In Brown v. Buhman, the recent challenge to the Utah law criminalizing polygamy brought by the stars of the reality television show Sister Wives, a federal district court determined both that strict scrutiny was required and that strict...
moreIn Brown v. Buhman, the recent challenge to the Utah law criminalizing polygamy brought by the stars of the reality television show Sister Wives, a federal district court determined both that strict scrutiny was required and that strict scrutiny could not be satisfied. A significant factor in this result was the state’s failure to mount a strong defense of the law, assuming that it could rely on long standing polygamy precedents such as the United States Supreme Court decision in Reynolds v. United States and more recent Tenth Circuit and Utah Supreme Court decisions to justify limiting scrutiny to rational basis and to provide legitimate reasons for the criminalization of polygamy. However, the State could have taken advantage of a then just released Canadian opinion, Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada (Reference), to explain the real and expansive harms of polygamy. The Reference court undertook an exhaustive examination of the impact of polygamy on women, on children, on men, and on society, utilizing empirical evidence, expert reports, personal anecdotes, and a wide range of “Brandeis Brief” materials. This Article argues that the broad range of social and individual harms of polygamy identified in Reference provide a compelling state interest sufficient to withstand the strict scrutiny deemed necessary by Brown.
The Article also argues that the Utah statute cannot properly be understood to be a “religious gerrymander” requiring strict scrutiny. The Brown court’s determination that the Utah statute only targeted religiously motivated polygamy was based on its improper segregation of the statute’s coverage of licensed bigamy and polygamy, which the court acknowledged covered both religiously and nonreligiously motivated marriages, from the statute’s coverage of unlicensed ceremonial polygamous marriages and polygamous marital cohabitation, which the court saw as only religiously motivated. The Article goes on to show that the real target of the Utah statute are the multiple marital relationships present in all polygamy and not the religious motivation for polygamy undeniably present in much of the actual Mormon Fundamentalist polygamy practiced in Utah. The Article additionally argues that the heightened scrutiny called for by the Brown court under the Smith hybrid analysis is also not justified.
Finally, the Article briefly considers how a statute that only criminalizes religiously motivated polygamy might be justified, based on the way in which polygamous religious communities funnel teenage girls into polygamous marriages by ensuring that they never have the chance to develop sufficient autonomy to truly choose for themselves, not unlike the way the Amish in Yoder sought to limit their children’s education to prevent them from having either the desire or ability to live anything but an agrarian life. This Article suggests that confronting the autonomy-destroying impact of religiously motivated practices such as polygamy might force reconsideration of both Yoder and the limits of free exercise.
