IHRIM UMR 5317

In the  first  letter  to  Bernard  of  Arezzo, Nicholas  d'Autrecourt  (ca.  1298-1369)
categorically states that a theory of knowledge that separates the acts of knowledge of sensible
objects is irrevocably in danger. This Communication aims to understand the distinction between
intuitive knowledge and abstractive knowledge, drawn by Bernard of Arezzo due to the objection
taken by your correspondent Nicholas d'Autrecourt under its first letter. It also aims to observe the
status of your objection rests on an aspect of reductio ad absurdum and on an inferential process
epistemological propositions at stake in the fourteenth century.  Keywords: intuition, abstraction,
epistemology, inferential process.

Abstract: The objective of this work is to show, according to Frege, in which the procedure
consists of 'abstraction' he worded unsystematic in Chapter IV, in the context of § § 64-69 ss.
Fundamentals of Arithmetic. This procedure, although controversial, is a key operator for defining
the concept of number, the object of investigation of that chapter. At the beginning of § 62,
asks the question: how can we therefore be given a number, if we can not have him no
representation or intuition? In a concise manner, that responds only in the context of a
proposition words mean something. Frege seeks to define the concept of number in a holistic
way, based on relationships until you reach your final definition of the numbers in propositions
that are objective and that follow. However, this proposal needs to be set and the procedure
which uses is the "abstraction" which is exemplified by (i) parallel and (ii) equinumerosity. That
is scoped to an equivalence relation: symmetry, reflexivity and transitivity, all the internal
principles mentioned procedure. Further, it will show the relevance of the criticism waged the
notion of abstract objects (numbers) prepared by E. J. Lowe in his book The Metaphysics of Abstract
Objects in section II about abstract entities.

Keywords: Frege; principles of abstraction; abstract entities.

Résumé: Cet article vise à montrer et d’analyser la façon dont ils constituent quelques-uns des arguments sur l'éternité des choses dans le premier traité, chapitre De aeternitate rerum de l’Exigit ordo de Nicolas d'Autrécourt (Ca. 1300-1369). Comme le titre du chapitre lui-même dit, il s'agit d'un ensemble d'arguments qui cherchent à justifier l'éternité des choses. La stratégie pour nous est de reconstruire et de montrer comment se constituent et s’organisent de tels arguments sur l'éternité des choses, en elucident le postulat autrécurien qu'il est probable que toutes les choses, sans exception, sont éternelles; et que l'univers est éternel et composée d'atomes, et régi par un seul mouvement, à savoir, le mouvement local. Notre interprétation cherche à aborder la question de la reconstruction de la philosophie de la nature d’Autrécourt et certaines de ces déclarations ontologiques et épistémologiques préparés par lui-même.
Mots-clés: l'éternité des choses; philosophie de la nature; Nicolas d'Autrécourt.

Often, the history of philosophy attaches to modernity, more precisely Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715), the origin of the discussion on the concept of occasionalism. But this issue has already been dealt with in the context of Islamic scholasticism.
This article presents an analysis of a series of arguments about causality developed by the Persian philosopher al-Ghazālī (ca. 1059-1111), in its 17th meditation on causality and miracles in "Tahâfot al-Falasifa" (Incoherence of the Philosophers). AlGhazālī then builds an insight into the no necessary relation between cause and effect, seeming to elaborate a theory of the divine will in which the occasionalism operates as a result of his theological and scientific thought.

The issue of epistemic foundationalism Nicholas of Autrecourt (ca.1300-1369) can be placed as follows: there is indeed a last foundation of knowledge? What is the justification test that regulates our knowledge? Contrary to John Buridan (ca. 1300-1361), one of his critics, Nicholas of Autrecourt is convinced that all knowledge has a single ground, which lies in the first principle as a reduction mechanism (renewal) and justification of knowledge. The main driver for setting up a foundational epistemology, both in medieval context as the contemporary
foundationalism is the search for a solution to avoid a return to infinity. The effort of an almost epistemological systematization by Autrecourt aims, first and foremost, a restriction on the return to infinity. This article, in short, will offer a reconstruction of the first principle as a central element in the constitution of a foundational character of epistemology.

Keywords: Epistemic foundationalism; epistemic logic; medieval philosophy.

This article aims to show some aspects of the legal humanism, just as developed by Francisco de Vitoria (Ca. 1486-1546). We must, though, the task of investigating and reconstructing the philosophical contributions of Late Scholasticism developed in the scope of legal humanism that enabled the systematization of the concept of ius communicationis (right of communication). Our depart reconstruction of a triple epistemological foundation often used by the author, namely the status of the doubt, certainty and belief. The discussion, prima facie, focuses on two of its main internationalist conferences on the problem of America's colonization. First, his approach to the subject in De potestate Civili; secondly, in De indis recenter inventis relectio prior.
Resumo: Este artigo tem como objetivo mostrar alguns aspectos do humanismo jurídico, tal qual desenvolvido por Francisco de Vitoria (Ca. 1486-1546). Cabe-nos, ainda, a tarefa de investigar e reconstruir as contribuições filosóficas da Escolástica Tardia desenvolvida no escopo do humanismo jurídico que permitiram a sistematização do conceito de ius communicationis (direito de comunicação). Nossa reconstrução partirá de uma tríplice fundamentação epistemológica frequentemente utilizada pelo autor, a saber, o estatuto da dúvida, da certeza e da opinião. A discussão, prima facie, se concentra em duas de suas principais conferências internacionalistas sobre o problema da colonização da América. Em primeiro lugar, sua aproximação do tema no De Potestate Civili; em segundo lugar, no De indis recenter inventis relectio prior. Palavras-chave: humanismo jurídico; segunda escolástica; direito; filosofia da ação. Abstract: This article aims to show some aspects of the legal humanism, just as developed by Francisco de Vitoria (Ca. 1486-1546). We must, though, the task of investigating and reconstructing

“Quae enim apud omnes naturalia sunt, a Deo auctore naturae, sine dubio”: Francisco de Vitoria et la notion de Dieu comme cause efficiente du pouvoir civil dans la Relectio De potestate civili, § 6, p. 159.



Jeferson da Costa Valadares (ENS-Lyon/UFRJ-Brésil)
Doctorant en Philosophie (Capes-Cofecub)
jeffersonvalladares@gmail.com

(Pour voir la vidéo : PARTIE 1 : dans le temps - 1:55:00")

La Seconde Scolastique en Espagne a certainement été influencée par la pensée philosophique et théologique developpée à l’Université de Paris au Moyen- ge et à la Renaissance. On peut trouver, e.g., dans la théorie du pouvoir politique et dans la philosophie morale de l’École de Salamanque, une influence très importante de la reflexion italienne sur la formation de la conscience, la conception de la nature, des lois et de Dieu. Dans ce contexte, deux théologiens ont notamment influencé le dominicain espagnol Francisco de Vitoria (ca. 1486-1546) :  le dominicain italien Antonino Pierozzi ou da Firenze (1389-1459) joue un certain rôle dans la pensée politique et morale du Maître salamantin, tandis que le théologien français Jacques Almain (ca.1480-1515) joue un rôle très important dans le developpement des Lectures et Relectiones. Il est certain que les idées de la Renaissance française et italienne sont décisives pour le développement systematique des notions de Dieu, de Nature et de pouvoir politique au XVI siècle en Espagne. Dans la Relectio de potestate civili, § 6, p. 159 (Conférence sur le pouvoir civil) le dominicain espagnol analyse en effet les causes du pouvoir civil et dit : “Quae enim apud omnes naturalia sunt, a Deo auctore naturae, sine dubio” (Parce que, en effet, tout ce qui est naturel dans les choses, vient de Dieu naturellement et sans doute provient de lui). L’apport majeur de la philosophie de Vitoria consiste dans la formulation philosophico-juridique de Dieu comme cause efficiente du pouvoir politique. Notre objectif dans ce travail est d’analyser et de reconstruire les sources anciennes (y compris la Politique, I d’Aristote) sur les notions de Dieu et de Nature que la Seconde Scolastique de Francisco de Vitoria utilise pour construire une théorie du pouvoir civil, c’est-à-dire, une théorie de “l’État”. Cette idée s’enracine dans la pensée aristotélicienne, théologique et bien sûr dans l’héritage franco-italien de la Relectio. En somme, il s’agit de se demander si, dans la Nature, tout procède de Dieu y compris le pouvoir civil.

Abstract: This article is tasked with presenting and rebuild critical of Nicholas of Autrecourt (ca. 1300-1369) to the principle of causality. Generally speaking, it is his criticism to show that there can be no demonstration (non potest evidenter ostendi), so some knowledge (nullus scit evidenter), the cause and effect relationship. In other words, we can not prove that something is the cause of another. Therefore, you can not have a clear understanding of Causality. If we have some knowledge of this relationship, we have to be it the result of conjectural habit (habitus conjecturativus), i.e., the faculty by which you can associate a result to an idea. What we have, in fact, it is nothing more than a probable knowledge (probabilis) in such a relationship and the propositions of science (scientia).


Resumo: Este artigo tem como tarefa apresentar e reconstruir a crítica de Nicolau de Autrécourt (ca. 1300-1369) ao princípio de causalidade. Em linhas gerais, consiste sua crítica em mostrar que não pode haver demonstração (non potest evidenter ostendi), portanto, conhecimento certo (nullus scit evidenter), da relação entre causa e efeito. Em outras palavras, não podemos demonstrar que uma coisa é causa de uma outra. Logo, não se pode ter um conhecimento evidente da causalidade. Se possuímos algum conhecimento desta relação, o temos por ser ele o resultado do hábito conjectural (habitus conjecturativus), i.e., a faculdade mediante a qual nos é possível associar um resultado a uma ideia. O que temos, na verdade, nada mais é do que um conhecimento provável (probabilis) de tal relação e das proposições da ciência (scientia).

Palavras-Chave: Causalidade. Epistemologia. Teoria da inferência. Ceticismo medieval.