Kristina Lekić Barunčić

This paper proposes a novel method for identifying the public evaluative standards that contribute to the classification of certain conditions as mental disabilities. Public evaluative standards could contribute to ascertaining disabilities by outlining characteristics whose presence beyond a threshold is fundamentally important for the life of a person and whose absence or reduced occurrence constitutes a disability. Additionally, they can participate in determining disabilities by delineating particularly grave difficulties, impairments, or incapacities. Our method relies on a model of public justification of evaluative standards that is inspired by Gerald Gaus’s theory of public reason. Thus, our approach recommends the justification of evaluative standards through sound deliberative routes from reasons accessible to all persons who participate in the process of justification and the convergence of what is justified in this way to each of them. We deem that disabilities could be ...

In this paper, I shall present the theoretical view on the reliability democracy as presented in Prijic Samarzija?s book Democracy and Truth (2018), and examine its validity through the case of the division of epistemic labour in the process of deliberation on autism treatment policies. It may appear that because of their strong demands, namely, the demand for rejection of medical authority and for exclusive expertise on autism, autistic individuals gathered around the neurodiversity movement present a threat to the reliability democracy.

According to Savulescu and Kahane’s principle of Procreative Beneficence, potential parents have a strong moral reason to select the child who will, on the basis of her genetic furniture, enjoy the most well-being. Embryos with a tendency towards autism are considered to have reduced wellbeing, and therefore, it is morally advised, when possible, not to select them. We claim that, in the case of mild autism, the principle of Procreative Beneficence should not be carried out, and more precisely, that there is no victorious public reason for potential parents to negatively select an embryo with mild autism. The focus of our argument is put on talents and abilities specific to persons with autism, and because of them, we can reasonably find this condition as that of a valuable human life. We extend the debate and discuss a question of enhancement. In this context, our proposal is future-oriented, under the assumption that needed biomedical resources will become available. Our thesis is...

Znanje može biti stečeno kroz procese slušanja ili čitanja iskaza ostalih sudionika. U posebnom fokusu ovog rada jest kako, i posebice – kome – se pripisuje pouzdanost pri slušanju ili čitanju iskaza, posebice u smislu društveno-epistemičkih devijacija koje se pojavljuju u obliku epistemičke nepravde. Neurotipske osobe, pojedinci s tipičnim neurološkim stanjima i razvojnim putevima percipiraju, pojedince s poremećajem spektra autizma (ASD) kao odstupanje od neuro-normativnosti, nesposobne na jednakoj osnovi pridonositi skupu epistemičkih resursa i zajedničkih značenja. Potonje se odnosi na stereotipe o nepouzdanosti svjedočenja autističnih osoba o vlastitim iskustvima i uvjetima. S obzirom na to da su atipični socijalni i bihevioralni uvjeti autističnog udjela klinički klasificirani kao poremećaj, postavlja se pitanje možemo li opravdati neuspjeh proširivanja povjerenja na autistične osobe.

The paper aims to shed light on Searle?s notion of collective intentionality (CI) as a primitive phenomenon shared by all humans. The latter could be problematic given that there are individuals who are unable to grasp collective intentionality and fully collaborate within the framework of ?we-intentionality?. Such is the case of individuals with autism, given that the lack of motivation and skills for sharing psychological states with others is one of the diagnostic criteria for Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD). The paper will argue that exclusion of individuals with autism is not a threat for Searle?s notion of collective intentionality, as the notion can be read as merely a biological disposition that all human beings share. Furthermore, the paper proposes the extension of Searle?s concept of CI so it can include behaviors of individuals who have the disposition towards CI, but which was not evolved through ontogenesis; namely, for individuals with autism.

In this paper, I shall present the theoretical view on the reliability democracy as presented in Prijić Samaržija’s book Democracy and Truth (2018), and examine its validity through the case of the division of epistemic labour in the process of deliberation on autism treatment policies. It may appear that because of their strong demands, namely, the demand for rejection of medical authority and for exclusive expertise on autism, autistic individuals gathered around the neurodiversity movement present a threat to the reliability democracy.

Knowledge can be acquired through the processes of listening or reading testimonies of other agents. How and, particular, to whom, one ascribes trustworthiness when listening or reading a testimony is of special interest in this paper, especially in terms of societal-epistemic deviations that appear in the form of epistemic injustice. Neurotypicals, individuals with typical neurological states and developmental pathways, perceive individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) as an aberration from neuro-normativity, unable to contribute on an equal basis to the pool of epistemic resources and shared meanings. The latter is related to the stereotypes of the unreliability of autistic persons’ testimonies about their own experiences and conditions. Given that atypical social and behavioural conditions autistics share are clinically classified as a disorder, the question of whether we can justify the failure to extend trust to the autistics arises.

The paper aims to shed light on Searle’s notion of collective intentionality
(CI) as a primitive phenomenon shared by all humans. The latter could
be problematic given that there are individuals who are unable to grasp
collective intentionality and fully collaborate within the framework of
“we-intentionality”. Such is the case of individuals with autism, given
that the lack of motivation and skills for sharing psychological states with
others is one of the diagnostic criteria for Autistic Spectrum Disorders
(ASD). The paper will argue that exclusion of individuals with autism is
not a threat for Searle’s notion of collective intentionality, as the notion
can be read as merely a biological disposition that all human beings share.
Furthermore, the paper proposes the extension of Searle’s concept of
CI so it can include behaviors of individuals who have the disposition
towards CI, but which was not evolved through ontogenesis; namely, for
individuals with autism.

According to Savulescu and Kahane’s principle of Procreative Beneficence, potential parents have
a strong moral reason to select the child who will, on the basis of her genetic furniture, enjoy the
most well-being. Embryos with a tendency towards autism are considered to have reduced wellbeing, and therefore, it is morally advised, when possible, not to select them. We claim that, in the
case of mild autism, the principle of Procreative Beneficence should not be carried out, and more
precisely, that there is no victorious public reason for potential parents to negatively select an
embryo with mild autism. The focus of our argument is put on talents and abilities specific to
persons with autism, and because of them, we can reasonably find this condition as that of a
valuable human life. We extend the debate and discuss a question of enhancement. In this context,
our proposal is future-oriented, under the assumption that needed biomedical resources will
become available. Our thesis is that potential parents that have a child with mild autism have a
moral obligation to use biomedical resources to remove or reduce their child’s impairment, under
the condition that the enhancement does not affect child’s talents and abilities.

Lijepa je umjetnost u Kanta mišljena kao skladna forma koja svojim nalikovanjem na prirodu uzrokuje čisti osjećaj ugode. Djela takve umjetnosti može stvoriti isključivo genij koji svojom autonomnom prirodom propisuje pravila umjetnosti. Kantov zahtjev da svaka umjetnost pretpostavlja pravilo problematičan je za lijepu umjetnost budući da ona ujedno mora biti nalik prirodi po svojoj spontanosti. Čini se kako se iz navedenih zahtjeva rađa paradoks. Naime, Kant zahtijeva pravilnost bez pravila u smislu da lijepa umjetnost istovremeno bude skladna forma stvorena prema pravilima i spontano djelo nalik prirodi oslobođeno svih pravila. Rad se fokusira na koncept genija – proizvođača lijepe umjetnosti, te prikazuje na koji način uža interpretacija genija razrješava paradoks pravilnosti bez pravila.

Joint into the common task, an international team of authors gathered in this editor's volume, offers what the title says – different perspectives on the Self. Edited by Boran Berčić, this volume attempts to clarify the vague notion of human's personal identity and the issues it raises in different branches of philosophy.