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   In: Working Papers Central Bank of Chile.
   RePEc:chb:bcchwp:390.

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1. ______, 1995, Modern Central Banking. En Capie, F., et.al. Eds. The Future of Central Banking (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
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2. ———, and F. Vázquez, 2005, “Any Link Between Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean” IMF Working Paper 05/75, (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

3. ———, E. Schaling, and M. Hoeberichts, 1998, “Central Bank Independence: A Sensitivity Analysis,” European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 14, pp. 73–88.

4. ———, P. Miller, and B. Neyapti, 2002, “Central Bank Reform, Liberalization, and Inflation in Transition Economies – An International Perspective,” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 49, pp. 237–64.
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5. Andersen, P., and W. Wascher, 1999, “Sacrifice Ratios and the Conduct of Monetary Policy in Conditions of Low Inflation,” BIS Working Papers, No. 82 (Basel: Bank for Internaitonal Settlements).

6. Barro, R., and D. Gordon, 1983, “A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 91, pp. 589–610.

7. Brumm, H., 2000, “Inflation and Central Bank Independence: Conventional Wisdom Redux,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 32, pp. 807–19 (November).

8. Bubula, A., and I. Ötker-Robe, 2002, “The Evolution of Exchange Rate Regimes since 1990: Evidence from De Facto Policies,” IMF Working Paper 02/155 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
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9. Carare, A., A. Schaechter, M. Stone, and M. Zelmer, 2002, “Establishing Initial Conditions in Support of Inflation Targeting,” IMF Working Paper 02/102 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

10. Carstens, A., D. Hardy, and C. Pazarbaşioğlu, 2004, “Banking Crises in Latin America and the Political Economy of Financial Sector Policy.” Document presented at the seminar Gobiernos y Bancos: Responsabilidades y Límites. Inter-American Development Bank, Annual Meetings, Lima, Peru (March).
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11. Chortareas, G., D. Stasavage, and G. Sterne, 2002, “Monetary Policy Transparency, Inflation, and the Sacrifice Ratio,” International Journal of Finance and Economics, Vol. 7, pp. 141–155.

12. Cukierman, A., 1992, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence (Cambridge, Massachussetts: The MIT Press).

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17. Fischer, S., 2001, “Exchange Rate Regimes: Is the Bipolar View Correct?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Spring).

18. For studies that look at developed countries, see for example the seminal work by Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) and those by Eijffinger and Schaling (1993), Eijffinger, Schaling, and Hoeberichts (1998), and Brumm (2000). The transition economies have also received some attention (see for example Loungani and Sheets, 1997 and Cukierman, Miller, and Neyapti, 2002). While the influential study by Cukierman (1992) included some Latin American countries as part of a large sample of industrial and developing countries, it covers a time span prior to the 1990s in which the legal reform took place in the region.
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19. Fuhrer, J., 1997, “Central Bank Independence and Inflation Targeting: Monetary Policy Paradigms for the Next Millennium?” New England Economic Review, pp. 19–36 (January/February).
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20. Gartner, M., 1997, “Central Bank Independence and the Sacrifice Ratio: The Dark Side of the Force,” Schweizerische Zeitschrift fur Wolkswirtschaft und Statistik, No. 133, pp. 513–38 (September).
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21. Grilli, V., D. Masciandaro, and G. Tabellini, 1991, “Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries,” Economic Policy: A European Forum, Vol. 6, pp. 342–91 (October).
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22. Jácome, 2003, “Independencia Legal de la Banca Central en la América Latina e Inflación,” El Trimestre Económico, Vol. LXX(4), pp. 673–719, Mexico, D.F (OctoberDecember) .

23. Kydland, F., and E. Prescott, 1977, “Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of the Optimal Plans,” Journal of Political Economy, 85, pp. 473–491.

24. Lora, E., 2001, “Structural Reforms in Latin America: What Has Been Reformed and How to Measure It,” Research Department Working Paper No. 466, (Washington: Inter-American Development Bank).

25. Loungani, P., and N. Sheets, 1997, “Central Bank Independence, Inflation, and Growth in Transition Economies,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 381–99 (August).

26. Rogoff, K., 1985, “The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 1169–1190 (November).

27. Siklos, P., 2002, The Changing Face of Central Banking: Evolutionary Trends Since World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

28. The data is obtained from the structural reform index calculated for Latin America by the Inter-American Development Bank. The index incorporates reforms in the trade, tax, financial, and labor spheres, and also includes privatization (see Lora, 2001). For this dummy variable, a value of 1 is assigned in the years when a systemic banking crisis occurred and 0 elsewhere.
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29. The specifics of the methodology used in this statistical exercise are similar to those discussed in Jácome and Vázquez (2005) for a sample that also includes the Caribbean countries. This variable takes a value in the range of 0 to 1, with higher variables reflecting deeper structural reforms.
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1. Heterogeneity Effect of Central Bank Independence on Inflation in Developing Countries. (2023). Anwar, Cep Jandi.
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2. The case for independence: Does central bank independence curb the spread of the underground economy?. (2023). Saunoris, James W ; Berdiev, Aziz N.
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3. The (home) bias of European central bankers: new evidence based on speeches. (2017). Neuenkirch, Matthias ; Bennani, Hamza.
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4. The (Home) Bias of European Central Bankers: New Evidence Based on Speeches *. (2016). Neuenkirch, Matthias ; Bennani, Hamza.
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5. .

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6. Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms?. (2013). Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov ; Landstrom, Mats ; Hellstrom, Jorgen.
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7. Are Central Bank Independence Reforms Necessary for Achieving Low and Stable Inflation?. (2013). Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov ; Landstrom, Mats ; Rudholm, Niklas.
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8. Political business cycles and monetary policy revisited–an application of a two-dimensional asymmetric Taylor reaction function. (2012). Klose, Jens.
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   RePEc:kap:iecepo:v:9:y:2012:i:3:p:265-295.

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9. Explicit inflation targets and central bank independence: friends or foes?. (2012). Libich, Jan ; Hughes Hallett, Andrew.
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   RePEc:kap:ecopln:v:45:y:2012:i:4:p:271-297.

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10. Constrained discretion in Sweden. (2012). Hubert, Paul ; Creel, Jerome.
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11. Political Business Cycles and Monetary Policy Revisited – An Application of a Two-Dimensional Asymmetric Taylor Reaction Function. (2011). Klose, Jens.
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12. New evidence on the effectiveness of Quantitative Easing in Japan. (2011). Voutsinas, Konstantinos ; Werner, Richard A..
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13. Quest for the Best: How to Measure Central Bank Independence and Show its Relationship with Inflation. (2011). Masłowska-Jokinen, Aleksandra.
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14. Incorporating rigidity and commitment in the timing structure of macroeconomic games. (2010). Libich, Jan ; Stehlik, Petr.
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15. INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: A META?REGRESSION ANALYSIS. (2010). de Haan, Jakob ; Klomp, Jeroen.
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16. Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms?. (2009). Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov ; Hellstrom, Jorgen ; Landstrom, Mats .
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17. ENDOGENOUS MONETARY COMMITMENT. (2009). Libich, Jan ; Stehlik, Petr.
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18. Informal central bank independence: an analysis for three European countries. (2008). Mattesini, Fabrizio ; Cobham, David ; Cosci, Stefania.
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19. Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms?. (2008). Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov ; Hellstrom, Jorgen ; Landstrom, Mats .
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20. Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms?. (2008). Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov ; Hellstrom, Jorgen ; Landstrom, Mats .
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21. An explicit inflation target as a commitment device. (2008). Libich, Jan.
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22. Labor market regimes and the effects of monetary policy. (2008). Hibbs, Douglas ; Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; acocella, nicola.
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23. Fiscal-monetary Interactions: The Effect of Fiscal Restraint and Public Monitoring on Central Bank Credibility. (2007). Libich, Jan ; Hughes Hallett, Andrew.
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24. Short-term leaders should make long-term appointments. (2007). Kanniainen, Vesa ; Glazer, Amihai.
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25. INCORPORATING RIGIDITY IN THE TIMING STRUCTURE OF MACROECONOMIC GAMES. (2007). Libich, Jan ; Stehlik, Petr.
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26. Central Bank Independence, Accountability and Transparency: Complements or Strategic Substitutes?. (2006). Libich, Jan ; Hughes Hallett, Andrew.
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27. Any Link Between Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean. (2005). Vazquez, Francisco ; Jácome, Luis ; Jacome, Luis.
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28. Any Link Between Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean. (2005). Vazquez, Francisco ; Jacome, Luis Ignacio.
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29. Central bank conservatism and labor market regulation. (2005). Laséen, Stefan ; Jordahl, Henrik ; Laseen, Stefan .
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30. The 1990s Institutional Reform of Monetary Policy in Latin America. (2005). Jácome, Luis ; Carstens, Agustin .
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31. The Political Economy of Inflation, Labour Market Distortions and Central Bank Independence. (2003). Herrendorf, Berthold ; Manfred J. M. Neumann, ; Manfred J. M. Neumann, .
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32. Why are price stability and statutory independence of central banks negatively correlated? The role of culture. (2002). de Jong, Eelke .
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34. A nonnormative theory of inflation and central bank independence. (2000). Herrendorf, Berthold ; Neumann, Manfred .
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35. Underpinnings of the European System of Central Banks. (1999). Hahn, Franz ; Mooslechner, Peter .
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36. Central Bank Conservatism and Labor Market Reform. (1999). Laséen, Stefan ; Jordahl, Henrik ; Laseen, Stefan .
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37. A non-Normative Theory of Inflation and Central Bank Independence.. (1998). Herrendorf, Berthold ; Neumann, M. J. M., .
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38. Historical U.S. money growth, inflation, and inflation credibility. (1998). Dewald, William G..
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39. A Non-normative Theory of Inflation and Central Bank Independence. (1998). Herrendorf, Berthold.
    In: Economic Research Papers.
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