operation mode Off/On of Zone timer,
Timer tPP Off,On On
Ph-Ph
tPP 0.000 60.000 0.001 0.800 s Time delay of trip,Ph-Ph
Operation PE On,Off On Operation mode Off/On of Ph-E loops
X1FwPE 0.50 3000.00 0.01 135.80 ohm/p Positive sequence reactance reach
Setting Range
Parameter Recommended Unit Description
Min Max Step
ZMCAPDIS5 Zone 5 Setting (PDIS, 21)
Operation On/Off On Operation Off / On
IBase 1 99999 1 800 A Base current i.e rated current
Ubase 0.05 2000.00 0.05 220 kV Base voltage i.e.rated voltage
OperationDir Reverse Operation mode of directionality
Operation PP On/Off On Operation mode Off/On of Ph-Ph loops
X1FwPP 0.50 3000.00 0.01 4.65 ohm/p Positive sequence reactance reach
R1PP 0.10 1000.00 0.01 0.82 ohm/p Positive sequence resistance reach
RFFwPP 1.00 3000.00 0.01 60.00 ohm/l Fault resistance reach in ohm/loop , Ph-Ph
X1RvPP 0.50 3000.00 0.01 4.65 ohm/p Positive sequence reactance reach
Operation mode Off/On of Zone timer, Ph-
Timer tPP Off,On On
Ph
tPP 0.000 60.000 0.001 0.500 s Time delay of trip,Ph-Ph
Operation PE On,Off On Operation mode Off/On of Ph-E loops
X1FwPE 0.50 3000.00 0.01 4.65 ohm/p Positive sequence reactance reach
R1PE 0.10 1000.00 0.01 0.82 ohm/p Positive sequence resistance reach
X0PE 0.5 9000.00 0.01 15.99 ohm/p Zero sequence reactance reach
Zero sequence resistance for zone
R0PE 0.5 3000.00 0.01 3.40 ohm/p
characteristic angle
RFFwPE 1.00 9000.00 0.01 75.00 ohm/l Fault resistance reach in ohm/loop , Ph-E
The light gray area in figure 3(j) represents the first zone of protection, Zone 1, and the dark gray area the
second zone of protection, Zone 2. Similarly for relay 2 but the zones direction is toward bus A.
In figure 3(k) as shown for the fault 1, both the relay 1 & 2 will tripped the CB instantaneously as both these
relay detect the fault in zone 1. However for the fault 2, the relay 1 will tripped its CB in zone 2 timing where as
the relay 2 will tripped its CB at zone 1 timing i.e. instantaneously. Therefore in this case the fault 2 will be feed
by Bus A until the relay 1 tripped in zone 2 timing (i.e. after 350ms or 500ms). To counter this carrier aided
protection schemes has been implemented.
3.5.2 PERMISSIVE UNDER REACH TRANSFER TRIPPED (PUTT)
In PUTT schemes whenever the distance relay tripped in zone 1 it will send a signal to the other end through
Power Line Carrier Communication (PLCC) or OPGW (Optical Ground Wire) . The other end relay upon
receiving the signal and with detection of zone 2 will trip instantaneously.
Consider a fault 3 is close to end A in figure 3(k), there may be negligible infeed from end B. The protection at
B may detect a Zone 2 fault only after the breaker at end A has tripped. It is possible for the Zone 1 element at A
to reset, thus removing the permissive signal to B and causing the 'signal received' element at B to reset before
the Zone 2 unit at end B operates. It is therefore necessary to delay the resetting of the 'signal received' element
to ensure high speed tripping at end B. This PUTT scheme is not suitable for short line as Zone 1 operation is
essential and Zone 1 setting in R and X will be small in short lines.
Unlike in PUTT where the relays send the carrier signal whenever zone 1 pickup, in POTT the relay will send
the carrier signal when zone 2 pickup. Therefore in the above fault the relay 1 will trip instantaneously and will
also send permissive signal to relay 2. The relay 2 on receiving the permissive signal from relay 1 will tripped
immediately as it had already detected the fault in zone 2. Thus both relay 1 & 2 isolated the faulty section.
This POTT signal from the other relay gives Relay-2 PERMISSION to trip faster if it also detects a Zone-2
pickup. The POTT scheme work satisfactorily in case of single circuit transmission lines and in case of double
circuit parallel line it may result in tripping of both the lines for a fault in one of the line.
For the fault close to relay 1 as shown in figure 3 (m) and considering the fault can be fed from both direction,
the following are the sequence of events that might occur.
a. The relay 1 will tripped the CB in zone 1 and will send carrier signal to relay 2 as its zone 2 had also
picked up.
b. The relay 2 will detect the fault in zone 2 and wait for tripping in zone 2 timing (350 or 500 ms) unless
it received any carrier signals to trip faster.
c. The relay 3 & 4 will detect the fault in zone 4 (reverse) and would consider the fault to be in other line.
Therefore will not.
d. Before the relay 1 trip its CB, the relay 5 will detect the fault in both zone 4 (reverse) as the fault would
be feed in the direction from 4 6 5 1. And the relay 6 would detect the fault in zone 2 and
send carrier signal to relay 5.
e. However the moment the relay 1 tripped its CB in zone 1, the relay 5 would detect the fault in zone 2 as
now the fault would be feed in the direction 5 6 2 1 and its has also received carrier signal
from relay 6 resulting in tripping of CB. The zone 2 pickup of relay 6 would eventually reset with relay
1 tripping but the carrier signal would be send to relay 5.
The logic block diagram from REL670 ABB relay is shown below.
1. TRANSIENT FAULT: These are cleared by the immediate tripping of Circuit Breakers and do not reoccur
when the line is re-energized.
2. SEMI-PERMANENT FAULTS: These require a time interval to disappear before a line is charged again.
3. PERMANENT FAULTS: These are to be located and repaired before the line is re-energized.
About 80-90% of the faults occurring are transient in nature. Hence the Automatic Reclosure of breaker (after
tripping on Fault) will result in the line being successfully re-energized. The advantages are
a. Decreasing outage time.
b. Improving Reliability.
c. Improving system stability.
d. Reduce fault damage and Maintenance Time.
DEAD TIME: The time between the Auto-reclosing Scheme being energized and the operation of the contacts
which energize the Circuit Breaker closing circuit. This time is normally set at 1 or 1.2 second.
RECLAIM TIME: The Time Following a successful closing operation measured from the instant the Auto-
Reclosing relay closing contacts make which must elapse before the Auto-Reclosing relay initiates another
reclosing attempt. In other words, it may be said to be the time between 1st and 2nd Auto-Reclosure. This time is
normally set at 25 to 30 Second. If the fault persists during the reclaim time 3-phase tripping of the CB will
occur. Below is the representation of the sequence of event from instant of fault to reclosing the CB on fault
during the reclaim time.
Considering single phase Autoreclosing is used and say a fault in a transmission line occurs as shown below.
The circuit breakers in 220kV line are single pole operated i.e. separate operating mechanism for each pole. But
all the transformer circuit breakers in all voltage level are 3-pole operated i.e. all the 3 poles will close at the
same time. The Autoreclosing function is only used in case of transmission lines and not in transformers.
Let us consider R-phase to ground fault occur at location F1. For the above fault both the relay A & B will
detect the fault in Zone 1. At both the end (A&B), the relay will send trip signal to R-phase only and the R-
phase will open at both end keeping the other healthy phases ON. The relay will then send the closing command
after the dead time (1sec) expired. The R-phase at both the end will get close again and the reclaim time start as
soon as closing coil is energised. If the fault persist during the reclaim time (25sec) there will be 3–phase
tripping or else if transient in nature the power flow will continue and after reclaim time get expired, the
Autoreclosing function get reset.
But if the fault occurs at location F2, the relay B will detect the fault in zone 1 and relay A will detect the fault
in zone 2. The relay B will immediately trip the CB and Autoreclosing function start. For immediate tripping
and starting of Autoreclosure at location “A” permissive transfer trip scheme must be implemented. If such
permissive scheme is enabled and the carrier switch is in IN position at both ends, the relay B will send
permissive signal to relay A for instantaneous tripping and Autoreclosing function start as mentioned above. If
no permissive scheme is used /Carrier switch is in OUT position, the Autoreclosure will be blocked, and it will
go for 3-phase tripping. For the above situation to make the Autoreclosing function successful, carrier inter
tripping scheme should be implemented. Mostly single phase Autoreclosing is used in our network. However 2
or 3-phase Autoreclosing can be implemented with check synchronisation facility.
The Auto-Reclosure Functions used for one & half breaker scheme are set as Masters (Mian CB) and one for the
Center Breaker CB(TIE) as Follower. Co-ordination is required between the Auto-Reclosure Functions. A
Synchrocheck function is also loaded in each Relay to permit 3 poles Auto-Reclosing. Each Line Protection
relays starts both MAIN & TIE Circuit Breakers to trip for the concerned line. After a Successful reclosure of
the Main Breaker, the Tie Breaker will be reclosed after a supplementary time delay (about 2 Second). If
the Main CB Auto- Reclosure is not successful in its reclosing attempts, the Tie CB Auto-Reclosure is blocked.
If the Main CB is Open or its Auto-Reclosure Relay is not ready or Out of service, the TIE CB Auto-Reclosure
will reclose the TIE Breaker after its own dead time without any supplementary time delay.
The basic principle of this protection is that if a CB failed to operate after the trip command from the relay due
to some electrical or mechanical problem in the CB, this protection operates and tripped all the CB connected to
that bus to which this problematic CB is connected.
The Breaker Failure Protection (LBB/BFR) can operate single-stage/two-stage. When used as single-stage
protection, the Bus trip command is given to the adjacent Circuit Breakers if the protected feeder Breaker fails.
When used as two-stage protection, the first stage can be used to repeat the trip command to the relevant feeder
Breaker, normally on a different trip coil, if the initial trip command from the feeder protection is not successful.
The second stage will result in a Bus trip to the adjacent Breakers, if the command of the first stage is not
successful.
Power swings are variations in power flow that occur when the internal voltages of generators at different
locations of the power system slip relative to each other. The change in power flow that occurs after clearing of
a system fault is one form of a power swing. Power swings can cause the impedance presented to a distance
relay to fall within its operating characteristics, away from the preexisting steady-state load condition, and cause
an undesired tripping of a transmission line. Distance relays should not trip during power swings, so that the
power system can obtain a new equilibrium and return to a stable condition.
The philosophy of power-swing protection is simple and straight forward; avoid tripping of any power system
element during stable power swings. Protect the power system during unstable power swings or out of step
(OOS) conditions. Traditionally, two basic types of functions are available to deal with power-swing detection
and system separation during unstable power swings or OOS conditions. The PSB function is designed to detect
power swings, differentiate power swings from faults, and block distance relay elements from tripping during
power swings. The PSB function prevents system elements from tripping at random and at unwanted source-
voltage phase-angle difference between systems that are in the process of losing synchronism with each other.
The difference in the rate of change of the impedance vector has been used traditionally to detect a stable power
swing or an OOS condition and block the operation of distance protection elements before the impedance enters
the protective relay operating characteristics. This detection method is based on the fact that it takes a certain
time for the rotor angle to advance because of system inertias. In other words, the rate of change of the
impedance vector is slow during stable or unstable power swings, because it takes a finite time for the generator
rotors to change position with respect to each other because of their large inertias. On the contrary, the rate of
change of the impedance vector is very fast during a system fault. Actual implementation of measuring the
impedance rate of change is normally performed though the use of two impedance measurement elements
together with a timing device. If the measured impedance stays between the two impedance measurement
elements for a predetermined time, the relay declares a power-swing blocking condition and issues a power-
swing blocking signal to block the distance relay element operation. During PSW All zone block is used in our
grid network.
FOR 400kV LINES: Low set stage (Stage-I) may be set in the range of 110% - 112% (typically 110%) with a
time delay of 5 seconds. High set stage (Stage-II) may be set in the range 140% - 150% with a time delay of
100milliseconds.
However, for over voltage Stage-I protection, a time grading of 1 to 3 seconds may be provided between
overvoltage relays of double circuit lines. Grading on overvoltage tripping for various lines emanating from a
station may be considered and same can be achieved using voltage as well as time grading. Longest timed delay
should be checked with expected operating time of Over-fluxing relay of the transformer to ensure
disconnection of line before tripping of transformer. It is desirable to have Drop-off to pick-up ratio of
overvoltage relay better than 97%.
The majority of faults on a power system occur between one phase and ground or two phases and ground. Such
fault arises from lightning discharges and other over voltages which initiate flashovers. Alternatively, they may
arise from other causes such as birds on overhead lines or mechanical damage to cables etc. Such faults result in
an appreciable increase in current and hence in the majority of applications are easily detectable. In Broken
Conductor Protection, it is assumed that broken conductor do not touch the ground that is why, it is also known
as the Open Jumper Protection.
The main purpose of the SOTF switch-on-tofault function is to provide high-speed tripping when energizing a
power line on to a short-circuit fault on the line. The SOTF function is a logical function builtup from logical
elements. It is enabled for operation either by the close command to the circuit breaker (CB), by a normally
closed auxiliary contacts of the circuit breaker, or automatically by the dead line detection. Once enabled, this
remains active until one second after the enabling signal has reset. During closing of the CB if the current I>2.0
times (or 2.5 times normal set value) it will result in an immediate 3-phase trip output from the SOTF function.
Fuses are provided in all the phases which are responsible for protection of the secondary circuit of the Potential
transformer (PT) connected to the numerical relays. If the fuse blow out the secondary voltage of PT supplied to
the relay will reduce to zero and the relay might operate in distance or undervoltage protection. To avoid such
tripping during fuse blown out the protection should be blocked from operation. This function is normally
configured for alarm with LED/Annuciator indication.
In an ideal NON switched scheme, there will be 6 starter, 3 for phase faults and 3 for ground faults. There will
be independent measuring units for both phase faults and earth fault for each phase, for all three zone, totalling
to 18 unit. This scheme is faster and more accurate but is costly.
In the switched schemes, only one measuring unit will be used for all types of faults. This single measuring unit
is switched to the correct fault loop impedance by switching in the respective voltage and current by the starter.
While protecting long lines the necessary reach may be so large that the minimum service impedance (or load
Impedance) falls within the zone of protection in R/X diagram. This would result in tripping without there being
any fault. The two condition i.e. operation at heavy load and short circuit differ by virtue of phase angle between
voltage and current. For the load impedance, the phase angle will be within +30 to -30 deg. While during short
circuits, the fault impedance has a phase angle of 60 to 80 deg (i.e. line angle).
Relays with suitable characteristic o R-X diagram have to be carefully chosen to protect long and heavily loaded
lines.
Differential protection works on Kirchoff’s current law that states that the currents flowing into a node of the
power system must sum to zero. The differential zone of protection is defined by the location of HV & LV
current transformers (CTs). If the currents sum to zero, all is well. If they do not, there is a fault.
The differential protection relay should be able to discriminate whether a fault is within its zone of protection or
outside the zone. Under ideal condition, a differential relay protection scheme is expected to respond only to
internal fault and restrain from tripping under normal condition or external (through) fault. The main
application concern with differential protection is to make it secure from operating on spill current due to
any departure from the nominal tap position of the transformer or
during heavy through fault conditions due to dissimilar magnetisation characteristic of
CTs as they are often of different make & types.
When a fault occurs in the zone limited by the current transformers, a current I1 + I2 which are proportional to
the fault currents i1 + i2 flowing in from both sides is fed to the measuring element. As a result, the simple
circuit shown above ensures a reliable tripping of the protection if the fault current flowing into the protected
zone during a fault is high enough for the measuring element M to respond.
In differential protection systems for protected objects with two terminals, a restraining quantity is normally
derived from the current difference |I1 – I2| or from the arithmetical sum |I1| + |I2|. And the differential current
is derived from IDiff = |I1 + I2|.
(A) Through-flowing current under healthy conditions or on an external fault: I1 flows into the protected zone,
I2 leaves the protected zone, i.e. thus has opposite sign, i.e. I2 = –I1, and consequently |I2| = |I1|
IDiff = |I1 + I2| = |I1 – I1| = 0
IRest = |I1| + |I2| = |I1| + |I1| = 2·|I1|
No tripping effect (IDiff = 0); restraint (IRest) corresponds to twice the through-flowing current.
(C) Internal fault, fed from one side only: In this case, I2 = 0
IDiff = |I1 + I2| = |I1 + 0| = |I1|
IRest = |I1| + |I2| = |I1| + 0 = |I1|
Tripping effect (IDiff) and restraining (IRest) quantities are equal and correspond to the fault current fed from
one side. This result shows that for internal fault IDiff = IRest. Thus, the characteristic of internal faults is a
straight line with the slope 1 (45°) in the operation diagram as illustrated in Figure 4(d). Further details are
available in Siemens manual.
The other primary equipment in this differential zone is the lightening arrestor (LA) and if some cases if station
service transformer is used from the tertiary winding of the Transformer. Other then the Transformer if any
abnormality occurs in the LA and station service transformer, the differential protection will operate.
To avoid the unwanted differential tripping under the above mentioned two conditions ( refer to para 4.1), the
percentage bias differential characteristic (figure 4(e)) is adopted.
The differential curve setting from Siemens (7UT613) relay is shown below.
Restricted earth fault protection (REF) means the protection function will work only within a specified zone that
is pre-determined. It will detect earth fault only within that range. Earth fault outside the boundary will not be
detected by the REF scheme.
The most occurred and severe earth fault in the Transformer happens when insulation of winding gets damaged,
and it touches the core. Since the core is kept earthed, this situation causes an earth fault.
It is also a high resistance earth fault as the core is a high resistance element. Therefore fault current is generally
low due to the high fault resistance and may not be detected by differential protection. This is also the case if the
fault occurs close to the Transformer neutral.
1. Low magnitude of earth fault current is difficult to detect by the differential protection relay.
2. If the earth fault current is beyond tolerable range of the core then it can cause damage of the core.
The restricted earth fault protection compares the fundamental wave of the current flowing in the starpoint
connection, which is designated as 3I0’ in the following, with the fundamental wave of the sum of the phase
currents, which should be designated in the following as 3I0". Thus, the following applies Figure 4(j):
3I0' = ISP
3I0" = IL1 + IL2 + IL3
Only 3I0' acts as the tripping effect quantity, during a fault within the protected zone this current is always
present.
When an earth fault occurs outside the protected zone, another earth current 3I0" flows though the phase current
transformers. This is in counter-phase with the starpoint 3I0' current and has equal magnitude. The maximum
information of the currents is evaluated for stabilization: the magnitude of the currents and their phase position.
The following is defined:
A tripping effect current
(C) Internal earth fault, fed from the starpoint and from the system, e.g. with equal earth current magnitude:
In this case, 3I0" = 3I0'
IREF = |3I0'|
IRest = |3I0' – 3I0'| – |3I0' + 3I0'| = –2 · |3I0'|
The tripping effect current (IREF) equals the starpoint current; the restraining quantity (IRest) is negative and,
therefore, set to zero, i.e. full sensitivity during internal earth fault.
This result shows that for internal fault no stabilization is effective since the restraint quantity is either zero or
negative. Thus, small earth current can cause tripping. In contrast, strong restraint becomes effective for external
earth faults. Figure 4(k) shows that the restraint is the strongest when the residual current from the phase current
transformers is high (area with negative 3I0"/3I0'). With ideal current transformers, 3I0"/3I0' would be –1.
If the starpoint current transformer is calculated weaker than the phase current transformers (e.g. by selection of
a smaller accuracy limit factor or by higher secondary burden), no trip will be possible under through-fault
condition even in case of severe saturation, as the magnitude of 3I0" is always higher than that of 3I0'.
It was assumed in the above examples that the currents 3I0" and 3I0' are in counterphase for external earth faults
which is only true for the primary measured quantities. Current transformer saturation may cause phase shifting
between the fundamental waves of the secondary currents which reduces the restraint quantity. If the phase
displacement _(3I0"; 3I0') = 90° then the restraint quantity is zero. This corresponds to the conventional method
of direction determination by use of the vectorial sum and difference comparison Figure 4(l).
Figure 4(l): Phasor diagram of the restraint quantity during external fault
In the figure 4(o), the stabilizing resistance is used to avoid REF tripping during through fault condition.
Metrosil make use of its non-linear properties to provide an “electrical safety valve” for protecting equipment
and insulation from the effects of over voltages damaged to relays.
As per the Ramakrishna guidelines, provided the Transformer Over Fluxing curve, Tailor made curve is selected
and setting parameters for tailor made curve are arrived from given Over Fluxing curve as explained below.
V/Hz> for the protection is set equal to the permissible continuous overexcitation according to overexcitation
curve provided V/Hz>= 110%. When the overexcitation is equal to V/Hz>, tripping is obtained after a time
equal to the setting of t1. When the overexcitation is equal to the set value of V/Hz>>, tripping is obtained after
a time equal to the setting of t6. The interval between V/Hz>> and V/Hz> is automatically divided up in five
equal steps, and the time delays t2 to t5
will be allocated to these values of overexcitation. In this case, each step will be (150-110) /5 = 8%, since
V/Hz>> is set to 150% and V/Hz> is set to 110% of rated V/Hz. 90% of its capability limits is considered for
tripping. For example, if transformer can withstand 126% of Overflux till 55s from Overfluxing curve, we have
set trip time 0.9 x 55 = 49.5s in relay to protect transformer before entering danger zone. The settings of time
delays t1 to t6 are listed in table below. Figure 3-5 shows the tailor made curve for Over fluxing protection.
110 t1 9000
118 t2 90
126 t3 49.5
134 t4 18
142 t5 4
150 t6 1
The transformer magnetic core cooling time is recommended to set at 1200 Sec.
Suppose we are going to energize the Transformer, obviously the Transformer will have an Inrush current which
is around 6 times of full load current. Therefore, the differential protection will operate. Thus we won’t ever be
able to energize the Transformer or we need to bypass the Transformer Differential Protection when we are
going to energize.
The inrush current of a Transformer, if analyzed, is rich in 2nd harmonic component. So we can use this fact to
prevent the operation of Differential Protection. Therefore a 2nd harmonic Restraining is provided in
Transformer Differential Protection. Normally the setting of 2ndHarmonic Restraining is kept at 15% which
means that if the 2nd harmonic component in the differential current of Relay is more than 15% of differential
current Id then Differential Protection Relay will not operate as it will think that it is because of Transformer
Inrush Current but if the 2 nd harmonic component in the differential current of Relay is less than 15% of
differential current Id then Differential Protection Relay will operate.
The gas actuated protective relay is designed to detect faults as well as to minimize the propagation of
any damage, which might occur within oil-filled Transformers. The Buchholz relay is therefore
particularly effective in case of:
Short-circuited core laminations
Broken-down of core bolt insulation
Overheating of some part of the windings
Bad contacts
Short circuits between phases, turns
Earth faults-puncture of bushing insulators inside tank.
The operation of the Buchholz relay is based upon the fact that every kind of fault in an oil-filled
transformer causes a decomposition of the insulating oil due to overheating in the fault zone or to the
An indirect system is used to measure winding temperature, since it is dangerous to place a sensor close
to the winding due to the high voltage. The indirect measurement is done by means of a Thermal Image.
The measuring system is filled with a liquid which changes its volume with rising of temperature. Inside
the instrument is fitted a heating resistance which is fed by a current proportionate to the current flowing
through the transformer winding. To do this we connect the terminal of the heating resistance with the
Bushing Current Transformer so that reflection of change in load is reflected in the Winding
Temperature Indicator, WTI.
The Winding Temperature Indicator, WTI is provided with a maximum temperature indicator. The
heating resistance is fed by a current transformer associated to the loaded winding of the transformer.
The increase in the temperature of the resistance is proportionate to that of the winding. The sensor bulb
of the instrument is located in the hottest oil of the transformer, therefore, the winding temperature
indicates a temperature of hottest oil plus the winding temperature rise above hot oil Level the hot spot
temperature.
Winding Temperature of Transformer may rise due to increased loading of Transformer or due to some
internal fault.
Cooling System (FAN operating temperature: 60 deg & drop out 55 deg)
Losses in the transformer are of the order of 1% of its full load kW rating. There are mainly two types of
losses in a Transformer i.e. Core Loss and Ohmic Loss. Because of these losses the winding of
transformer as well as Core gets heat up and we need to provide sufficient cooling to remove heat and
maintain a constant winding and Core temperature.
Various types of cooling methodologies are used for Transformer but before going to each methodology,
we will have a look at the General Method of designating a particular cooling method i.e. class.
In the nameplate of Transformer, four letter represents the cooling class / method of the Transformer.
The above table is self explanatory, therefore if you see ONAN on the Name Plate of Transformer then it
means that Oil with flash point less than 300° is used as cooling media and Natural convection is used for
removing heat. In secondary side of cooling mechanism, Air with Natural convection is used by
employing Radiator.
ONAN Cooling of Transformer:
This type of Transformer cooling method used Transformer capacity up to about 5 MVA. ONAN is the
simplest method of cooling of Transformer core and winding. In this method, the heat from the winding
and core is transferred to the surrounding Transformer Oil by conduction. The heated oil then moves up in
the Transformer tank and cold Oil occupies the vacant area. In this way oil circulates by convection. As
the heat removal capacity depends on the surface area, we need to increase the surface area so that the
heated oil at the upper portion of tank cools faster and become cold. Because of this purpose Radiator is
used as shown in figure below. Mind that atmospheric air is here responsible for removal of heat from the
hot oil in the Radiator. As the circulation of air is natural, hence it is Natural Air convection cooling.
This type of cooling is provided for very large transformers which have ratings of some hundreds of
MVA like Generating Transformer will have very high rating and rating equal to the rating of the
generator.
Evolution
Gas Formed Temperature Possible Causes
0
Hydrogen (H2 ) 150 C and above Partial discharge, arcing in oil
Methane (CH4) 150 0-3000C Partial discharge, Overheating of oil
Ethane (C2H6) 250 0-3500C Overheating of oil
Ethylene (C2H4) 350 0-7000C Overheating of oil
Acetylene (C2H2) 700 0C and above Arching in oil, Overheating of oil
Carbon Monoxide (CO) 300 0C and above Cellulose Overheating
Carbon Dioxide (CO 2) 300 0C and above Cellulose Overheating
Generally it is found that hydrogen and methane are produced in large quantity if the internal temperature
of power transformer rises up to 150oC to 300oC due to abnormal thermal stresses. If the temperature goes
above 300oC, ethylene (C2H4) is produced in large quantity. At the temperature is higher than 700oC a large
amount of hydrogen (H2) and ethylene (C2H4) are produced.
Ethylene (C2H4) is an indication of a very high-temperature hot spot inside an electrical transformer. If
during DGA test of transformer oil, CO and CO2 are found in large quantity it is predicted that there is
decomposition of proper insulation.
Furan Analysis of Transformer Oil
Transformer core and winding have mainly paper insulation. The base of the paper is cellulose. The
cellulose structure is a long chain of molecules. As the paper becomes aged, these long chains are broken
into a number of shorter parts. This phenomenon we often observe in our home. The pages of very old
books become brittle over time.
In a transformer, the aging effect of paper insulation is accelerated due to the oxidation that occurs in oil.
When insulating paper becomes mechanically weak, it cannot withstand the mechanical stresses applied
during an electrical short circuit – leading to electrical breakdown. It is therefore necessary to monitor the
condition of paper insulation inside a power transformer.
It is not possible to bring out a piece of paper insulation from a transformer in service for testing purpose.
But we are lucky enough, that there is a testing technique developed, where we can examine the condition
of paper insulation without touching it. The method is called Furan analysis.
Although by dissolved gas analysis one can predict the condition of the paper insulation primarily, it is not
a very sensitive method. There is a guideline in IEC-599, where it is stated that if the ratio of CO2 and CO
in DGA results is more than 11, it is predicted that the condition of paper insulation inside the transformer
is poor.
Healthy cellulose insulation gives that ratio in a range of 4 to 11. But still it is not a very sensitive way of
monitoring the condition of paper insulation. Because CO2 and CO gases also produced during oil
breakdown and sometimes the ratio may misleads the prediction.
When oil is soaked into paper, it is damaged by heat and some unique oil soluble compounds are realized
and dissolved in the oil along with CO2 and CO. These compounds belong to the Furfuraldehyde group.
These are sometimes called Furfural in short. Among all Furfurals compounds 2- Furfural is the most
predominant. This Furfural family compound can only be released from destructive heating of cellulose or
paper.
Furan analysis is very sensitive, as damage to a few grams of paper is noticeable in the transformer oil –
even in a large transformer. It is a very significant diagnostic test, and is generally considered the best test
for assessing the life of a transformer.
The percentage rate rise of Furfurals products in transformer oil over time is used to assess the condition
and remaining life of the paper insulation in a transformer.
Nitrogen injection fire protection system designed for oil filled transformers shall prevent tank explosion and
the fire during internal faults resulting in an arc, where tank explosion will normally take few seconds after arc
generation and also extinguish the external oil fires on transformer top cover due to tank explosion and for
external failures like bushing fires, OLTC fires and fire from surrounding equipment.
The system shall work on the principle of DRAIN AND STIR and on activation, it shall drain a pre-
determined quantity of oil from the tank top through outlet valve to reduce the tank pressure and inject
nitrogen gas at high pressure from the lower side of the tank through inlet valves to create stirring action and
reduce the temperature of top oil surface below flash point to extinguish the fire. Conservator tank oil shall be
isolated during bushing bursting, tank explosion and oil fire to prevent aggravation of fire.
During any periodic maintenance of the transformer the NIFPS system should be put in OFF position so that
the NIFPS doesn’t operate satisfying the above logic during protection checking.
B. BUS REACTOR
The reactor is connected parallel to the bus i.e like a feeder/line. During lightly loaded
conditions there may be possibility of raising bus voltages. For safeguard the operating
equipment bus reactors are used. Normally it is not in service. Whenever the voltage rises to
4%to 5% more than the rated voltage this may be kept in service and 2% to 3% less than the
rated voltage this may be kept out of service.
In case of one and half breaker scheme if any fault occur in line reactor and neutral grounding
transformer (NGT), both the main CB connected to Bus 1 and Tie CB will tripped and DT will
be send to the other remote end. It will also initiate LBB function in the main CB relay.
If a fault occurs in bus reactor, the trip signal will be extended from bus reactor panel to main
CB and tie panel and it will also initiate LBB function in busbar protection relay.
In case of directional earth fault relay open delta voltage is feed to the relay as shown in the above diagram.
During normal operation open delta voltage is zero and at the time of fault there is a residual voltage which
For coordination of the inverse time OC/EF relay, the pickup current and time multiplier setting (TMS) are to be
chosen. The actual operating time of the OC/EF relays can be varied by proper selection of the Time Multiplier
Setting (TMS). The pickup of the relays must be chosen such that it will operate for all short circuits in its own
line and provide backup for adjoining line, keeping in view of maximum full load current. Also for fault in any
33kV feeder the backup relay coordination should be such that the fault is cleared in the 33kV feeder itself and
transformer doesn’t trip for this. The following is the example of relay coordination between 33kV feeder and
transformer.
Example:
We consider a Transformer, 132/33kV, 25MVA, PU impedance of 10%, HV CT: 150/1A, LV CT: 600/1A. We
are to calculate the settings for non-directional OC and EF Protection of the above transformer.
Step 1: We calculate the Full load current on
HV and LV Sides of the transformer.
Step 3: We calculate the Pickup current (PSM) for the O/C relay.
Suppose a fault occur in the 33kV Outgoing line. The fault current flows as in the above figure. The same fault
current is sensed by all the overcurrent and earth fault relays of the bay. But selective tripping is of utmost
importance because for a downstream fault if the HV CB trips, we have a complete power loss. In this case, the
33kV O/G CB should only trip for the fault a fault in 33kV feeder and the LV CB, HV CB should not trip. We
can achieve this by proper time discrimination between the relays. A time difference of 300ms is kept between
tripping of the consequent breakers in case of a fault. We do this with the help of the TMS set in the O/C and
E/F relays.
Similarlly, for Earth fault protection let us considering the PSM to be 20% (0.2) and TMS to be 0.1 for 33kV
feeder. The relay operating time (ROT) of 33kV feeder will be = (0.14*0.1)/ ((4374/400*0.2)^0.02 – 1) = 168ms
Therefore keeping a margin of 300ms between subsequent tripping of circuit breaker, the TMS of LV ad HV
side relay will be
E/F Settings LV Side HV Side
PSM 0.2 0.2
TMS 0.249 0.41
HS 7.3 7.3
6.2 Directional Overcurrent and Earth fault setting calculation for Transmission Lines:
The main protection of a transmission line is the Distance Protection. Directional Overcurrent and Earth fault is
used as the backup protection for the line in case the distance protection fails to operate for a fault. Distance
protection is segregated into 4 zones. Zone 4 is in reverse direction whereas Zone 1, 2 and 3 are in the forward
direction. The Operating time of Zone 3 is 800ms. Hence, the backup protection should operate after a delay of
800ms from the fault occurrence in order not to conflict with the distance protection. Taking 200ms as an extra
margin. We use the R.O.T as 1 second for the Directional Overcurrent and Earth fault relays. This is as per
recommended in “Task Force for Power System Analysis under Contingencies”.
(Voltage phasors are the reference for measurement in case of transmission line protection).
A voltage element is included in the relay which decides the directionality feature. Voltage element can be seen
as the restraining quantity where as current element can be seen as the actuating quantity. When the Fault is in
forward direction toward line and the fault current exceed pickup value, the actuating quantity becomes more
than the restraining quantity and the relay trips.
For example: REF615 relay of ABB make. RCA is input as 65 degrees. ROA is input as 85 degrees.
For R phase (the operating region): (85-65) to –(85+65) in clockwise direction.
ie. 20 degrees to -150 degrees (Clockwise)
For Y phase (the operating region):
Y phase lags R phase by -120 degrees. So, we can subtract 120 degrees from the operating region of the R phase
to find the operating region for Y phase.
(20-120) to (-150-120)
ie. (-100) to (-270) degrees (Clockwise)
For B phase (the operating region):
B phase leads the R phase by +120 degrees. So, we can add 120 degrees from the operating region of the R
phase to find the operating region for B phase.
(20+120) to (-150+120)
ie. (140) to (-30) degrees. (Clockwise)
1. The potential of both the bus bar kept same by closing the bus coupler.
2. The bus bar on which the load is transferred is kept close.
When a fault occurs on any section, two circuit breakers have to open, resulting in the opening of the mesh.
Such type of arrangement provides security against bus-bar fault but lacks switching facility. It is preferred for
substations having a large number of circuits.
7.2 BUSBAR PROTECTION
The scheme of busbar protection, involves, Kirchoff’s current law, which states that, total current entering an
electrical node is exactly equal to total current leaving the node. Hence, total current entering into a bus section
is equal to total current leaving the bus section. The principle of differential busbar protection is very simple.
Here, secondary of CTs are connected parallel.
Feeders each bay have their own processing unit, which collects together information on the state of the feeder
(currents, voltages, CB and isolator status, etc.) and communicates it over high-speed fibre-optic data links to a
central unit. For large substations, more than one central unit may be used, while in the case of small
installations, all of the units can be co-located, leading to the appearance of a traditional centralised architecture.
For simple feeders, interface units at a bay may be used with the data transmitted to a single centrally located
peripheral unit. The central unit performs the calculations required for the protection functions.
Let us consider the 220kV double bus system. The bus 1 is the zone 1 and bus 2 is the zone 2 region for bus bar
protection relay. The relay would identified which bay (201 to 210) is connected to the bus 1 or 2 by the
close/open status of the bus isolator 89A & 89B. The diagram shown below is the centralized bus bar scheme
where the CT connection from all the bays are connected to the main bus bar protection relay without the
peripheral unit at each bay level.
Consider a spot between the current transformer and the circuit breaker. Here the circuit breaker is in closed
condition. A fault occurs between the spot. In this condition the busbar protection initiates the trip signal to the
local circuit breaker as well as to the other circuit breaker connected to that bus. Hence the circuit breaker got
tripped on bus differential protection. But the fault is still in the line and is fed from the remote end. Due to the
fault in the dead spot zone, the relay initiates the high speed tripping signal to the remote circuit breaker instead
of the local breaker such a protection is called end fault protection.
*All the data models should be preinstalled along with the DIGSI for successful communication. Data
models and DIGSI is free to download from Siemens official website.
3. A new blank project would open up. Create a new folder with any relevant name.
For simplicity we create a folder with the name of “Kahilipara 132kV Line”
4. We open the folder. There are two main things to be done now. The first is, we can either connect a
new relay online or we can open a already saved relay file (.dex format).
5. If we were to connect a relay online. First we-> right click -> Digsi Device (Plug&Play)
6. We will be asked for a confirmation of siprotec 4, click -> ok and then the following screen will be
displayed.
All the necessary settings like, inputting the CT PT ratio, configuring the Input and Output ports,
LEDS, configuring the protection functions, testing the Hardware configurations are done from this
very page.
9. The above was online accessing a relay. We can also view a saved .dex file.
Right click -> import device (inside the folder that we had made)
‘kahilipara.dex’ will be shown inside the folder. Double click on it. Select ->offline mode -> press
“ok”
And we can see all the relay settings and configurations of the file.
10. For communicating via LAN cable, the IP address can be set in the “interface” menu available
from the front panel. We have to select the option “Ethernet” in the same menu where earlier we chose
“direct”.
11. For 7SJXXX relays(Backup O/c & E/F), the exception is that “RJ45” cable is used. All the steps
are same, we have to select “USB” option in the main menu.
Communication with PC is done through the LAN port available at the front side. Communication can also be
done through optical fibre port available at the rear side of the relay. Both follow the same procedure of
establishing a network with the IED with same series IP address.
1. Connecting a REL670
with a PC via LAN
Cable.
Use the ‘Down’ arrow to move to the option ‘communication’ -> ‘TCP-IP configuration’ -> ‘Front port’ -
>check the IP address and subnet mask. For eg:
We are now ready to establish the connection between the IED and PCM600.
Goto File -> New Project -> Enter Project Name and Description -> Click on ‘create’
We create a sample project “Mirza”
Right click on mirza -> New -> General -> Substation
Right click on substation -> new -> general -> voltage level
All the desired outputs, inputs, logic, LEDS, Disturbance Recorder, GOOSE can be configured here.
*ABB relay files can be saved in .pcmi format. Right click on the REL 670, click on export and we can save it
in a desired location. For accessing it later on, we follow the same process, we right click on the “Bay” menu,
and click “import”. We choose our file and click on open. The same IED we had accessed online can also be
opened elsewhere in offline mode.
We click on New (ref: red circle) to create a new system. We give a user defined name, eg: “220kV Salakati
GSS”. Click ->Ok
We go down
the system
tree on the
right
column.
Device ->
Settings ->
The Four buttons in a circle as seen in the right half of the picture.
The top and bottom are used to scroll down a list. The Right button is used to enter and the left button is used to
exit a menu.
Besides these, there is another ‘enter’ button on the right half to accept a change, ‘menu’ button is used to access
the main menu.
(i)To access a D60 or T60 relay, a software named ‘Enervista UR’ is used.
(ii) To access F650 relay, ‘Enervista 650’ is used.
To access a relay, the first thing we have to do is to find out the ip address set in the relay.
We can do this from the front HMI panel.
a) Press ‘Menu’ -> Scroll with ‘Down arrow’ ->Go to ‘Product Setup’ -> Press ‘right arrow to enter it’
b) Go to ‘communications’ -> Press right arrow to enter this menu.
c) Go to ‘network’ -> Press right arrow to enter this menu.
d) Now, scroll down the list by pressing down and up arrows.
We will find the ip address and ip subnet mask.
We note down the ip address.
We set up a LAN network in the PC with that very ip address. Once the network is established, we ping the ip
address of the Relay (Ref: ABB relay accessing procedure for setting up network and pinging)
Clicking on save
sends the settings to
the relay. Files once
accessed can be
saved and reviewed
later on in the
offline
window(Bottom
column in the left
side of the screen).
Unlike ABB,
Siemens and Micom relays, separate drivers or data models are not required to access different relay models in
GE Relays.
For Transformer Differential Protection and Backup Protection, T-Pro and F-Pro are used respectively.
The main source of communication with a ERL manufactured relay is done through 4 separate software based
interfaces viz.
(i) Relay Control Panel
(ii) L-Pro Offliner settings
(iii) T-Pro Offliner settings
(iv) F-Pro 2000 Offliner Settings
Communication can be done in two ways: By a LAN or by RJ45 Cable. We take the general mode of
communication i.e. by using RJ45.
Steps: (i)Open the Relay Control Panel Software -> click on Add new.
Now, double clicking on this text inside the circle, will open the relay configuration and settings in the L-Pro
Offliner Settings software.
We single click on the file “shown in blue highlight” and click on “load to relay” button which is shown in the
circle. When the settings will be loaded, a confirmation message will be shown.
A) Double click “external opc da client” present in microscada pro control folder.
If not running then go to new browse select the appropriate .ini file.
When we double click on Dbwin.exe, a command prompt window pops up and SCADA prepares to load.
1. To start scada:
a. Click the “Start SCADA” Icon from your Home Screen.
b. After clicking “Start SCADA” Icon, this picture will appear on your screen.
c. Click the buttons with bay name to open any particular bay.
b. This page will open. We can check the events and alarm here.
c. After that, Right click the icon circled in below mentioned image.
Open the iControl folder and goto the folder named ‘bin’.
Inside the folder ‘bin’, we will find the
main ‘iControl’ application file. Double
clicking on it will open the scada software.
main SLD is shown. In order to perform operations we need to login with valid credentials. The login is present
in the top right corner.
2. A New window appears. We select the main Project Name as shown by the red arrow. “PLP” is the
main project here (for 132kV Pailapool GSS)
4. The SAS software thus starts. Next we have to enter our login details. There would be separate login
details for different groups of Shift duties.
6. SAS is logged in. The above screenshot shows the SLD of the 132kV Pailapool GSS with real time data.
8. For logging off, we click the logout button and confirm it.
In agreement with this logic, routine maintenance of overhead lines& transformers along with its associated
switchgear is essential to maintain a quality supply to the consumers. The maintenance intervals need to be
reviewed as the system changes. As the system reliability improves, it may be possible to extend the
maintenance periods. If the system has a high incident of fault, then full investigation is required to
determine the cause of fault. It may be due to local environment such as pollution, strong wind or it could
be due to poor maintenance. To achieve this regular inspection, survey & maintenance programme is a
precondition to find any urgent repairs. Surveys are to assess what work is required to be carried out on the
next maintenance & to find any urgent repair work requirement. Primarily preventive maintenance activity
can be divided into four components, which are listed below:
1) Inspection
2) Survey
3) Urgent maintenance .
4) Planned maintenance
10.1.1 In line with these four components of preventive maintenance activity, strategy should be formulated for
necessary frequency of maintenance cycle. Eventually the preventive maintenance programme of
transmission system can be broken down to the following standard six categories:
1) Weekly maintenance
2) Fortnightly maintenance
3) Monthly maintenance
4) Six month maintenance
__________________________________________________________________________________
ASSAM ELECTRICITY GRID CORPORATION LTD 1
5) Yearly maintenance
6) 3 yearly maintenance
1. Weekly, fortnightly & monthly maintenance are related to visual inspection only without disconnecting
power. As this is investigation of the lines & enlisting the various details particularly the condition of
tower members, which require rectification immediately or in the next maintenance programme, does
not need long time for observations, therefore, it is possible to scrutinize the entire overhead lines within
the division in a week/fortnight/month for transmission network.
2. Six monthly maintenance is aimed for pre—monsoon & post-monsoon check. This may require
switching off power to make the line dead. However, outages may be avoided if on-line maintenance
procedure is introduced, which require modern gadgets like hot line washing machine for insulator
cleaning, thermo- vision camera for identification of hot spots as a part of the diagnostic maintenance &
of course knowledge of on-line working technique to the workers.
3. There is another important reflection of this inspection & survey of the transmission system for
organizing the maintenance programme in accordance with the availability of the next outage where
necessary. Even if the outages could not be arranged due to any reason, the weak elements of the system
are known to the maintenance personnel & they have considerable idea about the basis due to which
failure may occur. Therefore, when the breakdown really takes place, maintenance personnel does not
have to guess regarding the cause of the fault in order to save time & enable them to go straight way for
the rectification.
4. However, every activity whether operation or maintenance depends on specific stipulation based ‘on
technical justification backed up by practical experience. With similar convention maintenance of
transmission system may be contemplated, any arbitrary way of maintenance cannot yield the desired
result. Unsystematically selecting the components of maintenance activity in conjunction with
inconsistent frequency from the standard maintenance cycle may not bring the desired effect of
achievement. Either it will be over-maintained or under-maintained. The degree of maintenance activity
can be decided from the economic point of view, which would delineate the right kind of maintenance
schedule for highest stability of the system. Computation of maintenance activity can be described as
follows: The breakdown repair cost & down time lost including consequential damages of a breakdown
& production loss, which is a function of preventive maintenance schedule, should be found out by
appropriate method. Similarly, the preventive maintenance cost that is linear in nature must also to be
found out.
5. Pre-monsoon Maintenance Procedures Pre-monsoon check is a common terminology used expensively
in transmission system. Technical reasons behind the pre—monsoon checks are:
6. During summer, dust storms are common in this part of the country. As a result, dust accumulates on the
insulators & the lighting arrestors.
7. High ambient temperature in summer causes heating up of the current carrying conductors. Thus, the
resistance of conductor’s increases, effecting further increase of temperature due to l2Rloss. Due to high
heat all connection joints expands, & when it contract under cold condition, joints get loose & conductor
strands are subjected to mechanical stress. Particularly the earth connections always undergo severe
variation in temperature. infect flow of current in earth circuit is inevitable during earth fault only, &
rest of the period there is no circulation of current. However, the magnitude ‘of current through earth
circuit can be as high as full-scale fault current. Thus, the thermal shock rendered by intermittent flow
of high current increases the resistance. Thus culminate in loose connections, which is in-turn followed
by visible flash or spark from the joints during earth faults. Consequently, the conductor gets damaged.
8. Extreme heat & humidity particularly in the Eastern part of India is predominant which causes the
overhead line joints being corroded & strands may get damaged due to uneven expansion & salt
deposition. Steel poles & aluminium conductors are oxidized consequent to the exposure in air &
moisture.
In line with the Pre-monsoon check, Post-monsoon check is also being carried out to ascertain the
extent of damage the system has sustained during the monsoon. This also enables the preventive
maintenance personnel to rectify the defects during the Post-monsoon check. Although this may not
always require outages, yet in case of major defect, shut down must be arranged. in agreement with
Pre-monsoon check,
Condition
Sl No Activity Action required if inspection shows unsatisfactory condition
Condition
Sl No Activity Action required if inspection shows unsatisfactory condition
Checking condition of Silica gel lf silica gel is pink, changed by spare charge. The old
WS/D
1 in breather charge may be reactivated for use again.
Checking of cooler oil pump and W S/D Check the AC supply at MCB and motor terminals
4
fans for manual actuation
Checking of cooler oil pump and Replace burnt or worn out contact or other parts.
5 S/D
fans for auto starting
Examine Bushing for cracks & Clean or replace.
6 S/D
dirt deposits.
7 Check on load tap changer S/D Replace burnt or worn out contact or other parts.
Check control circuits
If faulty, take suitable action to set free rights.
8 independently or on load tap S/D
changer driving mechanism.
Note
I) DGA frequency can be changed with the advice of respective lab/ MRT depending on criticality. For newly
commissioned or re-commissioned units, DGA shall be carried out for (I) before charging (ii) after 24 hrs
from charging (m) after 7 days (iv) after 15 days (v) after 1 month and then (vi) after 3 months.
2) Vibration measurement, 3M and 6M after commissioning and then based on abnormality in sound/vibration.
3) Tanᵟ measurement of Bushing first time after one year from commissioning within guarantee period, then
yearly measurement to be carried out.
4) Tanᵟ measurement of Winding first time after one year from commissioning and then once in every two
years. To be measured as per the following combinations :N/E, N/LV and LV/E for Auto Transformer and for
two winding transformer HV/E, LV/E.
Note: Dew point for SF6 shall be measured at the time of commissioning then after 6 months and one & half
years of commissioning and thereafter once in every two years.
W S/D (During
Checking of oil leakage in
3 November To
Terminal Box
March)
Thermo-vision Scanning of CT Half yearly termination, check the joints and for
4 W S/D Half yearly
and Topdome top dome temperature inform manufacturer
TESTING& MEASUREMENT
Authority Responsible: Maintenance Team/RE/MRT
Condition Action required if inspection shows unsatisfactory
Sl No Activity
condition
Measurement of Tanᵟ and
1 S/D (Sept to April) Tanᵟ value above 1%, CT shall be replaced
Capacitance
DGA & testing of other After one month from first
2 S/D yearly
parameters of oil Charging and than yearly
S/D (During If value is less than commissioning inform
3 I.R measurement (Pl, DAR) November To manufacturer
March)
S/D (During March
4 Cleaning of CT bushing
– April)
5 Marshalling Box
S/D (During
a) Checking of healthiness of
November To
gaskets
March)
S/D (During
b) Checking of space heater &
November To
Illumination
March)
S/D (During
c) Checking the tightness of all
November To
connections including earthing
March)
S/D (During
d) Cleaning of marshalling box
November To
and junction box
March)
S/D (During
e) Touch up painting November To
March)
Above schedule is for oil filled PT only, for Hermetically sealed, manufacturer guide lines to be followed.
Tan delta & Capacitance test rest test is to be carried out after one year from commissioning and then
In livery two years. For CVTs in which isolation of neutral of intermediate PT is not possible at site
mat for bottom stack and complete CVT is not required to be carried out. However, for top/ middle
less to be conducted in UST mode. Tan-delta up to +0.002 (3yearly), +0.002 to 0.003(yearly), above +0.003
(alarming)in capacitance up to 12% (3yearly), +-2% to +-3%(yearly), Above +-6% (needs replacement)
Normally depending on specifications all GIS CB’s will comply with lEC 62271-100 tested for about
10000 operating cycles of mechanical duty without significant wear inspection could be done at every
5000close-open cycles for CB’s, 3000 for for earth switches.
For electrical wear and tear» depending on fault level the manufacturer's be adhered to '
AUHF PD measuring facility could be available (on newer GIS at least) or UHF sensors may be
installed for testing on the barrier spacer insulators if these are UHF sensors can be fitted, a check with
acoustic PD instrument should be carried out. A
Note: The tests listed above for Distance Protection W S/D may be carried out without a Line S/D providing
I) Proper isolation of the relay under test.
ii) The other Main Protection of the Line is healthy and is in service.
1. The above diagram is the single line diagram of 220kV Sarusajai GSS. Assuming that the all the CB are
open and the substation will be charged from karbi langpi.
2. We will coordinating with SLDC and get the charging code.
3. All the earth switch should be open. This earth switch cannot be operated from SAS. So, physical
verification from field is must.
4. We will also ensure that all the 86 master trip relay and 96 LBB trip relay are reset.
5. All the CB, isolator should be in remote position.
6. The carrier switch should be in IN position.
7. The Busbar protection should be in IN position.
8. The PT selection in line bay should be toward CVT selection.
9. We should also ensure that all IED are reporting to SAS. If not reporting there might be problem with
FO cable assuming that no one had tried to put IED online through software and have changed any
configuration.
10. If charging is permitted, we will close the langpi line I&II both line & main-I bus isolator. This can be
done from SAS but physical inspection and confirmation of proper closing has to be ensured from field
A major difference between conventional air insulated substations (AIS) and the gas insulated substations
(GIS) is that the SF6 gas insulated electrical components are placed within an earthed, pressurized
metallic container. This is a significant change in operating the switchgear with circuit breakers,
disconnectors, and earth switches because there is no direct observation or visual contact of the open or
closed disconnect switch gap or the open or closed earthing switch status.
Besides this difference, other special operating characteristics are related to view ports, cameras,
endoscopes, induced currents in the metallic containers, alarms, local control cubicles, remote control,
mimic schemes, gas zone, unmanned substations, etc.
A few examples of interlocking are presented. Typical example involves the breaker status including the circuit
breaker, a disconnect switch on each side of the circuit breaker, and two earthing switches. Each earthing switch
is between one of the disconnect switches and the circuit breaker. The main bus and the transmission line are
assumed to be energized.
1. For the first example, the circuit breaker is closed and is either energized or de-energized.
The two earthing switches are open. The two disconnect switches need to be stopped from being
closed or opened, therefore stopping the disconnect switch from either interrupting or making
load current. Therefore, interlocking rule 1 is satisfied.
2. For the second example, assume that the circuit breaker is out of service and de-energized,
and that one or both of the two earthing switches are closed. The interlocking mechanism stops
either of the two disconnect switches from being closed, stopping them from connecting an
energized circuit into a earthed bus. Therefore, interlocking rule is satisfied.
3. Conversely, for the third example, the circuit breaker is energized (open or closed) and one or
both of the disconnect switches are closed. The interlocking mechanism stops either of the two
earthing switches from being closed, stopping them from closing on to an energized bus.
Therefore, interlocking rule 3 is satisfied.
4. A fourth example includes switching device on opposite voltage sides of a transformer bank.
If a high speed earthing switch on one side of a transformer bank is closed, effectively earthing
the transformer bank, the disconnect switches isolating the transformer bank on the opposite
side will be stopped from being closed into the earthed transformer. Therefore, interlocking
requirement 2 is satisfied.
5. Conversely, a fifth example also includes the transformer bank. If one or both of the isolating
disconnect switches on one side of a transformer bank are closed or earthed, the high speed
earthing switch on the opposite side of the transformer bank will be stopped from being closed
into the energized transformer. Therefore, interlocking requirement 3 is satisfied.
All these interlocking mechanisms are through hardware wiring and this is also being done in SAS logic.
10.25.2 Alarms In order to efficiently operate a GIS substation, the status of the devices has to be permanently
monitored similar to monitoring the devices in an air insulated substation (AIS). Nevertheless, due to
the criticality of the SF6 insulation system gas monitoring in a GIS is much more extensive than in AIS.
Commonly, the below listed alarms are used:
- Low SF6 alarm in circuit breaker operating mechanism pressure meaning that the circuit breaker can
no longer open or close in this case the protection arrangement may be designed to block any operation.
It has to be noted that in addition to providing insulation, in majority of puffer type circuit breakers the
gas is also used as a damper/cushion for the operating mechanism.
- Low circuit breaker operating mechanism pressure (pneumatic, hydraulic or spring).
- Low gas density (roughly 90%) in each gas chamber and zone meaning a gas leak.
- Low–low gas density (roughly 80%) in each gas chamber and zone meaning that the dielectric ratings
of the devices can no longer be met.
- Overcurrent operation of the circuit breaker mechanism’s motor protective circuit
- Excessive circuit breaker operating mechanism’s run-time of the motor providing operating energy
- Pole disagreement operation
- Loss of voltage to the circuit breaker mechanism’s motor providing operating energy
- Loss of DC control voltage to the annunciator in the LCC
- Loss of the DC control voltage or voltages to the circuit breakers
- The SF6 gas pressure signals that are configured in SAS or can be observe in pressure gauge for each
bay are:
SF6 low in CB Chamber
SF6 low in the isolator chamber connected to Bus I.
SF6 low in the isolator chamber connected to Bus II.
SF6 low in main bus I chamber
SF6 low in main bus II chamber
SF6 low in line isolator chamber
SF6 low in bus duct chamber
- Any SF6 gas pressure low alarm must be treated with high priority and need immediate isolation with
consultation with MRT or T&C.
In this specific situation, the portion of the substation is energized. The transmission bay no 4 has to be taken out
of for maintenance on the transmission line. An operator has been instructed to take the line out of service. The
operator has received instructions to remove the transmission line 4 from service. The operator is more
experienced in AIS then GIS. These is the steps that he needs to follow.
1. Upon reaching the substation, the operator checks the annunciator that there are no alarms showing
low gas pressure in chambers of bay 4. He also finds out that the overall appearance of the circuit
breakers and disconnect switches is completely different from what he is used to seeing in an AIS.
Moreover, he finds out that there are no open air conductors visible in the station, helpful for tracing the
path of power flow and applying portable grounds. He is highly dependent on precise signage to give
guidance to operate the correct elements.
2. The operator checks that the station is in normal operation and all disconnect switches and circuit
breakers are closed and all earthing switches are open. The status indicators in the LCC show the status.
3. In the specific LCC the operator finds the control handle for circuit breaker for bay 4 and moves it to
the opening position. He hears the circuit breaker open and finds out that the indicating lights change
from red to green, defining an open circuit breaker
4. The control element for disconnect switch 89A (Line isolator) in gas compartment is then found and
manipulated. The noise from the motor driving the disconnect switch open can be heard and the status
lights change from red to green, defining an open disconnect switch.
5. The control element for disconnect switch 89B (bus isolator) in gas chamber is then found and
manipulated. Again, the noise from the motor driving the disconnect switch open can be heard and the
status lights change from red to green, defining an open disconnect switch.
6. The control devices for associated earthing switches are then found in the LCC and individually
operated. The noise from the motor driving each earthing switch closed can be individually heard and
the status lights change from green to red, defining closed earthing switches.
8. The operator’s instructions demand that the blades of the disconnect switches and earthing switches
be visually checked for the correct status. In AIS, a brief glance at the blades would have done the
verification. Because this is a GIS, the blades are enclosed in an opaque metallic chamber and are not
readily visible. Nevertheless, since each of the viewing ports has previously been clearly, and uniquely
labeled as to phase and switch designation, each viewing port is readily found. With the aid of a
flashlight, the statuses of the blades are checked.
9. As the operator was checking the status of the switch blades, he notes that the mechanical semaphores
on the operating mechanisms for the circuit breakers and disconnect switches show that all phases are
open. The mechanical semaphores on the operating mechanisms for the earthing switches show that
they are closed.
10. The dispatcher now reports to supervision that the transmission line 4 has been de-energized and
completed. He also asks for the status of the switching at the opposite end of the transmission line 4 and
demands permission to proceed to ground the line. The remote end of the transmission line 4 has been
de-energized and he gets the required approval.
11. The operator comes back to the LCC that contains the control device for high speed earthing switch,
finds and operates the controls, hears the noise from the motor driving the earthing switch closed, and
observes that the status lights change from green to red, defining a closed earthing switch.
12. With the help of a handheld flashlight, the statuses of the three blades of the high speed earthing
switch are found to be in the correct fully closed position.
13. The operator now informs the supervisor that the transmission line 4 line has been earthed and that
he is coming back to base.
10.27 Maintenance
GIS equipment has showed great reliability over the last several decades. GIS factories are promoting a
“maintenance-free” approach. This does not mean that maintenance is not needed at all, but practice has showed
that very minimum maintenance is required for GIS installation in comparison to other substation technologies.
Following paragraphs focus on different aspects of maintenance and operation of GIS installations.
10.27.1 Typical Maintenance Processes
GIS manufacturers provide end users with suggested maintenance plans. These plans can insignificantly differ
between manufacturers but the basic principles are as follows.
- Verify proper operation of pressure switches, in the case of hydraulic mechanism use
- Verification of SF6 density relay operations
- Verification of control and alarm functions
- Verify the correct alignment and operation of position indicators
- Note down and verify circuit breakers operating times (from auxiliary switches) Exercise the circuit
breakers and switching elements
Standard DR Signal
3. For transmission Line (One & half breaker scheme)
MAIN-1
MAIN-2
A Configuration of ANALOG CHANNELS
S.No Channel Description Standardized Channel Name
1 R Phase Current I-R PH.
2 Y Phase Current I-Y PH.
3 B Phase Current I-B PH.
4 Neutral Current I-N PH.
5 R Phase Voltage V-R PH.
6 Y Phase Voltage V-Y PH.
7 B Phase Voltage V-B PH.
8 Open Delta Voltage V-N (Open Delta)
MAIN-1/2
Configuration of Digital Channels for 16 channels
Main 1
A Configuration of ANALOG CHANNELS
S.No. Channel Description Standardized Channel Name
1 R Phase Current I-R PH.
2 Y Phase Current I-Y PH.
3 B Phase Current I-B PH.
4 Neutral Current I-N PH
5 R Phase Voltage V-R PH.
6 Y Phase Voltage V-Y PH.
7 B Phase Voltage V-B PH.
8 Open Delta Voltage V-N-Open Delta
MAIN-2
A Configuration of ANALOG CHANNELS
S.No. Channel Description Standardized Channel Name
1 R Phase Current I-R PH.
2 Y Phase Current I-Y PH.
3 B Phase Current I-B PH.
4 Neutral Current I-N PH.
5 R Phase Voltage V-R PH.
6 Y Phase Voltage V-Y PH.
7 B Phase Voltage V-B PH.
8 Open Delta Voltage V-N (Open Delta)
System
8
Diagnosis
(SON) TIME SYNCHRONIZATION ERROR Y
System
9
Diagnosis
(SON) DIFFRENTIAL IED UNHEALTHY Y
DIFFERENTIAL RELAY GENERAL
10
SPI TRIP Y
11 SPI OTI ALARM Y
12 SPI WTI HV ALARM Y
13 SPI WTI IV ALARM Y
14 SPI WTI MV ALARM Y
15 SPI BUCCHOLZ TRIP Y
16 SPI OSR 1 TRIP Y
17 SPI PRD 1 TRIP Y
18
SPI FIRE PROTECTION OPERATED Y
19 SPI LOW OIL LEVEL Y
20 SPI OTI R PH ALARM Y
21 SPI OTI Y PH ALARM Y
22 SPI OTI B PH ALARM Y
23 SPI OTI SPARE ICT ALARM Y
24 SPI WTI HV R PH ALARM Y
25 SPI WTI HV Y PH ALARM Y
26 SPI WTI HV B PH ALARM Y
27 SPI WTI HV SPARE ICT ALARM Y
28 SPI WTI MV R PH ALARM Y
29 SPI WTI MV Y PH ALARM Y
30 SPI WTI MV B PH ALARM Y
31 SPI WTI MV SPARE ICT ALARM Y
32 SPI WTI IV R PH ALARM Y
System
4
Diagnosis
(SON) TIME SYNCHRONIZATION ERROR Y
5 System
Diagnosis
(SON) DIFFRENTIAL IED UNHEALTHY Y
6 SPI REF RELAY ALARM Y
7 SPI REF TRIP Y
8 SPI GENERAL TRIP Y
9 SPI REF TRIP Y
10 SPI OTI TRIP Y
11 SPI WTI HV TRIP Y
12 SPI WTI MV TRIP Y
13 SPI WTI LV TRIP Y
14 SPI OSR 2 TRIP Y
15 SPI PRD 2 TRIP Y
16 SPI BUCCHOLZ ALARM Y
17 SPI OTI R PH TRIP Y
18 SPI OTI Y PH TRIP Y
19 SPI OTI B PH TRIP Y
20 SPI OTI SPARE ICT TRIP Y
21 SPI WTI HV R PH TRIP Y
22 SPI WTI HV Y PH TRIP Y
23 SPI WTI HV B PH TRIP Y
24 SPI WTI HV SPARE ICT TRIP Y
25 SPI WTI MV R PH TRIP Y
26 SPI WTI MV Y PH TRIP Y
27 SPI WTI MV B PH TRIP Y
28 SPI WTI MV SPARE ICT TRIP Y
29 SPI WTI IV R PH TRIP Y
30 SPI WTI IV Y PH TRIP Y
31 SPI WTI IV B PH TRIP Y
32 SPI WTI IV SPARE ICT TRIP Y
33 SPI BUCCHOLZ R PH ALARM Y
34 SPI BUCCHOLZ Y PH ALARM Y
35 SPI BUCCHOLZ B PH ALARM Y
System
6
Diagnosis
(SON) TIME SYNCHRONIZATION ERROR Y
System
7
Diagnosis
(SON) M1 IED UNHEALTHY Y
8
SPI GOOSE RECEIPT FAIL/TROUBLE Y
ANY ADDITIONAL SIGNAL AS
9
PER SCHEME
System
4
Diagnosis
(SON) TIME SYNCHRONIZATION ERROR Y
System
5
Diagnosis
(SON) DIFFRENTIAL IED UNHEALTHY Y
DIFFERENTIAL RELAY GENERAL
6
SPI TRIP Y
7 SPI OTI ALARM Y
8 SPI WTI ALARM Y
9 SPI BUCCHOLZ TRIP Y
10 SPI OSR TRIP Y
11 SPI PRD TRIP Y
12
SPI FIRE PROTECTION OPERATED Y
13 SPI LOW OIL LEVEL Y
14 SPI OTI R PH ALARM Y
15 SPI OTI Y PH ALARM Y
16 SPI OTI B PH ALARM Y
17 SPI OTI SPARE PH ALARM Y
18 SPI WTI R PH ALARM Y
19 SPI WTI Y PH ALARM Y
20 SPI WTI B PH ALARM Y
21 SPI WTI SPARE ICT ALARM Y
22 SPI BUCCHOLZ R PH TRIP Y
23 SPI BUCCHOLZ Y PH TRIP Y
24 SPI BUCCHOLZ B PH TRIP Y
25 SPI BUCCHOLZ SPARE PH TRIP Y
26 SPI OSR R PH TRIP Y
27 SPI OSR Y PH TRIP Y
28 SPI OSR B PH TRIP Y
29 SPI OSR SPARE ICT TRIP Y
30 SPI PRD R PH TRIP Y
31 SPI PRD Y PH TRIP Y
SL.
NO.
WHETHER ALARM TO BE
TYPE EVENT/ALARM NAME GENERATED
System
1
Diagnosis
(SON) TIME SYNCHRONIZATION ERROR Y
System
2
Diagnosis
(SON) DIFFRENTIAL IED UNHEALTHY Y
3 SPI REF RELAY ALARM Y
4 SPI REF TRIP Y
5 SPI GENERAL TRIP Y
6 SPI REF TRIP Y
7 SPI OTI TRIP Y
8 SPI WTI TRIP Y
9 SPI BUCCHOLZ ALARM Y
10 SPI OTI R PH TRIP Y
11 SPI OTI Y PH TRIP Y
12 SPI OTI B PH TRIP Y
13 SPI OTI SPARE ICT TRIP Y
14 SPI WTI R PH TRIP Y
15 SPI WTI Y PH TRIP Y
16 SPI WTI B PH TRIP Y
17 SPI WTI SPARE PH TRIP Y
18 SPI BUCCHOLZ R PH ALARM Y
19 SPI BUCCHOLZ Y PH ALARM Y
20 SPI BUCCHOLZ B PH ALARM Y
21
SPI BUCCHOLZ SPARE PH ALARM Y
22
SPI GOOSE RECEIPT FAIL/TROUBLE Y
ANY ADDITIONAL SIGNAL AS PER
23
SCHEME
SL.
NO.
WHETHER ALARM TO BE
TYPE EVENT/ALARM NAME GENERATED
1 SPI START Z1
2 SPI Z1 TRIP Y
3 SPI GENERAL TRIP Y
4 DINT FAULT LOCATOR DISTANCE
5 SPI CVT FUSE FAIL Y
System
6
Diagnosis
(SON) TIME SYNCHRONIZATION ERROR Y
System
7
Diagnosis
(SON) M1 IED UNHEALTHY Y
22
SPI GOOSE RECEIPT FAIL/TROUBLE Y
ANY ADDITIONAL SIGNAL AS PER
8
SCHEME
4
System
Diagnosis
(SON) TIME SYNCHRONIZATION ERROR Y
System
5
Diagnosis
(SON) M1 IED UNHEALTHY Y
6
SPI GOOSE RECEIPT FAIL/TROUBLE Y
7
ANY ADDITIONAL SIGNAL AS PER
8
SCHEME
BLOCK AUTORECLOSE
3 SPI Y
FUNCTION
STATUS 1 AUTORECLOSE
FUNCTION READY
STATUS 2 AUTORECLOSE IN
Y
PROGRESS
STATUS 3 AUTORECLOSE
Y
SUCCESSFUL
4 INT Y
Available in
STATUS 10 AUTORECLOSE
Edition 2 IEDs, not
UNSUCCESSFUL
in Edition 1 IEDs
System
48 Diagnosis BCU UNHEALTHY Y
(SON)
CONDITIONS OK FOR
49 SPI
SYNCHRONIZATION
50 SPI SPRING DISCHARGED Y
51 SPI AC MOTOR SUPPLY FAIL Y
52 SPI SF6 GAS LOW Y
53 SPI OPERATION LOCKED OUT Y
CB READY FOR
54 SPI Y
AUTORECLOSURE
55 SPI DC SUPPLY FAIL Y
ANNUNCIATION
56 SPI TC-1 FAIL Y FOR CIRCUIT
57 SPI TC-2 FAIL Y BREAKER
POLE DISCREPANCY RELAY
58 SPI Y
OPTD
59 SPI COMPRESSOR SUPPLY FAIL Y
60 SPI AIR PRESSURE LOW Y
COMPRESSOR RUN TIME
61 SPI Y
SUPERVISION
62 SPI CSD FAIL Y
GAS COMPARTMENT n Alarm
63 SPI Y
Stage n
64 SPI LCC PANEL AC SUPPLY FAIL Y ANNUNCIATION
65 SPI LCC PANEL DC SUPPLY FAIL Y FOR GIS BAYS
SELECTOR SWITCH POSITION
66 SPI Y
LOCAL/REMOTE
FOR BCUs
67 SPI BUS VT MCB TRIP Y HAVING BUS VT
INPUT
48 V DC
1. Voltage of 48 V DCDB 1
2. Voltage of 48 V DCDB 2
3. Current from 48 V Battery set 1
4. Current from Battery Set 2
5. Current from 48 V Charger 1
6. Current from 48 V Charger 2
7. Battery 1 Output Voltage
8. Battery 2 Output Volatge
9. Charger Trouble 1
10. Charger Trouble 2
11. Charger 1 on Boost
DG Set
1. DG Set Breaker ON
2. DG Set Breaker OFF
3. Low Lube Oil Pressure
4. High Water Temperature
5. Engine Over Speed
6. Low Fuel in Service Tank
7. Over load Trip
8. Voltage RY, YB and BR
9. Current from DG set R, Y and B
Fire Fighting
1. Zone 1 Fire
2. Zone 2 Fire
3. Zone 3 Fire
4. Zone 4 Fire
5. Zone 5 Fire
Other Signal
1. PLCC Exchange Fail
2. Time Synch. Signal Fail
3. GPS Signal Fail
4. Current from Station transformer
5. Voltage from Station Transformer
6. Isolator Status of Station Transformer
7. Ambient Temperature
LV SIDE
HV SIDE
A11 R Phase A111
A31 Y Phase A131
A51 B Phase A151
A71 NEUTRAL A171
For Distance relay the ferrule will be A11, A31, A51, A71
Overcurrent and Earth Fault And Directional Overcurrent and Earth Fault
MARKINGS
C11 R Phase
C31 Y Phase
C51 B Phase
C71 NEUTRAL
If used for LV side of the Transformer it will be C111, C131, C151, C171
MARKINGS
D11 R Phase
D31 Y Phase
D51 B Phase
D71 NEUTRAL
If used for LV side of the Transformer it will be D111, D131, D151, D171
HV SIDE/LV SIDE
E11/E111 R Phase
E31E131 Y Phase
E51/E151 B Phase
E71/E171 NEUTRAL
7. J : DC SUPPLY
J1 + and J2 -
K1 + and K2 -
L1 + and L2 -
11. S : CT SECONDARY
3. Again tripped at Zone 1 with Zone 2 & 3 start but no tripping of Zone 2 & 3. The line
tripped in zone 1 and SOTF after AR.
Analysis
The Sarusajai-Kahilipara –IV CB at sarusajai end tripped showing Zone-1 and 0.9kM.
The CB of the Sarusajai-Kahilipara –IV at kahilipara end also tripped but at Zone 2 timing. The
distance was not recorded in the log book. Also the disturbance record was over-write by recent
pickup.
This fault was seen by relay 1, 3 & 4 in their respective zone 2 in forward direction.
The tripping of relay 3 in zone 2 timing (300mS) is possible if the fault was fed for more than
300mS. So that it initiate the tripping after 300mS.
The relay 4 & 5 was the fault in zone 2, so both the relay tripped at zone 2 timing.
Similarly the case with relay 1.
The relay 2 didn’t tripped, indicating the fault might have cleared before it initiate tripping.
The PT Voltage in the display of relay 5 was showing 150kV. However the voltage in the back
of relay terminal was around 110V phase to phase. The Analog card of this relay was replaced
with spare card and the voltage reading found to be correct (132kV).
This zone 2 tripping of the relays for a fault in one of the line can be avoided by carrier inter-
tripping.
PLCC had confirmed that the said PLCC panel at Sarusajai end is faulty due to the amplifier
unit. And thus the carrier protection is not possible at present.
If the amplifier unit is rectified, through checking of carrier inter-tripping between Sarusajai
and kahilipara is need.
Also the 48V DC source for PLCC is not yet commissioned
Observation:
Tripping of 220kV Samaguri-Sonabil feeder as per SLDC for the month of March 2017.
RYB PHASE ,
220 KV 16:56 TRIP RELAY
16 SMG - 19.03.17 10:01 19.03.17 6 55
Z-1 DISTANCE
SONABIL
15.1KM
220 KV
17 SMG - 22.03.17 11:10 22.03.17 13:10 S/D
SONABIL
220 KV G-TRIP,Z-1,
SMG - 25.03.17 10:53 25.03.17 11:04 11 DISTANCE
SONABIL 16.2KM
R,Y,B PHASE
DISTANCE
18 17.6 KM AT
220 KV
SONABIL,
SMG - 30.03.17 00:37 30.03.17 01:07 40
R,Y,B PHASE
SONABIL
DISTANCE
16.4 KM AT
SAMAGURI
220 KV G-TRIP,Z-1,
19 SMG - 25.03.17 11:05 25.03.17 16:45 5 40 DISTANCE
SONABIL 16.2KM
Cause of Tripping:
As per Nagaon T&T Division, the R-ph conductor of 220 KV SMG-Sonabil-1 feeder had snapped on
dated 17-09-16 in afternoon time over Brahamputra river at koliabhomora Bridge. After that the
snapped portion of the said R-ph conductor was recovered from river. Since, the water level of the
Tripping: 8th June 11:25: As per the fault report collected from the 220kV Sonabil-Samaguri GSS
Analysis
The 220kV Sonabil-Samaguri-I line tripped on Zone-3 on 8th June 2017. The fault was a high
resistive fault.
The Line was idle charged from Sonabil end. The fault was temporary and is due to existing
problem of R-phase conductor (which is tied to the suspension tower) snap in Brahmaputra
crossing which was later on charged through ground wire. The fault was very high resistive in
nature and so it was detected by the Distance relay in Zone 3 causing tripping.
Observation:
a. Before tripping the power flow in 132kV Sonabil-Depota line was 36.58 MW and in 132kV
Sonabil-AIDC was 33.89 MW
b. The 132kV Sonabil-AIDC line tripped on Distance Relay Zone 1 with current Iy = 5640A and
Ib = 5530A
c. The tripping for AIDC line was initiated by Distance relay and the tripping for sonabil line was
initiated by Overcurrent relay
Observation:
a. Before Tripping the power flow was 44.82 MW in 132kV Sonabil-Depota line and 38.43 MW in 132kV
Sonabil-AIDC line
b. Both these lines from Sonabil are in the same tower and both the relays of respective feeder have
detected the fault in Y-phase as shown above.
3rd Incident: Date: 09.10.17 Time: 13:33 Hrs
Conclusion:
a. Both these line 132kV Sonabil-Depota and 132kV Sonabil-AIDC are in the same tower.
b. Mostly detected fault was in Y-Phase in both lines
c. The Y-Phase is the bottom conductor of the tower in both the feeder.
d. It is also observed that the same type of fault occur in this line only in day time from 10:00 Hrs
to 15:00 Hrs.
e. It is suggested that the bottom conductor (Y-Phase) clearance with any vegetation should be
minimum 3 meters so that during day time due to sag the clearance is sufficient to maintain the
lines.
f. Four relays of the two lines are recording the same fault in each feeder.
FAULT PERIOD
REMEDIAL
Sl. TRIPPING RESTORATIO
DURATIO REASONS OF FAULT ACTION REMARKS
No. DATE TIME (IN N TIME (IN
N TAKEN
HRS) HRS)
100 MVA
08-07- 2 HRS 1 TRANSFORMER
1 16.26 18.27
2017 MIN TRIPPED AT
SAMAGURI END
KHALOIGAON
13-07-
2 11.55 12.03 8 MIN TRIPPED AT
2017
SAMAGURI END
DISTANCE RELAY
21-07-
3 10.55 11.01 6 MIN OPERATED AT ZONE 1
2017
SAMAGURI
23-07- 4 HRS 5 MAINTENANCE AT
4 8.01 12.06
2017 MINS SAMAGURI
27-07- DIRECTIONAL RELAY
5 3.15 3.38 23 MINS
2017 OPERATED
DISTANCE RELAY
28-08- ZONE 1 =
1 2.41 2.48 7 MINS OPERATED AT
2017 17.1KM
KHALOIGAON
03-09- MAINTENANCE AT
1 8.25 9.11 46 MINS
2017 SAMAGURI
04-09- 1 HR 3 MAINTENANCE AT
2 16.39 17.42
2017 MINS SAMAGURI
09-09- 1 HR 22 MAINTENANCE AT
3 9.02 10.24
2017 MINS SAMAGURI
09-09- 1 HR 33 MAINTENANCE AT
4 15.33 17.06
2017 MINS SAMAGURI
DISTANCE RELAY
17-09-
5 10.54 11 6 MINS OPERATED AT
2017 DISTANCE
SAMAGURI
NOT
DISTANCE RELAY
17-09- LOCATED
6 13.28 13.34 6 MINS OPERATED AT
2017
KHALOIGAON
24-09- 2 HRS 33 MAINTENANCE AT
7 8.36 11.09
2017 MINS SAMAGURI
From the above report it is seen that all the relays are working properly in time during conductor
snap and disc failure to evade electrical hazard.
Power flow
4.1.2 Observation:
a. As per the Rangia control room record the 132kV Kamalpur and 132kV Rangia use to take power
from Bhutan isolating 132kV Kahilipara- Kamalpur (idle charged) and 132kV Kamalpur-Sishugram
(idle Charged).
b. It has been observed by shift-in-charge that just after the above arrangement the 132kV Voltage at
Rangia bus is 136kV, however gradually it deceases from 136 kV to 113kV (or below) with load and
observed frequency at that moment of time is 49.88HZ and finally get tripped at Bhutan end.
c. A snap shoot of the voltage indicated in the relay (taken by Control room shift-in-charge) is below:
e. If 132kV Kamalpur is connected to either Kahilipara or Sishugram the voltage profile at Rangia
substation is well maintained at 132kV.
1. “Task Force for Power System Analysis under Contingencies” March 2014
3. CBIP website.
4. POSOCO website.