- Siegen, Germany
Cord Friebe
Universität Siegen, Philosophisches Seminar, Faculty Member
Introduction
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Introduction
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Introduction
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The earliest version of the Kantian Strategy for similar particles in QM.
Including a discussion of the qua(si)-set approach of non-individuals and of the QFT Fock-space formulation.
Including a discussion of the qua(si)-set approach of non-individuals and of the QFT Fock-space formulation.
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Anlässlich des 300. Geburtstages von Immanuel Kant
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Trägheit und Schwere sind eigentlich ganz verschiedene Eigenschaften, doch werden alle Körper im Schwerefeld der Erde gleichermaßen beschleunigt. Bei Kant aber kommt dieses Rätsel gar nicht vor! Warum nicht?
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Both bosons and fermions satisfy a strong version of Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII), and so are ontologically on a par with respect to the PII. This holds for non-entangled, non-product states and for... more
Both bosons and fermions satisfy a strong version of Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII), and so are ontologically on a par with respect to the PII. This holds for non-entangled, non-product states and for physically entangled states—as it has been established in previous work. In this paper, the Leibniz strategy is completed by including the (bosonic) symmetric product states. A new understanding of Pauli’s Exclusion Principle is provided, which distinguishes bosons from fermions in a peculiar ontological way. Finally, the program as a whole is defended against substantial objections.
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According to Kant, concepts can be used in three different ways. They can be in empirical (= pre-philosophical), in transcendentally real (= philosophically inadequate), or in transcendentally ideal (= philosophically reasonable) usage.... more
According to Kant, concepts can be used in three different ways. They can be in empirical (= pre-philosophical), in transcendentally real (= philosophically inadequate), or in transcendentally ideal (= philosophically reasonable) usage. Regarding the concept of the world as a whole, however, Kant misrepresents the empirical meaning and, therefore, overlooks the transcendentally ideal understanding of "everything". Along this guiding line, the paper defends Kant's program of spatiotemporal objects as being conditioned by subjective, non-empirical conditions against the thread of its inconsistency with Kant's alleged solution of the antinomies. It turns out that Kant's program is consistent both with ontological realism about the world as well as with empirical realism about, e.g., the Big Bang. The remaining problem will be how to formalize in modal logic unrestricted quantification in its transcendentally ideal usage.
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Kant rejects Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles, because he rejects that empirical objects are given by (individual-)concepts. Instead, the condition of the givenness of objects is, for Kant, the intuition of space (and... more
Kant rejects Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles, because he rejects that empirical objects are given by (individual-)concepts. Instead, the condition of the givenness of objects is, for Kant, the intuition of space (and time) with which one refers synthetically. Analogously, the metaphysical problem of individuation has been linked with the semantic problem of reference within the current debate about the interpretation of quantum physics. Also for quantum objects, Leibniz' principle is violated, and meanwhile Kant's view becomes a vivid alternative against the former received view. In this paper, I will provide, with the functional role of space as the example, a first step towards a metaphysical foundation of quantum physics, in Kant's sense.
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The paper spells out the thesis that the crucial, substantial move of presentism should be to temporalize modality. The present is not simply actual, and the future not simply possible, but the present is becoming actual, and the... more
The paper spells out the thesis that the crucial, substantial move of presentism should be to temporalize modality. The present is not simply actual, and the future not simply possible, but the present is becoming actual, and the present's becoming actual is future's becoming possi-ble (and past's becoming necessary). I will argue that by so temporalizing modality, as modes of becoming rather than of being, the presentists can make room for the future (and the past), can answer the triviality-objection raised against them, and can provide a specific account of presentist change.
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Wissenschaft ist kein Prozess stetigen Fortschritts, bei dem man sich nach und nach der Wahrheit annähert. Vielmehr ist Wissenschaft die Dynamik von Revolutionen, dem Aufstieg und Niedergang wohletabliert erscheinender Paradigmen-wie etwa... more
Wissenschaft ist kein Prozess stetigen Fortschritts, bei dem man sich nach und nach der Wahrheit annähert. Vielmehr ist Wissenschaft die Dynamik von Revolutionen, dem Aufstieg und Niedergang wohletabliert erscheinender Paradigmen-wie etwa der Newtonschen Physik. Wissenschaft ist daher wesentlich Streit, Kritik am Etablierten, die Bereitschaft, das Vertraute in Frage zu stellen. So könnte man Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) verstehen, wie ja schon der Titel seines Hauptwerks von 1962-The Structure of Scientific Revolutions-deutlich zum Ausdruck bringe. Eigentliche Wissenschaft betreibt demnach nicht jemand, der ein Paradigma bloß anwen
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Kant's ontology of appearances implies that the numerical distinctness of empirical objects is grounded in their appearance-aspect, more precisely in space as pure intuition, in which alone such objects can be given. With distinguishing... more
Kant's ontology of appearances implies that the numerical distinctness of empirical objects is grounded in their appearance-aspect, more precisely in space as pure intuition, in which alone such objects can be given. With distinguishing concepts things can only be thought: in contrast to Leibniz's complete concepts and to Kripke's rigid designators, Kant's general concepts do not entail their referents analytically. They must be applied to intuition, i. e. be completed synthetically. Consequently, Kant's ontology of merely singular (but not unique) individuals (Einzeldinge) is closely connected with a genuine semantics of synthetic reference via intuition, expressed by irreducible demonstratives such as "this", "here", and "now". Accordingly, the judgment "There can be (or could have been) indiscernibles" is synthetic-apriori, which distinguishes Kant's view both from skeptical empiricism and from heavyweight ontological realism.
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The paper addresses the referring problem in quantum mechanics, by spelling out the alternatives with complete or individual concepts (Leib-niz; in modern terms: definite descriptive proper names), with directly referential labels... more
The paper addresses the referring problem in quantum mechanics, by spelling out the alternatives with complete or individual concepts (Leib-niz; in modern terms: definite descriptive proper names), with directly referential labels (standard formalism of quantum mechanics), and with intuition (Kant). The connection between the way of referring and some metaphysical theses about objects will be explained. Then, the paper intends to make plausible that the Kantian way is the best way for the quantum domain, including quantum field theories.
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There are many problems with Time-Continuum, but there is a hard one for those philosophers who believe that the world is existentially dynamical. In particular, this holds for those who take seriously the requirement that in such a world... more
There are many problems with Time-Continuum, but there is a hard one for those philosophers who believe that the world is existentially dynamical. In particular, this holds for those who take seriously the requirement that in such a world must vary what exists unrestrictedly. As a paradigmatic case study, the paper discusses the growing block theory of time, as recently presented by Correia and Rosenkranz who consider temporal passage forcefully in the existential sense of the term. Then, it will be shown that their account fails to do justice to the continuity-requirement: nothing comes next. Without the time continuum, however, the genuinely temporal character of the dynamics gets lost: the objection of spatial analogue turns back. Finally, the paper suggests that Kantian consciousness-dependence is what one needs in order to get a genuinely temporal dynamics that really makes it distinguishable from mere variation across space.
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At first glance, every metaphysics of laws (humeanism, primitivism, power metaphysics) can be combined with every ontology of time (eternalism, growing block, presentism). In contrast, this paper intends to show that humeanism requires... more
At first glance, every metaphysics of laws (humeanism, primitivism, power metaphysics) can be combined with every ontology of time (eternalism, growing block, presentism). In contrast, this paper intends to show that humeanism requires eternalism and that Power metaphysics must presuppose an existentially dynamical view of temporal existence, i.e. the growing block view or presentism. The presented arguments turn out to be completely independent of whether the laws of nature are deterministic or probabilistic: the world is non-productive and static or productively dynamical, the future be ‘open’ or not.
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ABSTRACT
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ABSTRACT
... 4.1) he requires for the three-dimensional enduring object (and for the three-dimensional parts of a perduring one) only “maximal achronal” (i. e., maximal spacelike) hypersurfaces that need not to be flat, and also Ian Gibson and... more
... 4.1) he requires for the three-dimensional enduring object (and for the three-dimensional parts of a perduring one) only “maximal achronal” (i. e., maximal spacelike) hypersurfaces that need not to be flat, and also Ian Gibson and Oliver Pooley (2006) stress several times that ...
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Finally found the paper, in which (almost) everything had already been established - concerning Leibniz's Principle in QM, (non-)entanglement, summing defense.
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ABSTRACT
Die transzendentale Idealität des Raumes und damitd ie bedeutsame Rolle der Anschauungm otiviert Kant überz wei Phänomene: inkongruente Gegenstücke und ununterscheidbare Wassertropfen(vgl. GUGR,AA2:382 f., Prol, AA 4: 285f.; sowie... more
Die transzendentale Idealität des Raumes und damitd ie bedeutsame Rolle der Anschauungm otiviert Kant überz wei Phänomene: inkongruente Gegenstücke und ununterscheidbare Wassertropfen(vgl. GUGR,AA2:382 f., Prol, AA 4: 285f.; sowie KrV,A263/B 319 f.). Ziel des Beitragsist es zu zeigen, dass in beiden Phänomenen die Anschauung dieselbe, eigentümliche Rolle spielen soll:¹ Kant vertritt nämlich eine spezifische Variante direkter Referenz aufe mpirische Objekte. Diese Variante des Referierens ist charakteristisch für Kants transzendentalen Idealismus. Direkte Referenz steht in der analytischen Sprachphilosophie seit Kripke gegend en Deskriptivismus,d en etwa Fregeo der Russell vertreten haben. Nach Kripke referieren Eigennamen wie "Gödel" nicht durch einen deskriptivenGehalt, sondern unabhängig davon(eben: direkt), gewissermaßen an allen Eigenschaften vonGödel vorbei. "Gödel",soKripke, bezieht sich aufGödel, unabhängig davon, was Gödel tut,also auch in einer kontrafaktischenSituation, in der er etwa nicht den Unvollständigkeitssatz bewiesen hat oder nicht einmale in österreichischer Mathematiker ist (vgl. Kripke 1980). Nuns ind Eigennamen bei Kant zwar nicht Thema, doch in beiden Phänomenen geht es darum, dass der deskriptive Gehalt von(in diesem Fall) Begriffen nicht ausreiche, um aufempirische Objektezureferieren. Kant wendet sich also auch gegenD eskriptivismus. Im Unterschied zu Kripke brauchtK ant aber die Anschauung,u md ie Referenz aufr aumzeitliche Gegenstände herzustellen. Warum ist das so?Und: Wieist diese Variante direkter Referenz spezifisch zu charakterisieren? Diese Fragen sind zu beantworten durch die Analyse der beiden Phänomene. ZurErinnerung:Inkongruente Gegenstücke sind beispielsweise die rechteund die linke Hand eines Menschen.Gemeint sind also empirische Objekte, die metrisch, d. h. in allen ihren Strecken-und Winkelverhältnissen, vollkommen gleich sind, dennoch aber durch Drehungenu nd Verschiebungen (Kongruenzabbildungen) nicht zur Deckungg ebracht werden können. Sie sind spiegelverkehrt,o rientierungsverschieden. Kant sagt dann mehrfach, dass die begriffliche Bestimmung Das wurde bislangü bersehen, weil die Phänomene in der Regel getrennt voneinander behandeltwerden, auch in Friebe (2006) versus Friebe (2017).
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Was die Handlungstheorie von der Quantenmechanik wirklich lernen kann.
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This paper spells out why (in 2008) I changed my mind concerning the Correia/Rosenkranz-view on eternalism/presentism.
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In this paper, I argued erroneously in favor of the Williamson/Deasy/Cameron/Correia/Rosenkranz-view on eternalism/presentism. Also with regard to the endurance/perdurance distinction.
