Disarmament and Security Committee

Topic: Biological Warfare

Signatories: Armenia, Belize, China, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, North
Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, Yemen.

The Disarmament and International Security Committee,

Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of
delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Recalling its previous resolutions relating to the complete and effective regulationregulation of
bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction,

Considering the need of an Action Protocol to adhere to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
Their Destruction of 1972 and establishing this Document as such,

Endorsing cooperation with the Security council in order to inflict sanctions to countries that violates the
Convention of Biological Weapons,

1. Suggests the creation of the Office for the RegulatioRegulation of Biological Weapons (ORBW) which
will be -+ a UN subsidiary body dependent of the United Nations Disarmament Office Affairs (UNODA)
in charge of enforcing and monitoring the use, research and production of Biological Weapons through
the following:
a. Surveil member States and private companies compliance of the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC);
b. Keep track of the BTW Treaty and work as an impartial agent on it’s processes and reviews;
c. This office will work as an analogous to the existing Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) considering that the BWC doesn’t provide an international body
that focuses on Biological Hazards;
d. The organization will have the following structure:
i. The Conference of the parties that will be in charge of electing the members of the
Executive Council and taking the necessary measures to guarantee the accomplishment of
the Biological Weapons Convention,
ii. The Executive Council will be responsible of considering and submitting the annual
report to the Conference regarding the compliance of the convention and taking measures
in cases of non-compliance of the Convention and,
iii. The technical secretariat that will handle day to day communication with the State Parties
and create specific programs and plans for each member state to accomplish the
convention.
e. Funding will be provided by the annual budget of the UNODA
2. Strongly encourages the implementation of the PERSIA (Effective Research for Scientific Innovation and
Aid) program as a comprehensive plan of action for nations to address the production and research of
biotechnology to operate according to international quality criteria, due to the lack of proper guidelines in
regards to biological weapons and outdated regulations witch could possible lead to Biological Warfare,
by:
a. Establishing new regulations for the development of biotechnologies such as, these scientific
advances won’t be used for the ill intent against other individuals, in the context of armed
conflicts such developments can only be used for passive bio defensive reasons & the
manipulation of anthrax, smallpox, plague, botulism, and other pathological agents that are
commonly used in biological warfare must be only for scientific and research purposes;
 b. Providing annual reports of the current state of biotechnology within each nation, based on the
new regulations and the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, these reports will be
developed by the Office for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons (OPBW) in conjunction
with the UNODA, calling upon article VI of the 1972 BWC that states “Right to request the
United Nations Security Council to investigate alleged breaches of the BWC”;
3. Recommends the establishment of the “Cape Shield” BWC improvement plan aiming to reduce the risks
and vulnerability of nations in face of a biological attack via international cooperation based on three
main pillars:
a. Regarding Trust-Building Reducing the 5-year span of BWC Review Conferences to 2 years
in view of the accelerated pace of biological innovation, and improving Confidence-Building
Measures (CBM) by: 1) Allowing public consultation, 2) Submitting them to peer-review;
b. Regarding safe research;
i. Establishing Dual-Use Research of Concern (DURC) comprehensive risk assessment
guidelines during the next BWC Review Conference;
ii. Declaring DURC measures annually in CBM E submissions;
iii. Including Biosafety and Biosecurity measures in CBM E submissions which will cover,
Construction and operation of laboratories working with biological agents, and training
and certification of these lab’s personnel;
c. Regarding safeguarding of information adding CBM J on “declaration of annual cyber security
measures related to the management of NSAs” which comprehend private and national
laboratories;
4. Endorses the establishment of the Ethical Tampering and Handling of Organic Substances (ETHOS
Guidelines), to promote biosafety as a state-sponsored scientific discipline and the adequate protocols in
how to act and react when facing bioterrorism:
a. These guidelines will be drafted by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs’s
(UNODA) Information weapons and Outreach Branch based on the Convention on the
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques;
b. It shall be composed in three main pillars: (i) best practices for biological research, and the
ethical use of biological material for scientific advances that covers all areas of biological
research, including all areas of biomedical research such as human genetics and synthetic
biology; (ii) A know-how regarding defensive biological mechanism in the case that any
Member State is exposed to a bioterrorist attack and how to manage the post-exposure
response to biological agents; (iii) A section that develops the benefits of weapon biological
research as defensive weapons and all the procedures and processes to be a safe holder of
biological;
5. Proposes the implementation of the “Extremis” programme in order to incentivize the control of already
existing biological weapons in the international community to secure the peace and safety of every
nation. The program will work, as follows:
a. Carry out an investigation focused on the most common and lethal biological weapons such as
Flu, Anthrax, Smallpox and Capsaicin;
b. Provide limited mechanisms to enforce prohibitions on their development, stockpiling and
transfer;
c. Improve hospitals in case a massive biological weapon is used by the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) by the optimization of mechanisms regarding Biological
Mechanism;
6. Encourages the development of international guidelines (ARMY) to set a peer-reviewed framework to
propose criminalising the material proliferation and trafficking of biological weapons, tipify the
recommended sanctions and facilitate prosecution of the States and non-states actors which do not
comply with the international law guidelines, in collaboration with national authorities and the United
Nations Security Council (UN-SC);
 a. Calls upon the establishment of a UN-SC Permanet 5-sponsored bi-annual summit to support the
development of national commitments to advance the de-escalation of biological weapons
production and stockpiling, and strengthen nonproliferation mechanisms at regional levels to
establish key economic conditions and incentives that are necessary to be met for the de-
escalation efforts;
7. Encourages the NEMO program to undertake a comprehensive review of how existing maritime and
customs control measures could contribute to new and tougher enforcement activities under the BWC,
which bans production and stockpiling of biological warfare to enforce the defense by the international
guidelines;
8. Endorses the creation of the Biowarfare Development Catalogue (BDC) with the purpose of handling
annual reports of research, technology, advances with support of the World Health Organization (WHO)
and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) promoting the international
cooperation on passive defense systems elaboration and the creation of mechanisms to address immediate
emergencies through national policy by:
a. Calling for the creation of the Biowarfare Development Limitations Conference Cycle in order
to develop the BDC in key areas for the creation of regional and national policy on the
mitigation, treatment, dangerous information, and prevention of bioterrorism attacks:
i. The Conference Cycle shall start in January 2022 with participation of all UN members
States who wish to be part;
ii. The document shall be composed of 10 policy templates for each of the 4 key areas
described before;
b. Designating a group of experts at the end of the cycle shall be organized into an Ad-Hoc
committee to provide technical assistance on the development of national policy responding to
the recommendations made on the document by countries who request it;
9. Encourage the World Health Organization (WHO) to expand the UNECE's program of distribution of
vaccines against biological agents to a worldwide scale bye the implementation of the CAMEL SHIELD
Program, which is intended to generate a mass reproduction of vaccines in order to provide the Member
States with them, aiming to prepare the population in anticipation of any possible biological attacks, and
its effects on the population’s health, as follows:
a. This program shall work with the same mechanisms that has been in order until now in
Europe;
b. This program shall last until the distribution, research, and production of vaccines is
satisfactory and/or effective in its objectives, with a maximum of three years of duration;
c. This program shall be financed by member states, of which the amount they pay will depend
on the number of requested vaccines, in the same way that it has been financed;
10. Suggests the adoptation of the “Detect, Diagnose and Respond”( DDR) program in order to certify that
health care systems and governments are properly equipped to deal with the repercussions of
bioterrorism, the initiative will work hand in hand with the World Health Organization (WHO),
continuing the work line from the “Terrorist Threats to food” guideline proposed by the committee in
2003;
a. As a way to minimize the catastrophic impacts of biological attacks, the DDR, will
operate alongside WHO funds to work upon detecting; Air-monitoring, Analysis,
Notification, Procedures and Risk assessment;
b. In order to respond the General Assembly will solicit the UNited Nations Security
Council to implement sanctions to formally detected terrorists groups that employ
biological weapons to commit it henious crimes, sanctions are intended to limit as much
as possible the financial and commodities that the group may have;
c. To diagnose, biological weapons related illnesses , the DDR will undertake the most
effective and resilient healthcare systems across Asia, Africa, Europe, America and
Oceania to treat people enduring lethal diseases such as Ebola, Bubonic Plague among
 others in prime health facilities to strive for their rapid and successful recovery such
people;
11. Calls upon the implementation of SAFE, a supervision and investigation program to avoid the use of
biological weapons for environmental warfare. The program will proceed in two phases:
a. The first phase will consist of the supervision of the use of biological weapons, every year a
report must be delivered to the agency by every country, where it states how and for what
biological research is being used:
i. Every country that signs the resolutions must deliver such a report,
ii. The reports will be verified by experts on the topic;
b. The second phase consists of the investigation of allegations of the use of biological weapons
for environmental warfare to establish whether or not it has been used. There will be three
ways to cause an investigation:
i. If a party requests an investigation to another state alleging the improper use of such
technologies;
ii. If the party alleges that another party has used these weapons against the requesting party
and at its time affecting the environment;
iii. If the SAFE protocol considers that such technology is being used wrongly after they
have completed their annual supervision;
12. Recommends the implementation of the “Amal approach”, which will be based on a 3 phase course as the
improvement of the 1st phase already approved, taking into account the lack of prevention and
management of the biological warfare, the approach will work as following:
a. Alongside organizations such as the Oman Ministry of Health and the ICRC, will help develop
and transcend these courses with the purpose of preventing and and isolation according to the
material the person was exposed to;
i. The training course aims at CBRN risk mitigation for individuals or groups exposed to
CBRN agents through avoiding or reducing the exposure of the medical team to these
materials;
ii. The removal of contaminants from skin and hair and exposed clothes, getting the proper
medical care and antidotes to help control the symptoms of poisoning;
iii. In addition to learning about the recommended means and methods of protection and
isolation according to the material the person was exposed to;
13. Recommends the creation of the International BioGrowth Cooperation (IBC), a program based on a
collaboration system between UN member states, focusing on the global development of biotechnology
and biodefense systems through capacity building; it would set standardized guidelines for research with
biochemical components in order to develop strong defense mechanisms; it will work with the United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), functioning as follows:
a. Member states will be categorized in four groups depending on their possible input regarding
the development of mechanisms against biological warfare:
i. The main groups will be research nations, resources nations, and testing nations, these
would indicate the main assets of each member state, therefore, nations will be able to be
part of more than one group;
ii. The fourth group will be uncategorized nations, this category will include countries that
can not be included in any other group, as they would not be excluded from the program;
b. Meetings will be held when, either DISEC or UN member states deems it necessary, specially
in any riscky, hazardous or emerging situation;
14. Recommends the implementation of the “BTW” Biological Treaty for Weapons Reduction, which will be
a global initiative to reduce the existing tensions between countries with capacities to generate Biological
Weapons, in order to improve cooperation and transparency through the following:
15. implementing 5 yearly onsite Inspections between biological capable countries in order to improve
transparency through inspection teams of each country;
 i. allowed inspection activities and Peer Reviews that include visiting Scientific
Experimental and Production Bases with the supervision of the OPBW;
ii. aiming to enhance transparency countries should declare research intents that must be
approved by the newly created OPBW;
b. the treaty establishes a multilateral Consultative Commission of the OPBW as a compliance
and implementation body that meets at least twice each year unless otherwise agreed;
c. the treaty’s original duration is 10 years with the option for the Parties to agree to extend it for
up to an additional five years;
16. Recommend the implementation of the TARGET protocol, considering the usage of biological warfare by
non state actors, keeping in mind the Biological Warfare Convention in order to impulse research about
the usage of biological weapons and measures to respond, following the next criteria:
a. Regarding the situation of developing and developed countries regarding biological warfare;
b. Preventing the usage and waste of BW in order to accomplish the main purpose of the BWC
which is to prevent the spread of these biological weapons;
c. Proposing measures for each country to take in case of an attack, only in cases of attacks to the
government directly it will be considered the possibility of the usage of biological weapons;
17. Proposes the creation of the PANDA (Pathway for Anti-biological National Defense Action)
Framework, in order to aid States into developing national biodefense systems, aimed towards the
protection in case of a biological attack, using as a guide the People’s Liberation Army’s Military
Medical Research Institute, the Framework will work as follows:
a. The People's Republic of China will offer to the international community a guideline
regarding the defense systems against bioweapons, which can be used by the countries;
i. The guideline will be studied and upgraded by a panel of experts, named by the General
Assembly’s First Committee, which will have the responsibility of studying and
determining the liability of the system;
ii. This panel shall be called depending in the development of new technologies or the
presence of new and different threats;
b. Using funds allocated by the General Assembly’s Administrative and Budgetary Committee,
aids will be granted for less developed countries to have access to the technology develop and
implement such systems;
c. The General Assembly’s Sixth Committee will draft an international protocol which
determines the fundamental aspects that a defensive system again must have, using as a basis
the guidelines provided by the General Assembly’s First Committee;
18. Recommends, the implementation of the TAG protocol, which will consist of a framework to ensure the
legal protection, preservation and safety of the vital natural resources from biohazardous attacks in each
country:
a. The first step will be to examine the areas of each country’s context regarding
vulnerability towards biological weapons and classify them as “In danger” or
“Preserved”:
i. If it’s considered to be “In danger”, DISEC will implement measures for the
populations in that areas to be safe;
ii. If it’s considered as “Preserved” DISEC and the WHO will offer
recommendations to keep the safe from bioterrorism;
b. The second step:
i. The database will be updated by the DISEC staff every 4 years;
ii. This update will be done to see and compare if the situation in each country has
improved or deteriorated;
c. The program will be funded by the United Nations Environmental Programme;
19. Requests for the activation of article XI of the United Nations Biological Weapons Convention with the
purpose of activating the amendment process of the Biological Weapons Convention in order to foment
 the research on biological weapons, in which signatory states must agree to amend the following articles:
Article I, to allow the production of biological weapons. Article II, to avoid the destruction of biological
weapons. Article III, to allow the transfer of agents, toxins and weapons equipment to any recipient
whatsoever, directly or indirectly;
20. Recommends the implementation of the African Biopreparedness Vaccines Control (ABVC) sith support
from the African Congress for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) to include as a initiative
upon the property rights of vaccine and medicine creation during pandemics or large biosafety hazards,
by:
a. Seeking for African laboratories and agencies to recommend and unfold and share the rights
upon important vaccines production in hazards including communities of over five thousand
citizens;
b. Facilitating the progress and efficiency upon the amount of time of creation including short-
term time lapses over amount of production;
c. Strengthening biosafety and biosecurity measures (BBM) of the African Union Member States
to comply with the International Health Regulations (IHR);
21. Recommends to the United Nations General Assembly Sixth Committee to amend Article I of the
Biological Weapons Convention, in light of the world's complex and ever-changing context and the threat
of mass destruction posed by chemical and biological weapons, establishing a series of provisions for the
application of biological weapons for individual and collective self-defence in compliance with Article 51
of the UN Charter:
a. In accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter which states that nothing in the Charter shall
derive the right of individual or collective self-defense, and emphasizing that measures taken
in the exercise of this right shall be reported to the Security Council;
b. For the use of biological weapons in self-defense, the following provisions will be added to
Article I of the Biological Weapons Convention:
i. If it is used as a response to a biological attack that has taken place;
ii. Anticipatory self-defense is admissible if the necessity of self-defense is overwhelming
and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation;
iii. It is only permissible to use biological weapons for self-defence if they meet all the
necessary conditions of necessity, proportionality, and expediency;
22. It remains to be seized on the matter.