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Applications of α-Strongly Regular Distributions to Bayesian Auctions
Two classes of distributions that are widely used in the analysis of Bayesian auctions are the monotone hazard rate (MHR) and regular distributions. They can both be characterized in terms of the rate of change of the associated virtual value functions: ...
Fast Convergence in the Double Oral Auction
A classical trading experiment consists of a set of unit demand buyers and unit supply sellers with identical items. Each agent’s value or opportunity cost for the item is his private information, and preferences are quasilinear. Trade between agents ...
Impartial Selection and the Power of Up to Two Choices
We study mechanisms that select members of a set of agents based on nominations by other members and that are impartial in the sense that agents cannot influence their own chance of selection. Prior work has shown that deterministic mechanisms for ...
Sequential Posted-Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations
We study the revenue performance of sequential posted-price mechanisms and some natural extensions for a setting where the valuations of the buyers are drawn from a correlated distribution. Sequential posted-price mechanisms are conceptually simple ...
The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling
We study the problem of scheduling m tasks to n selfish, unrelated machines in order to minimize the makespan, in which the execution times are independent random variables, identical across machines. We show that the VCG mechanism, which myopically ...
Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games
The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader’s choice. We ...
