- Department of International Relations, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, Australian National University, Acton, 2601, Australia.
- I am a Research Fellow in the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University. My work fo... moreI am a Research Fellow in the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University. My work focuses on theoretical and historical approaches to the politics of the great powers and the management of nuclear weapons.edit
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The special rights and responsibilities of the great powers have traditionally been treated as a key component-even a primary institution-of international society in the English School literature. Recent interpretivist work has focused on... more
The special rights and responsibilities of the great powers have traditionally been treated as a key component-even a primary institution-of international society in the English School literature. Recent interpretivist work has focused on the meanings of special responsibilities in contemporary international society with far less scholarly attention being given to the corollary of this-special rights. This article uses an interpretivist approach to attempt to uncover what recent debates over China's right or otherwise to a sphere of influence in East Asia tells us about understandings of great power rights in contemporary international society. The argument advanced is that if Beijing's right to a sphere of influence is successfully rejected by the rest of international society without repudiating its status as a great power more broadly, China will indeed be a great power without historical precedent.
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A central theme of the literature on rising powers is that new aspirants to great power status pose a challenge to the underlying principles and norms that underpin the existing, Western-led order. However, in much of the literature, the... more
A central theme of the literature on rising powers is that new aspirants to great power status pose a challenge to the underlying principles and norms that underpin the existing, Western-led order. However, in much of the literature, the nature and significance of rising powers for international order are imprecisely debated, in particular the concept and practice of 'contestation'. In this article, we aim to establish a distinction between normative contestation and what can be thought of as 'contestation over representation': that is, contestation over who is setting and overseeing the rules of the game rather than the content of the rules themselves and the kind of order that they underpin. The paper engages with debates on international order and international society, and its empirical basis is provided by a thorough analysis of the discourse of rising power summitry. One of the central themes running through the current literature on rising powers is that the new aspirants to great power status pose a challenge to the underlying principles and norms that underpin the existing, Western-led order. This often takes the form of a discussion about normative contestation that is assumed to be taking place and is likely to characterise the current era of order transition. According to this, 'rising powers are not only contesting their position in the international system, but the very rules that govern their rise.' 1 However, we argue that there is ample evidence that rising powers – such as China, Russia and India – do not necessarily seek to resist or challenge the underlying principles of international order in all instances, but rather they seek to gain greater access to, and representation in, the institutions and processes which define, administer and uphold international rules. From this perspective, much of the political conflict that is associated with the transitional international order may be better be defined not as normative contestation but rather as 'contestation over representation'. This form of contestation reflects a demand by rising powers to have their material interests served through greater access to, and representation in, international regimes, but it is also a demand that respect and status are
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Chapter from "The Trump Administration’s First 100 Days: What Should Asia Do?", The Australian National University’s College of Asia & the Pacific. 24 April 2017.... more
Chapter from "The Trump Administration’s First 100 Days: What Should Asia Do?", The Australian National University’s College of Asia & the Pacific. 24 April 2017. http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/trump-100-days/trump-administration-and-nuclear-stability
Lowy Interpreter, 1 May 2017
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/what-north-korea-and-syria-tell-us-about-us-primacy-it-s-over
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/what-north-korea-and-syria-tell-us-about-us-primacy-it-s-over
The literature on the current global order is confused over its polarity. Depictions of a current multipolarity are found alongside discussions of the longevity of US-led unipolarity, while others point to the early stages of... more
The literature on the current global order is confused over its polarity. Depictions of a current multipolarity are found alongside discussions of the longevity of US-led unipolarity, while others point to the early stages of US–Sino-dominated bipolarity. These competing visions of the interstate order sit uneasily within the existing literature that both defines polarity in terms of the distribution of material capabilities and makes system-level predictions based on the assumption that all actors perceive polarity objectively. This article outlines the need for a more analytically eclectic understanding of polarity. Exploring the possibilities of a deeper engagement between the realist literature on structural power and the constructivist literature on perception, agency, and performativity, it puts forward a redefinition of polarity in which perceptions of status replace a focus on the distribution of capabilities. An analysis of the Cold War period—normally depicted as a clear case of unbroken bipolarity—demonstrates the usefulness of this reconceptualization.
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This article considers what the nineteenth century can tell us about the nature of great power management under conditions of ambiguity in relation to the holders of great power status. It charts the development of an institutionalised... more
This article considers what the nineteenth century can tell us about the nature of great power management under conditions of ambiguity in relation to the holders of great power status. It charts the development of an institutionalised role for the great powers as managers of international society but with a specific focus on the mutual recognition, and conferral, of status. Such a focus highlights the changing, and sometimes competing, perceptions of not only which states should be thought of as great powers, but also therefore whether the power structure of international society remained multipolar or shifted towards bipolarity or even unipolarity. The article argues that a ‘golden age’ of great power management existed during a period in which perceptions of great power status were in fact more fluid than the standard literature accounts for. This means that predictions surrounding the imminent demise of the social institution of great power management under an increasingly ambiguous interstate order today may well be misplaced.
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This piece is an imagined email correspondence between three renowned international relations scholars, E. H. Carr, Hedley Bull and Coral Bell, who are discussing the Australian 2016 Defence White Paper. The purpose of such an exercise is... more
This piece is an imagined email correspondence between three renowned international relations scholars, E. H. Carr, Hedley Bull and Coral Bell, who are discussing the Australian 2016 Defence White Paper. The purpose of such an exercise is to reflect on the ‘big-picture’ international relations questions posed by what might otherwise be thought of as a relatively technical defence policy document. In particular, the correspondence between the three focuses on the central importance of the White Paper’s assumptions of a ‘rules-based global order’ and the relationship between this order and US power. In their time, all three authors spoke directly to questions of power, law and order in their scholarly work, which had been deeply influenced, in all three cases, by periods spent working at the ‘coalface’ of these issues in government in Britain and Australia. As such, Carr, Bull and Bell have much to say about how Australia is positioning itself for a post-unipolar world.
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Some two decades after the US-led Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), advances in military technology and engineering have allowed the development of an array of advanced precision conventional weaponry that is increasingly prominent at... more
Some two decades after the US-led Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), advances in military technology and engineering have allowed the development of an array of advanced precision conventional weaponry that is increasingly prominent at the strategic level. This includes various new global strike capabilities (including antisatellite forces), significant improvements in antimissile defenses, as well as a host of more nebulous cyber capabilities. All of these technologies have implications for how we think about and manage nuclear weapons and major power relationships, and will create, in the words of Joshua Pollack (“Boost-glide Weapons and US-China Strategic Stability,” 22.2, June 2015, pp. 155-64), “a more complex set of interactions” within an already fragile nuclear order.
Taken together, these developments suggest that we are now standing on the edge of a major new era of nuclear affairs—one in which advanced conventional weapons become significant factors in the defense postures of the major nuclear-armed states—and one that will have significant implications for strategic stability and crisis management, arms control, and the global nuclear order more broadly.
Taken together, these developments suggest that we are now standing on the edge of a major new era of nuclear affairs—one in which advanced conventional weapons become significant factors in the defense postures of the major nuclear-armed states—and one that will have significant implications for strategic stability and crisis management, arms control, and the global nuclear order more broadly.
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With the rise of new centres of power, the environment in which British decision-makers attempt to create an effective foreign and defence strategy is undergoing a profound change. Benjamin Zala argues for a three-pronged response. First,... more
With the rise of new centres of power, the environment in which British decision-makers attempt to create an effective foreign and defence strategy is undergoing a profound change. Benjamin Zala argues for a three-pronged response. First, finding a way of building a national strategy for a world in which new powers are rising in different ways and at different rates that avoids the conceptual dead ends of a ‘networked' and ‘nonpolar' world. Second, revisiting the debate over the costs and benefits of the US alliance in light of the potential return of major-power alliances for the first time since the Second World War. Third, pursuing a British approach to multilateralism and global-governance reform that reflects the decreasing dominance of the West.
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United States’ foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region is set to be fundamentally altered by two developments in Washington's defence policy. The first is the so-called pivot towards the region in terms of overall defence strategy.... more
United States’ foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region is set to be fundamentally altered by two developments in Washington's defence policy. The first is the so-called pivot towards the region in terms of overall defence strategy. The second, occurring at roughly the same time, is a move towards a far greater role for advanced conventional weaponry in the US defence posture. We analyse the interaction of these two trends and discusses a central tension between short and long-term challenges, suggesting that, contrary to current developments, either a freeze in the deployment of these weapons programmes or a return to a strategy underpinned by traditional notions of deterrence may well be necessary.
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The Obama administration has made a great effort to increase the role of advanced conventional weaponry in US national security thinking and practice, in part to help reinvigorate the global nuclear disarmament agenda by reducing the role... more
The Obama administration has made a great effort to increase the role of advanced conventional weaponry in US national security thinking and practice, in part to help reinvigorate the global nuclear disarmament agenda by reducing the role played by nuclear weapons in the US defense posture. However, such a strategy is fundamentally flawed because increases in US conventional superiority will exacerbate US relative strength vis-à-vis other powers, and therefore make the prospect of a nuclear weapon-free world seem less attractive to Washington's current and potential nuclear rivals. Consequently, it is highly likely that the impact of efforts to increase US advanced conventional superiority through ballistic missile defense and a conventional “prompt global strike” program will ensure that the Obama administration is adopting a pathway to nuclear abolition on which it is the sole traveler for the foreseeable future.
January's long-awaited Missile Defense Review (MDR) unshackles the United States from its prior rhetorical commitments to limiting the size and scope of its defensive system, explicitly references missile threats from Russia and China,... more
January's long-awaited Missile Defense Review (MDR) unshackles the United States from its prior rhetorical commitments to limiting the size and scope of its defensive system, explicitly references missile threats from Russia and China, and commits Washington to further investment in ground- and space-based technologies. The normalisation of missile defence, despite the enduring problems it poses, should be resisted and challenged. A renewed debate over missile defence should focus on the a priori question of whether it lowers or raises the risks of nuclear weapons being used, not be limited to questions of financial cost and technical challenges.