research-article

Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games

Authors:

Branislav Bošanský,

Simina Brânzei,

Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen,

Troels Bjerre Lund,

Peter Bro MiltersenAuthors Info & Claims

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), Volume 5, Issue 4

Article No.: 23, Pages 1 - 24

https://doi.org/10.1145/3133242

Published: 14 December 2017 Publication History

Abstract

The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader’s choice. We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximation algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.

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Cited By

Ling CKolter JFang FWilliams BChen YNeville J(2023)Function approximation for solving stackelberg equilibrium in large perfect information gamesProceedings of the Thirty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Thirty-Fifth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence and Thirteenth Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25715(5764-5772)Online publication date: 7-Feb-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25715
Zhang HCheng YConitzer VLeyton-Brown KSamuelson LHartline J(2023)Efficiently Solving Turn-Taking Stochastic Games with Extensive-Form CorrelationProceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3580507.3597665(1161-1186)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3580507.3597665
Yeh CChen HYang DLee WYu PChen M(2023)Planning Data Poisoning Attacks on Heterogeneous Recommender Systems in a Multiplayer Setting2023 IEEE 39th International Conference on Data Engineering (ICDE)10.1109/ICDE55515.2023.00193(2510-2523)Online publication date: Apr-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDE55515.2023.00193
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games
1. Theory of computation
  1. Computational complexity and cryptography
    1. Problems, reductions and completeness
  2. Theory and algorithms for application domains
    1. Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
      1. Algorithmic game theory
      2. Exact and approximate computation of equilibria

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Abstract
The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader’s ...

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Published In

cover image ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Volume 5, Issue 4

Special Issue on Wine'15

November 2017

146 pages

ISSN:2167-8375

EISSN:2167-8383

DOI:10.1145/3174276

Editors:
David Pennock
Microsoft
,
Ilya Segal
Stanford University

Issue’s Table of Contents

Copyright © 2017 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 14 December 2017

Accepted: 01 June 2017

Revised: 01 December 2016

Received: 01 July 2016

Published in TEAC Volume 5, Issue 4

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Funding Sources

Grantová Agentura České Republiky
United States-Israel Binational Science Foundation
I-CORE Program of the Planning and Budgeting Committee and The Israel Science Foundation
Danish National Research Foundation and The National Science Foundation of China
Danish Strategic Research Council
Israel Science Foundation
European Research Council

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Cited By

Ling CKolter JFang FWilliams BChen YNeville J(2023)Function approximation for solving stackelberg equilibrium in large perfect information gamesProceedings of the Thirty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Thirty-Fifth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence and Thirteenth Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25715(5764-5772)Online publication date: 7-Feb-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25715
Zhang HCheng YConitzer VLeyton-Brown KSamuelson LHartline J(2023)Efficiently Solving Turn-Taking Stochastic Games with Extensive-Form CorrelationProceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3580507.3597665(1161-1186)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3580507.3597665
Yeh CChen HYang DLee WYu PChen M(2023)Planning Data Poisoning Attacks on Heterogeneous Recommender Systems in a Multiplayer Setting2023 IEEE 39th International Conference on Data Engineering (ICDE)10.1109/ICDE55515.2023.00193(2510-2523)Online publication date: Apr-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDE55515.2023.00193
Mańdziuk JŻychowski A(2023)Duel-based neuroevolutionary method for Stackelberg Security Games with boundedly rational AttackerApplied Soft Computing10.1016/j.asoc.2023.110673146(110673)Online publication date: Oct-2023
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.asoc.2023.110673
Aine SOza YLikhachev M(2021)Disruption-Limited Planning for Robot Navigation in Dynamic Environments2021 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS)10.1109/IROS51168.2021.9636274(377-383)Online publication date: 27-Sep-2021
https://doi.org/10.1109/IROS51168.2021.9636274
Hall-Andersen MSchwartzbach N(2021)Game Theory on the Blockchain: A Model for Games with Smart ContractsAlgorithmic Game Theory10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_11(156-170)Online publication date: 14-Sep-2021
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_11
Fattahi JWright DSchriemer H(2020)An Energy Internet DERMS Platform using a Multi-level Stackelberg GameSustainable Cities and Society10.1016/j.scs.2020.102262(102262)Online publication date: May-2020
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scs.2020.102262
Farina GMarchesi AKroer CGatti NSandholm T(2018)Trembling-hand perfection in extensive-form games with commitmentProceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3304415.3304449(233-239)Online publication date: 13-Jul-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3304415.3304449
Černý JBoýanský BKiekintveld CTardos EElkind EVohra R(2018)Incremental Strategy Generation for Stackelberg Equilibria in Extensive-Form GamesProceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3219166.3219219(151-168)Online publication date: 11-Jun-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3219166.3219219

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