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 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/6/2016, SPi

Emotions, Values, and Agency

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/6/2016, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/6/2016, SPi

Emotions, Values,
and Agency

Christine Tappolet

1
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 9/6/2016, SPi

3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
© Christine Tappolet 2016
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
First Edition published in 2016
Impression: 1
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics
rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
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Library of Congress Control Number: 2016930236
ISBN 978–0–19–969651–2
Printed in Great Britain by
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 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/6/2016, SPi

For my mother Ursula and my father Luc, as well as for

Philippe, with whom I have been sailing for many a year
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/6/2016, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/6/2016, SPi

Origins

The present book supersedes, I trust, my previously published work on

these matters. This being said, all but Chapter 4 draw in part on pub-
lished works, as follows.
Chapter 1 develops ideas presented in the book that arose from my
PhD thesis, Emotions et Valeurs (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
2000), as well as in “Emotions, Perceptions, and Emotional Illusions,” in
Clotilde Calabi (ed.), Perceptual Illusions: Philosophical and Psychological
Essays, Houndsmill: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2012, 207–24.
Chapter 2 draws on and expands “Emotions, Action, and Motivation:
The Case of Fear,” in Peter Goldie (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy
of Emotion, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 325–45.
Chapter 3 is partly based on “Values and Emotions: The Prospects of
Neo-Sentimentalism,” in Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 117–34; and makes use of some
ideas presented in a paper cowritten with Mauro Rossi: “What Is Value?
Where Does It Come From? A Philosophical Perspective,” in Tobias
Brosch, David Sander et al. (eds), The Handbook of Value: The Affective
Sciences of Values and Valuation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015.
Chapter 5 also draws on Emotions et Valeurs as regards epistemo-
logical issues, and expands ideas presented in “Emotions, Reasons, and
Autonomy,” in Andrea Veltman and Mark C. Piper (eds), Autonomy,
Oppression and Gender, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014,
163–80.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/6/2016, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/6/2016, SPi

Contents

Preface xi
Acknowledgments xv

1. Emotion and Perception 1

1.1. Sketching the Landscape 1
1.2. Theories of Emotion 8
1.3. The Perceptual Theory 15
1.4. The Disanalogies Between Emotions and Sensory Experiences 24
1.5. The Irrationality of Emotions 31
1.6. Two Further Objections 39
Conclusion 45
2. Emotion and Motivation 47
2.1. Fear and the Fearsome 50
2.2. Motivational Modularity 52
2.3. The Desire Theory 58
2.4. Fearing Fictions 64
2.5. Motivational Egoism 66
2.6. Generalizing the Account 72
2.7. The Direction of Fit Objection 76
Conclusion 78
3. Emotion and Values 79
3.1. The Attractions of Sentimentalism 81
3.2. Two Versions of Neo-Sentimentalism 85
3.3. The Open Question Argument and the Normativity
Requirement 90
3.4. Values and the Justification of Action 92
3.5. The Wrong Kind of Reason Objection 95
3.6. Circularity Threats 98
3.7. The Solitary Good Objection and the Distance Problem 103
3.8. Generalizing Representational Neo-Sentimentalism 110
3.9. Sentimental Realism 116
Conclusion 121
4. Emotion and Responsibility 123
4.1. Strawson and Reactive Attitudes 126
4.2. Responsibility Analyzed? 129
4.3. The Asymmetry Problem 133
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x CONTENTS

4.4. Two Further Problems 145

4.5. Bringing Values into the Picture 152
Conclusion 158
5. Emotion and Agency 161
5.1. The Tracking of Practical Reasons 163
5.2. Epistemic Reasons 167
5.3. Reason-Responsiveness 173
5.4. Akratic Actions 179
5.5. Further Objections 184
5.6. Autonomy Theories 190
Conclusion 194

References 197
Index 219
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/6/2016, SPi

Preface

As a child, I was not particularly fearful—I used to climb trees and ride
my bicycle downhill from the village school at full speed—but I was
extremely shy. I would rather have died than ring at our neighbors’ door
to deliver a message. Picking up the phone was out of the question. It is
difficult to say to what extent I am still shy, but in any case, ringing at the
neighbors’ door or taking the phone does not trigger fear or unease
anymore. Our emotional dispositions and the emotional experiences
that come in their tow change over time. When they do so, we change.
As most would agree, the emotions we experience are crucial to who we
are, to what we think, and to what we do.
But what are emotions, exactly? This is a tricky question, for emotions
form a complicated, even messy, territory. Firstly, emotional, and more
generally affective, phenomena are varied. For instance, some things we
call “emotions,” such as fear of spiders, appear to be dispositions to
undergo a certain number of emotional experiences, while others appear
to be a state that we experience at a certain time or over a given period.
Secondly, emotions are usually taken to split into kinds, such as fear,
anger, shame, pride, or joy, to name but a few. The problem is that we
cannot assume that what appears true of one kind of emotion is true of
the others. Thirdly, emotional episodes are complex. Typical emotional
episodes involve sensory perceptions, physiological changes, conscious
feelings, cognitive processes, motivational components, and, according
to many, some kind of appraisal. This makes it hard to say what
emotions are: what, if any, is, or are the essential components, and how
do the different parts hang together?
My aim in this book is to spell out what I take to be a highly attractive
account of emotions, according to which emotions are closely related to
values or more precisely to evaluative concepts such as fearsome, dis-
gusting, or admirable and the properties that can be taken to correspond
to these concepts.1 The claim is that emotions consist in perceptual

1
The term “value” is often used to refer to what is believed to be good and which ought
to be promoted or respected, such as friendship, knowledge, or justice. The term can also
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/6/2016, SPi

xii PREFACE

experiences of values, and to examine the implications of that account for

a variety of interconnected questions: the role of emotions in motivation,
the nature of evaluative judgments, the relation between responsibility
and reactive attitudes, and, finally, the nature of reason-responsive
agency. A better understanding of the role of emotions in these phenom-
ena, which are central to human concern, will allow for a better grasp of
the nature of agency and the self.
The first chapter develops the Perceptual Theory of emotion by
contrasting it with its main contenders, such as, primarily, so-called
Judgmental Theories, according to which emotions are or involve evalu-
ative or normative judgments. One central feature of the Perceptual
Theory is that it claims that emotions represent the world as being a
certain way, but that their contents are non-conceptual. The main
argument in favor of the Perceptual Theory is an argument by analogy:
emotions and perceptual experiences share many important features,
such as phenomenal qualities or the absence of direct control by the
agent. Special attention is given to so-called recalcitrant emotions, which
conflict with the agent’s evaluative judgments, and to their similarities,
but also to their differences, with respect to perceptual illusions.
To assess the Perceptual Theory, but also to better understand the role
of emotions in agency, it is important to examine how emotions are
related to what moves us to action. Thus, the second chapter looks into
the relationship between emotions and motivation. I argue that emotions
need not come with rigid and innate behavioral dispositions, which
would manifest themselves in automatic and thought-independent
ways, and result in a small number of specific behaviors. The relationship
between emotions and motivation is much more complex. In addition to
important arational influences on motivation, such as the focusing of
attention, emotions normally involve desires that set goals. However, as
cases of emotions which have fictional objects show, emotions can be
contemplative, in the sense that they can occur without any desires.
Moreover, I argue that by contrast with what is often assumed, even
emotions such as fear need not set egoistic goals.
The third chapter examines the implications of the Perceptual Theory
with respect to evaluative concepts and the properties these concepts

refer to ideals that are action-guiding, such as when we say that democracy or autonomy are
Western values, or that integrity and generosity are someone’s personal values.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/6/2016, SPi

PREFACE xiii

appear to pick out. According to the proposed account of evaluative

concepts such as admirable or disgusting, something falls under such a
concept if and only if feeling the relevant emotion is fitting or appropri-
ate. Neo-Sentimentalist accounts of this kind have recently come
under heavy attack. The chapter offers an appealing version of Neo-
Sentimentalism that, unlike standard accounts, avoids its many pitfalls.
In a nutshell, the suggestion is that an attitude can be considered to be
appropriate when it correctly represents evaluative states of affairs. The
main worry that arises is that the resulting account is too circular to be of
interest. In reply, I argue that the proposed account is illuminating from
an epistemological point of view, for it expresses the epistemic indis-
pensability of our emotional responses with respect to evaluative judg-
ments. This chapter also explores ontological issues and argues that
an attractive form of realism about values, which I call “Sentimental
Realism,” and according to which evaluative concepts are response-
dependent but pick out properties that are fully objective, is available
to Neo-Sentimentalism.
Interestingly, Strawsonian theories of responsibility can be seen as a
kind of Neo-Sentimentalism. Roughly, what such theories suggest is that
one is responsible for something on condition that a number of emo-
tions, such as resentment, are fitting or appropriate. The fourth chapter
aims at critically assessing the plausibility of this increasingly popular
account of responsibility. I argue that there are important asymmetries
between the case of value and the case of responsibility, so that one has to
conclude that the concept of moral responsibility is not response-
dependent. In order to preserve Strawson’s insight regarding the role of
emotions in responsibility attributions, I propose that the relation
between emotions and moral responsibility is mediated by values.
The last chapter brings the different threads together and discusses the
implications of the proposed account of emotions with respect to agency.
The central question I consider is how emotions relate to practical
reasons. I argue that in so far as emotions are perceptions of values,
they can be considered to be perceptions of practical reasons. I also
consider the relation between emotions and epistemic reasons and
spell out an account of the justification of evaluative judgments. Fur-
thermore, I argue that on a plausible account of reason-responsiveness,
emotions not only allow us to track reasons, but also to be reason-
responsive. In contrast with the view that reason-responsiveness requires
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/6/2016, SPi

xiv PREFACE

rational guidance I propose an account in terms of the exercise of

well-tuned epistemic and practical habits or virtues, something which
involves a kind of standby control instead of active control. I close with
a discussion of the implications of this account regarding the debate
about autonomous agency. One important result of the proposed
account is that emotions and autonomous agency need not be at
odds. As a consequence, accounts of autonomy in terms of reason-
responsiveness and accounts that emphasize the motivational and affect-
ive in autonomy need not be fundamentally opposed. The upshot is that
the role of emotions in our awareness of evaluative states of affairs
renders them essential to our agency.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/6/2016, SPi

Acknowledgments

When I started working on emotions in the early 1990s, emotions had

barely started to arouse philosophical interest. Things have changed
quite a bit, of course. Philosophers have grown fond of emotions. Indeed,
everyone seems to be working on emotions nowadays, from philo-
sophers and ethicists to neuroscientists and psychologists. It is foolhardy
to believe that something can be added to the massive amount of
literature which has been produced on this topic. I guess I would not
have persisted in working on this project without the encouragement of
my friends and colleagues.
Because my work on emotions goes far back, the debt I incur began to
accumulate long before I started writing this book. The first person
I would like to thank is Kevin Mulligan, for the generous and insightful
comments from which I benefited when and ever since he supervised my
PhD thesis, which already focused on emotions and values. I should also
like to thank Anthony Savile, Malcom Budd, and Mark Sainsbury for
commenting on early and quite inchoate ideas on this topic when I was a
student in London, as well as David Brink, who was kind enough to
discuss my work when I spent a year in Boston writing up my thesis as a
visiting scholar at M.I.T.
My research has been generously funded by the Fonds de recherche
société et culture and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council, both of which I gratefully acknowledge. Part of this book was
written when I was on sabbatical at the Centre for Ethics of the
University of Toronto, where I had the status of visiting researcher.
I wish to express my gratitude to the Centre and to its director at the
time, Joe Heath, for providing excellent work conditions.
Many thanks to Peter Momtchiloff at Oxford University Press for his
support and his patience whenever I asked for huge extensions, and to
the editorial and production teams at Oxford University Press for their
hard work, to Antoine Panaïoti for revising the English at the speed of
light, to Samuel Dishaw for doing so again on the final version, as well
as for his help on the references, and to Nigel DeSouza for his help on
the proofs.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/6/2016, SPi

xvi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Over the years, I have benefited from innumerable questions,

comments, and discussions. I particularly wish to thank Carla Bagnoli,
Jake Beck, Paul Bernier, Ian Blaustein, Frédéric Bouchard, Michael
Brady, John Broome, Krister Bykvist, Clotilde Calabi, Åsa Carlsson,
Roberto Casati, John Christman, Josep Corbi, Florian Cova, Christopher
Cowley, Justin D’Arms, Nigel DeSouza, Jérôme Dokic, Luc Faucher,
Chloë Fitzgerald, Christel Fricke, Marilyn Friedman, Olav Gjelskvik,
Bruno Guindon, Joe Heath, Bennett Helm, Louis-Philippe Hodgson,
David Horst, Tom Hurka, Kent Hurtig, Karen Jones, Uriah Kriegel,
Rae Langton, Federico Lauria, Daniel Laurier, Catriona Mackenzie,
Colin MacLeod, Barry Maguire, Heidi Maibom, Kate Manne, Olivier
Massin, Anne Meylan, Martin Montminy, Bob Myers, Mark Nelson,
Vanessa Nurock, Graham Oddie, Jonas Olson, Marina Oshana, Claude
Panaccio, Antoine Panaïoti, Philip Pettit, Christian Piller, David Pineda,
Mark Piper, Josep Lluis Prades, Huw Price, Andrew Reisner, Sophie
Rietti, Amélie Rorty, Gideon Rosen, Andrea Scarantino, Tim Schroeder,
Andrew Seppielli, David Sosa, Gopal Sreenivasan, Daniel Star, Natalie
Stoljar, Cass Sunstein, Patrick Turmel, Joey van Weelden, David
Velleman, Andrea Veltman, Augustín Vincente, and Benjamin Wald.
I owe a special debt to Ronnie de Sousa for immediately reading and
commenting on whatever piece of work I happened to send him, to Sarah
Stroud for her constant support and insightful questions, to Michele
Palmira for his advice in epistemological matters, to Mauro Rossi for his
readiness to discuss tricky points, to Stéphane Lemaire for disagreeing
with me over and over, to Sebastián Figueroa Rubio for his advice on
responsibility theories, to Julien Deonna for his comments on Chapter 1
and for discussions of most of the material, to Fabrice Teroni for having
commented on Chapters 3, 4, and 5, as well as for lots of discussions, to
Hichem Naar, who organized a reading group on the manuscript and
provided helpful feedback on the complete final draft, to Michael
Zimmerman for his comments on Chapter 4, to the late Peter Goldie
for his comments on the paper on which Chapter 3 is based, to Michael
Lacewing, who recently revealed to me that he was Reader B, and whose
detailed remarks greatly helped me to revise the manuscript, to Adam
Morton for sprinkling the text with helpful suggestions under the rather
suitable identity of Reader A, and finally to Ruwen Ogien, for his
friendship and his unfailing encouragements.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/6/2016, SPi

1
Emotion and Perception

The aim of this chapter is to present and defend a thoroughly worked out
account of emotions, which importantly differs from current accounts
in the literature. The first section surveys the somewhat messy territory
of emotions and more generally of affective states. Doing so will allow
me to introduce common distinctions within emotion theory. The
second section presents the main theories of emotions on offer, namely
Feeling Theories, Conative Theories, and Cognitive Theories, such as the
Judgmental and Quasi-Judgmental Theories, and argues that they all
have important weaknesses. Section 1.3 offers arguments in favor of what
I take to be a superior account, one which underlines the analogies
between emotions and sensory experiences and which I call the
“Perceptual Theory.” The following three sections of this chapter then
turn to objections which can be leveled against the Perceptual Theory.
Section 1.4 discusses the disanalogies between emotions and sensory
experiences, and proposes to adopt a liberal account of what counts as
a perception. Section 1.5 turns to an objection based on the observation
that emotions can be assessed in terms of rationality, and responds to it
by appealing to the plasticity of our emotional systems. The final section
aims at rebutting two related objections, one according to which the
Perceptual Theory cannot make room for the fact that emotions allow
for reasons, and another according to which the content of emotions
is more dependent on that of other states than the Perceptual Theory
can allow.

1.1 Sketching the Landscape

Understanding what emotions are is not an easy task. There is nothing
unusual in the fact that there has been, is, and in all likelihood will
continue to be, a vast number of competing philosophical theories of
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/6/2016, SPi

 EMOTION AND PERCEPTION

emotions. That is just how things usually are in philosophy, and there is
no reason to think that the study of emotions should be an exception.
However, one thing that is special about emotions as compared to
free will or reference, say, is that they are not the private hunting
preserve of philosophers. In addition to philosophical accounts, theo-
ries about the nature and function of emotions have been proposed
by experimental scientists, such as psychologists and neuroscientists.
Some of the questions philosophers ask about emotions might well
be specifically philosophical—the question of how emotions can help
make sense of people’s action is one example.1 But a number of these
questions are common to philosophers and experimental scientists.
The question of what emotions are is one of these shared questions.
This point raises several methodological questions. Are the philo-
sopher’s usual tools, that is, conceptual analysis, thought experiments,
introspection, and, I should add, observation, the best way to approach
emotions, or should emotion theorists all switch to experimental
methods? It is not my intention to open this can of worms. Let me
simply note that it would be wrong to think there is a deep divide
between philosophical and experimental methods. In general, philo-
sophers working on emotions are not oblivious to experimental results,
and they often use such results in their arguments. In fact, there are
reasons to think that the methods of the natural sciences are simply more
systematic ways to conduct everyday observation (Haack 2003: 94). In
any case, scientists cannot help using ordinary words and concepts, and
they are of course not devoid of imaginative, introspective, and observa-
tional skills. So, what scientists do when they put forward theories
about the nature of emotion is not different, in essence, from what
philosophers do. The proof is in the pudding, so what I propose is
to see where empirically informed philosophical methods will lead us.

1
Thus, Peter Goldie distinguishes between scientific explanation and prediction, and
another sort of endeavor: “Our thought and talk of emotions is embedded in an inter-
pretative (and sometimes predictive) narrative which aims to make sense of aspects of
someone’s life. These concepts give us, so to speak, the equipment with which to under-
stand, explain and predict what people think, feel, and do: a personal and thoroughly
normative approach” (2000: 103). Also see Roberts 2003, chap. 1 for the claim that
conceptual analysis and scientific methods are complementary because they address
different aspects of emotions.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/6/2016, SPi

EMOTION AND PERCEPTION 

The main reason for the lack of agreement in emotion theory is that
emotions form a particularly intricate territory. A first source of com-
plication is that emotional, and more generally affective, phenomena are
varied. Episodes of emotions, such as someone’s fright when suddenly
confronted with a huge dog, are commonly distinguished from disposi-
tions to undergo emotional experiences, such as the fear of dogs a child
might have.2 In contrast with the latter, the former has the form of an
episode, which is typically experienced consciously over a certain time,
and which has an end and a beginning.
Emotional dispositions further divide into different kinds. Arachno-
phobia is an example of an emotional disposition, but so is irascibility
and hostility. A disposition like spider phobia concerns a specific type
of object and can last for years. By contrast, dispositions like irascibility
or hostility need not be focused on a particular type of object. Moreover,
though such dispositions can be short-lived—your irascibility can dis-
appear as soon as you have had your breakfast, for instance—they are
often more deeply ingrained. There seems to be a continuum here
between passing emotional dispositions and more permanent disposi-
tions, which are more closely related to the character of persons than
passing emotional dispositions.
Following the lead of most philosophers and psychologists, I shall
mainly focus on episodes of emotions, which for the sake of simplicity
I will simply call “emotions.” In contrast with many, however, I will not
assume that such episodes are always short-lived. Emotions sometimes
last for days, months, and maybe even years. Think of a child who lives
in constant fear of bomb shells. It could be claimed that the child
undergoes a series of consecutive fear experiences, but this description
fails to account for the fact that the tenseness and readiness characteristic
of the fear persists over time and even during sleep.3

2
See for instance Pitcher 1965: 331–2; Lyons 1980: 142; Mulligan 1998: 163; Deonna and
Teroni 2012: 8.
3
This appears to correspond to a common understanding of emotions. As Nico Frijda
remarks, when people are asked to describe one of their recent emotional incidents, more
than 50 percent describe episodes lasting more than an hour and 22 percent describe
episodes longer than twenty-four hours. His studies show that these people have a sense of
continuity of their experience; they perceive the episodes as wholes (see Frijda 1994: 62). See
also Goldie 2000 for the distinction between emotions and episodes of emotional experience,
where the former are claimed to be more enduring and more complex than the latter.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/6/2016, SPi

 EMOTION AND PERCEPTION

A further point to note here is that we use a number of terms and

locutions to refer to affective phenomena: “moods,” “sentiments,” “passions,”
“feelings,” “commotion,” etc. So, the question arises whether these terms
refer to different kinds of affective phenomena. One distinction which is
commonly made is that between emotions and moods.4 Being gloomy,
depressed, grumpy, but also joyful or elated, count as moods.5 Whereas
emotions are taken to involve intentional objects, in the sense that
they are directed at something, moods are often supposed to have no
intentional objects.6 You are afraid of a dog or proud of your new bicycle,
but when you are gloomy or joyful, there appears to be nothing particular
that your mood is directed at. According to others, however, moods
do have intentional objects, but these objects are less specific than those
of emotions.7 In contrast with an episode of fear that is directed at a
particular dog, the mood of anxiety would be directed at the whole world
and the general threat that it is seen to pose. Alternatively, moods can be
thought to concern evaluative possibilities and their likelihood. When
you are in an irritable mood, for instance, it would seem to you that it is
likely that people will behave offensively.8 This is a plausible view, but
I shall not argue for it. The strategy I shall adopt in this book is to focus
on paradigmatic cases of emotions, such as fear and disgust, leaving it an
open question whether what is true of these cases also applies to moods.
Some distinguish emotions and moods from yet another class of
affective phenomena, which they call “sentiments.” In ordinary language,
this term is not very well-defined. We often speak of sentiments of
love and of horror, but also of religious sentiments, of patriotic, and of
racist sentiments. We also use the term to refer to mere opinions, as
when we say that we share a sentiment about a certain question. When
psychologists and philosophers use the term, what they usually have in
mind are complex dispositions to react affectively to certain objects or
kinds of objects.9 Moral sentiments are thus often taken to be disposi-
tions to undergo a range of emotions, such as guilt if one has committed

4
See for instance Griffiths 1997: chap. 10; Prinz 2004: 182–8; Deonna and Teroni 2012: 9.
5
Moods seem related to temperaments, which can be thought of as tendencies to
undergo moods. See Deonna and Teroni 2012: 105–6.
6
See for instance Elster 1999: 272.
7
See Lazarus 1991: 48; Goldie 2000: 143; Prinz 2004: 185.
8
See Price 2006; Tappolet forthcoming.
9
See Frijda 1994: 64–5; Lazarus 1994: 80; Prinz 2007: 84; Deonna and Teroni 2012: 8.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/6/2016, SPi

EMOTION AND PERCEPTION 

something deemed morally dubious, and indignation if the deed is

someone else’s. These are interesting phenomena, but again my strategy
here is to mainly focus on emotions.
This brings me to a second source of complication. Emotions are
usually taken to be of different kinds. If we take ordinary language as
our guide, there appears to be a huge variety of different kinds of emotions.
In English, we can, it would seem, distinguish between fear, fright, scare,
dread, horror, panic, terror, anger, irritation, annoyance, indignation,
outrage, fury, rage, loathing, envy, jealousy, disgust, repugnance, abhor-
rence, repulsion, surprise, aversion, attraction, shame, pride, contempt,
admiration, disdain, respect, sadness, unhappiness, grief, sorrow, re-
signation, regret, remorse, guilt, embarrassment, resentment, gratitude,
contentment, happiness, joy, delight, rapture, relief, excitement, serenity,
respect, love, pity, compassion, wonder, awe, hope, boredom, interest, and
amusement, among others. This list is already long, but it becomes even
longer if we take into account distinctions from other cultures, such as the
Japanese amae, a pleasurable feeling of dependency (Doi 1973; Morsbach
and Tyler 1986), the Chinese pa-leng, a fear of cold,10 or song, a feeling of
admonition with moralistic overtones but no disposition to revenge, to
name just a few examples (Lutz 1988; Wierzbicka 1999). Whether such
a list resists scrutiny or whether, as seems plausible, a tidier and signifi-
cantly shorter list should replace it, it is important to keep in mind that
what appears to be true of one kind of emotion is not necessarily true of
others. Consider the relation between emotion and attention, for instance.
It is plausible that when one experiences fear, attention is focused on
what one is afraid of. But emotions such as joy or boredom appear to
have a very different influence on attention. When you are bored at a
concert, your attention drifts away from the music as you start thinking
about some philosophical puzzle, say. As experimental work suggests, joy
and more generally positive affective states come with a widening of
attentional focus.11 Another striking example of the differences between
kinds of emotions is that a number of emotions have a fiery, passionate

10
Thanks to Jingsong Ma for information on this emotion. According to her, it is not
clear that pa-leng is a morbid fear of the cold, associated with a yin/yang imbalance (but see
Prinz 2004: 135 and Kleinman 1980).
11
See Fredrickson 1998: 307. More generally, on the interaction between emotions and
attention, see de Sousa 1987: 195–6; Damasio 1994: 197–8; Derryberry and Tucker 1994;
Faucher and Tappolet 2002; Brady 2013: 20–3, 2014.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/6/2016, SPi

 EMOTION AND PERCEPTION

quality. Think of a burst of anger or the pangs of guilt. But you can also be
surreptitiously amused by a private joke or feel quiet contentment
while sharing a meal with a friend. Hence, it would be wrong to consider
the fiery cases to be paradigmatic of all emotions. As Hume would have
expressed it, one should not forget the calm passions.12
As many have stressed, kinds of emotions appear also to differ with
respect to their relation to thoughts. To be proud of having climbed a
mountain, for instance, you need to be able to form the thought that you
climbed that mountain. But it does not seem necessary to entertain any
thoughts to be afraid of a loud noise; it is sufficient to hear it. More
generally, psychologists and philosophers have distinguished between
“basic” emotions and “higher cognitive” emotions.13 There are different
ways to spell out this distinction, and each comes with different lists of
basic emotions.14 The core idea that is conveyed by the notion of basic
emotions is that one has to distinguish buildings blocks, such as the
elementary molecules found in chemistry, to account for more complex
phenomena. In the recent literature, a common suggestion is that basic
emotions are innate and pan-culturally shared, whereas higher cognitive
emotions, such as indignation or envy, are culturally variable because they
depend on the availability of culturally embedded concepts and thoughts.
Given this great diversity, the question arises whether all the things
that are commonly considered to be emotions really form a useful and
unified category. Indeed, Amélie Rorty (1978), and later Paul Griffiths
(1997), have argued that they do not. What they claim, more precisely, is
that emotions do not constitute a natural kind. Often captured by the
phrase “nature must be carved at its joints,” natural kind discourse
supposes that nature is divided into real, naturally occurring entities
that scientific concepts and classifications purport to match. Natural
kinds are supposed to have unifying features that are independent of

12
See Treatise, II. 3. iii.
13
See for instance Ekman 1972; Plutchik 1980; Cosmides and Tooby 2000; Griffiths
1997; Panksepp 2000; D’Arms and Jacobson 2003.
14
Ekman’s initial list is fear, anger, happiness, sadness, surprise, and disgust (Ekman
1972). Later on Ekman proposed a list of fifteen basic emotions: amusement, anger,
contempt, contentment, disgust, embarrassment, excitement, fear, guilt, pride in achieve-
ment, relief, sadness, satisfaction, sensory pleasure, and shame (Ekman 1999). D’Arms and
Jacobson (2003) propose the following list of what they call “natural emotions,” as opposed
to “cognitive sharpening”: amusement, anger, contempt, disgust, embarrassment, envy,
fear, guilt, jealousy, joy, pity, pride, shame, and sorrow.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/6/2016, SPi

EMOTION AND PERCEPTION 

categories imposed on them by observers. In this way, they contrast

with arbitrary collections of objects (e.g., the contents of dustbins) or
groupings that depend on human choice or interest (e.g., a collection of
jewels). More generally, natural kind terms such as “gold,” “water,” and
“tiger” denote types of naturally occurring stuffs and things, but they are
also essential to theories in so far as the function of natural kind terms is
to allow for inductive inferences and generalizations.
Now, it might well be the case that whether or not emotions form a
natural kind is in the last instance up to the scientists to settle. In light of
this, it is surely revealing that as of now, the suggestion to abandon the
category of emotions appears to have fallen on deaf ears. More import-
antly, however, there are reasons to believe that the concept of emotion
corresponds to a useful and sufficiently unified category, whether or not
it corresponds to a natural kind.15 In particular, it is far from evident that
basic emotions are essentially different from higher cognitive emotions.
First, emotions that are considered to be basic emotions can involve
higher cognitive states, such as when you fear that it might rain tomor-
row. Second, even if we suppose that some emotions depend on higher
cognitive capacities, such emotions might well share enough features
with basic emotions to justify the claim that emotions form a unified
category. It is thus reasonable to assume as least provisionally that the
general category of emotions is one that makes sense. Moreover, in view
of the wide variety of putative emotion kinds, the strategy I adopt is to
mainly focus on paradigmatic cases of emotion kinds, such as fear,
disgust, and admiration.
A third source of complication is that emotions appear to be complex.
Consider a typical episode of fear. You are strolling down a lonely
mountain lane when suddenly a huge dog leaps towards you. Intense
fear overcomes you. A number of different interconnected elements are
involved here. First, there is the visual and auditory perception of the
animal and its movements. In addition, it is likely that, however implicitly
and inarticulately, you appraise the situation as acutely threatening. Then,
there are a number of physiological changes, involving different systems
controlled by the autonomic nervous system. Your heart is pounding,
your breathing becomes strained, and you start trembling. These changes

15
See Goldie 2000: 103; Roberts 2003: 14–36; Prinz 2004: 81–6; Deonna and Teroni
2012: 25–6.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/6/2016, SPi

 EMOTION AND PERCEPTION

are accompanied by an expression of fear on your face: your mouth opens

and your eyes widen as you stare at the dog. You also undergo a kind of
experience, such as the feeling of a pang. Moreover, a number of thoughts
are likely to cross your mind. You might think that you’ll never escape and
that the dog is about to tear you to pieces. In addition, your attention
focuses on the animal and its movements, as well as, possibly, on ways of
escaping or of defending yourself. Accordingly, your fear is likely to come
with a motivation, such as an urge to run away or to strike back.
Whatever the details of the story, it is clear that a typical episode of
fear involves a number of different components. These components are
a) a sensory experience or more generally an informational component,
b) a kind of appraisal, c) physiological changes, d) facial expressions,
e) characteristic feelings, f) cognitive and attentional processes, and
g) an action-tendency or some other kind of motivational component.
One central question in the theory of emotion is which, if any, of these
components constitute(s) the emotion. For instance, is the fear you
undergo a feeling, a thought, or an action-tendency? Alternatively, does
it involve several or maybe all of the components on the list? What can
we subtract without losing the emotion of fear? In other words, the
question is what components are essential to fear.
More generally, emotion theorists have tried to determine what, if
any, are the essential components of emotions, regardless of the kind
of emotion under consideration.16 Very different answers are proposed
in the literature. In the next section, I will briefly sketch the main
theoretical options.17

1.2 Theories of Emotion

Theories of emotion often proceed by assimilating emotions to different,
and supposedly better understood, kinds of mental states.18 When doing

16
This is what Prinz calls “the problem of parts” (2004: 4).
17
A theory that I will not discuss here is social constructionism (see Averill 1980, 1985;
Armon-Jones 1986; Russell 2003, 2008). For an excellent book-length discussion of
emotions theories, see Deonna and Teroni 2012.
18
But see de Sousa 1987 and Goldie 2000 for the claim that emotions are sui generis
states. Note however that according to de Sousa the analogy with perception is nonetheless
important. He speaks of emotions as “apprehensions” of values. In a later text, de Sousa
claims that some emotions “are plausibly characterized as perceptions of values” (2002:
255). See also de Sousa 2011: 20–1; 36–7.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/6/2016, SPi

EMOTION AND PERCEPTION 

so, the theories generally focus on one or the other components involved
in a typical emotion episode.19 According to one view, emotions are
kinds of feelings (James 1884; Lange 1885; Whiting 2006). William James
thus claimed that fear is the feeling that corresponds to certain physio-
logical changes, such as the racing of the heart, which are caused by the
perception of something dangerous. Another view is that emotions are
conative states, such as desires or action-tendencies (Frijda 1986;
Scarantino 2015).20 Conative states can have propositional content—
one can desire that it rain—and satisfaction conditions—the desire that
it rain is satisfied when it rains—but it is usually assumed that conative
states lack correctness conditions. In terms of the direction of fit, cona-
tive states have a world to mind direction of fit, in the sense that the
world has to change in order to fit what is desired.21 Cognitive states have
the opposite direction of fit: it is the mind that has to try to match the
world. In contrast with Conative Theories, Cognitive Theories claim that
emotions are partly or wholly constituted by cognitive states. This is
often taken to mean that emotions are kinds of judgments (Solomon
1976; Nussbaum 2001), or thoughts (Greenspan 1988), or else, con-
struals (Roberts 1988, 2003; Armon-Jones 1991). However, Cognitive
Theories can also be spelled out in terms of representational content that
is not conceptually articulated.22 This is the kind of cognitive account
proposed by those who adopt the Perceptual Theory, according to which
emotions are a kind of perception.23

19
Another possibility is to opt for hybrid views. For instance, according to a view that
used to be popular, emotions are desire-belief pairs (Gordon 1974; Marks 1982; Searle 1983;
Green 1992). For critical discussion of hybrid views, see Goldie 2000: chap. 3 and Deonna
and Teroni 2012: chaps 3 and 5.
20
In so far as the Attitudinal Theory defended by Deonna and Teroni (2012: chap. 7,
esp. 79–80; 2014: 25–9) claims that emotions are felt bodily attitudes, which have to be
understood in terms of felt action readiness, it is plausibly interpreted as a conative theory.
For a critical discussion, see Dokic and Lemaire 2015.
21
For the notion of direction of fit, see Searle 1983.
22
See Lacewing 2004: 176 for this broad use of the concept of cognition.
23
See Meinong 1917; de Sousa 1987, 2002, 2011; Tappolet 1995, 2000a; Charland 1995,
1997; Elgin 1996, 2008; Stocker 1996; Johnston 2001; Döring 2003, 2007, 2008; Zagzebski
2003, 2004; Prinz 2004, 2008; Deonna 2006; Tye 2006, 2008; Betzler 2009; Wringe 2015. In
so far as Roberts claims that construals are reminiscent of sense perception and that they
need not be propositional, he might be considered to defend a perceptual theory (2003: 75;
see also Roberts 2013: chap. 3). Goldie (2000) is sometimes interpreted as defending a
Perceptual Theory, but even though his account of emotion underlines the analogies
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/6/2016, SPi

 EMOTION AND PERCEPTION

Before I spell out the argument for the Perceptual Theory, it will be
useful to examine the limitations of the other theoretical options. Let me
start with Feeling Theories. As we saw in the fear example, emotions
typically involve feelings. Thus, an account that focuses on the experi-
ential aspect of emotions has initial plausibility. But Feeling Theories also
raise difficult questions.
First, the nature of the feelings at stake is hard to pin down. Are they
sui generis feelings (Stocker 1983) or are they bodily feelings (James 1884;
Lange 1885)? Another difficult question is whether emotions necessarily
involve feelings. According to some, such as Martha Nussbaum (2001: 62),
one of the main problems with Feeling Theories is that some emotions
lack feelings. This is a moot point, however. Given that paradigmatic
cases of emotions come with feelings, one might well claim that alleged
cases of emotions involving no feeling, such as an angel’s purely intel-
lectual admiration, say, should not count as genuine emotions. More-
over, most cases of emotions that are claimed to be unconscious and
would thus lack feelings appear to be cases in which the feelings are
involved but not attended to, or not conceptualized as corresponding to
an emotion. Thus you can be angry at your partner without realizing that
you are, only becoming aware of your feelings when a friend enlightens
you.24 In light of this, it might well make sense to consider only states
that involve feelings to be genuine emotions. A further criticism of
Feeling Theories is that such theories are not in a position to account
for the demarcation between different kinds of emotions that are ordin-
arily distinguished.25 Thus, it is far from clear that indignation and
discontent can be differentiated only on the basis of the feelings they
involve.26 In a similar way, it appears difficult to distinguish regret and
shame only on the basis of felt bodily changes. Again, this criticism is not
decisive. There might be more to the phenomenology and especially to
the physiology of emotions than these cursory observations suggest.
A first decisive objection to the Feeling Theories is that such theories
cannot make room for the fact that emotions are assessable in terms of

between emotions and sensory experiences, he in fact advocates that emotions are sui
generis states.
24
See Goldie 2000: 62–72; Dainton 2000: chap. 2; Hatzimoysis 2007; Lacewing 2007;
Deonna and Teroni 2012: 16–18.
25
See Cannon 1929: 352; Bedford 1957: 282–3; Alston 1967: 482; Green 1992: 32.
26
See Bedford 1957: 282–3.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/6/2016, SPi

EMOTION AND PERCEPTION 

how they fit the world. My fear can be appropriate or not, depending on

whether what I am afraid of is fearsome, that is, depending on whether it
calls for fear.27 But feelings, such as an itch or a headache, are not things
that can be assessed in terms of how they fit the world. That emotions
can be thus assessed is intimately related to the fact that emotions have
intentional objects. So, it is no surprise that a second decisive objection
to Feeling Theories is that this theory fails to make room for the
intentionality of emotions.28 When you experience fear when confronted
with a dog, your emotion is about the dog. By contrast, your itch or your
headache is not about anything. One might reply that this objection
falsely assumes that such states lack representational content, whereas in
fact, itches and headaches have correctness conditions: they represent
bodily states (Tye 1995; Matthen 2005). But this will not do either, for it
seems unlikely that emotions represent bodily states. Typically, the
assessment of emotions depends on external states of affairs.
Let me now turn to Conative Theories. It is widely believed that
emotions are tied to motivation. As made clear in the fear example
I gave, an emotion like fear typically comes with an action-tendency,
such as the tendency to run away or to strike back. But, here again, a
number of difficult questions arise. What exactly is the nature of the
motivational component? Is it a behavioral disposition? Is it a desire?
And is such a motivational component necessarily present? I will return
to these questions in Chapter 2, but what can already be noted is that it is
far from obvious that emotions necessarily come with motivation. Con-
sider admiration, for instance. If you admire an alpine landscape, say,
you might be tempted to look at it or go for a hike, but surely no
motivation at all needs to be involved. As I will argue, even an emotion
such as fear need not come with a motivation.

27
See Brentano 1889: 11; Scheler 1913–6: 263; Meinong 1917: 129–31; Broad 1954: 293;
Bedford 1957: 295–6; Hall 1961: chap. 12; Warnock 1957: 52; Pitcher 1965: 329 sqq.; de
Sousa 1978: 686; 1987: 122; Lyons 1980: 8; Wiggins 1987: 187; Greenspan 1988: 83; Gibbard
1990: 7 and 277; Armon-Jones 1991: 135; Mulligan 1995: 76 and 1998; Elster 1999: 312–14.
28
See Bedford 1957; Kenny 1963: 60. For the claim that emotions are intentional, also
see Brentano 1874; Pitcher 1965: 327; Alston 1967: 482; Wilson 1972: chap. 6; Lyons 1980:
104 sqq.; Marks 1982: 228; Gordon 1987: 22; de Sousa 1987: chap. 5; Husserl 1988: 252;
Gaus 1990: 50; Elster 1999: 271–3. Because the “feelings towards” Peter Goldie (2000)
postulates as essential to emotions are intentional, his account is not a Feeling Theory as
specified here.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/6/2016, SPi

 EMOTION AND PERCEPTION

A further problem with Conative Theories is that even though they

can make room for the intentionality of emotions, they fail to account for
the fact that we assess emotions in terms of how they fit the world. Desire
and more generally conative states are taken to have intentional content,
but the direction of fit that is involved is a world-to-mind one; it is the
world which has to change in order to fit what is desired. So, a desire,
indeed even the most foolish desire, cannot be blamed for not matching
how things are. In reply, it might be claimed that desires in fact have
correctness conditions: to desire something involves the representation
of that thing as desirable.29 A first point to note here is that following
this suggestion would essentially amount to adopting a Cognitive
Theory, according to which an emotion is accurate in so far as its object
is desirable. The main point, however, is that the envisaged account
would be quite unconvincing. This is so because all emotions would
have the same type of content, i.e., that something is desirable. And in
view of the variety of emotions this claim appears much too coarse-
grained. When we assess an emotion like amusement, what we check is
whether its object is amusing, not whether it is desirable. Negative
emotions pose an even more acute problem, for surely what we fear is
not represented as desirable. One might reply that escaping from the
object of the emotion is represented as desirable, but then it becomes
difficult to discriminate between fear, embarrassment, and anger. The
moral is that being desirable is thus too general a concept to characterize
the content of specific emotions.30
By contrast, Cognitive Theories of the judgmental sort have no diffi-
culty in accounting both for the intentionality and the assessability of
emotions. Judgmental Theories assimilate emotions to evaluative or
normative beliefs or judgments.31 On the simplest version, to fear some-
thing is simply to judge that the thing is fearsome, to be disgusted by
something is to judge that the thing is disgusting, to admire something is
to judge that the thing is admirable, and so forth for each emotion kind.
Other Judgmental Theories claim that further ingredients, such as

29 30
See Stampe 1987. See Brady 2013: 32.
31
See Solomon 1976; Lyons 1980; Nussbaum 2001. Psychologists have defended the
same kind of theory under the name of “Appraisal Theory”: see Arnold 1960; Lazarus 1991.
See also the more sophisticated theory in terms of a multiplicity of appraisal dimensions
advocated by Scherer et al. (2001).
Exploring the Variety of Random
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Title: Ihmiskohtalo
Kuvaus tilattoman elämästä

Author: Väinö Kataja

Release date: January 9, 2024 [eBook #72663]

Language: Finnish

Original publication: Helsinki: Otava, 1911

Credits: Juhani Kärkkäinen and Tapio Riikonen

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK

IHMISKOHTALO ***
IHMISKOHTALO

Kuvaus tilattoman elämästä

Kirj.

VÄINÖ KATAJA

Hämeenlinnassa, Arvi A Karisto Oy, 1911.

1.

Illallinen oli syöty nuotion ympärillä, törmäladon luona, ja väki oli

kiivennyt ladon ovesta heiniin nukkumaan. Hyvältä tuoksuvia
maaheiniä oli lato täpösen täynnä, ja hyvä ja lämmin oli siellä
raskaan päivätyön perästä levätä.

Ulkona oli hämyävä elokuun ilta. Päivä oli laskenut pilvettömän

taivaanrannan taakse, ja se oli merkki, että pouta on huomennakin.
Valtaväylältä ja saarien putaista ja vuopioista oli noussut pehmeää
usvaa, joka nuoskeana levisi yli laajan niittymaan, kasteena
laskeutuen heinikoille.
 Hiljainen, rauhallinen ja äänetön yö oli alkanut.

Latonsa edessä istui Törmälän isäntä, harmajapartainen Joonas,

vielä hetkisen sen jälkeen kun muu väki jo oli käynyt nukkumaan.
Piippuaan poltellen hän keräili kekäleenjäännöksiä nuotioon, jolla
illallinen oli keitetty.

Kuuma ja poutainen oli päivä ollut. Heinät olivat kuivuneet

mainiosti, ja monta suovaa oli Törmälänkin väki saanut valmiiksi.
Mutta raskas oli päivä myöskin ollut, sillä paljon oli heiniä luokona ja
kaikki oli ehditty saada kokoihin. Levähtämättä oli pitkä, kesäinen
päivä raadettu.

Hyvä oli vanhan isännän mieli, kun parhaan niityn, tämän

Karjasaaren heinät poutapäivinä tehdyksi saatiin. Hän keräsi vielä
viimeiset kekäleet nuotioon ja sitten silmäili ympärilleen yli laajan
saaren, josta hämyn ja usvan seasta vielä häämöitti latoja ja korkeita
suovia. Jo olivat tulet sammuneet muidenkin latojen luota ja
niittymiehet käyneet nukkumaan…

Nukkuvan tuntuivat Törmälänkin ladossa olijat. Väsymys ja

raukeus tuntui isännänkin jäsenissä. Vanha jo oli ja koko ikänsä
kovaa työtä tehnyt. Ei ollut enää hänessäkään kuin puolet entisestä
miehuudesta, tuskin sitäkään. Ei syntynyt enää suova niinkuin
ennen. Puolen verran entisestä jaksoi enää hangolla suovaan
nostaa, ja tutisemaan pani jo sekin paino sekä kädet että jalat.

— Vaan kummasti jaksaa vielä tuo Samuli, mietti isäntä. —

Nuorempana kun Samuli oli, niin eihän ollut niin joutuisaa eikä
ahkeraa heinäntekijää näillä tienoin toista. Vaan vielä näkyy olevan
täysi mies, nyt tänä päivänä näin, kun hankosi… Mahtaa nyt Samuli-
parkaakin väsyttää; kun vaan siltä sisusvialtaan saisi nukkua
rauhassa…

Viimeisetkin kekäleet olivat palaneet ja alkoivat mustua sitä mukaa

kuin hiillos riutui. Isäntä kopisti piippunsa tyhjäksi ja nousi
seisomaan.

— Huomisaamuna saavatkin levähtää pitempään! tuumaili hän. —

Ei olekaan kiirettä niittämään… vaikka nukkuisivat aamiaiseen asti…
Ja jos poutana pysyy koko päivän, niin hyvissä ajoin ovat koko niityn
heinät koossa, jotta ehditään vielä koreasti kotia kylpemään… onkin
lauantaipäivä…

Hän kiipesi latoon, jossa jo ennen nukkuivat piiat ja renkipoika ja

hänen torpparinsa Samuli Koski eli Koski-Samuli. Piiat olivat
kaivautuneet ladon nurkkaan syvään heinien sisään, mutta
renkipoika retkotti keskellä latoa, lakki kasvoilla. Toisessa
ovinurkassa nukkui Samuli, jonka toinen pieksu näkyi heinäin päällä.
Isäntä kaivoi itselleen makuusijan ladon toiseen ovipieleen, riisui
takkinsa, painoi lakin syvempään päähänsä ja pani maata, takin
kasvojensa yli peitteeksi levittäen.

Pian nukkui hänkin, ja hiljainen hämy-yö hiipi latoon.

Ei minkäänlaista ääntä kuulunut tuosta laajasta joensaaresta,

jossa monen kylän ihmisiä oli heinää tekemässä. Öinen rauha
kaikkialle levisi ja suloinen lepo joka niittymiehen mieleen.
Uneksuvan levollinen ja tyyni oli hämyinen elokuun taivas, jonka
kannelta jo kirkkaana vilkkui jokunen tähti, ensimmäisiä valoisan
kesän perästä ja ikäänkuin hyvästellen mennyttä, lyhyttä valon
aikaa.
 Ja suuri rauha vallitsi kaikkialla, hiljainen lepo ja onni, ikäänkuin
raskaat surut ja vaivat eivät koskaan ihmisten mieliä rasittaisi.

Sakeana usvana oli vielä koko aamuinen maailma, kun Törmälän

ladosta jo kömpi mies ulos. Idän taivaalta kohottihe nouseva aurinko
sakean usvan läpi kuin itkun seasta. Kastehelmissä kimaltelivat
heinikot, ja ilman täytti kuivuneiden heinien lemu ja aamutuoreen
raikas tuoksu.

Jo kuului etempää usvameren keskeltä viikatteiden hiontaa ja

puhelua, mantereen puolelta liikettä taloista ja teiltä. Mutta pian alkoi
usvameri hävitä. Sitä mukaa kuin aurinko kohosi, hälveni usva,
nuoskeana kasteena maahan laskeutuen. Silloin aukeni koko laaja
niitty kuin verhon takaa ja vilkasta liikettä näkyi joka haaralta. Tuolla
niittivät Viinikan väet, neljä roimaa miestä, niin että valkoiset
paidanhihat vilkkuivat ja pitkien, kirkkaiden viikatteiden terät
välkkyivät, kasteisen heinän suhahtaen katketessa.

Törmälän saran vieressä niittivät Riekkolan väet: nuori ja pitkä

mies edellä, kirjava pusero yllä ja musta, julman leveälierinen hattu
päässä. Kaukana hänen jälessään kynsivät piiat, avopäin ja
alushameisillaan, kynsivät kaikin voimin pysyäkseen edelläniittävän
nuoren miehen perässä, ettei väli kovin pitkäksi ehtisi. Mutta turhaan
näyttivät ponnistelevan, sillä väli pitenemistään piteni. Piikojen
jälessä kampaili Riekkolan emäntä tasaisesti ja tähdellisesti ja huusi
joskus piioille, että »niittäkää tarkemmin, pitkiä heinätupsuja jää
pystyyn… elkääkä rimpuilko Ison-Iivarin perään… ette ehdi hänen
matkassaan kuitenkaan…»

Mies, joka Törmälän ladon luota Riekkolan väen niittoa katseli, oli
Koski-Samuli, Törmälän torppari. Hän oli istunut, ladon seinän
viereen, nojasi selkäänsä siihen, käsivarret ristissä vatsan yli, ja
voihki ja valitteli hiljaa. Samuli ei vielä ollut vanha mies, vaikka
vanhalta jo näytti. Pitkä varsi oli jo kumarassa, ja ruumis oli niin
luisevan laiha, että melkein luusolmut paidan ja puseron alta
kyhmyinä kohosivat. Kasvot olivat kalpean laihat ja silmät mustien
renkaiden ympäröimät. Rasittuneelta, kivulloiselta ja surkastuneelta
näytti mies.

Edellisen päivän kova työnteko oli taas saanut vanhan vian ja

kivun virkoamaan. Vatsaa väänteli, rintaa poltti ja koko ruumista
pakotti niin, että tuskin saattoi hengittää. Koko yön oli polttanut ja
särkenyt, hän ei ollut nukkunut kuin iltayöstä hetkisen ja oli herännyt
siihen, että vatsaa väänsi ja rintaa poltteli…

Heinänhankoaminen oli eilen ollut niin rajua, että tämän teki. Ei

hän enää kestänyt niinkuin ennen… Ja heiniä hangotessa se oli ensi
kerran ruvennut tämä polttaminen ja vihlominen tuntumaankin…
siinä oli vika sisälmyksiä, rintaan ja vatsaan tullut… juuri tällä
samalla niityllä… tässä Karjasaaressa… tällä Törmälän saralla…

Siitä oli toistakymmentä vuotta aikaa. Mutta eipä enää parannut

silloin sattunut repeämä… Joka kesä oli tullut huonommaksi, aina
heinän aikana, ja varsinkin uudistui silloin, kun joutui enemmältä
heiniä korkeaan suovaan hankoamaan…

Hän katseli laimein, väsynein silmin Riekkolan saralla niittävää

miestä, Isoa-Iivaria… Noin hänkin niitti ja liehui ensi vuosina, kun
tällä saralla heinää teki, liehui ehkä vielä rajummin kuin Iso-Iivari nyt
tuolla… Mutta silloin ei polttanut sisälmyksiä eikä vihlonut rintaa…

Kipu tuntui kuitenkin vähän helpottavan, ja hän alkoi hommata

tulta entiseen paikkaan. Ennen oli aina kipu lieventynyt, kun tulen
loisteessa lämmitteli rintaa ja vatsaa. Niin hän nytkin toivoi, ja
saatuaan pilkotut puut iloiseen liekkiin hän alkoi paistatella itseään.
Siitä tuntui nytkin tulevan kivuille lievennystä, ja helpotuksen
huokaus nousi hänen rinnastaan.

— Jaksaisi vielä tämän päivän, tuumaili hän itsekseen. — Ei olisi

tänä päivänä enää niin paljon heiniä hangottavanakaan kuin eilen…
hyvään aikaan jouduttaisiin kotia, ja lauantai kun on, olisi kylpy illalla,
ja huomenna saisi levähtää koko päivän…

Kuta likempänä loistetta hän rohkeni olla, sitä enemmän kivut

hellittivät, ja hän höpisi jo itsekseen, ohuitten huulien mennessä
hymyn irveen:

— Taitaapa tästä sentään vielä miestyä!

Silloin isäntäkin ilmestyi ladosta, pusero ja harmaja parta heinän

pelmuissa, haukotellen ja taivaalle katsellen.

»Joko sitä Samulia taas vanha vika alkoi haitata?» sanoi hän, kun
Samulin näki paistelemassa rintaansa. »Taisi eilinen hankoaminen
tehdä pahaa… Sinä yrität liian ruttoon… pitäisi sinun säästää itseäsi,
ennenkuin miehuus kokonaan loppuu…»

»Olisi pitänyt nuorempana säästää», virkkoi siihen Samuli kuin

toivottomalla äänellä.

Siihen ei Törmälä heti vastannut. Hän katseli Samulia melkein

ilmeettömin, vielä unisin silmin ja alkoi hommata piippuunsa.

»Tuolla piika-Maijalla taitaa olla matkassa hokmannia… Olisi

herättää
Maija ja pyytää tilkkanen», esitteli hän.
 »Ei siitä ole hokmannistakaan ollut enää näinä vuosina apua»,
sanoi
Samuli siihen ja lisäsi sitten peittäessään rintansa:

»Tuosta loisteessa paistamisesta se tuntuu paras apu olevan.»

»No eipä olekaan nyt vielä kiirettä työhön… vasta aamiaiselta

alamme… kun kastekin ehtii heinästä lähteä», lohdutteli isäntä.

Ja haukoteltuaan vielä ja sytytettyään piippunsa hän silmäili

ympärilleen, missä joka haaralla vilkkui niittymiehiä, kuului
hauskaäänistä viikatteiden hiontaa ja jostakin etempää joelta
rallatuksia.

»Taitaapa pysyä poutana vielä tämänkin päivän… ja se nyt ensiksi

meillekin riittäisi», sanoi hän sitten, käveli ladon ovelle ja alkoi
huudella piikoja hereille:

»Nouseppa, Maija, sieltä kahvin keittoon ja hommailemaan

aamiaista!»

Sitten hän hiljaisemmalla äänellä puhui Samulille:

»Otetaanpa aamusta päivä talteen, niin pääsemme ennen

auringonlaskua jo kotia saunomaan.»

Hetken kuluttua kähmivät piiatkin ulos ladon eteen. Unisina olivat

vieläkin, silmät puoliummessa; massotellen ja vähäpuheisina
rupesivat ensin epäjärjestykseen joutunutta pukuaan tasailemaan.

Poutainen ja kuuma oli koko lauantaipäivä. Ja kiire oli joka talon

niityllä, sillä kunkin talon väki koetti panna kaiken kuntonsa liikkeelle
ehtiäkseen illaksi kotia.

Lännen vaarain lakia jo aurinko kosketteli, ennenkuin Törmälän

väki sai kaikki heinät suoviin. Liikkeellä olivat olleet ja ahkeroina
koko päivän, mutta tarkkaan otti työ päivän sittenkin. Samuli oli ollut
kaiken aikaa huonosti voipa. Ei ollut saanut syödyksikään kuin
päivällisen aikana hiukkasen, ja senkin vähän oli oksentanut
takaisin. Mutta merkillisesti oli sittenkin jaksanut liehua.

Mutta kun kaikki työ oli saatu loppumaan ja lähtökahvit vielä

törmäladon luona juotu, ruvettiin hommaamaan kotimatkaa.
Laulellen ja hyvillä mielin nyt piiatkin kantoivat eväänjäännöksiä
suureen kolmilaita-niittyveneeseen, joka oli ollut viikon päivät
Loueputaan rannassa. Siihen pyttyjä ja leilejä toivat, tyhjiä laukkuja,
ja keskelle venettä kumolleen asettivat leveäjalkaisen, nokisen
padan ja sen alle vielä nokisemman kahvipannun Isäntä ja Samuli
sillä aikaa irroittivat viikatteita varsistaan ja kokoilivat muita työaseita
venevalkamaan.

Ja niin siitä joutuivat lähtemään. Vene työnnettiin vesille

syvävetiseen, korkearantaiseen, mutta laimeavirtaiseen
Loueputaaseen, joka koukeroisena halkoi laajan Karjasaaren eri
osiin.

Samuli asettui etukeulaan sauvomaan ja isäntä peräkeulaan. Piiat

laittoivat istumapaikat keskelle venettä, mutta renkipoika istui
perään. Sillä sellainen oli niittymiesten laki, että niitylle mennessä tuli
naisten soutaa myötävirralle ja miehet saivat jutella puheitaan ja
tupakoida, mutta palatessa tuli miesten sauvoa vastavirtaa ja naiset
saivat vuorostaan joutilaina köllötellä.
 Ja pitkin Loueputaan rantoja näkyi niittyveneitä ja niittymiehiä,
jotka valmistausivat kotia lähtemään. Mutta muutamilla saroilla vielä
hangottiin heiniä korkeisiin suoviin tai työnnettiin latojen aukoista
sisälle.

Tasaisesti ja verkalleen sauvoivat Törmälä ja Samuli, ja vene solui

hiljaista vauhtia pitkin putaan tyventä, kirkasta pintaa. Hyvänä oli
kaikkien mieli, sillä raskain ja etäisin niitty oli nyt tehty ja suotuisat
ilmat olivat työtä jouduttaneet. Ja Törmälän talossa olikin nyt, kun
Karjasaari oli koossa, heinätyö loppunut. Tuntui suloiselta mielessä,
kun tiesi, että raskas heinänteko nyt tälle kerralle oli päättynyt,
vaikka ruumista raukaisikin ja painava uupumus jäseniä pakotti.

Kun saavuttiin Loueputaan suuhun, aukeni leveä joen uoma ja

suuria kyliä tuli näkyviin kummaltakin rannalta, niittyjä näkyi yhä vielä
edessäkin päin, mutta laaja Karjasaari putaineen alkoi jäädä taakse.

»Poutainen on ollut tänä kesänä heinäaika ja varsinkin tämä

viikko», arveli Törmälä peräkeulasta, kun Loueputaasta pullahtivat
valtaväylälle.

»Onpa se ollut», vastaili Samuli, »eipä niitä ole minun muistooni

jäänyt monta näin hyvää kesänkulkua kuin tämä…»

»Monesko kesä jo ollee, jona Samuli on Karjasaaressa ollut? Eikö

alkane jo lähennellä kahtakymmentä?» alkoi isäntä muistella.

»Kolmaskolmatta kesä tämä on», sanoi siihen Samuli. »Silloin olin

ensi kertaa, kun sitten syksyn tullen Varpumäkeen tulin asumaan.
Siitä muistan.»
 »Niin kuluu aika… Vai on siitä jo niin kauan… Ja niinhän todella
onkin, kun minäkin oikein alan muistella.»

He olivat jo tasaisesti sauvoen päässeet valtaväylälle ja pyrkineet

likelle rantaa, jossa virta ei tuntunut niin väkevältä kuin ulompana
joella.

Matalalle oli jo laskenut aurinko, veripunaisena pallona vielä

viivähti vaarojen lakien päällä, mutta alkoi vähitellen upota niiden
taakse. Vaaleaa hämyä ympärilleen hajoitellen alkoivat
taivaanrannat tummua sitä mukaa kuin aurinko uppoamistaan
upposi. Lauhan näköisiä olivat korkeiden vaarojen puuttomat,
harmaansinertävät huiput, ja ilman henki vastasi lämpimältä
poskipäihin.

»Jo nyt ohra kypsyy tämmöisinä päivinä ja tämmöisinä… näin

lämpöisinä öinä», virkkoi Törmälä.

»Ei ole hallasta nyt pelkoa… tänä syksynä…»

»Kai sitä ensi viikolla, jos eletään, jo leikkuu alotetaan…»

Niin jutellen Törmälän väki hiljainen kulki kotiin päin.

Mutta heidän jälessään sauvoi monta niittyvenettä. Vihaista

vauhtia ne likenemistään likenivät, sillä nuoria, notkeita miehiä näkyi
olevan sauvomassa. Sieltä kuului lauluakin ja nauravaa puhelua,
joka tyynenä, kirkkaana iltana kantoi kauas. Pian jälessätulevat
saavuttivatkin Törmälän veneen ja sauvoivat samaa vauhtia ohi.
Mutta laulu ja puhelu lakkasi, kun tunsivat Törmälän vanhan
isännän, joka oli herännyt mies eikä suvainnut loilotuksia. Vasta kun
olivat ehtineet kauas edelle, alkoivat taas laulaa ja rallattaa.
Törmälän piikainkin teki mieli rallatella, mutta kun isäntä oli
veneessä, eivät uskaltaneet.

»Noillapa on kiire», sanoivat piiat kuitenkin, kun edellä menevät jo

katosivat kivisen jokiniemen taakse.

»On se noussut tämäkin vene joskus hyvinkin pian Karjasaaresta

Törmälän rantaan», virkkoi piikojen puheeseen Samuli.

»Vaan silloin olivatkin nuoremmat miehet sauvomassa», arveli

Törmäläkin. »Nyt meitä on… Samulikin sairas mies, ja mitä minusta
enää seitsemänkymmenen ikäisestä ukosta… Ja mikäpä tässä
kiireenä…
Saunaan ehdimme hyvissä ajoin.»

Ja rykäistyään puheli hän vielä:

»Tuskin noidenkaan sauvojien työnteko on niin ruttoon käypää

kuin on heidän sauvomisensa… Niinpä arvelen…»

»Eivät ne niitylle mennessä näkyneet kiirettä pitävän», virkkoi

Samuli.

Törmälä naurahti ja puheli lisää:

»Me olemme tällä viikolla tehneet lujasti työtä, ja kiitokset minä

annan teille kaikille… On sillä samalla niityllä mennyt paremmalla ja
lukuisammallakin joukolla enemmän aikaa kuin meillä nyt, ja
poutailmat ovat silloinkin olleet… Minä sen tiedän, joka
kuudettakymmenettä vuotta olen Karjasaaren sarkaa tehnyt…»

Törmälä ei juuri koskaan kiitellyt väkensä työntekoa, mutta sitä

paremmalta tuntui nyt Samulista ja piioista isännän kiitos.
 Ja näytti kuin olisi venekin saanut osansa, sillä vauhti alkoi enetä.
Samuli näkyikin heiluttelevan sauvointa aika kiireesti, ja notkeammin
liikkui vanha Törmäläkin.

Niemen takaa tuli kotikylä näkyviin viettävältä joen törmältä.

Hämyn seasta häämöittivät rakennukset mustina ja totisina, eikä
vielä valoja näkynyt yhdestäkään talosta. Mutta joelle tuli jo vastaan
ihana savun haju lämpiävistä saunoista ja tuoksahti veresten vihtain
miellyttävä lemu.

Törmälän talo oli keskikylällä, vähän loitompana jokirannasta kuin

muut talot, ja venevalkama oli kivinen, mutta syvä.

Viimeiset syltäkymmenet kulki vene jo semmoista vauhtia, että

vesi molemmin puolin vaahtosi. Samuliin oli tarttunut entinen
sauvomainto, ja hän työnsi niin että piiat keskiveneessä
notkahtelivat, kun hän sauvoimen vetäisi virrasta.

Pian saapuivatkin kotirantaan.

Piiat lähtivät laulellen nousemaan pihaan, mutta miehet jäivät

veneestä kapineita maalle nostamaan.

2.

Nuorena, naimattomana miehenä hän oli kylään tullut.

Tukkilaisten joukossa oli etelän puolesta noussut ylös Lappiin asti

ja siellä kevättulvan aikana tukkeja uittanut olkajokia pitkin suureen
valtasuoneen. Notkea oli varsi, rohkea mieli, ja taitava oli tukkipoika.
Oli ollut liiankin rohkea. Kun koskissa ruuhkasi eivätkä muut
uskaltaneet mennä ruuhkaa purkamaan, oli hän aina valmis. Mutta jo
ensi matkalla sai niin monta kylpyä kevätkylmässä jäävedessä, että
öisin oli paleltua sammuvan nuotion viereen.

Sieltä kai ne olivat jäseniin ensimmäiset kylmyydet nousseet,

hyhmäisistä kirsivesistä ja hallaa huokuvilta korpimailta, missä yöt
sai nuotiolla värjöttää.

Verkalleen Samuli käveli mökkiään kohti elämänsä kulkua

miettien. Hän oli vielä kylvynkin jälkeen hetkisen aikaa istunut pirtin
penkillä ennenkuin läksi kotiaan.

Tänä kesänä oli hän monta kertaa tavannut itsensä miettimässä

kulunutta elämäänsä ja tulevia päiviään kuvittelemassa. Ja varsinkin
silloin ne aina mieleen johtuivat, kun tunsi kipujen ruumista
raatelevan, ja iltaisin, kun oikein raskas väsymys koko olemusta
vaivasi ankaran päivätyön jälkeen.

Kun kaiken voimansa pani liikkeelle ja yritti niin, että oli läkähtyä,
ja aina vain muiden hyväksi, silloin ne tulivat nämä huolet ja
surulliset ajatukset. Eivät ennen nuorempana rasittaneet, mutta kuta
vanhemmaksi tuli ja kun kipujen tunsi vuosi vuodelta enenevän ja
voimien vähenevän, sitä enemmän pani miettimään.

Niinkuin nytkin.

Ei hänellä nuorenakaan ollut sellaista kulkurin henkeä kuin

monella muulla tukkilaisella. Ja maatyö häntä enemmän miellyttikin.

Hän muisti kuin tämän illan, kun lauttoineen tämän kylän ohi olivat
menossa. Ottivat lautat maihin tuohon Törmälän rantaan, ja taloon
nousivat miehet. Nyt siitä oli jo kolmaskolmatta kesä kulumassa.
Heinänteon aika oli.

Hän antausi keskusteluihin isännän kanssa, tämän Törmälän.

Isäntä pyysi häntä heinäntekijäksi, kun kuuli, että hän oli siihen
tottunut. Häntä oli aina tämä kylä miellyttänyt sivu kulkiessa, ja kun
talossa tarjottiin melkoisen hyvää palkkaa, jäi hän niittomieheksi, ja
silloin jäivät tukkihommat ikipäiviksi.

Sillä siitä asti oli hän Törmälässä ollut, ei tosin vuosirenkinä, mutta
kesät talvet talon töitä tehden, milloin urakalla, milloin päiväläisenä.

Niin oli aika sitten lähtenyt kulumaan, ja seuraavana talvena hän jo

nai Tikan Liisan, joka siihen aikaan oli karjakkona Törmälässä.
Törmälä antoi silloin tuon torpan, Varpumäen, jossa ei ollut muuta
kuin pirtin kehä. Sisustetuksi oli pirtin saanut ja palasen peltoa pirtin
ympärille, mutta muuta ei.

Niin olivat nämä vuodet menneet, ja kaikki mitä ansaitsi kului

jokapäiväisessä elämässä, ja puutekin oli hätyytellyt talvisydämen
aikoina. Sillä perhe oli lisääntynyt. Oli jo seitsemän lasta, nuorin
vasta alkanut kävellä.

Samuli oli jo mietteissään kulkenut tietä palasen matkaa, mutta

kääntyi sitten polulle, joka Törmälän ja Alapietin rajaa pitkin nousi
Varpumäkeen kylän taakse. Hiljainen tuulenhenki kävi etelästä, ja
ilma oli lämmin. Komeatähkäistä ohrapeltoa oli siinä molemmin
puolin polkua. Jyvä oli jo aivan valmista, sillä se tuntui kovalta, kun
Samuli otti käteensä tähkän ja sormiensa välissä sitä pyöritteli.

Kauniina ohrapeltona oli puoli Törmälän vainiota. Siinä vainiossa

oli hän monta kovaa päivätyötä tehnyt … tämäkin rajaoja oli hänen
kaivamansa ja samoin koko vainion salaojat hänen tekemiänsä. Ja
jyrkässä metsänrannassa, jossa nyt oli talon paras viljapelto, oli koko
aukea hänen valmistamansa. Sakea metsä oli ollut päällä, kun hän
aloitti… ja nyt työnsi ohraa kuin seinää.

Niin oli.

Oli kuin olisi ikäväksi mieli käynyt, kuin kättensä töitä katseli,
vaikka iloltahan siitä olisi pitänyt, että valmista oli tullut.

Mutta ei hän nyt vain voinut siitä iloltakaan.

Sillä nyt vasta tänä kesänä olivat häntä alkaneet kummalliset

ajatukset vaivata öin ja päivin. Ei ollut hänkään saattanut korviaan
tukkia, kun kuuli työväen puolesta puhuttavan. Ei hänkään itse ollut
kertaakaan käynyt työväenpuhujia kuulemassa, mutta oli muilta
Varpumäen miehiltä kuullut, varsinkin sinä talvena, jona ensi kerran
käytiin äänestämässä.

Häntä oli kehoitettu yhtymään työväenseuraan, joka oli perustettu

kirkonkylään. Mutta Törmälä oli kieltänyt ja sanonut, ettei työväki
huutamalla ja Jumalaa pilkkaamalla päiviänsä paranna.

Ja niin oli hän noudattanut Törmälän neuvoa. Ei ollut

työväenseuraan liittynyt, mutta talvi-illoin, kun osui toisiin mökkeihin
menemään, kuunteli hän, mitä työväen hyväksi tehtiin.

Eivät ne vielä olleet saaneet parempia päiviä. Työtä heidän täytyi

tehdä nytkin, niinkuin olivat tehneet ennen ensimmäistäkin
äänestämistä. Eikä ollut kuulunut vielä seuraavienkaan äänestyksien
perästä mitään erikoisempaa.
 Mutta sittenkin hän oli ruvennut miettimään omaa elämäänsä
enemmän kuin ennen, ja salaisesti oli hänkin toivonut, että joku
suurempi muutos tapahtuu. »Kunniallisille, rehellisille työmiehille on
yhteiskunta suuressa velassa»… tai jotakin sinnepäin hän muisteli
erään etelänpuolen työväenpuhujan sanoneen.

Lanko-Pekka, kylän seppä, Samulin naapuri, oli siitä puheesta

Samulillekin selvää tehnyt.

Hän oli jo mietteissään kävellyt rajapyörtänöä peltojen päähän ja

kääntyi nyt mökilleen päin. Hänen mökkinsä oli Törmälän maalla
erillään muista Varpumäen mökeistä, jotka olivat kaikki saman
kumpulan nokassa melkein vierekkäin. Siinä oli kylän someropalsta,
ja siihen oli aikain kuluessa mökki mökin perästä rakennettu, niin
että koko someropalsta nyt oli vallattu ja pelloksi viljelty.

Nukkuivat siellä jo Varpumäessä joka mökissä, koska ei mitään

liikettä kuulunut.

Samuli pääsi aitapolkua menemään ohi muiden mökkien kotiin

päin. Lämmin kylpy oli häntä virkistänyt. Ruumis tuntui notkealta,
eivätkä vaivanneet rinnan tai vatsan kivut.

Hänellä oli ollut unelma, jonka kerran toivoi toteutuvan. Vuosi

vuodelta oli odottanut ja toivonut, mutta ei siitä vielä ollut mitään
tullut — ja kohta oli lopussa taas tämäkin kesä. Aika oli kulunut, ja
hopussa piti olla, jotta sai ansaituksi jokapäiväisen leivän ja vaatetta
väelleen. Ei mihinkään muualle liiennyt. Ei vaikka oli aina raatanut ja
ponnistanut, että jäseniä särki.

Oli ollut mielessä silloin kun tätä mökkiä valmisteli ja naimisiin

meni, että kaivaa peltoa usean tynnyrinalan, ja kun torpankirjat
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