CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

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 CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Introduction

Language is a means of communication which is used not only to convey

the thoughts and views of the speaker but also to perform certain actions by
use of words. Actions performed via words are referred to by Austin as
speech acts. The theory of speech acts has aroused a wide interest in the
field of language usage. Speech acts are the actions performed by use of
words which are synonymous with the notion of the illocutionary acts of
Austin. Speech acts are classified into five different categories by Austin,
which were later on modified by Searle. The classification of the speech
acts by Austin and Searle are the attempts of the two great philosophers of
language to group the ‘thousands’ of performatives of English into five
broad categories.

Pragmatics studies the use of language in context. It basically deals with

conversational aspect of language and it is a context bound study of
language use in society. David Crystal (1971: 243) says “pragmatics studies
the factors which govern someone’s choice of language when they speak or
write”. Pragmatics began to grow with the theories provided by the great
philosophers like J. L. Austin, J. R. Searle, and H. P. Grice.

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The major theories and concepts of pragmatics are:

2.2. Cooperative Principle

H. P. Grice formulated the theories of cooperative principle and

conversational implicature. He proposed that in ordinary conversation
speakers and hearers to cooperate in order to make the conversation
successful and speakers shape their utterances to be understood by the
hearers.

According to Grice, the total meaning of an utterance could be

distinguished in two ways. Firstly, Grice thought of what the part of
meaning of an utterance is and what is not. Secondly, he thought what the
literal meaning of a sentence or an utterance is and what is implicated. In
conversation, people use language in such a way that they follow certain
principles to be cooperative to further the purpose of communication,
which Grice called as the ‘cooperative principle’. Grice stated the
cooperative principle in the following words: “Make your conversational
contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the
accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are
engaged”. (Grice, in Cole and Morgan, 1975: 45)

Grice talks of the maxims of cooperative principle, which are: Maxim of

Quality, Maxim of Quantity, Maxim of Manner, and Maxim of Relevance.

2.2.1. Maxim of Quality

Try to make true contribution.

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a) Do not say what you believe to be false.
b) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

2.2.2. Maxim of Quantity

a) Make your contribution as informative as required (for the current

purposes of the exchange)
b) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

2.2.3. Maxim of Manner

Be perspicuous

a) Avoid obscurity of expression

b) Avoid ambiguity
c) Be brief
d) Be orderly

2.2.4. Maxim of Relation

Be relevant.

According to S. Blum-Kulka (1997: 40), “these conversational norms serve

as a set of guidelines by which interlocutors judge each other’s
contributions to talk and make sense of what is said”.

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2.3. Conversational Implicature

H. P. Grice also formulated the theory of ‘conversational implicature’

which studies the implied meaning in an utterance. Grice presented his idea
of implicature in the William James lectures that he delivered in 1967. The
theory of implicature basically treats the implied meaning of an utterance.

Speakers are generally supposed to obey the cooperative principle, but

sometimes they flout the maxims of cooperative principle to convey more
than that is said, and the hidden meaning is inferred by the listeners.
Speakers use implicatures to convey the implied meaning which is known
as conversational implicature.

The different types of implicatures are: Generalized Conversational

Implicature, Particularized Conversational Implicature, Scalar Implicature,
and Conventional Implicature.

2.3.1. Generalized Conversational Implicature

Generalized conversational implicatures “arise irrespective of the context in

which they occur”. Grundy (1995: 44)

For example,

a) Most of the people in India believe in superstitions.

b) I have Rs. 9000 in the bank.

Here the examples a and b would always give rise to the same implicature
without bothering about the context.

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2.3.2. Particularized Conversational Implicature

Particularized implicature is “derived, not from the utterance alone, but

from the utterance in context.” Grundy (1995: 45). The total meaning of an
utterance is dependent on the inferences of the context of the utterance.

For example,

a) It’s tasty.
b) We won.

The examples given here as a and b have the implicatures that would
depend on the inferences gathered by the particular context of the utterance.
The utterance in example a would be an appreciation of good food or it
might even be an ironical comment if the food is not good in taste, and the
implicature would depend on the particular context. The utterance We in
example b would even indicate a local team or a national team like the
Indian team and won might mean a really winning team or a sarcastic
comment on the losing of the game.

2.3.3. Scalar Implicature

In a scalar implicature “certain information is always communicated by

choosing a word which expresses one value from a scale of values.” Yule
(1996: 41)

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For example,

I have completed some of the syllabus of my course of study.

Here the word some expresses the value of scale that not all or most of the
syllabus is completed but some of the syllabus is completed.

2.3.4. Conventional Implicature

Conventional implicature is “associated with specific words and results in

additional conveyed meanings when those words are used.” Yule (1996:
45)

For example,

a) Even Rita danced in the party.

b) She prefers coffee, but I like tea.

In the above example a the word even conveys the additional meaning that
Rita was not expected to dance in the party (the reason may be that she is
very shy) but contrary to the expectations of the people present in the party,
she danced. In example b the word but conveys the additional meaning of a
certain contrast of choice between the girl and the boy regarding coffee and
tea.

2.4. Politeness Principle

Politeness principle is used in interpersonal communication in order to be

polite while speaking to each other to make the situation of conversation

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comfortable. It is generally associated with the social concept of face. Face
is “the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the
line others assume he has taken during a particular contact.” E. Goffman
(1967: 5)

Brown and Levinson suggest face to be a concept which is possessed by all

human beings. They categorise face in two different types: the positive face
and the negative face. The positive face is the positive representation of
one’s self-esteem, whereas the negative face is a concept which makes one
feel that our action should be free and nothing should be imposed by others.

The positive face and the negative face should generally be balanced in a
communication process as most of the utterances tend to interfere with free
action and thus threaten the face, or is face threatening.

According to Verschueren, J. (1999: 45), the negative face is “a person’s

need to have freedom of action, and positive face, a person’s need to be
treated as an equal or insider. Any act that puts face wants at risk is a face-
threatening act.”

Politeness Principle helps in saving the face of the participants engaged in a

conversation, rather than to threaten the face, as the face threatening
utterance would make the conversation impolite.

A face-saving act is that in which the positive social image or self-esteem

of the face is balanced against any utterance that would break the self-
esteem of the social image of the person.

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Geoffrey Leech (1983: 132) suggested six maxims of politeness principle.
They are: Tact Maxim, Generosity Maxim, Approbation Maxim, Modesty
Maxim, Agreement Maxim, and Sympathy Maxim. According to Leech,
the maxims of politeness principle tend to go in pairs as follows:

2.4.1. Tact Maxim

(a) Minimize cost to other [(b) Maximize benefit to other]

2.4.2. Generosity Maxim

(a) Minimize benefit to self [(b) Maximize cost to self]

2.4.3. Approbation Maxim

(a) Minimize dispraise of other [(b) Maximize praise of other]

2.4.4. Modesty Maxim

(a) Minimize praise of self [(b) Maximize dispraise of self]

2.4.5. Agreement Maxim

(a) Minimize disagreement between self and other [(b) Maximize

agreement between self and other]

2.4.6. Sympathy Maxim

(a) Minimize sympathy between self and other [(b) Maximize apathy
between self and other]

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2.5. Presupposition

Presupposition is, yet another, major concept in pragmatics. In the process

of communication, speakers, many a times, design their speech with certain
assumptions that they believe the hearer already know or is aware of the
context. The speakers prior to their speech generally make these
assumptions. These assumptions are known as presuppositions.

Presuppositions are considered as the aspects of meaning that are generally

presupposed or understood so that an utterance can make sense. According
to Van Dijk, T. (1977: 221), presupposition is “an assumption about the
knowledge of the hearer.”

There are six indicators of potential presupposition: existential

presupposition, factive presupposition, non-factive presupposition, lexical
presupposition, structural presupposition, and counter-factual
presupposition.

2.5.1. Existential Presupposition

If a presupposition commits a speaker to the existence of the thing or things

named in the utterance than such a presupposition is known as existential
presupposition.

For example,

His bike has been stolen. (Presupposes that he had a bike)

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2.5.2. Factive Presupposition

The utterance which presupposes that the things mentioned in the utterance
could be considered as facts are termed to be factive presupposition.

For example,

I was not aware that she left the job. (Presupposes that she left the job)

2.5.3. Non-Factive Presupposition

A non-factive presupposition is that which is generally assumed as not to be

true.

For example,

I dreamed that I was killed in the riot. (In fact, I am not killed and it was
only a dream)

2.5.4. Lexical Presupposition

The presupposition of an asserted meaning by use of a different lexical item

is known as lexical presupposition.

For example,

He stopped taking alcohol. (It presupposes that he used to drink alcohol

earlier)

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2.5.5. Structural Presupposition

Structural presupposition is the presupposition in which a certain type of

sentence structure gives rise to a presupposition which is conventionally
treated as true.

For example,

When did he die? (It presupposes that he died)

2.5.6. Counter Factual Presupposition

A counter factual presupposition is the presupposition in which the

presupposition not only turns out to be false but also the opposite of the
presupposition is, in fact, the truth.

For example,

He pretends to be honest (In fact, he is not honest.)

Presupposition has a very specific property which enables it to survive even

under the condition when it is negated, which is known as ‘constancy under
negation’.

It is the property of presupposition that the assumption of the

presupposition of an utterance remains the same even after it has been
negated.

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For example,

a) His car is violet.

b) His car is not violet

a and b both presuppose that he has a car.

2.6. Turn-taking

Speakers generally use their own turn to speak while engaged in a

conversation. They stop for their own turn to speak to avoid any confusion
in the process of conversation when different speakers are involved. This
concept of turn taken by each speaker in a conversation is known as turn-
taking. The concept of turn-taking prevents a speaker from being rude to
another by interrupting his speech.

The turn of the speaker is generally decided by the process of development

of interaction among the speakers. The second speaker takes his turn to
speak as soon as he recognizes that the utterance of the first speaker is
complete or near completion. The second speaker taking his turn sees that
there should be minimum or no overlap or silence in the process of turn-
taking during the conversation.

If the speakers engaged in a conversation do not speak according to their

turn, then the whole conversation would end up into a large noise without
being successful.

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2.7. Adjacency Pair

Adjacency pair is the pair of utterance that generally come together in the
form of ‘question-answer’, ‘offer-acceptance’, ‘greeting-greeting’, etc.
where two or more speakers are involved.

For example,

(Question-Answer)

A. Do you possess a car?

B. No.

(Offer-Acceptance)

A. Will you have some coffee?

B. I would love that.

(Greeting-Greeting)

A. Happy New Year.

B. Same to you.

When the adjacent part of an utterance does not follow immediately after
the first part, rather another adjacent pair of utterance is inserted before the
adjacent pair of the first part is uttered; it is known as the ‘insertion
sequence.’ E. A. Schegloff (1972) termed the inserted adjacent pair as
‘insertion sequences.’

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The second pair of utterance must have a relation to the first utterance of
the first pair and it cannot be produced without having any relation to the
first pair. According to Malcolm Coulthard (2007: 73), “adjacency pairs are
normative structures, the second part ought to occur, and thus the other
sequences are inserted between the first pair part that has occurred and the
second pair part that is anticipated.”

For example,

Q1. Can you check the availability of a berth from Howrah to Guwahati?
Q2. Which train—Saraighat Express or Kamrup Express?
A2. Sairaighat Express.
A1. Sure.

Here, in the conversation at a railway enquiry, question two (Q2) has been
asked before answering question one (Q1) and answer to the second
question (Q2) has been provided first and then the answer to the first
question (Q1); that is Q2 and A2 are inserted as an adjacency pair and so
known as insertion sequence.

According to Verschueren, J. (1999: 39), insertion sequences help in

providing “a maximally relevant answer.”

2.8. Speech Acts

John Langshaw Austin (1911-1960) was born in Lancaster and educated at

Balliol College, Oxford University and was a British philosopher of
language. He was a professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of
Oxford. He delivered a series of William James lectures at Harvard

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University in 1955, which were printed posthumously in the form of a book
in 1962 as How To Do Things With Words. Basically, these lectures were a
protest against the age-old assumption that the function of a declarative
sentence was to describe, report or state something and that the statement
made by a declarative sentence could be proved to be either true or false.
The theory expounded in these lectures came to be known as the ‘Theory of
Speech Acts.’ Through this, Austin put the ideas concerned in concrete
shape of the theory of speech acts. The speech acts theory has probably
aroused the widest interest than any other theory of language usage.

Austin launched his theory of speech acts at a period when the doctrine of
‘Logical Positivism’ flourished. The central tenet of the doctrine was that
unless a sentence can be verified, that is, tested for its truth or falsity; it
was, strictly speaking, meaningless. He noted that some ordinary language
declarative sentences, contrary to logical positivist assumptions, are not
apparently used with any intention of making true or false statements, but
rather the uttering of the sentence is an action, or is part of an action.

For example,

a) I name my team as ‘The Warriors.’

b) I bet you hundred rupees that India is going to win the match.

By uttering such sentences the speaker actually ‘names the team’ or ‘makes
a bet’ but he is not making any kind of statement that can be regarded as
true or false.

Austin discussed his theory of speech acts with his concept of

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‘performative verbs’ and the ‘conditions for happy performatives’. The
‘performative verbs’ of Austin give an illocutionary force to the utterance,
whereas the ‘condition for happy performatives’ guides the performative
utterance to be felicitous.

2.8.1. Locutionary, Illocutionary, and Perlocutionary Speech Acts

According to Austin, while making the use of language in conversation

people perform three different types of acts simultaneously. They produce
an utterance to make the hearer know what they mean and what the hearer
has to do. The utterance of the sentence, on the part of the speaker, is
termed by Austin as locutionary act.

When people utter a sentence, they make a statement, a request, a promise,

etc. with a certain conventional force associated with the verb, this is an
illocutionary act.

People try to get desired effect on the hearer, by performing an

illocutionary act; the consequences of the illocutionary acts were termed by
Austin as the perlocutionary act.

Austin (1962: 109) says that a locutionary act “is roughly equivalent to
‘meaning’ in the traditional sense”, whereas illocutionary acts are the
“utterances, which have a certain ‘conventional’ force”, and the
perlocutionary act brings certain effect on the hearer “by saying
something.”

The locutionary act is explicitly the act “of saying” something, whereas the
illocutionary act is the act performed by the speaker “in saying” something,

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and the consequence that the speaker brings on the hearer “by saying”
something is the perlocutionary act.

For example,

A husband says to his wife: I am hungry.

The locutionary act ‘of saying’ the sentence is the literal meaning that the
husband is hungry, the illocutionary force ‘in saying’ is that he wants
something to eat, whereas ‘by saying’ that he is hungry, he has persuaded
his wife to provide him with food or indirectly requested his wife to prepare
food for him, which is the perlocutionary act of the sentence.

Though, Austin classified three types of actions that people perform in

saying something, it is the illocutionary act that Austin was mostly
interested in while talking about ‘doing things with words’. It is the
illocutionary act that is of main concern in the theory of speech acts either it
be with the explicit use of performative verbs or the indirect use of
performatives.

2.8.2. The Performative Verb

In his theory of speech acts, Austin sets the view that some declarative
sentences are not simply used to declare anything with an intention of
making true or false statements; rather they are used to perform some
actions or are part of an action. According to George Yule (1996: 47),
“actions performed via utterances are generally called speech acts.”

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For example,

i) I name the building as the Taj Mansion.

ii) I bet you one thousand rupees that India will win.

In these two examples the speaker performs the act of naming the building,
and betting; he has not simply uttered a sentence in the form of a
declaration or a statement. These sentences are grammatically termed as
statements, but Austin termed them as ‘performatives’.

The performatives are sentences that can only be assessed as felicitous or

infelicitous. They are neither true nor false. Stephen Levinson (1983: 232)
says, “performative utterances are identifiable because they have the form
of first person indicative of active sentences in the simple present with one
of a delimited set of performative verbs as the main verb, which will
collocate with the adverb hereby.”

The performatives are divided into two types – the explicit performatives
and the implicit performatives. Utterances like I name the building as the
Taj Mansion and I bet you one thousand rupees that India will win are
examples of explicit performatives. The utterances, which do not contain
any obvious marker of a performative verb, are categorised as implicit
performatives, but based on the contexts, the implicit performatives
perform the function of a performative.

2.8.3. Austin’s Classification of Speech Acts

Austin labelled five broad categories of the speech acts, and each of these
categories is characterized by the use of some performative verbs.

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They are:

Verdictives: The verdictives are “typified by giving of a verdict, as the

name implies, by a jury, arbitrator or umpire”. - Austin (1962: 151)

For example: convict, sentence, rank, grade, etc.

Exercitives: Exercitives “are the exercising of powers, rights, or

influence”- Austin (1962: 151).

For example: ordering, voting, warning, etc.

Commissives: Commissives create an obligation to a course of action.

They are “typified by promising or otherwise undertaking; they commit you
to doing something” Austin (1962: 152)

For example: promising, vowing, etc.

Behavitives: Behavitives are, to quote Austin, “a very miscellaneous

group, and have to do with attitudes and social behavior” Austin (1962:
152).

For example: apologizing, congratulating, cursing, challenging, etc.

Expositives: According to Austin (1962: 152), “They make plain how our
utterances fit into the course of an argument or conversation, how we are
using words, or, in general, are expository.”

Examples of acts of exposition are: illustrating, assuming, replying,

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arguing, etc.

Austin’s classification of the speech acts was not satisfactory enough for
many philosophers; and so there came up other classificatory schemes of
speech acts.

2.8.4. Searle and His Classification of Speech Acts

Austin’s classification of speech acts did not satisfy Searle and, so, he
classified the speech act verbs and grouped the different illocutionary acts
into five basic types, which is rather a modified form of Austin’s
classification. Searle readily accepted Austin’s view that the speech acts
particularly refer to the illocutionary act of an utterance. Searle (1969: 21)
says that “some of the English verbs denoting illocutionary acts are ‘state’,
‘describe’, ‘assert’, ‘warn’, ‘remark’, ‘comment’, ‘command’, ‘order’,
‘request’, ‘criticize’, ‘apologize’, ‘censure’, ‘approve’, ‘welcome’,
‘promise’, ‘object’, ‘demand’, and ‘argue’. His classification of speech acts
has gained wide popularity.

According to Searle, one can perform only five basic kinds of actions in
speaking, by means of the following types of utterances:

Representatives – These types of speech acts commit the speaker to the

truth of the expressed proposition.

The illocutionary verbs employed are: asserting, concluding, hypothesizing,

etc.

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For example,

It was very cold yesterday.

Directives – These types of speech acts are used by the speaker to make the
hearer to do something.

The illocutionary verbs employed are: requesting, questioning, begging,

commanding, etc.

For example,

May I have a glass of water?

Commissives – These types of speech acts are employed by the speaker if

he commits himself to a certain course of action to be taken in the future.

The illocutionary verbs employed are: promising, threatening, warning,

guaranteeing, etc.

For example,

I will pick you up at 8 a.m.

Expressives – These types of speech acts express the feelings of the

speaker. They express particularly the psychological state of the speaker
associated with feelings of joy, sorrow, etc.

The illocutionary verbs employed are: apologizing, welcoming,

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congratulating, sympathizing, etc.

For example,

May I ask your pardon for breaking the piece of glass?

Declaratives –The performance of these types of speech acts tend to bring

out a change in the external situation of the world through utterances.

The illocutionary verbs or verb phrases employed are: declaring war,

christening, firing from employment, marrying, resigning, etc

For example,

I name this baby as Bishnu.

2.8.5. Primary and Secondary Illocutionary Acts

Searle, in his essay Indirect Speech Acts, is of the view that actions
performed through speech acts possess two different types of illocutionary
acts which he termed as the primary illocutionary act and the secondary
illocutionary act. Searle says “the secondary illocutionary act is literal; the
primary illocutionary act is not literal” (in Cole and Morgan; 1975: 61). His
term primary illocutionary act indicates the group of utterances which
convey a different meaning from the literal meaning expressed by the
speech acts. The function of the sentence uttered in conveying the non-
literal meaning of the utterance does not directly associate with the form of
the sentence. Searle is of the view that the speech acts in which “two
illocutionary forces” are involved and “in which one illocutionary act is

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performed indirectly by way of performing another” are indirect speech
acts. (in Cole and Morgan; 1975: 61)

2.8.6. Direct and Indirect Speech Acts

Austin’s theory of speech acts defines that speakers perform actions ‘in
saying’ something. While saying something, the speakers perform acts like
warning, promising, declaring, etc. Austin classified the actions performed
through words into five broad categories which are: verdictives, exercitives,
commissives, behavitives, and expositives. Searle, on the other hand,
modified the five categories of speech acts into representatives, directives,
commissives, expressives, and declarations.

While performing actions through words speakers generally make use of

sentences which have a particular form and a specific function. The
linguistic forms and the functions conventionally associated with them are
sometimes very strictly followed, whereas on some occasions the functions
performed by the linguistic form uttered are not directly associated with the
conventional function of the form. These direct and indirect associations of
the form and function of an utterance lead to the classification of the speech
acts into Direct Speech Acts and Indirect Speech Acts.

A Direct Speech Act has a typical sentence form (for example, interrogative
for question) with a performative verb, whereas in an Indirect Speech Act,
the form of the sentence suggests a different function than it actually has to
perform (for example, interrogative for request). If speakers strictly adhere
their use of sentence to the forms and functions associated with it, then they
are said to perform a Direct Speech Act.

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For example,

Did you eat my chocolates?

It is a Direct Speech Act, as the speaker has performed the act of

questioning by using the interrogative form. But if the speaker utters—

My Chocolate box is empty.

The utterance, then, seems to be a declaration but it also implies that the
speaker is making an indirect question to the hearer whether he knows
anything about how his chocolate box is empty or if he himself has eaten
the chocolates in the box.

Similarly, if speakers use a sentence in a certain form but the function it

performs is different than that assigned to it conventionally, then it is an
Indirect Speech Act.

For example,

Can you write a letter for me?

Here, the form is in interrogative, but the speaker is not asking whether the
hearer knows how to write, rather it is a request to the hearer which is
indirectly stated. It can also mean that the hearer knows better techniques of
writing a letter than the speaker. In the given example, one form of the
sentence is used to perform the function of a different form.

The meaning of a Direct Speech Act is more or less encoded in the literal

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meaning of the utterance, whereas an Indirect Speech Act has an implied
meaning.

2.8.7. Some Definitions of Indirect Speech Acts

i) According to J. R. Searle, Indirect Speech Acts are the “cases in which

one illocutionary act is performed indirectly by way of performing
another.” (in Cole and Morgan; 1975: 60)

ii) Malcolm Coulthard (2007: 27) defines Indirect Speech Acts as “speech
acts performed indirectly through the performance of another speech
act.”

iii) Stephen Levinson (1983: 270) says “for an utterance to be an indirect

speech act there must be an inference-trigger, i.e. some indication that
the literal meaning and/or literal force is conversationally inadequate in
the context and must be ‘repaired’ by some inference.”

People generally prefer to use Indirect Speech Acts as they seem to be more
polite use of language than Direct Speech Acts. Although, many Indirect
Speech Acts are softened use of language or polite commands, Indirect
Speech Acts also include apologies, assertions, congratulations, promises,
thanks, doubts, etc. Indirect Speech Acts are also seen in irony, metaphor,
hint, and insinuation. In the daily conversation of human society various
uses of Indirect Speech Acts can also be found like indirect request, indirect
invitation, indirect order, indirect assertion, etc. Joking is also considered as
Indirect Speech Act, as Brown and Levinson (1978), is of the view that a

50
jocular comment is a politeness technique. Indirect Speech Acts are of
much greater importance in the act of communication.

2.9. Felicity Conditions

According to the theory of speech acts, people make use of words to

perform actions, which are typically marked, by the use of performatives.
Austin says that performatives are not like ‘constatives’ that can be
assessed by being either true or false. Performatives, rather, can only be
felicitous or infelicitous depending on whether their felicity conditions are
met or not. A performative utterance can either be happy or unhappy as
whether the ‘conditions for happy performatives’ are followed or not.

For example,

i) I declare that he is dead.

This utterance would be infelicitous if the speaker does not have any
authority of declaring anybody dead, if he is not a doctor.

ii) I declare war…

Here, the declaration would make the performative happy only if the
speaker has the authority to declare war, like the king of a country;
otherwise it is infelicitous.

iii) I promise that…

Here, the utterance can be felicitous only if the speaker intends to keep his

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promise.

Austin formulated six rules to be followed for making a performative

happy. Austin believed that these rules of his “are necessary for the smooth
or ‘happy’ functioning of a performative.” (1962: 14). According to Austin
(1962: 14), the six rules in regard to be an utterance to be happy are:

A) “There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain

conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain
words by certain persons in certain circumstances…”

B) “the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be

appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.”

C) “The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly” and

D) “completely.”

E) “Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having

certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain
consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person
participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those
thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct
themselves” and further

F) “must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.”

Searle, later on, modified the six rules of felicity conditions of

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performatives, given by Austin, into four major types. Searle’s
systematized classification of the felicity conditions are divided into four
categories “depending on how they specify propositional content,
preparatory preconditions, conditions on sincerity, and the existential
condition”, Levinson (1983: 239). The felicity conditions of Searle are:

2.9.1. Preparatory Condition

Preparatory condition takes into account pre-conditions that are required of

the real-world to the illocutionary act.

For example, it may relate to whether the person performing a speech act
has the authority to do so; as everyone in the society is not qualified to
arrest, fine, etc.; similarly a promise should have a beneficial effect for the
hearer, whereas effect of a warning should not be beneficial to the hearer.

2.9.2. Propositional Content Condition

Propositional content condition specifies restrictions on the content of

complement sentence.

For example, a promise is a future event and will be a future act of the
speaker.

2.9.3. Sincerity Condition

Sincerity condition states the requisite beliefs, feelings and intentions of the
speaker, as whether the speech act is performed sincerely.

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For example, if the speaker performs the act of promising then he must do
this only if he intends to do the act, he should not lie.

2.9.4. Essential Condition

Essential condition relates to the way the speaker is committed to a certain

kind of belief of behaviour, having performed a speech act.

For example, if a person performs an act of promising then he must

undertake the obligation to perform the act he promised.

2.10. Conclusion

The present chapter provides the basic theoretical concepts of pragmatics. It

discusses the theories and concepts like cooperative principle,
conversational implicature, politeness principle, presupposition, turn-taking
and adjacency pair. It also discusses the theory of speech acts along with
the direct speech acts and indirect speech acts. The felicity conditions of
performative utterance are also discussed in the chapter. These issues
prepare a ground and framework for the pragmatic analysis of selected
plays of G. B. Shaw.

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