Climate Engineering

Geoengineering, or climate engineering, is the umbrella term for large-scale technological interventions into the climate system that seek to counter some of the effects of global warming. Due to limited progress in reducing global greenhouse-gas emissions thus far, geoengineering has been increasingly investigated as a potential addition to the portfolio of climate responses. At this point, however, the shape and role that geoengineering will take in the future remain highly uncertain. In this report, we look 10 years ahead, at the year 2025, and present two scenarios of geoengineering’s possible evolution, with the goal of providing policy recommendations for its effective governance. Geoengineering technologies are generally divided into approaches that aim to reflect sunlight away from the earth (solar radiation management, SRM), and approaches that aim to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere (carbon dioxide removal, CDR). This report focuses on SRM interventions, and particularly on those methods that aim to reflect sunlight by injecting reflective particles into the stratosphere. Such interventions raise important governance issues that are different from those raised by CDR techniques. This is because SRM would have a quick, global effect, could be deployed by a single actor or a small group of actors at a relatively low cost, and would have different impacts on different regions of the world. SRM is also likely to be perceived as a more fundamental intervention than CDR into the workings of the planet, with the potential for significant societal conflict to result from different worldviews and value systems. Most CDR technologies, on the other hand, would act only over long time scales, are prohibitively expensive at the moment and would require collaboration between many actors in order to have a significant effect on the climate. SRM has also generated various concerns. First, it has been argued that SRM would create a “moral hazard” by reducing the incentive for states to engage in mitigation and adaptation efforts, for SRM may prove to be faster, cheaper and less difficult to agree upon in international negotiations. Second, its potential impacts are highly uncertain. Factors that will be particularly difficult to predict and understand include regional and local impacts on agricultural production, water resources and biodiversity. Third, it has been questioned whether it is ethically permissible to interfere with Earth-system processes at such a fundamental level. The global governance of SRM will have to take these concerns into account. Although SRM is still in its infancy and may take decades to research, develop and deploy, it is precisely this early stage of development that offers a critical window of opportunity for developing collaborative and inclusive approaches to effective global governance of the potential SRM life cycle, or parts thereof.

This report offers a detailed examination,
by a team of global governance experts,
of governance needs and options for Solar
Radiation Management (SRM) technologies.
The report focuses on near-term governance,
outlining feasible and needed actions that
can be taken by approximately 2025, at the
national, regional, and international levels
and by non-state actors.
The fourteen experts who contributed to
this report were convened as the Academic
Working Group on Climate Engineering
Governance (the Working Group). Starting in
March 2016, we gathered for five meetings
to consider and define the challenges
and opportunities associated with SRM
technologies and to craft a set of specific,
actionable governance recommendations.
During these meetings, the group heard
from established experts on SRM as well as
experts in the governance of other emerging
technologies. Between meetings, group
members delved into and contributed to the
academic literature on SRM and into related
policy conversations.
The report focuses on SRM as a subset
of speculative climate engineering or
geoengineering responses to climate
change. SRM refers to technologies that
might reflect a small percentage of incoming
solar radiation back into space before it can
warm the planet. Although the term “climate
engineering” is often used to encompass
both SRM and technologies that would
remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere
in large quantities, the Working Group
decided to focus solely on SRM in order to
provide clear, sharp, and implementable
recommendations pertaining to the specific
governance challenges surrounding SRM.

Warnings about climate change often come wrapped in apocalyptic language and scenarios, often as a rhetorical strategy to convey the sense of urgency with which action is required. Similarly, technologies that promise to deliver us from the impending climate apocalypse often come shrouded as savior-technologies. Once such example are carbon capture and storage solutions. Language and imagery on websites and in marketing material presents these technologies as transformative technologies: they promise to transform something harmful in the atmosphere (CO2) into paradisiacal plentitude: carbon as infinite energy resource. This paper will discuss and explore the underlying ideas behind carbon capture and storage technologies and discuss how language used to talk about the climate opportunities they offer transcends the everyday and the ordinary. Based on David Chidester’s understanding of religion, this paper argues that the power of carbon capture narratives is grounded in religious tropes and ideas.

Numerous recent studies project that 'climate engineering' technologies might need to play a major role in the future. Such technologies may carry major risks for developing countries that are often especially vulnerable to, and lack adaptive capacity to deal with, the impacts of such new technologies. In this situation, one would expect that developing countries-especially the least developed countries that are most vulnerable-should play a central role in the emerging discourse on climate engineering. And yet, as this article shows in detail, the discussion about whether and how to engage with these technologies is shaped by experts from just a small set of countries in the Global North. Knowledge production around climate engineering remains heavily dominated by the major research institutions in North America and Europe. Drawing on information from 70 climate engineering events between 2009 and 2017 along with extensive document analysis, the article maps a lack of involvement of developing countries and highlights the degree to which their concerns remain insufficiently represented in politically significant scientific assessment reports. The article concludes by sketching options that developing countries may have to influence the agenda on climate engineering, reflecting on earlier attempts to increase control over novel technologies and influence global agenda setting.

Faced with the urgency of climate change, Climate Engineering has been framed as a fast and feasible technological solution. At the same time, however, critique against it is getting increasingly louder. This paper articulates a critical analysis of Climate Engineering technologies from a point of view situated within the degrowth discourse. In the first part two approaches discussed within the degrowth debate are presented: the concept of viability based on a biophysical perspective and the concept of conviviality based on a socio-cultural approach. In a second step formalized arguments from the point of view of applied ethics are articulated and applied to three Climate Engineering Technologies: Sulfate Aerosol Injection, Bio-energy with Carbon Capture and Storage, and Afforestation. In a third step, an extended version of the trade-off argument about mitigation versus Climate Engineering solution is discussed from a degrowth perspective: accordingly, within the current dominant growth paradigm, climate engineering technologies might lead to reduced mitigation efforts. The paper follows the argumentative turn in applied ethics and displays a formalization of arguments that can help clarify decision-making and identify the different dimensions at stake. The paper articulates arguments against the deployment of CE technologies and advances a new version of the trade-off-argument based on a degrowth perspective. From the point of view of a degrowth-based critique of technology, the only type of Climate Engineering Technology ethically acceptable would be afforestation under specific conditions. Highlights: • Critique of technology based on degrowth is applied to Climate Engineering • Biophysical (viability) and socio-cultural (conviviality) criteria are presented • Via formalized arguments a critique of Climate Engineering Technologies is discussed • Sulfate Aerosol Inj., Bio-energy w. Carbon Capture & Storage, Afforestation analyzed Acknowledgments We would like to thank the editors and the anonymous reviewers for their very interesting comments that greatly helped improve this paper.

Can climate engineering help provide more time for an ambitious mitigation program? And if so, is a buying time deployment of climate engineering morally acceptable? The work at hand means to thoroughly scrutinize this specific argument of the climate engineering discourse – the buying time argument (BT-argument). The point of departure of this research is the notion that climate engineering (CE) is not inherently morally wrong. The guiding question is: Is there a possible buying time deployment of a climate engineering technology absent any general moral constraints? This question will be answered in several steps: First, a deductively valid version of the BT-argument is established.  In particular, this argument implies that deployment of CE is to be finite and should not interfere with mitigation efforts. Containing a placeholder for a specific climate goal and a placeholder denoting a specific CE technology, the argument can only be fully evaluated, if the placeholders are instantiated. By doing so, this thesis aims at providing a comprehensive discussion of two CE technologies, Sulfate Aerosol Injection (SAI) and Bio-energy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS), and sheding some light on the moral aspects of potential CE deployment. The preliminary conclusion states that a finite and strictly purpose bound deployment of SAI might be morally sound, but the boundary conditions for such a deployment must be guaranteed by political efforts. The work at hand also highlights the importance of further research, especially with respect to negative emission technologies.

In recent years there has been growing academic and policy interest in geoengineering – the large scale, intentional manipulation of climate system in order to attempt to counteract the effects of climate change (Belter & Seidel 2013). Alongside a number of other important policy issues, concerns have been raised over the potential for geoengineering technologies to contribute to so-called ‘carbon lock-in’ (Unruh 2000), or to become ‘locked-in’ themselves (CBD, 2012; Shepherd et al., 2009; Rayner et al., 2013). In particular, the scale of infrastructures that geoengineering interventions would require, and the issue of the so-called ‘termination effect’ (Jones et al. 2013) (whereby the termination of a programme of stratospheric aerosol injection would result inrapid heating of the planet) have been discussed in these terms. Dynamics of ‘lock-in’ have been raised even in relation to the more purely discursive aspects of these challenges, where (despite the emergent and somewhat ill-defined nature of the field), it has been suggested that the extant framings of geoengineering in academic and policy literatures may already demonstrate features recognisable as forms of cognitive lock-in, likely to have profound implications for future developments in this area (Bellamy et al. 2012). This review paper, prepared in advance of an academic and policy workshop on the topic, is intended to give participants a brief overview of the theoretical literature on lock-in and path-dependence, to summarise the ways in which these concepts have been invoked in the existing literature on geoengineering, to highlight some on-going theoretical debates around these concepts, and to examine the generic, and more geoengineering-specific challenges of assessment of these processes.

Geoengineering is the deliberate and large-scale intervention in the Earth's climate system in an attempt to mitigate the adverse effects of global warming. Now that climate emergency is upon us, claims that geoengineering is inevitable are rapidly proliferating. How did we get into this situation where the most extreme path now seems a plausible development? Is it an accurate representation of where we are at? Who is this “we” who is talking? What options make it onto the table? Which are left out? Whom does geoengineering serve? Why is the ensemble of projects that goes by that name so salient, even though the community of researchers and advocates is remarkably small? These are some of the questions that the thinkers contributing to this volume are exploring from perspectives ranging from sociology and geography to ethics and Indigenous studies. The editors set out this diverse collection of voices not as a monolithic, unified take on geoengineering, but as a place where creative thinkers, students, and interested environmental and social justice advocates can explore nuanced ideas in more than 240 characters.

The sky above us, and the weather it brings, is changing.  But what metaphors do we use to describe the actions of humans upon the atmosphere?  In this essay I reflect on one such metaphor – that of cultivation – and consider how fruitful it might be.  After offering a brief account of the changing ways humans have sought to make sense of their weather, I consider proposed new climate engineering technologies as forms of atmospheric cultivation.  Humans cannot escape their role as cultivators, but they will always meet resistance from the physical world.  We also need to think carefully – as also with bodily enhancement – about the ends for which we might undertake cultivational projects of atmospheric enhancement.

A number of commentators have expressed concern about the role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in climate engineering (CE) research and governance. However, these concerns have often been couched in general terms, and diverge in the relative importance that they attach to the issue. Whether, how, and why IPRs might matter for the governance of CE activities has
yet to receive a comprehensive treatment; thus the policy and governance implications remain completely unclear.

To untangle the issue, this paper focuses on patents and trade secrets as the most relevant categories of intellectual property, and develops a framework within which to situate IP-related
concerns, specifically as related to direct air capture, ocean iron fertilization, and stratospheric aerosol spraying. The paper shows that there is no a priori “yes or no” answer to the question of whether IPRs are desirable and appropriate for “geoengineering.” Rather, the question of whether they ought to be encouraged or discouraged is highly conditional. We must first ask “What are the specific challenges that IP claims might pose for the technological domain in question?” Next, we must explicitly foreground normative concerns by asking, “Given the scale and distribution of
potential risks and benefits, what is the appropriateness of introducing private property rights?” Only after we have answered these first two questions can we reasonably ask “What is the best
way to incentivize research,” and determine whether IPRs should be recommended or discouraged. The paper concludes by calling for an enhanced research program among CE and IP scholars on the relationships between IPRs and CE research, development, and governance.

Many  in  the  discourse  on  climate  engineering  agree  that  if  deployment  of  Solar  Radiation
Management (SRM) technologies is ever permissible, then it must be accompanied by  far-
reaching mitigation of  greenhouse gas (GHG)  emissions. This raises the question of if and
how both strategies interact. Although raised in many publications, there are surprisingly few
detailed investigations of this important issue. The paper aims at contributing to closing this
research gap by (i) reconstructing moral hazard claims to clarify their aim, (ii) offering one
specific  normative  justification  for  far-reaching  mitigation  and  (iii)  investigating  in  greater
detail  different mechanisms  potentially  causing  a  trade-off  between  mitigation  and  SRM.  I
conclude  that  the  empirical  evidence  questioning  the  trade-off  hypothesis  is  inconclusive.
Moreover, theoretical reflections as well as economic model studies point to a trade-off. In
our current epistemic situation these findings must be taken seriously. They caution against
researching and developing SRM technologies before measures to avoid or minimize a trade-
off are implemented.

Climate change is socially constructed by the way we imagine the future. Catastrophism and the fear of future climate risk dominate public discourse and constitute how we respond to climate change now. In the debate on climate change, there are two competing catastrophisms: one is emancipatory catastrophism, coined by Ulrich Beck; and the other is what the author of this article calls apocalyptic catastrophism – the dystopian imagination of the future climate and a discourse serving to feed the idea of a ‘techno-fix’, namely geoengineering the Earth’s climate. The two catastrophisms are different in their view on climate change and democracy. This article explores the discursive contours of these two catastrophisms.

Geoengineering is the deliberate modification of the climate system. It has been discussed as a technique to counteract changes expected as a result of Anthropogenic Global Warming (AGW).1 Speculation has occurred that the possibility of geoengineering will reduce or delay efforts to mitigate AGW. This possible delay or reduction in mitigation has been described as ‘moral hazard’ by various authors. We investigate the definitions and use of the term ‘moral hazard’, and the related (but significantly different) concept of ‘morale hazard’, in relevant law, economic and insurance literatures. We find that ‘moral hazard’ has been generally misapplied in discussions of geoengineering, which perhaps explains unexpected difficulties in detecting expected effects experimentally.2 We clarify relevant usage of the terms, identifying scenarios that can properly be described as moral hazard (malfeasance), and morale hazard (lack of caution or recklessness). We note generally the importance of correctly applying this distinction when discussing geoengineering. In conclusion, we note that a proper consideration of the risks of both moral and morale hazards allows us to easily segment framings for both geoengineering advocacy and the advocate groups who rely on these framings. We suggest mnemonics for groups vulnerable to moral hazard (Business as Usuals) and morale hazard (Chicken Littles) and suggest the development of an experimental methodology for validating the distinction thus drawn.

The concept of climate engineering (CE, also: geoengineering) is discussed as a “plan B” against climate change. This makes CE an alternative to low-carbon energy approaches which help to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and therefore mitigate effects of climate change. CE intervenes directly into the climate system.
The central question of this paper: Is responsibility an adequately respond to the need for governance of CE?
The concept of responsibility will be sociologically analysed. I did not look much into the Horizon2020 documents and will not work with the fixed term of Responsible Research and Innovation. My impression is that often the term responsibility is used to insert some ethics without discussion the term itself.

Geoengineering is a proposed response to anthropogenic global warming (AGW). Conventionally it consists of two strands: Solar Radiation Management (SRM), which is fast-acting, incomplete but inexpensive, and Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR), which is slower acting, more expensive, and comprehensive. Pairing SRM and CDR offers a contractually complete solution for future emissions if effectively-scaled and coordinated. SRM offsets warming, while CDR takes effect.We suggest coordination using a blockchain, i.e. smart contracts and a distributed ledger. Specifically, we integrate CDR futures with time and volume-matched SRM orders, to address emissions contractually before release. This provides an economically and environmentally proportionate solution to CO2 emissions at the wellhead, with robust contractual transparency, and minimal overhead cost.

Our proposal offers a ‘polluter pays’ implementation of Long & Shepherds SRM ‘bridge’ concept. This ‘polluter geoengineers’ approach mandates and verifies emissionslinked payments with minimal friction, delay, or cost. Finally, we compare alternative market designs against this proposal, finding that this proposal offers several advantages. We conclude that blockchain implementation of the ‘polluter geoengineers’ approach is attractive and feasible for larger wellhead contracts. We also identify a handful of advantages and disadvantages that merit further study.

In the absence of a governance framework for climate engineering technologies such as solar radiation management (SRM), the practices of scientific research and intellectual property acquisition can de facto shape the development of the field. It is therefore important to make visible emerging patterns of research and patenting, which we suggest can effectively be done using bibliometric methods. We explore the challenges in defining the boundary of climate engineering, and set out the research strategy taken in this study. A dataset of 825 scientific publications on climate engineering between 1971 and 2013 was identified, including 193 on SRM; these are analysed in terms of trends, institutions, authors and funders. For our patent dataset, we identified 143 first filings directly or indirectly related to climate engineering technologies-of which 28 were related to SRM technologies-linked to 910 family members. We analyse the main patterns discerned in patent trends, applicants and...

Various parts of the world have " dimmed " and " brightened " at times, as measured by surface solar radiation records, and some of that is clearly related to pollution patterns. But new data suggest an additional mechanism is at work. That something is whitening global cloud­free skies and changing the way that solar radiation reaches Earth's surface. A provocative new analysis, presented in this briefing, points to a likely cause—an unintentional geoengineering experiment.

If deployed, aerosol geoengineering (AG) could involve unfairness to both present and future parties. I discuss three broad risks of unfairness that an AG deployment policy might carry: (1) causing disproportionate harm to those least responsible for climate change, (2) burdening future parties with the costs and risks of AG, and (3) excluding some interested parties from contributing to AG decision-making. Yet despite these risks, it may be too hasty to reject AG deployment as a potential climate change policy. I argue that since it is very unlikely that a completely fair climate change policy will be pursued, we have ethical reason to prefer some “incompletely fair” policy. Given various facts about our world, it might be the case that some AG policy is ethically preferable to many other feasible climate change policies, even if AG carries deeply problematic risks of unfairness.

Policy advisors and research institutions increasingly emphasize the “need to understand the possibilities, limitations, and potential side effects” of so-called climate interventions. Understanding the impacts of climate engineering (CE) depends to a large extent on choosing the right indicators and metrics for assessing CE simulations. Although it is clear that they often differ from conventional climate change research metrics due to changes in prevailing correlations (e.g. the breakdown of a correlation between global mean temperature and other indicators with a solar CE deployment), only a few studies have attempted to identify the metrics required for a fair and comprehensive CE assessment. This study utilizes the available CE literature and aims to identify and map currently used indicators and metrics to highlight research gaps. Applying quantitative text analysis to a comprehensive corpus of scientific CE literature allows us to efficiently map scientific applications of metrics. Furthermore, we aim to track how the metrics have changed over time, and if there are predominant metrics that appear in certain types of studies. By pointing to research gaps our results will foster research on insufficiently studied metrics and help to select the most appropriate ones, which have both scientific and societal relevance.

Aircraft can distribute slaked lime for ocean alkalinity enhancement. • A feasibility analysis is conducted, considering different discharging scenarios. • Scenarios assume various aircraft payload, discharge altitude and duration. • Energy penalty and costs are much higher than distribution in the ships' wake. • Very high dispersion is reached, but effects on surface microlayer are still unclear.

In the absence of a governance framework for climate engineering technologies such as solar radiation management (SRM), the practices of scientific research and intellectual property acquisition can de facto shape the development of the field. It is therefore important to make visible emerging patterns of research and patenting, which we suggest can effectively be done using bibliometric methods. We explore the challenges in defining the boundary of climate engineering, and set out the research strategy taken in this study. A dataset of 825 scientific publications on climate engineering between 1971 and 2013 was identified, including 193 on SRM; these are analysed in terms of trends, institutions, authors and funders. For our patent dataset, we identified 143 first filings directly or indirectly related to climate engineering technologies-of which 28 were related to SRM technologies-linked to 910 family members. We analyse the main patterns discerned in patent trends, applicants and...