research-article

Impartial Selection and the Power of Up to Two Choices

Authors:

Max KlimmAuthors Info & Claims

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), Volume 5, Issue 4

Article No.: 21, Pages 1 - 20

https://doi.org/10.1145/3107922

Published: 22 December 2017 Publication History

Abstract

We study mechanisms that select members of a set of agents based on nominations by other members and that are impartial in the sense that agents cannot influence their own chance of selection. Prior work has shown that deterministic mechanisms for selecting any fixed number k of agents are severely limited and cannot extract a constant fraction of the nominations of the k most highly nominated agents. We prove here that this impossibility result can be circumvented by allowing the mechanism to sometimes but not always select fewer than k agents. This added flexibility also improves the performance of randomized mechanisms, for which we show a separation between mechanisms that make exactly two or up to two choices and give upper and lower bounds for mechanisms allowed more than two choices.

References

[1]

N. Alon, F. Fischer, A. D. Procaccia, and M. Tennenholtz. 2011. Sum of Us: Strategyproof selection from the selectors. In Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge. 101--110.

Digital Library

[2]

H. Aziz, O. Lev, N. Mattei, J. S. Rosenschein, and T. Walsh. 2016. Strategyproof peer selection: Mechanisms, analyses, and experiments. In Proceedings of the 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 390--396.

Digital Library

[3]

G. Birkhoff. 1946. Tres observaciones sobre el algebra lineal. Revista Facultad de Ciencias Exactas, Puras y Aplicadas Universidad Nacional de Tucumán, Serie A 5 (1946), 147--151.

[4]

N. Bousquet, S. Norin, and A. Vetta. 2014. A near-optimal mechanism for impartial selection. In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics. 133--146.

[5]

I. Caragiannis, A. Filos-Ratsikas, S. K. S. Frederiksen, K. A. Hansen, and Z. Tan. 2016. Truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation: An exact analysis of serial dictatorship. In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics. 236--259.

Digital Library

[6]

G. de Clippel, H. Moulin, and N. Tideman. 2008. Impartial division of a dollar. J. Econ. Theor. 139, 1 (2008), 176--191.

[7]

F. Fischer and M. Klimm. 2015. Optimal impartial selection. SIAM J. Comput. 44, 5 (2015), 1263--1285.

Digital Library

[8]

R. Holzman and H. Moulin. 2013. Impartial nominations for a prize. Econometrica 81, 1 (2013), 173--196.

[9]

D. Kurokawa, O. Lev, J. Morgenstern, and A. D. Procaccia. 2015. Impartial peer review. In Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 582--588.

Digital Library

[10]

A. Mackenzie. 2015. Symmetry and impartial lotteries. Games Econ. Behav. 94 (2015), 15--28.

[11]

A. Mackenzie. 2017. A game of the throne of Saint Peter. (2017). Working paper.

[12]

M. Mitzenmacher, A.W. Richa, and R. Sitaraman. 2001. The power of two random choices: A survey of techniques and results. In Handbook of Randomized Computing, S. Rajasekaran, P. M. Pardalos, J. H. Reif, and J. Rolim (Eds.). Vol. 1. Springer, 255--312.

[13]

A. D. Procaccia and M. Tennenholtz. 2013. Approximate mechanism design without money. ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. 1, 4 (2013), Article 18.

Digital Library

[14]

D. D. Sleator and R. E. Tarjan. 1985. Amortized efficiency of list update and paging rules. Commun. ACM 28, 2 (1985), 202--208.

Digital Library

[15]

S. Tamura. 2016. Characterizing minimal impartial rules for awarding prizes. Games Econ. Behav. 95 (2016), 41--46.

[16]

S. Tamura and S. Ohseto. 2014. Impartial nomination correspondences. Soc. Choice Welf. 43, 1 (2014), 47--54.

[17]

J. Witkowski, Y. Bachrach, P. Key, and D. C. Parkes. 2013. Dwelling on the negative: Incentivizing effort in peer prediction. In Proceedings of the 1st AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing. 190--197.

[18]

J. Witkowski and D. C. Parkes. 2012. Peer prediction without a common prior. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. 964--981.

Digital Library

Cited By

Cembrano JGriesbach SStahlberg M(2024)Deterministic Impartial Selection with WeightsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/367717712:3(1-22)Online publication date: 6-Sep-2024
https://doi.org/10.1145/3677177
Cembrano JFischer FHannon DKlimm M(2024)Impartial selection with additive guarantees via iterated deletionGames and Economic Behavior10.1016/j.geb.2024.01.008144(203-224)Online publication date: Mar-2024
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.01.008
Olckers MWalsh T(2024)Manipulation and peer mechanisms: A surveyArtificial Intelligence10.1016/j.artint.2024.104196336(104196)Online publication date: Nov-2024
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2024.104196
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

Impartial Selection and the Power of Up to Two Choices
1. Theory of computation
  1. Theory and algorithms for application domains
    1. Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design

Recommendations

Impartial Selection with Additive Guarantees via Iterated Deletion
EC '22: Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

Impartial selection is the selection of an individual from a group based on nominations by other members of the group, in such a way that individuals cannot influence their own chance of selection. We give a deterministic mechanism with an additive ...
Optimal impartial selection
EC '14: Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation

We study the problem of selecting a member of a set of agents based on impartial nominations by agents from that set. The problem was studied previously by Alon et al. and by Holzman and Moulin and has important applications in situations where ...
Deterministic Impartial Selection with Weights
Web and Internet Economics
Abstract
In the impartial selection problem, a subset of agents up to a fixed size k among a group of n is to be chosen based on votes cast by the agents themselves. A selection mechanism is impartial if no agent can influence its own chance of being ...

Comments

Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

cover image ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Volume 5, Issue 4

Special Issue on Wine'15

November 2017

146 pages

ISSN:2167-8375

EISSN:2167-8383

DOI:10.1145/3174276

Editors:
David Pennock
Microsoft
,
Ilya Segal
Stanford University

Issue’s Table of Contents

Copyright © 2017 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 22 December 2017

Accepted: 01 March 2017

Revised: 01 December 2016

Received: 01 July 2016

Published in TEAC Volume 5, Issue 4

Permissions

Request permissions for this article.

Request Permissions

Check for updates

Author Tags

Qualifiers

Research-article
Research
Refereed

Funding Sources

ECMath

Contributors

Other Metrics

View Article Metrics

Bibliometrics & Citations

Bibliometrics

Article Metrics

14
Total Citations
View Citations
151
Total Downloads

Downloads (Last 12 months)22
Downloads (Last 6 weeks)2

Reflects downloads up to 10 Nov 2024

Other Metrics

View Author Metrics

Citations

Cited By

Cembrano JGriesbach SStahlberg M(2024)Deterministic Impartial Selection with WeightsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/367717712:3(1-22)Online publication date: 6-Sep-2024
https://doi.org/10.1145/3677177
Cembrano JFischer FHannon DKlimm M(2024)Impartial selection with additive guarantees via iterated deletionGames and Economic Behavior10.1016/j.geb.2024.01.008144(203-224)Online publication date: Mar-2024
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.01.008
Olckers MWalsh T(2024)Manipulation and peer mechanisms: A surveyArtificial Intelligence10.1016/j.artint.2024.104196336(104196)Online publication date: Nov-2024
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2024.104196
Deligkas AFilos-Ratsikas AVoudouris A(2024)Truthful interval coveringAutonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems10.1007/s10458-024-09673-638:2Online publication date: 1-Dec-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s10458-024-09673-6
Caragiannis IChristodoulou GProtopapas N(2023)Impartial Selection with Prior InformationProceedings of the ACM Web Conference 202310.1145/3543507.3583553(3614-3624)Online publication date: 30-Apr-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3543507.3583553
Bloch FDutta BDziubiński M(2023)Selecting a winner with external refereesJournal of Economic Theory10.1016/j.jet.2023.105687211(105687)Online publication date: Jul-2023
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105687
Lev OMattei NTurrini PZhydkov S(2023) PeerNominationArtificial Intelligence10.1016/j.artint.2022.103843316:COnline publication date: 1-Mar-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.artint.2022.103843
Cembrano JGriesbach SStahlberg M(2023)Deterministic Impartial Selection with WeightsWeb and Internet Economics10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_9(151-168)Online publication date: 4-Dec-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_9
Caragiannis IChristodoulou GProtopapas N(2022)Impartial Selection with Additive Approximation GuaranteesTheory of Computing Systems10.1007/s00224-022-10081-066:3(721-742)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s00224-022-10081-0
Cembrano JFischer FKlimm M(2022)Optimal Impartial CorrespondencesWeb and Internet Economics10.1007/978-3-031-22832-2_11(187-203)Online publication date: 12-Dec-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-031-22832-2_11
Show More Cited By

View Options

Get Access

Login options

Check if you have access through your login credentials or your institution to get full access on this article.

Full Access

Get this Article

View options

PDF

View or Download as a PDF file.

eReader

View online with eReader.

Media

Figures

Other

Tables

View Issue’s Table of Contents