Why Comply - The Domestic Constituency Mechanism

International Organization Foundation
Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism

Author(s): Xinyuan Dai
Source: International Organization, Vol. 59, No. 2 (Spring, 2005), pp. 363-398
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the International Organization
Foundation
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Why Comply? The Domestic
Constituency Mechanism
Xinyuan Dai
Abstract Why do countries comply with international agreements? While schol-

ars have done rigorous work to address compliance and enforcement in an inter-
national game, less analytical attention has been paid to domestic mechanisms of
compliance. However, because international agreements have domestic distribu-
tional consequences, there exist domestic sources of enforcement. In this article, I
develop an analytical framework of domestic accountability, where I identify spe-
cific channels of influence through which domestic constituencies can influence
national compliance. Using a game theoretic model, I show that a government's com-
pliance decision reflects the electoral leverage and the informational status of domes-
tic constituencies. This framework further provides a theoretical rationale for why
and how international institutions may influence states' compliance through domes-
tic mechanisms. The European acid rain regime offers an empirical illustration of the
domestic constituency argument.
In the framework of the Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) Con-
vention, twenty-one European countries agreed in 1985 to reduce their sulphur
emissions by at least 30 percent before 1993. In 1993 most countries reported
reaching this goal, and some reported much steeper reductions. This presents char-
acteristics of a classic collective action problem. On one hand, sulphur emission
reduction entails large short-term costs; on the other hand, because acid rain trav-
els over a long distance and often across borders, potential benefits of emission
reduction are widely diffused. The combination of concentrated costs and diffuse
benefits may give rise to free-riding incentives. A natural question to ask, there-
fore, is why do countries comply with their commitments?
Scholars have written much about how international institutions can resolve such
collective action problems at the international level. International institutions
I have benefited from the generous help of many colleagues and friends in the course of this research.
I would particularly like to thank the editor-in-chief of IO, anonymous reviewers of this article, as
well as William Bernhard, Paul Diehl, Daniel Drezner, James Fearon, Robert Keohane, Charles Lip-
son, Ronald Mitchell, Robert Pahre, Duncan Snidal, Detlef Sprinz, Milan Svolik, and Pieter van Houten.
Nazli Avdan provided valuable research assistance. MacArthur Foundation, the U.S. Institute of Peace,
Fuqua School of Business at Duke University, and the Research Board at University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign sponsored various phases of this research.
International Organization 59, Spring 2005, pp. 363-398

? 2005 by The IO Foundation. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818305050125
364 International Organization
monitor states' compliance with treaties. By providing compliance information,

they facilitate reciprocity and thus induce compliance. Analytically, as in the
repeated prisoners' dilemma game, a cooperative equilibrium can be supported
with tit-for-tat strategies if the players' behavior is transparent. When information
on players' behavior is missing, then defection may not be punished with sticks
while compliance may not be rewarded with carrots, thus the cooperative equilib-
rium may break down.1
However, the monitoring program under the LRTAP Convention only monitors
the aggregate pollution levels. It does not monitor or verify each country's emis-
sion reduction. Rather, for compliance measurements, the convention essentially
relies on governmental self-reports. Indeed, faced with collective action prob-
lems, many international institutions do not directly monitor states compliance with
treaties.2 In those situations where international institutions provide information,
often it is not states that use the information to either reward or sanction other
states. Thus one is confronted, once again, with the puzzle of compliance.3
This article conceptualizes an alternative mechanism of compliance. The point
of departure is that problems that resemble a prisoners' dilemma game at the inter-
national level may present governments with an entirely different strategic envi-
ronment domestically. Within a country, some actors gain while others may lose if
the government does not comply with an international agreement. When those who
are victimized by noncompliance have crucial leverage over the government, com-
pliance can be rational even if the country as a whole pays for it more than ben-
efits from it. One needs to specify such domestic sources of enforcement before
one can begin to identify, in theoretically coherent ways, how international insti-
tutions may work through these sources to influence national compliance.
I thus model a government's compliance decision in the shadow of competing
domestic constituencies. Two key observations inspire this conception. First, gov-
ernments are to varying extents in agency relationships with their domestic con-
stituents. That is, a government (as an agent) makes policy decisions on behalf of
various domestic constituents (as principals). While the agent's decision affects the
welfare of the principals, the principals have the power to sanction the agent through
various mechanisms. In the context of this article, while a government makes com-
pliance decisions that affect the welfare of domestic constituents, the latter can exer-
cise certain leverage to influence the government's compliance decisions.
Constituents possess political leverage over governments because national leaders
want to stay in office by making and implementing policies that have the constit-
uent support. Second, a government is usually accountable to a variety of constit-
uencies with competing claims. Trade agreements, for instance, affect import
1. See Keohane 1984; Axelrod 1984; Oye 1986; and Kreps 1990.
2. For an explanation of diverse monitoring arrangements in treaty regimes, see Dai 2002a.
3. For the need to better understand how international institutions influence states' behavior, see
Martin and Simmons 1998; as well as Simmons and Martin 2002.
Domestic Constituency Mechanism 365
competing industries and consumers differently within a single country. Similarly,

regarding compliance with environmental agreements, industries and environmen-
tal groups often take opposing stands. In such cases, interest groups who care about
compliance decisions compete to get the government to devote relatively more time
and effort to their interests at the expense of the interests of other groups. In order
to maximize political support, the government must respond to different claims from
competing constituents.
The central task in this model is, therefore, to specify how competing constitu-
encies influence a government's compliance decision. In agency relationships, the
problem of moral hazard often presents itself: while the agent takes an action that
affects the principals' welfare, the principals may not observe the action directly.4
Rather than directly observing a government's compliance efforts, constituents expe-
rience only their welfare, which depends jointly on the governmental action and a
variety of exogenous probabilistic factors. Constituencies have varying ability to
infer the governmental action from the welfare they experience. The accuracy of
their inference depends on how much information they have about the policy pro-
cess and how much resources they invest in monitoring the governmental action.
The informational status or the monitoring ability of constituents should thus affect
their ability to shape the policymaker's incentives in a way quite distinct from the
political clout originating from the size of constituencies.
As this model shows, a government's compliance decision is determined not
only by the electoral leverage of domestic constituencies but also by their infor-
mational endowment. On one hand, compliance decisions tend to bias toward large
interest groups that have significant electoral influence. On the other hand, inter-
estingly, compliance decisions can also bias toward special interests if these groups
are much better informed about the policy process. This is because, facing an infer-
ence problem, the relatively better informed group is more likely to base its approval
of the government on the actual policy rather than noise in the policy process.
Accordingly, the policymaker would lose more support by fooling the well-informed
than by fooling the ill-informed.
The European Acid Rain regime provides an important empirical illustration of
the domestic constituency mechanism. Typically viewed as in a classic collective
action problem, European countries' compliance with the LRTAP Convention is
often taken as evidence for the direct effect of international institutions. A closer
look however, reveals that national compliance varies significantly from country
to country, which suggests a domestic story in the first place. To illustrate how the
domestic constituency mechanism works in this case, I conduct categorical data
analysis involving all participating countries as well as in-depth examination of
some of these countries. Consistent with the central finding in the model, Euro-
pean countries' compliance with the 1985 Sulphur Protocol reflects the electoral
leverage and informational status of domestic constituencies.
4. See Holmstrim 1979; and Grossman and Hart 1983.
While the primary purpose of this article is to advance a theory of domestic

compliance mechanism and to delineate specific channels of influence by domes-
tic constituencies, this study also has important implications on international insti-
tutions. The fact that compliance decisions tend to reflect the electoral leverage
and the informational status of domestic constituencies suggests indirect but
incentive-compatible ways in which international institutions can influence national
compliance. Specifically, international institutions can facilitate national compli-
ance by increasing the electoral leverage and improving the informational status
of procompliance constituencies. In doing so, international institutions can facili-
tate a decentralized compliance system, where the enforcement source is not from
some states over others, but rather from some domestic constituencies over their
government. In the case of the LRTAP Convention, I find that the Convention has
empowered domestic environmental activists by providing them with specific rel-
evant information and by legitimizing their demands.
The article proceeds as follows. The next section develops a model of domestic
compliance mechanisms and, in that framework, delineates specific channels of
influence over national compliance. The third section provides an empirical illus-
tration of the domestic constituency mechanism. The fourth section highlights major
implications for the role of international institutions in the context of domestic
enforcement. The last section concludes.
A Model of Domestic Constituency Mechanism
In this section, I develop a model in which a government makes a compliance

decision in the shadow of competing domestic constituencies. I build on moral
hazard models in political science, where voters' retrospective voting gives the
policymaker incentives to attend voters' interests.5 Specifically, a chief policy-
maker decides how much to comply with an international agreement on behalf of
two competing interest groups. While the policymaker's decision affects the wel-
fare of interest groups, it is up to the interest groups to decide whether to keep the
incumbent policymaker in power. In making the compliance decision, therefore,
the policymaker must consider how it may affect each interest group's voting
decision.
I begin with the basic setup of the model, where I first discuss the environment
in which players interact and derive their preferences accordingly and then describe
the sequence of the game. I then analyze equilibrium decisions in two scenarios,
one where the chief policymaker faces electoral pressure and the other where the
chief policymaker does not face any pressure. Finally, I compare the two equilib-
rium decisions of compliance. With the compliance decision under no electoral
pressure as a benchmark, I derive the central result about the effects of domestic
5. In particular, see Ferejohn 1986; Lohmann 1998; and Fearon 1999.
constituencies on compliance through the electoral process. Appendix 1 contains

the complete derivations of all formal results.
The Setup of the Model
There are three players in this model of domestic enforcement: besides the national
government or the chief policymaker, there are two distinctive groups of voters or
interest groups.6 The decision of interest is the government's compliance policy in
a unidimensional policy space X = R 1. After an international agreement is signed,
the policymaker chooses a target compliance level x E X to implement the agreed
terms. Compliance is defined as the degree to which the explicit treaty provision
is achieved by a participating country. Oftentimes, the question about compliance
is not whether to comply, but rather how much to comply. The target compliance
level as a policy decision can thus range from no action at all to exceeding the
requirement set in the treaty. To capture the empirical variation of compliance deci-
sions, therefore, the compliance policy x in the model takes the form of a contin-
uous variable ranging from noncompliance to overcompliance.
A thoughtful reader would question treating the compliance stage independent
of the negotiation stage and thus treating the content of the agreement exogenous,
because it does not confront an important alternative hypothesis that compliance
is because of shallow agreements.7 I believe, however, the varying levels of com-
pliance by participating countries cannot be fully explained by the same "shallow-
ness" of the same agreement that binds all participating countries. In fact, it is
reasonable to view compliance as an analytically different stage of international
cooperation from the agreement-making stage. For various reasons, governments
often conduct different strategic calculations when they comply with an inter-
national agreement than when they negotiate it. Frequently, a government only
decides how much resource to allocate to the implementation of an agreement
after it has already been signed by the current government or by its predeces-
sor, sometimes years afterwards. Furthermore, the cost that domestic groups must
incur in complying with international agreements tends to become concrete at the
compliance stage. This may initiate actions-and reactions, depending on the chang-
ing political salience of the issue-from previously involved and/or newly mobi-
lized actors. Indeed, studies have found that participation by interest groups often
rises when policymakers shift from negotiating commitments to complying with
6. This of course does not mean that all voters can be categorized into two competing interest groups.
What matters in this model are those constituents who have preferences on the given issue rather than
those who are indifferent. The former can be categorized roughly into two competing interest groups.
Naturally, those who do not care about an issue can be subsequently persuaded by those who do. That
possibility is captured by the changing size of two interest groups.
7. Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996. However, Gilligan 2004 argues that broad multilateral agree-
ments are not necessarily shallow.
them.8 Although one may always say that any agreements that are lucky enough
to get made are likely the shallow sort compared to those that never make it, the
interesting question is what happens at the compliance stage that helps explain the
varying levels of compliance with the same agreement. The model of the domes-
tic constituency mechanism helps shed light on such issues.
The interest groups differ in their preferences regarding compliance. Each group
i has an ideal point xi, for i E {1,2}. Each group i desires the policymaker to take
a compliance policy x as close to its ideal point xi as possible. A simple function
representing these preferences is the negative quadratic, -ai(x - Xi)2, where ai E
(0,1) reflects the intensity of preferences. To mark the difference between the two
groups, let group 1 prefer a low compliance level and group 2 prefer a high com-
pliance level. That is, xl < x2.
The interest groups also differ in another aspect: their informational endow-
ment. Domestic constituents do not perfectly observe a government's compliance
efforts. They, do however, experience their welfare, which depends partly on the
government's compliance efforts and partly on exogenous and probabilistic fac-
tors. In deciding whether to vote for the incumbent policymaker, both groups need
to infer how much the welfare they experience is attributable to the government's
compliance policy versus some exogenous factors. The relative accuracy of their
inference depends on how well each group understands the policy process.9 A nat-
ural way to capture the effect of their information endowment is to incorporate a
group-specific exogenous shock in each group's utility function. This group-specific
exogenous shock, Oi, is a random variable drawn from a strictly unimodal and sym-
metric probability density function fi with mean zero. Thus, the closer Oi is to 0 or
the lower the variance of Oi is, the better informed the interest group i is and thus
the better able it is to infer the compliance decision made by the government.
Accordingly, each interest group experiences a group-specific outcome of the
government's compliance policy. Formally, each group's single-period utility func-
tion is
Ui(x, Oi) = -a,(x - xi)2 + Oi,i E {1, 2} (1)
8. Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff 1998.

9. This is a general assumption to capture the informational asymmetry between th
the agent. The acid rain case to be investigated in the empirical section of this article fit
action assumption just as well as economic voting where this assumption is frequently ap
ing an economic policy, voters do not necessarily observe the policy taken by the go
they do experience how much money they have in their pockets. Similarly, regarding an
policy, domestic groups do not necessarily observe the policy taken by the governme
have a sense of how polluted the surrounding air is. However, assuming that voters a
rience their own welfare does not mean that they know the precise effect of the pol
because their welfare is a function of more than the policy. Just as voters do not know
and how much an economic policy that they do not perfectly observe contributes to the
whether domestic groups can infer how and how much an environmental policy that the
fectly observe contributes to the air quality depends on how much they invest in monit
ernmental policy and learning about the policy process. That uncertainty and its effe
what the analysis below seeks to capture.
It is a function of the group's preference as well as its informational endowment,

in addition to the compliance policy chosen by the policymaker.
The policymaker's preference over the compliance decision is shaped by both
his public spirit and his private interest. While the policymaker aims to increase the
aggregate welfare, he also desires to increase his chance of getting reelected into
office. Thus, the policymaker's utility function consists of two main components:
Ugovt,(x) = UL(x) + Pr(w)8V, Vi E {1, 2} (2)

i=1
Thefunction
ity first part, 2=1 Uigroup
of interest (x), i.captures aggregate
The second social
part, Pr(o)8V, welfare,
captures where Ui is the util-
the expected
value of getting reelected, where Pr(wo), is the probability that the policymaker
wins reelection, 8 E (0,1) is the discount factor and V > 0 is the benefit of being
reelected.
The assumption that the policymaker cares about aggregate social welfare ensures
that any predictions that I make about the policymaker's shifting attention to those
with more electoral leverage and better information stem from the electoral pro-
cess rather than the policymaker's preferences. However, this assumption is not
necessary for the central result in this model. An alternative assumption, for instance,
is that the policymaker is either a partial rent-seeker or a pure rent-seeker.1' This
can be incorporated into the model by letting the policymaker weigh special inter-
est more heavily, even to the extent of putting all weight on special interest. Because
this modification affects the compliance decision with electoral pressure and that
without electoral pressure in identical ways, it does not alter the difference between
the two compliance decisions. Accordingly, this modification does not affect the
central result in this model about the effects of domestic constituencies through
electoral accountability.
The other assumption about the policymaker's preference is that, the policy-
maker values holding office and thus chooses policies to maximize his chance of
staying in office. It implies that the policymaker is concerned with how voters
evaluate his performance on a given policy. This assumption is crucial: if the pol-
icymaker does not value holding office and thus is indifferent to his chance of
retaining office, the policymaker does not need to pay any attention to what voters
want. Then the source of electoral accountability is eliminated. It is of course pos-
sible that the policymaker may maximize his chance of retaining office until he is
reasonably sure that he has enough to win. In that case, electoral accountability
reaches the cap at the point when the policymaker feels secure. That point, how-
ever, is arguably difficult to reach in a competitive election and particularly with a
10. Important recent studies have explored rent-seeking behavior as a function of regime types.
See, for instance, Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi 2001; and Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and
Morrow 2003. In the current model, I do not assume different preferences for political leaders in dif-
ferent regimes. My purpose is to isolate the effect of electoral accountability from that of preferences.
risk-averse policymaker. The qualitative results in this model hold so long as the
policymaker cares about gathering public support to some extent.
There are two periods in the model. I use subscript t E {1,2} to denote each of
the two periods of the game. In the first period, the sequence of events goes as
follows. First, the policymaker chooses a compliance policy, x. Then, observing
the policy outcome, each group i subsequently votes the incumbent policymaker
either in or out. In the second period, the incumbent policymaker remains in power
if he receives the majority of votes."1 In that case, to simplify the analysis, he can
stay in office at most one more term. Because he can no longer get reelected for
another term, the incumbent policymaker simply decides on a compliance level
and players' payoffs are realized, and the game ends. If the incumbent loses the
election, a new game with a new policymaker starts.12
The assumption that no policymaker can stay in office for more than two terms
is not necessary for the central results in this model. The purpose of this simpli-
fying assumption is to allow the governmental action without electoral pressure to
serve as a benchmark for the governmental action with electoral pressure. Because
I assume that most governments do care about staying in office, the central ques-
tion that this model addresses is: When a government is motivated by reelection
and thus constituencies have leverage over the government's fate of staying in
power, what influences the government's choice of the compliance policy?
Equilibrium Analysis
To trace how domestic constituencies influence the government's compliance pol-

icy through the electoral process, I compare the government's compliance deci-
sion in the first period under electoral pressure with that in the second period where
the government no longer faces any electoral pressure. To do so, I first derive the
equilibrium decisions in the two scenarios respectively.
Proposition 1: The following strategies constitute a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium:

In the first period, the incumbent chooses a compliance level
ai (1 + AioibV)xi
x ,(k+) = (3)
i=l
i a1(l + Ai4i8V)
11. To capture the intuition that voters in each group may possibl
pret the probability that group i votes for the incumbent policymak
that group that vote for the incumbent policymaker.
12. As a common assumption in this sort of formal models, the
any active role. The importance of the competing candidate lies
which the voters' leverage over the incumbent would be diminish
and interest group i chooses the retrospective voting rule
1 if i k*, where k- + at (x(k) - xi)2 - (4)

i 0 otherwise (4)
In the second period, the incum
Sai xi
i=1
t=2 2 (5)
i=1
Throughout, Oii =fi(0), and Ai = aPr(w)/aPr(vi = 1), for i E {1
In the second period, the incumbent policymaker cannot get re

more terms. Without electoral pressure, the compliance level sim
ideal points of the two groups and their preference intensity.
In the first period, however, the policymaker can compete for r
the goal of this model is to understand the domestic sources of enf
uted to electoral accountability, I now focus on the policymaking
pressure in the first period.
In choosing the compliance policy, the policymaker must co
decision in the first period affects the probability that he gets r
second period. As shown in Appendix 1, the effect of the complia
his chance of getting reelected can be expressed as follow
j=l[aPr(w)/aPr(vi = 1)][aPr(vi = 1)/ax]. This effect consists of
One term, aPr(vi = 1)/ax, captures how the compliance level af
bility that each interest group votes for the incumbent policyma
term, aPr(w)/aPr(vi = 1), captures how the probability that each g
the incumbent policymaker affects the probability that the
reelection.
Regarding the term aPr(vi = 1)/ax, whether a chosen compliance policy can
induce a particular interest group to vote for the policymaker depends on the
voting strategy of that group. The voting strategy for each interest group is a rule
that says whether, at the end of the first period, to reelect the incumbent policy-
maker. Because the groups do not directly observe the actual compliance policy,
they assess how much the policymaker attends their interests according to the
welfare they experience. Group i votes for the incumbent, if and only if the first
period welfare for group i is at least as great as ki, that is, Ui(x) : ki.13 As
13. The voting strategy often takes the form of a cut rule. See, for instance, Ferejohn 1986; and
Fiorina 1981. For how a cut rule is a delicate choice for voters, see Fearon 1999.
shown in Appendix 1, interest group i chooses the optimal cut rule k7 to maxi-
mize the sensitivity of the incumbent's chance of reelection to how much the
incumbent attends the group's interests.14 The actual choice of k7 is shaped by
the group-specific exogenous shock Oi, which captures the extent to which group
i is able to infer the government's action from its observed welfare. Intuitively,
the better informed a group is, the more likely that its voting rule reflects the
policymaker's effort rather than the noisy outcome. Accordingly, to win the sup-
port of such a better-informed group, the policymaker must attend its interests in
return.15
Regarding the other term aPr(w)/aPr(vi = 1), besides the voting strategy of
each group, the policymaker must also consider the extent to which the support of
a particular group enhances his chance of getting reelected. That is, the policy-
maker must consider the electoral significance of each group. Empirically, the elec-
toral significance or leverage of a group can be a number of things, depending on
the specific electoral mechanism. It can be the number of voters in each group, or
the amount of campaign contributions the group can generate, or the ability of the
group to mobilize those with weaker preferences over a given issue, just to name
a few.
Anticipating the effect of his compliance decision on his chance of reelection,
the incumbent policymaker decides on a compliance policy, x(k7 ) = /=i1 ai(1 +

AifiaV)xi/=l
probability , ai(function
density + Aioi8V) for
of the i E {1,2}. Again,
group-specific 4i shock
exogenous =f(O),0O.
where
the f, is
Capturing
the informational status of group i, 4~ influences group i's voting strategy. Fur-
thermore, Ai = aPr(w)/3Pr(vi = 1). Capturing the electoral significance of group i,
Ai reflects how group i's actual vote affects the election outcome. To examine
how these group-specific factors influence the compliance policy, I turn to com-
parative statics.
Comparative Statics
To establish the effect of constituencies on the government's compliance policy

through the electoral process, I compare the compliance decision with electoral
pressure in the first period to that without electoral pressure in the second period
as a benchmark.
14. Arguably, the interest groups and voters who use retrospective voting rules are not entirely ratio-
nal, because it is not certain that their retrospective voting strategy serves their prospective interests.
Nevertheless, if the voters seek to influence their future welfare with their votes and yet they are bounded
in the amount of information they have and their ability to process the information, then a government's
retrospective performance provides voters with a proxy of how the government may serve their inter-
ests in the future. In this sense, therefore, a retrospective voting strategy has a prospective purpose.
For an excellent discussion on this point, see Schultz 1998.
15. The importance of the information status or the monitoring ability is consistent with earlier
moral hazard models such as Ferejohn 1986; Lohmann 1998; and Fearon 1999. However, most authors
focus on these traits of the electorate as a whole rather than that of disaggregated interest groups,
except for instance Lohmann 1998.
Proposition 2: The compliance policy in the first period differs from that in the
second period, if and only if two interest groups differ in the interactive effect
of their electoral leverage and informational status, xt*l(k*) = x=2 = A1
A202, Vi E {1,2}.
Furthermore, the compliance policy under electoral pressure increases with the
electoral leverage and the monitoring ability of the group that favors compliance,
(a/aA2)x1 > 0 and (&/02)x t=~ > 0. It decreases with the electoral leverage
and the monitoring ability of the group that opposes compliance, (3/aA1)xt=l < 0
and (/la41)x* 1 < 0.
So long as the two groups differ in their electoral leverage and informational
status, the compliance level under electoral pressure as in the first period deviates
from that without electoral pressure as in the second period. If one considers the
deviation of the compliance level in the first period from that in the second period
as a policy bias induced by electoral control, the direction as well as the magni-
tude of the policy bias is determined by the electoral leverage and the informa-
tional status of interest groups. Specifically, the equilibrium policy under electoral
pressure favors the more electorally significant group. All else equal, the more
electorally significant the group that favors compliance, the higher the compliance
level, that is, (a/lA2)xt=1 > 0. Furthermore, the equilibrium policy in the first
period also favors the better informed group. All else equal, the better informed
the group that favors compliance-better able to monitor the governmental action-
the higher the compliance level, that is, (a/a42)xt=l > 0.
It is important to note that the strength of each group originates not only from
its electoral leverage, but also from its informational endowment. Here is an exam-
ple of how these factors influence the compliance decision. Assume that one impor-
tant indicator of a group's electoral leverage is the size of the group. Now suppose
the group that prefers a high compliance level (for example, environmental groups
and interested public) is two times as large as the group that prefers a low com-
pliance level (for example, industry groups). Then, the policymaker will bias the
compliance decision in favor of the larger group, if both groups have the same
monitoring ability. Typically, however, special interests such as industry groups
may be better informed because their activities may be directly subject to regula-
tions. If the smaller group is three times as information rich as the larger group,
then the policy bias turns to favor special interests. As the less informed larger
group improves its informational status, the policy bias toward the originally bet-
ter informed special interests decreases.
Electoral control is therefore exercised through the electoral leverage and the
informational endowment of interest groups. The importance of the electoral lever-
age is intuitively straightforward, so long as one assumes a government cares about
maximizing support. However, the way information works in this model is less
intuitive. Besides considering which group controls more votes, an incumbent pol-
icymaker also considers what it takes for each group to vote him back into office.
The voting strategy of each group depends on how well each group is informed
about the policy process. Compared to the less well informed group, the better-
informed group is more likely to base its voting decision on the policy, since their
inference of the policymaker's compliance decision from their welfare is less dis-
turbed by noise. In other words, the incumbent policymaker would lose more votes
by deceiving the well-informed than by deceiving the ill-informed.
While the direction of the policy bias is solely determined by the attributes of
interest groups, the magnitude of the policy bias is influenced by two additional
factors. That is, the stakes the incumbent perceives in getting reelected and his
discount factor directly affect the compliance level under electoral control. First,
the more the incumbent values the reelection benefits, the more the policy favors
the electorally significant and the better informed group. Second, the less the incum-
bent discounts the future, the more the policy favors the electorally significant and
the better-informed group.
Although I do not have space to expand, the second point above deserves a
brief comment. One way to interpret this result is that, a government under imme-
diate electoral pressure-with a low discount factor-responds more to the elec-
toral control of domestic interests than a government that is more insulated. It is
thus possible that, to the extent that democratic governments face more regular
and frequent elections than nondemocratic governments, electoral accountability
tends to shape the compliance decision in democratic states more than it does in
nondemocratic states. This alone, however, does not mean that democratic states
tend to comply with international agreements more than nondemocratic states do.
This is because, although democratic institutions may intensify the effect of elec-
toral control, the direction of electoral effect on the compliance level is deter-
mined by the attributes of competing domestic interests such as their electoral
leverage and informational endowment. This is consistent with the finding that
popular pressure in democratic states does not necessarily point toward a higher
level of compliance with international agreements.16 To fully account for the effects
of democratic institutions-a fascinating but a much broader and different issue
than the one addressed in this article-one needs to look in addition at various
other dimensions of democratic institutions"7 as well as the preferences that go
into the institutions.18
Compliance with the 1985 Sulphur Protocol:

An Illustration
The preceding analysis suggests, because governments are interested in retaining

office, a country's compliance effort responds to the demands of domestic constit-
uencies. Specifically, compliance reflects the electoral leverage and the informa-
tional status of competing domestic constituencies. To illustrate how the domesti
16. Simmons 2000.

17. Martin 2000.
18. Dai 2002b.
constituency mechanism works empirically, I take another look at the LRTAP

Convention.
Responding to acid rain that typically travels across borders, European coun-
tries collaborated within the framework of the LRTAP convention. Since the estab-
lishment of the LRTAP Convention in 1979, there have been a series of substantive
protocols requiring specific amounts of pollutant emission reductions. I focus here
on the 1985 Sulphur Protocol, which required signatory countries to reduce sul-
phur emissions by at least 30 percent by 1993, with 1980 as the base year. As this
protocol was the first substantive agreement in the framework of the LRTAP Con-
vention and it reached its deadline for implementation the earliest, it allows a suf-
ficient time span to study the subsequent compliance with the protocol. Furthermore,
the fact that more than twenty countries signed this protocol offers variation in
dependent and independent variables.
In this section, I examine how domestic constituents affected national compli-
ance with the 1985 Sulphur Protocol. I carry out the analysis in two different modes.
I first conduct categorical data analysis with opinion survey data involving all sig-
natory countries. To supplement the data analysis, I then examine some signatory
countries in more depth. By combining quantitative and qualitative evidence, I
hope to provide both a broad picture about and an in-depth look into how domes-
tic compliance mechanisms work in this case.
A Broad Picture
To provide a general pattern of national compliance as mapped against politically

relevant traits of domestic constituencies as suggested by the formal model, I first
develop measures for the dependent and independent variables, respectively, and
then trace how they relate to each other.
A measure of the dependent variable is straightforward. As required by the 1985
Sulphur Protocol, each participating country should reduce sulphur emissions by
at least 30 percent with 1980 as the base year. As compliance is defined as the
degree to which the explicit treaty provision is achieved, the actual percentage
reduction of sulphur emissions thus serves as the perfect measure of compliance
in this case. Consistent with the definition of compliance as capturing outcomes
ranging from noncompliance to overcompliance, the percentage reduction of sul-
phur emissions is a continuous variable capped at 100 percent.19
Regarding independent variables, a natural measure of the electoral leverage
and the informational status of competing domestic constituencies in this case
is what I call domestic environmental activism mobilized around the acid rain
issue. First, this measure captures both political clout and informational status of
domestic constituents, because it covers the following four specific dimensions:
19. Consistent with the general conceptualization of compliance in the literature, the definition of
compliance does not address the motivations behind the observed behavior. See Fisher 1981; Mitchell
1994; and Raustiala and Slaughter 2002.
(1) public opinion regarding acid rain; (2) public consciousness over the environ-
ment; (3) the membership of environmental nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs); and (4) the electoral strength of Green parties. Two of these dimensions-
the size of environmental NGOs and potential votes for political parties that
endorse environmental agendas-contribute to the electoral leverage of environ-
mental activism. Two other dimensions-the public awareness of the environ-
ment in general and the acid rain problem in particular-reflect the informational
status of environmental activism.20 Second, this measure captures competing inter-
ests within a society in a parsimonious way. In each of the four dimensions as
mentioned above, it takes into consideration the opinion and organizational incli-
nation from the entire spectrum of the society, including procompliance elements
as well as anticompliance interests. For instance, the score that I derive regard-
ing the perceived urgency of acid rain policies is based on the opinion of both
those who favor such policies and those who oppose them. Similarly, the score
that I derive regarding one's likelihood to vote for political parties such as the
Greens is based on the inclination of both the environmentally friendly and
unfriendly groups. Thus the measure of domestic environmental activism reflects
the strength of procompliance force somewhat averaged by the strength of the
opposition to compliance. Overall, even though each indicator along each of these
dimensions can be biased in its own ways, together they provide a sense of how
strong procompliance force is in comparison to anticompliance sentiments, in terms
of both political clout and informational endowment.
I construct an ordinal measure of domestic environmental activism. That is,
I rank order the signatory countries according to the level of environmental
activism mobilized around the acid rain issue. I have six data sets, each of which
provides useful information on at least some dimensions of domestic environmen-
tal activism in at least some countries under study here. These are Euro-barometer
25, 29, 31A, 35, 43.IBIS, and the International Social Survey Program (ISSP)
on Environment.21 Appendix 2 contains a list of relevant variables in each data
set.
With each data set, I derive a ranking of the signatory countries covered in that
data set by the level of domestic environmental activism mobilized around the
acid rain issue. This takes three steps. First, I rank order the signatory countries
along each of the four dimensions. Second, I sum up each country's rankings along
all dimensions to attain an aggregate score for that country. Third, I rank order
the signatory countries according to the aggregate score of each country. Thus, a
country that ranks consistently high along all dimensions tends to rank high in
20. Incorporating both electoral leverage and informational status into one independent variable is
consistent with the theoretical expectation from the model. While the model captures the individual
effect of electoral leverage and informational status respectively, it also captures the interactive effect
of the two, allowing the strength in one dimension to compensate the weakness in the other. Of course,
with a fuller empirical model and sufficiently more data points, one could measure these dimensions
separately while taking into account their interactive effect.
21. See Rabier, Riffault, and Inglehart 1988; Reif and Melich 1990, 1993, and 1998; Reif and Mar-
lier 1998; and International Social Survey Program 1996.
domestic environmental activism around the acid rain issue. Appendix 3 contains
the ranking of relevant countries in each data set.
The first four data sets, Euro-Barometer 25, 29, 31A and 35, cover six signatory
countries under investigation here. These six countries naturally form two groups,
with Denmark, West Germany, and the Netherlands ranking consistently at the top
and Belgium, Italy, and France ranking consistently at the bottom. The ISSP Envi-
ronment data set covers, in addition, Norway and several Eastern European coun-
tries. With Italy-from the second group in each of the first four data sets-as a
reference point, Norway falls into the first group above Italy and East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary form a third group below Italy.22 The Euro-
Barometer 43 covers Sweden, Austria, and Finland, in addition. With all the sig-
natory countries from the first four data sets as reference points, Sweden, Austria,
and Finland-ranking above or between the Netherlands and West Germany-
naturally belong to the first group.23
As a result, three groups present themselves, with domestic environmental activ-
ism around the acid rain issue ranging from high to low: (1) West Germany, the
Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Austria, and Finland; (2) Belgium, Italy,
and France; and (3) East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.24 This
categorization of countries is consistent with secondary sources on environmen-
tal movements and the struggle against acid rain in Europe.25 What some second-
ary sources also show, but the analysis here based purely on survey data cannot
demonstrate, is that West Germany, Sweden, and Norway-with particularly high
political salience of the acid rain problem-stand out from the first category of
countries.26 Whether or not the category of countries with a high level of domes-
tic environmental activism is further differentiated, the importance of domestic
constituencies is clear in Table 1.
With signatory countries categorized into three groups, the group of countries
with the highest level of domestic environmental activism reduced their sulphur
22. There is additional support for this categorization. For instance, Kitschelt 1993 finds that the
influence of green and other left-libertarian parties is much more significant in Norway than in Italy.
In Eastern European countries, according to Jancar-Webster 1993a, environmental movements sprang
out of democratic movements and the priority they placed on the environment per se was unclear.
23. Compared to the other five data sets, the Euro-Barometer 43 is not good for this analysis because
it is the only one among these six data sets that was conducted after the Sulphur Protocol reached its
implementation deadline. However, if using this data set carries with it any bias, it is a bias against my
argument. Sweden, Austria, and Finland were among the most significantly traumatized by the acid
rain problem, which was a more serious problem in the mid-1980s. If any data had been collected on
these countries, then these countries would have more likely ranked even higher than other countries
but not lower. For instance, since the late 1970s, the acidification problem was one of the most prom-
inent environmental issues on the Swedish public agenda. Beginning in the early 1990s, political pri-
orities shifted somewhat from environmental issues towards economic issues, when the country entered
a recession with growing unemployment.
24. Signatory countries to the 1985 Sulphur Protocol that are not covered by any of these data sets
are inevitably left out of the analysis.
25. This is largely consistent with Dalton 1994, who studied some of the signatory countries. Domes-
tic environmental activism is treated less systematically in studies of international cooperation to com-
bat acid rain, but see Sprinz 1992.
26. Levy 1993.
TABLE 1. Average level of sulphur emission reduction in signatory countries of

the 1985 Sulphur Protocol, by domestic environmental activism mobilized over
acid rain, with signatory countries categorized into three groups and four groups
respectively
Environmental activism around acid rain

<strong----------------------------------------------------weak>
Signatories in three groups West Germany Belgium Bulgaria

Norway Italy Czechoslovakia
Sweden France East Germany
Denmark Hungary
Netherlands
Austria
Finland
Average reduction 72% 56% 26%
Standard deviation 8% 13% 28%
Environmental activism around acid rain

<strong----------------------------------------------------weak>
Signatories in four groups West Germany Denmark Belgium Bulgaria

Norway Netherlands France Czechoslovakia
Sweden Austria Italy East Germany
Finland Hungary
Average reduction 75% 70% 56% 26%
Standard deviation 6% 11% 13% 28%
Sources: Data on emission reductions are from

vakia, the West Germany and East Germany ar
emissions by 72 percent on averag

the lowest level of domestic envir
sions by only 26 percent on ave
sulphur emission reductions and d
rain issue persists when the signa
Just as remarkably, the average
domestic environmental activism mobilized around the acid rain issue. Consistent
with the core hypotheses from the model, European countries' compliance with
the 1985 Sulphur Protocol has remarkably reflected the electoral leverage and the
informational endowment of domestic constituencies.
An In-depth Look
A closer look into individual countries supports the aggregate finding that compli-
ance with the 1985 Sulphur Protocol reflected the electoral leverage and the infor-
mational status of domestic constituencies. Because of space limitations, I focus
here on a subset of signatory countries, namely Norway, West Germany, France,

and the former Czechoslovakia. In presenting the evidence from each country, I
identify competing domestic interests and examine both their electoral leverage
and their informational conditions.
Norway. Facing similar ecological and geographic vulnerability as Sweden, Nor-

way joined Sweden early on to push for an international solution to the acid rain
problem. However, compared to Sweden, the implementation of sulphur reduction
policies in Norway was more contested. The treaty compliance process activated
both procompliance activism and anticompliance interests.
The major opposition was the industrial sector. Initially it was not particularly
interested in the acidification policy, as Norwegian effort was mainly framed as
getting central European countries and Britain to reduce their sulphur emissions.
As information regarding abatement costs unfolded and as the industry came to
realize that the LRTAP negotiations would have serious domestic consequences,
the industrial sectors pushed the corresponding ministries to voice both reserva-
tion over sulphur reduction at home and opposition to further international targets.27
Overcoming this opposition, however, was the growing strength of procompli-
ance interests. Initially only the Norwegian Ministry of Environment and the nat-
ural science community showed much interest in the acid rain issue.28 In the
mid-1980s, while more societal groups that had previously been indifferent
about environmental issues became sensitive to the acid rain problem, a new
generation of environmental activists entered the stage.29 Environmental groups
old and new conducted the important task of information gathering and dis-
semination. They not only compiled information on the severity of the acid-
ification problem,30 but they also monitored their government's environmental
regulations for any implementation and enforcement deficits.31 As such informa-
tion spread through environmentalist networks and through media, public aware-
ness and concern over environmental policies steadily increased. The upsurge
of public environmental awareness further stimulated the greening of the politi-
cal arena. According to opinion polls, the percentage of people who viewed the
environment as the most important election issue rose from 1.3 percent in 1981,
to 2.1 percent in 1985, and to 18.8 percent in 1989; the percentage of people
who viewed the environment as the second most important election issue rose
from 1 percent in 1985 to 11.6 percent in 1989.32 By another account, back
in the mid-1970s, only 25 percent of the public rated environmental issues as
the primary reason for party choice. In 1989 this percentage reached a record of
27. Laugen 2000, 120-24.

28. Ibid., 120.
29. Two important organizations are Nature and Youth (Natur og Ungdom) and Bellona (Reitan
1997, 294).
30. Wetstone and Rosencranz 1983, 65.
31. Reitan 1997, 294.
32. Laugen 2000, 121.
37 percent.33 The ensuing green cleavage cut across the traditional party lines,
which resulted in increasing institutionalization of green policies and an increased
percentage of party programs devoted to ecological issues. These increases were
most notable in the 1985-89 era, following the Sulphur Protocol.34
Against the background of increasing political salience of the acid rain issue,
costly measures were still being introduced to reduce the sulphur contents in oil in
1985 and 1989. This was well after Norway had met the minimum compliance
requirements. Furthermore, this was despite the fact that its sulphur emissions con-
tributed only about 5 percent of total sulphur dioxide fallout in Norway and thus
even the most costly measures would not dramatically reduce the ecological dam-
age Norway suffered from acid rain. Yet, these measures made sense as the envi-
ronment emerged to be the single most important issue in the late 1980s.35
West Germany. Achieving an even greater percentage of sulphur reductions,

West Germany experienced less domestic opposition in the compliance process
while witnessing a high level of domestic environmental activism mobilized around
the acid rain issue. The position of the West German government itself toward the
LRTAP regime began to change after the discovery of German forest death in the
early 1980s. This alarming information and the subsequent media coverage over-
whelmingly alerted the public and even partially silenced the potential opposition
to sulphur reduction policies.
The industrial sector largely maintained a neutral position regarding sulphur
reduction policies, partially because the three leading industries-fabricated metal
products, wholesale and retail, and real estate and business-were neither among
those highly vulnerable to exposure nor among those particularly hurt by abate-
ment costs. The only sector that opposed the LRTAP process was the automobile
industry, which was, however, somewhat compensated by tax exemptions pro-
vided by the federal government.36
The government's effort to buy off any opposition and to adopt aggressive abate-
ment measures was more than justified by the overwhelming surge in pro-
compliance sentiments. In addition to environmental NGOs and Green parties,
procompliance interests in Germany also included part of the industrial sector:
industries producing abatement technologies and industries selling environment
friendly products.37 This was largely a result of intense media exposure and sub-
sequent public sensitivity to environmentalism.
The strength of procompliance interests, in terms of both informational condi-
tions and electoral leverage, was significant in the 1980s. The increase of public
environmental awareness was clearly shown in the German election surveys:
อุตสาหกรรม except ยานยนต์ไม่ได้รับผลกระทบ
33. Reitan 1997, 305.

34. Ibid., 305-6.
35. Laugen 2000, 121.
36. Sprinz and Wahl 2000, 154.
37. Ibid., 155.
43 percent of voters viewed environmental protection as very important in 1972.

This number increased to 69 percent in 1987.38 Coupling the growing environmen-
tal awareness was the large number of citizen action groups concerned with envi-
ronmental issues. By 1980 there were more than 130 supraregional and more than
1,100 regional environmental groups.39 The grass-roots environmental organiza-
tions served a voluntary monitoring function over governmental implementation
of desulphurization policies at different levels. These organizations further voiced
the increasingly widespread public concern over the acid rain issue to increase its
salience. Capitalizing on scientific reports and media coverage, environmental activ-
ists helped ensure that the acid rain issue was widely discussed and debated in
Germany. Such information about the acid damage to German forest and the debate
over acidification policies further mobilized public opinion and brought out wide-
spread support for environmental policies.
Meanwhile, with the increase in public environmental consciousness, air pollu-
tion became one of the central electoral issues in the 1980s. This substantially
facilitated the electoral success of the Greens. According to surveys in the late
1980s, the public viewed the Greens as the party best suited to solve environmen-
tal problems.40 Indeed, the Green Party's presence in the center of national poli-
tics facilitated a direct influence of the environmentalists, which was also facilitated
by a somewhat "green" bureaucracy and "green" media.41 As a result, West Ger-
many displayed a steady record of reducing sulphur emissions. Particularly, it con-
tinued with serious sulphur reductions after the Sulphur Protocol was signed. By
the time of German unification, West Germany had already reduced more than 70
percent of sulphur emissions.
France. Unlike such leaders as West Germany and Norway in complying with
the 1985 Sulphur Protocol, France along with Belgium and Italy displayed much
less impressive records of compliance. In France, sulphur reductions in the early
1980s were largely attributable to a switch of energy policy to rely on nuclear
power. In the years after the 1985 Sulphur Protocol was signed, France barely
undertook any further reductions. A look into its domestic dynamics helps illus-
trate why.
When the 1985 Sulphur Protocol was being negotiated and signed, France viewed
sulphur pollutants as originating from the heavy industry in East Europe and thus
considered itself not so vulnerable. The government's low profile in the LRTAP
process spurred little opposition from the industrial sectors. However, when the
acid rain damage soon became associated with motor vehicle exhaust emissions,
the French automobile industry led the opposition to domestic and international
measures to reduce air pollution. Taking advantage of the lack of knowledge at
พรรคกรีนของเยอ มีทั้ง 2 ระดับ แต่ ฝรศ ไม่มีทั้ง ngo ไม่มีพรรคที่ให้คสจ
38. Conradt and Dalton 1988.

39. Boehmer-Christiansen and Skea 1991, 85.
40. Frankland 1995, 30.
41. Boehmer-Christiansen and Skea 1991, 85-92.
the domestic level on the science of acid rain, the automobile industry questioned
whether new measures or technologies were truly necessary and thus further con-
tributed to the aura of skepticism over the acid rain issue.42 Such skepticism pre-
sented a serious obstacle to both enforcement of existing abatement measures and
the adoption of new measures.
Facing such opposition, procompliance elements enjoyed neither informational
nor electoral advantage. Regarding public awareness, the French public knew lit-
tle about the acid rain problem and was by and large not concerned with it. This
had to do with several factors. First, sulphur emissions resulted in increased vul-
nerability only in certain regions in France and not the whole country. Conse-
quently, sulphur damage did not get exposed extensively in the media. Second,
although the scientific community gathered more information on the science of
acid rain through international networks, that information did not achieve any
significant degree of salience domestically, partially because of a lack of either
an elite or a grass-roots element to employ it. Unlike Germany, where the Greens
helped ensure the salience of the acid rain issue in national politics and environ-
mental NGOs helped monitoring governmental policies at various levels, French
Greens and environmentalists played a limited role in information gathering and
dissemination.
Partially resulting and further worsening the low level of public environmental
awareness was the limited electoral leverage of procompliance interests. First, envi-
ronmental NGOs in France were traditionally marginalized. In fact, a large per-
centage of the public perceived ecological policies as opposing national welfare, a
perception that was further fueled by the anticompliance alliance of the car indus-
try and the Ministry of Industry.43 Indeed, the membership of environmental NGOs
was low and their image poor.44 Furthermore, the Green movement was unable to
alter the dominant class confrontation in electoral politics, as the two major Green
parties failed to form a unified green front.45
Czechoslovakia. Different from Norway and West Germany and also different
from France, Eastern European signatory countries including the former Czecho-
slovakia share, among other things, the following: they have been among the most
heavily polluted, and yet such vulnerability did not translate into a high level of
environmental activism around the acid rain issue. Accordingly, their compliance
with the 1985 Sulphur Protocol was limited.
In Czechoslovakia, the opposition to sulphur reduction policies came from the
energy sector that traditionally relied on the combustion of fuel high in sulphur.
รบกลาง vs รบท้องถิ่น
42. Skea and Monteuil 2000, 245, 249.
43. Even though the public gradually gained greater awareness of environmental issues, it was more
attributable to the rise of Europe-wide ecological movements and much less to the acid rain issue in
France or any other national or local environmental issues. See Cole and Doherty 1995, 59.
44. Skea and Monteuil 2000, 250.
45. Cole and Doherty 1995, 56, 60-63.
ปห สิ่งแวดล้อมเป็นรอง เพราะเรื่องศก จะไม่รอด Domestic Constituency Mechanism 383
As these industries were largely state-owned, local governments took the lead in
opposing air pollution abatement proposals. They argued that governmental author-
ities at the federal level should place priority on economic goals.46
Countering such opposition, procompliance interests were limited in both infor-
mational advantage and political clout. First, although most air pollution in Czecho-
slovakia stemmed from sulfur dioxide emissions, basic information on acid rain
was limited until the late 1980s. This had to do with a number of factors. One
factor was the sparse scientific research into these matters. Another factor was the
information control, or what has been called "a state embargo on environmental
data.""47 A further compounding factor was the absence of a comprehensive sys-
tem of NGOs gathering and disseminating environmental information. The infor-
mational condition only began to improve gradually in the 1990s. Second, the
political clout of procompliance interests was rather complex. In some sense, envi-
ronmental NGOs played a significant mobilizing role in the late 1980s, certainly
more than many of their counterparts in other Eastern European countries. How-
ever, at the same time, their environmental appeal was limited. This was because
that environmental activism took place under the umbrella of opposition to the
totalitarian regime and thus it is unclear to what extent it was environmentally
driven. This was also because that, as in other Eastern European countries, eco-
nomic concerns predominated the public mind. The majority of the public saw
seeking economic and social security as the most important goal.48
Such preference ordering of the public over the economy and the environment
partially explains why the procompliance force became even weaker in the years
following the transition from communism to a multiparty system. Despite the
improvement in its informational conditions and overall hospitable changes, such
as freedom in press and association, the environmental movement lost strength in
membership. The environmental concern of the public was overshadowed by the
much more pressing economic survival. Jobs and social security were viewed by
the public as much more important than the environment. The new government-
including previous leaders of the environmental movement-had electoral obliga-
tions to fulfill their promises of not only a democratic society but also economic
prosperity.49 Consistent with such weak support for sulphur reduction policies, right
before the separation of the two republics, Czechoslovakia was still quite some
distance away from the minimum compliance requirement.
The purpose of the above empirical analysis-both quantitative and qualitative
inquiries-has been to illustrate how the domestic constituency mechanism works.
I have therefore focused on the informational and electoral advantages of compet-
ing domestic interests. This, of course, is not to say that no other factors have
anything to do with sulphur emission reductions. However, the focus on domestic
กระบวนการต้องมี ngo ที่ monitor และผลักดัน รบ ด้วย
46. Adamova 1993, 53.

47. Ibid., 43.
48. Ibid., 44. Also see Jancar-Webser 1993b for Eastern Europe in general.
49. Hardi 1994.
constituencies provides a key to understanding the political nature of domestic

enforcement of international agreements in this case.
Implications for International Institutions

ให้คงามชอบธรรมในข้อเรียกร้อง
In the preceding sections, I have developed a model of domestic compliance mech-
anism and provided preliminary empirical evidence that compliance reflects the
electoral leverage and informational status of competing domestic constituencies.
A natural question to ask is that, if compliance is largely a function of domestic
constituencies, what is the role of international institutions? In this section, I develop
implications for international institutions in the context of domestic enforcement.
Although the formal model does not explicitly incorporate international institu-
tions as a strategic player, the conceptualization of domestic compliance mecha-
nism provides a theoretical rationale for why and how international institutions
may influence states' compliance indirectly. Because a policymaker's pursuit for
reelection is ultimately determined by voters, and thus governments are primarily
responsive to domestic constituencies, international institutions may influence the
policymaker's compliance decision through domestic constituencies. To explore
how outside-interested parties such as international institutions may use domestic
pathways of influence, I turn to those factors that are subject to deliberate manip-
ulation in the model. As shown in the model, two manipulable parameters deter-
mine the direction of policy bias under electoral pressure. Indeed, international
institutions can influence both parameters through specific features or activities.
One parameter is the incremental change in the probability that the incumbent
policymaker wins reelection due to the change in the probability that an interest
group votes for the policymaker. This captures the electoral leverage of interest
groups. International institutions can strengthen the electoral leverage of those who
favor compliance. For instance, by writing compliance provisions into inter-
national agreements and by providing this information directly or indirectly to
potential victims of noncompliance, international institutions may help increase
the number of people who favor compliance.
The other parameter is the variance of the density function of the exogenous
shock. This captures the informational status or monitoring ability of interest groups.
While few international institutions are able to directly inspect states' compliance,
many can facilitate domestic constituencies in monitoring their governments. For
instance, international institutions can publish information associated with com-
pliance to make it easier for domestic groups to infer states' compliance. They can
also publish governmental reports, thereby enabling domestic constituents to check
them.
Therefore, international institutions can influence states' compliance calcula-

tions through two specific channels: (1) strengthening the electoral leverage and
(2) improving the informational status of procompliance constituencies. Fre-
quently, domestic constituencies use the information made available by inter-
national institutions to mobilize support. Often, domestic constituencies employ
international initiatives in debates for legitimation purposes. Thus, while domes-

tic constituencies are the direct source of enforcement, international institutions
may influence governments' compliance decisions indirectly by empowering pro-
compliance constituencies. Furthermore, given the resource constraints that inter-
national institutions usually face, rational institutions have incentives to endorse
low-cost enforcement mechanisms. It may be both effective and efficient for inter-
national institutions to facilitate domestic enforcement.
In the remainder of this section, I discuss briefly how the LRTAP Convention
has indirectly influenced states' compliance with the 1985 Sulphur Protocol.5o I
argue that the LRTAP Convention has empowered domestic environmental activ-
ists by providing them with specific relevant information and by legitimizing their
demands. In so doing, the LRTAP Convention has facilitated national compliance
indirectly. The specific ways in which the LRTAP Convention empowered domes-
tic environmental activism can be summarized as follows.
First, the LRTAP Convention facilitated research on acid damage and helped
disseminate research findings.5' The accumulated research results and their dis-
semination are critical to mobilizing public concern with the acid rain problem.
When the LRTAP Convention was signed in 1979, only the bureaucratic and sci-
entific communities in Sweden and Norway were convinced of the transboundary
damage of acid rain. Reluctant to make any explicit commitment, countries none-
theless agreed on the need to study the ecological damage of acid rain. The Work-
ing Group of Effects oversaw a series of research programs, each of which was
operated by a lead country. For instance, Germany, Norway, and Sweden operated
research programs respectively on forest, fresh water, and materials. It was not
entirely coincidental that Germany conducted its first systematic forest survey in
1982, which demonstrated serious forest damage as a result from acid rain.52
Through institutional arrangements such as annual review meetings of the Execu-
tive Board, the LRTAP Convention further helped collecting and disseminating
information on acid damage. Such information contributed significantly to the per-
ceived salience of the acid rain issue in many other countries.53 Environmental
activists used this information to mobilize public concern through publications and
symbolic action.54 These activities illustrate how international institutions can
50. While the aggregate level of sulphur pollution has been declining since the early 1980s, most
signatory countries of the 1985 Sulphur Protocol have reported much deeper reductions in sulphur
emissions than nonsigners. On average, nonsigners and signers have reduced 17 percent and 50 per-
cent, respectively, with 1980 as the base year (Economic Commission for Europe 1993).
51. For the coordination by the LRTAP of national research programs and the effects of such coor-
dination, see Levy 1993, 87-90.
52. There was no official connection between the LRTAP convention and the German forest survey,
but some experts attribute the decision to conduct such a national survey partially to the influence from
Nordic countries through the LRTAP convention. Author's interview with German forest survey experts.
53. See Enyedi, Gijswijt, and Rhode 1987; Wetstone and Rosencranz 1983; and Levy 1993. Author's
interviews with officials from the Austrian Federal Environmental Agency and the Hungarian Ministry
of Environment.
54. Author's interviews with staff members at the Swedish NGOs Secretariat on Acid Rain and
World Wide Fund for Nature.
strengthen the electoral leverage of procompliance constituents by increasing the

number of people who care about the issue.
Second, the LRTAP Secretariat compiled information on emission trajectories
and abatement strategies. This information enabled environmental activists to bet-
ter understand the policy processes and thus made them better able to monitor
governmental action. The LRTAP Secretariat coordinated the Cooperative Pro-
gram for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-range Transmission of Air Pol-
lutants in Europe (EMEP). Its main objective was to provide "information on the
deposition and concentration of air pollutants, as well as the quantity and signifi-
cance of the long-range transmission of pollutants and fluxes across boundaries.""55
In addition, governments were required to report on policies taken in accordance
with the Sulphur Protocol. Through the annual review meetings, the LRTAP Sec-
retariat published compilations of abatement strategies. The abatement strategies
adopted by one country were frequently cited by environmental activists in other
countries in demanding stricter environmental policies.56 It was more difficult for
governments to neglect the better-informed environmental activists and the gen-
eral public. These activities illustrate how international institutions can improve
the informational status of procompliance constituencies.
Third, what was important for the above two channels to be effective was that
the LRTAP Convention facilitated the involvement of environmental activists in
the compliance process. The review meetings of the LRTAP Convention were open
to environmental NGOs. For example, Greenpeace and World Wide Fund for Nature
were regular participants at such meetings. This was instrumental to environmen-
tal activism in three ways. First, environmental NGOs could get all documents
released by the convention.57 Thus the convention provided environmental activ-
ists, particularly those from countries with information controls, access to infor-
mation that they might not receive otherwise. Second, because NGOs sometimes
had information about a particular country that the LRTAP Secretariat did not nec-
essarily know, they were usually given the chance to present their knowledge and
opinion at meetings.58 These opportunities often provided environmental NGOs
with additional forum to appeal to public opinion and helped them to increase
their influence over their governments. Third, environmental activists from differ-
ent countries used such meetings to share information and strategies and, in fact,
built networks with one another as well as with the environmental branches in
governments. Such a broad network of like-minded people was important in
strengthening the environmental forces.59
Finally, the LRTAP Convention helped legitimize the environmental demands
of procompliance advocates. The signing of the convention and the Sulphur
55. Economic Commission for Europe 1991.

56. Author's interviews with staff at the World Wide Fund for Nature.
57. Author's interviews with staff from the LRTAP Secretariat.
58. Ibid.
59. Sand 1991. See also Haas 1989; and Young 1989.
Protocol helped establish expectations regarding environmental policies and their

implementation. To some extent, it functioned as a benchmark for correct govern-
mental behavior. This was particularly important in those countries where envi-
ronmental activists lacked domestic instruments. For instance, shortly after
Czechoslovakia ratified the Sulphur Protocol, about 300 people in North Bohemia
protested against government authorities regarding the inadequate system to con-
trol air pollution. For the first time, environmental protesters were not punished.
Instead, government representatives promised to take appropriate action.60 Even
for countries where substantial measures have been taken to reduce sulphur emis-
sions, the fact that a more demanding sulphur protocol was already in the making
under the LRTAP Convention lent support to environmental demands to actually
go much beyond the minimum level of compliance. In Norway and Sweden, the
way that environmental activists resorted to the convention was particularly inter-
esting. Procompliance activists in these countries argued that "now that we finally
got other countries to sign up on the Convention and the Protocol, we need to set
an example with deeper reductions."61 Essentially, domestic environmental activ-
ists used the LRTAP Convention in various ways to defend the legitimacy of their
demands, thus adding international support to domestic pro-environmental
constituencies.
Overall, rather than enabling states to enforce each other through carrots or sticks,
the LRTAP Convention performed important functions to empower domestic envi-
ronmental activism, which directly affected governments' compliance calculations.
Conclusion
This article advances a theory of domestic constituency mechanism. Becaus

government's pursuit for reelection is ultimately determined by domestic consti
uencies, a government's compliance policy is primarily responsive to competing
domestic interests. Within such a conceptual framework of electoral accountabi
ity, I identify specific channels of influence through which domestic constituen
can influence national compliance. In analytically distinctive ways, policymaker
attend disproportionately not only those with more political clout but also thos
better informed. To illustrate the domestic constituency mechanism empiricall
show that European countries' compliance with the 1985 Sulphur Protocol reflect
the electoral leverage and the informational status of competing domestic const
uencies. Among major implications this study provides, I highlight the role of int
national institutions in the context of domestic enforcement. The conceptualizati
of domestic constituency mechanism provides a theoretical rationale for why a
how international institutions may influence national compliance indirectly thro
60. Jancar-Webster 1993a.

61. Author's interview with staff at the Swedish NGOs Secretariat on Acid Rain.
domestic mechanisms. Indeed, the LRTAP Convention empowered domestic envi-

ronmental activists by providing them with specific relevant information and by
legitimizing their demands.
I conclude with a discussion of how this study contributes to three broad areas
in the fields of international cooperation. First, whereas scholars have done rigor-
ous work to address compliance and enforcement in an international game,62 less
analytical attention has been paid to domestic enforcement. Indeed, in the increas-
ingly large literature on compliance, systematic theorizing of domestic mecha-
nisms has been limited. Among those studies that allude to domestic stories, the
theoretical component is often confined to a laundry list of possible mechanisms,
without careful attention to how these mechanisms interact in a unified theoretical
framework. This article fills the gap by developing a conceptual framework, where
I spell out the logic of domestic constituency mechanism and delineate specific
channels of influence. One frequently recognized channel of influence is domestic
support in terms of size or financial endowment of competing interests. Yet, in
politics, sheer number does not always determine the outcome. What explains vary-
ing success of those who are numerous? This study takes into account the less
theorized trait of informational status and specifies how information may affect
policy outcomes through political accountability.
Second, this study joins the scholarly effort to uncover indirect ways in which
international institutions may influence state behavior. Early theories of inter-
national institutions have focused primarily on the functions that international insti-
tutions perform directly for states. Although these functions remain important, the
state centric focus has left unaccounted for a range of indirect pathways through
which international institutions may influence national policies.63 I argue that,
because compliance with international agreements has domestic consequences, there
exist domestic sources of enforcement. It not only is efficient but also can be effec-
tive for international institutions to use these sources to influence states' behavior.
Furthermore, by altering the domestic balance of competing interests and thus indi-
rectly influencing policymakers' compliance decisions, even "weak" institutions
and "soft" laws can impact national policies.64 Thus, although the specific causal
mechanisms differ, this study contributes to the literature on how international insti-
tutions empower domestic actors in pursuit of international rules.65
Third, this study also contributes to the literature on transnational politics of
information. Although many studies frequently refer to information dynamics and
62. See Snidal 1985; Martin 1992; Morrow 1994; Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996; and Fearon
1998.
63. For the need to specify, not just whether, but how international institutions influence national
policies, see Keohane and Martin 1995; and Martin and Simmons 1998. For early calls and recent
efforts to explore how international institutions work through domestic mechanisms, see Haggard and
Simmons 1987; Milner 1997; and Martin 2000.
64. See Weiss 1997; and Abbott and Snidal 2000. See also Lipson 1991.
65. See Burley and Mattli 1993; Goldstein 1996; Cortell and Davis 1996; and Keck and Sikkink
1998.
describe an increasing number of relevant factors in these dynamics,66 the litera-

ture as a whole has paid inadequate attention to delineating analytically the large
number of diverse conjectures. Within the context of domestic enforcement, as
this study suggests, information has two analytically distinct effects. While infor-
mation can be used to mobilize domestic support by essentially altering some
citizens' preferences, it can also enable those who possess it to make relatively
more accurate inferences without changing their preferences. At the international
level, although information provision by international institutions is commonly rec-
ognized, various kinds of information can be used by different actors to evoke
different compliance mechanisms. For instance, while information from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund can work through the financial market to influence states'
compliance,67 information from international human rights networks can influ-
ence states' compliance through powerful states, which can punish noncomplying
states by withholding aid.68 This study suggests a different mechanism, in which
information made available by international institutions can be used by domestic
actors to influence a government's compliance decision. Of course, whether or not
such information bolsters compliance depends on its content and its impact on
domestic power balance.69 This study highlights the need to specify who has which
type of information and, more importantly, who has incentives to use the informa-
tion and who has the leverage to turn that information into influence.
Appendix 1: Formal Solutions
Proof of Proposition 1. The game is solved by backwards induction. In the second period,
because the incumbent policymaker can no longer compete for reelection, Pr(w) = 0.
max
x
Uov,(x)
x i=1
= max (-a(x - Xi)2 + ), i E {1,2} (6)
The first-order co
is C2=1 - 2ai < 0. Thu
2=1 aixi/i /jI= ai, as
In the first period, be
max Ugovt(x) = max (-ai(x- Xi)2 + O) + Pr(w)8V, ie {1,2} (7)

x x i=1
66. Studies of environmental c

tic factors. See Haas, Keohan
Jacobson 1998; and Underdal
67. Simmons 2000.
68. Sikkink 1993.
69. Goldstein and Martin 2000.
The first-order condition is given by
2 aPr(w) (8)
-
i= 12a(x-
aX i) + ax V =
To solve for x, we need to figure out

compliance level changes his chance o
Let vi be the voting strategy of group
the actual compliance level, they as
bent has attended their interests acco
for i E {1,2},
1 if Ui (> ki
i = 0 otherwise (9)
How does interest group i decide on the optimal

cumulative density function of Oi, the probability t
icymaker is
Pr(vi = 1) = Pr(U/i ki) = Pr(- ai(x - xi)2 + 0i i: ki) = 1 - Fi(ki + ai(x - Xi)2)
(10)
How precisely do the voting strategies of interest groups affect the government's choice
of the compliance level? Applying the generalized chain rule,
aPr(w) aPr(w) aPr(v= 1)

ax i=l aPr(vi = 1) ax
Thus, the impact of the compliance level on the probability that the incumbent policymak
wins reelection is expressed in terms of (1) the effect of the compliance level on the pr
ability that each interest group votes for the incumbent policymaker; and (2) the effect o
the probability that each group votes for the incumbent policymaker on the probability t
the incumbent wins reelection.
Letting aPr(w)/aPr(vi = 1) = Ai, which represents the electoral leverage of group i, and
applying Equation (10),
aPr(w) 2
- - 2Aiai(x - xi)fi(ki + ai (x- xi)2) (12)
aX i=1
Now that one has figured out aPr(w)/lax, the first-order condition defined by Equ
(8) becomes
2 2
- 2ai(x -xi) - 2Aiai(x -xi)fi(ki + ai(x- xi)2)aV = 0 (13)

i=1 i=1
Provisionally assumi
itly defines the pol
find out the optima
Step 1. Rearranging
group 1,
fl(kl + a(x - x)2)

1Sa2 a2f2(k2
X - X2 h2 02 X+- X2
aX(X - x2)2) (14)
A18V Alal8V x -x, Ala, x-xI
It is straightforward to verify that the right-hand side of Equation (14) is decr
given that xl < x2 and xl < x < x2 and if f2'(k2 + a2(x - x2)2) 2 0, which
verified later. Accordingly, x is smallest when the left hand of Equation
maximum. So, group 1-who prefers a low compliance level-chooses a uni
kT so as to maximize the left hand and thus minimize x. The assumption
strictly unimodal and symmetric with mean zero implies that fl(.) reaches its
fi(0). Thus, to induce a lowest possible compliance level, group 1 chooses k
k* + al(x(k*) - x1)2 = 0.
Step 2. Rearranging terms of the first-order condition as expressed in Equa

group 2,
f2(k2 + 2(X - X2)2)
al x - x1 1 A1 a, x - X1
a x-f,(kl
A2a28V x - x2 A2V A2a2 x - X2 + a, (x - Xl)2) (15)
The right hand side of Equation (15) is increasing in x, because x1 < x < x2 and f'(k1 +
al(x - X1)2) O0. Regarding fl'(kl + al(x - x1)2) - 0, it is satisfied at k* because, as

shown n in Step 1, group 1 chooses k* such that k* + al(x(k~ ) - xl)2 = 0 and thus f1'(0) =
0. Thus, x is biggest when the left hand of Equation (15) is at the maximum. So, group 2-
who prefers a high compliance level-chooses a unique cut rule k* so as to maximize the
left hand. Again, the assumption that f2(.) is strictly unimodal and symmetric with mean
zero implies that f2(.) reaches its maximum at f2(0). Thus, to induce the highest possible
compliance level, group 2 chooses k* such that k* + a2(x(k*) - X2)2 = 0, and thus
f2'(0) = 0.
Because k* is chosen such that k* + a2(x(k ) - x2)2 = 0 and thus f2'(0) = 0, the
condition pending for verification from Step 1, f2(k2 + a2(X - x2)2) > 0, is therefore
satisfied at k*.
Therefore, interest group i chooses the optimal cut rule k* such that k* + ai(x(k*) -
xi)2 = 0, for i E {1,2}, as given in Equation (4).
Step 3. With the optimal strategies k7 such that k* + ai(x(k*) - xi)2 = 0, i E {1,2},
Equation (13) which implicitly defines the policymaker's best response x* becomes
2 2
i=1 --
i=1 ai(x
Because f1 is strictly
with the variance of
higher the fi(0) valu
Pi, one can solve dir
jI1 ai(1 + Ai (1V)xi/ _ ai(1 + Aiii8V), as given in Equation (3).

It remains to check that the second-order condition is indeed satisfied at x* and k*. Car-
rying on from Equation (13), the necessary second-order condition is
2 2
--
i=1 i=1 ali- Aciti8Vfi
2
- i2Aita2V(x=-xi)2fi'(ki+ai(x-xi)2) <0 (17)

i= 1
This is true because k. + ai(x*(kp) - xi)2 = 0, fi(0) > 0, and f/'(0) = 0,Vi E {1,2}.
Proof of Proposition 2. I now turn to what makes the second period compliance p
differ from that in the first period. Given xt, (k*) and x=2 as in Proposition 1, Vi E
c, 1(1 + Ah 18V)xl + a2( +A2 28V)x2 lX +1 a2X2

x,*,(k?) = xt=2
= a,(1 + Ah 418V) + a2(1 + A2 028V) a1 + a2
= at a28V(x2 - 1 )(2 2 - Al 41) = 0
SA202 1 = A 1 , because ai > 0, 8 > 0, V > 0, andx2 > 1 (18)
Thus, x,=l1(k*) = x*=2 t = 1 22, as provided in Proposition 2.

Furthermore, it is straightforward to verify the following comparative statics:
a - al(1 (l+ A\l18V)xl + a2( +A2 2V)x2
aA2 1 aa2 a(l + A,11V) + a2(l + A228V)

-(X2 - X)(+1 +A 18V)
= - a2428Va a,l 1 V + a + a2 02 V)2 (19)
>0
a al(1 + A1 lS8V)x1 + a2(l + A2428V)x2

02 x=l = ~a2 a1 ( + AI1V) + a2(l +2 28V)
-(x2 - X2)(1 + A1418V)
= - a, 2 2 Va1 (al + a A1 , V + a2 a2 A2 028V)2
> 0 (20)
a a al(1
xAl1 =-
-(x2 -
=- a,1 OVa2
(a1 + a, Ai 3V~V + a2 + a2A2 28V)2
<0 (21)
S - a ra
x = ~1
-( - X
<(a1 + al Ah,
0 1V + a2 + a2A2 28V)2
(22)
Appendix
Environmental Activism
Euro-Barometer 25: Holiday travel and environmental problems, April 198670

Public opinion or awareness of acid rain as damage to the environment: variable 172
Public opinion over the environment in general: variable 218
Membership in environmental NGOs: variables 276 and 277
Voting intention for Green parties or other ecologist parties: variable 286
Euro-Barometer 29: Environmental problems and cancer, March-April 198871

Public awareness about acid rain as damage to the environment: variable 181
Euro-Barometer 31A: European elections; postelection, June-July 198972

Public awareness of acid rain: variable 488
How well informed are people about acid rain: variables 503 and 504
Voting intention for green parties or other ecologist parties: variable 656
70. Rabier, Riffault, and Inglehart 1988.

71. Reif and Melich 1990.
Euro-Barometer 35: Foreign relations, the common agricultural policy, and environ-
mental concerns, Spring 199173
Public awareness of acid rain: variable 127
How well informed are people about acid rain: variables 145 and 146
Public opinion over environmental protection in general: variable 114
Voting intention for Green parties or other ecologist parties: variable 235
International Social Survey Program: Environment, 199374

Concern over industry pollution (a main source of acid rain): variable 46
Membership in environmental NGOs: variable 60
Euro-Barometer 43.1BIS: Regional development and consumer and environmental

issues, May-June 199575
Public awareness of acid rain as damage to the environment: variable 170
Membership in environmental NGOs: variable 188
Appendix 3. Ranking countries by domestic

environmental activism over acid rain
Public Public Votes

opinion opinion NGOs for
acid rain environment membership Greens Score Ranking
Euro-Barometer 25 v172 v218 v276/v277 v286

Denmark 2 1 1 4 8 1
West Germany 3 3 5 1 12 2
Netherlands 1 5 2 5.5 13.5 3
Belgium 4 6 3 2 15 4
Italy 6 2 4 5.5 17.5 5
France 5 4 6 3 18 6
Euro-Barometer 29 v181 v221
Denmark 1 1 2 1
West Germany 4 2 6 2
Netherlands 2 5 7 3
Belgium 3 6 9 5
Italy 6 3 9 5
France 5 4 9 5
Euro-Barometer 31A v488/v503/v504 v323 v656
Denmark 2 3 1 6 1
West Germany 2 2 3 7 2
Netherlands 2 1 6 9 3
Belgium 4 4 2 10 4
Italy 5.5 5 5 15.5 5
France 5.5 6 4 15.5 6
Euro-Barometer 35 v127/v145/v146 v114 v235
Denmark 1 1 6 8 2

74. International Social Survey Program 1996.
75. Reif and Marlier 1998.
Public Public Votes

opinion opinion NGOs for
acid rain environment membership Greens Score Ranking
West Germany 2.5 3 3 8.5 3

Netherlands 2.5 2 2 6.5 1
Belgium 4 4 4 12 4
Italy 5.5 5 5 15.5 6
France 5.5 6 1 12.5 5
ISSP Environment v46 v13 v60
West Germany 1 2 2 5 1
Netherlands 6 3 1 10 2
Norway 7 1 3 11 3
Italy 3 6 4 13 4
Czechoslovakia 5 4 5 14 5
East Germany 2 7 6 15 6
Bulgaria 4 5 8 17 7
Hungary 8 8 7 23 8
Euro-Barometer 43 v170 v182 v188
Sweden 2 2 3 7 1
Denmark 6 1 2 9 2.5
Netherlands 4 4 1 9 2.5
Finland 1 3 6 10 4
Austria 3 7 4 14 5
East Germany 5 5 5 15 6
Italy 8 6 8 22 7
Belgium 7 9 7 23 8
France 9 8 9 26 9
Note: v = variable.
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Why Comply - The Domestic Constituency Mechanism

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International Organization Foundation

Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism

Cambridge University Press, International Organization Foundation are collaborating

Abstract Why do countries comply with international agreements? While schol-

International Organization 59, Spring 2005, pp. 363-398

monitor states' compliance with treaties. By providing compliance information,

competing industries and consumers differently within a single country. Similarly,

4. See Holmstrim 1979; and Grossman and Hart 1983.

While the primary purpose of this article is to advance a theory of domestic

A Model of Domestic Constituency Mechanism

In this section, I develop a model in which a government makes a compliance

5. In particular, see Ferejohn 1986; Lohmann 1998; and Fearon 1999.

constituencies on compliance through the electoral process. Appendix 1 contains

The Setup of the Model

Ui(x, Oi) = -a,(x - xi)2 + Oi,i E {1, 2} (1)

8. Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff 1998.

It is a function of the group's preference as well as its informational endowment,

Ugovt,(x) = UL(x) + Pr(w)8V, Vi E {1, 2} (2)

To trace how domestic constituencies influence the government's compliance pol-

Proposition 1: The following strategies constitute a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium:

and interest group i chooses the retrospective voting rule

1 if i k*, where k- + at (x(k) - xi)2 - (4)

In the second period, the incum

Throughout, Oii =fi(0), and Ai = aPr(w)/aPr(vi = 1), for i E {1

In the second period, the incumbent policymaker cannot get re

Anticipating the effect of his compliance decision on his chance of reelection,

the incumbent policymaker decides on a compliance policy, x(k7 ) = /=i1 ai(1 +

To establish the effect of constituencies on the government's compliance policy

Compliance with the 1985 Sulphur Protocol:

The preceding analysis suggests, because governments are interested in retaining

16. Simmons 2000.

constituency mechanism works empirically, I take another look at the LRTAP

To provide a general pattern of national compliance as mapped against politically

TABLE 1. Average level of sulphur emission reduction in signatory countries of

Environmental activism around acid rain

Signatories in three groups West Germany Belgium Bulgaria

Environmental activism around acid rain

Signatories in four groups West Germany Denmark Belgium Bulgaria

Sources: Data on emission reductions are from

emissions by 72 percent on averag

here on a subset of signatory countries, namely Norway, West Germany, France,

Norway. Facing similar ecological and geographic vulnerability as Sweden, Nor-

27. Laugen 2000, 120-24.

West Germany. Achieving an even greater percentage of sulphur reductions,

33. Reitan 1997, 305.

43 percent of voters viewed environmental protection as very important in 1972.

พรรคกรีนของเยอ มีทั้ง 2 ระดับ แต่ ฝรศ ไม่มีทั้ง ngo ไม่มีพรรคที่ให้คสจ

38. Conradt and Dalton 1988.

46. Adamova 1993, 53.

constituencies provides a key to understanding the political nature of domestic

Implications for International Institutions

Therefore, international institutions can influence states' compliance calcula-

international initiatives in debates for legitimation purposes. Thus, while domes-

strengthen the electoral leverage of procompliance constituents by increasing the

55. Economic Commission for Europe 1991.

Protocol helped establish expectations regarding environmental policies and their

This article advances a theory of domestic constituency mechanism. Becaus

60. Jancar-Webster 1993a.

domestic mechanisms. Indeed, the LRTAP Convention empowered domestic envi-

describe an increasing number of relevant factors in these dynamics,66 the litera-

Thus, x,=l1(k) = x=2 t = 1 22, as provided in Proposition 2.