Wil Burns

After more than two decades of UN negotiations,
global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions continue
to rise, with current projections indicating the
planet is on a pathway to a temperature increase of
approximately 3.2°C by 2100, well beyond what is
considered a safe level. This has spurred scientific and
policy interest in the possible role of solar radiation
management (SRM) and carbon dioxide removal
(CDR) geoengineering activities to help avert passing
critical climatic thresholds, or to help societies recover
if global temperatures overshoot expectations of
safe levels. There are various proposals for SRM and
CDR marine geoengineering, but aside from ocean
iron fertilization (OIF) and marine cloud brightening
(MCB), none of these options have moved beyond
conceptual development and laboratory testing.
Marine geoengineering proposals show significant
diversity in terms of their purpose, scale of application,
likely effectiveness, requisite levels of international
cooperation and intensity of environmental risks. This
diversity of marine geoengineering activities will likely
place significant new demands upon the international
law system to govern potential risks and opportunities.
International ocean law governance is comprised
of a patchwork of global framework agreements,
sectoral agreements and customary international
law rules that have developed over time in response
to disparate issues. These include maritime access,
fisheries management, shipping pollution, ocean
dumping and marine scientific research (MSR). This
patchwork of oceans governance contains several
bodies of rules that might apply in governing marine
geoengineering activities. However, these bodies
of rules were negotiated for different purposes,
and not specifically for the governance of marine
Executive Summary
vii
geoengineering. The extent to which this patchwork
of rules might contribute to marine geoengineering
governance will vary, depending on the purpose
of an activity, where it is conducted, which state is
responsible for it and the types of impacts it is likely
to have. Applying this patchwork to a specific marine
geoengineering activity is complex, and existing
rules may provide only limited concrete guidance as
to how an activity ought to be conducted. The 2013
amendment to the London Protocol on ocean dumping
provides the most developed and specific framework
for marine geoengineering governance to date. But the
capacity of this amendment to bolster the capacity of
international law to govern marine geoengineering
activities is limited by some significant shortcomings.
Negotiations are under way to establish a new global
treaty on conservation of marine biodiversity in areas
beyond national jurisdiction, including new rules
for area-based management, environmental impact
assessments (EIAs) and capacity building/technology
transfer. The potential provisions of this agreement
could be pertinent to marine geoengineering options.
This negotiation is both an opportunity and a risk
for marine geoengineering governance. A new
agreement has the potential to fill key gaps in the
existing patchwork of international law for marine
geoengineering activities in high-seas areas. However,
it is also important that this new treaty be structured
in a way that is not overly restrictive, which might
hinder responsible research and development
of marine geoengineering in high-seas areas.

Recent assessments of the international community’s
ability to hold the increase of global average temperature
to well below 2°C, while pursuing efforts to limit
that increase to 1.5°C, indicate that this goal is unlikely
to be achieved without large-scale implementation of
climate engineering (CE) technologies. In light of the
prominent, albeit contested, role that CE is likely to
play in international climate policy, this Article analyzes
the specific provisions of the Paris Agreement
with a view to assessing the extent to which the Agreement
can provide an institutional framework to effectively
govern CE internationally, and how it may shape
the development and implementation of CE options.
In particular, the Article examines a number of critical
interpretive questions that will need to be addressed as
states begin to develop CE technologies at large scales,
including the need to provide guidance respecting
the acceptability of exceeding the Paris targets before
drawing down atmospheric CO2 levels, the challenges
for equity, human rights, and sustainability objectives
that CE poses, and the need to incorporate CE technologies into accounting and incentive structures.

The feckless response of the world community to the mounting threat of climate change has led to a growing interest in climate geoengineering research. In early 2015, the us National Academy of Sciences released two major reports on the topic. While it is notable that both reports recommended some form of public participation to inform research, this article argues that the vagueness of these recommendations could mean that their implementation might not comport with optimal approaches for public deliberation. We outline some options for public deliberation on climate geoengineer-ing and important design considerations.