research-article

Affine Maximizers in Domains with Selfish Valuations

Authors:

Arunava SenAuthors Info & Claims

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), Volume 3, Issue 4

Article No.: 26, Pages 1 - 19

https://doi.org/10.1145/2786014

Published: 31 July 2015 Publication History

Abstract

We consider the domain of selfish and continuous preferences over a “rich” allocation space and show that onto, strategyproof and allocation non-bossy social choice functions are affine maximizers. Roberts [1979] proves this result for a finite set of alternatives and an unrestricted valuation space. In this article, we show that in a subdomain of the unrestricted valuations with the additional assumption of allocation non-bossiness, using the richness of the allocations, the strategyproof social choice functions can be shown to be affine maximizers. We provide an example to show that allocation non-bossiness is indeed critical for this result. This work shows that an affine maximizer result needs a certain amount of richness split across valuations and allocations.

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Cited By

Bhattacharyya RDave PDey PNath SDastani MSichman JAlechina NDignum V(2024)Optimal Referral Auction DesignProceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3635637.3662867(198-206)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3635637.3662867
De PMitra M(2019)Balanced implementability of sequencing rulesGames and Economic Behavior10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.005Online publication date: Sep-2019
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.005
Mishra DNath SRoy S(2018)Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfersGames and Economic Behavior10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.018109(240-261)Online publication date: May-2018
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.018
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

Affine Maximizers in Domains with Selfish Valuations
1. Applied computing
  1. Law, social and behavioral sciences
    1. Economics

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Published In

cover image ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Volume 3, Issue 4

Special Issue on WINE '13 and Regular Papers

July 2015

186 pages

ISSN:2167-8375

EISSN:2167-8383

DOI:10.1145/2810066

Editors:
Vincent Conitzer
Duke University
,
Preston McAfee
Google

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Copyright © 2015 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 31 July 2015

Accepted: 01 June 2009

Revised: 01 March 2009

Received: 01 February 2007

Published in TEAC Volume 3, Issue 4

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Cited By

Bhattacharyya RDave PDey PNath SDastani MSichman JAlechina NDignum V(2024)Optimal Referral Auction DesignProceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3635637.3662867(198-206)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3635637.3662867
De PMitra M(2019)Balanced implementability of sequencing rulesGames and Economic Behavior10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.005Online publication date: Sep-2019
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.005
Mishra DNath SRoy S(2018)Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfersGames and Economic Behavior10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.018109(240-261)Online publication date: May-2018
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.018
Thomson W(2016)Non-bossinessSocial Choice and Welfare10.1007/s00355-016-0987-747:3(665-696)Online publication date: 5-Sep-2016
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0987-7

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