1. Gandionco v. Peñaranda, G.R. No.

79284, November 27, 1987

Petitioner: Froilan C. Gandionco
Respondent: Hon. Senen C. Peñaranda, presiding Judge of RTC Branch 18, Cagayan De Oro City
Private Respondent: Teresita S. Gandionco

Summary:
- Froilan contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents (such as the application
for support pendente lite) should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed
against him.
- Whether a conviction for concubinage is necessary to secure a legal separation.
- NO. A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction
is necessary.

DOCTRINE
A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance
of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.

FACTS
- 1986: Teresita, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed with RTC Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City, a
complaint against Froilan for legal separation, on the grounds of concubinage.
- Teresita filed the provisional remedy pendente lite, pending a decision in the action for legal
separation, in which Hon. Peñaranda or the presiding judge ordered The payment of
support pendente lite.
- Froilan contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents (such as the application
for support pendente lite) should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed
against him.
- Froilan argues that his conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured before the action for
legal separation can prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action for legal separation is his alleged
offense of concubinage.

ISSUE
- Whether a conviction for concubinage is necessary to secure a legal separation.

RULING
- The Supreme Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.
- A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or
conviction is necessary.
- The requirement under the former law, that the guilt of defendant spouses had to be established by
final judgment in a criminal action, has not been reproduced or adopted by the framers of the
present Civil Code.
- Petitioner's attempt to resist payment of support pendente lite to his wife must also fail, as we find
no proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge in ordering the same.
Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted
at the discretion of the judge. If petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered as too
onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Additional Discussion on Procedures

Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may
proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action
is not one “to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense” even if both the civil and criminal actions
arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to
live separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support, and disqualification from inheriting from the innocent
spouse, among others.

2. Somosa-Ramos v. Vamenta Jr., G.R. No. L-34132, July 29, 1972

Petitioner: Lucy Somosa-Ramos
Respondent: Hon Cipriano Vamenta, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental
Private Respondent: Clemente Ramos

Summary:
- Lucy filed a petition for legal separation on the grounds of concubinage and sought the return of her
properties.
- Clemente asserts the colling off period in Article 103 of the Civil Code, which states that “ An action
for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of
the petition.”
- Whether Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal separation before
the lapse of six months bars the filing of the petition.
- NO. Article 103 does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of
the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstance.

DOCTRINE

FACTS
- Lucy filed a petition for legal separation on the ground of (1) concubinage and (2) attempt on her
life. She likewise sought the return of her property being managed by Clemente.
- Clemente moved to suspend the hearing using Article 103 of the Civil Code: “An action for legal
separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the
petition.” Respondent judge, Hon. Vamenta suspended the proceedings.

ISSUE
- Whether Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal separation before
the lapse of six months bars the filing of the petition.

RULING
- The Supreme Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.
- Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the hearing motion for preliminary injunction
prior to the expiration of the six-month period.
- “It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is evidently
intended as a cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses. The recital
of their grievances against each other in court may only fan their already inflamed passions against
one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them opportunity for dispassionate
reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy, does not have
the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of the
children and alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstance ... The law
expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the circumstances. If
these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank injustice may be caused.”
(Araneta v. Concepcion).
- There would appear to be then a recognition that the question of management of their
respective property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An
administrator may even be appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal
partnership.
 - At any rate, from the time of the issuance of the order complained of on August 4, 1971, more than
six months certainly had elapsed. Thus, there can be no more impediment for the lower court
acting on the motion of petitioner for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
WHEREFORE, the plea of petitioner for a writ of certiorari is granted, and the order of respondent Court of
August 4, 1971, suspending the hearing on the petition for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is set
aside. Respondent Judge is directed to proceed without delay to hear the motion for preliminary mandatory
injunction.

3. Ong Eng Kiam v. Ong, G.R. No. 153206, October 23, 2006
Petitioner: Ong Eng Kiam/William Ong
Respondent: Lucita G. Ong

Summary:
- Lucita invokes repeated physical violence (Article 55[1]).
- William invokes abandonment as legal separation (Article 55 [10]).
- Whether Article 56 [4] is applicable in this case.
- NO. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for
more than one year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such
does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.

DOCTRINE
The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than
one year.

FACTS
- 1975: William and Lucita got married at the San Agustin Church Manila. They were blessed with 3
children: Kingston, Charleston (favorite daw ni Lucita according to William), and Princeton.
- 1995: Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code
alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly
abusive conduct.
- Lucita asserts that she suffered physical and verbal abuse throughout their marriage. William would
often yell insults at her and physically assault her, including slapping, kicking, pulling her hair, and
hitting her with objects, the causes of these fights were petty things regarding their
children or their business. William would also scold and beat the children at different parts of
their bodies using the buckle of his belt, and whenever she tried to stop William, he would turn his
ire on her and box her.
- Tipping point: On December 14, 1995, Lucita left the house and went to her parents’ home after
William hit her on the stomach and she bent down because of the pain, he hit her on the head then
pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house.
- William argues that Lucita and her family’s motive in filing the case is to seize control of their
conjugal properties (includes real properties in HK, Baguio, MM, and Dagupan), which he acquired
solely through his efforts during their marriage. He contends that only Lucita's family would benefit
from a legal separation, and the decree would damage his reputation in the Filipino Chinese
community. He argues that marriage cannot be impaired by mere verbal disagreements. William
expresses his willingness to reconcile but blames Lucita for abandoning the family home
and filing for legal separation.
- Further, William argues that since respondent herself has given ground for legal separation by
abandoning the family simply because of a quarrel and refusing to return, no decree of legal
separation should be issued in her favor.

ISSUE
- Whether the decree for legal separation should be granted.

RULING
 - The Supreme Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE.
- Following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied
when both parties have given ground for legal separation.
- The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more
than one year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does
not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
- As Lucita has adequately proven the presence of a ground for legal separation, the Court has no
reason but to affirm the findings of the RTC and the CA, and grant her the relief she is entitled to
under the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.