1206E Gender and Economic Choice RQA 2012

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
Case Study Series
Gender and Economic Choice:

What’s Old and What’s New for Women in Afghanistan
Results from a Rapid Qualitative Assessment in
Kabul and Parwan Provinces
Chona R. Echavez
March 2012
Editing and Layout: Oliver Lough
Cover Photograph: A women’s focus group discussion in Bamiyan Province, by

Massouda Kohistani
AREU Publication Code: 1206E
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Gender and Economic Choice: What’s Old and What’s New for Women in Afghanistan?
About the Author

Chona R. Echavez is a Senior Researcher at the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
(AREU). Before joining AREU in January 2010, Chona served as an Asia Fellow in Cambodia
at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, during which she looked into healing,
dreams, aspirations and concepts of peace among Cambodian youth. She also worked
as Senior Research Associate at the Research Institute for Mindanao Culture where she
managed a research portfolio that included: population, health, peace and livelihood
programmes, considering gender as a cross-cutting issue. She has a Ph.D. in Demography
from the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. Her dissertation was on
women and factory work in Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines.
About the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) is an independent research
institute based in Kabul. AREU’s mission is to inform and influence policy and practice
through conducting high-quality, policy-relevant research and actively disseminating the
results, and to promote a culture of research and learning. To achieve its mission AREU
engages with policymakers, civil society, researchers and students to promote their use
of AREU’s research and its library, to strengthen their research capacity, and to create
opportunities for analysis, reflection and debate.
AREU was established in 2002 by the assistance community working in Afghanistan and
has a board of directors with representation from donors, the United Nations and other
multilateral agencies, and nongovernmental organisations. AREU receives core funds
from the governments of Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. Specific
projects in 2011 have been funded by the European Commission (EC), the International
Development Research Centre (IDRC), the Humanitarian Aid Department of the European
Commission (ECHO), the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and UN
Women.
Acknowledgements
The author would like thank the following: The people in the four communities whose
answers informed this work; the local government officials at all levels for the support
they gave in the course of the study; OSDR and the research team that collected the data
and for their patience in handling the countless questions and clarifications; Jennefer
Lyn L. Bagaporo for the tedious work in the initial processing and analysis of the data
and assistance in the writing up; and Michael Lou Montejo and Oliver Lough for their help
with layout and editing.
Chona R. Echavez
March 2012
Table of Contents
Glossary��vi
Acronyms��vi
1. Introduction�� 1
2. Methodology and Study Contexts �� 4
2.1 The study context................................................................. 5
3. Power and Freedom�� 11
3.1 How free time is spent: Young and adult men and women................. 11
3.2 Steps on the ladder of power and freedom (LOPF).......................... 11
3.3 Movement along the LOPF....................................................... 17
3.4 Shifts in women’s and men’s levels of empowerment over the past
decade............................................................................... 19
4. Marriage and Children�� 23
4.1 What makes an ideal spouse? .................................................. 23
4.2 Timing of marriage............................................................... 24
4.3 Marriage practice: Outcomes and possibility of changing.................. 25
4.4 Family size and family planning................................................ 25
4.5 Gender equality and domestic violence....................................... 27
4.6 Divorce: Taboo as a topic of discussion ....................................... 28
5. Education�� 30
5.1 Who is currently sent to school? Why?......................................... 30
5.2 Desire for education.............................................................. 31
6. Economic Opportunities�� 32
6.1 What are the best and worst jobs? ............................................ 32
6.2 Women’s access to paid work................................................... 32
6.3 Types of job available to men and women.................................... 33
6.4 Economic cooperation between women and men........................... 36
7. Summary and Conclusion�� 37
Annex�� 41
Bibliography�� 55
Boxes
Box 1: Without peace, there can be no development........................................ 5
Box 2: The women’s shura and NSP beneficiaries: Spaces and avenues for women to
share and learn............................................................................. 9
Box 3: Getting an education: The negative result as perceived by families.............. 8
Box 4: A return to tomorrow..................................................................... 9
v
Tables
Table 1: Provinces and communities covered by the RQA study and selection criteria...4
Table 2: Empowerment index of Boyina Bagh, Kabul Province............................. 20
Table 3: Empowerment index of Shirabad Ulya, Kabul Province........................... 20
Table 4: Empowerment index of Kart-i-Bakheter, Parwan Province....................... 20
Table 5: Empowerment index of Naw Da, Parwan Province................................. 21
Annex Table 1: Summary table of fieldwork activities conducted in Boyina Bagh,
Shirabad Ulya, Kabul; and Kart-i-Bakheter, Naw Da, Parwan....................... 41
Annex Table 2: Number of participants from CQs, FGDs, and mini-case studies........ 42
Annex Table 3: Socio-demographic profile of adult FGD participants..................... 42
Annex Table 4: Socio-demographic profile of youth FGD participants..................... 42
Annex Table 5: Best and worst ways to make a living: Responses of adult female and
male FGD participants in Boyina Bagh, Kabul Province.............................. 43
Annex Table 6: Best and worst ways to make a living: Responses of youth female and
male FGD participants in Boyina Bagh, Kabul Province.............................. 43
male FGD participants in Shirabad Ulya, Kabul Province............................ 44
male FGD participants in Shirabad Ulya, Kabul Province............................ 44
male FGD participants in Kart-i-Bakheter, Parwan Province........................ 45
male FGD participants in Kart-i-Bakheter, Parwan Province........................ 45
male FGD participants in Naw Da, Parwan Province................................. 46
male FGD participants in Naw Da, Parwan Province................................. 46
Annex Table 13: Characteristics of a good wife today: Results of female and male
adults’ FGDs................................................................................ 47
Annex Table 14: Characteristics of a good husband today: Results of female and male
adults’ FGDs................................................................................ 47
Annex Table 15: Characteristics of a good wife of the previous generation: Results of
female and male adults’ FGDs........................................................... 48
Annex Table 16: Female youth daily schedules in Boyina Bagh, Kabul Province......... 48
Annex Table 17: Male youth daily schedules in Boyina Bagh, Kabul Province............ 49
Annex Table 18: Female youth daily schedules in Shirabad Ulya, Kabul Province....... 49
Annex Table 19: Male youth daily schedules in Shirabad Ulya, Kabul Province.......... 50
Annex Table 20: Female youth daily schedules in Kart-i-Bakheter, Parwan Province... 50
Annex Table 21: Male youth daily schedules in Kart-i-Bakheter, Parwan Province...... 51
Annex Table 22: Female youth daily schedules in Naw Da, Parwan Province............ 51
Annex Table 23: Male youth daily schedules in Naw Da, Parwan Province................ 52
Annex Table 23: Placement of women on the LOPF at present and 10 years ago by
percentage—Responses from female adults........................................... 52
vi
Annex Table 25: Placement of men on the LOPF at present and 10 years ago by
percentage—Responses from male adults.............................................. 52
Annex Table 26: Causes of tension, forms of abuse and consequences of abuse—
Responses of adult men and women in Boyina Bagh, Kabul Province............. 53
Responses of adult men and women in Shirabad Ulya, Kabul Province........... 53
Responses of adult men and women in Kart-i-Bakheter, Parwan Province........ 54
Responses of adult men and women in Naw Da, Parwan Province................. 54
Glossary
jirga community council; normally an ad-hoc body convened to discuss
a specific issue
mahram male chaperone
shura community council; more often a standing body with a fixed
membership
walwar bride price
Acronyms
ANDS Afghanistan National Development Strategy
AREU Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
BRAC Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
CDC Community Development Council
CEDAW The Convention to Eliminate all forms of Discrimination Against Women
CQ community questionnaire
FGD focus group discussion
GoA Government of Afghanistan
LOPF ladder of power and freedom
MISFA Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan
NGO nongovernmental organisation
NSP National Solidarity Programme
OSDR Organisation for Sustainable Development Research
RQA rapid qualitative assessment
vii
1. Introduction
The status of women in Afghanistan is one of the lowest in the world in areas ranging
from health, deprivation of rights, protection against violence, economic productivity,
education and literacy.1 Currently challenged by severe depletion of intellectual resources
due to decades of exclusion and constraints, exposure to violence, and disadvantages
across multiple aspects of their lives, their participation in the country’s public life is also
minimal.2 If education is one of the keys that can help solve the problems Afghan women
currently face, the 2007 Afghanistan Human Development Report3 paints a bleak picture:
Enrollment rates for women at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels
are almost half that of men—41.8% for females and 73.7% for males...
Afghanistan’s adult literacy rate sadly ranks among the lowest in the world...
Only 23.5% of the population, 15 and older can read and write. More shocking,
only an estimated 12.6% of women are literate, compared to 32.4% of men.
The female to male literacy ratio is 0.4 for the entire population, far lower
than in neighboring countries such as Iran (0.8) and Pakistan (0.6).
Afghan women’s health status is also considered among the worst in the world, with
maternal mortality at 1,800 per 100,0004 live birth, a fertility rate of 7.3,5 and female life
expectancy at birth at only 43.5 years.6 These are but a few examples of the challenges
Afghan women face—challenges that are to a significant degree rooted in family, culture,
tradition and religion. For example, both women and men regularly cite tradition when
not allowing women to go to school or to work outside the home, and women’s access
to economic opportunities is constrained by discriminatory attitudes that restrict their
mobility, limit their economic choice and hinder control over assets. However, the harsh
realities that women face in Afghanistan should not be viewed in isolation from the
country’s experience of wars that have shaped women’s current position within their
homes, their communities and society as a whole.
The Human Development Report7 noted that despite decades of war and suffering,
Afghanistan continues to make progress in achieving its development goals. The
Government of Afghanistan (GoA) has made commitments and crafted legislation
and policy to uphold and promote gender equality. These include the following: The
Constitution of Afghanistan (particularly Articles 22, 44 and 54); acceding to the UN
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW);
and drafting and implementing the Afghanistan Compact, the Afghanistan National
Development Strategy (ANDS), and the National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan.
However, despite these measures and commitments, notions of women’s second class
status remain entrenched and can continue to pose a barrier to change. Developments
such as parliament’s passage of the highly regressive Shia Personal Status Law in 2009
also suggest that even these fragile gains are reversible.
1 MOWA and UNIFEM, “Women and Men in Afghanistan: Baseline Statistics on Gender” (Kabul: Ministry of
Women’s Affairs, 2008).
2 Government of Afghanistan, “National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan 2008-18” (Kabul:
Ministry of Women’s Affairs, 2008).
3 Center for Policy and Human Development/United Nations Development Programme, “Afghanistan
Human Development Report 2007” (Islamabad: Army Press, 2007), 24.
4 UNDP, Power, Voices and Rights; A Turning Point for Gender Equality in Asia and the Pacific 2000-2005
figure from Table 6: Inequalities (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2010), 211.
5 Power, Voices and Rights, 207.
6 Power, Voices and Rights, 210.
7 “Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007,” 3.
1
One of the themes that emerged in a conference that tried to understand the gender
dynamics in Afghanistan and Afghan women’s role in their society was that gender
policies have always been part of a larger debate between traditionalist and modernist
forces in Afghanistan.8 The same conference noted that recent Afghan history recorded
this pattern:
...beginning with King Amanullah (1919-1929), continuing with the reign of

King Zahir Shah (1933-1973); Daoud’s presidency after the coup d’état (1973-
1978); the Marxist regime (1978-1989); the Mujahideen resistance movement
(1979-1994); and the Taliban regime (1994-2001).
In this trend, efforts to support and emancipate women have often been led by male
political leaders as a component of the state’s modernisation policy and have been
challenged and at times reversed by the conservative beliefs of religious leaders, the
rural population, and more recently by organised religious movements which have
gained control of the apparatus of state.9 In recent years, women’s role in the public
sphere has thus been both strengthened and barred through legislative reforms. The
past 30 years of war and political upheavals have also been particularly harsh on women
and girls. The societal changes resulting from both prolonged exposure to conflict and
instability and the emergence of radical religious ideologies as a political force have
significantly impacted on religious and cultural practices and attitudes in a way that
disproportionately affects women.10
As Afghanistan enters what is supposed to be a post-conflict transition period, the

need to understand the kinds of changes women and men of all ages have experienced
in recent decades is thus imperative. As the country’s economy changes and as
connectivity rises, it is especially important to look into the gender dimensions that
surround economic decision-making. Are they changing, and if so, how? In asking this
question, it is also important to take into account certain factors that can contribute
to change, such as access to markets and areas of production, schools at all levels, and
long-term development initiatives like the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) that
involve women’s participation.
In response to these questions, AREU conducted a rapid qualitative assessment (RQA)

in cooperation with the World Bank, which eventually formed part of the basis for the
latter’s 2012 World Development Report.11 Covering two rural and urban communities
in Kabul (Shirabad Ulya and Boyina Bagh) and Parwan (Kart-i-Bakheter and Naw Da) and
using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods, it examined: 1) women’s and men’s
subjective views of and experiences in making key economic decisions, such as how
to make a living and how to build and protect major assets; and 2) whether and how
the gender norms surrounding these choices are shifting as educational opportunities
expand.12 In the process of delving into these research objectives, this study has also
8 “Transition Within Tradition: Restoring Women’s Participation in Afghanistan” (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Kennedy School Women and Public Policy Programme, 2001).
9 It is also important to note that in addition to the dynamics of tradition and modernity, efforts at
extending women’s rights have also tied into conflicts over the balance between the reach of the central
state, and the autonomy of its rural periphery. See Deniz Kandiyoti, “Old Dilemmas or New Challenges? The
Politics of Gender and Reconstruction in Afghanistan,” Development and Change 38, no. 2 (2007): 169-99.
10 Kandiyoti, “Old Dilemmas or New Challenges?”
11 World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development (Washington,
DC: The World Bank, 2011) http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2012/
Resources/7778105-1299699968583/7786210-1315936222006/Complete-Report.pdf (accessed 19 January
2012).
12 The RQA dovetails with AREU’s study funded by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC)
2
grappled with concepts of gender power relations and social norms as manifested in the
Afghan case. Is there an evidence of shifting gender norms and how may those shifts be
affecting the economic options and decisions of women and men in different roles as
individuals, members of households, workers, and citizens?
A main tool for analysis in this study has been the fictional “ladder of power of freedom”
(LOPF) which participants in each study community were asked to construct. In line with
parallel World Bank studies in other countries, women and men in all study areas were
asked to place a set number of representative women and men in their communities
on different steps of the LOPF, with the most powerful at the top and the least at the
bottom.13
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 outlines the study’s
methodology and the socio-economic context of each study community. Section 3
explores the dynamics of the LOPF in each community, looking at women’s place relative
to men as well as how people move up—and down—the ladder. In light of these findings,
Section 4 examines questions of marriage and family formation, Section 5 focuses on
access to and desires for education, and Section 6 explores perceptions of women’s
and men’s economic roles, and the kinds of economic opportunities available to each.
Section 7 outlines the study’s key findings, and the Annex contains the study’s data in
table format.
on women’s participation in development initiatives. This project explores women’s participation in the NSP
and Microfinance Institutions (MFIs), examining the effects these forms of participation are having on gender
roles and relations within the family and the local community. For more information, see Chona Echavez,
“Does Women’s Participation in the National Solidarity Programme Make a Difference in their Lives? A Case
Study in Balkh Province” (Kabul: AREU, 2012); Sogol Zand, “The Impact of Microfinance Programmes on
Women’s Lives: A Case Study in Parwan Province” (Kabul: AREU, 2010); Chona Echavez, “Does Women’s
Participation in the National Solidarity Programme Make a Difference in their Lives? A Case Study in Parwan
Province” (Kabul: AREU, 2010); and Sogol Zand, “The Impact of Microfinance Programmes on Women’s Lives:
A Case Study in Kabul Province” (Kabul: AREU, 2011).
13 For more information, see “Women’s pathways to empowerment: Do all roads lead to
Rome?” in World Development Report 2012, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2012/
Resources/7778105-1299699968583/7786210-1316090663409/Spread-1.pdf (accessed 19 January 2012).
3
2. Methodology and Study Contexts

This study focused on a total of four communities—one rural and one urban—in both Kabul
(Boyina Bagh and Shirabad Ulya) and Parwan (Naw Da and Kart-i-Bakheter) provinces.
For selection criteria in each case see Table 1 below.
Table 1. Provinces and communities covered in the RQA study and selection
criteria
Rural (is located quite a distance Urban (is located near schools ,
from schools, market and areas market and areas of production, e.g.
Province of production, e.g. factories), factory), residents have a relatively
residents have a relatively low higher level of education (especially
level of education. Kart-i-Bakheter)
Naw Da (NSP implemented just Kart-i-Bakheter (NSP implemented in
Parwan
recently) 2006)
Boyina Bagh (NSP implemented in Shirabad Ulya (NSP implemented just
Kabul
2006) recently)
The study employed a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, with focus
group discussions (FGDs) involving male and female adults and young people as the main
qualitative tool. For the quantitative method, a community questionnaire was employed,
as well as supplementary data gleaned from the FGDs. Fieldwork for this study lasted
for a month and involved two teams, one working in each province. Debriefing sessions
were conducted after the completion of fieldwork in each area, followed by a series of
exchanges and meetings with the teams to clarify points reflected in the transcripts as
well as the contextual underpinnings of answers given.
Wherever possible, team members attempted to cover all parts of the questionnaires and
interview guides with participants. However, people were reluctant to answer questions
regarding family issues, specifically about living arrangements, decisions about how
many children to have, use of family planning, causes of disagreements, and divorce. A
summary of activities conducted with study participants in all four areas is presented in
Annex Table 1.
Characteristics of informants and participants
A total of 162 females and males participated in the study, comprising 91 adults over
25 and 71 youths aged 18-25 (see Annex Table 2). Forty-eight percent (77 people) of
participants were female. Overall, the number of participants from the two rural
communities was slightly greater than that from the urban communities.
The socio-demographic characteristics of the adult participants are shown in Annex

Table 3. The majority were in their early 30s and late 40s. All of them were married with
4-6 children. Although as a group, the majority of these participants had not been able
to go to school, this was disproportionately the case with female adults, 86 percent of
which had no formal education. By contrast, 30 percent of the male adults had reached
10-12th grade level.
The profile of the younger participants is presented in Annex Table 4. The majority were
between 18 and 21, and were single. As with the adult participants, a greater number
of female than male youths had not gone to school—around 76 percent compared to 29
percent (several male youths had by contrast reached 10-12th grade level). In addition,
4
the majority of this group were childless, although several young women already had
between four and six children.
2.1 The study context

Kabul Province
Boyina Bagh
Boyina Bagh is a community in Kalakan District, Kabul Province. The area is four kilometers
away from the district centre where most government offices are located. At present,
the village has approximately 600 residents, the majority of whom are Tajiks. Comparing
the situation ten years ago, the community questionnaire (CQ) informants reported that
the community had become more prosperous, with a ten percent decrease in the number
of poor people.
Struggling with the legacies of prolonged conflict, the area around Boyina Bagh still has a
weak local market. The upheavals prior to 2001 had made it impossible for people there to
produce beyond subsistence levels. Although the situation has improved over the past ten
years, people there still have to go to other villages or to the district centre to purchase
goods.
The availability of work for both men and women in both private and public arenas remains
virtually nil. However, women and men can now find some work in private companies as
long as they have friends and relatives to assist their entry. The CQ informants claimed
that there were now women in their community who were engaged in income-generating
activities. In the past, women did not or were not allowed to work outside the home due to
security fears as well the lack of job opportunities. For women, access to the public sector
is now limited not so much by security or cultural constraints—both of which have lessened
in significance—as it is by of their low education levels and the lack of available jobs.
Box 1: Without peace, there can never be development

Malik Sahib [the village head] led a group of villagers here in Boyina Bagh to participate
in a Jihad. The Jihad cost the lives of 76 people from a neighboring community. Enmity
surged between the families in the two communities. This caused mobility problems for all
residents in the area. In 2007, a member of parliament from Kalakan District, Mohammad
Dawood Kalakani, mediated for the feuding villages. He called for a shura [council] among
the villagers in order to solve the existing violent conflict. When the villagers convened,
they agreed to bury the past and live together as brothers, sisters and friends, accepting
that the casualties of the conflict are with Allah in Heaven. In addition, those who were
directly involved in the conflict were asked to forget what they did at that time.
Da’wud, 45, CQ Informant, Boyina Bagh
The coming together of the villagers, celebrated with a ceremony of peace, was
considered a historic event. People in the area found it a significant contributor to
the present and possibly future peace conditions in the community. The outcomes of
the shura were described as follows: 1) people no longer live in fear and live more
happily; 2) everyone can move freely outside the community and visit other villages,
including those that they were once in conflict with, women can visit their relatives
and parents who are living in another community; 3) there are intermarriages of
people from the two areas; and 4) girls and young women are now allowed to go to
school.
5
The village is largely bereft of services, lacking a clinic, electricity, piped water, a public
standpipe, a public sewage system and a bus service. The only school in the community
is the newly-opened girl’s school, which runs up to grade 4. Although most school-age
children now attend primary school, the number of enrolees in secondary schools is less
than half of the number based on their age and at what educational level they should
be. Boys and girls go to separate schools. Ten years ago, the village’s only source of
information was the national radio station. At present, the community has access to
a local newspaper and national television stations. The CQ informants were able to
enumerate three associations present in the community.
As stated earlier, the community has been torn by violent conflicts. Box 1 presents one
episode that was resolved through mediation. At present, there is no conflict of any kind
within Boyina Bagh or with other places. Within the community, meetings to mediate
and resolve disputes do take place, but are only attended by a small proportion of the
community and involve no women For the past ten years, Boyina Bagh has had an elected
leader, and currently has a shura (community council) charged with looking after the
area’s welfare. However, the community has never had a female leader, and all members
of the shura are men. They do have a separate shura for women, which has been active
during the NSP implementation. However, it was noted that the women’s CDC and the
projects it implemented had led to some changes in women’s lives (see Box 2).
Box 2: The women’s shura and NSP beneficiaries: Spaces and avenues for
women to share and learn
Under the women’s shura, tailoring and literacy courses were organised for women in
the village. Informants raised some issues regarding transparency and accountability
with project money, while some pointed out that they had gained little from the
tailoring course it organised since the teacher was not good. However, in spite of these
misgivings, they also noted some changes that had happened in the lives of those who
attended the courses as well as those women who were elected as members of the
women’s shura.
In an FGD conducted with NSP course beneficiaries, Razeya, a 17-year-old Tajik

housewife, reflected on the skills she had learned as well as her interaction with
other women in the community after attending the tailoring course:
It may not have had an impact on the others but it was good for me because now I can
sew my clothes in my house...Now, we can share our experience with other women. Like,
yesterday, someone came to our house and told me that she cut a dress and was asking
for guidance on how to proceed. Now, I also go to my neighbour’s house and we exchange
information about our day-to-day lives. Before, we never had this interaction.
Razeya’s view was shared by older women who were either project beneficiaries or
members of the women’s shura. This view is summed up in a quote from Gul Nissa, a
35-year-old illiterate Tajik housewife, in an FGD for beneficiaries.
It did not bring big changes but we have made some contacts that we did not have before.
I found more courage to talk with people from inside and outside of our community. It is
courage and confidence that we gained.
Although little change was observed in their income-earning ability, the courage
and confidence they gained in meeting women from outside the community and the
fellowship they felt with women within it could lead to an increased sense of solidarity
to do things together as a group for the good of the wider community.
6
Shirabad Ulya
Until four years ago, there was some confusion over which district Shirabad Ulya actually
belonged to, which may account for why its needs had received scant attention in
previous years. The community is composed of 60 percent Tajiks, 35 percent Pashtuns,
and five percent of other ethnic groups. The CQ informants reported a ten percent
increase in the number of poor people compared to ten years ago. At present, 60 percent
of its population of 2,500 remain in poverty. The same informant explained that despite
the presence of better amenities in their area, such as the installation of water pipes
in 2007, supply has been unable to keep up with the speed of population growth and
resources remain scarce.
Unlike its rural counterpart Boyina Bagh, Shirabad Ulya has its own local market located
about 1.5 kilometres from the centre of the community. Although the economic situation
in the area remains poor, the local market has become more active over the past decade.
The CQ informants were confident in saying that, at present, both women and men can
work in private and public companies if assisted by friends, relatives or professional
employment agencies. This was not the case ten years ago. The informants noted that
ten years ago, men from the community were never hired by private institutions because
of their lack of skills and the preference of private company owners to hire their own
relatives, and could not enter the public sector because the government was unstable.
As for women, working outside the house was not an option since the Taliban regime
prohibited them from engaging in paid work.
Although the CQ informants explained that women can now find work outside the home,
details about the types of work available still demonstrated the disadvantaged position
of women compared to men. The CQ informants said that women did not work in factories
because the tasks are physically laborious, and most factories prefer other nationalities
such as Indians and Pakistanis for higher-paying positions because of their technical
knowledge. Other factors raised by informants that hindered women’s participation in
the labour force compared to men included women’s low educational attainment, the
distance of government and other offices from their community, and the lack of relatives
to vouch for women seeking employment.
In terms of social services, Shirabad Ulya is better off than Boyina Bagh. While it is
about the same distance from the district centre, it has much better access to reliable
transport services. The whole community has access to electricity, while pipe-borne
water is available to about half of the residents and there are communal water sources
for those who do not have faucets in their homes. That said, there are very few reliable
sources of clean drinking water. People in the community now have access to national
television stations as well as radio broadcasts and newspapers.
However, the community is similar to Boyina Bagh in its lack of schools, health centres,
and a public sewage system. Noteworthy though is that even with schools 6.5 kilometers
away, this distance seems negligible; most school-age children attend school, and half
of their number are in secondary school. Boys and girls go to separate schools. Shirabad
Ulya is now reportedly peaceful, with no friction between the community’s ethnic groups
or disputes or disagreements with other areas.
Currently, there are three associations present in the community. Like those in Boyina
Bagh, none of these organisations are relevant to women, but unlike those in Boyina
Bagh, these organisations do not interact on a regular basis with organisations outside
the community.
7
Box 3: Getting an education: The negative result as perceived by families

At the beginning of the Karzai administration, Shirabad Ulya experienced what could
be called a backlash against sending girls and young women to school. An educated,
young woman got married to a man without asking her family’s permission. Disgusted,
the woman’s father wrote to the government about what his daughter did. He insisted
that the family members would not accept the marriage.
A jirga (ad-hoc council) was called together with the woman and the man’s parents.
They discussed and agreed that the boy should provide the girl 300,000 Afs and a
payment of gold for the marriage to be accepted.
This event had an impact on women’s access to education, discouraging families

from sending their daughters to school. The villagers thought that women who got
educated would decide to marry on their own without consulting the parents and the
rest of their families. Furthermore, it remains established practice that parents are
the one who decide when and whom to marry. For a long time, girls were not allowed
to go to school.
In the past year, the elders of the community have been gathering and conducting
organised meetings to resolve conflicts in the community. None of this would have
happened ten years ago. While attendance was higher than in Boyina Bagh, the
gatherings remained exclusively male affairs. Shirabad Ulya now has an elected leader
and a shura. Like Boyina Bagh, Shirabad Ulya has a separate shura for women, but has
never had elected female leaders.
Parwan Province
Kart-i-Bakheter
The land of Kart-i-Bakheter used to be government estate. In 1979, it was turned into a
residential area to house government employees. The village, at present, has a population
of 660 people, predominantly Tajiks. Kart-i-Bakheter is relatively near schools, markets
and areas of production such as factories, and residents have relatively high levels of
education compared to neighbouring communities. It has a good road network and is
close to the district centre and the main highway to Kabul. The population of Parwan
Province as a whole has access to good education facilities and benefits from Kabul’s
growing network of higher education institutions.
The CQ informants of Kart-i-Bakheter confirmed that there had been progress in their
community over the past ten years, with the estimated number of poorer inhabitants
falling from 30 percent to ten percent. This was attributed to better governance, the
collapse of the Taliban regime, and the return of people who migrated to other places
to escape it. Returnees reportedly brought with them new skills, ideas and knowledge,
making a major contribution to Kart-i-Bakheter’s recovery and prosperity.
Like the Kabul communities, development in the area was slow compared to other
communities in Parwan. However, it appears that apart from being more active
compared to the situation ten years ago, the community’s local market has improved
more than that in either Boyina Bagh and Shirabad Ulya. This is largely due to a stable
security situation and population growth following the return of migrants. Open daily,
it has the goods to meet households’ daily needs.
8
Box 4: A return to tomorrow

Returning migrants brought different ideas about women’s rights and value of education
back to Kart-i-Bakheter, reportedly contributing to an increase in the mobility and
decision-making capacities of women. People who migrated were exposed to more
liberal and progressive ideas compared with those who stayed behind. Younger couples
are now more open to practicing equality in their relationships; women now are
no longer confined to household work and men are now helping with the household
chores as well.
...Through the experience of migration, they saw different cultures and different ideas
with regard to women...Our people saw in Iran and Pakistan that the girls can study in
school and in universities and eventually they can also go to offices to work. Now in our
district, women can study in schools and in universities. They can go to offices to work.
Our people know that the community cannot improve without women’s participation.
Jalil, Deputy District Governor [Parwan Province]
There has also been an improvement in the employment scenario in the community. Both
women and men now have better chances of working in private and public institutions
compared to ten years ago, as long as they have friends and relatives to facilitate their
entry. This change has been accompanied by an increase in the number of women and
even young girls working outside the home, with tradition no longer preventing women
from getting paid work. Still, only a few people have jobs or are engaged in paid work
due to limited work opportunities both in the public and the private sectors.
Kart-i-Bakheter is the only community in this study to have a relatively reliable sewage
system. It is also better off than the two Kabul communities in terms of education
services and access to information. The community has a government-run primary school
and a lower secondary school. All children of primary school age and most of the children
of secondary school age are in school. There are separate schools for boys and girls.
In terms of access to information, the community now has access to both local and
national radio stations, national newspapers, and national television stations, as well as
producing its own bulletin.
However, there is still no bus service to the district centre two kilometres away, and
only a few houses have access to unreliable grid electricity. The community has no
piped water and very few standpipes, and people still rely on the nearby canal as a
source of drinking water. In addition, there are no private or public health centres.
Community relations are reportedly harmonious, a fact attributed to the high literacy of
its residents. The area also apparently has no history or incidents of conflicts with other
communities.
The number of organised shura meetings in the village has also increased in the past
ten years. The CQ informants claimed that 80 percent of the population have attended
such meetings. Like Boyina Bagh and Shirabad Ulya, all of those who attend are male
residents of the area. Kart-i-Bakheter has always had an elected community leader,
although never a female one. Similar to Boyina Bagh and Shirabad Ulya, it now has
separate shuras for women and men.
Naw Da
Naw Da is a rural community located in a wide stretch of mountain and rocky desert, and
quarrying stones in the mountains is the most common work of the people in this community.
9
CQ informants offered conflicting assessments of Naw Da’s prosperity First, they

explained that Naw Da is less prosperous than it was ten years ago, yet when asked about
how the percentage of poor people in the community had changed in the same period,
they said that there had been a slight decrease (from 100 percent to 90 percent). Naw
Da is the least prosperous of the four study communities. There are no jobs available
for its residents and 85 percent of the population are illiterate. The area was badly
damaged during fighting in the Taliban period, and while the change of regime in 2001
has signalled a time of community reconstruction, change and transformation have been
neither quick nor easy.
Naw Da does not have its own local market. To obtain household goods, residents have
to go to Charikar City, six kilometres away. People complained about the high prices of
goods in the city’s markets, as well as the cost of actually getting there, which could
be as much as 30 Afs (a little under US$1). However, the city at least has a more active
market going on than during the Taliban period, when it was reportedly almost empty.
Public and private sector job opportunities remain largely absent, with no improvement
over the past decade, a problem CQ informants blamed on both the Taliban authorities and
the present government. Without education, it is reportedly impossible for community
members to find any kind of government employment. Women in Naw Da do not engage
in paid work. Even if cultural perceptions in this regard have changed over the past ten
years, there remain no job opportunities that would allow women to do so.
Further aggravating the lack of economic activities in the community is the lack of basic
social services. Residents have to go to Charikar to access clinics and other services,
and even public transportation there is unreliable. The village has a government-run
lower secondary school, but fewer than half of school-age children attend. Naw Da is
different from the other study communities in that the school has a mixed intake of both
boys and girls. The area has six mosques, but no public or private health centre, and no
electricity. The community also has no access to any form of information via the media,
and information comes mostly from cellphones owned by around half the population.
Naw Da also has a major water supply problem. With no piping system or any community
standpipes for water, people depend on streams, water holes, and ponds for all their
water needs, including drinking water. Even these sources are only available three to
four months a year. For the rest of the year, they rely on the rain or fetch water from
springs located up to one kilometre from the village—a task given to women and children
that can occupy almost six hours of their day.
The residents of Naw Da are mostly Sunni Mazhab Tajiks. The CQ informants claimed
that there is no distinct division in ethnicity and religion within the community, though
tensions do sometimes occur. They also mentioned that Naw Da residents run into
sometimes violent disputes over water with people from nearby villages.
There were organised meetings in the area in the past year which they did not have ten
years ago. Like all the other communities included in this study, all the attendees of
these meetings are men. What is distinct in Naw Da is that only members of the different
shuras of each mosque had joined these meetings. These people were considered as the
representatives and the meetings were not intended for all the residents of the entire
place. Shura meetings in Naw Da are also only held when there is a need for it.
At present, there are no groups or organisations in the village apart from shuras in each
of the mosques. Nevertheless, the area now has an elected leader, which they did not
have ten years ago. As in the other study communities, there are no women leaders in
Naw Da, a fact CQ informants attributed to women’s lack of education.
10
3. Power and Freedom

This section tackles the following: how free time is spent, description of the steps of the
ladder of power and freedom (LOPF) and the factors leading to and impacts of domestic
violence.
3.1 How free time is spent: Young and adult men and women
Evidence across all study communities suggests that women and men spend their free
time differently; in all instances, women were limited in how they spent their leisure
time. The female adults and youths from the two Kabul communities (Boyina Bagh and
Shirabad Ulya) stated that women were limited in terms of both mobility and money.
The only places they went to spend their free time were their neighbours’ or relatives’
houses, and the only thing they did there was exchange stories with each other.
Meanwhile, the male adults and youths from these two communities explained that they
either do nothing or go somewhere else during their free time. The male adults from
Shirabad Ulya reported spending their free time assisting their children with schoolwork
or helping their sons attend to their shops. Ultimately, all male participants from these
two communities claimed never to spend money during their free time, and male adults
from Boyina Bagh even pointed out that leisure time is not a major part of life in their
community.
The female participants from the two Parwan communities (Kart-i-Bakheter and Naw Da)
were even more limited, devoting what little free time they had to completing household
chores. The account of a 28-year-old female adult from Kart-i-Bakheter encapsulates
the sentiments of other women in her community:
I am disappointed about having no free time because I am busy with my

household chores and also have no money. If I had money then I would not
have to look in my husband’s pocket for it and I could solve my problems. And
if I were educated, I could have got a job.
Aabirah, female adult, Kart-i-Bakheter
In our free time, we arrange the kitchen and keep busy with household chores.
All female youth, Naw Da
Male adults and youths in these communities had relatively greater independence on
how to spend their free time, but in most instances, they did nothing with it.
3.2 Steps on the ladder of power and freedom

As mentioned in Section 2, participants in all four study communities were asked to
place both men and women in their respective communities on differing steps of a
LOPF. In doing so, different communities ended up constructing slightly different
LOPFs: participants from Boyina Bagh created a three-step LOPF, while the two urban
communities of Shirabad Ulya and Kart-i-Bakheter created a four-step LOPF. By contrast,
Naw Da came up with only a two-step ladder.
Given the differences in the number of steps of each LOPF, analysis was done in three
stages. First, the attributes of the individuals at the bottom and the top levels in all
areas were compared and contrasted. Second, since the two urban communities of each
province created a four-step LOPF, the steps in between the bottom and the top steps were
compared. Finally, the middle step on Boyina Bagh’s LOPF was addressed in its own right.
11
Top step: Mobile, decision-makers, and income earners
The women and men composing the top levels of the LOPF created by each community
had similar characteristics: 1) they were not restricted in their mobility; 2) they were
decision-makers; 3) they were earning an income; and 4) they came from wealthy
families. Of all these characteristics, mobility—the ability to move around both inside
and outside their areas—was the ultimate indicator of their placement on this rung of
the ladder.
The value given to mobility is understandable, especially among women. Most female
adult participants in all of the communities recalled their experiences during the
Taliban regime, when they were prohibited from leaving their houses. Local traditions
maintained in each community mean that many women are still largely confined to their
homes. For men, mobility is highly valued since it affords them the opportunity to find
work and build networks. As in any patriarchal society, men in the study communities
were generally still attached to the notion that men have the greatest, if not the sole,
responsibility of providing for the family’s needs. In addition, men were also socialised to
build networks with other community members, demonstrated by the numerous friends
possessed by men at the top of the LOPF in both Kabul study communities.
Given that mobility allows men to look for jobs and socialise with other community
members, mobility for women might appear to make them almost equal with men.
However, this is not to say that mobility allows women to do and attain the same things
that men can.
Whether women at the top of the LOPF were engaged in paid work or not differed in
each of the four areas. Female adults in Boyina Bagh said that only widowed women
had work, while the male adults said that the only women they knew in their area who
were earning were female teachers. Female adults from Shirabad Ulya did not mention
that women at this level earned their own income, while all the adult participants from
Kart-i-Bakheter explained that both men and women at the top step of the LOPF in their
area were earning well. Finally, female adults from Naw Da said that due to the lack of
opportunities in their community, women had no work no matter where they stood on
the LOPF.
As for men, male adults in Shirabad Ulya said that men on the top level were traders or
occupied high government positions. They also included male elders on this step even
if they did not have jobs, since they still wielded significant decision-making power. By
contrast, male adults from Naw Da claimed that even men on top of the LOPF in their
area were limited to working in the stone mines.
Taken at face value, the narratives of all adults in all study communities claimed that
women and men on the top rung of the ladder had control over the money they earned.
Examining things more closely however, it appears that in practice this generalisation
only applied to men, with women subject to specifications or conditions about what they
could purchase with their own money.
Female adults from the two Kabul communities said that women could spend their own
money on things that were legal and not against their culture (Boyina Bagh), and personal
belongings such as clothes and jewellery (Shirabad Ulya). While women in the Parwan
communities initially affirmed the general view that women on the top step could spend
their money in any way they wanted, the statement below conveys the opposite:
12
Women are able to buy some things which are common in the family for women
like clothes, shoes and some gold, but not big things like cars, houses or others
items. For those, they need to ask permission from their husbands.
All female adults, Kart-i-Bakheter
Due to the relatively poor economic conditions across study communities, savings were
apparently a rarity. In Boyina Bagh and Shirabad Ulya, only men were reported to have
some amounts saved; none of the participants from Naw Da were able to say if the
women and men at the top of the LOPF had any savings; while adults from Kart-i-
Bakheter seemed to imply that women and men at the top rung could save whatever
they wanted because they had control over their money.
Perhaps particularly significant was the lack of correlation between education levels
and placement on the top step of the LOPF among both men and women. Only the two
Kabul villages made specific reference to the educational attainment of those on the top
level of their respective LOPFs. Within and between these two areas, the educational
attainment of the women and men differed. Female adults from Boyina Bagh explained
that none of the women on any of the rungs of the ladder had any education. On the
other hand, male adults said that men on the top step had the highest educational
attainment in their community. In Shirabad Ulya, female adults said that women at the
top level of the LOPF were able to select the universities they wanted to go to earn a
bachelor’s degree. Conversely, men who had reached only the 11th grade were classified
as on the top rung.
In summary, the main characteristics of men who are on this level of the LOPF are
that they are mobile; they earn a living; and have full control over their money. In
comparison, while the women on this rung are mobile, they may or may not be earning
money on their own, and if earning, they are limited to buying only those items that
are not in conflict with what is culturally acceptable (i.e. nothing beyond jewellery and
personal effects).
Bottom step: No decision-making power, no income, very limited mobility

Adults from all study communities described women and men at the bottom level of the
LOPF as lacking everything that those on the top step had: decision-making capacity,
mobility, education, and jobs:
They are uneducated, powerless, without freedom and jobless. They spend
their lives at home, busy with household chores and bearing children.
On the bottom step, there is no income source, relationships between wives
and husbands are not good because of poor financial situations, and women at
the bottom step cannot make decisions. They have no education and do not
have good relationships with their relatives and friends.
All female adults, Naw Da
Male adults from Boyina Bagh and Naw Da and female adults from Kart-i-Bakheter said
that women on this rung of the ladder have to seek their husbands’ permission when doing
anything, such as spending the household income or making purchases from themselves.
Male adults from Naw Da added that women on this step were “completely dependent
on their husbands” in almost all things.
Men placed on this step lacked decision-making capacity as well as mobility. Male adults
from Boyina Bagh explained how this type of man would normally need permission from
13
other family members, while male adults in Shirabad Ulya claimed that they were led by
their household heads or other men categorised as on the top step of the LOPF.
All adults in Boyina Bagh and female adults in Shirabad Ulya related that the relationships
between couples on this on this level of the LOPF are quite strained, with male adults in
Boyina Bagh adding that such tensions could sometimes spill over into heated arguments.
Only male adults in Shirabad Ulya said that relationships between couples at this
level remained friendly. Moreover, in three out of the four communities (Boyina Bagh,
Shirabad Ulya and Naw Da), newly-wed couples were generally classified as occupying
the bottom level of the LOPF. This was because without assets or decision-making power,
they needed approval or permission from the older members of their households before
deciding about anything in their lives.
From the descriptions provided above, it might seem that the women and men at the
bottom step of the LOPF are on an equal footing since they all need to ask someone’s
consent before doing anything. However, if one could add a step below the bottom
step, it is surely the women that would belong there since they still need to seek the
permission from their husbands who are already situated at the bottom of the LOPF.
Second step from the bottom: Engaging in home-based income-earning

activity, limited decision-making power, mobility within the
community
Both urban communities presented similar characteristics of the women and men on
the second level of the LOPF. They were alike in their descriptions of 1) the income-
generating activities women engaged in; 2) women’s decision-making capacity; and 3)
the levels of mobility enjoyed by both women and men.
Female adults in both communities stated that women on this step were engaged in some
form of income generation within the home. For instance, female adults in Shirabad
Ulya said that women were doing embroidery or tailoring, while female adults in Kart-
i-Bakheter answered that women on this level of the LOPF were involved in poultry-
raising.
All adults in Shirabad Ulya said that women were still limited in terms of decision-
making power, and could only make decisions for themselves on matters related to their
children. For other things, such as spending the money they had personally earned or
purchasing personal items, they need to ask their husbands’ opinions. Female adults
there also stated that in lieu of their husbands, women on this level of the LOPF could
also seek permission from other powerholders in their families, such as their mothers-in-
law. This scenario was largely the same for women in Kart-i-Bakheter.
In terms of mobility, female adults in Shirabad Ulya said that women on this step could
go anywhere within the community, but not outside of it. According to female adults
in Kart-i-Bakheter, the mobility of women on this step was more restricted, limited to
visiting their relatives within the community with the permission of their husbands.
Men, on the other hand, could go around the community and find jobs without seeking
anyone’s consent. In Shirabad Ulya, however, if men wanted to leave the area, they
need to ask the permission of the household head.
Each community differed in its accounts of the educational attainment of the women
and men on this step, and of the types of paid work men were involved in. Male adults
in Kart-i-Bakheter said that women on this rung had very little education, but did
14
not specify what level exactly. By comparison, none of the adults from Shirabad Ulya
mentioned that women on this step of the ladder had any education at all. According
to them, only the men on this step were educated, in some cases up to the 12th grade.
As for paid work, male adults from Shirabad Ulya said men on this level were able to
access a limited amount of skilled labour or were daily wage labourers earning about 200
Afs (US$ 4) a day. They also mentioned that some of these men had savings amounting
to 5,000-10,000 Afs (around US$ 100-200), and that they could buy anything that they
wanted without having to ask for permission. However, participants from Kart-i-Bakheter
did not offer any information about men’s paid labour at this level.
In sum, women on this level of the LOPF were engaged in economic activities but not
necessarily outside the house. Men, on the other hand, were sometimes able to work as
day labourers. In terms of decision-making, women on this rung of the ladder were able
to decide on matters related to their children, but nothing else. In addition, they were
still dependent on the say-so of either their husband or other household powerholders
to spend the money they themselves had earned. With regard to mobility, men could go
anywhere they wanted within the community without seeking consent, but still needed
to ask permission from older household members if they wanted to leave the area.
Women were able to move around the village or go to their relatives’ houses as long as
their husbands permitted them to do so.
Third step from the bottom: Relatively harmonious relationships between

husband and wife, long-established marriages, some decision-making
power
The two urban communities were again comparable in terms of the characteristics of
the women and men on the third step of the ladder. Similarities were found in: 1) the
relationships between household members among those on this level; 2) the mobility of
the women; 3) the educational attainment of both women and men; 4) their income-
generation activities; and 5) decision-making on matters related to expenditures in the
household.
All adult participants in Shirabad Ulya and male adults in Kart-i-Bakheter agreed that
the households of the women and men on this level were in good shape. Female adults
from Shirabad Ulya said that the women had been married for quite some time, though
not as long as those on the top rung. Male adults from Kart-i-Bakheter added that there
was less conflict within households on this level because of their stable economic status.
All adults from both areas also stressed that both women and men on this step of the
LOPF were highly educated. All male adults also mentioned that the men had access to
regular employment and earned a stable income. Male adults in Shirabad Ulya added
that these men were either government or NGO employees, had their own businesses,
or worked in private companies. However, only the female adults from Kart-i-Bakheter
said that women on this rung were also earning a stable income, while female adults
from Shirabad Ulya said instead that women on this step came from rich families or were
married to high-earning men.
All female adults from both areas explained that women on this level of the LOPF could
go around their own areas without asking their husbands’ permission. Female adults
from Kart-i-Bakheter added that this level of mobility facilitated women’s ability to
build networks within the community. However, female adults in Shirabad Ulya noted
that unlike men, women on this level could not go out of their communities on their
own.
15
Female adults in both communities said that couples discussed decisions on matters
related to the household and their own expenditures together. Women were also able to
decide how best to spend their own income when it came to making purchases to meet
household needs (especially those of the children), buying personal items, and saving
a portion of their income. However, female adults from Shirabad Ulya said that women
could not decide to buy household appliances and other luxury items on their own. Men,
of course, could buy anything they wanted.
A synopsis of the characteristics of the people on this rung is that there is basically a
good relationship between the husband and the wife; they are highly educated; both
women and men can go around the community without necessarily seeking anyone’s
permission; and women have greater decision-making power, albeit still confined to
issues concerning the family and their own personal needs.
Middle step on the three-step LOPF: Husbands are income-earners, with

influential families, limited mobility, good relationships between
husband and wife
The rural community of Boyina Bagh created a three-step LOPF. Women placed on this
level of the ladder were typically married to a man working outside the community
either as a shopkeeper or shop owner. Female adults there added that in these women’s
households there were family members who had gone to school and so were a little more
open-minded. Male adults described men on this rung of as young, but already earning
their own income, adding that these men came from influential families in the area.
All adults also attested that the couples on this step maintained good relationships with
each other, with female adults going on to mention that couples strove to have a good
life and avoid arguments, regardless of whether one or other of them had gone to school.
Despite this, women on this rung were apparently limited in their mobility and could
only go to their neighbours’ houses without permission. If they wanted to go anywhere
further afield, they had to seek the permission of their husbands or other male family
members. Men, on the other hand, only had to ask permission from their household head
if they wanted to leave the area.
With regard to their expenditures and savings, all adult participants said that women on
this step decided with their husbands about what to do with their own money, although
they were also permitted to save a portion of it for themselves. As usual, the men were
able to decide independently about how to spend their own money.
Conclusion
The descriptions of the women and men at the different levels of the LOPF in the
four study communities showed stages of transition in the areas of decision-making,
education, and income-generation. It was noticeable that as each step ascended, the
amount of decision-making capacity, educational attainment, and the type of work
they are engaged in generally improved on the third and top steps. While there were
gaps within each area’s accounts (e.g. whether women on the third and top steps really
worked or not), in general they gave a reasonably clear picture of the differences and
similarities between women and men on each step of the LOPF, both within and across
communities.
Clearly present in the descriptions of adult participants from all communities was a sense
that, even though women’s decision-making capacity and mobility progressed as they
16
moved up the LOPF, they were still subject to significant limitations when compared to
male counterparts on each step. For example, while women on the upper steps could go
out to relatives’ or neighbours’ houses within the community, they still often needed to
secure the consent of their husbands or other household powerholders. By the same token,
women on the upper steps had a degree of decision-making capacity in some areas—
especially in matters related to children and their personal needs—but were limited in
others. In all steps of the ladders the participants made, it is perhaps significant that only
on the bottom step did women and men appear closest to being equal.
3.3 Movement along the LOPF

The factors that caused women’s and men’s movement up the LOPF were almost the
same. Though it was only adult participants from Shirabad Ulya who meticulously
provided details on what was needed to move up each step in the ladder, there was an
obvious repetition of some of these factors in all of the communities.
In addition to the overarching question of mobility, the main things women on lower
levels of the LOPF were deemed to need in order to climb up a rung included education,
having a job, having networks, and making sure that their children went to school:
They must work hard and make efforts as well as make decisions with other
household members; they must not quarrel with other family members; they
must consult with their friends to inquire about information and assistance;
and they must send their children to school as well as be careful of their
expenses and avoid unnecessary ones.
All female adults, Shirabad Ulya
Some conditions need to in place, such as education, vocational courses and
hard work to be able to move up the ladder. All women need these same things.
Vocational skills such as tailoring, carpet-weaving, embroidery, or poultry-
raising are especially important for a woman to move from one step to the
next. As they get to the top step, their power and freedom will increase.
All male adults, Kart-i-Bakheter
By contrast, it was felt that all men needed to do to move up the LOPF was get a better
job that paid well. However, it is important to mention that some of the male adults in
Naw Da felt it was impossible for individuals on the bottom step to ever climb to the
next step:
The men and the women who are on the bottom step do not have enough
freedom, their life is not good, and they cannot do anything good with their
life since they cannot overcome their problems. Because of this they cannot
make a plan for their future and they are constantly faced with numerous
problems. It is difficult for people to move up in this community.
Barraq, 40, Naw Da
It is also interesting that the female adults from the Parwan communities cited a change
in cultural practices and gender rights as necessary for women’s upward movement on
the rungs of the LOPF. By this measure, individual or household efforts in their own right
were thus not enough for people to move up to the next step or steps. In addition, an
enabling community environment was also necessary, as was government help:
Starting with a small investment such as poultry or tailoring, going to school

to be educated, doing work outside the house, improvement of culture, the
17
government providing opportunities for women, development and changes in

the behaviour of the men. If the above factors are implemented, women will
find a good life and they will be in power.
Only adults from Shirabad Ulya explained what could keep people on top of the LOPF.
Male adults there explained that women and men “must not manifest negative traits,”
and instead sustain those attributes that brought them to that level in the first place.
Female adults there also felt that women in particular could remain on top of the ladder
if they continued to have a good job and contribute to economic development.
Opinions were more varied about the factors that could pull people back down the ladder.
Two female adults from Shirabad Ulya reasoned that women at present have more chances
to grow with the availability of education and jobs, and were hence less likely to drop
back:
We don’t know about this, and we don’t see any reason for women falling down
from the top to the lower steps because now the women have a chance to go up.
The government is trying to change the lives of the women through education
and employment.
Eiman, 51, and Eshal, 25, Shirabad Ulya
However, female adults in Kart-i-Bakheter contended that government policy inhibitions
could pull down women from the top level:
There is a possibility of women moving up by doing business and with their

own power, but the women who are on the top step could drop one step lower
because of the restrictive policies of the government.
In contrast, men on the top rung of the LOPF could be pulled down by events such as
natural disasters or armed battles. Male adults in Kart-i-Bakheter also said that men could
“lose their jobs or face health problems which might cause them to drop down.”
The placement of women and men on each area’s LOPF also demonstrated changes when
compared with ten years ago. However, these changes were not consistent across different
areas. Since each area developed its own steps of the ladder, only the placement of women
on the bottom and the top rungs will be presented here for comparison and contrast.
All female adults from Boyina Bagh, Kart-i-Bakheter and Naw Da felt that the percentage
of women in their community on the top level of the ladder had increased compared to ten
years ago, while the percentage of women on the bottom rung had decreased (see Annex
Table 24). By contrast, female adults in Shirabad Ulya thought that their percentage on
the top step had remained roughly constant over the past ten years, while the percentage
of women at the bottom had grown. While they did not offer an explanation for this
change at the bottom, they attributed stability for women at the top of the LOPF to the
fact that the community had been part of Kabul City ten years ago and was thus working
off a high baseline.
Annex Table 25 shows male adults’ assessment of the placement of men on the LOPF in
their respective communities both now and ten years ago. Male adults from the two rural
communities agreed that there had been an increase in the percentage of men on the top
level of the LOPF and a decrease among those on the bottom rung. Men in Naw Da offered
the following explanation:
18
Ten years ago, there was no freedom for men because the area was under the
control of the Taliban. Most of the people were afraid of the Taliban and no-
one was able to go anywhere. All decisions were made by the Taliban. The
present ladder presents an opposite picture. It means that 30 percent of the
men are on the top step and 70 percent are on the bottom step.
All male adults, Naw Da
Male adults from the two urban communities varied in their opinions about how the
position of men on their LOPFs had changed over the past decade. In Shirabad Ulya,
they thought that there had been no change in the percentage of men on the top
step, and a growth in the percentage at the bottom. Male adults in Kart-i-Bakheter,
conversely believed that the percentage of men on the top rung had shrunk, while
those on the bottom had stayed the same.
Adult males and females in Shirabad Ulya shared similar observations on the status of
women and men in their village both now and ten years ago. They both related that
the percentage of individuals on the top level of the LOPF, for both women and men,
remained the same, while those on the bottom rung had increased. Female and male
adults in Naw Da and Boyina Bagh were likewise unified in their opinion, saying that
the percentage of women and men on the top step had increased, while those on
the bottom level had decreased. By contrast, female and male perspectives in Kart-
i-Bakheter differed. For the female adults, the percentage of women on the top rung
increased, while those on the bottom step decreased; male adults on the other hand
stated that the percentage of women at the top had decreased, while those at the
bottom had remained the same.
3.4 Shifts in women’s and men’s levels of empowerment over

the past decade
To examine the shifts that occurred in the empowerment levels of both men and women,
empowerment indices for each community are shown below. Tables 2 and 3 are for the
two Kabul communities, and demonstrate that there has been a positive change in the
levels of empowerment for women and men in Boyina Bagh, but not in Shirabad Ulya.
Boyina Bagh has experienced the introduction of a development initiative (in the form
of the NSP) with a gender focus and a strong emphasis on women’s participation (See
Box 2). The community’s—and specifically women’s—exposure to NGOs operating in the
community may also have played a role in this change.
The case of Shirabad Ulya, and specifically the women’s empowerment index, may be
questionable since both female and male adult participants indicated that women now
have the option to stay at home or go out to work:
The women of this community are busy with household chores, and a few are
working as teachers and government employees. During the Taliban they were
not allowed to take jobs. Now they are able to work outside if they wish and
if there are available jobs for them.
In the past, women just worked inside their homes. But now, some of them
are working outside, like teachers, government employees, and NGO workers
All male adults, Shirabad Ulya
19
Table 2. Empowerment index* of Boyina Bagh, Kabul Province

% 10 years Weighted Weighted mean Empowerment index
Steps % Now
ago mean now 10 years ago (difference in means)
Men’s ladder, Boyina Bagh

3 30 20 1.9 1.7 0.2
2 30 30
1 40 50
Women’s ladder, Boyina Bagh
3 20 10 1.9 1.5 0.4
2 50 30
1 30 60
Table 3. Empowerment index of Shirabad Ulya, Kabul Province

Steps % Now
Men’s ladder, Shirabad Ulya
4 40 30 2.95 2.7 0.25
3 30 30
2 15 20
1 15 20
Women’s ladder, Shirabad Ulya
4 20 20 1.75 1.9 -0.15
3 5 10
2 5 10
1 70 60
Table 4. Empowerment index of Kart-i-Bakheter, Parwan Province

Steps % Now
Men’s ladder, Kart-i-Bakheter
4 5 10 2.15 2.3 -0.15
3 25 30
2 50 40
1 20 20
Women’s ladder, Kart-i-Bakheter
4 60 30 3.3 2.3 1
3 20 10
2 10 20
1 10 40
* “Empowerment Index” from the Ladder can be used as an analytic tool to frame comparative analysis. The
men’s and women’s ladders have shares at each step for now and ten years ago. The distribution of and change
in these shares can be synthesised into summary statistics that may be useful for assessing empowerment
levels, and enabling a rough comparison of the trends affecting men and women in the same community.
The fourth and fifth columns present the “mean” position on the ladder where the community members
can be found, or the “mean step.” See “National Synthesis Report (NSR) Guidance Notes,” a supplementary
guidance note of the “Gender and Economic Choice: Methodology Guide – Rapid Qualitative Assessment to
inform the World Development Report on Gender, August 21010.” (Washington, DC: The World Bank: 2010).
20
Table 5. Empowerment index of Naw Da, Parwan Province

Steps % Now
Men’s Ladder, Naw Da
2 70 30 1.7 1.3 0.4
1 30 70
Women’s Ladder, Naw Da
2 20 20 1.2 1.2 0
1 80 80
However, female adult participants here also added:
Ten years ago, the community was a part of Kabul City and so the women of
the community had freedom. [Now 20 percent of women on this step] only
have power and freedom at the community level.
Talking about the area’s male empowerment index, Fahim, a 58-year old male shura
clerk, reflected the views of other adult males when he explained that men had gained
back their “power” after being dominated by the Taliban in the past. Ten years ago,
conditions were dire, and there was no work available:
The men are always in power but in the past [during the Taliban time] the
people were poor, there was no work available and they were faced with a lot
of problems. Now a lot of people have work and have income.
Tables 4 and 5 show the empowerment indices of the two Parwan communities. For the
urban village of Kart-i-Bakheter, a positive change in the levels of empowerment was
only seen among women, while the men’s empowerment level had actually dropped.
The statements below suggest some of the reasons behind this set of circumstances:
Men had activities in the past such as wage labour, farming and government
jobs, and they are still doing these at present. Ten years ago, women had
activities at home and did not do anything outside. Nowadays, there are jobs
for women outside the home such as teaching and work for the government,
and they also raise poultry.
In the past, women did only household chores like preparing the fire and
cooking, but now there are other options such as gas and electricity. Now some
of them have jobs outside of the house. Most of the girls are going to school.
Women participate in elections and run as candidates for the provincial council
and other things.
The women in Kart-i-Bakheter thus felt that progress was being made, leading to a
significant amount of movement up the steps of the LOPF. When discussing the enabling
environment that may have contributed to this change, participants cited the area’s
relatively high education levels compared to other communities, as well as people’s
exposure to other places and cultures with relatively liberal ideas during migration.
Furthermore, the area has also benefitted from a development initiative (the NSP) with a
strong focus on women’s participation, as well as the presence of several NGOs
The explanation for the drop in Kart-i-Bakheter’s male empowerment index could be that
men in the community are already relatively educated. They have raised expectations
21
and consciousness and consequently expected that their community—and the country
as a whole—would by now have offered a better deal for them and their families. As
a consequence, they have produced a much lower rating and even a movement down
rather than up the LOPF when compared with men in the other study communities. Their
exposure to other places during migration could also have triggered an unfavourable
comparison between people’s situation in these areas and their own. The feelings of
frustration this might have engendered could again account for their relatively low
empowerment rating.
In Naw Da, only the men experienced an increase in their level of empowerment
compared to ten years ago. Male adult participants’ response showing an increase in
power at present suggests that restrictions on mobility and decision-making imposed on
them during the Taliban period were indeed debilitating, especially for men socialised
to find work, raise families and possess decision-making abilities. Furthermore, the men
in this poor rural community were only moving up from the bottom of a two-step LOPF.
Although they complained that the work they did was one of the worst ways to make
a living, they still earned an income from it. With this income, no matter how small,
comes the corresponding power and authority associated with acting as a bread-winner
for the family.
By contrast, women’s status on the LOPF had not changed, with female adults in the
community insisting that “the scenario is the same because nothing has changed in this
community.” This group also felt that in order for women to gain power and freedom,
they needed to be educated, while the government and other actors such as NGOs and
community elders needed to recognise women’s rights and encourage the men to follow:
If we want to change the lives of the women for them to gain power and
freedom, a lot of work has to be done by the government, NGOs, elders and
mullahs. They should know the rights of women and push the men to accept
these rights. In the present situation, we do not see any chance for women to
change their lives.
Ban, 57, and Bakhtawar, 60, Naw Da
We are not educated and we do not know anything. We do not know how we
would be able to change our lives to obtain power and freedom and move to
the next step.
Baraah, 60, Naw Da
22
4. Marriage and Children

4.1 What makes an ideal spouse?
Participants generally described the traditional and assigned roles of women—managing
household expenses, carrying out household chores, and looking after children—as
attributes of a good or ideal wife, both now and in the past (see Annex Table 13). All
adults of both sexes in all four communities shared this view. In addition, all adults in
the two urban communities (Shirabad Ulya and Kart-i-Bakheter) mentioned that being
educated and having a job were also now considered characteristics of a good wife. Male
adult participants’ accounts of a good wife also emphasised good behaviour toward her
husband, specifically keeping in mind what her husband tells her (Boyina Bagh); avoiding
conflict with her husband (Shirabad Ulya); showing good behaviour with her in-laws
(Kart-i-Bakheter); and respecting her husband (Naw Da).
In describing currently held views of what constituted a good husband, all adult
participants described a figure who earns a living, provides for family needs, and is
aware of the rights of his wife (see Annex Table 14). This latter attribute also extended
to respecting his wife’s relatives (Shirabad Ulya), not placing restrictions on her (Kart-i-
Bakheter), and not beating either his wife or his children (New Da). Except in Naw Da,
all female adults articulated that a good husband today is also one who is educated or
literate. In addition, all male adults in Boyina Bagh, Shirabad Ulya, and Kart-i-Bakheter
felt that a good husband should also help his wife with the household chores. Finally,
adult participants in Shirabad Ulya and Kart-i-Bakheter added that good husbands also
look after the welfare of their children.
The greatest—if not the most significant—similarity in the descriptions of what currently
makes a good husband or wife is that they are still tied to gender roles traditionally
assigned to men and women. To be considered a good husband or a good wife, one
thus has to conform to these expectations. The emergence of new perceived traits of
a good husband and a good wife (for a wife: education and employment; for husband:
knowledge of women’s rights and helping out in the household), did not necessarily
translate to a change in what is actually practiced. However, the articulation of these
new, additional traits may represent the start of a new understanding of what marriage
relationships should look like. It is now a matter of working out how to translate this
new-found consciousness into action.
People’s descriptions of what constituted a good wife in the past are largely similar
to those of the present. The good wife in the past was pictured as the caretaker of
the children, the home, and the expenses of the household. However, participants in
each area also produced significant additional descriptions of the past attributes of
good wives. Female adults in Boyina Bagh and Shirabad Ulya mentioned that submissive
women were once considered good wives (see Annex Table 15); female adults in Kart-
i-Bakheter also stated that the good wives in the past guided their children even if
they could not access any form of formal education. For male adults, good wives were
those who always sought the permission of their husbands before leaving the house.
Male adults in Naw Da especially also said that frugal women who were less concerned
about themselves were once seen as good wives. Female adults from this village seem
to suggest that good wives had once been submissive when they said that wives in the
past were not open-minded.
Since good wives in the past took on the role of taking care of the household, adult
participants from all communities logically went on to say that previous views of good
23
husbands essentially focused on their ability to financially support or provide for their
families (see Annex Table 16).
Another quality of good husbands in the past mentioned in FGDs among male adults
in Boyina Bagh, Shirabad Ulya, and Kart-i-Bakheter was that they had power over
their families, particularly their wives. This attribute speaks to the complementary
characteristic of submissiveness that was once the mark of a good wife. However, female
adults from the rural villages of Boyina Bagh and Naw Da stated that in the past, men
in their communities had not behaved nearly as well in practice, a fact they attributed
to the violent conflict happening in their community at that time. Finally, it is also
important to note that good husbands in the past were not expected to be educated, as
they are in the present.
4.2 Timing of marriage

All the youth in all study communities felt that late-teens to mid-twenties was the best
window for young adults to get married; female youths in Boyina Bagh commented that
marrying at this age left enough time for couples to enjoy their married life together.
However, in practice youth in Naw Da married much earlier compared to the other
communities, with boys marrying at 15-16 and girls marrying as young as 13. According
to all the youths in Shirabad Ulya and all the male youths in Boyina Bagh and Naw Da, the
acceptable age range for a woman to bear her first child was 16-25 years old, while the
youth participants from Kart-i-Bakheter and Naw Da felt it would not be good for woman
to have a baby if she were below 18 years old.
It is still common in all of the four study communities for parents to arrange the marriage
of their child. Youth participants generally agreed with this practice, with youths from
Kart-i-Bakheter adding that the economic stability of both families is an important factor
to consider when planning for a marriage. However, it is also worth noting in this respect
that the majority of youths in Boyina Bagh, Shirabad Ulya and Naw Da explained how—in
contrast to past practice—the consent of a couple engaged to be married is now sought
before the arrangement is finalised.
When the boy and the girl accept each other, then some women from the boy’s
family will go to the girl’s house and will woo her family. If the girl’s family
does not accept the boy’s courting, then some elders will go to their house
to explain and satisfy whatever they want, and will specify all the issues
they want settled and then they pray together and bring the sweets. Sweets
are distributed among the friends and relatives to let people know that the
engagement is complete.
Faaz, 19, Shirabad Ulya
Some women marry at the age of 14-15 but some of them wait up to 30-35, but
this is not good. According to the culture, a woman or girl cannot go and ask
for marriage; she just waits if someone comes and wants to marry her. After
that, her parents and other members of the family decide about her marriage.
When they come to a decision, they will ask her if she agrees to get married.
If she does not agree, her parents need to reject the marriage request.
However, it remains unclear what happens when either the boy or the girl refuses the
arrangement. Do the parents seek another partner for their daughter or son, and if so,
when? Equally important is the question of whether the parents instantly accept the
rejection of their children of their choice or if a “persuasion” stage occurs which may
ultimately lead to the boy or the girl accepting the arrangement.
24
4.3 Marriage practice: Outcomes and possibility of changing

Participants in all study communities felt that the marriage practices described above
appear highly unlikely to change. In general, many youths felt that the practices they
observed had been handed down by their ancestors and deserved respect. However,
some also voiced some suggested changes on matters related to walwar (bride prices)
and the age of marriage.
All female youths from Boyina Bagh and some female and male youths from Kart-i-
Bakheter wanted to see a decrease in the size of walwar, and some of these male youths
even wanted it abolished entirely. The female youths from Boyina Bagh in particular
emphasised the strain that the bride price places on newly-married couples:
Now, people pay big amounts for the walwar. But the women want to be
married without taking the walwar because it causes problems within her
family. Most of the people are poor, so they cannot afford to pay a walwar.
The groom will sell agricultural land or he will borrow from someone. After
the wedding, the one who lent the money wants his money back, but the
groom’s family doesn’t have the money to pay...most of the time they blame
the woman who has got married. Because of this, we want to remove the
walwar.
All female youths, Boyina Bagh
I do not think that the marriage practices would change in our community
and the same tradition will still be practical in the future too, and people are
happy with these customs. However, they talk about the need to change or
abolish the walwar.
All male youth, Kart-i-Bakheter
Female youths in Kart-i-Bakheter debated over the reduction of the bride price after
one recommended that the amount be decreased. Another disagreed, arguing that the
amount of the walwar determines the value of the woman whose hand is being sought:
The walwar is too high, the amount should be decreased.

Aala, 18, Kart-i-Bakheter
If the walwar is decreased, then the value of the girl will also go down. Other
villagers will blame her father for not receiving enough money. Someone will
tell him that his daughter is not a good girl.
Aalia, 20, Kart-i-Bakheter
The youth participants from Naw Da did not discuss the bride price. Instead, the change
they wanted—especially female youths—was for the girls to marry at a legal age (it was
assumed that they meant 18 years and above). As noted earlier, women in Naw Da marry
at much younger age compared to women in the other three study areas; this is possibly
due to the community’s relative isolation and limited access to information given the
lack of media availability there.
4.4 Family size and family planning

Families across the four study communities are generally large. For instance, all the
youth participants in Boyina Bagh stated that women there usually bear eight children,
and that they themselves had come from large families. Youth participants in Kart-i-
Bakheter told similar stories, but added that they wanted to have fewer children than
their parents, and that the average family size in the community was declining.
25
While perspectives varied within and across different communities, the decision on the
number of children to have was generally felt to be in the hands of the husband. It
should be noted that in Kart-i-Bakheter, there was a particularly strong divide between
the perspectives of male and female youths, with women stating that a wife would be
responsible for this decision and men insisting it rested largely with the husband:
Mostly it is the women who are making the decisions in this regard.
All female youth, Kart-i-Bakheter
The men decide about it, but women also have a role in it. Husbands usually
make the decision and women act upon it. If a woman makes the decision, she
will need to get her husband’s consent.
All male youth, Kart-i-Bakheter
Regardless of who is ultimately involved in making this choice, the majority of all youth
participants appeared to want families smaller than those currently prevalent in their
respective communities. However, opinions were divided about whether it was better
to have sons or daughters. In Boyina Bagh, only one male youth expressed a preference
for a son over a daughter, citing male children as a source of security for their families:
People in our community like to have more sons because any family that has
more sons is happy and spared from the cruelty of other families. If families
do not have more sons, the other families in the community are harsh to them.
Dawlah, 19, Boyina Bagh
The majority of the youth participants from Shirabad Ulya offered no opinions on this
issue; three male youth declared a preference for a large family, but said it did not
matter how many sons or daughters were involved.
The scenario was different in the two Parwan communities, where both male and female
youth participants expressed a preference for male children. The principal reason given
for this choice was that sons remain with their families even when they get married,
providing a valuable source of income, eventually taking the place of their fathers as
head of the household and inheriting the family’s property:
To have a son is better than to have a daughter because when the daughter
gets married, she will go to another household, whereas the son stays with his
parents. If the father dies, the son is responsible for the family.
Aaleyah, 23, Kart-i-Bakheter
In our community people think that when the daughter grows up, she gets
married grows up and goes to her husband in his home, but a son remains with
parents forever and serves his parents.
Aaban, 18, Kart-i-Bakheter
A son takes care of the family after his father passes away while the daughter
goes to another home; that is why people prefer to have sons rather than
daughters.
Baha al Din, 24, Naw Da
Most of the people prefer a son, because in our community, life is difficult
for the person who does not have a son. Most of his relatives are interested
in his property. When he dies, his property is distributed to his relatives and
nothing will go to his wife or daughter. If he has a son, all the property will
go to his son.
Bahijah, 23, Naw Da
26
The majority of youth participants were not comfortable discussing family planning
services. In Kabul Province, only male youths were prepared talk about whether women
in their respective communities had access to family planning services. Even in these
instances, they simply said they had no information since this was a private matter for
couples alone. In the two Parwan communities, by contrast, all youths responded to this
question, but differently. The youth participants from Kart-i-Bakheter explained that
there was a lack of information about the number of women who use family planning
services, while youths Naw Da claimed that women in their village did not access family
planning services because they do not know about them and there were no health
facilities in their community.
Here women are uneducated; they don’t know how to use family planning
services because they are busy with their household chores.
Babar, 18, Naw Da
Women cannot do anything regarding family planning in this community...
because there are no facilities in the community and it is difficult for them to
go Charikar since their husbands do not let them.
4.5 Gender equality and domestic violence

Participants in both urban communities demonstrated awareness of the idea of gender
equality. Central to their understanding of the issue was the fact that women’s and
men’s rights are afforded to them by Islam, and that these rights should be observed by
everyone.
The rights that are provided by Islam are good. There is no violence against
women in this community. They spend their lives happily and are able to
balance their lives. Yes, there is equality and this is a good thing.
We heard from the mullah that in Islam, women have their own rights, and
the men have their own rights. But the problem is we don’t have any more
information about this.
Eliza, 45, and Eiman, 51, Shirabad Ulya
The recognition of these gender rights, however, did not necessarily translate to a change
in perceptions in these communities. Male adults in Kart-i-Bakheter noted that having
seen how gender rights and roles were dealt with in the cultures of other countries,
they were starting to modify their practices. Male adults in Shirabad Ulya may also have
changed their practices, but warned that if the notion of gender equality means that
their women would become like the “women in Europe and America,” and “what the
present administration and the non-Muslim people want,” then they were not interested.
Domestic violence was not a topic adult participants felt particularly comfortable
discussing. Even the participants from the two urban communities who had been quite
open with their views on gender equality were hesitant to talk about domestic violence
or abuses. Female adults in Shirabad Ulya, all adults in Kart-i-Bakheter and male adults in
Naw Da went further, specifically stressing that the issue should not be discussed in public
because it was a private matter.
In some families there are conflicts, but that is not reported to the police.
Maybe there are conflicts in some families that are solved by the community.
But no one wants to talk about that, because if these families find out that
27
you are talking about their disputes, they will get angry and will fight you and
ask why you are talking about their family issues.
Eliza, 45, Shirabad Ulya
There is no family which does not have problems and if problems do occur in
the family, they are solved by the head of the family and no one is informed
about it. Family problems are kept secret at home.
Family issues are not talked about.
Baligh, 35, Naw Da
However, there were two factors that consistently surfaced as reasons for conflicts within
the household or between husbands and wives. Both female and male adult participants
mentioned that poor economic conditions or financial difficulties could trigger tensions
between couples. Women’s misconduct or, as female adults from Shirabad Ulya framed
it, “too much conservatism,” was another precursor of marital conflict (see Annex Tables
26-29).
In Naw Da, adult participants argued that domestic violence was a family matter that
no one should interfere with, but went on to say that this form of conflict could have a
severe impact on the household and often resulted in husbands beating their wives and
children. Furthermore, both female and male adult participants felt that even “a simple
wrong accusation or gossip can cause a woman to be beaten up by her husband.”
When a member of an extended family like a daughter, mother-in-law or

brother tells a lie to the husband and says to him, “Your wife is going to the
neighbour’s house without your permission,” the husband beats up his wife
and a conflict occurs between them.
All male adults, Naw Da
In most instances, it was the man who “threatened” or “abused” the woman. The term
“threatened” was also used by male adults in Shirabad Ulya when asked whether wives
could ever abuse their husbands. They explained that a husband would feel insecure if
his wife were earning more than him, or if she were more educated. By contrast, adult
participants in Kart-i-Bakheter explained that while a woman cannot abuse her husband,
she could threaten him by declaring that she will commit suicide.
Even if majority of participants in all study communities were hesitant to expand on

the issue of domestic violence, they at least confirmed its presence, both now and a
decade ago. However, it is worth noting that in all communities, the number of cases of
domestic violence was reported to have decreased over the past ten years.
4.6 Divorce: Taboo as a topic of discussion

Discussion on divorce generated negative reactions from most of the male participants
in the study. Female adults from Kart-i-Bakheter said that there were times when a
couple’s disputes could escalate and lead to their separation. In Naw Da, male adults
avoided questions on divorce altogether. Female adults and youths there claimed that
divorce has not happened in their area because it was against their culture and tradition
and that elders in their community attend to couples who have fights and help settle the
issues between them:
It is against the culture and traditions of our community and such event
has not happened in our village so far. Divorce is considered very bad in our
28
community and it is not easy for a woman and a man to separate. If there are
differences between wife and husband, family members solve their problems,
so the couple can live happily together.
Here only men have income. They use their money for the home, and there is
no conflict between husband and wife about money. People of this community
detest and loathe the word divorce and they do not even want to pronounce
the word.
All male youth, Naw Da
In Boyina Bagh, male adult participants disagreed that divorce was a right for women,
saying that it contravened the laws of Islam:
Divorce in western countries is also considered the right of wives...this kind of

right is not good because it is against Islamic laws and culture and traditions.
All male adults, Boyina Bagh
Male youths from this area also said that divorce is an uncommon event in their community
because it is seen to bring shame on a family.
29
5. Education
5.1 Who is currently sent to school? Why?
In general, participants from the rural communities were less educated than their urban
counterparts, possibly because of the comparative lack of nearby schools. Furthermore,
rural areas were more conservative in their views on sending children to school,
especially girls and young women. Across all study communities, sex selection was very
much evident in determining who was sent to school. Although almost all participants
claimed that there was no distinction between which children would go to school when
they reached school age, the data show that more boys than girls are sent to school.
Whether youths or adults, more males than females have attained at least a certain
level of education. In Boyina Bagh, not a single female participant had ever gone to
school. In all of the communities except for Naw Da—where out of all participants, only
one male adult participant had ever attended school—it was also apparent that young
people had better access to schools than their adult counterparts.
Participants in all four communities cited a combination of distance and security concerns
as reasons for why more boys were sent to school than girls. Adhering to traditional
gender roles was another reason raised by participants in both the urban and rural
community in Kabul, suggesting that the divide between women’s private and men’s
public world still operates in these areas. In Boyina Bagh, participants noted that as girls
grow older, families tended to arrange their engagement to get married rather than send
them to school:
If the school is next to our village then the families’ decision is that that they
send girls to school and when they reach 11-15 years [old], they are made to
stay at home. Once they grow up...it is bad for these girls to go to school...
they get engaged instead.
Deema, 19, Boyina Bagh
The problem of sending girls to school in Shirabad Ulya was compounded by the incident
of a girl who was sent to school and then got married without the permission of her
parents (see Box 3). As mentioned, this event has affected parent’s opinions about
sending their children—specifically young women—to school, convincing many that doing
so would mean their daughters would no longer adhere to the customs and traditions
observed by their families. In this community, the threat of kidnap was also raised as a
barrier to both girls and boys attending school:
There is no difference among girls and boys, whenever they reach five or six
years old, they have to go to school. The only problem for them is that the
school is very far from this village and most of the families, due to kidnapping
problems, can’t send their children to school. That is the big problem here.
In this case, there are more constraints on girls because...families are more
protective of girls than boys.
Fadi, 22, and Ehsan, 20, Shirabad Ulya
In Naw Da, the most impoverished of the communities studied, participants cited poor
economic conditions as an additional reason for not sending girls (and boys) to school.
Since girls would be joining another family when they got married, the idea of investing
in their education was not entertained by their own relatives. As one male youth there
put it, children’s education in Naw Da is a secondary concern to their economic roles:
30
Our economic condition is very weak so instead of going to school we go to work.

Children, instead of going to school, work to help family members.
By contrast, none of the participants from Kart-i-Bakheter brought up issues that
hampered girls’ education, complaining only of the lack of higher educational institutions
near the village to accommodate those who want to pursue higher degrees. As noted in
the previous chapter, residents in Kart-i-Bakheter are generally more open to the idea
of sending both boys and girls to school, in part as a result of new ideas imported by
returning migrants. All youths in Kart-i-Bakheter stressed that parents in the community
were eager to send their children to school regardless of whether they were boys or girls.
5.2 Desire for education

Participants across all four study communities acknowledged that education is a major
factor in getting a job, and there were signs that even in rural areas, attitudes toward
women attending school were changing:
Education has a big role in finding a job...a person who has education can land
a job and do it well.
Participant in an FGD for female youths, Boyina Bagh
If we had attended school and were educated, we might have had jobs in the
government or in NGOs, but now we cannot have any job except for mining
stones and being labourers.
Participant in an FGD for male youths, Naw Da
Female youths in Boyina Bagh in particular resented that they were not being sent to
school. They insisted that the prime consideration in deciding on who goes to school
or not should be the value of education, trumping questions of distance to the nearest
school or security concerns. They also expressed a desire to change how they were
spending their time, and were keen to substitute time in school for time spent doing the
housework.
Male youths in this community appeared to agree with their female counterparts in
saying that a person’s talent should be the main thing determining whether they went to
school or not. In the words of one male youth:
First, parents should think about whether a girl has the merit and talent to
go to school and study or not. If she has enough potential, then obviously she
must go to school. Clothes, shoes, books, and notebooks should be provided
for her.
Dean, 26, Boyina Bagh
This apparent statement of support for equality among boys and girls in this respect should,
however, be contrasted with the fact that in Boyina Bagh, the only factor determining
whether or not boys were sent to school was their age, and not their potential.
In Naw Da, youth participants were keenly aware of the value of education despite
the fact that none of them had been able to attend school. Significantly, youths in this
community expressed a desire to go to school and work at the same time. While they
anticipated that balancing these activities would be a challenge, they still felt that
having access to work was necessary since it would provide them with an income that
could help pay for their schooling and support their families during their studies.
31
6. Economic Opportunities
6.1 What are the best and worst jobs?
Respondents from Boyina Bagh, Shirabad Ulya and Kart-i-Bakheter mentioned teaching
and working in the government as the best ways to make a living. By contrast, male
participants from Naw Da mentioned economic activities such as driving, tailoring,
raising livestock, and—for youths at least—shopkeeping, as the best ways for them
to earn a living. Female adults from the community felt that the best jobs involved
“raising livestock, shopkeeping, modern farming, government employment, teaching,
engineering, and engaging in the medical profession.” However, no-one of either sex
from Naw Da occupied any of the positions mentioned (see Annex Tables 5-12). Men in
the community mentioned that for now, they are not really after the best jobs and would
be satisfied with any means to earn an income.
Decent pay and regular work were the main reasons people felt teaching, being in the
government or in a medical profession (and in the case of men, running a business) were
the best ways to make a living. Other reasons included the fact that these jobs were less
strenuous, and highly regarded by other community members.
By contrast, farming and any form of daily-waged labour were seen as the worst ways
to make a living, especially in rural Boyina Bagh and urban Kart-i-Bakheter. Youth
participants from Boyina Bagh said that these forms of economic activity require hard
work and yet pay less, while adults and youths in Kart-i-Bakheter tended to focus only on
the lack of decent pay. In the case of Naw Da, all participants concluded that the worst
ways to make a living were in fact the jobs they already had—quarrying stones, hauling
goods, and gathering and selling firewood. However, they also noted that such work was
better than having no income at all. Male youths from Boyina Bagh and Shirabad Ulya
saw joining the army or the police as the worst jobs since doing so would put their lives
at risk in fighting against lawless elements and the Taliban.
6.2 Women’s access to paid work

In all study areas except Kart-i-Bakheter, women have no more access to paid work
than they did ten years ago. Participants explained that women were overwhelmingly
confined inside the home performing household chores and taking care of children. Ten
years ago, ongoing armed conflict and the presence of the Taliban in their communities
prevented women from going outside and working. Today, it appears that the views
of women and men in these three communities regarding women working outside the
home are much more positive. Instead, the factor hindering women’s participation in
the workforce is the lack of employment opportunities and a lack of education that
renders them uncompetitive for the few chances that do exist.
The participants from the two urban communities mentioned that for men and women
to get into the government or private companies, assistance from employment and
professional agencies was necessary. People in Kart-i-Bakheter also raised the issue of
bribery and nepotism, essential for anyone seeking serious employment, as CQ informants
in the community described:
Government employment is available, but to get the job you must have
relatives [in the government] or pay bribes, otherwise it is impossible.
Currently in our village there are a lot of people who are literate but they are
32
jobless because they don’t have any supporters or relatives and can’t afford
the bribe. During the Taliban period, there were more jobs but people didn’t
have care about work and a lot of people had left.
In Naw Da, participants said that women did not work ten years ago mainly because
both women and men adhered to the belief that women stay at home and take care
of the house and children. At present, women are still invisible in the workplace, but
participants said that if there were job opportunities for them, they would definitely
join the workforce. However, they also pointed out that people in the community had
little idea about how to look for jobs.
6.3 Types of job available to men and women

Local traditions and perceived differences in the biological make-up of men and
women came out as the main factors influencing the types of jobs that women and
men engage in, along with questions of education, distance, class, and power. In
all four communities, tradition continued to play a significant role in determining
how women were viewed. Female adults and youths made specific mention of the
discrimination this engendered and the limits it placed on what jobs women could do.
According to a female youth participant in Kart-i-Bakheter:
For women finding a job is different because of work discrimination. For

example if a woman becomes a police officer then she will be faced with
discrimination but if she is a teacher or doctor, she will not face any
discrimination because it is acceptable for a woman to take on such types
of jobs.
In relation to this, distance was also an additional factor for women in particular
to consider when taking a job in all communities apart from Kart-i-Bakheter. Given
religious and traditional norms limiting women’s movement, the feasibility of women
being able to work was almost nil if the job was located outside the community.
There was a general feeling across these three communities that women would need
a mahram (a male relative to act as chaperone) if they were to take on work outside
the community. By contrast, in Kart-i-Bakheter, there were women who were able to
work outside of their homes and outside of the community without a mahram.
Most if not all of male participants said that there was a division in terms of what jobs
women and men could undertake. Jobs that needed physical strength were for men,
as were jobs undertaken outside the home. However, this view is slowly changing,
especially in urban areas like Kart-i-Bakheter and Shirabad Ulya. Even in the rural
communities, women and men are slowly opening up to the idea of women working
outside of the home, especially in times of economic difficulty.
There was a significant divide in opinions about perceived changes in attitudes to

what jobs women could do among adult participants across research communities.
Female adults from Shirabad Ulya, Kart-i-Bakheter and Naw Da felt that there should
be an end to gender-specific job access. Female adults from Naw Da said that women
have the capacity to perform jobs normally reserved for men, such as a professional
work (although they felt that women could not be involved in physical labour like
quarrying):
That there are jobs solely for men or for women is not important, because
women can do the jobs men can. For example, men and women outside our
community perform similar jobs such as teaching, engineering, medical jobs
33
and vocational courses etc. This is not happening in our community though,
because both men and women are not educated and will not qualify for these
jobs.
Some female adults also stated that tradition inhibited women in getting engaged in
paid work, yet they also repeatedly suggested that there should be separate jobs for
women and men because of their biological differences and their level of mobility.
In contrast, male adults from these three communities started discussions by asserting
these differences should remain. Later on, however, they expressed that it would no
longer be important if women and men worked together. Ultimately, they felt that if
their communities were to develop economically, men should be provided with job
opportunities first because they remained the main breadwinners, and women therefore
did not need to earn money:
If there are available jobs it does not matter whether women are separated or
work together with men. But now we need to find work and jobs so it is okay
if these jobs are separated. Based on the present situation of the community
there is no work for men. If someone wants to help the community, the first
step they will do is to help the men because the men [are] responsible for
providing food and for the overall maintenance of the family
All male adults, Boyina Bagh
Continuing this line of thinking, all the male adults and youths in Boyina Bagh, male
youth in Shirabad Ulya, and male adults in Kart-i-Bakheter believed that men would be
more affected than women if they lost their jobs. Again, they argued that this was the
case because the demands of raising a family were on men’s shoulders.
Even among youths, there was a sense across all four study communities that, in terms of
economic activity, women’s place was in the home while access to the public sphere was
largely restricted to men. Interestingly, while female and male youth participants were
conscious of the differences in their economic pursuits, none of them ever expressed
a willingness to switch any of their activities with those of the opposite sex. Female
youths in Shirabad Ulya said they were happy with what they were doing, while youth
participants from Naw Da pointed out the difficulty women would have working in the
stone mines, and how men are uncomfortable doing household chores (although female
youths from this community mentioned that men help in fetching water and collecting
firewood).
Only in Boyina Bagh did anyone state that economic opportunities should be afforded to
both men and women—a view expressed by one male youth and all the female youths.
However, this is an important thought if the typical scenario of women/house and men/
work is to be challenged.
If the road were be paved and loans provided to us to support our economic
[activities], the same assistance [should be given] to women, because they
[too] don’t have any economic activity.
Dawid, 18, Boyina Bagh
Engaging in business is not a woman’s place
The gender divide of “who does what” was particularly evident when participants
discussed the question of who could engage in a business enterprise. Overwhelmingly,
34
the feeling was that business should be conducted by men since business enterprise is
conducted outside the home, and the outside world was largely seen as a male domain;
male youths in Boyina Bagh explained that “according to our tradition, women do not do
business in our community.”
As a consequence, participants generally thought that it would be very difficult for a

woman to succeed in a business endeavour without the support of her husband. This was
a point stressed especially strongly by adult participants across all communities:
If the man wants to open a business and the woman does not agree with him,
he will not face a big problem. But if the woman wants to open a business
and the man does not agree with her, she will face problems, because in
our community the man is powerful. They have freedom and able to make
decisions, but women need the support from men.
In our community the men are strong and they have access to information and
resources and are able to move every time and everywhere. The support of
the men is most important for women.
Male adults, Kart-i-Bakheter
According to our culture men are more powerful than women. A man is able
to make decisions without the support of the woman. It is more difficult for a
woman to make decisions without the support of the men in the family. This
is because women do not have access to information, markets or other main
factors related to business.
Bakr, 65, Naw Da
The three most common reasons cited by all participants for why women would struggle
to run a business on their own were as follows: 1) men have more authority in terms of
decision-making; 2) men are more mobile than women, allowing them more access to
information and networking opportunities; and 3) it is not culturally acceptable for a
woman to open a business on her own. It is also worth noting that on top these issues,
the enabling environment for would-be female entrepreneurs in these communities was
also minimal, with no government programmes or NGOs offering economic support such
as low-interest loans. This is critical since women by and large lack any independent
access to capital.
By contrast, male adults in three communities (Boyina Bagh, Shirabad Ulya and Kart-i-
Bakheter) felt that a wife’s support would be largely immaterial to whether or not her
husband’s business prospered, since all decisions were made by men in any case:
Because the husband is responsible for financial questions...the wife’s

activities [i.e. support] do not affect him.
Dameer, 32, Damurah, 28, and Dani, 27, Boyina Bagh
The husband is the head of the family and he is powerful. Also, the husband
is responsible for food and expenditures. He can do all the work without the
support of his wife, although if this is the case, the relationship between
husband and wife may be affected.
All male adults, Shirabad Ulya
A woman is not in the position in our community to make decisions regarding

business outside the home. She is just able to do some things inside the house,
35
while men are able to go everywhere and make decisions regarding work or
business.
Barir, 30, Naw Da
However, there were two groups of male youths in Boyina Bagh and Kart-i-Bakheter who
said that men would have difficulty in pursuing a business if their women would not
support them. In Kart-i-Bakheter, male youths explained this in terms of traditionally
ascribed gender roles, suggesting that without a wife’s support in managing affairs inside
the home, he would struggle to run a business outside it.
Needless to say, wives succeeding in business were ultimately seen as a rare and even
peculiar scenario across all study communities by the majority of adults and many youths.
Female adults in Shirabad Ulya and all participants from Kart-i-Bakheter also said that
even if a woman were to run a successful business, she would still have to consult with
men about how to spend the money they earned. Only male youths in Boyina Bagh
claimed that such women would have “One hundred percent control over the money
they have earned.”
6.4 Economic cooperation between women and men

In terms of economic cooperation within the household, the general scenario was that
a man earns a living and turns over the income to the women to take care of household
expenses. This description was especially evident in the accounts by male adults in
Boyina Bagh and Shirabad Ulya, and female adults in Naw Da:
There is economic assistance among men and women in their family life. If a
woman is educated and there is a job for her, she takes the job and gets [a]
salary...or if she is uneducated and there is a job for her, then she also does the
job...if a woman doesn’t have a job and she takes care of the house, doesn’t
spend more, but according to the husband’s income...this is also economic
assistance.
All male adults, Shirabad Ulya.
Upon receiving their wages, the men turn over the money to the women and
men and women try to make do with their earnings and they share whatever
they have in the family.
It is notable from the responses of female adults in Naw Da that this form of economic
cooperation only occurs among the couples on the top level of the ladder of power and
freedom (LOPF; see Section 2), and that women at the bottom of the ladder were not
involved in this kind of teamwork.
36
7. Summary and Conclusion

Results of the study show that women are faced with considerable barriers that prevent
them from accessing economic opportunities. Across all four study areas, women remain
constrained by discriminatory attitudes that restrict their mobility, limit employment
choices and hinder control over assets.
Adherence to traditional gender stereotypes that regard men as income earners and
women as dependents still prevails. This restricts women’s mobility and leaves them
disadvantaged when it comes to decisions about who will be sent to school and who
will join the workforce. Lack of knowledge and education contribute to women being
powerless or having no voice in decision-making processes both within and outside the
home. In rural areas, women were either unaware of their rights, or unable to exercise
them, and decisions about their lives were in the hands of others. This chapter lays out the
key findings and some potential ways forward in each of the study’s main areas of focus.
Power and freedom
Spending free time was not a common activity in the study communities, and in cases
where it did occur, there were differences between how men and women spent it.
Women and girls either spent their free time doing household chores or visiting relatives’
houses inside the community. For boys and men, on the other hand, activities ranged
from doing nothing to studying for classes.
In the LOPF, mobility and decision-making capacity are the primary indicators of one’s
placement in society, and women with these capabilities were generally placed on the
highest rung of the ladder across all four study communities. However, women on the
top rung were still faced with limitations not encountered by their male counterparts:
Being placed on the top step of the ladder did not necessarily mean that they were
earning their own income, and even if they did, they were not guaranteed to have full
control over the money they earned.
The men and women on the bottom step of the LOPF lacked both mobility and decision-
making power; in this respect, they appeared in some ways to be more equal than men
and women on the top rung of the ladder. However, a closer examination of the status
of women on this step reveals that if there were a step below the bottom step, they
would actually be placed there. This is because without the power to make decisions
themselves, they still have to seek the consent of men who may themselves already be
on the bottom step.
As one climbs up the LOPF, one observes a gradation of decision-making capacity and
mobility among both men and women. However, while mobility and decision-making
ability are the chief factors needed for any man or woman to move up a step on the
LOPF, women had to put in significantly more work to make this transition than men did.
For example a woman on the bottom step has to have an education, a job, networks, and
to make sure her children are educated in order to move up a step. By contrast, the main
thing a man needs to move up is a good job that pays well. In terms of slipping down the
LOPF, it was felt that restrictive cultural practices could still knock a woman off the top
step, whereas men could only slip down as a result of natural disasters, violent conflict
or health problems.
It is significant to note that women in both Kart-i-Bakheter and Naw Da accompanied

their assessment of who was where on the LOPF by explicitly laying out the conditions
37
they felt needed to be made to foster greater upward mobility on the ladder. In doing
so, they argued that communities needed to modify their cultural practices and
acknowledge women’s existing rights in order to provide them with more opportunities.
Women’s limited decision-making capacity, mobility and education also has a significant
impact on their levels of political capital. While women’s networks remain largely kin-
based and confined to the household, men are able to attend organised meetings and
make decisions on matters of importance to the community. While this division has
been eroded somewhat by the introduction of women’s shuras, via the NSP, questions
over their long-term sustainability remain. To date, no woman has ever been elected
to a community-wide leadership position in any of the study areas, with the leaders of
women’s shuras elected only by women.
Marriage and children
In general, people’s idea of what constitutes an ideal spouse focuses—just as it did ten
years ago—around the customary gender roles assigned to men and women. A woman
who takes care of her husband, carries out household chores and manages the family
budget is characterised as a good wife. Similarly, a man who has an income and provides
well for his family qualifies as a good husband. However, certain other attributes of
what currently makes a good spouse cited in different study communities pointed to a
change in perspective compared to the previous decade. For example, female adults in
the two urban communities explained that a good wife now has an education and earns
her own income. In all communities except impoverished Naw Da, a good husband is
now expected to have at least some level of education. All participants also stated that
good husbands should be knowledgeable about women’s rights. These new attributes of
a good spouse represent—up to a point—a shift away from traditional perspectives. It
is important to examine both what has driven these shifts, and what implications they
might have for the future. In particular, the new expectation that husbands understand
women’s rights represents one potentially fruitful opportunity for positive change.
Encouragingly, there appears to have been a significant change in marriage practices

across all four study areas in recent years. Youth participants in each community related
that at present, boys and girls are asked whether or not they accept the person that
their parents have arranged for them to marry. However, this does not erase the fact
that parents are still fundamentally the ones in charge of determining when and to
whom their children will be married.
While youth participants were pessimistic about this overall state of affairs changing
any time in the near future, they still made certain suggestions about more specific
elements of marriage practices in their communities. For instance, youth participants in
Naw Da proposed that children be married only when they reach legal age (i.e. 18 and
above). More widespread, however, was the suggestion on the part of both male and
female youths that the walwar be reduced, and in the case of Kart-i-Bakheter, abolished.
Complaints about the walwar focused both on the fact that could antagonise newly-
married couples because of the debts it generated, and the commodification of women
it represented by putting a price on a young girl’s life (a commodification that some
female youth participants, by contrast, were ready to accept). Reducing or abolishing
the walwar must therefore be examined and addressed, not only to assist newly-wedded
couples, but to convey that no monetary value can compensate for anyone’s being.
The majority of youth participants wanted to have small families, even though most of
them came from large households. However, the actual decision on how many children
38
a couple will have apparently still rests with the husband. Neither of the two Kabul
communities expressed a specific preference over the sex of their children. However,
youth participants in Parwan generally wanted sons more than they did daughters for the
following reasons: 1) boys protect their families; 2) even when boys get married, they
remain economically productive members of their own families, unlike girls who go and
live with their husbands; and 3) boys inherit all property and responsibility when their
fathers die.
Only a few participants ventured to discuss domestic violence. Their answers suggested
that there was a link between levels of violence and a couple’s place on the LOPF, with
women on the lowest rung most susceptible to abuse from their husbands, in part because
of the stress economic hardship placed on their households. Beyond this, participants all
but refused to discuss questions of family planning or divorce, insisting that they were
private matters dealt with within the household.
All of these three areas present significant challenges to policymakers and programmers
looking to provide choices or agency for women to take command of their own bodies and
being. It is thus important to develop strategies to raise consciousness on these issues
and explore how communication campaigns might be integrated into existing formal and
informal education programmes. In terms of domestic violence specifically, incorporating
women’s shuras in efforts to address the issue—for example via mediation—represent
one possible avenue to be explored in future.
Education
In general, male youths across all study communities had much better access to
education than their female counterparts. When making decisions on whether to send
their daughters to school—if they could afford to do so—parents primarily considered
the distance to the nearest school, along with the prevailing security conditions and,
in some cases, traditional norms. For boys, by contrast, the only limiting factor beyond
economic considerations was age.
Currently, education did not play much of a role in the LOPF ranking since most female
participants (except in the urban communities) had low levels of education, and many
had not gone to school at all. That said, improving the degree of women’s education is a
critical foundation for any improvement of their status and rights. Getting an education
has clear economic returns since it is directly linked to the kind of job opportunities that
are available. Currently, however, the chances of girls going to school in these communities
will remain low until structural changes—such as the provision of new schools within the
villages, reliable transportation, and better security on the roads—take place.
Economic opportunities
In Kart-i-Bakheter, some women were doing paid work and in Shirabad Ulya, some women
were engaging in home-based income-generating activities. However, in the other two
communities, women were doing no more paid work than they were ten years ago under
the Taliban. For a woman, being able to earn an income had a significant impact on her
decision-making power and mobility, in turn helping her move up the LOPF. In addition,
exposure to the outside world that paid employment in particular brings can help raise
women’s awareness and, in turn, change both their own and their families’ expectations
of themselves.
A number of factors affect women’s entrance to paid work. At first glance, cultural
constraints were the main factors hindering women’s mobility and thus shutting off
39
their chances of taking work outside their homes and communities. However, participant
responses across study communities suggested that attitudes toward women working
outside the home are shifting. This highlights another important constraint: in the
current economic climate, relatively few work opportunities are available, and without
enough education or experience, women are at a major disadvantage in competing for
those jobs that are available.
It is also worth noting that despite the above shift in attitudes toward women being
able to work for pay, there was still a sense among many participants that women and
men should still work in accordance with their assigned gender roles. This meant that
distinctions remained in terms of the types of work it was appropriate for women and
men to engage in. In this context, female and male youths agreed that they would not
want to switch places with the opposite sex in terms of their economic roles—a factor
it is important to consider when designing gender-specific programmes or education
for young people. Beyond this, there was also a sense that men’s work is ultimately
more important than that of women. Since men are still expected to act as the main
breadwinner, it was felt that it would be more problematic for a man to lose his job
than a woman, and that if new opportunities were to be created, they should be made
available to men first and foremost. As a consequence of these perceptions, women’s
work and unpaid economic contributions to their families are devalued, which could in
turn lead to a tendency to be lenient in terms of work policies and guidelines in jobs
where most of the workers are women.
These distinctions where especially stark when it came to the question of who could
own or operating a business. This was largely seen to be the sole preserve of men, and
participants across study communities remarked that a woman setting up a business
would represent an unusual or even peculiar scenario. Adult participants also felt it would
be difficult for women to set up a business without a man’s support for the following
reasons: 1) men hold the majority of decision-making power in the household; 2) men
enjoy more mobility than women; and 3) is not normal cultural practice for a woman to
set up a business on her own. Some of these participants also noted that even if women
were able to successfully run their own businesses, they would still need their husbands’
permission on how to spend their income.
Within these multiple barriers, though, there are still cracks and spaces for women
to pass through, and enabling environments in the different study communities have
already yielded various changes in outlook and practice. These have included women’s
empowerment initiatives on the part of both the government (the NSP) and NGOs,
migration, higher education levels, availability and proximity to schools for boys and
girls, and good infrastructure links to neighbouring communities. In future, strategies
could also be developed to create participation processes that empower women to voice
out their particular ideas and issues in more equitable ways.
Overall, women’s situation in the study communities seemed at first glance to have
progressed little over the past ten years. However, a closer look reveals that important
changes are taking place, opening up spaces and avenues for women’s participation in
development endeavours that result into their empowerment. It is vital to continue and
build on this momentum by making maximum use of these opportunities, which are vital
in helping women and young people gain more control of their lives.
40
Annex
Annex Table 1: Summary table of fieldwork activities conducted in Boyina
Bagh, Shirabad Ulya, Kabul; and Kart-i-Bakheter, Naw Da, Parwan
Informants/participants
Data collection
Duration Purpose Shirabad Kart-i-
method Boyina Bagh Naw Da
Ulya Bakheter
To gain an understanding of the

local context; community-level
Key
factors that may contribute 1 key 1 key
Activity 1. informants 2 key
to gender differences and informant informant
Community 1 hour with 3 informants
changes in gender norms; and
questionnaire participants
practices surrounding economic
decision-making and access to
opportunities
To explore with young women

and men:
• Happiness
• Daily time use
1 FGD of 1 FGD of 1 FGD of
• Decisions surrounding
female female female youth, 1 FGD of
transitions from school to
youth, ages youth, ages 18 to female youth,
work and family formation
Activity 2. 18 to 24 with ages 18 to 24 with 8 ages 18 to
• Independence, cooperation
Focus group 9 participants 24 with 9 participants 24 with 12
and obligations in economic
discussion with participants participants
2.5 hours decision-making processes 1 FGD of
youth: Making 1 FGD of
• Divorce, family dispute male youth,
economic 1 FGD of male youth, 1 FGD of male
resolution mechanisms ages 18 to
choices male youth, ages 18 to youth, ages
• Local economic opportunities 24 with 9 ages 18 to 24 with 8 18 to 24 with
• Savings practices participants 24 with 9 participants 8 participants
• Community participation
participants
• Knowledge of gender-related
rights
• Role models
• Hopes for the future
To explore with adult women

and men:
• Happiness
1 FGD of 1 FGD of 1 FGD of 1 FGD of
• Differences in the exercise of
female female female female
power and freedom, with a
adults, adults, adults, adults,
focus on economic decisions
Activity 3. ages 25 to ages 25 to ages 25 to ages 25 to
• Local economic opportunities
Focus group 60 with 10 60 with 10 60 with 10 60 with 10
• Independence, cooperation,
discussion with participants participants participants participants
2.5 hours and obligations in economic
adults: Ladder
decision-making processes 1 FGD of
of power and 1 FGD of 1 FGD of 1 FGD of
• Divorce, family dispute male adults,
freedom male adults, male adults, male adults,
resolution mechanisms ages 25 to ages 25 to ages 25 to ages 25 to
• Sources of economic support 60 with 8 60 with 10 60 with 8 60 with 11
• Household gender relations participants participants participants participants
• General patterns of domestic
and community violence
• Hopes for the future
To provide in-depth analysis

of a finding that emerges as Key Key Key Key
Activity 4. 1 to 2 important for understanding informants informants informants informants
Mini-case study hours gender norms or structures with 3 with 3 with 2 with 3
shaping economic decisions in participants participants participants participants
the area
41
Annex Table 2: Number of participants from CQs, FGDs, and mini-case

studies
Area Female Male Total
Adults 9 15 24
Boyina Bagh
Youth 8 9 17
Total 17 24 41
Adults 10 10 20
Shirabad Ulya
Youth 9 9 18
Total 19 19 38
Kart-i- Adults 10 11 21
Bakheter Youth 8 8 16
Total 18 19 37
Adults 11 15 26
Naw Da
Youth 12 8 20
Total 23 23 46
Overall total 77 85 162
Annex Table 3: Socio-demographic Annex Table 4: Socio-demographic

profile of adult FGD participants profile of youth FGD participants
Attributes Female Male Total Attributes Female Male Total
Age:
25-33 5 8 13 Age:
34-42 10 10 20 18-21 20 23 43
43-51 15 8 23 22-25 17 9 26
52-60 7 8 15 25 and above 0 2 2
61 and above 0 6 6
Marital status: Marital status:
Single 0 0 0 Single 23 24 47
Married 37 40 77 Married 14 10 24
Educational level: Educational level:
0 32 15 47 0 28 10 38
1-3 0 0 0 1-3 0 0 0
4-6 1 4 5 4-6 2 0 2
7-9 1 1 2 7-9 2 7 9
10-12 3 12 15 10-12 5 16 21
12th grade+ 1 7 8 12th grade+ 0 1 1
No. of children:
0 1 1 2 No. of children:
1-3 7 5 12 0 24 25 49
4-6 16 10 26 1-3 6 7 13
7-9 9 14 23 4-6 7 2 9
10-12 4 10 14
Total 37 40 77 Total 37 34 71
42
Does Women’s Participation in the National Solidarity Programme Make a Difference in their Lives? A Case
Annex Table 5: Best and worst ways to make a living: Responses of adult
female and male FGD participants in Boyina Bagh, Kabul Province
Views of female adults Views of male adults

The best ways to make a living
Women Men Women Men
Teacher √ √ √ √
Government work √ √ √
Doctor √ √
Business √
The worst ways to make a living
Farmer √ √
Shopkeeper √
Tailor √ √
Poultry/livestock-raising √ √
Wage labour √
Annex Table 6: Best and worst ways to make a living: Responses of youth
female and male FGD participants in Boyina Bagh, Kabul Province
Views of female youths Views of male youths
Women Men Women Men
Government work √
Doctor √ √
Business/trade √ √
Tailoring √
Livestock-raising √ √ √
Driver √
Farming √ √
Embroidery √
Poultry-raising √ √
Wage labour √ √ √
Collecting wood √
Cook √
Police √
Army √
43
female and male FGD participants in Shirabad Ulya, Kabul Province

Women Men Women Men
Government work √ √ √ √
Doctor √ √ √ √
Business/shopkeeper √ √ √
NGO worker √ √
Engineer √ √
Farmer √
Driver √
Fruit-picking √
Soldier/policeman √ √
Wage labour √ √
female and male FGD participants in Shirabad Ulya, Kabul Province
Views of female youth Views of male youth

Women Men Women Men
Doctor √ √ √ √
Trade √ √ √ √
Tailor √ √
Fruit picking √
Shopkeeper √
Soldier √
Poultry-raising √
Driver √
Farmer √
Livestock-raising √ √
Baker √ √
Brick-making √
44
female and male FGD participants in Kart-i-Bakheter, Parwan Province

Women Men Women Men
Teacher √ √
Government work √ √
Doctor √ √
Shopkeeper √ √
Business √
Factory work √ √
Poultry-raising √
Carpet-weaving/embroidery √
Carpenter √
Livestock-raising √ √
Farmer √
Washing clothes √ √
Wage labour √ √ √
Driver √
Porter √ √
female and male FGD participants in Kart-i-Bakheter, Parwan Province

Women Men Women Men
NGO work √ √ √ √
Factory work √ √
Trade/shopkeeper √ √
Tailor √ √
Farmer √ √
Construction work √ √
Wage labour √ √
45
female and male FGD participants in Naw Da, Parwan Province

Women Men Women Men
Driver √
Tailor √ √
Livestock/poultry-raising √ √ √ √
Government work √ √
Shopkeeper √
Modern farmer √ √
Teacher √
Engineer √
Doctor
Quarrying stone √ √
Wage labour √ √
Collecting wood √
Fetching water √ √
Potter √
Traditional farmer √
Porter √
Street vendor √
Annex Table 12. Best and worst ways to make a living: Responses of youth
female and male FGD participants in Naw Da, Parwan Province

Women Men Women Men
Shopkeeper √ √
Driver √ √
Tailor √ √ √ √
Household tasks √ √
Teacher √ √
Quarrying stone √ √
Carrying stone √ √
Collecting wood √ √
Fetching water √ √ √ √
46
Annex Table 13: Characteristics of a good wife today: Result of female and
male adults’ FGDs
FGD Boyina Bagh Shirabad Ulya Kart-i-Bakheter Naw Da

1. Educated
2. Has a job 1. Has good
3. Has a good attitude toward 1. Educated manners
1. Good behaviour within the other people 2. Modest
2. Kind
family 4. Accepts her husband’s 3. Doctor 3. Kind to other
Female adults 2. No fighting; patient orders villagers
4. Broad-minded
3. Sociable; deals well with 5. Serves her husband’s 4. Courageous
neighbours parents 5. Takes care of
the children 5. Sociable
6. Spends money according
to the family’s economic
conditions
1. Contributes to the income 1. Must be an
1. Keeps in mind what her of the family 1. Educated
husband wants expert in the
2. Takes care of her children 2. Shows good housework
2. Lives according to husband’s behaviour toward
3. Keeps the house clean 2. Must follow
financial position husband and
4. Has a good attitude toward members of family and respect
3. Does not demand things from husband
her husband and prevents
Male adults her husband 3. Educates her
conflict 3. Must think
4. Good behaviour; does not children
5. Has a good attitude toward about the family
quarrel with husband 4. Prays five times expenses
her in-laws
5. Looks after her family/ a day
6. Educated 4. Helps
children, cooks good food, and 5. May go out and husband by
pays attention to the home 7. Has skills like cooking, work
tailoring, and embroidery raising livestock
Annex Table 14: Characteristics of a good husband today: Result of female

and male adults’ FGDs
1. Educated
2. Broad-minded
1. Literate 1. Hardworking, kind
3. Does not impose a lot and responsible
2. Has a good job of restrictions
1. Education 3. Has good behaviour 2. Has good income
4. Merciful
2. Has good behaviour and deals well with other 3. Is responsible
people 5. Clever for providing all
Female 3. Knows women’s rights and
adults 4. Respects his wife’s 6. Developed requirements of the
family
relatives 7. Has a good job family.
4. Deals well with relatives and
5. Protects the children 8. Uneducated but still a 4. Has good manners,
friends
good father is kind and does not
6. Has a good style beat his wife and
7. Pious 9. Farmer but works hard
children.
10. Sensitive toward
responsibilities
1. Has a good job/income
1. Good behaviour toward the 1. Educated and knows
wife; listens to her 2. Helps his wife with
the rights of men and
housework
2. Helps his wife with the women 1. Kind to his children
household chores 3. Fulfils his wife’s needs/
2. Helps with household and other family
does not fight with her
3. Solves problems with his wife tasks members.
Male adults and does not abuse her 4. Has good relations
2. Good behaviour with 2. Has income and will
with in-laws and other
4. Does not restrict his wife all family members and provides a good life
villagers
5. Good financial status; fulfils wife for his family
5. Cares about children’s
his responsibility to the family 3. Solves problems at
education
home
6. A Muslim
47
Annex Table 15: Characteristics of a good wife of the previous generation:

Results of female and male adults’ FGDs

1. Modest
1. Attends to her
2. Head of family
husband, children,
1. At peace with and the house 3. Not extravagant 1. Does not go
members of her 4. Kind anywhere; modest;
2. Does not go
family not talkative
Female adults anywhere 5. Uneducated but
2. At peace with able to perform her 2. Courageous;
3. Does not cause
those in the tasks as a wife and hardworking; well-
trouble or conflict
community mother behaved
4. Accepts her
husband’s orders 6. Few are teachers
and educated
1. Has a good 1. Does not go out
attitude toward her of the house
1. Similar to the husband 2. Participates in
characteristics of 2. Serves her tasks at home
today’s good wife husband, mother- 3. Prays five times 1. Modest; follows
Male adults 2. Attuned to her in-law, and father- a day her husband
husband’s financial in-law 4. Does not go out
status and to that 3. Has a part- to homes of friends
of the home time job as well or relatives without
as attending to the permission of
housework her husband
Annex Table 16: Female youth daily schedules in Boyina Bagh, Kabul
Province
Time Participant 3 Participant 5 Participant 2 Opposite sex

5:00 a.m. Housework Housework Housework Housework
6:00 Housework Housework Housework Housework
7:00 Housework Housework Housework School
8:00 Free time Free time Housework School
9:00 Housework Free time Housework School
10:00 Housework Housework Housework School
11:00 Housework Housework Housework Earning income
12:00 p.m. Housework Housework Housework Earning income
1:00 Free time Free time Free time Free time
2:00 Housework Free time Free time Earning income
3:00 Housework Housework Free time Earning income
5:00 Free time Housework Housework Free time
6:00 Free time Free time Housework Free time
7:00 Housework Housework Housework Free time
8:00 Housework Housework Free time Free time
48
Annex Table 17: Male youth daily schedules in Boyina Bagh, Kabul Province

5:00 a.m. Housework Housework Housework Housework
7:00 Commuting Commuting Commuting Housework
8:00 School School School Housework
9:00 School School School Housework
10:00 School School School Free time
12:00 p.m. School School School Housework
1:00 Free time Free time Free time Housework
3:00 School Earning income School Free time
4:00 School Earning income School Free time
Annex Table 18: Female youth daily schedules in Shirabad Ulya, Kabul
Province
Time Participant 8 Participant 1 Participant 7

5:00 a.m. Housework Housework Housework
6:00 Housework Housework Housework
8:00 Earning income Earning income Earning income
9:00 Earning income Earning income Earning income
10:00 Earning income School Earning income
11:00 Earning income School Earning income
12:00 p.m. Housework School Housework
1:00 Free time Commuting Free time
5:00 Free time Free time Free time
6:00 Free time Free time Free time
49
Annex Table 19: Male youth daily schedules in Shirabad Ulya, Kabul
Province
Time Partcicipant 1 Participant 5 Participant 8 Opposite sex

5:00 a.m. Housework Housework Housework Free time
8:00 Earning income School School School
9:00 Earning income School School School
10:00 Commuting School School School
11:00 Commuting School School School
12:00 p.m. Commuting School School School
1:00 Commuting School School Housework
5:00 Housework School Free time Housework
6:00 Free time Free time School Housework
7:00 Free time School School Housework
Annex Table 20: Female youth daily schedules in Kart-i-Bakheter, Parwan

Province

6:00 a.m. Housework Housework Housework Free time
7:00 Housework Commuting Housework Earning income
8:00 School School Housework Earning income
11:00 School School Free time Earning income
12:00 p.m. School School Housework Earning income
1:00 Free time Free time Free time Earning income
3:00 Free time Free time Housework Earning income
4:00 Free time Free time Housework Earning income
7:00 Housework Free time Housework Free time
50
Annex Table 21: Male youth daily schedules in Kart-i-Bakheter, Parwan

Province

6:00 a.m. Housework Earning income Housework Housework
7:00 Housework Earning income Housework Housework
8:00 School Earning income Earning income Earning income
12:00 p.m. School Commuting Earning income Housework
1:00 Housework Commuting Commuting Housework
2:00 Housework Commuting Earning income Housework
3:00 School Earning income Earning income Housework
8:00 Commuting Commuting Commuting Free time
Annex Table 22: Female youth daily schedules in Naw Da, Parwan Province
5:00 a.m. Housework Free time Free time Earning income
6:00 Housework Free time Housework Earning income
8:00 Housework Housework Housework Commuting
12:00 p.m. Housework Housework Housework Earning income
1:00 Free time Housework Housework Commuting
4:00 Housework Free time Free time Earning income
8:00 Free time Free time Housework Free time
51
Annex Table 23: Male youth daily schedules in Naw Da, Parwan Province

5:00am Earning income Earning income Earning income Free time
6:00 Earning income Earning income Earning income Housework
10:00 Earning income Earning income Earning income Free time
12:00pm Earning income Earning income Earning income Housework
Annex Table 24: Placement of women on the LOPF at present and 10 years
ago by percentage—Responses of female adults
Top step Bottom step

Community
Present (%) 10 years ago (%) Present (%) 10 years ago (%)
Boyina Bagh 20 10 30 60
Shirabad Ulya 20 20 70 60
Kart-i-Bakheter 60 30 10 40
Naw Da 20 20 80 80
Annex Table 25: Placement of men on the LOPF at present and 10 years ago
by percentage—Responses of male adults
Top step Bottom step

Community
Present (%) 10 years ago (%) Present (%) 10 years ago (%)
Boyina Bagh 30 20 40 50
Shirabad Ulya 15 15 30 25
Kart-i-Bakheter 5 10 20 20
Naw Da 70 30 30 70
52
Annex Table 26: Causes of tension, forms of abuse, and consequences of

abuse—Responses of adult men and women in Boyina Bagh, Kabul Province
Female adults
Causes of tension Forms of abuse Consequences of abuse
1. Bad economy
1. Verbal 1. Poverty and misfortune
2. Joint house
2. Punishment 2. Homelessness
3. Living with in-laws
3. Killing 3. Joblessness
4. Disagreement
4. Looting 4. Restrictions
5. Enmity
5. Theft and kidnapping 5. Failing
6. Nervousness
Male adults
1. Misbehaviour of wife 1. Financial restrictions on the
2. Lack of wife’s attention to wife
1. Verbal
children’s cleanliness and discipline 2. Not talking to the wife
at home 2. Psychological (for
example not talking to 3. Forbidding her from visiting
2. Careless in entertaining the guests her parents’ home
each other)
3. Not fulfilling husband’s orders 4. Bad behaviour of husband
3. Physical
4. Reacts against husband’s father 5. Negative changes at home
and mother regarding discipline

abuse—Responses of adult men and women in Shirabad Ulya, Kabul Province
Female adults
1. Not having their own house;
renting a house 1. Loss of job
2. Having a joint house (living 2. Restrictions
1. Verbal abuse
with other families in the same 3. Conservatism; the family
household) 2. Physical abuse
does not develop
3. Having economic problems 3. Robbery and theft
4. Poverty and failure
4. Feelings of hatred 4. Killing and murder
5. Hatred
5. Mental illness 6. No house
6. Excessive conservatism
Male adults
1. Argument
1. Inhibiting wife from visiting
2. Bad attitude of wife toward her father’s house
husband’s family
2. No talking
3. Bad attitude of husband toward 1. Verbal abuse
wife’s family 3. Sadness
2. Physical abuse 4. No coordination; husband and
4. Poverty and misery
3. Psychological abuse wife do not help each other
5. Unemployment
5. Misunderstanding and no
6. Interference of husband’s father harmony between husband and
and mother in the life of husband wife
and wife
53
Annex Table 28: Causes of tension, forms of abuse, and consequences of abuse—
Responses of adult men and women in Kart-i-Bakheter, Parwan Province
Female adults
1. Weak finance
1. Conflicts have negative impacts
2. Interference of families
on children
3. Backbiting between
1. Verbal abuse 2. Suicide may occur
husband and wife
2. Physical abuse 3. There may be divorce or disunity
4. Selfishness
3. Psychological abuse between the couple
5. Suspicion
4. Economic abuse 4. Man leaves home
6. Prejudice
5. Poor economic conditions
7. Restriction
6. Disagreement in the family
8. Irresponsibility
Male adults
All members of family become
1. Poverty 1. Verbal abuse unhappy; conflict affects children
2. Illiteracy 2. Physical abuse badly; more conflict and physical
violence may occur

abuse—Responses of adult men and women in Naw Da, Parwan Province
Female adults
1. Negative impact on children
2. Fighting; people have bad
relations with each other in the
1. Poor finances
village
2. Fighting among
3. Enmity among the people
children and grown-ups; 1. Verbal abuse
involvement in a fight 4. No links between children
2. Physical abuse
3. Accusation 5. Poor relationship which ends up
in violence; they hurt each other
4. Joblessness of husbands
verbally and men hurt women
physically
Male adults
1. Unemployment
2. Poverty
3. Customs 1. Verbal abuse
Bad language between the son-in-
4. Wife going somewhere 2. Physical abuse
law and mother-in-law; enmity
without permission of 3. Psychological abuse
husband
5. Violence of children
54
Bibliography
Center for Policy and Human Development/United Nations Development Programme.
“Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007.” Islamabad: Army Press, 2007.
Government of Afghanistan. “National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan 2018-
18.” Kabul: Ministry of Women’s Affairs, 2008.
Ministry of Women’s Affairs and UNIFEM. “Women and Men in Afghanistan: Baseline
Statistics on Gender.” Kabul: Ministry of Women’s Affairs, 2008.
“Transition within Tradition: Restoring Women’s Participation in Afghanistan.” Cambridge,

MA: Harvard University Kennedy School Women and Public Policy Program, 2001.
United Nations Development Programme. Power, Voices and Rights: A Turning Point for
Gender Equality in Asia and the Pacific 2000-2005. New Delhi: Macmillan, 2010.
55
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Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

Case Study Series

Gender and Economic Choice:

Editing and Layout: Oliver Lough

Cover Photograph: A women’s focus group discussion in Bamiyan Province, by

AREU Publication Code: 1206E

About the Author

About the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

...beginning with King Amanullah (1919-1929), continuing with the reign of

As Afghanistan enters what is supposed to be a post-conflict transition period, the

In response to these questions, AREU conducted a rapid qualitative assessment (RQA)

2. Methodology and Study Contexts

Characteristics of informants and participants

The socio-demographic characteristics of the adult participants are shown in Annex

2.1 The study context

Box 1: Without peace, there can never be development

In an FGD conducted with NSP course beneficiaries, Razeya, a 17-year-old Tajik

Box 3: Getting an education: The negative result as perceived by families

This event had an impact on women’s access to education, discouraging families

Box 4: A return to tomorrow

CQ informants offered conflicting assessments of Naw Da’s prosperity First, they

3. Power and Freedom

I am disappointed about having no free time because I am busy with my

3.2 Steps on the ladder of power and freedom

Top step: Mobile, decision-makers, and income earners

Bottom step: No decision-making power, no income, very limited mobility

Second step from the bottom: Engaging in home-based income-earning

Third step from the bottom: Relatively harmonious relationships between

Middle step on the three-step LOPF: Husbands are income-earners, with

3.3 Movement along the LOPF

Starting with a small investment such as poultry or tailoring, going to school

government providing opportunities for women, development and changes in

There is a possibility of women moving up by doing business and with their

3.4 Shifts in women’s and men’s levels of empowerment over

Table 2. Empowerment index* of Boyina Bagh, Kabul Province

Men’s ladder, Boyina Bagh

Table 3. Empowerment index of Shirabad Ulya, Kabul Province

Table 4. Empowerment index of Kart-i-Bakheter, Parwan Province

Table 5. Empowerment index of Naw Da, Parwan Province

However, female adult participants here also added:

4. Marriage and Children

4.2 Timing of marriage

4.3 Marriage practice: Outcomes and possibility of changing

The walwar is too high, the amount should be decreased.

4.4 Family size and family planning

4.5 Gender equality and domestic violence

When a member of an extended family like a daughter, mother-in-law or

Even if majority of participants in all study communities were hesitant to expand on

4.6 Divorce: Taboo as a topic of discussion

Divorce in western countries is also considered the right of wives...this kind of

Our economic condition is very weak so instead of going to school we go to work.

5.2 Desire for education

6.2 Women’s access to paid work

6.3 Types of job available to men and women

For women finding a job is different because of work discrimination. For

There was a significant divide in opinions about perceived changes in attitudes to

As a consequence, participants generally thought that it would be very difficult for a

Because the husband is responsible for financial questions...the wife’s

A woman is not in the position in our community to make decisions regarding

6.4 Economic cooperation between women and men