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Rob  Bellamy
  • Oxford, Oxfordshire, United Kingdom

Rob Bellamy

Since the late 1970s, over 140 global environmental assessments (GEAs) have been completed. But are they any longer fit for purpose? Some believe not. Compelling arguments have been advanced for a new assessment paradigm, one more... more
Since the late 1970s, over 140 global environmental assessments (GEAs) have been completed. But are they any longer fit for purpose? Some believe not. Compelling arguments have been advanced for a new assessment paradigm, one more focussed on problem-solving than problem-identification. If translated into new assessment practices, this envisaged paradigm could prevail for the next several decades, just as the current one has since the late 1970s. In this paper, it is contended that the arguments for GEAs 2.0 are, in fact, insufficiently bold. Solutions-orientated assessments, often associated with a ‘policy turn’ by their advocates, are undoubtedly necessary. But without a ‘politics turn’ they will be profoundly insufficient: policy options would be detached from the diverse socio-economic explanations and ‘deep hermeneutics’ of value that ultimately give them meaning, especially given the very high stakes now attached to managing human impacts on a fast-changing planet. Here we mak...
In a short period of time, climate ‘geoengineering’ has been added to the list of technoscientific issues subject to deliberative public engagement. Here, we analyse this rapid trajectory of publicization and explore the particular manner... more
In a short period of time, climate ‘geoengineering’ has been added to the list of technoscientific issues subject to deliberative public engagement. Here, we analyse this rapid trajectory of publicization and explore the particular manner in which the possibility of intentionally altering the Earth’s climate system to curb global warming has been incorporated into the field of ‘public engagement with science’. We describe the initial framing of geoengineering as a singular object of debate and subsequent attempts to ‘unframe’ the issue by placing it within broader discursive fields. The tension implicit in these processes of structured debate – how to turn geoengineering into a workable object of deliberation without implying a commitment to its reality as a policy option – raises significant questions about the role of ‘public engagement with science’ scholars and methods in facilitating public debate on speculative technological futures.
Since the late 1970s, over 140 global environmental assessments (GEAs) have been completed. But are they any longer fit for purpose? Some believe not. Compelling arguments have been advanced for a new assessment paradigm, one more... more
Since the late 1970s, over 140 global environmental assessments (GEAs) have been completed. But are they any longer fit for purpose? Some believe not. Compelling arguments have been advanced for a new assessment paradigm, one more focussed on problem-solving than problem-identification. If translated into new assessment practices, this envisaged paradigm could prevail for the next several decades, just as the current one has since the late 1970s. In this paper, it is contended that the arguments for GEAs 2.0 are, in fact, insufficiently bold. Solutions-orientated assessments, often associated with a ‘policy turn’ by their advocates, are undoubtedly necessary. But without a ‘politics turn’ they will be profoundly insufficient: policy options would be detached from the diverse socio-economic explanations and ‘deep hermeneutics’ of value that ultimately give them meaning, especially given the very high stakes now attached to managing human impacts on a fast-changing planet. Here we mak...
Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-anr-10.1177_2053019620971664 for The future of global environmental assessments: Making a case for fundamental change by Noel Castree, Rob Bellamy and Shannon Osaka in The Anthropocene Review
pus.sagepub.com
Proposed ways of governing climate engineering have most often been supported by narrowly framed and unreflexive appraisals and processes. This article explores the governance implications of a Deliberative Mapping project that, unlike... more
Proposed ways of governing climate engineering have most often been supported by narrowly framed and unreflexive appraisals and processes. This article explores the governance implications of a Deliberative Mapping project that, unlike other governance principles, have emerged from an extensive process of reflection and reflexivity. In turn, the project has made significant advances in addressing the current deficit of responsibly defined criteria for shaping governance propositions. Three such propositions argue that (1) reflexive foresight of the imagined futures in which climate engineering proposals might reside is required; (2) the performance and acceptance of climate engineering proposals should be decided in terms of robustness, not optimality; and (3) climate engineering proposals should be satisfactorily opened up before they can be considered legitimate objects of governance. Taken together, these propositions offer a sociotechnical framework not simply for governing clim...
Assessments of geoengineering have so far largely taken place under two dominant problem definitions. First, those efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will not be enough to tackle climate change. Second, that as a result of this,... more
Assessments of geoengineering have so far largely taken place under two dominant problem definitions. First, those efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will not be enough to tackle climate change. Second, that as a result of this, we may be faced with a dangerous change in climate, often stylised as crossing one or more "tipping points"–a "climate emergency". The expert multi-criteria assessment conducted for the Royal Society's seminal report provides a valuable illustration of how framing geoengineering assessment through the selection and elevation of particular criteria can compel particular outcomes. These permutations demonstrate how different instrumental framings can serve to "close down" on certain geoengineering proposals. Broadening out and opening up geoengineering assessment reveals the complexities and uncertainties that are often reduced and hidden in narrowly framed assessments. Indeed, a remarkable level of consistency has been found across expert, stakeholder, and public perspectives, with geoengineering proposals being outperformed by mitigation alternatives.
Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) is considered a key mitigation technology in most 1.5–2.0°C compatible climate change mitigation scenarios. Nonetheless, examples of BECCS deployment are lacking internationally. It is... more
Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) is considered a key mitigation technology in most 1.5–2.0°C compatible climate change mitigation scenarios. Nonetheless, examples of BECCS deployment are lacking internationally. It is widely acknowledged that widespread implementation of this technology requires strong policy enablers, and that such enablers are currently non-existent. However, the literature lacks a more structured assessment of the “incentive gap” between scenarios with substantive BECCS deployment and existing policy enablers to effectuate BECCS deployment. Sweden, a country with progressive climate policies and particularly good preconditions for BECCS, constitutes a relevant locus for such examinations. The paper asks to what extent and how existing UN, EU, and Swedish climate policy instruments incentivize BECCS research, development, demonstration, and deployment in Sweden. The analysis is followed by a tentative discussion of needs for policy reform to impro...
Societal issues involving policies and publics are generally understudied in research on ocean-based Negative Emission Technologies (NETs), yet will be crucial if novel techniques are ever to function at scale. Public attitudes are vital... more
Societal issues involving policies and publics are generally understudied in research on ocean-based Negative Emission Technologies (NETs), yet will be crucial if novel techniques are ever to function at scale. Public attitudes are vital for emerging technologies: publics influence political mandates, help determine the degree of uptake by market actors, and are key to realizing broader ambitions for robust decision-making and responsible incentivization. Discourses surrounding ocean NETs will also have fundamental effects on how governance for the techniques emerges, shaping how they are defined as an object of governance, who is assigned the authority to govern, and what instruments are deemed appropriate. This Perspective brings together key insights on the societal dimensions of ocean NETs, drawing on existing work on public acceptability, policy assessment, governance, and discourse. Ocean iron fertilization is the only ocean NET on which there exists considerable social scienc...
Framing solutions to climate change as natural strongly influences their acceptability, but what constitutes a ‘natural’ climate solution is selected, not self-evident. We suggest that the current, narrow formulation of natural climate... more
Framing solutions to climate change as natural strongly influences their acceptability, but what constitutes a ‘natural’ climate solution is selected, not self-evident. We suggest that the current, narrow formulation of natural climate solutions risks constraining what are thought of as desirable policy options.
Proposed ways of governing climate engineering have most often been supported by narrowly framed and unreflexive appraisals and processes. This article explores the governance implications of a Deliberative Mapping project that, unlike... more
Proposed ways of governing climate engineering have most often been supported by narrowly framed and unreflexive appraisals and processes. This article explores the governance implications of a Deliberative Mapping project that, unlike other governance principles, have emerged from an extensive process of reflection and reflexivity. In turn, the project has made significant advances in addressing the current deficit of responsibly defined criteria for shaping governance propositions. Three such propositions argue that (1) reflexive foresight of the imagined futures in which climate engineering proposals might reside is required; (2) the performance and acceptance of climate engineering proposals should be decided in terms of robustness, not optimality; and (3) climate engineering proposals should be satisfactorily opened up before they can be considered legitimate objects of governance. Taken together, these propositions offer a sociotechnical framework not simply for governing clim...
Meeting international targets to limit climate change requires countries around the world to decarbonise whole energy systems. It is increasingly recognised that low-carbon energy transitions will need to focus as much on social... more
Meeting international targets to limit climate change requires countries around the world to decarbonise whole energy systems. It is increasingly recognised that low-carbon energy transitions will need to focus as much on social transformations and the meaningful engagement of society as they do technical aspects. Most existing studies to engage society with energy system change focus on discrete forms of participation around specific technologies or particular parts of the energy system, with very few exploring distributed engagements with energy in terms of 'whole system' change. We set out to address this research gap in two important ways. First, we report on an innovative approach to opening up diverse issue framings and participant perspectives about energy futures in the UK, called distributed deliberative mapping (DDM), that examines how alternative formats and models of public participation shape appraisal outcomes. In this way, we experimentally broaden out beyond conventional deliberative formats of participation, in terms of 'representative' mini-publics and expert elicitation, to also engage with activist, grassroots innovator and consumer-based models of participation and their associated publics. Second, in doing so we develop an explicitly sociotechnical approach, emphasising the oftenunacknowledged social arrangements that are co-produced with the technical elements of energy systems. Six diverse sociotechnical visions were developed and appraised: business as usual, large-scale technologies, deliberative energy society, smart tech society, local energy partnerships and off-grid energy communities. Across the five groups, we find a variety of problem framings that go far beyond the energy 'trilemma' and a greater diversity and range of technical and social criteria with which low-carbon energy futures are appraised. Our DDM study involving citizens and specialists shows that incumbent visions of centralised energy systems, such as business as usual and large-scale technologies, perform much lower than decentralised alternatives, such as a smart-tech society and local energy partnerships. Rather than a dominant focus on eliciting the views of 'representative' mini-publics to inform centralised decisions made by those managing 'the transition', DDM reveals and can support much more distributed modes of governing and democratising sustainable energy futures, across spaces and scales.
Research Interests:
Deliberate large-scale interventions in the Earth’s climate system, known collectively as climate ‘geoengineering’, have been proposed in order to moderate anthropogenic climate change. A host of normative rationales for geoengineering... more
Deliberate large-scale interventions in the Earth’s climate system, known collectively as climate ‘geoengineering’, have been proposed in order to moderate anthropogenic climate change. A host of normative rationales for geoengineering has led to a growing number of appraisals to evaluate the different proposals and provide decision support. This thesis critically reviews current appraisals of geoengineering before developing and executing its own appraisal methodology in response to their limitations. These limitations concern: (1) the appraisal of geoengineering proposals in ‘contextual isolation’ of alternative options for tackling climate change; (2) inadequate methodological responses to the ‘post-normal’ scientific context in which climate change and geoengineering resides; and (3) a premature ‘closing down’ upon particular geoengineering proposals, principally stratospheric aerosol injection, through the exertion of power via framings. This thesis exhibits the findings of an ...
Chapter 5 (“Governing BECCS: “Slippery Slope” or “Uphill Struggle”?”) highlights how BECCS and other large-scale interventions in the Earth’s climate system, proposed to moderate anthropogenic global warming, are commonly portrayed as... more
Chapter 5 (“Governing BECCS: “Slippery Slope” or “Uphill Struggle”?”) highlights how BECCS and other large-scale interventions in the Earth’s climate system, proposed to moderate anthropogenic global warming, are commonly portrayed as threatening to initiate a “slippery slope” from research to deployment. The argument suggests that governance should constrain or even proscribe research into BECCS on the grounds that allowing it to proceed unchecked could lead to a chain of events resulting in deployment and the undesirable consequences that this might bring. This chapter begins by critically examining the slippery slope argument as articulated in relation to BECCS. It then draws on the empirical findings of an expert scenario method designed to explore how far BECCS might develop in the future and under what governance arrangements. Rather than a slippery slope, the scenarios instead illustrate what might best be described as an “uphill struggle,” in which BECCS innovators confront manifold technical, political, and societal challenges to deployment. The chapter concludes by seeking to reframe the governance task as one of responsible incentivization, rather than one of constraint or proscription.
Experiments for technology proposals to deliberately intervene in the Earth’s climate system to moderate anthropogenic climate change, collectively known as geoengineering, have begun. Recent controversies have demonstrated that they are... more
Experiments for technology proposals to deliberately intervene in the Earth’s climate system to moderate anthropogenic climate change, collectively known as geoengineering, have begun. Recent controversies have demonstrated that they are more than simply a technical concern: they are political, social and ethical ones too. With more experiments planned, it is imperative that the ways in which such ambitions are understood and used by different participants in discourses on geoengineering are scrutinised by social science. For the first time, this article examines framings of geoengineering experimentation using a corpus approach to thematic discourse analysis. The analysis identifies eleven distinct framings with twenty–four distinct sub–frames under four thematic constructs: knowledge, precaution, control and society. These framings are discussed in the light of research into divergent epistemic and institutional cultures. The article concludes by offering a ‘clumsy’ solution space...
This report focuses on the methodological development of the testing and implementation framework (TIF) for increasing the socio-technical readiness of climate adaptation innovations and assessing their impact on different socio-economic... more
This report focuses on the methodological development of the testing and implementation framework (TIF) for increasing the socio-technical readiness of climate adaptation innovations and assessing their impact on different socio-economic and environmental sectors. It is designed to be read by innovators and used as a supporting document for the application of different toolboxes made available through BRIGAID. In this report, Chapter 2 provides an overview of the different components of the TIF, including an overview of the planned testing phases. Definitions for the Performance Indicators (PI) are provided in Chapter 3, which also includes a description of how the test results which are to be integrated into the Climate Innovation Window (CIW) (in WP7). Elaborated guidelines for testing are provided in Chapters 4-6. Specifically, guidelines for assessing the technical effectiveness of innovations are provided in Chapter 4; guidelines for assessing the impact of an innovation on the...
Chapter 6 (“Multilevel Policy Incentives for BECCS in Sweden”) builds on the high potential for BECCS in Sweden identified in chapter 4, summarizing the current policy incentives for BECCS research, development, demonstration, and... more
Chapter 6 (“Multilevel Policy Incentives for BECCS in Sweden”) builds on the high potential for BECCS in Sweden identified in chapter 4, summarizing the current policy incentives for BECCS research, development, demonstration, and diffusion (RDD&D). It examines the given policy drivers and obstacles at multiple scales (e.g., international, supranational, and national) and in terms of various forms of instruments (e.g., economic, regulatory, and informational). The chapter concludes that current policy instruments mostly fail to incentivize BECCS RDD&D in Sweden. The instruments partly favor R&D yet fail to provide incentives covering operational costs. Under current circumstances, BECCS is unlikely to reach demonstration scale in Sweden.
Societal issues involving policies and publics are generally understudied in research on ocean-based Negative Emission Technologies (NETs), yet will be crucial if novel techniques are ever to function at scale. Public attitudes are vital... more
Societal issues involving policies and publics are generally understudied in research on ocean-based Negative Emission Technologies (NETs), yet will be crucial if novel techniques are ever to function at scale. Public attitudes are vital for emerging technologies: publics influence political mandates, help determine the degree of uptake by market actors, and are key to realizing broader ambitions for robust decision-making and responsible incentivization. Discourses surrounding ocean NETs will also have fundamental effects on how governance for the techniques emerges, shaping how they are defined as an object of governance, who is assigned the authority to govern, and what instruments are deemed appropriate. This Perspective brings together key insights on the societal dimensions of ocean NETs, drawing on existing work on public acceptability, policy assessment, governance, and discourse. Ocean iron fertilization is the only ocean NET on which there exists considerable social science research thus far, and we show that much evidence points against its social desirability. Taken in conjunction with considerable natural science uncertainties, this leads us to question whether further research is actually necessary in order to rule out ocean iron fertilization as an option. For other ocean NETs, there is a need for further research into social dimensions, yet research on analogous technologies shows that ocean interventions will likely evoke strong risk perceptions, and evidence suggests that the majority of ocean NETs may face a greater public acceptability challenge than terrestrial NETs. Ocean NETs also raise complex challenges around governance, which pose questions well-beyond the remit of the natural sciences and engineering. Using a conceptual exploration of the ways in which different types of discourse may shape emerging ocean NETs governance, we show that the very idea of ocean NETs is likely to set the stage for a whole new range of contested futures.
Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) is considered a key mitigation technology in most 1.5–2.0°C compatible climate change mitigation scenarios. Nonetheless, examples of BECCS deployment are lacking internationally. It is... more
Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) is considered a key mitigation technology in most 1.5–2.0°C compatible climate change mitigation scenarios. Nonetheless, examples of BECCS deployment are lacking internationally. It is widely acknowledged that widespread implementation of this technology requires strong policy enablers, and that such enablers are currently non-existent. However, the literature lacks a more structured assessment of the “incentive gap” between scenarios with substantive BECCS deployment and existing policy enablers to effectuate BECCS deployment. Sweden, a country with progressive climate policies and particularly good preconditions for BECCS, constitutes a relevant locus for such examinations. The paper asks to what extent and how existing UN, EU, and Swedish climate policy instruments incentivize BECCS research, development, demonstration, and deployment in Sweden. The analysis is followed by a tentative discussion of needs for policy reform to improve the effectiveness of climate policy in delivering BECCS. Drawing on a tripartite typology of policy instruments (economic, regulatory, and informational) and the ability of these instruments to create supply-push or demand-pull, the article finds that: (1) no instruments create a demand-pull to cover operational expenditure; (2) economic instruments provide partial support for research and the capital expenditure associated with demonstration, and; (3) regulatory instruments provide partial clarity on environmental safeguards and responsibilities. A few regulatory barriers also continue to counteract deployment. The article concludes that the existing policy mix requires considerable reform if BECCS is to contribute substantially to the Swedish target for net-zero emissions. Continued effort to dismantle regulatory barriers must be complemented with a strong demand-pull instrument that complements the current focus on supply-push incentives. If unreformed, the existing policy mix will most likely lead to substantial public expenditure on BECCS research, development, and demonstration without leading to any substantial deployment and diffusion.
Since the late 1970s, over 140 global environmental assessments (GEAs) have been completed. But are they any longer fit for purpose? Some believe not. Compelling arguments have been advanced for a new assessment paradigm, one more... more
Since the late 1970s, over 140 global environmental assessments (GEAs) have been completed. But are they any longer fit for purpose? Some believe not. Compelling arguments have been advanced for a new assessment paradigm, one more focussed on problem-solving than problem-identification. If translated into new assessment practices, this envisaged paradigm could prevail for the next several decades, just as the current one has since the late 1970s. In this paper, it is contended that the arguments for GEAs 2.0 are, in fact, insufficiently bold. Solutions-orientated assessments, often associated with a ‘policy turn’ by their advocates, are undoubtedly necessary. But without a ‘politics turn’ they will be profoundly insufficient: policy options would be detached from the diverse socio-economic explanations and ‘deep hermeneutics’ of value that ultimately give them meaning, especially given the very high stakes now attached to managing human impacts on a fast-changing planet. Here we make the case for GEAs 3.0, where two paradigmatic steps forward are taken at once rather than just one. The second step involves the introduction of political reasoning and structured normative debate about existential alternatives, a pre-requisite to strategic decision-making and its operational expression. Possible objections to this second step are addressed and rebutted. Even so, the case for politically-overt GEAs faces formidable difficulties of implementation. However, we consider these challenges less a sign of our undue idealism and more an indication of the urgent need to mitigate, if not overcome them. In a world of ‘wicked problems’ we need ‘wicked assessments’ adequate to them, preparatory to so-called ‘clumsy solutions’. This paper is intended to inspire more far-reaching debate about the future of GEAs and, by implication, about the roles social science and the humanities might usefully play in addressing global environmental change.

And 19 more

Assessments of geoengineering have so far largely taken place under two dominant problem definitions. First, those efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will not be enough to tackle climate change. Second, that as a result of this,... more
Assessments of geoengineering have so far largely taken place under two dominant problem definitions. First, those efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will not be enough to tackle climate change. Second, that as a result of this, we may be faced with a dangerous change in climate, often stylised as crossing one or more "tipping points"–a "climate emergency". The expert multi-criteria assessment conducted for the Royal Society's seminal report provides a valuable illustration of how framing geoengineering assessment through the selection and elevation of particular criteria can compel particular outcomes. These permutations demonstrate how different instrumental framings can serve to "close down" on certain geoengineering proposals. Broadening out and opening up geoengineering assessment reveals the complexities and uncertainties that are often reduced and hidden in narrowly framed assessments. Indeed, a remarkable level of consistency has been found across expert, stakeholder, and public perspectives, with geoengineering proposals being outperformed by mitigation alternatives.
Chapter 6 (“Multilevel Policy Incentives for BECCS in Sweden”) builds on the high potential for BECCS in Sweden identified in chapter 4, summarizing the current policy incentives for BECCS research, development, demonstration, and... more
Chapter 6 (“Multilevel Policy Incentives for BECCS in Sweden”) builds on the high potential for BECCS in Sweden identified in chapter 4, summarizing the current policy incentives for BECCS research, development, demonstration, and diffusion (RDD&D). It examines the given policy drivers and obstacles at multiple scales (e.g., international, supranational, and national) and in terms of various forms of instruments (e.g., economic, regulatory, and informational). The chapter concludes that current policy instruments mostly fail to incentivize BECCS RDD&D in Sweden. The instruments partly favor R&D yet fail to provide incentives covering operational costs. Under current circumstances, BECCS is unlikely to reach demonstration scale in Sweden.
Chapter 5 (“Governing BECCS: “Slippery Slope” or “Uphill Struggle”?”) highlights how BECCS and other large-scale interventions in the Earth’s climate system, proposed to moderate anthropogenic global warming, are commonly portrayed as... more
Chapter 5 (“Governing BECCS: “Slippery Slope” or “Uphill Struggle”?”) highlights how BECCS and other large-scale interventions in the Earth’s climate system, proposed to moderate anthropogenic global warming, are commonly portrayed as threatening to initiate a “slippery slope” from research to deployment. The argument suggests that governance should constrain or even proscribe research into BECCS on the grounds that allowing it to proceed unchecked could lead to a chain of events resulting in deployment and the undesirable consequences that this might bring. This chapter begins by critically examining the slippery slope argument as articulated in relation to BECCS. It then draws on the empirical findings of an expert scenario method designed to explore how far BECCS might develop in the future and under what governance arrangements. Rather than a slippery slope, the scenarios instead illustrate what might best be described as an “uphill struggle,” in which BECCS innovators confront manifold technical, political, and societal challenges to deployment. The chapter concludes by seeking to reframe the governance task as one of responsible incentivization, rather than one of constraint or proscription.