- University of California, Hastings, Hastings international and comparative law review, Graduate StudentUniversity of Cambridge, Politics and International Studies (POLIS), Graduate Studentadd
Research Interests:
This study seeks to determine how the Islamic Republic of Iran (‘the IRI’) has survived despite the multitude of forces seeking its ouster and vulnerability of prior twentieth century Iranian governments to regime change. The IRI’s... more
This study seeks to determine how the Islamic Republic of Iran (‘the IRI’) has survived despite the multitude of forces seeking its ouster and vulnerability of prior twentieth century Iranian governments to regime change. The IRI’s survival has puzzled many analysts especially due to the regime’s reported domestic unpopularity. That the IRI has survived longer than any other twentieth century Iranian regime is even more unusual when compared to its predecessors. Pre-1979 Iranian regimes enjoyed foreign support and fell when those external forces became hostile in 1921, 1941 and 1953 or wavered in 1979. In contrast, the IRI has not only lacked substantial foreign support but has faced formidable external challengers like the United States.
Two relationships effectively explain the IRI’s survival. The first is between the Supreme Leader and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (‘IRGC’). This ensures that the regime has the enforcers to quell domestic unrest and project power internationally to weaken actors seeking regime change. The nature of this relationship prevents a military takeover, as the IRGC’s ideology requires the pre-eminence of the Supreme Leader. The second is between the regime and the general public (particularly the poor). This ensures that the regime does not face mass dissatisfaction, as the last Shah did in 1979.
The IRI has balanced repression, populism, pragmatism, and popular legitimacy (frequently with elections) and appeasement. Further, the Islamic Republic began with an advantage: regimes resulting from mass revolutions are traditionally difficult for foreign powers to overthrow due to the regime’s dedication and popular support.
After the Shah’s overthrow, the clerics contended with numerous armed post-revolutionary factions. As a result of superior popular support, unifying the country behind anti-Americanism and the war effort against Iraq’s invasion, the clerical regime won the post-revolutionary struggle against its domestic armed opponents.
After the war with Iraq and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s death, the IRI moderated its policies while promoting socio-economic populism to prevent mass discontent. The new Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, addressed his legitimacy shortcomings by turning to the IRGC. Although no longer an IRGC member upon his appointment as Supreme Leader, Khamenei had positive personal relationships with IRGC officials due to his supervision of the organization in its early days.
Internationally, the IRI projected power and exploited American foreign policy blunders to forge a geopolitical situation that made it prohibitively costly for foreign powers to topple the Islamic Republic. Further, the Iranian landmass is difficult to invade due to its unique and formidable geography. Additionally, the IRI, by fostering relations with militias throughout the Middle East (e.g. the Lebanese Hezbollah), has created asymmetric trip wires that would cause intense instability against an invading power throughout the Middle East. An overt military action against the IRI then, would not only result in the invader facing an intensely difficult campaign on Iranian soil but also a series of pro-Iranian guerrilla campaigns outside Iranian territory.
Two relationships effectively explain the IRI’s survival. The first is between the Supreme Leader and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (‘IRGC’). This ensures that the regime has the enforcers to quell domestic unrest and project power internationally to weaken actors seeking regime change. The nature of this relationship prevents a military takeover, as the IRGC’s ideology requires the pre-eminence of the Supreme Leader. The second is between the regime and the general public (particularly the poor). This ensures that the regime does not face mass dissatisfaction, as the last Shah did in 1979.
The IRI has balanced repression, populism, pragmatism, and popular legitimacy (frequently with elections) and appeasement. Further, the Islamic Republic began with an advantage: regimes resulting from mass revolutions are traditionally difficult for foreign powers to overthrow due to the regime’s dedication and popular support.
After the Shah’s overthrow, the clerics contended with numerous armed post-revolutionary factions. As a result of superior popular support, unifying the country behind anti-Americanism and the war effort against Iraq’s invasion, the clerical regime won the post-revolutionary struggle against its domestic armed opponents.
After the war with Iraq and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s death, the IRI moderated its policies while promoting socio-economic populism to prevent mass discontent. The new Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, addressed his legitimacy shortcomings by turning to the IRGC. Although no longer an IRGC member upon his appointment as Supreme Leader, Khamenei had positive personal relationships with IRGC officials due to his supervision of the organization in its early days.
Internationally, the IRI projected power and exploited American foreign policy blunders to forge a geopolitical situation that made it prohibitively costly for foreign powers to topple the Islamic Republic. Further, the Iranian landmass is difficult to invade due to its unique and formidable geography. Additionally, the IRI, by fostering relations with militias throughout the Middle East (e.g. the Lebanese Hezbollah), has created asymmetric trip wires that would cause intense instability against an invading power throughout the Middle East. An overt military action against the IRI then, would not only result in the invader facing an intensely difficult campaign on Iranian soil but also a series of pro-Iranian guerrilla campaigns outside Iranian territory.